Annulment of Commercial Closure in Maritime Zone Based on Legitimate ExpectationsAnulación de cierre de local comercial en zona marítimo terrestre por confianza legítima

V.First, and before proceeding to an analysis of the specific case, this Chamber deems it important to make some brief observations regarding the legal regime of the maritime-terrestrial zone, given that in the present case, the real property giving rise to these proceedings is undoubtedly located in the maritime-terrestrial zone (hereinafter MTZ), as indicated in the list of proven facts of this decision. The legal regime of the national maritime-terrestrial zone is immersed within the scope of the institution of public domain, and from this premise, the coastal zones of the Costa Rican territory have been protected for a long time in our legal system, legal protection that in the currently effective legislation derives from Article 6 of the 1949 Political Constitution and was most recently reaffirmed with the enactment, on March 2, 1977, of Law No. 6043, the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law. These regulatory bodies establish public domain over the two hundred meters along the country's coastline, that territory therefore possessing the characteristics of inalienability, imprescriptibility, and unattachability, being outside the commerce of men and, by its nature, also subject to the state's police power regarding its use and exploitation. In this regard, Article 1 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law states, literally: "The maritime-terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national patrimony, belongs to the State, and is inalienable and imprescriptible. Its protection, as well as that of its natural resources, is the obligation of the State, its institutions, and all the inhabitants of the country. Its use and exploitation are subject to the provisions of this Law." By definition derived from the law itself, the maritime-terrestrial zone "(...) is the strip of two hundred meters wide along the entire length of the Atlantic and Pacific coastlines of the Republic, whatever its nature, measured horizontally from the ordinary high-tide line and the lands and rocks left uncovered by the sea at low tide (...)." Said zone encompasses islands, islets, maritime crags, and any land and/or formation that protrudes above ocean level in the territorial sea, with the exception of Isla del Coco and those islands whose domain is excluded by law from this regime. Said zone is in turn divided into two areas: the so-called public zone, which comprises the strip fifty meters wide measured from the ordinary high-tide line, which is composed of the littoral, shore, or seacoast that extends through the permanent rías and estuaries up to where they are sensibly affected by tides and present defined marine characteristics, and the areas left uncovered during low tide; as well as all mangroves on the continental and insular littorals and estuaries of the national territory, islets, crags, and other small areas and natural formations that protrude from the sea (Articles 9 to 11 of Law No. 6043). On the other hand, the restricted zone, constituted by the remaining strip of one hundred fifty linear meters or by the remaining lands in the case of islands. It is this latter zone, the restricted zone, that can be subject to exploitation through the figure of the concession (Articles 10 and 39 of Law No. 6043), this being the legitimate mechanism for obtaining a right over said strip of land, according to the provisions of Chapter VI, Articles 39 to 60 of the repeatedly cited legal text, and in numerals 24 to 81 of its respective regulation (Executive Decree No. 7841 of December 16, 1978). However, the granting of such rights over public domain property is subject to a series of limitations. Among others, we can cite that Article 38 of the indicated special law, in relation to numeral 19 of its Regulation, expressly contains a prohibition that prevents municipalities from granting concessions in restricted zones if the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Turismo) and the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo) have not approved the respective regulatory plans for said zones. To that extent, the concession regime over the maritime-terrestrial zone is subject to the effective enforcement of the respective Regulatory Plan. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the legal system establishes another avenue for obtaining a legitimate exploitation license, albeit precarious in nature, over such zones, since Transitory Provision VII of the governing Law on the matter foresees the possibility of granting so-called "use permits (permisos de uso)," insofar as they are instituted as a weakened right or a right at will, susceptible to unilateral revocation by the administration, although not in an untimely manner (according to the provisions of Article 154 of Law No. 6227, the General Law of Public Administration). Such use permits (permisos de uso) constitute an exception to the rule of the concession, the latter being the appropriate legal instrument for obtaining a right over the maritime zone. Due to their precarious and revocable characteristics, in the case of permits granted over the restricted zone, the activities whose deployment and development are permitted under such license must be simple and have a minimal impact on the property on which they are carried out. Likewise, the granting of a use permit without the prior approval of the coastal regulatory plan cannot impede or compromise the adoption of a regulatory plan by the respective municipality, nor prevent the revocation of the permit if deemed convenient for the interests of the zone. Therefore, any buildings or constructions erected under a use permit (permiso de uso) must be easy to remove, it being legally unviable to erect those that have the condition of permanence. For the latter, the appropriate figure is not the permit, but the concession. To that extent, for the maritime-terrestrial zone, it is only possible to admit use permits (permisos de uso) that meet two essential characteristics: firstly, they do not affect the natural conditions of the zone to be exploited nor hinder the free exploitation and free access to the public zone, and additionally, their execution does not limit in the future the implementation of a regulatory plan, without disregarding that, by virtue of its nature as a permit, it will have the same inherent characteristics of such licenses (namely, their nature consists of removing a legal obstacle to the exercise of a pre-existing power; it is said to be a concession of restricted scope, since it grants rights of lesser intensity and greater precariousness than the concession. It creates an individual legal situation conditioned upon compliance with the law, non-compliance implying the expiration of the permit; it is granted intuito personae in consideration of its motives and the beneficiary; its assignment and transfer is prohibited in principle; it confers a weakened right or a legitimate interest, the precariousness of the permittee's right being based on the fact that the permit constitutes a tolerance on the part of the respective Public Administration, which acts discretionally when granting it; it is precarious, which is why the Public Administration may revoke it at any time, without the right to compensation or indemnity; and its granting depends on administrative discretion, meaning the Public Administration may assess whether the requested permit is or is not in accordance with the general interest, and may deny it). In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in Ruling (Voto) No. 3451-96 from 15:33 hours, stated the following, which is of interest:

"The doctrine of public law admits almost unanimously that the transcendence held by a concession, being the ordinary form for satisfying a service need, disappears in the permit, which, when granted by the administration, is applied in cases lacking that greater importance, whence its essentially temporary nature derives. Therefore, the permit possesses a unilateral and precarious content. Its precariousness is consubstantial with the figure itself, such that the permittee – save for the prerogative of exercising their activity – lacks concrete rights that they may demand of the State that go beyond what the administrative act of authorization provides. The power arising to grant a permit does not constitute a complete and perfect subjective right, and its very essence allows it to be revoked without liability for the administration, that is, without right to indemnity, when the causes that gave rise to it disappear, or when the Administration formalizes the concession contract. The administration’s ability to revoke the permit, without the need for a special clause to so establish, is of general principle, but in any case, when the revocation is legally possible, it may not be untimely or arbitrary, legal concepts that have been sufficiently developed by the Chamber. It is understood that one who engages with the administration on such precarious bases cannot subsequently complain about the consequences arising therefrom. Now, the granting of permits depends on administrative discretion, and the Administration may assess whether the requested permit is or is not in accordance with the public interest and accordingly decide whether to grant it or deny it (...)".

As a matter of principle and for the reasons stated, under the figure of the use permit (permiso de uso), the erection in the zone of constructions such as hotels, cabins, restaurants, urban developments, among others, in a condition of permanent attachment to the land, could not be authorized prior to the issuance of the respective regulatory plan, since such constructions could eventually obstruct the planned urban development in the regulatory plan. Without disregarding that such buildings, even with a regulatory plan in force, could only be erected in the restricted zone, but never in the public zone, even if a concession exists granted under the duly issued local urban development plan.

VI.Regarding the specific case. In the present matter, it is indispensable to assess certain aspects that undoubtedly influence what will ultimately be decided. Firstly, for the sector of Play Palo Buena Vista in Sámara, where the plaintiff carries out his activity, there is currently no Regulatory Plan enacted, therefore it is not possible to grant any concession on that beach, in accordance with what was indicated in the preceding recitals. While it is true that a concession application was filed for said beach by the company Ala Delta Monte Reina S.A., through agreement No. 8 adopted at ordinary session No. 122 held by the Municipal Council of Nicoya on August 30, 2004, it was decided to reject their application because no approved Regulatory Plan existed for said zone, as recorded in the certification visible on folio 117 of the precautionary measure file, which was in accordance with the law, according to what was stated by this Court in the preceding lines. As previously indicated, the maritime-terrestrial zone is part of the public domain, and therefore some type of administrative license—either the concession ideally, or the permit—is required for its exploitation and use by private parties. To that extent, the mere granting of a "land use (uso del suelo)" authorization will never empower one to freely dispose of the land as if enjoying the attributes of ownership derived from a property right, as the Ministry of Health seems to erroneously understand, based on its arguments. All the actions carried out by Mr. Potting on the area within Playa Buena Vista were accompanied by a request from his represented party, with which he undoubtedly intended to obtain the respective municipal approval for a concession over the property. But even though his interest was manifest, he did not obtain said concession from the co-defendant municipality. The plaintiff must understand that the lot he claims, being located in the restricted area of the maritime-terrestrial zone, cannot be subject to any possession, is outside the commerce of men, and, therefore, is non-negotiable; it belongs to the community and as such is non-transferable; he can only obtain some precarious right once the Municipality recognizes a right of use (permit), or when a concession can be granted, having complied with the territorial planning procedure indicated and proven that he meets the legal requirements. Under current conditions, it is not possible to grant him any concession over that lot, according to the current legal provisions detailed in the preceding paragraphs. Now then, in the case before us, we are faced with a truly particular situation, which is that, even though the municipality never granted the concession to Mr. Potting or his company, the truth of the matter is that, in an absolutely tolerant manner, both the Municipality of Nicoya and the Nicoya Health Area have condoned and even fostered the development and exercise of lucrative activity by the plaintiff. And this is so much the case that over the years they have granted him building permits, health operating permits, bar licenses, cabin licenses, restaurant licenses, liquor licenses; that is, they have provided him with all the legal licenses and authorizations so that Mr. Rainer has been carrying out his commercial activity for at least more than ten years, as demonstrated in the list of proven facts of this decision. With this, this Chamber believes that, obviously, Mr. Potting was imbued with a clear appearance or aura of legality surrounding the exercise of his activity, and a clear trust that he was acting in accordance with the law. And if one analyzes the entire sequence of actions carried out by the Municipality of Nicoya, there is no doubt that in this instance an implicit administrative authorization (though irregular) operated in favor of Mr. Rainer for the use and enjoyment of the restricted zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone at Playa Bonita. It is true that he was never given the concession, nor a use permit (permiso de uso), but the Municipality engaged in a series of material and formal actions with which it could well have made anyone believe that he was acting in accordance with the law and that he enjoyed municipal approval. At bottom, Mr. Rainer could not consider that he was acting illegally by occupying the restricted zone, and it cannot be so because the entity responsible for oversight and surveillance over said zone in Sámara was the municipality, the local government that gave him permits, licenses, patents, and authorizations to exploit the area and, furthermore, even charged Mr. Rainer the respective fees for it, as was demonstrated in the list of proven facts of this judgment. That is, the plaintiff placed his trust in the conduct of the Public Administration, because both the Municipality of Nicoya and the regional offices of the Ministry of Health produced sufficiently clear and conclusive external signals that induced the plaintiff to trust in the legality of the administrative conduct and his own actions. This is undeniable, and no argument from the co-defendants can disprove it, given the clarity of the facts. That is, the Corporation itself created a legitimate trust (confianza legítima) in him to exercise the activity, circumstances and states that the City Council and the State cannot now claim to reverse, in an untimely manner and to the detriment of the consolidated legal situations of the businessman appearing before this jurisdictional instance. It is clear to this Court that in the instant case, the principle of legitimate trust (confianza legítima) operated in favor of the plaintiff, as his legal counsel rightly argues. The constitutional principle of legitimate trust (confianza legítima) derives from the legal principle of good faith that must govern all legal relationships, including, of course, those arising under administrative law. It derives in turn from the principle of legal certainty enshrined in numeral 34 of the Political Constitution, materializing—usually, but not exclusively—in the theory of the intangibility of one's own acts. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice has defined it by its effects as that "(...) according to which, if it is the public institutions themselves who give an appearance of legitimacy and credibility to a situation, which induces the individual to act in good faith in a certain manner, it is not the latter who must bear the consequences of the error to which they have been incited, but rather it is the State who must abide by the effects of the confusion created (...)". (in this regard, see Ruling (Voto) No. 003263-2006 from 10:50 hours on March 10, 2006). Doctrinally, it has been defined as "(...) the citizen's trust in the maintenance of stable conditions for exercising professional and economic life (...) The principle, of German origin—Vertrauenschutz—, is thus decisively oriented towards preserving the value of legal certainty and the market economy system against the potentially uncontrolled or insufficiently cautious action of public powers". (Castillo Blanco, Federico A. La Protección de Confianza en el Derecho Administrativo. Editorial Marcial Pons, Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales S. A. Madrid. 1998, Page 114). In the instant case, it is clear that the aforementioned principle applied, insofar as the plaintiff enjoyed a series of permits and licenses granted to him by the State (in its broadest sense), since he held building permits and licenses granted by the Municipality, as well as a health operating permit (permiso sanitario de funcionamiento) from the Ministry of Health.

VII.Now, regarding the health operating permit (permiso sanitario de funcionamiento) that was granted in due course to the plaintiff by the Ministry of Health, it must be stated that it is indeed not viable, as it validated the operation of the plaintiff's lucrative activity in the restricted zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, without having a municipal permit or concession for it. However, the state body made an error, given that (even though it was feasible to deny said permit because it was intended for use in a public domain zone, without the interested party having the necessary authorizations for its exploitation), it proceeded to order the closure of the commercial premises in an untimely manner, even though it had previously authorized its operation repeatedly for years. It is evident in the record that there were health operating permits (permisos sanitarios de funcionamiento) prior to 2009, meaning the Ministry itself condoned the operation of the plaintiff's commercial establishment in the restricted zone, contributing to the legitimate trust (confianza legítima) that he now claims was violated, as indeed it was. And this is not to say that the Ministry was obligated to grant him such permits for life, as it could well deny or revoke them, but in a manner consistent with the law, that is, not in an untimely and arbitrary manner as it did, but rather giving the administered party a reasonable opportunity to cease his activity, within a prudent period for doing so, as established in numeral 154 of the General Law of Public Administration, and this because the permits had been previously granted by the aforementioned Ministry. The case would be different if the Ministry of Health had never granted such authorizations, but having done so, it reinforced the trusting position of the administered party and must therefore assume the consequences of its negligence in the administrative procedure. Added to the above is the fact that the reasoning contained in the closure act is not in accordance with the law, because contrary to what was argued by the state representation, articles 8 and 9 of Executive Decree No. 34728-2, the General Regulation for Granting Health Operating Permits, were not applicable to the plaintiff's case—since those numerals establish the requirements for a first-time applicant for that permit, whereas the applicable procedure was the requirements for renewal, established in numerals 22 and following of the same infra-legal regulatory body. This being the case, the Ministry of Health acted wrongly by proceeding arbitrarily and contrary to law, shutting down the plaintiff's commercial premises untimely based on the cited regulations, when it had previously given him health permits to exercise his activity. Thus, the appropriate course is to annul the administrative act corresponding to health order No. CH-ARS-NI-ERS-A-030-2010 of April 9, 2010, official letter No. MSARN-033-2008 and Resolution No. APAHN-042-08, as well as official letter 444-09 of October 1, 2009, all issued by the Ministry of Health, for having been issued and executed contrary to law. Likewise, even though no proof was provided in the record, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 122, subsection m), the appropriate course is to grant the plaintiff payment for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused by said closure, to be borne by the State, but with the understanding that only those incurred from the moment the closure was effected by the Ministry of Health until the moment the precautionary measure requested by the plaintiff was made effective before this Court and confirmed by the Court of Appeals for Contentious-Administrative Matters through Resolution No. 341-2010 from 16:13 hours on July 19, 2010 are recognized. Said damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) shall be demonstrated and quantified in the judgment enforcement stage. The remaining claims raised by the plaintiff in his complaint are rejected, given that they are not legally viable, as the area where he seeks authorization for his actions corresponds to a public domain property, and moreover, to land located in the maritime-terrestrial zone, for whose use and enjoyment it is imperative to hold the respective concession and/or use permit (permiso de uso), which neither the plaintiff nor his represented company possesses, providing further reason not to grant the requests he raised before this Court.

VIII.In accordance with the considerations set forth above, this collegiate body deems that the plaintiff holds sufficient right to seek the annulment of the administrative acts indicated in the preceding recital, issued by the Ministry of Health, which led to the closure of his business at Playa Buena Vista in Sámara, and the defense of lack of right invoked is therefore partially rejected, only with respect to those acts. Regarding the remaining claims raised by the plaintiff, the defense of lack of right is upheld and they are rejected, for the reasons stated throughout this decision. Consequently, the filed complaint is declared partially upheld, in the terms set forth in the preceding recital. Analysis is omitted regarding the expression "sine actione agit" and what is termed in the record as "lack of action," as these are not properly procedural defenses, their existence being a product of litigation custom but lacking any legal basis.

IX.As a corollary, this Court cannot overlook that the real property on which the plaintiff exercises his activity is a public domain property located within the maritime-terrestrial zone, and that the plaintiff—though acting to this day under the protection of good faith and legitimate trust (confianza legítima)—holds no right whatsoever to exploit said land, except for the municipal tolerance itself. Therefore, under the protection of the foregoing and in accordance with the provisions of numerals 154 and following of the General Law of Public Administration and the current Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, the Municipality of Nicoya shall immediately proceed with the initiation of legal procedures for the recovery of the strip of maritime-terrestrial zone where the plaintiff and his represented company exercise their activity without permits, but the local government must act in strict observance of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality, not in an untimely or arbitrary manner.

The foregoing, without prejudice to the initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings in order to establish the corresponding responsibilities in this case with respect to the officials who granted patents and licenses to the plaintiff, without having a concession or use permit for the exercise of his commercial activity in said restricted maritime zone.

Such damages shall be substantiated and quantified in the enforcement-of-judgment stage. The remaining claims raised by the plaintiff in his complaint are dismissed, as they are not legally viable, given that the area on which he seeks authorization to act constitutes public-domain property (bien demanial), and furthermore, land located in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), for whose use and enjoyment it is imperative to hold the respective concession (concesión) and/or use permit (permiso de uso), which neither the plaintiff nor his represented party possesses—an additional reason for not granting the requests he has made before this Court.

VIII.In accordance with the considerations set forth above, this collegiate body finds that the plaintiff holds sufficient right to seek the annulment of the administrative acts indicated in the preceding whereas clause (considerando), issued by the Ministry of Health and which led to the closure of his business in Playa Buena Vista de Sámara, for which reason the defense of lack of right is partially rejected, solely with respect to said acts. Regarding the remainder of the claims raised by the plaintiff, the defense of lack of right is upheld and they are dismissed, for the reasons set forth throughout this resolution. Consequently, the complaint filed is partially granted, in the terms set forth in the preceding whereas clause. Analysis of the expression "sine actione agit" and that which is referred to in the record as "lack of action" is omitted, as these are not procedural defenses properly speaking, their existence being a product of litigation custom but lacking any legal basis whatsoever.

IX.By way of corollary, this Court cannot overlook the fact that the real property on which the plaintiff carries out his activity is public-domain property located within the maritime-terrestrial zone, and that the plaintiff—though acting to date under the protection of good faith and legitimate expectations (confianza legítima)—holds no right whatsoever to exploit said land, except for the municipality's own tolerance. Therefore, under the foregoing and in accordance with Articles 154 et seq. of the General Public Administration Law and the current Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, the Municipality of Nicoya shall immediately proceed with the initiation of the statutory procedures for the recovery of the strip of maritime-terrestrial zone where the plaintiff and his represented party carry out their activity without permits, but the local government must act in strict observance of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality, neither abruptly nor arbitrarily. The foregoing is without prejudice to the initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings in order to establish the corresponding responsibilities in the case with respect to the officials who granted patents and licenses to the plaintiff, without his holding a concession or use permit for the exercise of his commercial activity in said restricted maritime zone.”

Now, the granting of permits depends on administrative discretion and the Administration may assess whether the permit requested is or is not in accordance with the public interest and, accordingly, decide whether to grant or deny it (...)".

In principle and for the reasons stated, under the figure of the use permit, prior to the issuance of the respective regulatory plan, the construction in the zone of structures such as hotels, cabins, restaurants, urban developments, among others, in a condition of permanent attachment to the land, could not be authorized, since such constructions could eventually come to obstruct the planned urban development in the regulatory plan. Without neglecting that such buildings, even with a regulatory plan in force, could only be constructed in the restricted zone, but never in the public zone, even if there is a concession granted under the duly issued local urban development plan.

**VI. Regarding the specific case.** In the present matter, the assessment of some aspects that undoubtedly affect what will ultimately be decided is essential. Firstly, for the Palo Buena Vista beach sector of Sámara, where the plaintiff carries out his activity, there is to date no enacted Regulatory Plan, so it is not possible to grant any concession on that beach, in accordance with what was indicated in the preceding recitals. Although it is true that a concession application was filed on said beach by the company Ala Delta Monte Reina S.A., through agreement No. 8 taken at ordinary session No. 122 held by the Municipal Council of Nicoya on August 30, 2004, it was decided to reject its application because there was no approved Regulatory Plan for said zone, as recorded in the certification visible on folio 117 of the precautionary measure file, which was in accordance with the law, as set forth by this Court in the preceding lines. As previously indicated, the maritime-terrestrial zone is part of the public domain, and therefore some type of administrative license is required—either the concession ideally, or the permit—for its use and exploitation by private individuals. In that regard, the mere granting of a "land use" will never authorize one to freely dispose of the land, as if enjoying the attributes of dominion derived from a property right, as the Ministry of Health seems to erroneously understand it, based on its arguments. All actions deployed by Mr. Potting on the area within Playa Buena Vista were accompanied by an application by his represented company with which he undoubtedly sought to obtain the respective municipal approval of concession over the property. But even though his interest was manifest, he did not obtain said concession from the co-defendant municipality. The plaintiff must understand that the lot he claims, being located in the restricted area of the maritime-terrestrial zone, cannot be the object of any possession, is outside the commerce of men and, therefore, is not negotiable, belongs to the community and as such is non-transferable; he can only obtain some precarious right once the Municipality recognizes a right of use (permit) to him, or, when a concession can be granted to him, having complied with the territorial planning procedure indicated and proven that he meets the requirements of the law. Under current conditions, it is not possible to grant him any concession over that lot, as provided by the current legal regulations detailed in the preceding paragraphs. Now then, in the case at hand, we are in the presence of a truly particular situation, which is that, even though the municipality never granted the concession to Mr. Potting or his company, the truth of the matter is that in an absolutely tolerant manner, both the Municipality of Nicoya and the Nicoya Health Area have condoned and even fostered the development and exercise of the lucrative activity by the plaintiff. And so much so, that over the years they have granted him construction permits, sanitary operating permits, bar licenses, cabin licenses, restaurant licenses, liquor licenses, that is, they have provided him with all the legal licenses and authorizations so that Mr. Rainer carries out his commercial exercise for at least more than ten years, as demonstrated in the list of proven facts of this decision. With this, this Chamber considers that, obviously, a clear appearance or halo of legality was generated in Mr. Potting that surrounded the exercise of his activity, and a clear confidence that he was acting in accordance with the law. And if the entire iter of the actions deployed by the Municipality of Nicoya is analyzed, undoubtedly in this case a tacit administrative authorization (albeit irregular) operated in favor of Mr. Rainer for the use and enjoyment of the restricted zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone in Playa Bonita. It is true that the concession was never given to him, nor a use permit, but the Municipality incurred a series of material and formal actions with which it could well have made anyone believe that he was acting in accordance with the law and that he enjoyed the municipal approval. At heart, Mr. Rainer could not believe that he was acting illegally by occupying the restricted zone, and it cannot be so because the entity in charge of oversight and vigilance over said zone in Sámara was the municipality, a local government that gave him permits, licenses, and authorizations to exploit the area and even more, even charged Mr. Rainer the respective canons for it, as was accredited in the list of proven facts of this judgment. That is, the plaintiff placed his confidence in the actions of the Public Administration, because both the Municipality of Nicoya and the regional offices of the Ministry of Health produced external signals sufficiently clear and conclusive that induced the plaintiff to trust in the legality of the administrative action and his own conduct. This is undeniable and there is no argument from any of the co-defendants that manages to distort it, given the clarity of the facts. That is, the Corporation itself created a legitimate expectation in him to exercise the activity, circumstances and states that the City Council or the State cannot now seek to reverse, abruptly and to the detriment of the consolidated legal situations of the businessman who comes before this jurisdictional instance. It is clear to this Court that in this case the principle of legitimate expectations operated in favor of the plaintiff, as his legal counsel rightly argues. The **constitutional principle of legitimate expectations**, derives from the legal principle of good faith that must govern all legal relationships, including of course the relationships that arise under administrative law. It emanates in turn from the principle of legal certainty enshrined in Article 34 of the Political Constitution, materializing—usually, but not exclusively—in the theory of the intangibility of one's own acts. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has defined it by its effects, as that *"(...) according to which, if it is the public authorities themselves who give an appearance of legitimacy and credibility to a situation, which induces the individual to act in good faith in a certain way, it is not the latter who must bear the consequences of the error to which he has been incited, but rather it is the State who must abide by the effects of the created confusion (...)"*. (in this regard, see ruling No. 003263-2006 of 10:50 hours on March 10, 2006). Doctrinally, it has been defined as *"(...) the citizen's confidence in the maintenance of stable conditions for the exercise of professional and economic life (...) The principle, of German origin—Vertrauenschutz—is thus decisively oriented towards the preservation of the value of legal certainty and the market economy system in the face of the action, eventually uncontrolled or without sufficient precautions, of public powers"*. (Castillo Blanco, Federico A. *The Protection of Confidence in Administrative Law*. Editorial Marcial Pons, Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales S. A. Madrid. 1998, Page 114). In this case, it is clear that the aforementioned principle operated, insofar as the plaintiff enjoyed a series of permits and licenses that were granted to him by the State (in its broadest sense) since he held construction permits and licenses granted by the Municipality, as well as a sanitary operating permit from the Ministry of Health.

**VII.** Now then, regarding the sanitary operating permit that was at the time granted to the plaintiff by the Ministry of Health, it must be indicated that it is indeed not viable, since it validated the operation of the plaintiff's lucrative activity in the restricted zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, without having a municipal permit or concession for it. However, the state body made an error, since (even though it was viable to proceed to deny said permit because it was intended for use in a public domain zone, without the interested party having the necessary authorizations for its use), it proceeded to order the closure of the commercial premises abruptly, even though for years it had been repeatedly authorizing its operation. Note that in the case file the existence of sanitary operating permits prior to the year 2009 has been accredited, so the Ministry itself condoned the operation of the plaintiff's commercial establishment in the restricted zone, collaborating with the legitimate expectation that he now alleges has been violated, as indeed it has been. And it is not that the Ministry was obligated to grant him said permits for life, since it could well deny or revoke them, but in a manner consistent with the law, that is, not abruptly and arbitrarily as it did, but rather giving the administered party a reasonable opportunity to proceed with the cessation of his activity, within a reasonable period for it, as established by Article 154 of the General Law of Public Administration, and this because such permits had previously been granted to him by the aforementioned Ministry. The case would be different if the Ministry of Health had never granted him such authorizations, but by having done so, it strengthened the trusting position of the administered party and therefore must assume the consequences of its negligence in the administrative procedure. To the above must be added that the motivation contained in the closure act is not in accordance with the law, since contrary to what was maintained by the state representation, in this case it was not Articles 8 and 9 of Executive Decree No. 34728-2, General Regulation for the Granting of Sanitary Operating Permits, that were applicable to the plaintiff's case—since said articles establish the requirements for those requesting said permit for the first time, when rather it was appropriate to apply the renewal requirements established in Article 22 and subsequent articles of the same infra-legal regulatory body. Thus, the Ministry of Health acted wrongly by acting arbitrarily and contrary to law, abruptly closing the plaintiff's commercial premises based on the cited regulations, when it had previously given him sanitary permits to carry out his activity. Accordingly, it is appropriate to annul the administrative act corresponding to sanitary order No. CH-ARS-NI-ERS-A-030-2010 of April 9, 2010, official letter No. MSARN-033-2008 and Resolution No. APAHN-042-08, as well as official letter 444-09 of October 1, 2009, all issued by the Ministry of Health, for having been issued and executed contrary to law. Likewise, even though no proof of them was provided in the case file, in accordance with the provisions of Article 122 subsection m, it is appropriate to grant the plaintiff the payment of damages and losses caused by said closure to be borne by the State, but with the understanding that he is only recognized those incurred from the moment it was made effective by the Ministry of Health, until the moment the precautionary measure requested by the plaintiff before this Court became effective and was confirmed by the Administrative Litigation Court of Appeals through resolution No. 341-2010 of 16:13 hours on July 19, 2010. Said damages and losses will be accredited and quantified in the judgment enforcement stage. The other claims raised by the plaintiff in his complaint are rejected, as they are not legally viable, since the area over which he seeks to have his actions authorized corresponds to a public domain asset, and moreover, to a land located in the maritime-terrestrial zone, for whose use and enjoyment it is imperative to have the respective concession and/or use permit, which both the plaintiff and his represented company lack, an additional reason for not granting the requests he made before this Court.

**VIII.** In accordance with the considerations set forth above, this collegiate body considers that the plaintiff has sufficient right to request the annulment of the administrative acts indicated in the preceding recital, issued by the Ministry of Health and that led to the closure of his business in Playa Buena Vista de Sámara, for which reason the invoked exception of lack of right is partially rejected, solely with regard to said acts. As for the rest of the claims raised by the plaintiff, the exception of lack of right is upheld and they are rejected, for the reasons set forth throughout this decision. Consequently, the filed complaint is partially granted, in the terms set forth in the preceding recital. Analysis of the expression "sine actione agit" and what is denominated in the case file as "lack of action" is omitted, as they are not properly procedural exceptions, their existence being a product of litigation custom, but lacking any legal basis.

**IX.** By way of corollary, this Court cannot overlook that the real property over which the plaintiff carries out his activity is a public domain asset located within the maritime-terrestrial zone, and that the plaintiff—although acting to this day under the protection of good faith and legitimate expectations—has no right whatsoever to use said land, except for the municipal tolerance itself. Therefore, under the protection of the foregoing and in accordance with what is indicated by Articles 154 and following of the General Law of Public Administration and by the current Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, the Municipality of Nicoya shall proceed immediately with the initiation of the legal procedures for the recovery of the strip of maritime-terrestrial zone where the plaintiff and his represented company carry out their activity without permits, but the local government must act in strict observance of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality, not abruptly or arbitrarily. The foregoing is without prejudice to the initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings in order to establish the responsibilities proper to the case with respect to the officials who granted licenses and permits to the plaintiff, without having a concession or use permit for the exercise of his commercial activity in said restricted maritime zone”

“V. En primer término y de previo a realizar el análisis del caso concreto, estima importante esta Cámara realizar algunas breves reflexiones en relación con el régimen jurídico de la zona marítimo terrestre, toda vez que en la especie, sin duda alguna el bien inmueble que genera este proceso se encuentra ubicado en la zona marítimo terrestre (en adelante ZMT), tal y como se indicara en el elenco de hechos probados de esta resolución. El régimen jurídico de la zona marítim o terrestre nacional se encuentra inmerso dentro del ámbito del instituto de la demanialidad, y partir de ello, las zonas costeras del territorio costarricense fueron protegidas desde vieja data en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, protección jurídica que en la normativa actualmente vigente deviene del artículo 6 de la Constitución Política de 1949 y últimamente se reafirmó con la promulgación, el 02 de marzo de 1977, de la ley No. 6043 Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre . Dichos cuerpos normativos establecen la demanialidad sobre los doscientos metros a lo largo del litoral del país, teniendo por ende dicho territorio las condiciones de inalienabilidad, imprescriptibilidad e inembargabilidad, estando fuera del comercio de los hombres y por su naturaleza, además sujetos al poder de policía estatal en lo relativo a su uso y aprovechamiento. Señala al respecto el el artículo 1° de la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, en su literalidad: " La zona marítimo terrestre constituye parte del patrimonio nacional, pertenece al Estado y es inalienable e imprescriptible. Su protección, así como sus recursos naturales, es obligación del Estado, de sus instituciones y de todos los habitantes del país. Su uso y aprovechamiento están sujetos a las disposiciones de esta Ley." Por definición derivada de la propia ley, la zona marítimo terrestre "(...) es la franja de doscientos metros de ancho a todo lo largo de los litorales Atlántico y Pacífico de la República, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza, medidos horizontalmente a partir de la línea de la pleamar ordinaria y los terrenos y rocas que deja el mar en descubierto en la marea baja (...)". Dicha zona abarca islas, islotes, peñascos marítimos, tierra y/o formación que sobresalga del nivel del océano en el mar territorial, salvedad hecha de la Isla del Coco y de las islas cuyo dominio, por ley, se excluye de este régimen. Dicha zona se encuentra a su vez dividida en dos áreas: la denominada zona pública, que comprende la faja de cincuenta metros de ancho contados a partir de la pleamar ordinaria, misma que se encuentra compuesta por el litoral, orilla o costa del mar que se extiende por las rías y esteros permanentes, hasta donde éstas sean sensiblemente afectadas por las mareas y presenten características marinas definidas y las áreas que quedan al descubierto durante la marea baja; así como también todos los manglares de los litorales continentales e insulares y esteros del territorio nacional, islotes, peñascos y las demás áreas pequeñas y formaciones naturales que sobresalen del mar (artículos 9 al 11 de la ley No. 6043). Por otro lado la zona restringida , constituida por la franja de los ciento cincuenta metros lineales restantes o por los demás terrenos en el caso de las islas.Es ésta última, sobre la zona restringida, la que puede ser objeto de aprovechamiento mediante la figura de la concesión (artículos 10 y 39 de la ley No. 6043), siendo éste el mecanismo legítimo para la obtención de un derecho sobre dicha franja de terreno, al tenor de lo establecido en el Capítulo VI, artículos 39 a 60 del texto legal de repetida cita, y en los numerales 24 a 81 de su respectivo reglamento (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7841 del 16 de diciembre de 1978). Sin embargo, el otorgamiento de tales derechos sobre bien demanial se encuentra sujeto a una serie de limitantes. Entre otras, podemos citar que el artículo 38 de la ley especial indicada en relación con el numeral 19 de su Reglamento, expresamente contiene una prohibición que impide a las municipalidades otorgar concesiones en las zonas restringidas, si el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo y el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo no han aprobado los respectivos planes reguladores para dichas zonas. En ese tanto, el régimen de concesiones sobre zona marítimo terrestre queda sujeto a la vigencia efectiva del respectivo Plan Regulador. Sin perjuicio de lo anteriormente de aprovechamiento legítimo, aunque con carácter de precariedad, sobre tales zonas, pues el Transitorio VII de la Ley rectora de la materia prevé la posibilidad de otorgar los denominados "permisos de uso", en el tanto se instituyen como un derecho debilitado o a título precario, susceptible de revocatoria unilateral por parte de la administración, aunque no de manera intempestiva (al tenor de lo dispuesto por el artículo 154 de la ley No. 6227 Ley General de la Administración Pública). Tales permisos de uso constituyen una excepción a la regla de la concesión, pues es ésta última el instrumento jurídico idóneo para la obtención de un derecho sobre la zona marítima. Por sus características de precariedad y revocabilidad, en tratándose de permisos concedidos sobre zona restringida, las actividades cuyo despliegue y desarrollo se permite al amparo de dicha licencia deberán ser sencillas y con un mínimo impacto en el bien sobre el cual se despliegan. Así mismo, el otorgamiento del permiso de uso sin la aprobación previa del plan regulador costero, no pueden impedir o comprometer la adopción de un plan regulador por parte del municipio respectivo, ni tampoco evitar la revocatoria del permiso de estimarse conveniente para los intereses de la zona. Por ello, las edificaciones o construcciones que al amparo del permiso de uso se levanten, deben ser de fácil remoción, resultando jurídicamente inviable levantar aquéllas que ostentan condición de permanencia . Para esas últimas, la figura idónea no es la del permiso, sino la concesión. En ese tanto, para la zona marítimo terrestre sólo resulta posible admitir permisos de uso que reúnan dos características esenciales: primeramente que no afecten las condiciones naturales de la zona por explotar ni estorben el libre aprovechamiento y acceso a la zona pública, y además, que con su su ejecución no limite n a futur o la puesta en vigencia de un plan regulador, sin dejar de lado que en atención a su condición de permiso, tendrá la mismas características propias de ellos (a saber, su naturaleza consiste en la remoción de un obstáculo legal para el ejercicio de un poder preexistente, se dice que es una concesión de alcance restringido, puesto que, otorga derechos de menor intensidad y de mayor precariedad que la concesión. Crea una situación jurídica individual condicionada al cumplimiento de la ley, siendo que su incumplimiento implica la caducidad del permiso; se da intuito personae en consideración a sus motivos y al beneficiario; en principio se prohibe su cesión y transferencia; confiere un derecho debilitado o un interés legítimo, la precariedad del derecho del permisionario se fundamenta en que el permiso constituye una tolerancia de la Administración Pública respectiva que actúa discrecionalmente al conferirlo; es precario, razón por la cual la Administración Pública puede revocarlo en cualquier momento, sin derecho a resarcimiento o indemnización; y su otorgamiento depende de la discrecionalidad administrativa, por lo que la Administración Pública pueda apreciar si el permiso solicitado se adecúa o no al interés general, pudiendo denegarlo). Al respecto, ha señalado la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el Voto No. 3451-96 de las 15:33 horas, en lo que resulta de interés:

"La doctrina del Derecho público admite de manera casi unánime, que la trascendencia que tiene la concesión, por ser la forma ordinaria para la satisfacción de la necesidad del servicio, desaparece en el permiso, que al ser otorgado por la administración tiene aplicación en supuestos carentes de esa mayor importancia, de donde se deriva su naturaleza esencialmente temporal. Por ello el permiso tiene un contenido unilateral y precario. Su precariedad es consubstancial con la figura misma, de manera que el permisionario -salvo la prerrogativa de ejercitar su actividad- carece de derechos concretos que pueda exigir al Estado y que vayan más allá de lo que dispone el acto administrativo de autorización. La facultad emergente para conceder un permiso no constituye un derecho subjetivo completo y perfecto y su propia esencia admite que sea revocado sin responsabilidad para la administración, es decir, sin derecho a indemnización, cuando desaparecen las causas que le han dado origen, o cuando la Administración formaliza el contrato de concesión. La posibilidad que tiene la administración de revocar el permiso, sin necesidad de que exista una cláusula especial que así lo establezca es de principio general, pero de todas formas, cuando la revocación sea jurídicamente posible, ésta no puede ser intempestiva, ni arbitraria, conceptos jurídicos que han sido suficientemente desarrollados por la Sala. Se parte de que quien se vincula a la administración sobre bases tan precarias no puede luego quejarse de las consecuencias que de ello se derivan. Ahora bien, el otorgamiento de permisos depende de la discrecionalidad administrativa y la Administración puede apreciar si el permiso que se pide está o no de acuerdo con el interés público y conforme a ello decidir si lo otorga o lo niega (...)".

En tesis de principio y por las razones expuestas, bajo la figura del permiso de uso no podría autorizarse, de previo a la emisión del plan regulador respectivo, el levantamiento en la zona de construcciones tales como hoteles, cabinas, restaurantes, desarrollos urbanísticos , entre otros; en condición de adherencia permanente al terreno, pues eventualmente tales construcciones podrían venir a obstaculizar el desarrollo urbano planificado en el plan regulador. Sin dejar de lado que tales edificaciones, aún con un plan regulador vigente, sólo podrían levantarse en la zona restringida, pero nunca en la zona pública, aún y cuando exista concesión otorgada al amparo del plan de desarrollo urbanístico local debidamente emitido.

VI.Sobre el caso concreto. En el presente asunto, resulta indispensable la valoración de algunos aspectos que sin duda inciden sobre lo que en definitiva se resolverá. Primeramente, para el sector de playa Palo Buena Vista de Sámara, donde desarrolla su actividad el actor, no existe a la fecha un Plan Regulador promulgado, por lo que no es posible conferir concesión alguna en esa playa, de conformidad con lo indicado en los considerandos precedentes. Si bien es cierto fue formulada una solicitud de concesión en dicha playa, por parte de la empresa Ala Delta Monte Reina S.A., mediante acuerdo No. 8 tomado en la sesión ordinaria No. 122 realizada por el Concejo Municipal de Nicoya el 30 de agosto del 2004, se dispuso rechazar su solicitud por no existir Plan Regulador aprobado para dicha zona, tal y como consta en la certificación visible a folio 117 del legajo de medida cautelar, lo cual resultaba conforme a derecho, según lo expuesto por este Tribunal en las líneas que preceden. Tal y como se indicó anteriormente, la zona marítimo terrestre es parte del demanio público, y por ello se requiere de algún tipo de licencia administrativa -ya sea la concesión de manera idónea, o bien el permiso-, para su aprovechamiento y explotación por parte de particulares. En ese tanto, el mero otorgamiento de un "uso del suelo" nunca facultará para disponer libremente del terreno, cual si gozara de los atributos del dominio derivado de un derecho de propiedad, como parece entenderlo erradamente el Ministerio de Salud, según se deriva de sus argumentaciones. Todas las actuaciones desplegadas por el señor Potting sobre el área dentro de Playa Buena Vista, fueron acompañadas de una solicitud por parte de su representada con la cual sin duda pretendía obtener la respectiva aprobación municipal de concesión sobre el inmueble. Pero aún y cuando resultó manifiesto su interés, no obtuvo dicha concesión por parte del municipio codemandado. Debe comprender la parte actora que el lote que reclama, al encontrarse en el área restringida de la zona marítimo terrestre, no puede ser objeto de posesión alguna, está fuera del comercio de los hombres y, por ende, no es negociable, pertenece a la colectividad y como tal resulta intransmisible; sólo puede obtener algún derecho precario una vez que la Municipalidad le reconozca un derecho de uso (permiso), o bien, cuando se le pueda otorgar concesión, habiéndose cumplido con el procedimiento de ordenación territorial indicado y comprobado que cumple con las exigencias de ley. En las condiciones actuales, no es posible conferirle concesión alguna sobre ese lote, según lo dispone la normativa jurídica vigente detallada en los párrafos que anteceden. Ahora bien, en el caso que nos ocupa estamos en presencia de una situación realmente particular, y es que, aún y cuando el municipio nunca brindó la concesión al señor Potting o a su empresa, lo cierto del caso es que de una forma absolutamente tolerante tanto la Municipalidad de Nicoya como el Área de Salud de Nicoya, han cohonestado y hasta fomentado el desarrollo y ejercicio de la actividad lucrativa por parte del actor. Y tanto es así, que a lo largo de los años le han otorgado permisos de construcción, permisos sanitarios de funcionamiento, patentes de bar, de cabinas, de restaurante, patente de licores, es decir, le han brindado todas las licencias y autorizaciones legales para que don Rainer realice su ejercicio comercial desde hace más de diez años cuando menos, tal y como se demuestra en el elenco de hechos probados de esta resolución. Con ello, estima esta Cámara que obviamente, se generó en el señor Potting una clara apariencia o halo de licitud que rodeó el ejercicio de su actividad, y una clara confianza en que estaba actuando de manera conforme a derecho. Y es que si se analiza todo el íter de las actuaciones desplegadas por la Municipalidad de Nicoya, sin duda en la especie operó una autorización administrativa tácita (aunque irregular) en favor de don Rainer para el uso y disfrute de la zona restringida de la zona marítimo terrestre en Playa Bonita. Es cierto que nunca se le dió la concesión, ni tampoco un permiso de uso, pero el Municipio incurrió en una serie de actuaciones materiales y formales con las que, bien hubiera hecho creer a cualquiera, que actuaba conforme a derecho y que gozaba de la venia municipal. En el fondo, no podía estimar don Rainer que actuaba de manera ilegal al ocupar la zona restringida, y no puede ser así porque el ente encargado de la fiscalización y vigilancia sobre dicha zona en Sámara era el municipio, gobierno local que le dió permisos, patentes, licencias y autorizaciones para que explotara el área y más aún, hasta le cobraba a don Rainer los respectivos cánones por ello, según se acreditó en el elenco de hechos probados de esta sentencia. Es decir, el actor puso su confianza en la actuación de la Administración Pública, debido a que tanto la Municipalidad de Nicoya como las oficinas regionales del Ministerio de Salud, produjeron señales externas lo suficientemente claras y concluyentes que indujeron al actor a confiar en la legalidad de la actuación administrativa y de su propio proceder. Esto es innegable y no hay argumento alguno de los codemandados que lo logre desvirtuar, ante la claridad de los hechos. Es decir, la propia Corporación le creó una confianza legítima para ejercer la actividad, circunstancias y estados que no puede pretender ahora revertir el Ayuntamiento ni el Estado, de forma intempestiva y en desmedro de las situaciones jurídicas consolidadas del empresario que acude ante esta instancia jurisdiccional. Es claro para este Tribunal que en la especie operó el principio de confianza legítima en favor del accionante, como bien lo aduce su director legal. El principio constitucional de la confianza legítima, deriva del principio jurídico de buena fe que debe regir en todas las relaciones jurídicas, incluyendo por supuesto las relaciones que surgen al amparo del derecho administrativo. Dimana a su vez del principio de seguridad jurídica consagrado en el numeral 34 de la Constitución Política, concretizándose -usualmente, pero no de manera exclusiva- en la teoría de la intangibilidad de los actos propios. La Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia lo ha definido por sus efectos, como aquél "(...) de conformidad con el cual si son las propias instancias públicas quienes dan una apariencia de legitimidad y credibilidad a una situación, que induce al particular a actuar de buena fe de una manera determinada, no es a éste último a quien toca cargar con las consecuencias del error al que ha sido incitado, sino que es el Estado quien habrá de atenerse a los efectos de la confusión creada (...)". (al respecto, ver voto No. 003263-2006 de las 10:50 horas del 10 de marzo del 2006). Doctrinariamente, se ha definido como "(...) la confianza del ciudadano en el mantenimiento de unas condiciones estables para el ejercicio de la vida profesional y económica (...) El principio, de origen alemán -Vertrauenschutz-, se orienta deci­didamente así a la preservación del valor de la seguridad jurídica y del sistema de economía de mercado frente a la acción, eventualmente incontrolada o sin las cautelas suficientes, de los poderes públicos". (Castillo Blanco, Federico A. La Protección de Confianza en el Derecho Administrativo. Editorial Marcial Pons, Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales S. A. Madrid. 1998, Pág. 114). En la especie, es claro que operó el principio aludido, en el tanto la parte actora disfrutó de una serie de permisos y licencias que le fueron otorgadas por el Estado (en su más amplia acepción) pues ostentó permisos de construcción y patentes conferidas por el Municipio, así como permiso sanitario de funcionamiento por parte del Ministerio de Salud.

VII.Ahora bien, en cuanto al permiso sanitario de funcionamiento que en su oportunidad se le confiriera al accionante por parte del Ministerio de Salud, debe indicarse que efectivamente no resulta viable, pues validaba la operación de la actividad lucrativa del actor en la zona restringida de la zona marítimo terrestre, sin contar con permiso ni concesión municipal para ello. Sin embargo, incurrió en un error el órgano estatal, toda vez que (aún y cuando resultaba viable proceder a denegar dicho permiso por pretenderse para su uso en una zona demanial, sin que el interesado contara con las autorizaciones necesarias para su aprovechamiento), procedió a ordenar el cierre del local comercial de manera intempestiva, aún y cundo desde años atrás ya la venía autorizando su funcionamiento de manera reiterada. Véase que en autos se ha acreditado la existencia de permisos sanitarios de funcionamiento anteriores al año 2009, por lo que el propio Ministerio cohonestó el funcionamiento del establecimiento comercial del actor en la zona restringida, colaborando con la confianza legítima que ahora él aduce violentada, como en efecto lo es. Y no es que el Ministerio estuviese obligado a concederle dichos permisos de por vida, pues bien podía denegarlos o revocarlos, pero de manera acorde a derecho, sea, no de forma intempestiva y arbitaria como lo hizo, sino que dándole la oportunidad razonable al administrado para proceder al cese de su actividad, dentro un plazo prudencial para ello, tal y como lo establece el numeral 154 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, y ésto por cuanto anteriormente se le había concedido tales permisos por parte del Ministerio aludido. Distinto sería el caso si Salud nunca le hubiera conferido tales autorizaciones, pera al haberlo hecho, afianzó la posición confiada del administrado y por ello debe asumir las consecuencias de su incuria en el proceder administrativo. A lo anterior se suma que la motivación contenida en el acto de cierre no resulta conforme a derecho, pues contrariamente a lo sostenido por la representación estatal, en la especie no eran los artículos 8 y 9 del decreto ejecutivo No. 34728-2 Reglamento General para el Otorgamiento de Permisos Sanitarios de Funcionamiento los aplicables al caso del accionante, -ya que dichos numerales establecen los requerimientos para quien por primera vez solicita dicho permiso, cuando más bien era lo procedente aplicar los requisitos propios de la renovación, establecidos en los numerales 22 y siguientes del mismo cuerpo normativo infralegal. Así las cosas, mal hizo el Ministerio de Salud al actuar de manera arbitraria y contraria a derecho, cerrando de manera intempestiva el local comercial del accionante con sustento en la normativa citada, cuando de previo le había dado permisos sanitarios para ejercer su actividad. Así las cosas, es lo procedente anular el acto administrativo correspondiente a la orden sanitaria No.CH-ARS-NI-ERS-A-030-2010 del 09 de abril del 2010, el oficio No. MSARN-033-2008 y la Resolución No. APAHN-042-08, así como el oficio 444-09 del 01 de octubre del año 2009, todos emitidos por el Ministerio de Salud, por haberse dictado y ejecutado de manera contraria a derecho. Así mismo, aún y cuando no se aportó a los autos prueba de ellos, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el numeral 122 inciso m, es lo procedente conceder al accionante el pago de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados con dicho cierre a cargo del Estado, pero en el entendido de que se le reconocen únicamente los comprendidos desde el momento en que se hizo efectivo el mismo por parte del Ministerio de Salud, y hasta el momento en que se hizo efectiva la medida cautelar solicitada por el accionante ante este Tribunal y confirmada por el Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo mediante resolución No. 341-2010 de las 16:13 horas del 19 de julio del 2010. Dichas daños y perjuicios serán acreditados y cuantificados en etapa de ejecución de sentencia. Se rechazan las demás pretensiones planteadas por el accionante en su demanda, toda vez que las mismas no resultan jurídicamente viables, pues el área sobre la cual pretende se autorice sus actuaciones corresponde a un bien demanial, y más aún, a un terreno ubicado en zona martítimo terrestre, para cuyo uso y disfrute es imperioso contar con la concesión y/o el permiso de uso respectivo, de los cuales carece tanto el accionante como su representada, razón de más para no acceder a las solicitudes por él planteadas ante este Tribunal.

VIII.De conformidad con las consideraciones anteriormente expuestas, estima este órgano colegiado que ostenta derecho suficiente el accionante para solicitar la anulación de los actos administrativos indicados en el considerando precedente, emitidos por parte del Ministerio de Salud y que llevaron al cierre de su negocio en Playa Buena Vista de Sámara, razón por la cual se rechaza parcialmente la excepción de falta de derecho invocada, únicamente en cuanto a dichos actos. En lo que corresponde al resto de pretensiones planteadas por el accionante, se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho y se procede al rechazo de las mismas, por las razones expuestas a lo largo de esta resolución. Consecuentemente, se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda intentada, en los términos expuestos en el considerando anterior. Se omite análisis sobre la expresión "sine actione agit" y la que se denomina en autos como "falta de acción", por no tratarse de excepciones procesales propiamente tales, siendo su existencia fruto de la costumbre del litigio, pero carente de sustento jurídico alguno.

IX.A modo de corolario, no puede dejar de lado este Tribunal que el bien inmueble sobre el cual ejerce su actividad el accionante, es un bien demanial ubicado dentro de la zona marítimo terrestre, y que el actor -aunque actuando hasta el día de hoy al amparo de la buena fe y la confianza legítima- no ostenta derecho alguno para aprovechar dicho terreno, salvo la propia tolerancia municipal. Por ende, al amparo de lo anteriormente la Ley General de la Administración Pública y por la Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre vigente, proceda la Municipalidad de Nicoya de inmediato con el inicio de los procedimientos de ley para la recuperación de la franja de zona marítimo terrestre donde ejerce su actividad sin permisos el accionante y su representada, pero deberá el gobierno local actuar en estricta observancia de los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad constitucionales, no de manera intempestiva ni arbitraria. Lo anterior, sin perjuicio de que se inicien los procedimientos administrativos disciplinarios a efecto de sentar las responsabilidades propias del caso con respecto a los funcionarios que otorgaron patentes y licencias para el actor, sin contar con concesión ni permiso de uso para el ejercicio de su actividad comercial en dicha zona restringida marítima”