Loss of trust and disciplinary prescription in public employmentPérdida de confianza y prescripción disciplinaria en empleo público

VII.- On the inadmissibility of the complaint in its entirety. It is the view of this Tribunal that the claims formulated in their totality must be dismissed, based on the following reasoning:

1.- On the statute of limitations (prescripción) for the exercise of disciplinary sanctioning power by the Public Administration. Within the range of possible manifestations of the will of the Public Administration is that which corresponds to its sanctioning, corrective, and/or disciplinary power. In doctrine, it could be defined as "a power of an authentically repressive nature, exercised based on a violation or disturbance of pre-established rules" founded on the recognition of a natural power of command inherent or consubstantial to the State, that is, the "single ius puniendi of the State." (CANO CAMPOS (Tomás). Derecho Administrativo Sancionador, Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, Madrid, No. 43, January-April 1995, p. 339. Also, Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgments No. 1265-95 of 3:36 p.m. on March 7, 1995; 1264-95 of 3:03 p.m. on March 7 of the same year and 8193-2000 of 3:05 p.m. on September 13, 2000). This power—of course—can be projected within the framework of a public employment legal relationship (disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria)) regarding the activities of the individual in their capacity as a public agent or official, in which case, based on a finalistic principle, it is deployed with the aim of compelling and ensuring, preventively and repressively, the fulfillment of the legal duties that this type of relationship imposes on the servant according to the function or position held. (See in this regard resolution No. 479-97 of the Constitutional Chamber, as well as opinion C-159-2000 of July 20, 2000, of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República)). Now then, whether the exercise of a power of command or not, the legal system provides certain limitations for its exercise, one of which is temporal in nature, that is, determined based on the time for its exercise, which leads us to the analysis of two possible legal institutes that share certain common features, namely expiration (caducidad) and statute of limitations (prescripción), the latter being of interest to us. The claimant, regarding this topic, limited himself to affirming that in the specific case, it would have to be declared that the statute of limitations (prescripción) for the exercise of the disciplinary power against him had taken effect, based on the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), for which he starts, regarding the computation provided in the norm, from the date of the occurrence of the events for which the plaintiff was investigated. Well then, the legal institute of the negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa) is provided as one of the modes of extinguishing obligations, and the correlative action for it to operate is sufficient with the passage of a certain time without the holder of the right promoting any type of action to claim it. Through this figure, it is intended to provide legal relationships with a framework within which each of the linked subjects can operate in a framework of certainty, this being one of the values that is protected by the legal system as a principle. Thus, in accordance with the legal system, obligations prescribe, as does the correlative right of action, and to that extent, also the possibility of exercising powers, even when in specific cases they are powers of command, when their holder is the Public Administration. The statute of limitations (prescripción) in general terms requires the concurrence of three fundamental assumptions: a) the inertia of the holder of a right to exercise it when they are in a position to do so; b) the passage of the time set by the legal system for that purpose; and, c) the allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship, asserting that statute of limitations (prescripción). This leads to the affirmation that there is no liberating effect if, despite the concurrence of the first two assumptions, the allegation is not articulated or formulated, since it is waivable or available whether to assert that prescriptive effect or not. That is, the statute of limitations (prescripción) follows a rogatory principle (principio rogatorio), a situation different from that which occurs in the case of expiration (caducidad) (in procedural terms like the one at hand), a framework in which it is possible to say that, expiration (caducidad) being susceptible to being declared ex officio, the statute of limitations (prescripción) must be alleged by the party. Regarding public employment relationships, the exercise of this power in principle rests with the head of each organization vis-à-vis its officials, on the occasion of having committed sanctionable offenses. The statute of limitations (prescripción) stands against this as a factor of temporality after which, if the person with the power to discipline has not done so properly, such exercise may not be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be stated, varies according to the regulated subject matter, since there is not a single legal regime for public employment, depending on whether we are faced with specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, that disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of Article 102, subsection c) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that, for finalistic reasons, are considered imprescriptible, those referring to the internal sanctioning exercise like the one examined in this case are subject to temporality rules by virtue of which they can expire. In this type of relationship, the holder of this power is in principle the administrative head, while the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which, their power to require recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power emerges. It is necessary to point out the existence of various scenarios in which the institute can be made to operate in disciplinary matters. The statute of limitations (prescripción) for the exercise of the disciplinary power refers to the period set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the appropriate procedural measures to issue the final decision. It is the maximum period within which the opening of the administrative procedure aimed at establishing the appropriateness or not of sanctioning must be ordered. In this line of ideas, it must be borne in mind that the notification to the investigated person of the opening of the procedure is what would be capable of generating an interrupting effect on that margin of temporality, to the extent that it constitutes an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of the referred power; an interrupting effect that will be maintained while the administrative procedure is in process, underway, active, and has not expired (caducado) (Article 340 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)). It must be borne in mind that as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is an unavoidable condition for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative case—the procedure prior to the issuance of the final act, it is insisted—to establish whether the sanction is appropriate or not, as a derivation of the provisions in Articles 214, 221, 297, and 308 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). For the specific case of servants subject to the Civil Service regime, by express referral of Article 51 of the Statute on that matter, the statute of limitations period (plazo de prescripción) is provided in Article 603 of the Labor Code, which reads as follows: "The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their offenses prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from when the cause for separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known." However, it must be warned that this is a norm that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding that point, as is the case provided in the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía), No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, as well as in Laws No. 8292 (in its Article 43), 8422 (Article 44), and 8131 (Article 112) regarding the oversight of the public treasury. Now then, it is clear that the expiry of the period granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the causes of interruption set by Article 876 of the Civil Code, by referral made by Article 601, first paragraph, of the Labor Code. Interruption only occurs, of course, to the extent that it occurs before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, because even if the causes have occurred, if it is after the period has expired, the simple allegation of the negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa) leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded due to inertia in its exercise. It is well-established legal doctrine that only the statute of limitations (prescripción) not yet fulfilled can be interrupted. Even so, it must be insisted that interruption does not occur with the simple opening of the procedure, but with the due communication of the order that establishes the cause, in accordance with Articles 140, 239, 240, 243 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Finally, once the interruption has occurred, the period begins to run again. Another aspect that must be clarified is the one linked to the moment from which the period must be computed. Article 603 cited above indicates that the period runs from when the cause for separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly period is computed from the moment when the holder of the corrective power is in an objective possibility of knowing the offense and therefore, in a position to be able to undertake the exercise of their power; before that, by logical consequence, the exercise of such power would not be demandable from them, under penalty of admitting odious margins of impunity arising from the concealment, in more cases than less, natural to the offender, of their reprehensible conduct. It must also be considered that when the particularities of the case require the carrying out of a prior preliminary investigation in order to place the holder of the power in a position to exercise it, the duration of which, it is warned, also cannot be unjustifiably excessive, the aforementioned monthly period runs from the moment when the results of that preparatory exercise—which does not form part of the formal administrative procedure regulated in Article 308 and following of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)—are brought or are in a condition to be brought to the attention of the head. Even so, the need or not for that phase must be discriminated in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a dilatory strategy to evade the statute of limitations (prescripción), given that such an investigation would not be necessary in all scenarios, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine, among other things, the existence of sanctionable conduct, the identification of the author thereof or of someone who, having some participation in the conduct, can be attributed responsibility to a certain degree, as well as the appropriateness or not, based on the merit, evidence, and existing indications, for the opening of the disciplinary sanctioning procedure.- 2.- On the statute of limitations (prescripción) alleged by the plaintiff. This Tribunal considers that the claimant's argument aimed at the annulment of all proceedings based on the disciplinary sanctioning power having been exercised in his case outside the period provided in Article 603 of the Labor Code is not receivable. Solely for the sake of greater precision, it must be indicated that in the same manner as regulated by the Labor Code in Article 603, Article 116 of the Labor Relations Regulations (Normativa de Relaciones Laborales) of the defendant entity, in what is pertinent, provides as follows: "The body competent to exercise the disciplinary power shall have a period of one month to order the initiation of a preliminary investigation, from the moment it becomes aware of a presumed irregularity that must be investigated." (The highlighting is not from the original). The foregoing is without prejudice to the fact that the same point is again regulated in Article 118, with some lack of rigor in regulatory normative technique. It suffices to indicate in a first line of thought that it has been uncontested between the parties that the person in whom the exercise of the administrative disciplinary sanctioning power resided in relation to Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez was the person holding the position of Director of the Pharmacy Service at Hospital México. Then, in accordance with what has thus been held as proven facts in what is of interest, despite the conduct for which the plaintiff was investigated dating from the beginning of December 2012, namely, between the 3rd and the 5th, and without prejudice to what happened on the 17th, it was on December 4, 2012, that the Subdirectorate of Pharmacy at Hospital México, in the person of Mr. Federico Jiménez Loría, was made aware, exclusively of the existence of a shortage of 2 units (cans) of Lactose-Free Enteral Formula (ENSURE) in what was identified as the "staging warehouse (bodega de paso)" located in the Central Pharmacy, for which reason that official proceeded to carry out a preliminary investigation in this regard, in accordance with the exercise of a natural function in the performance of a position that entails being in charge, to a certain degree, of the institutional pharmacy service or process. (See official note FHM-0352-13 on folios 01 to 05 of the administrative file in its first paragraph or heading, to which must be added the non-existence of evidence that permits affirming the contrary). This preliminary investigation elapsed, and it was not until February 26, 2013, that, after a report with the results had been rendered by the Subdirector of Pharmacy, the report was sent by official note FHM-0352-13 to the Director of Pharmacy of the same hospital center, Margarita Dall´anese Ruiz. It was from this moment onward, then, that the person holding the power to discipline the plaintiff first accessed the information that allowed her to order the opening of an administrative disciplinary procedure. The text of the report appears on folios 01 to 05, and the evidentiary material gathered during the preliminary investigation, on those from 06 to 44, all of the administrative file, including an envelope in which compact discs were attached that comprised some video images captured through the security cameras placed in the infrastructure of the Pharmacy. That is the date, consequently, from which the prescriptive period (plazo prescriptivo) would have to be computed. On the other hand, beyond a shortage of ENSURE, some facts other than that were detected, which up to that moment were associated with Mr. Tardencilla Martínez as a result of the investigation, consisting of the presumed theft of medications by accessing restricted areas without authorization within the infrastructure constituting the Central Pharmacy, as well as the recording in the computer system used to control the entry and exit of medications from the pharmacy, using a username and password assigned to another official, of false information based on a non-existent prescription, only to later delete it using his own username and password. The date of February 26, 2013, and no other, constitutes the starting point for the computation of the aforementioned one-month statute of limitations period (plazo de prescripción)—it is insisted—for which reason, having designated the members of the directing body that would have to conduct the procedure on February 28, 2013 (folios 47 to 51 of the administrative file), this body issued the initial procedural order (auto inicial) on March 15, 2013 (folios 59 to 77 of the administrative file) and notified it to the plaintiff, in accordance with the record drawn up for the effect of the corresponding registration that appears on folio 78 of the administrative file, on the day of March 15, 2013, whereby, it being more than evident that the one-month period referred to in Article 603 of the Labor Code was not exceeded, the argument referring to the illegality of the proceedings from this perspective is not appropriate, so that the reproach lacks support, nor does what was sought in this respect, and its inadmissibility is thus declared. It is not superfluous to indicate that with regard to the preliminary investigation, no exaggerated and unjustified delays are located that could suggest that the prescriptive institute had occurred, nor in the procedures involved in bringing the plaintiff's case to the attention of the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), which, in any case, corresponds to yet another instance, before which what could be made to operate is the expiration (caducidad) referred to in Article 340 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), something that does not constitute a reproach by the claimant. Thus, no statute of limitations (prescripción) is observed at any level.- 3.- Some considerations on the rules that inform the administrative procedure of a disciplinary sanctioning nature. The administrative procedure (Articles 308 and following of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), when it is of a disciplinary sanctioning nature, begins in principle with the issuance of an initial order (auto inicial), which, when it involves a procedure aimed at determining whether it is appropriate to sanction an individual, is usually called a statement of charges (traslado de cargos). The adequate formulation of this initial order (auto inicial) within the procedure of this kind has a very close link with the need for the principle of defense and contradiction, as well as in general the rules that inform the principle of due process, to all be observed. In an administrative procedure of a sanctioning nature (disciplinary or corrective), the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) constitutes the indispensable act of bringing to the knowledge of the investigated person the facts that are the object of investigation against them, as well as the evidence supporting the opening of such a procedure and its legal classification, but at the same time, the mention of the rights that assist them within that procedural path (iter) and the possible legal consequence that would emerge from the result at the end of the procedure should those facts under scrutiny be proven. As a fundamental structure, it must contain at least the following aspects: a) identification of the body, which implies the clear indication that allows the individualization and identification of the public agents, natural persons, who make up the directing body. This enables the protection of the right to recuse public agents as a derivation of the maxim of objectivity: Articles 230-238 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP); b) statement of charges (traslado de cargos); c) purposes of the administrative procedure, without the open-ended formula "to seek the real truth of the facts" being valid, without identifying and specifying them concretely; d) making the administrative file available; e) summons to an oral and private hearing with due advance notice (Article 311 of the LGAP); f) warnings regarding the appointment of a legal representative, definition of a place or means for receiving notifications; g) remedies available against the act, with details of the period within which they can be filed and the competent body. Regarding the factual detail, it is elementary that this statement of charges (traslado) brings to the knowledge of the addressee the set of concrete and detailed facts that will be the object of investigation in the procedure. Although the object is the establishment of what the LGAP calls the real truth of the facts (Articles 214, 221, 297, and 308 of that legal body), it is evident that the procedure is established as an instrument (and not an end in itself) to verify the facts that serve as the grounds (motivo) for the final act in the most faithful and complete manner possible as provided in precept 221 ibidem. It could not be otherwise without such treatment coming to harm the aforementioned principle of material defense and contradiction. The final act, on the other hand, constitutes the culmination of the administrative procedure, according to the terminology of the LGAP in its normal form of termination (without prejudice to some diverse modalities of termination that are considered early). From this examination angle, the grounds (motivo) of the final act as its objective material element, understood as the factual or legal presuppositions that enable the issuance of the act and therefore, its contained dispositive effect, are determined through the procedure, which in that logic stands as the instrumental means to infer whether in the particular case the factual or legal presupposition that legitimizes the public proceeding occurs or not, and gives support to the content, that is, to the operative part of the act, the effect it intends to generate in material reality. That is to say, through the procedure it is sought to verify whether in the specific case the facts that give basis to the grounds (motivo) of the act concur or not; the procedure determines whether the factual presupposition provided by the legal system to support the public conduct occurs or not, stated in other terms. Thus, with the protection of due process and the set of principles inherent to it, this procedure serves to establish whether or not the fact and its legal classification (grounds (motivo)) occurred, which justifies and validates a specific administrative will. If the fact is not proven, the effect foreseen for that factual cause cannot occur. Thus, for example, the sanction proceeds based on the demonstrated non-compliance, wherein this is configured by the proof of concrete facts (in this case by omission), so that, if those facts that hypothetically configure the non-compliance are not proven, it cannot be affirmed that any obligation has been breached, ergo, the sanction would not be appropriate. It concerns the inseparable relationship between the grounds (motivo) and the content of the act (Articles 132 and 133 of the LGAP), in this case nourished by the procedure, an instrument for determining the existence of the grounds (motivo) of the act. In this way, in sanctioning procedures, like the one in which the correct imputation of charges made at the beginning thereof is examined, communicating to the addressee with precise detail the concrete facts imputed to them and which, in the judgment of the Administration, configure a disregard of applicable regulations; duties, obligations or, in general, legal duty situations, is fundamental. Thus, it is a fundamental piece within due process. Even so, within its content and as a logical derivation of that necessary detail of investigated facts, it is also necessary for the directing or investigating body of the procedure to indicate what the possible legal consequences of the investigated facts or possible sanction will be, since what is relevant is the description of the factual supposition(s) that provoke the apparent offense, based on which the examination of their material implications and the consequence that the legal system assigns to that effect is carried out. The above is so, because it is the analysis of that factual picture that will determine, once clarified and after weighing the particularities of the case, the appropriateness or not of the proposed sanction in accordance with the punitive parameters initially imputed. But furthermore, it will constitute the logical axis within which the investigated subject would be expected to exercise their defense, that is, the detail of the facts and the probable sanctions, it is insisted, lies in what will constitute the elements based on which the addressee will carry out their effective defense. An objection could be raised to the foregoing, indicating that it is sufficient to state the facts subject to the administrative case, since ultimately, the object of the procedure is to verify those facts that serve as the basis for the grounds (motivo). However, that position overlooks that although the clarification of the facts allows verifying the grounds (motivo) of the act, the effect of the act that emanates from its content depends on the legal classification made of those facts. The passive subject of the procedure defends themselves against the facts imputed to them, there is no doubt about that, but additionally, against their legal classification. However, on one hand, it must be understood that those basic facts of an eventual sanctioning effect correspond, in principle, to be demonstrated by the Administration and not vice versa, given that the object of the case is to establish whether those facts concur or not, not to establish a procedure for the investigated person to discredit the hypothetical truths of facts supposedly already demonstrated, fixed a priori by the instructing Administration. Even so, there will be scenarios before which—particularly when the reproach of disciplinary responsibility corresponds to some omission or breach of duties—the most elementary rational logic would lead to affirming that it is that individual or agent accused of conduct of this kind who, by being in a better position to do so, must demonstrate the same under the protection of the constitutionally provided principle arising from Article 11 of the Political Constitution, identified as that of accountability. This is without prejudice to an elementary principle in public management, related to transparency, which should not violate the principle of innocence when the circumstances so dictate. In summary, the procedure is not born under this understanding to define the applicable sanction, but rather, and instead, to determine whether the imputed facts were committed or not, and whether those facts, once demonstrated—should this happen—would lead to the adoption of a sanction previously warned of in the statement of charges (traslado de cargos). It is not a matter of excessive formalism as might be thought, but of safeguarding what is considered a basic characteristic of due process. Omitting that aspect is to expose oneself to doubt and uncertainty about the implications of the investigated facts, which undoubtedly leads to a state of vulnerability within that procedure. The exercise of defense granted for a possible sanction of reprimand is not the same as that granted for a separation from the position, regardless of whether the reproached facts are the same. In essence, it is not enough to convey facts; the disciplinary destiny of those factual aspects must also be added, since it may well be the case that the defense at that opportunity is that the classification of the facts is not correct. If in the course of the procedure new facts relevant to the object of the case appear, or the legal classification is reconsidered, the Administration is called upon to bring these variations to the knowledge of the addressee so that they may exercise their defense, under penalty of harm to due process and generating invalidity of the proceedings according to precept 223 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Now then, all of the foregoing being so, it is notorious that the sanction definitively adopted must have fulfilled several presuppositions: a) that it be for facts that were duly notified from the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) or, in general, that were conveyed to the investigated person for their defense; b) that the facts constituting the administrative sanction have been proven within the administrative procedure; c) that beforehand the person had been notified that this factual set under investigation could end up producing that sanction as a conditional effect; and, d) that the imposed sanction is the consequence that the legal system assigns to that factual grounds (motivo) of the act that is adopted.

Hence, an infringement of those duties undoubtedly entails a violation of the principles of the procedure that lead to the nullity of the proceedings in accordance with the aforementioned Article 223. Regarding the specific issue linked to the notification of charges and imputation, the case law of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: "Due process is a complex right, composed of a series of elements or sub-principles, such as notification and imputation of charges (intimación e imputación de cargos), defense, access to the administrative file, the right to formulate grievances and offer evidence, the right to contradiction and mediation, due reasoning of the administrative resolution, the right to appeal said resolutions, among others. Of particular interest for the resolution of this dispute, it is necessary to analyze the scope of the principle of notification of charges (principio de intimación). When the Administration initiates an ex officio proceeding against a natural or legal person, it must indicate in an express, precise, and particularized manner the facts or conducts attributed to them, as well as the possible legal consequences that would result should they prove true; the foregoing is what is understood by the principle of notification of charges (principio de intimación). Note that it is a requirement for the Administration to clearly detail the facts and conducts imputed to a subject. The purpose of the foregoing is so that the latter may adequately prepare their defense and not arrive devoid of the evidence and arguments necessary to refute what is attributed to them, or to guarantee that only those facts or conducts will be examined within the procedure and not other new ones for which they were not prepared to debate. That said, it is necessary for the Administration to describe the possible legal consequences that those facts or conducts would bring about if they are proven true. We speak of possible consequences, because it is perfectly feasible that during the course of the proceedings, the anticipated legal effects may undergo some type of modification due to the factual elements proven within the respective procedure, which would imply a change in the legal consequences that were initially anticipated as possible at the start of the proceeding before being adequately analyzed. The foregoing occurs for the simple reason that the administrative procedure aims to find the real truth of the facts, so that once these facts or the conducts attributed to a person are clearly established in the normal course of the procedure, if it were proven that the circumstances did not occur in the manner the Administration had contemplated them, and therefore the legal effects that were initially warned to the individual as possible did not occur, because other facts emerged that were duly discussed during the development of the procedural path, those legal consequences may vary without violating fundamental rights. Thus, while there will not necessarily be correspondence between what was initially notified and what is finally ordered, there will always be a correlation between the proven facts and the legal consequences derived from them." (No. 950-F-S1-2010, at 9:50 hours on August 12, 2010). It must be kept in mind, from a perspective of systematic and purposive interpretation of the legal system, that although it is a requirement that at the beginning of the procedure, the investigated person has been informed clearly and in detail of the facts for which they are being investigated in terms of elements such as manner, time, and place, this is so and makes sense solely so that defenselessness is not generated in the individual; ergo, in those cases where some inconsistency in this regard, despite being one, does not generate that state, a defect in the proceedings will not be evident.- 4.- Regarding the defect associated with the official who ordered the start of the investigation. The plaintiff reproached that the administrative procedure followed against him began with a defect because the person who initiated it was barred from doing so, as they held the immediate superior position of the plaintiff, and according to the Institutional Labor Relations Regulations, namely Mr. Federico Jiménez, who acted under an interim appointment substituting for Ms. Margarita Rosa Francisca Dall´anese Ruiz, this according to the provisions of Article 115, paragraph 4 of that regulation. Furthermore, he reproached that in his case, vested interests existed aimed at promoting his dismissal. This allegation is not admissible from the outset, although it is notable that there is regulation on the matter in the Labor Relations Regulations of the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social in its Article 115, paragraph 4, which we proceed to transcribe as relevant, in regulating the potential preliminary investigation phase prior to the start of the formal administrative procedure, regarding the officials who would carry it out. The article reads as follows: "The officials that make up the Preliminary Investigation Commission shall under no circumstance be from the same service where the alleged fact or alleged fault to be investigated is generated." It cannot be overlooked that this regulatory norm is openly illegal, as will be seen, and starts from a false premise, which is that an investigation carried out by officials from the same service where the events occur must be presumed, as a rule, not to be objective and impartial in performing that task. First, it must be noted that according to the provisions of Article 102 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), the hierarchical superior not only has the power to give orders to their subordinates (subsection a) and discipline their faults (subsection c), but also, as is logical and reasonable, has the duty to "monitor the subordinate's action to verify its legality and suitability, and use all necessary or useful means for that purpose that are not legally prohibited" (subsection b). Suffice it to say that this hierarchical superior in relation to Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, as he himself states, was the Deputy Director of the Pharmacy Service, without prejudice that the power to dismiss resided in a common superior to both, namely the Director of the same service. Thus, when the hierarchical superior was investigating what happened with a missing product, he was doing so in compliance with the duties of his position and not in pursuit of harming the plaintiff; that the latter result arose along the way is a circumstantial situation. That said, the indicated norm also comes into clear collision with the provisions of the General Law of Internal Control No. 8292 (Ley General de Control Interno N° 8292) regarding the duties that must be observed by whoever is in charge of a process, as in this case the pharmacy process, as well as Law No. 8422 against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Functions (Ley número 8422 contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función Pública), Article 38, subsection d). The powers-duties that, in a dual dimension, correspond to the hierarchical superior to exercise regarding the processes under their charge, undoubtedly carry the obligation to investigate any circumstance that may weaken the internal control system, and there is no regulatory norm that, in open collision with this system and Article 102 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), superimposes itself over both normative bodies. The hierarchical superior will always be part of the service for which the subordinate provides services; therefore, the poorly devised regulatory provision mentioned shall not be applicable, under penalty of promoting its application in violation of the law, a norm of higher rank, force, and precedence. In any case, another inherent power of the superior is the direction, organization, and delegation of functions to subordinates, so that nothing prevents an investigation report on any topic that puts the internal control system at risk from being carried out under the cited legal sources. Finally, as concerns the principle of purposive interpretation and application of the legal system, no element brought by the plaintiff, not even at the argumentative level, demonstrates that the officials who participated in the preliminary investigation carried out—not against him, as will be seen—acted with a lack of objectivity and/or with the intention of harming him, so that the alleged protected legal interest that the regulatory norm we question seeks to safeguard would not even have been affected, and it is not acceptable to declare nullity for nullity's sake. Furthermore, it is clear that the investigation was ordered by the Deputy Director of the Pharmacy Service based solely on the information referring to the loss of two cans of ENSURE from the transit warehouse and nothing more, so that no link with that situation and/or any other circumstance discovered later was known of with respect to Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez; hence, no impediment existed, when, on the contrary, there was a duty imposed by law on said official to investigate, either on his own account or by delegating the task to other subordinates, as indeed he proceeded to do. At this same level of analysis, the fact that at some point the Director of the Pharmacy Service appointed a Pharmacy Service official—that is, from the same service in which the plaintiff worked—as a member of the directing body does not constitute a defect based on the same analysis, as there is no evidence whatsoever proving that this official acted improperly and/or motivated by purposes alien to the public interest and the rights of the involved person. It was proven that two officials were appointed, of whom one, namely, Doctora Daniela Aburto Varela, belongs to the Pharmacy Service (see official communication No. FHM-408-2013 located on folios 47 through 51 of the administrative file). That said, this official was relieved of that function and replaced prior to the holding of the oral and private hearing, and of course, before the directing body entered into any substantive analysis in the evaluation of the evidence. This occurred on April 10, 2013, by official communication FHM-0575-13 from the Pharmacy Directorate of Hospital México, through which Doctora Daniela Aburto Varela was excused from the duty of performing duties as an integrating member of the Directing Body of the procedure, and in her place, Doctora Isela Araya Piedra was designated, the latter whose participation has not been questioned at any level. (Folio 131 of the administrative file). Thus, the complaint related to the claim that a failure to observe the referred labor relations norm—which contravenes the law in the stated terms—has the power to generate any nullity in the proceedings is not admissible, as indeed this Chamber so determines in rejection of the arguments of the plaintiff. Consequently, if it was intended to associate a defect such as the one related to the subject who ordered the investigation of a missing quantity of ENSURE in the mentioned Warehouse, and to that extent the nullity of the preparatory act identified with the preliminary investigation from which the report of facts emerged that were later imputed to the plaintiff, namely, official communication No. FHM-0352-13 dated February 26, 2013, issued by the Deputy Director of Pharmacy of Hospital México, Doctor Federico Jiménez Loría, the rejection of the petition is imposed, as indeed is hereby decided. Furthermore, it was also alleged that some irregularity occurred because the person who ordered the preliminary investigation was, at the same time, received as a witness within the administrative procedure proceedings. Even accepting that the statement of said official was indeed taken in the oral and private hearing, nothing in the legal system prevents the immediate hierarchical superior of the investigated person from not only supervising the execution of the tasks of the staff under his charge—on the contrary, this constitutes one of his duties—but also from inquiring about eventual conduct that may generate liability for those officials, and should he have had contact with the facts to be investigated, his statement be received as part of the disciplinary administrative procedure. It must be added to the foregoing that from a legal standpoint, the plaintiff did not put forth any argument that allows inferring the basis for that type of defect that in his view emerged from the foregoing, so the reproach is also inadmissible.- 5.- Regarding the principles of specificity (tipicidad), imputation (imputación), and relative congruence (congruencia relativa). On other occasions, this Court has had the opportunity to refer to the principles of specificity, imputation, and relative congruence in matters of public employment and, of course, in administrative matters as relevant, making it imperative to revisit them for the purposes of the case at hand. From a criminal law perspective, the principle of specificity has to do with any conduct involving an action or omission that conforms to the detailed assumptions established as unlawful within a legal body within the framework of the applicable body of law. In criminal matters, this means that for a conduct to be typical, it must be specifically and detailedly set forth as a crime or misdemeanor within a legal norm, understood in a broad sense, meaning a law in the formal sense, duly approved by the legislative body of the State. Specificity (Tipicidad) is the adaptation of the voluntary human act performed by the subject to the figure described by law as a crime. It is the fitting, the matching, the subsumption of the voluntary human act to the type or description established by the legal system, carrying an associated sanction. If it fits, it is an indication that we are in the presence of a possible crime, whereas if the adaptation is not complete, there is no crime. It is said that it must be set forth specifically and detailedly, because in some countries that adopt a modern criminal law, analogy is not applicable, therefore, the conduct must be specifically detailed. In summary, the principle of imputation is the right to a formal accusation, so that the body representing the punitive action from the beginning of the process is called upon to individualize the person who could suffer the adverse consequences and to describe in a detailed, precise, and clear manner the fact of which they are accused, as well as to make a clear legal classification of the fact, indicating the legal grounds for the accusation and the specific punitive claim. This right to a formal accusation determines, for the affected person, the scope of the right of defense they wish to exercise, and it is based on the grounds of this accusation that the person considers the need to provide elements of conviction or reasoning in their favor. A correctly formulated imputation opens the possibility of an adequate defense. In other words, stating the same thing: the correct accusation implies the possibility of setting out the defense strategy and, consequently, the full exercise of the right to be heard. This is where the importance of procedural guarantees lies that seek to limit the punitive power of the State, preventing the person from being subjected to an arbitrary proceeding or penalty. Both because the State did not conclusively prove their participation in a fact defined by law as a crime, and because the limits imposed by the constitutional system on state punitive activity aimed at verifying it and applying the sanction were not respected. Congruence is a procedural principle that forms part of the guarantee of due process, which marks a path for the Adjudicator to arrive at the resolution and sets a limit on their discretionary power. The authority, in principle, cannot initiate ex officio the exercise of its powers without taking into account facts or evidence not alleged by the parties, and the judgment must be limited to them, that is, only to what was petitioned by the parties. Congruence here is manifested in the suitability between what was requested and the judicial decision contained in the judgment. This must be referenced exclusively to the intervening parties, to the object or petition, as well as to the specific cause (grounds) in litigation, without considering aspects or evidence that the parties have not provided. When dealing with sanctioning processes, the limit is found in that which was imputed and regarding which the person linked to the investigation defended themselves. An incongruent resolution is arbitrary because it exceeds the power of the public authority, whether it decides more than what was claimed, or less than what was requested, or on issues not raised. It is worth noting that criminal law has been the maximum expression of the punitive power of the State, which has been responsible for the greatest development of the topic. In matters of employment, and especially in public employment, these principles have undergone an attenuation, which has come to be called relativity. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in its judgment No. 2007-013903, at 15:00 hours on October 3, 2007, stated the following: "V.- Regarding the principle of specificity in the disciplinary regime.- The principle of specificity is an application of the principle of legality that demands, on the one hand, the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reprehensible for purposes of their sanction, and on the other hand, the concrete delimitation of the possible sanctions to apply, it being possible to affirm that the principle of specificity constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary liability. Regarding the concrete delimitation of the reprehensible conduct, this Chamber has held on previous occasions (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 at twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes on May thirty-first, two thousand five, and 94-5594 at fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four) that although certainly this principle in this matter does not have the same form as in the criminal legal field, since faults not literally provided for can be sanctioned discretionally—it must always be understood that these faults are included in the text—. That is, faults not literally provided for may be sanctioned discretionally, but which are understood to be included in the text and always provided that they result from the verification of the disciplinary fault, through a procedure created for that purpose. Now, regarding the concrete delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this must be clearly and previously established without the Administration being able to create new sanctions that are not contemplated in the applicable norms. In summary, although it is inferred that the determining facts of disciplinary faults are innumerable—since they depend on the nature of the subjects' behaviors or conduct—and that the principles 'nullum crimen sine lege', 'nullum poena sine lege', do not have the rigidity and exactingness that characterize them in substantive criminal law, it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in attention to the principle of specificity, that the conduct be inferred from the normative text and that the sanction be—yes it must be—clearly pre-established." (The highlighting and underlining are not from the original). By virtue of the foregoing, both the non-compliance with general functional duties and legally typified conducts (at the level of the Civil Service Statute, statutory norms proper to the regime, or Labor Code, for example), as well as those found in lower-ranking norms, such as those contained in autonomous service regulations or in cases where the classification occurs with respect to the sanction to be imposed, are sanctionable. This relative classification makes the need for positive norms in the nature of formal law more flexible, making it possible for their regulation to be generated by a positive norm of lower rank. In the manner indicated, it can be seen that compared to criminal law, the exercise of the State's punitive power, insofar as it can affect the most essential goods of the person, such as life (in places where the death penalty is accepted), physical integrity, and freedom of movement (such as the custodial sentence), and even property (such as confiscation), seeks to guarantee in the individual not only the greatest resources but also the most technical mechanisms for the fulfillment of the three principles, which leads to a level of requirement not known in other areas of law. In the remaining areas of sanctioning law (derecho sancionatorio), the same principles are applied but evidently with a lower level of rigor, the most relevant being the attention to the purpose pursued by the public legal system (the exercise of the right of defense) and not the means (the measured exposition of the principle). By way of example then, while criminal law demands rigorous specificity, in administrative sanctioning law, the norm is allowed to be complemented or integrated from regulatory provisions, all based on a special relationship of subjection. Furthermore, the issuance of more generic types is legitimate insofar as the right of defense is permitted. The same situation occurs with the principle of imputation, in that if not all the elements of manner, time, and place are present when describing the conduct, these may be omitted, as long as, clearly, the elements provided allow the exercise of the right of defense. Let the foregoing be said in other terms: always and provided that a true state of defenselessness is not generated. Lastly, regarding the principle of congruence, the generation of a sanction is permitted based on aspects not clearly described in the imputation, to the extent that the unlawfulness of the conduct is extracted, it was mentioned in the transfer of charges, and the exercise of the right of defense was permitted. To which it must be added that what is imputed and eventually punished are not legal classifications but human conduct, so that a person could have been charged with one fault and sanctioned for another, to the extent that the factual description covers them. When it comes to the omission of compliance with official duties, it must also be considered that with regard to the omissive conduct, there are infinite ways in which it manifests, which to a lesser or greater degree can be specified, so that the level of description will always be defined according to the active conduct that is reproached for not having been deployed. Now, if we translate what has been said, mutatis mutandi, to the administrative field and more specifically regarding the validity of the administrative act that imposes an administrative sanction, there must undoubtedly be a correspondence between the facts imputed and notified to the alleged offender, their verification and proof in the administrative procedure, and their correspondence in the final act, so that a relationship of identity exists between the accusation and the imposed sanction.- 6.- Regarding the non-existence of a defect associated with an improper act of transfer of charges (traslado de cargos), as well as the obstruction of the right of defense during the administrative procedure. On this point, the plaintiff alleged that in the transfer of charges, no account is given in terms of the day and time when the facts for which he was investigated would have been located, which would have affected the exercise of his defense. Without prejudice that the reproach was formulated vaguely, according to the evidence appearing on folios 59 through 77 of the administrative file, it is shown that by resolution issued at 13:00 hours on March 15, 2013, the directing body of the procedure issued the so-called "initial resolution of transfer of charges" as part of the procedure to be followed against Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, in which the following was reported: "Facts: (...) FIRST: In the Pharmacy of Hospital México, three shifts are worked, the third shift runs from twenty-two hours to six hours and only one pharmacist and one technician work. Within the Central Pharmacy is located an area called 'transit warehouse' (bodega de paso) where the medications necessary to supply the main dispensary and other restricted medications are stored; only pharmacists are permitted entry, therefore access to technicians and any other personnel is prohibited; technicians can only enter with prior authorization from the pharmacist on shift; furthermore, there is a sign on the door that reads 'authorized personnel only.' The protocol for entering that transit warehouse on the third shift is as follows: should entry be required, the company of the pharmacist and a security guard must be requested. In the month of December two thousand twelve, Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez had the schedule Sunday through Friday from twenty-two hours to six hours, in the position of Pharmacy Health Technician 3, where his duties were to enter prescription information into the Integrated Pharmacy System (Sistema Integrado de Farmacia, SIFA), medication gathering, attending the window, restocking medications into the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA), any other function assigned according to service needs, which he was to perform within the Central Pharmacy of Hospital México. On December 3, two thousand twelve, Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez started his duties at twenty-two hours; on December fourth, two thousand twelve, he entered the transit warehouse on two occasions, as follows: at 01:55:52.75 hours, he enters it; at 01:57:52.7 hours, he exits the transit warehouse and heads toward the warehouse area. At 01:58:31.55 hours, he exits the warehouse hallway and heads toward the hallway between Farmacotecnia and the transit warehouse and immediately turns left and enters the transit warehouse at 01:58:35.85 hours. He exits the transit warehouse at 01:58:50.70 hours with a cardboard box in his left hand; said box contained a product inside and he heads toward the medication gathering area. All of the foregoing was done without authorization from the pharmacist on shift, who was Dra. Ginette Cerna Gutiérrez. At eleven hours forty-seven minutes, on December fourth, two thousand twelve, Ms. Adriana Calvo Marín, via electronic mail, informed Dr. Federico Jiménez Loría that a shortage of two containers of Lactose-Free Enteral Formula (ENSURE) had been detected, which are stored in the transit warehouse, and also that on that day the door of that warehouse had been found open. / SECOND: That in the Pharmacy of Hospital México, the three shifts are worked; the second shift runs from fourteen hours to twenty-two hours and only one pharmacist and two technicians work. On December 5, two thousand twelve, Mr. Jorge Matamoros Calvo worked as a technician and Dr. Rafael Chaves Jiménez as a pharmacist, who for that day left at twenty-two hours. At twenty-one hours fifty-five minutes, Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez indicated to Mr. Jorge Matamoros Calvo that he had closed his Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA) login. According to the Integrated Pharmacy System, on December fifth, two thousand twelve, at twenty-two hours thirty-four minutes, prescription number 166-A was entered in the name of Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales, ID (...), who at that date did not have a clinical file at Hospital México; the prescription included the following medications: two units of lactose-free enteral formula (ENSURE), 25 ampules of testosterone, 300 tablets of oximetalona; it is indicated that the prescribing physician is Dra. Guadalupe Maroto Argüello, neonatologist of the Newborn Service of Hospital México, who states that she did not prepare that prescription and does not know the patient Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales. Prescription 166-A in the name of Ms. Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales was entered into the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA) on December fifth, two thousand twelve, but that the person who entered it registered the date as November fifth, two thousand twelve; said prescription was entered by the user 'JMATAMOROS' which belongs to Mr. Jorge Matamoros Calvo.

On the fifth day of December two thousand twelve, from twenty-two hours until six hours on the sixth day of December two thousand twelve, at the Central Pharmacy of Hospital México, the only persons working were Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez and Pharmacist Ginette Cerna Gutiérrez; however, at that time and place, the only person with the knowledge to enter prescriptions into the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA) was Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez. When searching for physical prescription number 166-A in the name of Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales, (...), it could not be found, and Pharmacist Ginette Cerna Gutiérrez states that she has no knowledge of that prescription. / THIRD: The process log report of the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA) shows that prescription 166-A in the name of Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales (...), was deleted from the system on the seventeenth day of December two thousand twelve, at twenty-one hours and fifty-nine minutes, by the user corresponding to Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, who stated via an unnumbered official document dated the twenty-first of December two thousand twelve, (...) that he did so due to human error. / FOURTH: On the ninth of January two thousand thirteen, the inventory conducted by Ms. Adriana Calvo Marín reflects a shortage of 2 units of lactose-free enteral formula (ENSURE), 27 ampoules of testosterone, 234 tablets of oximetholone, which, although two of (sic) products do not match the exact quantity of prescription 166-A, they may be associated insofar as prior to the fourth day of December two thousand twelve, there was no shortage of ENSURE, the shortage of oximetholone was equal to 70 tablets, and testosterone equal to 6 ampoules. ACCUSATION: The following is imputed to Jorge Terdencilla Martínez (...) at the level of probability: improper manipulation of the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA), entering information into the Integrated Pharmacy System for a prescription that did not exist, using the password assigned to Mr. Jorge Matamoros Calvo, entering the pass-through warehouse located in the Central Pharmacy without authorization from the Shift Supervisor Pharmacist, removing products from a restricted area as well as from the Pharmacy dispensary, failing to inform his immediate superior of his error or omission in deleting prescription 166-A in the name of Zoila Hortencia Thorpe MOrales, (...) and thereby harming the interests of the Institution, also failing to maintain loyalty to the institution by not refraining from actions that could cause moral or material harm to the institution. For performing his duties with efficiency, constancy, and diligence. For engaging in matters unrelated to the functions assigned to him. For making improper and unauthorized use of the instruments, tools, utensils, and belongings of the institution for purposes unrelated to their true function. Remaining within the premises and properties of the institution without any reason related to work or without the express authorization of his immediate superior or representatives of the institution. Using the position he holds to obtain personal advantages. Violating articles: (...) Should the facts be proven true, an objective loss of confidence on the part of the employer is caused, based on the following: By resolution 2002-00234 of 9:30 hours on May 22, two thousand two, the Constitutional Chamber referred to the necessary trust that must characterize the relations between public-sector entities and their workers: (...). / It has thus been indicated that the personal conditions valued in a specific person for hiring, as well as transparency in the performance of functions connected to or directly related to their work, must be maintained throughout the entire period of employment. The investigated individual, as a public official, is subject to an essential ethical content in his contractual relationship with the Administration, which demands conduct in accordance with ethical standards. Therefore, if no complaint about the investigated individual's work had previously been made, the fact remains that if the events are proven, at that moment the Pharmacy Directorate could lose the objective confidence placed in him, since considerable trust has been placed in Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez due to his intellectual capacity and willingness to work; he was trained in different areas and sent to courses on the Integrated Pharmacy System SIFA and was entrusted (sic) permissions in the system. The foregoing is relevant because SIFA is an institutional program whose purpose is to maintain accounting control of each Pharmacy Service, including maintenance of the medication inventory, the accounting entry and removal of each product line, and simultaneously to maintain pharmacotherapeutic control of each patient." Subsequently, the purpose of the procedure was stated, as well as a list of the evidence contained in the administrative file and the testimonial evidence to be gathered as part thereof, and his rights were enumerated to him, among other things. This Court observes no imprecision or obscurity in the drafting of the facts in terms of the elements of time, manner, and place that could have caused difficulty for the plaintiff in exercising an adequate defense, which he in fact exercised throughout the procedure with the assistance of legal counsel. Rather, the exact opposite is observed, as derived from what was stated in the brief submitted by the plaintiff himself before the body directing the procedure on May 27, 2013, visible at folios 256 to 269 of the administrative file. In short, it is clear that in essence, regarding the facts in the initial order, reference is made to specific dates and times, in which, insofar as possible, the detection of a shortage of medications removed from the area identified as the pass-through warehouse was essentially specified; that the plaintiff allegedly made unauthorized entry into that restricted area on December 4, 2012, on two occasions; that a record of a non-existent prescription was entered into the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA) when the official qualified to manipulate it was the plaintiff; that the foregoing was done using the password corresponding to the user assigned to an official who had already left the workplace, while the person who remained at that time at the site was Mr. Tardencilla and a Pharmacist not trained in manipulation of the indicated system; and that later, on December 17, 2012, the same Mr. Tardencilla proceeded to erase or delete the record of that non-existent prescription. In all cases, the information in terms of the day and hour on which it was estimated that these facts imputed to the plaintiff could have occurred was, in the opinion of this Court, sufficient and adequate given the complexity of the matter, and it is not observed from the proceedings that it could have produced the state of defenselessness of which the plaintiff accused, finding itself based on that; therefore, since his objections are unfounded, it is also not appropriate to declare the nullity of the resolution issued by the body directing the procedure at 13:00 hours on March 15, 2013; therefore, this ground is declared without merit. On this matter, it is considered that the drafting of the corresponding portion does not represent any obstacle to understanding what facts, and what legal classification regarding them, as well as the consequences that would ensue for the plaintiff if they were deemed proven; thus, an adequate defense based on the act was perfectly possible. Finally, the plaintiff was permitted to participate in all phases of the process, his rights were advised and respected, he was adequately informed of the nature and scope of the procedure, the objections and appellate remedies he raised at the time were observed, all procedural stages were respected, including knowledge of the case by the bipartite body with representation of the workers and the employer, in addition to which, no bias was observed in the proceedings that would allow asserting an associate vice regarding the purpose of the proceedings, the principle of innocence of the plaintiff also having been respected; therefore, his objection in this regard is also not accepted.- 7.- Regarding the non-existence of a vice associated with the bringing into the administrative procedure of evidence consisting of elements corresponding to a previous investigation. The plaintiff refers to a vice linked to the fact that documentation regarding a previous investigation carried out by the Judicial Investigation Agency was brought into the procedure followed against him, which was allegedly conducted without any responsibility being determined on his part for the occurrence of events in 2010 similar to those of interest, related to the removal of medications. In the plaintiff's view, this action would demonstrate an interest in damaging his honor and forming an opinion about him among the persons who were to hear his case, without reason and/or explanation for it. The plaintiff's objection is unfounded, although it was indeed credited that among the evidence added to the administrative file processed against Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, there was documentation related to an investigation carried out by the Judicial Investigation Agency in 2010, unrelated to the events that occurred in 2012 but of the same nature, that is, linked to the possible removal of medications from the pass-through warehouse, occasioned by information that was denounced at the time by the Head of Hospital Pharmacy Supply, Mr. Álvaro Bogarín, as shown in folios 35 to 44 of the administrative file, it being sufficient to state that it is not credited, first, that it had any impact within the administrative procedure followed against him, even for the purpose of the assertion made to the effect that it was brought into the procedure with the intention of harming him, an intention that is neither demonstrated, nor is the aforementioned harm observed, nor any effect that may have affected the objectivity of the persons in charge of the instruction of the process, let alone the decision-making body, none of whom even assessed that evidence, either for rendering the final report or for the issuance of the final act, both as part of the procedure's processing. Consequently, no vice whatsoever, let alone nullity in the proceedings at any level, can be derived from this.- 8.- Regarding the vices associated with the non-existence or falsehood of the facts for which the plaintiff was dismissed. The plaintiff alleged that the facts for which he was dismissed resulted from a fabrication thereof by the Administration, which does not correspond to reality. In relation to this point, the statement given in due course by Mr. Federico Jiménez was accused of being false – who, it is asserted, not only would have been the one who illegitimately ordered the investigation against him, but also, would have proposed himself as a witness – in what he affirmed about having seen the plaintiff leaving the pass-through warehouse carrying a box and, inside a box he was carrying, some medications or products.- 8.1.- Some generalities regarding the legal regime that protects the conduct of the public official. This Section IV, in its judgment number 33-2013-IV at 14:45 hours on April 23, 2013, indicated the following on the subject at hand: "V.- (...) it is necessary to start from the consideration that in Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from that of the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations emanate. Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, establishing the following: Article 191.- A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration; and Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed based on proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof. In accordance with the indicated constitutional norms, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of proper normative regulation, stability in employment – limiting the regime of free removal characteristic of private labor regulation – and an administrative career, along with the other guarantees existing for persons covered by a subordination regime, such as payment of a salary, vacations, maximum work hours, the right to strike, etc. (with the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber). Correlative to the aforementioned rights, he also possesses a series of functional obligations inherent to the public purposes sought by his activity, which must always guide his performance so as not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary responsibility. Without claiming to be exhaustive, some of the duties inherent to the public employment regime include: a) the duty of probity (art. 3 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Administration), b) the duty to comply with the principles of public service – continuity, efficiency, adaptation to change in the legal regime, and equality of treatment – (art. 4 of the General Law of Public Administration), c) the duty to ensure an adequate internal control environment (art. 39 of the General Law of Internal Control); d) the duty to protect the best interests of children (arts. 4 and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code); e) the duty to comply with the legal order (art. 13 and concordant articles of the General Law of Public Administration, art. 39.a of the Civil Service Statute); f) the duty to provide prompt response and information to the user (arts. 5 and 10 of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excessive Administrative Requirements and Procedures); g) the duty of obedience (art. 108 of the General Law of Public Administration); h) the duty to act with efficiency (art. 5 of the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets); i) the duty to maintain decorum and provide proper attention to the user (art. 114 of the General Law of Public Administration and art. 39.d) and e) of the Civil Service Statute); j) the duty to respond in case of having acted with willful intent or gross negligence (arts. 199 and 211 of the General Law of Public Administration); k) the duty to abide by the Political Constitution (art. 11 of said normative body). Additionally, in a supplementary manner and based on article 9 of the General Law of Public Administration and article 51 of the indicated Statute, the provisions of the Labor Code and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship, such as the Law on Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching, the Law Regulating Smoking, the Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, among others. In this regard, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and labor principles given the existence of a statutory and non-contractual relationship (article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration), we cannot ignore the existence of general guiding lines of the relationship that are common, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in article 19 of the Labor Code. Regarding the disciplinary regime to be applied in case of breach of said duties, in accordance with various rulings of the Constitutional Chamber, the principle of typicality becomes more flexible, meaning that a specific legal definition of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of public servants. In this sense, vote 2007-013903 at fifteen hours and twenty-five minutes on October third, two thousand seven, of the Constitutional Chamber, indicates the following: 'V.- On the principle of typicality in the disciplinary regime.- The principle of typicality is an application of the principle of legality that requires, on the one hand, the concrete delimitation of the conduct deemed reprehensible for the purposes of sanction, and on the other hand, the concrete delimitation of the possible sanctions to be applied; it can be affirmed that the principle of typicality constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary responsibility. Regarding the concrete delimitation of the reprehensible conduct, this Chamber has previously held (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 at twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes on May thirty-first, two thousand five, and resolution 94-5594 at fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four) that although this principle in this area certainly does not have the same form as in the criminal legal sphere, since faults not literally foreseen can be discretionarily sanctioned, it must always be understood that these faults are included in the text. That is, faults not literally foreseen, but which are understood to be included in the text, may be discretionarily sanctioned, provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary fault, through a procedure created for that purpose. Now, regarding the concrete delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this must be clear and previously established, without the Administration being able to create new sanctions not contemplated in the applicable norms. In summary, although it is inferred that the facts determining disciplinary faults are innumerable – since they depend on the nature of the subjects' behaviors or conduct – and that the principles "nullum crimen sine lege," "nullum poena sine lege" do not have the rigidity and demand that characterize them in substantive criminal law, it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, with regard to the principle of typicality, that the conduct be inferred from the normative text and that the sanction be – this one, indeed – clearly pre-established.' The foregoing generates what is known in doctrine as the principle of relative typification, with the understanding that the fault must be provided for in the disciplinary system, but without the level of rigor characteristic of criminal matters insofar as it derives from the specific service relationship. By reason of the above, both the breach of general functional duties and legally defined conduct (at the level of the Civil Service Statute, statutory norms specific to the regime, or the Labor Code, for example), and those contemplated in lower-ranking norms, such as those contained in autonomous service regulations or in cases where the definition refers to the sanction to be imposed, are sanctionable. This relative typification makes the need for a positive norm in the form of formal law more flexible, making it possible for its regulation to be generated by a lower-ranking positive norm. The foregoing considerations are without prejudice to the existence of a series of principles of sanctioning law derived from criminal law, which must necessarily be complied with in all cases, e.g., proportionality, non bis in idem, innocence, due process, proper reasoning of the respective resolution. In this regard, it should be noted that in matters of defining conduct that can be considered part of the duties of public officials or subject to sanction in case of breach, our country has a diffuse system, given that these are not detailed in a single normative body but dispersed among different norms of different ranks, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to issue, according to article 27 of the Regulation to the Civil Service Statute. The foregoing, in accordance with the self-normative powers of the Public Administration, and given the impossibility of regulating through the legal route each and every one of the specific behaviors incurred by public servants, and in the understanding that the exercise of regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal system. Cross-cutting this set of principles and norms of different rank, in this matter we find the public interest as a constant reference in the adoption of any formal or informal decision or conduct by the Administration with respect to its servants. Said interest, understood in accordance with article 113 of the General Law of Public Administration, provides: '1. The public servant must perform his duties in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the governed. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In assessing the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, in the first place, to which mere convenience cannot in any case be preferred.' By reason of the above, any analysis in matters of public employment must not ignore the analysis of compliance with the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference for its underlying motivation. Complementary to the above, the aforementioned regulations and principles are the sine qua non basis for determining the appropriateness or not of a specific annulment claim filed by a public servant against an administration." Regarding the matter of responsibility, the aforementioned ruling continued to state: "From said responsibilities emanates a sanctioning regime, to which the following provisions are applicable, as they are to the rest of the servants: 'Article 211.- 1. The public servant shall be subject to disciplinary responsibility for his actions, acts, or contracts contrary to the law, when he has acted with willful intent or gross negligence, without prejudice to a more severe disciplinary regime established by other laws. 2. The superior shall also respond disciplinarily for the acts of his immediate subordinates, when he and the latter have acted with willful intent or gross negligence. 3. The corresponding sanction may not be imposed without prior formation of an administrative file, with ample hearing for the servant to assert his rights and prove his innocence.' 'Article 213.- For the purposes of determining the existence and degree of fault or negligence of the official, when assessing the alleged defect of the act he opposes, or that he issues or executes, account shall be taken of the nature and hierarchy of the functions performed, it being understood that the higher the official's rank and the more technical his functions, relative to the defect of the act, the greater is his duty to be aware of it and assess it properly.' It is relevant to note that in the General Law of Public Administration, there are some cases where the Law expressly qualifies the seriousness of the infraction, such as the issuance of manifestly illegal acts (art. 199), obeying such acts (art. 199), ordering the execution of an absolutely null act (art. 170), and serious and unjustified delay in concluding an administrative procedure (art. 225). In other cases, including the omission to act with due diligence or the omission of a functional duty, it is necessary to analyze in each specific case whether the servant acted with gross negligence or willful intent in order to determine his administrative responsibility. As noted, unlike the private employment regime, which establishes a system for imputing certain more or less open-ended conduct deemed unlawful, in the case under review, there are subjective criteria of responsibility – existence of 'willful intent or gross negligence' in the conduct. Regarding the scope of said responsibility, the following was stated in the discussion of the General Law bill: 'The official will be responsible to the administration and will be responsible to the individual. We have sought to capture all of that evolution, which we consider sound. In principle, soundness consists of the official knowing that, despite being an official, he must have the same duty of prudence or diligence and respect for the rights of others as the ordinary citizen. There is no reason to punish an ordinary citizen who causes harm to another with liability, and not to punish a public employee who imprudently or negligently causes harm to an individual with equal liability. The latter is even more reprehensible to us because it is assumed that, by his condition, he must have not only more exemplary but also more controlled conduct. The final term (sic) is that one who gravely violates his duties of office actually commits punishable negligence. However, we have chosen to use two terms that have always been used in Costa Rica in the Civil Code and in many of our legal systems. Willful intent or gross negligence, which effectively means negligence that is already well-defined by the courts. Depending on each case, it is that case (sic) where, either intentionally or by running (sic) a risk, or with obvious awareness that elementary rules are being violated, harm was caused. In those cases, we consider it moral and also convenient for the good functioning of the administration, from the standpoint that it creates accountability in an official and makes him personally responsible to the individual for the harm he causes. Apart from the disciplinary responsibility he may have, this individual will answer to the administration if the administration has to pay the individual. It is a brake on carelessness and gross negligence of the administration in the performance of its duties. That is why we speak of willful intent or gross negligence. What could be called slight negligence, or professional negligence, or habitual negligence, those explainable carelessnesses in an official, those are not sanctioned. But what is gross carelessness, a forgetting of elementary rules of prudence in the performance of his duties, that is sanctioned, in favor of the injured party and before the administration...' (Proceedings No. 104 of the Permanent Commission on Government and Administration of April 3, 1970, p. 10). (...) Based on the foregoing, it is evident to this Court that for gross negligence to exist, there must be a clear, objective, and serious departure from a duty of care emanating from the law, attributable to a specific servant, which has a harmful consequence for public interests. That serious conduct or omission that departs from said legal duty may or may not have a result, given that the General Law and the administrative system provide for cases where responsibility operates regardless of the result. However, it is evident that in most cases, the determination of the existence of gross negligence is associated with some type of impact, whether on the administration itself, on third parties, or on both. Regarding the determination of its occurrence or not in these latter cases, it is viable to refer to the mechanisms used in criminal proceedings to determine whether culpable conduct has occurred in cases where there is a harmful result, which are referred to as the theory of equivalence of conditions and the conditio sine qua non theory, through which the necessary causal relationship between the omission of the objective duty of care (cause) and the harmful result (effect), necessary for the configuration of negligence, is established or ruled out. In this sense, vote 696-2003 at 11:55 on July 18, 2003, of the Court of Criminal Cassation states: '...

According to the cited theories (...) the judge must carry out an objective posthumous ex ante facto prognosis, also called hypothetical suppression and inclusion, such that in the face of various omissions of the objective duties of care, the event is mentally reconstructed, but fulfilling said duties one at a time—that is, as many reconstructions as breaches of duty are verified—with the following results: (i) if, having fulfilled the duty, the result still occurs, the causal relationship is discarded; or (ii) if, having fulfilled the duty of care, the result does not come about, the cause-and-effect relationship between the omission of the objective duty of care and the result is verified...". In the same vein, it is stated: "... the judicial mechanism for ascertaining culpable conduct is that by which the analyst places a conduct in the hypothetical scenario where the required duties of care are present and observes whether the result always occurs. If the latter occurs, the evident conclusion is that even with all the duty of care, the Result would have occurred, and therefore the conduct does not constitute a typical culpable act. On the contrary, if the analyst places the due conduct in the hypothetical scenario and the Result does not occur, then the conclusion is that the infringement of the duty of care was efficient in producing that Result, and therefore the conduct constitutes a typical culpable act" (Issa El Koury Jacob (Henry), Chirino Sánchez (Alfredo). Metodología de Resolución de Conflictos Jurídicos en Materia Penal, Ilanud, San José, 1991, page 114). Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court deems that the determination of the existence of gross negligence (culpa grave) in an administrative conduct or a specific omission attributed to a public official (servidor público) begins with a verification of the following premises: a) Existence of general or specific official duties (deberes funcionariales) that are demandable from an official, by virtue of their determination in norms of legal or regulatory scope. b) Existence of a real, objective, concrete, attributable, and demonstrated departure of the official from said demandable duty, such that this departure occurred by not conforming to the expected average fulfillment of their duty in a conscious and deliberate manner. c) Determination of the existence or not of conducts which, by their mere occurrence, can be considered as generating liability, regardless of the result caused. d) Verification of whether, by reason of the conduct, a result was caused or not to the Administration or third parties, of an administrative type (e.g., weakening of the entity's internal control system), economic, or of another nature. e) Assessment of the gravity of the departure from conduct or omission of the indicated duties. For this purpose, consideration must be given to the environment in which the conduct or omission operated, the hierarchical level of the official, the eventual damages caused, the concurrence of other acts by third parties, and the technical nature of the conduct that was due and was not performed. It is through the integrated assessment of these considerations that it will be possible to determine whether, in a specific case, disciplinary liability (responsabilidad disciplinaria) can or cannot be attributed to a particular official, taking into account that one could well incur in conduct without negligence (culpa), or despite its existence, it could be considered minor (leve), which would not generate administrative liability." Having made these considerations, the substantive analysis of the case subject to this resolution proceeds. Regarding the claim that the facts for which the plaintiff's dismissal was ordered did not exist.- [...]

8.2.- Regarding the objective loss of trust (pérdida objetiva de confianza) as a cause for dismissal. This is a subject that, although central since it founded the act of the plaintiff's dismissal, is not referenced at all by the claimant. It is one of the causes for dismissal that, although not expressly provided for in Article 81 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), has been recognized as such, mainly by the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) according to consistent case law on the matter. This premise is not restricted to those positions identified as "of trust" (de confianza), but rather covers all forms of entry into public employment. By way of example, we cite Judgment No. 2004-00967 of that Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación), from 10:35 a.m. on November 10, 2004, which reads as follows in the relevant part: "It has been repeatedly stated that the personal conditions valued in a given worker for being hired, as well as the transparency in the exercise of tasks related or directly connected to their work, due to their nature of 'intuitu personae', must be maintained throughout the entire hiring period, in addition to taking into account the type of work the employee performs; and, in the present case, justifiably, the defendant entity objectively lost trust in the official (funcionaria), due to the serious anomalies that were discovered in the processing of the policy settlement, which were recalculated in amounts far lower than those that really corresponded and that had initially been correctly set by another official. Regarding this topic, Cabanellas has indicated that 'When the acts the worker provokes justify the loss of trust, it is evident that the harmony that should prevail in the employment contract disappears, and therefore the dismissal is justified, mainly if the set of acts of the subordinate creates insurmountable mistrust. Such is the case of conducts that, without constituting a crime, cause the loss of that element which is basic in the labor relationship; even when the sanctioned disloyalty does not constitute a criminal offense nor a fault of such character, it is sufficient reason to make the continuation of the employment contract impossible. Due to this nature of the labor bond, the worker must maintain impeccable conduct inside and outside of work; when this is not the case, the element of trust placed in him disappears, and he can be dismissed with just cause... In conclusion, any fact that is susceptible to sowing the employer's distrust and that prevents the continuation of the labor relationship—within an environment without misgivings—can serve to found the termination of the employment contract.' (CABANELLAS DE TORRES, Guillermo. Compendio de Derecho Laboral, Volume I, Buenos Aires, Editorial Heliasta, S.R.L., third edition, 1992, pp. 973-974)". However, for it to be instrumentalized as a cause for dismissal without employer liability (responsabilidad patronal), although the term trust refers to a subjective situation of the employer, this does not mean that one can arrive at it by intuition or simple suspicion, in a subjective and arbitrary manner. On the contrary, it must be supported by objectively appreciable circumstances, which, in most cases, affect the good faith and fidelity that the employee owes to their employer in the employment relationship, such that the continuation of the relationship is not possible within the framework of the interests that must prevail, in the case of relationships of the type maintained with the Public Administration (Administración Pública), which are none other than the public interest. Furthermore, the decision must be consistent and proportional to the facts that are considered proven, which must be of sufficient gravity.- This preliminary investigation proceeded, and it was not until February 26, 2013, that a report with the results was rendered by the Deputy Director of Pharmacy and was sent via official memorandum FHM-0352-13 a to the Director of Pharmacy of the same hospital center, Margarita Dall´anese Ruiz. It was from this moment, therefore, that the person holding the authority to discipline the plaintiff first accessed the information that allowed her to order the opening of a disciplinary administrative procedure. The text of the report is found on folios 01 to 05, and the evidentiary material gathered during the preliminary investigation is in those from 06 to 44, all from the administrative file, including an envelope containing compact discs with video images captured by the security cameras placed in the infrastructure of the Pharmacy. That is the date from which the prescriptive (prescripción) period must consequently be calculated. On the other hand, beyond a shortage of ENSURE, certain facts distinct from that were detected, which up to that moment were associated with Mr. Tardencilla Martínez as a result of the investigation, consisting of the presumed removal of medications through unauthorized access to restricted areas within the infrastructure comprising the Central Pharmacy, as well as the entry into the computer system that controls the entry and exit of medications from the pharmacy, using a username and password assigned to another official, of false information based on a non-existent prescription, only to later delete it using his own username and password. The date of **February 26, 2013** and no other, constitutes the starting point for calculating the one-month prescriptive (prescripción) period referred to—it must be stressed—such that, having designated the members of the directing body that would conduct the procedure on February 28, 2013 (folios 47 to 51 of the administrative file), this body issued the initial resolution of the procedure on March 15, 2013 (folios 59 to 77 of the administrative file) and notified the plaintiff according to the corresponding record of notification on file at folio 78 of the administrative file, on **March 15, 2013**. Thus, it being more than evident that the one-month period referred to in Article 603 of the Labor Code was not exceeded, the allegation regarding the illegality of the actions from this perspective is without merit, such that the reproach lacks basis in that regard, and it is hereby declared without merit. It is not superfluous to indicate that, regarding the preliminary investigation, there are no exaggerated or unjustified delays that could suggest that the prescriptive mechanism (instituto prescriptivo) had occurred, nor in the procedures involving bringing the plaintiff's case to the attention of the Labor Relations Board, which, in any case, corresponds to another instance, against which what could be triggered is the expiration (caducidad) referred to in numeral 340 of the General Law of Public Administration, something that does not constitute a reproach by the claimant. Thus, prescription (prescripción) is not observed at any level.

**3.- Some considerations on the rules governing the sanctioning disciplinary administrative procedure.** The administrative procedure (Articles 308 and following of the General Law of Public Administration), when it is of a sanctioning disciplinary nature, begins in principle with the issuance of an initial resolution, which, when dealing with a procedure aimed at determining whether it is appropriate to sanction a citizen, is usually called a statement of charges (traslado de cargos). The proper formulation of this initial resolution within this type of procedure has a very close link to the necessity of observing the principle of defense and contradiction (principio de defensa y contradictorio), as well as the general rules informing the principle of due process (debido proceso). In a sanctioning administrative procedure (disciplinary or corrective), the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) constitutes the indispensable act of notifying the person under investigation of the facts that are the object of investigation against them, as well as the evidence supporting the opening of such a procedure and its legal classification, but at the same time, mention of the rights they possess within this iter and the possible legal consequence that would emerge from the final result of the procedure if those facts under scrutiny are proven. As a fundamental structure, it must contain at least the following aspects: a) identification of the body, which implies a clear indication allowing for the individualization and identification of the public agents, natural persons, who make up the directing body. This enables the protection of the right to recuse (recusar) public agents as a derivation of the principle of objectivity: Articles 230-238 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP); b) statement of charges (traslado de cargos); c) purposes of the administrative procedure, without an open-ended formula such as "to seek the real truth of the facts" being valid without identifying and specifying them concretely; d) making the administrative file available; e) summons to an oral and private hearing with due notice (Article 311 of the LGAP); f) warnings to appoint a legal representative, to define a place or means for receiving notifications; g) remedies available against the act, with details of the period within which they are available and the competent body. Regarding the factual detail, it is fundamental that this statement informs the recipient of the set of concrete and detailed facts that will be the object of investigation in the procedure. Although the object is the establishment of what the LGAP calls the real truth of the facts (verdad real de los hechos) (numerals 214, 221, 297, and 308 of that legal body), it is evident that the procedure is established as an instrument (and not an end in itself) to verify the facts that serve as the grounds (motivo) for the final act as faithfully and completely as possible, as provided in precept 221 ibidem. It could not be otherwise without such treatment causing injury to the aforementioned principle of material defense and contradiction. The final act, on the other hand, constitutes the culmination of the administrative procedure, in the terminology of the LGAP, in its normal form of termination (without prejudice to some diverse modalities of termination considered early). From that angle of examination, the grounds (motivo) of the final act as its objective material element, understood as the factual or legal premises enabling the issuance of the act and therefore its dispositive content, is determined through the procedure, which in that logic stands as the instrumental means to ascertain whether, in the particular case, the factual or legal premise that legitimizes the public action occurs or not and supports the content, that is, the operative part of the act, the effect it intends to generate in material reality. That is to say, through the procedure, it is sought to verify whether or not the facts supporting the grounds (motivo) of the act occur; the procedure determines whether the factual premise provided by the legal system to support the public conduct occurs or not, stated in other terms. Therefore, safeguarding due process and the set of principles inherent to it, this procedure serves to establish whether or not the fact occurred and its legal classification (grounds (motivo)) that justifies and validates a specific administrative will. If the fact is not proven, the effect provided for that factual cause cannot occur. Thus, for example, the sanction is appropriate for demonstrated non-compliance, where this is configured by the proof of concrete facts (in this case, by omission) so that, if those facts that hypothetically configure non-compliance are not proven, it cannot be affirmed that any obligation has been breached, ergo, the sanction would not be appropriate. It concerns the inseparable relationship between grounds (motivo) and content of the act (ordinals 132 and 133 of the LGAP), in this case nourished by the procedure, an instrument for determining the existence of the grounds for the act. In this way, in sanctioning procedures such as the one where the correct formulation of charges presented at its beginning is examined, it involves communicating to the recipient with precise detail the concrete facts attributed to them that, in the Administration's judgment, constitute a disregard of applicable regulations; duties, obligations, or, in general, legal duty situations. Thus, it is a fundamental piece within due process. Nevertheless, within its content and as a logical derivation of that necessary detail of the investigated facts, it is also necessary for the directing or investigating body to indicate the possible legal consequences of the investigated facts or possible sanction, since what is relevant is the description of the factual scenarios that cause the apparent fault, based on which the examination of their material implications and the consequence assigned to that effect by the legal system is carried out. The foregoing is so because it is the analysis of that factual picture that, once clarified and the particularities of the case weighed, will determine the appropriateness or not of the proposed sanction according to the punitive parameters initially charged. But also, it will constitute the logical axis within which the investigated subject would be expected to exercise their defense; that is, the detail of the facts and the probable sanctions, it is insisted, rest on what will constitute the elements from which the recipient will carry out their effective defense. One could raise as an objection to the stated that it is sufficient to point out the facts that are the object of the administrative cause, since, after all, the object of the procedure is to verify those facts that serve as the basis for the grounds (motivo). However, this position overlooks the fact that, although the clarification of the facts allows verifying the grounds of the act, the effect of the act emanating from its content depends on the legal classification made of those facts. The passive subject of the procedure defends themselves against the facts attributed to them, there is no doubt about that, but also against their legal classification. However, on the one hand, it must be understood that those facts, the basis of an eventual sanctioning effect, correspond in principle to be proven by the Administration and not the other way around, the object of the cause being to establish whether or not those facts occur, and not to institute a procedure for the investigated person to discredit the hypothetical truths supposedly already proven, set a priori by the investigating Administration. Nonetheless, there will be cases in which—particularly when the reproach of disciplinary responsibility corresponds to some omission or breach of duties—the most elementary rational logic would lead one to affirm that it is that administrator or agent accused of such conduct who, being in a better position to do so, must prove the same, under the protection of the constitutionally provided principle identified from Article 11 of the Political Constitution as that of accountability (rendición de cuentas). This is without prejudice to an elementary principle in public management, related to transparency, which should not violate the principle of innocence when circumstances so require. In short, the procedure is not born under this understanding to define the applicable sanction, but instead, to determine whether or not the attributed facts were committed, and whether these, once proven—should this happen—must lead to the adoption of a sanction previously warned of in the statement of charges. This is not excessive formalism as might be thought, but rather the safeguarding of what is considered a basic characteristic of due process. Omitting that aspect exposes one to doubt and uncertainty (incerteza) about the implications of the investigated facts, which undoubtedly leads to a state of vulnerability within that procedure. The exercise of defense granted for a possible sanction of admonition is not the same as that granted for a separation from the position, regardless of whether the reproached facts are the same. In essence, it is not enough to convey facts; the disciplinary outcome of those factual aspects must also be added, since it may well be the case that the defense at that opportunity is that the classification of the facts is not correct. If in the course of the procedure new facts relevant to the object of the cause appear, or the legal classification is reconsidered, the Administration is called upon to inform the recipient of these variations so that they may exercise their defense, under penalty of injury to due process and generating invalidity of the proceedings according to precept 223 of the General Law of Public Administration. Now, all the foregoing being so, it is evident that the sanction ultimately adopted must have fulfilled several premises: **a)** that it is for facts that were duly notified from the statement of charges or, in general, that were conveyed to the investigated person for their defense; **b)** that the facts constituting the administrative sanction were proven within the administrative procedure; **c)** that the person was previously notified that this investigated factual set could result in that sanction as a conditional effect; and, **d)** that the imposed sanction is the consequence that the legal system assigns to that factual grounds of the act adopted. Hence, a violation of these duties undoubtedly presupposes an injury to the principles of the procedure leading to nullity of the proceedings pursuant to the aforementioned ordinal 223. On the specific topic related to notification and imputation of charges, the jurisprudence of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: *"Due process is a complex right, comprised of a series of elements or sub-principles, such as notification and imputation of charges, defense, access to the administrative file, the ability to formulate grievances and offer evidence, the right to contradiction and mediation, due substantiation of the administrative resolution, the ability to appeal said resolutions, among others. Of particular interest for the resolution of this dispute, it is necessary to analyze the scope contained in the principle of notification. When the Administration initiates a procedure ex officio against a natural or legal person, it must expressly, precisely, and specifically indicate the facts or conduct attributed to them, as well as the possible legal consequences they would face if they were found to be true; the foregoing is what is understood by the principle of notification. Note that it is a requirement for the Administration to clearly detail the facts and conduct reputed to a subject. The purpose of this is so that the latter may adequately prepare their defense and not arrive devoid of the evidence and arguments necessary to refute what is attributed to them, or to ensure that only those facts or conduct will be examined within the procedure and not new ones for which they were not prepared to debate. Now, it is necessary for the Administration to describe the possible legal consequences that those facts or conduct would entail for them if they are proven true. Possible consequences are mentioned, because it is perfectly possible that in the development of the process, the legal effects that were anticipated undergo some type of modification due to the factual elements that were found to be proven within the respective procedure, which would imply a change in the legal consequences that at the beginning of the process, before being adequately analyzed, had been foreseen as possible. The above occurs for the simple reason that the administrative procedure's object is to find the real truth of the facts, so that once these are clearly established, or the conduct attributed to a person in the normal course of the procedure, if it were verified that the circumstances did not occur in the manner the Administration had contemplated and therefore the legal effects warned of to the citizen as possible did not come to pass, because other facts arose that were duly discussed during the development of the procedural iter, those legal consequences may vary without violating fundamental rights. Thus, although there will not necessarily be correspondence between what was notified at the beginning and what is finally ordered, there will always be correlation between the proven facts and the legal consequences derived from them."* (N° 950-F-S1-2010 of 9:50 a.m. on August 12, 2010). It must be kept in mind, from a perspective of systematic and purposive interpretation of the legal system, that while it is a requirement that at the beginning of the procedure the person investigated be informed of the facts for which they are being investigated in a clear and circumstantial manner in terms of elements such as manner, time, and place, this is so and makes sense only to prevent defenselessness (indefensión) in the citizen, ergo, in those cases where some inconsistency in this regard, despite being one, does not generate that state, a defect in the proceedings shall not be evident.

**4.- Regarding the defect associated with the official who ordered the start of the investigation.** The plaintiff reproached that the administrative procedure pursued against him began defective because the person who initiated it had an impediment to do so, being the person occupying the plaintiff's immediate superior position, and according to the institutional Labor Relations Regulations, namely, Mr. Federico Jiménez, who acted under an interim appointment substituting for Ms. Margarita Rosa Francisca Dall´anese Ruiz, this according to the provisions of Article 115, paragraph 4 of those regulations. He further reproached that in his case, there were vested interests aimed at promoting his dismissal. Initially, this allegation is not admissible, although it is evident that there is regulation on the matter in the Labor Relations Regulations of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund in its Article 115, paragraph 4, which we proceed to transcribe in the relevant part, when regulating the potential preliminary investigation phase prior to the start of the formal administrative procedure, with reference to the officials who would carry it out. The numeral reads as follows: *"The officials who make up the Preliminary Investigation Commission under no circumstances shall be from the same service where the alleged fact or alleged fault to be investigated is generated"*. It cannot go unobserved that the regulatory norm is openly illegal, as will be seen, and starts from a false premise, which is that an investigation conducted by officials from the same service in which the facts occur must be presumed, as a rule, not to be objective and impartial in carrying out that task. First, it must be indicated that according to the provisions of Article 102 of the General Law of Public Administration, the hierarchical superior not only has the authority to give orders to their subordinates (subsection a) and to discipline their faults (subsection c), but also, as is logical and reasonable, has the duty to *"monitor the action of the subordinate to verify its legality and suitability, and to use all necessary or useful means for that purpose that are not legally prohibited"* (subsection b). Suffice it to say that this hierarchical superior in relation to Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, as he himself affirms, was the Deputy Director of the Pharmacy Service, without prejudice that the authority to dismiss resided in a superior common to both, that being the Director of the same service. Thus, when the hierarchical superior was investigating what happened with a missing product, he was doing so in fulfillment of the obligations of his position and not in pursuit of harming the plaintiff; that this latter result arose along the way is a circumstantial situation. Furthermore, the indicated norm also openly collides with the provisions of the General Law of Internal Control N° 8292 regarding the duties that must be observed by whoever is in charge of a process, as in this case, the pharmacy process, as well as Law Number 8422 against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, Article 38, subsection d). The powers-duties that, in a double dimension, correspond to the hierarchical superior to exercise regarding the processes under their charge, undoubtedly carry the obligation to investigate any circumstance that could weaken the internal control system, and no regulatory norm exists that, in open collision with this system and Article 102 of the General Law of Public Administration, superimposes itself upon both normative bodies. The hierarchical superior will always be part of the service for which the subordinate provides services, so the anti-technical regulatory provision mentioned shall not be applied, under penalty of promoting its application in violation of the law, a norm of higher rank, potency, and resistance. In any case, another inherent faculty of the superior is the direction, ordering, and delegation of functions to subordinates, so nothing prevents an investigation report, on any topic that puts the internal control system at risk, from being carried out under the protection of the cited legal sources. Finally, regarding the principle of purposive interpretation and application of the legal system, no element brought by the claimant, even at an argumentative level, demonstrates that the officials who participated in the preliminary investigation carried out—not against him as will be seen—acted with a lack of objectivity and/or with the intention of harming him. Therefore, the alleged legal interest to be protected by the regulatory norm we question was not even affected, making it inappropriate to declare nullity for nullity's sake. Moreover, it is clear that the investigation was ordered by the Deputy Director of the Pharmacy Service based solely on the exclusive information concerning the shortage of two cans of ENSURE from the transit warehouse and nothing else, so any link to that situation and/or any other circumstance discovered subsequently with Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez was unknown, meaning there was no impediment, but instead, a duty imposed by law on said official to investigate, either on his own or by delegating it to other subordinates, as he indeed proceeded to do. At this same level of analysis, the fact that at some point the Director of the Pharmacy Service appointed a pharmacy service official—that is, from the same service where the plaintiff worked—as a member of the directing body does not constitute a defect based on the same analysis, as there is no element of proof whatsoever demonstrating that this official acted improperly and/or motivated by purposes alien to the public interest and the rights of the person involved. It was proven that the appointees were two officials, of whom one, namely, Dra. Daniela Aburto Varela, belongs to the Pharmacy Service (See official memorandum number FHM-408-2013 on folios 47 to 51 of the administrative file). Nevertheless, that official was relieved of that function and substituted prior to the holding of the oral and private hearing, and of course, prior to the directing body entering into any substantive analysis in the weighing of the evidence. This occurred on April 10, 2013, by memorandum FHM-0575-13 from the Pharmacy Directorate of the Hospital México, through which Dra. Daniela Aburto Varela was excused from the duty to perform tasks as a member of the Procedure's Directing Body, and in her place, Dra. Isela Araya Piedra was designated, the latter's participation not having been questioned at any level. (Folio 131 of the administrative file). Thus, the accusation linked to the idea that non-observance of the referred-to labor relations norm—which contravenes the law in the terms stated—has the power to generate any nullity in the proceedings is not admissible, as indeed this Chamber so determines in rejection of what was argued by the plaintiff.

Consistent with the foregoing, if it was intended to associate a defect such as the one related to the subject who ordered an investigation into a shortage of ENSURE in the mentioned Warehouse, and to that extent the nullity of the preparatory act identified with the preliminary investigation from which the report of facts later imputed to the plaintiff emerged, namely, official letter number FHM-0352-13 dated February 26, 2013, issued by the Deputy Director of Pharmacy of the Hospital México, Doctor Federico Jiménez Loría, the rejection of the petition is required, and it is so ruled. On the other hand, it was also alleged that some irregularity occurred because the person who ordered the preliminary investigation was at the same time received as a witness within the administrative procedure. Even accepting that the statement of that official was indeed taken in the oral and private hearing, nothing in the legal system prevents the immediate hierarchical superior of the investigated person from not only supervising the execution of tasks of the personnel under his charge—when, on the contrary, this constitutes one of his obligations—, investigating potential conduct that may generate responsibility for those officials, and eventually, if he had contact with the facts to be investigated, having his statement taken as part of the disciplinary administrative procedure. It must be added to the foregoing that, from a legal standpoint, the plaintiff did not outline any argument that allows for inferring the basis for that type of defect which, in his view, emerged from the foregoing, and therefore the objection is also inadmissible.- 5.- On the principles of classification (tipicidad), imputation (imputación), and relative congruence (congruencia relativa). On other occasions, this Court has had the opportunity to refer to the principles of classification (tipicidad), imputation (imputación), and relative congruence (congruencia relativa) in public employment matters and, of course, in administrative matters of interest, which makes it imperative to revisit them for the purposes of the case at hand. From a criminal law perspective, the principle of classification (tipicidad) relates to any conduct entailing an action or omission that conforms to the assumptions detailed and established as unlawful within a legal body under the applicable block of legality. In criminal matters, this means that for a conduct to be classified as an offense, it must appear specifically and in detail as a crime or infraction within a legal norm, understood in a broad sense, meaning a law in the formal sense, duly approved by the State's legislative body. Classification (Tipicidad) is the adaptation of the voluntary human act performed by the subject to the figure described by law as a crime. It is the adaptation, the fit, the subsumption of the voluntary human act to the type or description established by the legal system, entailing a sanction. If it fits, it is an indication that we are in the presence of a possible crime, whereas if the adaptation is not complete, there is no crime. It is said that it must appear specifically and in detail because in some countries that adopt a modern criminal law, analogy is not applicable; therefore, the conduct must be specifically detailed. In summary, the principle of imputation (imputación) is the right to a formal accusation, so that the body representing the punitive action from the beginning of the process is called upon to individualize the person who could suffer adverse consequences and to describe in detail, precisely, and clearly the act of which they are accused, as well as to make a clear legal classification of the act, indicating the legal grounds of the accusation and the specific punitive claim. This right to a formal accusation determines, for the affected person, the scope of the right of defense they wish to exercise, and it is based on this that the person considers the need to provide elements of conviction or reasoning in their favor. A correctly formulated imputation is the gateway to the possibility of an adequate defense. In other words, the correct accusation implies the ability to propose a defense strategy and, consequently, the full exercise of the right to be heard. This is the importance of procedural guarantees that seek to limit the punitive power of the State, preventing the person from being subjected to arbitrary proceedings or penalties. Whether because the State did not reliably prove their participation in an act defined by law as a crime, or because the limits imposed by the constitutional system on state punitive activity aimed at verifying it and applying the penalty were not respected. Congruence (Congruencia) is a procedural principle that underpins the guarantee of due process, which sets a path for the Judge to reach a resolution and places a limit on their discretionary power. The authority, in principle, cannot initiate ex officio the exercise of its powers, without taking into account facts or evidence not alleged by the parties, and the judgment must be limited to them, that is, only to what is requested by the parties. Congruence here manifests in the adequacy between what is requested and the judicial decision contained in the judgment. The decision must be referenced exclusively to the intervening parties, the object or petition, as well as the specific cause (grounds) in dispute, without considering aspects or evidence that the parties have not provided. When dealing with sanctioning processes, the limit is found in what was imputed and upon which the person linked to the investigation defended themselves. An incongruent resolution is arbitrary because it exceeds the authority of the public authority, whether it decides beyond what was claimed, or less than what was requested, or on matters not raised. It is worth noting that criminal law has been the maximum expression of the State's punitive power, which has been responsible for the greatest development of the subject. In employment matters, and especially in public employment, these principles have suffered a mitigation, which has been called relativity. Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in its judgment number 2007-013903 of 3:00 p.m. on October 3, 2007, stated the following: "V.- On the principle of classification (tipicidad) in the disciplinary regime.- The principle of classification is an application of the principle of legality that requires, on the one hand, the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reprehensible for the purpose of their sanction, and on the other hand, the concrete delimitation of the possible sanctions to be applied; it can be affirmed that the principle of classification constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary responsibility. Regarding the concrete delimitation of the reprehensible conduct, this Chamber has held in previous opportunities (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 of eight hours and fifty-eight minutes on May thirty-first, two thousand five, and 94-5594 of three hours and forty-eight minutes on September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four) that although certainly this principle in this area does not have the same form as in the criminal legal field, since offenses not literally provided for may be discretionarily sanctioned -it must always be understood that these offenses are included in the text-. That is, offenses not literally provided for, but understood to be included in the text, may be discretionarily sanctioned, provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary offense, through a procedure created for that purpose. Now, regarding the concrete delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this one must be clearly and previously established, and the Administration cannot create new sanctions that are not contemplated in the applicable norms. In summary, although it is inferred that the determining acts of disciplinary offenses are innumerable -since they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conduct of the subjects- and that the principles 'nullum crimen sine lege', 'nullum poena sine lege' do not have the rigidity and requirement that characterizes them in substantive criminal law, it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in attention to the principle of classification, that the conduct be inferred from the normative text and that the sanction be -this one must be- clearly pre-established." (The highlighting and underlining are not from the original). As a result of the foregoing, both the breach of general functional duties and legally classified conducts (at the level of the Civil Service Statute, specific statutory norms of the regime, or the Labor Code, for example) are sanctionable, as well as those contemplated in norms of a lower rank, such as those contained in autonomous service regulations or in cases where the classification is given with respect to the sanction to be imposed. This relative classification relaxes the need for positive norms in the nature of formal law, making it possible for their regulation to be generated by a positive norm of lower rank. In the manner indicated, one can see that, compared to criminal law, the exercise of the State's punitive power, insofar as it can affect the most essential goods of the person, such as life (in places where the death penalty is accepted), physical integrity, and freedom of movement (such as imprisonment) and even property (such as confiscation), seeks to guarantee for the Administered person not only the greatest resources but also the most technical mechanisms for the fulfillment of the three principles, which leads to a level of rigor unknown in other areas of law. In the remaining areas of sanctioning law, the same principles apply but evidently with a lower level of rigor, the most relevant thing being attending to the purpose pursued by the public legal system (the exercise of the right of defense) and not the means (the measured exposition of the principle). By way of example then, while criminal law requires rigorous classification (tipicidad), in sanctioning administrative law, it is permitted that the norm be complemented or integrated from regulatory provisions, all based on a special relationship of subjection. Furthermore, the issuance of more generic categories is legitimate as long as the right of defense is allowed. The same situation occurs with the principle of imputation (imputación), insofar as if all the elements of manner, time, and place are not present when describing the conduct, these can be omitted, as long as, of course, the elements provided allow the exercise of the right of defense. Stated another way, provided a true state of defenselessness is not generated. Finally, regarding the principle of congruence (congruencia), the generation of a sanction is allowed based on aspects not clearly described in the imputation, to the extent that the unlawfulness of the conduct is extracted, it was mentioned in the statement of charges, and the exercise of the right of defense was allowed. To which must be added that what is imputed and eventually punished are not legal classifications but human conducts, so that one could have been imputed for one offense and sanctioned for another, to the extent that the factual description covers them. When dealing with the omission of the fulfillment of official duties, it must also be taken into account that with omissive conduct, there are countless ways in which it manifests itself, which can be specified to a lesser or greater degree, so that the level of description will always be defined according to the active conduct that is reproached for not having been displayed. Now, if we transfer what has been said, mutatis mutandi, to the administrative sphere and more specifically regarding the validity of the administrative act that imposes an administrative sanction, there must undoubtedly be a correspondence between the facts imputed and intimated to the alleged offender, their verification and proof in the administrative procedure, and their correspondence in the final act, such that there is a relationship of identity between what is accused and the sanction imposed.- 6.- On the non-existence of a defect associated with an improper act of statement of charges, as well as with the obstruction of the right of defense during the administrative procedure. On this particular point, the plaintiff alleged that the statement of charges does not provide an account, in terms of the day and time, in which the facts for which he was investigated would have been located, which would have affected the exercise of his defense. Without prejudice to the fact that the objection was formulated vaguely, according to the evidence appearing on pages 59 to 77 of the administrative file, it is established that by resolution issued at 1:00 p.m. on March 15, 2013, the directing body of the procedure issued the so-called "initial statement of charges order" as part of the procedure to be followed against Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, in which the following was reported: "Facts: (...) FIRST: Three shifts are worked in the Pharmacy of Hospital México, the third shift runs from twenty-two hundred hours to six hundred hours and only one pharmacist and one technician work. Within the Central Pharmacy is located (sic) an area called 'passthrough warehouse' where the necessary medications are stored to supply the main dispatch and other restricted medications; entry is only permitted to pharmacists, therefore access to technicians and any other personnel is prohibited; they may only enter with prior authorization from the pharmacist on duty; furthermore, there is a sign on the door that reads 'authorized personnel only'. The protocol for entering that passthrough warehouse on the third shift is as follows: if entry is required, one must request the company of the pharmacist and manager and a security guard. In the month of December two thousand twelve, Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez had the Sunday to Friday schedule from twenty-two hundred hours to six hundred hours, in the position of Health Technician in Pharmacy 3, where his functions were to enter prescription information into the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA), collection of medications, attend the window, return of medications to the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA), any other function assigned according to service needs, which he was to perform within the Central Pharmacy of Hospital México. On December 3, two thousand twelve, Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez began his duties at twenty-two hundred hours; on December 4, two thousand twelve, he entered the passthrough warehouse on two occasions, as follows: at 01:55:52.75 hours, he enters it; at 01:57:52.7 hours, he leaves the passthrough warehouse and heads towards the warehouse area. At 01:58:31.55 hours, he leaves the warehouse corridor and heads towards the corridor between Farmacotecnia and the passthrough warehouse and immediately turns left and enters the passthrough warehouse at 01:58:35.85 hours. He leaves the passthrough warehouse at 01:58:50.70 hours with a cardboard box in his left hand; said box contained a product inside, and he heads towards the medication collection area. All of the above is carried out without authorization from the pharmacist on duty, who was Dr. Ginette Cerna Gutiérrez. At eleven forty-seven hours on December 4, two thousand twelve, Miss Adriana Calvo Marín, via email, informed Dr. Federico Jiménez Loría that a shortage of two jars of lactose-free enteral formula (ENSURE) had been detected, which are stored in the passthrough warehouse, and also that on that day the door of that warehouse had been found open. / SECOND: That the three shifts are worked in the Pharmacy of Hospital México, the second shift runs from fourteen hundred hours to twenty-two hundred hours and only one pharmacist and two technicians work. On December 5, two thousand twelve, Mr. Jorge Matamoros Calvo worked as a technician and Dr. Rafael Chaves Jiménez as Pharmacist, who for that day left at twenty-two hundred hours. At twenty-one fifty-five hours, Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez told Mr. Jorge Matamoros Calvo that he had closed his password for the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA). According to the Integrated Pharmacy System, on December 5, two thousand twelve, at twenty-two thirty-four hours, prescription number 166-A was entered in the name of Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales, ID (...), who at that time had no clinical file at Hospital México; the prescription included the following medications: two units of lactose-free enteral formula (ENSURE), 25 ampoules of testosterone, 300 tablets of oxymetholone; it is indicated that the prescribing physician is Dr. Guadalupe Maroto Argüello, neonatologist of the Newborn Service of Hospital México, who states not having made up that prescription and not knowing the patient Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales. Prescription 166-A in the name of Mrs. Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales was entered into the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA) on December 5, two thousand twelve, but the person who entered it recorded the date November 5, two thousand twelve; said prescription was entered by the user 'JMATAMOROS' which belongs to Mr. Jorge Matamoros Calvo. On December 5, two thousand twelve, from twenty-two hundred hours until six hundred hours on December 6, two thousand twelve, the only persons working in the Central Pharmacy of Hospital México were Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez and Pharmacist Ginette Cerna Gutiérrez; however, at that time and place, the only person with the knowledge to enter prescriptions into the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA) was Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez. When looking for the physical prescription number 166-A in the name of Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales, (...), it was not possible to find it, and Pharmacist Ginette Cerna Gutiérrez states having no knowledge of that prescription. / THIRD: The process log report of the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA) shows that prescription 166-A in the name of Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales (...), was deleted from the system on December seventeen, two thousand twelve, at twenty-one fifty-nine hours, by the user corresponding to Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, who stated in a document without an official letter number, dated December twenty-one, two thousand twelve, (...) that he did it due to human error. / FOURTH: On January 9, two thousand thirteen, the inventory carried out by Miss Adriana Calvo Marín reflects a shortage of 2 units of lactose-free enteral formula (ENSURE), 27 ampoules of testosterone, 234 tablets of oxymetholone; although two of the products do not match the exact quantity on prescription 166-A, they can be associated to the extent that prior to December 4, two thousand twelve, there was no shortage of ENSURE, the shortage of oxymetholone was equal to 70 tablets, and testosterone equal to 6 ampoules. IMPUTATION: Jorge Terdencilla Martínez is imputed in degree of probability (...), improper manipulation of the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA), entering into the Integrated Pharmacy System information for a prescription that did not exist, using the password assigned to Mr. Jorge Matamoros Calvo, entering the passthrough warehouse located in the Central Pharmacy without the authorization of the Shift Manager, removing products both from a restricted area and from the Pharmacy dispatch, failing to inform the immediate superior of his error or omission in deleting prescription 166-A in the name of Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales, (...) and in that way harming the interests of the Institution, also not maintaining loyalty to the institution, failing to refrain from actions that may cause moral or material harm to the institution. For failing to perform tasks with efficiency, consistency, and diligence. For devoting himself to matters unrelated to the functions entrusted to him. For making improper and unauthorized use of the instruments, tools, utensils, and belongings of the institution for purposes unrelated to their true purpose. For remaining within the facilities and properties of the institution without any reason related to work or without express authorization from his immediate superior or representatives of the institution. For using his position to obtain personal advantages. Violating articles: (...) If the facts are proven true, it causes the objective loss of trust by the employer, for the following reasons: Through resolution 2002-00234 of 9:30 a.m. on May 22, two thousand two, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) referred to the necessary trust that must characterize relations between public sector entities and their workers: (...). / In this way, it has been indicated that the personal conditions valued in a given person to be hired, as well as transparency in the exercise of tasks related or directly connected to his work, must be maintained throughout the entire employment. The investigated person, as a public official, is subject to an essential ethical content in his contractual relationship with the Administration, which requires behavior in accordance with ethical standards. Therefore, if previously there had been no complaints about the work of the investigated person, the truth is that if the facts are proven, at that moment the Pharmacy Directorate could lose the objective trust placed in him, since a great deal of trust has been placed in Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez due to his intellectual capacity and willingness to work; he was trained in different areas and sent to courses on the Integrated Pharmacy System SIFA and was entrusted with permissions in the system. The foregoing is relevant because SIFA is an institutional program whose purpose is to keep an accounting control of each Pharmacy Service, which involves maintaining the medication inventory, the accounting entry and exit of each product line, and at the same time keeping a pharmacotherapeutic control of each patient"; subsequently, the purpose of the procedure was expressed, as well as a list of the evidence in the administrative file and the testimonial evidence to be taken as part of it, and his rights were listed, among other things. This Court observes no imprecision or obscurity in the drafting of the facts in terms of the elements of time, manner, and place that could have generated difficulty for the plaintiff in exercising an adequate defense, which he in fact exercised throughout the procedure with the assistance of legal counsel. On the contrary, the opposite is observed as a derivation from what was expressed in the brief presented by the plaintiff himself before the directing body of the procedure, on May 27, 2013, visible on pages 256 to 269 of the administrative file. Ultimately, it is clear that in substance, regarding the facts in the initial order, reference is made to specific dates and times, in which, to the extent possible, the following were substantively specified: the detection of a shortage of medications that were extracted from the identified passthrough warehouse; that the plaintiff would have made unauthorized entry into this restricted area on December 4, 2012, on two occasions; that a record was entered for a non-existent prescription in the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA) when the official with the conditions to manipulate it was the plaintiff; that the foregoing was carried out using the password corresponding to the user assigned to an official who had already left the workplace, while the one remaining at that time on site was Mr. Tardencilla and a Pharmacist not trained in manipulating the indicated system; and that later, on December 17, 2012, the same Mr. Tardencilla proceeded to delete or eliminate the record of that non-existent prescription.

In all cases, the information regarding the day and time when these acts attributed to the plaintiff were estimated to have possibly occurred was, in the opinion of this Court, sufficient and adequate given the complexity of the matter. It is not observed from the proceedings that this could have generated the state of defenselessness alleged by the plaintiff; rather, it was found otherwise. Therefore, as the plaintiff is not correct in his objections, it is also inappropriate to declare the annulment of the resolution issued by the procedural directing body at 1:00 p.m. on March 15, 2013, and this point is therefore dismissed. Regarding this particular aspect, it is considered that the wording of the corresponding section neither represents any obstacle to understanding what facts and what legal characterization apply to them, nor the consequences that proving them would entail for the plaintiff, such that an adequate defense based on the act was perfectly possible. Finally, the plaintiff was permitted to participate in all phases of the process, his rights were explained to him and were respected, he was adequately informed of the nature and scope of the procedure, the objections and appeals he raised at the time were observed, all procedural (procedimentales) stages were respected, including the hearing of the case by the bipartite body with representation of the workers and the employer. Added to this, no bias was observed in the proceedings that would permit affirming a defect associated with the purpose of the proceedings. Furthermore, the principle of innocence regarding the plaintiff was respected, making his objection in this regard also without merit.- 7.- Regarding the non-existence of a defect associated with the introduction into the administrative procedure of evidence consisting of elements from a prior investigation. The plaintiff refers to a defect he links to the fact that, in the proceeding brought against him, documentation from a prior investigation conducted by the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) was introduced as evidence. This investigation was reportedly carried out without determining any responsibility on his part for the occurrence of events in 2010 of the same nature as those at issue, related to the theft of medications. In the plaintiff's opinion, this action was intended to prove an interest in harming his honor and forming a biased opinion of him among those who were to hear his case, without motive and/or explanation. The plaintiff is not correct in his objection, even though it was indeed proven that among the evidence added to the administrative file processed against Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, there was documentation related to an investigation carried out by the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) in 2010. This investigation was unrelated to the events that occurred in 2012 but was of the same nature, that is, linked to the possible theft of medications from the transit warehouse, following information that was reported at the time by the Head of the Hospital Pharmacy Supply Department, Mr. Álvaro Bogarín, as stated in folios 35 through 44 of the administrative file. It is sufficient to note, first, that it has not been proven that this had any influence on the administrative proceeding brought against him, even regarding the assertion that it was introduced into the proceeding with the intent to harm him—an intent that is not demonstrated, nor is the alleged harm observed. Nor is any effect observed that would have influenced the objectivity of the persons in charge of the process's instruction, much less that of the decision-making (decisor) body, none of whom even took this evidence into consideration, either when issuing the final report or when issuing the final act, both as part of the process's procedure. Consequently, no defect can be deduced from this, much less nullity in the proceedings at any level.- 8.- Regarding the defects associated with the non-existence or falsity of the facts for which the plaintiff was dismissed. The plaintiff alleged that the facts for which he was dismissed were fabricated by the Administration, and do not correspond to reality. In relation to this point, the statement rendered in due course by Mr. Federico Jiménez was accused of being false—it is asserted that he not only would have illegitimately ordered the investigation against the plaintiff, but also would have proposed himself as a witness—in what he affirmed regarding having seen the plaintiff leave the transit warehouse carrying a box, and inside that box, some medications or products.- 8.1.- Some generalities regarding the legal regime that protects the conduct of the public employee. This Section IV, in its judgment number 33-2013-IV of 2:45 p.m. on April 23, 2013, stated the following on the subject at hand: "V.- (...) it is necessary to start from the consideration that in Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations derive. Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction by establishing the following: Article 191.- A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration; and Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed on the basis of proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof. In accordance with the indicated constitutional-level norms, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of a specific regulatory framework, stability in employment—limiting the free removal regime inherent in private labor regulation—and an administrative career, along with the other guarantees existing for persons protected under a subordination regime, such as the payment of a salary, vacations, maximum work hours, the right to strike, etc. (noting the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)). Correlative to the foregoing rights, the servant also possesses a series of professional obligations inherent to the public ends sought through their activity, which must always guide their management so as not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary responsibility. Without intending to be exhaustive, some of the duties specific to the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (Art. 3, Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Administration), b) duty to comply with the principles of public service—continuity, efficiency, adaptation to changes in the legal regime, and equality of treatment—(Art. 4, General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), c) duty to ensure an adequate internal control environment (Art. 39 of the General Law of Internal Control), d) duty to protect the best interests of children (Art. 4 and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code), e) duty to comply with the legal system (Art. 13 and concordant articles of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), Art. 39.a of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil)), f) duty to give prompt response and information to the user (Art. 5 and 10 of the Law for the Protection of the Citizen from Excessive Bureaucratic Requirements and Procedures), g) duty of obedience (Art. 108 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), h) duty to act with efficacy (Art. 5 of the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets); i) duty to maintain decorum and provide due attention to the user (Art. 114 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and Art. 39. d) and e) of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil)); j) duty to respond in case of having acted with intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) (Art. 199 and 211 General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)); k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) (Art. 11 of said normative body). Additionally, in a suppletory manner and based on Article 9 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and Article 51 of the indicated Statute, the provisions of the Labor Code and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship, such as the Law on Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching, the Law Regulating Smoking, the Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, among others. In this vein, while in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles in labor matters, given the existence of a statutory and not contractual relationship (Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), the existence of general guiding lines for the relationship that are common cannot be ignored, such as the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in Article 19 of the Labor Code. Regarding the disciplinary regime applicable in case of breach of said duties, in accordance with various votes of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the principle of specificity becomes more lax, such that a specific legal description of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of the servants. In this sense, vote 2007-013903, of three twenty-five p.m. on October third, two thousand seven, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), states the following: 'V.- Regarding the principle of specificity in the disciplinary regime.- The principle of specificity is an application of the principle of legality that requires, on the one hand, the concrete definition of the conduct deemed reprehensible for purposes of its sanction, and on the other hand, the concrete definition of the possible sanctions to apply. It can be affirmed that the principle of specificity constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary responsibility. Regarding the concrete definition of the reprehensible conduct, this Chamber has held on previous occasions (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 of eight fifty-eight p.m. on May thirty-first, two thousand five, and 94-5594 of three forty-eight p.m. on September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four) that although it is true this principle does not have the same form in this area as in the criminal legal field, since faults not literally provided for can be discretionarily sanctioned, it must always be understood that these faults are included in the text. That is to say, faults not literally provided for, but understood as included in the text, may be discretionarily sanctioned, provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary offense, through a procedure created for that purpose. Now then, regarding the concrete definition of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this must be clear and previously established, without the Administration being able to create new sanctions not contemplated in the applicable norms. In summary, although it is inferred that the determining facts of disciplinary offenses are innumerable—since they depend on the nature of the subjects' behaviors or conducts—and that the principles 'nullum crimen sine lege', 'nullum poena sine lege' do not have the rigidity and requirement that characterize them in substantive criminal law, it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in attention to the principle of specificity, that the conduct be inferred from the normative text and that the sanction be—this one must be—clearly pre-established.' The foregoing generates what in doctrine is known as the principle of relative specificity, with the understanding that the offense must be provided for in the disciplinary system, but without the level of rigor characteristic of criminal matters, insofar as it derives from the specific employment relationship. By reason of the above, both the breach of general functional duties and legally defined conducts (at the level of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), statutory norms of the regime, or the Labor Code, for example) are sanctionable, as well as those contemplated in lower-ranking norms, such as those contained in autonomous service regulations or in cases where the definition refers to the sanction to be imposed. This relative specificity makes the need for a positive norm in the character of a formal law more flexible, making it possible for its regulation to be generated by a positive norm of lower rank. The foregoing considerations are without prejudice to the existence of a series of principles of sanctioning (sancionatorio) law derived from criminal law, the compliance with which is necessary in all cases, e.g., proportionality, non bis in idem, innocence, due process, and due reasoning (fundamentación) of the respective resolution. In this vein, it should be noted that in terms of defining conducts that can be considered part of the duties of public employees or subject to sanction in case of non-compliance, our country has a diffuse system, given that these are not detailed in a single normative body, but are dispersed among different norms of varying rank, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to issue, according to Article 27 of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil). The foregoing, in accordance with the self-regulatory powers of the Public Administration, and given the impossibility that all and every one of the specific conducts incurred by public servants could be regulated through legal means, and with the understanding that the exercise of regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the sup-legal system. Crossing this set of principles and norms of different rank, in this matter we find the public interest as a constant reference in the adoption of any formal or informal decision or conduct of the Administration with respect to its servants. Said interest, understood in accordance with Article 113 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), provides: '1. The public servant must perform their functions in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In assessing the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be considered, in the first place, to which mere convenience can in no case be preordained.' By reason of the above, any analysis in matters of public employment must not ignore the analysis of the fulfillment of the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference point of its underlying motivation. Complementary to the above, the aforementioned norms and principles are the sine qua non basis for determining the appropriateness or not of a specific annulment claim, presented by a public servant against an administration." Regarding the matter of liability, the indicated judgment continued stating that: "From said liability emanates a sanctioning (sancionatorio) regime, to which, as with the rest of the servants, the following provisions are applicable: 'Article 211.- 1. The public servant shall be subject to disciplinary responsibility for their actions, acts, or contracts contrary to the legal system, when they have acted with intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave), without prejudice to a more severe disciplinary regime provided by other laws. 2. The superior shall also be disciplinarily responsible for the acts of their immediate subordinates, when they and these latter have acted with intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). 3. The corresponding sanction may not be imposed without the prior formation of a case file (expediente), with ample hearing provided to the servant to assert their rights and demonstrate their innocence.' 'Article 213.- For the purposes of determining the existence and degree of the fault or negligence of the employee, when evaluating the presumed defect of the act to which they object, or which they issue or execute, the nature and hierarchy of the functions performed must be taken into account, it being understood that the higher the employee's hierarchy and the more technical their functions, in relation to the defect of the act, the greater their duty to know and duly assess it.' It is relevant to indicate that in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), there are some cases where the Law expressly qualifies the seriousness of the infraction, such as the issuance of manifestly illegal acts (Art. 199), obeying said acts (Art. 199), ordering the execution of an absolutely null act (Art. 170), and the serious and unjustified delay in concluding an administrative procedure (Art. 225). In other cases, including the omission to act with due diligence or the omission of a functional duty, it is necessary to analyze in each specific case whether the servant acted with gross negligence (culpa grave) or intent (dolo) for the purpose of determining their administrative responsibility. As is noted, unlike the private employment regime where a system of imputation of certain more or less open conducts considered unlawful is established, in the case under examination, there are subjective criteria of responsibility—existence of 'intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave)' in the conduct. Regarding the scope of said responsibility, in the discussion of the draft of the General Law, the following was stated: 'The employee will be liable to the administration and will be liable to the individual. We have wanted to take all of that evolution that we consider is healthy. In principle, the healthy thing consists of the employee knowing that, despite being an employee, they must have the same duty of prudence or diligence and respect for the rights of others as the common citizen. There is no reason to punish with liability a common citizen who causes harm to another, and not to punish with equal liability a public employee who imprudently, negligently causes harm to an individual. The latter seems even more punishable to us because it is presumed that by their condition, they must have not only more exemplary but also more controlled conduct. The term such (sic), is that whoever gravely violates their duties of office in reality commits a punishable negligence. However, we have opted to use two terms that in Costa Rica have always been used in the Civil Code and in many of our legal systems. Intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave), which effectively means a fault that is already very defined by the courts. Depending on each case, it is that case (sic) where either intentionally or by taking a risk, or with obvious awareness that elementary rules are being violated, harm was caused. In those cases, we consider that it is moral and also convenient for the smooth functioning of the administration, from the viewpoint that it creates responsibility in an employee and that they be personally liable to the individual for the harm caused. Apart from the disciplinary liability that they may have, this person will be liable to the administration if the administration has to pay the individual. It is a check on carelessness, the gross negligence of the administration in the performance of its functions. That is why we speak of intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). What could be called minor negligence (culpa leve) or professional negligence or habitual negligence, those explainable carelessnesses in an employee, those are not sanctioned. But what is a serious carelessness, a forgetting of elementary rules of prudence in the performance of their duties, that is sanctioned on behalf of the offended party and before the administration...' (Record No. 104 of the Permanent Commission on Government and Administration (Comisión Permanente de Gobierno y Administración) of April 3, 1970, p. 10). (...) By reason of the above, it is evident to this Court that for gross negligence (culpa grave) to exist, there must be a clear, objective, and serious departure (apartamiento) from a duty of care emanating from the law, attributable to a determined servant that has a harmful consequence to public interests. That serious conduct or omission that departs from that legal duty may or may not have a result, as the General Law and the administrative legal system provide for cases where, regardless of the result, liability operates. However, it is evident that in most cases, the determination of the existence of gross negligence (culpa grave) is associated with some type of impact, whether to the administration itself, to third parties, or to both. Regarding the determination of its occurrence or not in these latter cases, it is viable to refer to the mechanisms used in criminal court to determine if culpable conduct has occurred in cases where there is a harmful result, mechanisms known as the theory of the equivalence of conditions and the theory of conditio sine qua non, through which the necessary causal link between the omission of the objective duty of care (cause) and the harmful result (effect) is established or ruled out, which is necessary for the configuration of negligence (culpa). In this sense, vote 696-2003 of 11:55 a.m. on July 18, 2003, of the Criminal Cassation Tribunal states: '... According to the said theories (...) the judge must make a retrospective objective prognosis (prognosis postuma ex ante facto), also called hypothetical suppression and inclusion, such that when faced with several omissions of objective duties of care, the event is mentally reconstructed, but fulfilling those duties one at a time, that is, as many reconstructions as breaches of duty are verified, with the following results: (i) if, with the duty fulfilled, the result still occurs, the causal link is ruled out; or (ii) if, with the duty of care fulfilled, the result would not occur, the cause-effect relationship between the omission of the objective duty of care and the result is verified...' In the same sense, it is stated: '... the judicial mechanism for investigating culpable conduct is that by which the analyst places a conduct in the factual scenario where the required duties of care exist and observes whether the result still occurs. If the latter occurs, the obvious conclusion is that even with all the duty of care, the Result would have occurred, thus the conduct is not typical of negligence (culpa). On the contrary, if the analyst places the due conduct in the factual scenario and the Result does not occur, then the conclusion is that the infraction of the duty of care was effective for producing that Result, and therefore the conduct is typical of negligence (culpa)' (Issa El Khoury Jacob (Henry), Chirino Sánchez (Alfredo). Methodology for the Resolution of Legal Conflicts in Criminal Matters, Ilanud, San José, 1991, page 114). Based on the above considerations, this Court considers that the determination of the existence of gross negligence (culpa grave) in an administrative conduct or specific omission attributed to a public servant starts from a verification of the following assumptions: a) Existence of general or specific professional duties, which are exigible of a servant, by virtue of their determination in norms of legal or regulatory scope. b) Existence of a real, objective, concrete, attributable, and demonstrated departure (apartamiento) of the servant from said exigible duty, such that it occurred by not conforming to the expected average compliance with their duty in a conscious and deliberate manner. c) Determination of the existence or not of conducts that, by their mere occurrence, can be considered as generating responsibility, regardless of the result caused. d) Verification of whether, on account of the conduct, a result was caused or not for the Administration or third parties, of an administrative type (e.g., weakening of the entity's internal control system), economic, or of another order. e) Assessment of the seriousness of the departure (apartamiento) of the conduct or omission from the indicated duties.

**VII.- On the dismissal of the claim in its entirety.** It is the criterion of this Court that the claims formulated must be dismissed in their totality in the specific case, based on the following reasoning:

**1.- On the statute of limitations (*prescripción*) for the exercise of disciplinary sanctioning power by the Public Administration.** Within the range of possible manifestations of the will of the Public Administration is that which corresponds to its sanctioning, corrective, and/or disciplinary power. In doctrine, it could be defined as *"a power of an authentically repressive nature, exercised upon a violation or disturbance of pre-established rules"* based on the recognition of a power of imperium natural or inherent to the State, that is, the *"single ius puniendi of the State."* (CANO CAMPOS (Tomás). Derecho Administrativo Sancionador [Sanctioning Administrative Law], Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, Madrid, Nº43, January-April 1995, p. 339. Also, Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgments Nº 1265-95 of 3:36 p.m. on March 7, 1995; 1264-95 of 3:03 p.m. on March 7 of the same year, and 8193-2000 of 3:05 p.m. on September 13, 2000). This power - clearly - can be projected within the framework of a legal public employment relationship (disciplinary power) concerning the activities of the individual in their capacity as a public agent or official, in which case, by finalist principle, it is deployed with the object of compelling and ensuring, preventively and repressively, compliance with the legal duties that this type of relationship imposes on the server according to the function or position held. (See in this regard resolution Nº 479-97 of the Constitutional Chamber, as well as opinion C-159-2000 of July 20, 2000, of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic [Procuraduría General de la República]). Now, whether it is the exercise of a power of imperium or not, the legal system provides for certain limitations on its exercise, one of which is of a temporal nature, that is, determined as a function of time for its exercise, which leads us to the analysis of two possible legal institutes that share certain common traits, such as expiration (*caducidad*) and statute of limitations (*prescripción*), of which the latter interests us. The plaintiff, regarding this topic, limited himself to affirming that in the specific case, it should be declared that the statute of limitations had run for the exercise of the disciplinary power against him, based on the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code, for which he starts, regarding the computation provided for in the rule, from the date of the occurrence of the facts for which the plaintiff was investigated. Well, the legal institute of the negative statute of limitations (*prescripción negativa*) is provided for as one of the modes of extinguishing obligations, and the correlative action for it to operate requires the mere passage of a certain time without the holder of the right promoting any type of action for its claim. Through this figure, the aim is to provide legal relationships with a framework within which each of the linked subjects can operate in a framework of certainty, this being one of the values protected by the legal system as a principle. Thus, both obligations and the correlative right of action expire by statute of limitations (*prescriben*) in accordance with the legal system, and to that extent also, the possibility of exercising powers, even when in specific cases these are powers of imperium, when their holder is the Public Administration. The statute of limitations (*prescripción*), in general terms, supposes the concurrence of three fundamental presuppositions: a) the inertia of the holder of a right in exercising it when they are in a position to do so; b) the passage of the time set for this purpose by the legal system; and, c) the allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship, asserting that statute of limitations. This leads to the affirmation that there is no liberatory effect if, despite the concurrence of the first two presuppositions, the allegation is not articulated or formulated, since asserting that prescriptive effect or not is waivable or available. That is, the statute of limitations is subject to a rogatory principle, a situation different from that which occurs in the case of expiration (*caducidad*) (in procedural terms such as the one that concerns us), a framework in which it is possible to say that, while expiration is susceptible to being declared ex officio, the statute of limitations must be alleged by the party. Regarding public employment relationships, the exercise of this power, in principle, resides with the head of each organization vis-à-vis their officials, upon the commission of sanctionable offenses. The statute of limitations (*prescripción*) stands against this as a factor of temporality after which, if the person who has the power to discipline has not done so in a proper manner, such exercise cannot be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be stated, varies depending on the regulated matter, since there is not a single legal regime for public employment, given that we find specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, that disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of subsection c) of Article 102 of the General Law of the Public Administration [Ley General de la Administración Pública] is not unrestricted in time.

Unlike other public powers that, due to their teleological nature, are considered imprescriptible, those referring to the internal sanctioning (sancionatorio) exercise, such as the one examined in this case, are subject to rules of temporality by virtue of which they may expire. In this type of relationship, the holder of this attribution is, in principle, the administrative superior (jerarca administrativo), while the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly established by the applicable regulations, upon the expiration of which, their power to request recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power emerges. It is necessary to point out the existence of various scenarios in which the legal concept (instituto) can be applied in disciplinary matters. The statute of limitations (prescripción) for the exercise of disciplinary power refers to the period established by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the procedural (procedimentales) measures of the case that allow them to issue the final decision. It is the maximum period within which the opening of the administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo) directed (direccionado) at establishing the appropriateness or not of sanctioning must be ordered. In this line of thought, it must be borne in mind that the notification to the investigated party of the opening of the procedure is what would be capable of generating an interrupting effect on that temporal margin, to the extent that it constitutes an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of the referred power; an interrupting effect that will be maintained while the administrative procedure is in process, underway, active, and has not lapsed (Article 340 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)). It must be kept in mind that, as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is an unavoidable condition for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative cause—the procedure prior to the issuance of the final act, it is insisted—to establish whether or not the sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of the provisions set forth in Articles 214, 221, 297, and 308 of the General Law of Public Administration. For the specific case of employees subject to the Civil Service Regime, by express referral of Article 51 of the Statute of that matter, the statute of limitations period is provided for in Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which reads as follows: *"The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults are barred by the statute of limitations in one month, which shall begin to run from the date the cause for separation arose or, as the case may be, from the date the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known."* However, it must be noted that this is a rule that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate different rules regarding this aspect, as is the case provided for in the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía), No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, as well as in Laws No. 8292 (in its Article 43), 8422 (Article 44), and 8131 (Article 112) regarding the oversight of public finances. Now then, it is clear that the expiration of the period granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the grounds for interruption established by Article 876 of the Civil Code, by referral made by Article 601, first paragraph, of the Labor Code. The interruption only occurs, of course, to the extent that it happens before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, because even if they occur, if the period has expired, the simple allegation of negative statute of limitations leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded (precluido) by inertia in its exercise. It is well-established legal doctrine that only an unfulfilled statute of limitations can be interrupted. Nevertheless, it must be insisted that the interruption does not occur with the simple opening of the procedure, but with the proper communication of the order (auto) that deems the cause initiated, in accordance with Articles 140, 239, 240, 243 of the General Law of Public Administration. Finally, once the interruption has occurred, the period begins to run again. Another aspect that must be clarified is that linked to the moment from which the period should be computed. Article 603 cited above indicates that the period runs from the date the cause for separation arose or, failing that, **from the date the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known**. In this sense, the monthly period is computed from the moment in which the holder of the corrective power is in an objective possibility of knowing the fault and, therefore, in a position to be able to undertake the exercise of their power; before that, as a logical consequence, the exercise of such power would not be demandable of them, under penalty of admitting odious margins of impunity arising from the concealment—natural in the offender in more cases than not—of their reprehensible conduct. It must also be considered that when the particularities of the case require the conduct of a prior preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar) to be able to place the holder of the power in a position to exercise it, the duration of which, it is noted, also cannot be unjustifiably excessive, the aforementioned monthly period runs from the moment in which the results of that preparatory exercise—which is not part of the formal administrative procedure regulated in Article 308 and following of the General Law of Public Administration—are placed or are in a position to be placed in the knowledge of the superior. Even so, the necessity or not of that phase must be discriminated in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a delaying strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that such an investigation would not be necessary in all scenarios, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine, among other things, the existence of sanctionable conduct, the identification of the perpetrator thereof or of someone who, having some participation in the conduct, is reproachable with a degree of responsibility, as well as the pertinence or not, depending on the merit and existing evidence and indications, for the opening of the disciplinary sanctioning (sancionatorio) procedure.- **2.- Regarding the statute of limitations alleged by the plaintiff (parte actora).** This Court considers that the allegation of the claimant (accionante) aimed at the annulment of everything acted upon, based on the disciplinary sanctioning (sancionatoria) power in his case having been exercised outside the period provided for in Article 603 of the Labor Code, is not admissible. For the sake of greater precision only, it should be indicated that in the same manner as regulated by the Labor Code in Article 603, Article 116 of the Labor Relations Regulations (Normativa de Relaciones Laborales) of the defendant entity, in what is relevant, provides as follows: *"The competent body to exercise the disciplinary power shall have a period of* **one month***, to order the start of a preliminary investigation, from* **the moment it learns of a presumed irregularity that must be investigated***".* (The highlighting is not from the original). The foregoing is without prejudice to the fact that the same point is regulated again in Article 118, with some lack of rigor in regulatory normative technique. It suffices to indicate as a first order of ideas, that it has been undisputed between the parties that the person in whom the exercise of the administrative disciplinary sanctioning power resided in relation to Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, was the person holding the position of Director of the Pharmacy Service of Hospital México. Then, as they have been taken as proven facts in what is relevant, even though the conduct for which the plaintiff was investigated dates back to the beginning of December 2012, namely, between the 3rd and the 5th, and without prejudice to what happened on the 17th, it was on December 4, 2012, the day on which awareness was brought, but to the **Deputy Directorate** (Subdirección) of Pharmacy of Hospital México in the person of Mr. Federico Jiménez Loría, exclusively of the existence of a shortage of 2 units (cans) of Lactose-Free Enteral Formula (Fórmula Enteral) (ENSURE) in what was identified as the *"transfer warehouse (bodega de paso)"* located in the Central Pharmacy (Farmacia Central), for which reason that official proceeded to carry out a preliminary investigation in this regard, in the exercise of a natural function in the performance of a position that entails being in charge, by degree, of the institutional pharmacy service or process. (See official communication FHM-0352-13 a folios 01 to 05 of the administrative file in its first paragraph or heading, to which must be added the lack of evidence allowing the assertion of the contrary). This preliminary investigation elapsed, and it was not until February 26, 2013, that, having rendered a report with the results by the Deputy Director of Pharmacy, the report was forwarded by official communication FHM-0352-13 a to the Director of Pharmacy of the same hospital center, Margarita Dall´anese Ruiz. It was from this moment, then, that for the first time, the person holding the power to discipline the plaintiff accessed the information that allowed her to order the opening of a disciplinary administrative procedure. The text of the report is found at folios 01 to 05, and the evidentiary material gathered during the preliminary investigation, on those from 06 to 44, all from the administrative file, including an envelope in which compact discs were attached containing some video images captured through the security cameras placed in the infrastructure of the Pharmacy. That is the date from which the prescriptive (prescriptivo) period should consequently be computed. On the other hand, beyond a shortage of ENSURE, some facts different from that one were detected, which until that moment were associated with Mr. Tardencilla Martínez as a result of the investigation, consisting of the alleged removal of medications by accessing restricted areas without authorization within the infrastructure comprising the Central Pharmacy, as well as the entry into the computer system used to control the entry and exit of medications from the pharmacy, using a user ID and password assigned to another official, of false information from a non-existent prescription, to later delete it using his own user ID and password. The date of **February 26, 2013** and no other, constitutes the starting point for the computation of the one-month statute of limitations period referred to—it is insisted—such that, having designated the members of the directing body (órgano director) that was to conduct the procedure on February 28, 2013 (folios 47 to 51 of the administrative file), this body issued the initial order (auto inicial) of the procedure on March 15, 2013 (folios 59 to 77 of the administrative file) and notified the plaintiff thereof, according to the corresponding record drawn up to that effect, found at folio 78 of the administrative file, on **March 15, 2013**. Thus, it being more than evident that the one-month period referred to in Article 603 of the Labor Code was not exceeded, the allegation referring to illegality in what was acted upon from this perspective is not appropriate, such that the reproach lacks support, nor what was intended in that regard, and its inadmissibility is thus declared. It is not superfluous to indicate that regarding the preliminary investigation, exaggerated and unjustified delays that could suggest that the prescriptive legal concept had occurred are also not located, nor in the procedures that involved bringing the plaintiff's case to the attention of the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), which in any case, corresponds to yet another instance, against which what could be triggered is the expiration (caducidad) referred to in Article 340 of the General Law of Public Administration, something that does not constitute a reproach from the claimant. In this way, no statute of limitations is observed at any level.- **3.- Some considerations regarding the rules that inform the administrative procedure of a disciplinary sanctioning nature.** The administrative procedure (Articles 308 and following of the General Law of Public Administration) when it is of a disciplinary sanctioning (sancionatorio) nature, begins, in principle in theory, with the issuance of an initial order, which, when it is a procedure aimed at determining whether it is appropriate to sanction an administered party, is usually called a statement of charges (traslado de cargos). The adequate formulation of this initial order within the procedure of this type has a very close link with the need for the principle of defense and contradiction, as well as in general the rules that inform the principle of due process, to all be observed. In an administrative procedure of a sanctioning nature (disciplinary or corrective), the statement of charges constitutes the indispensable act of informing the investigated party of the facts that are the object of investigation against them, as well as the evidence supporting the opening of such a procedure and its legal characterization, but at the same time, the mention of the rights that assist them within that *iter* and the possible legal consequence that would emerge from the result at the end of the procedure if those facts under scrutiny are proven. As a fundamental structure, it must contain at least the following aspects: a) identification of the body, which implies the clear indication that allows the individualization and identification of the public agents, physical persons, that make up the directing body. This enables the safeguarding of the right to challenge (recusar) public agents as a derivation of the maxim of objectivity: Articles 230-238 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP); b) statement of charges; c) purposes of the administrative procedure, without the open formula of "to search for the real truth of the facts" being valid, without identifying and specifying them concretely; d) making the administrative file available; e) summons to an oral and private hearing with due advance notice (Article 311 of the LGAP); f) warnings regarding the designation of a legal representative, definition of a place or means for receiving notifications; g) appeals that may be filed against the act, with detail of the period within which they may be filed and the competent body. As for the factual detail, it is fundamental that said statement of charges informs the recipient of the set of concrete and detailed facts that will be the object of investigation in the procedure. Although the object is the establishment of what the LGAP calls the *real truth of the facts* (Articles 214, 221, 297, and 308 of that legal body), it is evident that the procedure is established as an instrument (and not an end in itself) to verify the facts that serve as the grounds (motivo) for the final act in the most faithful and complete manner possible, as provided in Precept 221 *ibidem*. It could not be otherwise without such treatment coming to harm the aforementioned principle of material defense and contradiction. The final act, on the other hand, constitutes the culmination of the administrative procedure, according to the terminology of the LGAP in its normal form of termination (without prejudice to some diverse modalities of termination considered early). From this angle of examination, the grounds of the final act as an objective material element thereof, understood as the factual or legal presuppositions that enable the issuance of the act and, therefore, its dispositive effect, its content, is determined through the procedure, which, in that logic, stands as the instrumental means to deduce whether in the particular case the factual or legal presupposition that legitimizes the public action and gives support to the content—that is, the operative part of the act, the effect that it intends to generate in material reality—occurs or not. That is to say, through the procedure, it is sought to verify whether the facts that provide the basis for the *grounds* of the act concur or not in the specific case; the procedure determines whether or not the factual presupposition foreseen by the legal system to support the public conduct occurs, to put the above in other terms. This being the case, with protection of due process and the set of principles inherent to it, this procedure serves to determine whether the fact and its legal characterization (grounds) occurred or not, which justifies and validates a certain administrative will. If the fact is not proven, the effect foreseen for that factual cause cannot be produced. Thus, for example, a sanction is appropriate for demonstrated non-compliance, where the latter is configured by the accreditation of concrete facts (in this case by omission) such that, if those facts that hypothetically configure the non-compliance are not proven, it cannot be affirmed that any obligation has been breached, *ergo*, the sanction would not apply. This concerns the inextricable (inescindible) relationship between the grounds and the content of the act (Articles 132 and 133 of the LGAP), in this case nourished by the procedure, an instrument for determining the existence of the grounds of the act. In this way, in sanctioning (sancionatorios) procedures such as the one in which the correct imputation of charges set forth at its commencement is examined, it entails communicating to the recipient with precise detail the concrete facts that are imputed to them and which, in the judgment of the Administration, configure a disregard of applicable regulations; duties, obligations, or, in general, legal duty situations. Thus, it is a fundamental piece within due process. Nevertheless, within its content and as a logical derivation of that necessary detail of investigated facts, it is additionally necessary for the directing or investigating body of the procedure to indicate what the possible legal consequences of the investigated facts or possible sanction will be, since what is relevant is the description of the factual scenario or scenarios that provoke the apparent fault, from which the examination of its material implications and the consequence assigned to that effect by the legal system is carried out. The foregoing is so, since it is the analysis of that factual picture that will determine, once the particularities of the case have been clarified and weighed, the appropriateness or not of the sanction proposed in accordance with the punitive parameters initially imputed. But furthermore, it will constitute the logical axis within which the investigated subject would be expected to exercise their defense, that is to say, the detail of the facts and the probable sanctions, it is insisted, constitutes the elements from which the recipient will carry out their effective defense. An objection to what has been stated could be that it is sufficient to indicate the facts that are the object of the administrative cause, since ultimately, the object of the procedure is to verify those facts that serve as the basis for the grounds. However, that position overlooks that although the clarification of the facts allows verifying the grounds of the act, the effect of the act that emanates from its content depends on the legal characterization made of those facts. The passive subject of the procedure defends themselves against the facts imputed to them; there is no doubt about that, but also against their legal characterization. However, on one hand, it must be understood that those facts, the basis of an eventual sanctioning (sancionatorio) effect, correspond, in principle in theory, to be demonstrated by the Administration and not the other way around, given that the object of the cause is to establish whether or not those facts occur, not to institute a procedure so that the investigated party discredits the hypothetical truths of facts supposedly already demonstrated and established *a priori* by the investigating Administration. Nonetheless, there will be scenarios in which—particularly when the reproach of disciplinary responsibility corresponds to some omission or breach of duties (deberes)—regarding which the most elementary rational logic would lead to affirm that it is that administered party or agent who is accused of a conduct of that type, who, being in a better position to do so, must demonstrate what is their own under the protection of the constitutionally provided principle based on Article 11 of the Political Constitution identified as that of accountability (rendición de cuentas). This is without prejudice to an elementary principle in public management, related to transparency, which would not violate the principle of innocence when circumstances so require. In short, the procedure is not born under this understanding to define the applicable sanction, but rather, instead, to determine whether the imputed facts were committed or not, and whether those facts, once demonstrated—should this happen—would lead to the adoption of a sanction previously warned of in the statement of charges. It is not a matter of excessive formalism as might be thought, but of safeguarding what is considered a basic characteristic of due process. Omitting that aspect exposes one to doubt and uncertainty (incerteza) regarding the implications of the investigated facts, which undoubtedly leads to a state of vulnerability within that procedure. The defense exercise granted for a possible sanction of reprimand is not the same as that granted for a separation from the position, regardless of the fact that the reproached facts are the same. In essence, it is not enough to transfer facts; the disciplinary destiny of those factual aspects must also be added, because it may well be the case that the defense at that time is that the characterization of the facts is not correct. If during the course of the procedure new facts relevant to the object of the cause appear, or the legal characterization is reconsidered, the Administration is called to make the recipient aware of those variations so that they may exercise their defense, under penalty of harm to due process and generating the invalidity of what was acted upon according to Precept 223 of the General Law of Public Administration. Having said all that, it is notorious that the sanction that is ultimately adopted must have fulfilled several presuppositions: **a)** that it is for facts that were duly conveyed (intimados) in the statement of charges or, in general, that were transferred to the investigated party for their defense; **b)** that the constitutive facts of the administrative sanction were proven within the administrative procedure; **c)** that beforehand the person was informed (intimado) that this investigated factual set could potentially produce that sanction as a conditioned effect; and, **d)** that the imposed sanction is the consequence that the legal system assigns to that factual ground of the act that is adopted. Hence, an infraction of those duties certainly entails a harm to the principles of the procedure leading to a nullity of what was acted upon in accordance with the aforementioned Article 223. On the specific topic linked to notification (intimación) and imputation, the jurisprudence of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has stated: *"Due process is a complex right, comprised of a series of elements or sub-principles, such as notification and imputation of charges, defense, access to the administrative file, the ability to formulate grievances and offer evidence, the right to contradiction and to mediation, due reasoning (fundamentación) of the administrative resolution, to appeal said resolutions, among others. Of particular interest for the resolution of this dispute, it is necessary to analyze the scope contained in the principle of notification. When the Administration initiates, ex officio, a proceeding against a natural or legal person, it must expressly, precisely, and specifically indicate the facts or conduct attributed to them, as well as the possible legal consequences that would result for them should these prove true; the foregoing is what is understood by the principle of notification. Note that it is a requirement for the Administration to detail clearly the facts and conduct that are attributed to a subject. The foregoing with the aim that the latter adequately prepare their defense and not arrive devoid of the evidence and arguments necessary to refute what is attributed to them, or to guarantee that it is only those facts or conduct that will be examined within the procedure and not other new ones for which they were not prepared to debate. However, it is necessary for the Administration to describe the possible legal consequences that those facts or conduct would entail for them if they are demonstrated to be true.* possible consequences, because it is perfectly possible that in the course of the proceedings the legal effects that were foreseen may undergo some type of modification due to the factual elements that were proven within the respective procedure, which would imply a change in the legal consequences that at the beginning of the proceedings, before being properly analyzed, had been foreseen as possible. The foregoing occurs for the simple reason that the administrative procedure aims to find the real truth of the facts, so that once these facts or the conduct attributed to a person in the normal course of the procedure are clearly established, if it is proven that the circumstances did not occur as the Administration had contemplated them and therefore the legal effects that were at the time warned to the individual as possible did not come to pass, because other facts arose that were duly discussed during the course of the procedural iter, those legal consequences may vary without violating fundamental rights. Thus, although there will not necessarily be a correspondence between what was initially alleged and what is finally ordered, there will always be a correlation between the proven facts and the legal consequences derived from them." (N° 950-F-S1-2010 of 9:50 a.m. on August 12, 2010). It must be kept in mind, from a perspective of systematic and purposive interpretation of the legal system, that although it is a requirement that at the beginning of the procedure the investigated party be informed of the facts for which he is being investigated in a clear and detailed manner in terms of elements such as manner, time, and place, this requirement exists and makes sense only to prevent defenselessness of the individual; ergo, in those cases where any inconsistency in this regard, despite being one, does not generate such a state, a defect in the proceedings shall not be evidenced.- 4.- Regarding the defect associated with the official who ordered the initiation of the investigation. The plaintiff reproached that the administrative procedure followed against him was initiated defectively because the person who opened it was barred from doing so, as he was the plaintiff's immediate superior, and according to the institutional Labor Relations Regulations, namely, Mr. Federico Jiménez, who acted under an interim appointment in substitution of Mrs. Margarita Rosa Francisca Dall´anese Ruiz, pursuant to Article 115, paragraph 4 of said regulations. Furthermore, he reproached that in his case, there were vested interests aimed at promoting his dismissal. This allegation is not admissible from the outset, although it is notorious that there is regulation in this regard in the Labor Relations Regulations of the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, in its Article 115, paragraph 4, which we proceed to transcribe as relevant, when regulating the eventual preliminary investigation phase prior to the initiation of the formal administrative procedure, regarding the officials who should carry it out. The provision reads as follows: "The officials who make up the Preliminary Investigation Commission shall under no circumstances be from the same service where the alleged event or alleged fault to be investigated originates from". It cannot be overlooked that the regulatory provision is openly illegal, as will be seen, and is based on a false premise, namely, that an investigation carried out by officials from the same service where the events occur must be presumed, as a rule, not to be objective and impartial in carrying out that task. First, it should be noted that pursuant to Article 102 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), the hierarchical superior not only has the power to give orders to his subordinates (subsection a) and to discipline their faults (subsection c), but also, as is logical and reasonable, has the duty to "monitor the action of the subordinate to verify its legality and appropriateness, and to use all necessary or useful means for that purpose that are not legally prohibited", subsection b). Suffice it to indicate that this hierarchical superior in relation to Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, as he himself states, was the Deputy Director of the Pharmacy Service, without prejudice to the fact that the power to dismiss was vested in a common superior to both, namely the Director of the same service. Thus, when the hierarchical superior was investigating what happened with a missing product, he was doing so in compliance with the obligations of his position and not in an attempt to harm the plaintiff; that the latter result arose along the way is a circumstantial situation. Notwithstanding, the indicated provision also comes into open collision with what is provided in the General Law of Internal Control No. 8292 in relation to the duties that must be observed by the person in charge of a process, as in this case the pharmacy process, as well as Law No. 8422 against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, Article 38, subsection d). The powers-duties that, in a double dimension, the hierarchical superior must exercise regarding the processes under his charge undoubtedly entail the obligation to investigate any circumstance that may weaken the internal control system, and there is no regulatory provision that, in open collision with this system and Article 102 of the General Law of Public Administration, supersedes both regulatory bodies. The hierarchical superior will always be part of the service for which the subordinate provides services; therefore, the aforementioned untechnical regulatory provision shall not be applied, under penalty of promoting its application in violation of the law, a norm of superior rank, force, and resistance. In any case, another inherent power of the superior is the direction, ordering, and delegation of functions to subordinates, so nothing prevents an investigation report on any topic that jeopardizes the internal control system from being carried out under the same cited legal sources. Finally, regarding the principle of purposive interpretation and application of the legal system, no element brought by the plaintiff, even at an argumentative level, demonstrates that the officials who participated in the preliminary investigation carried out—not against him, as will be seen—acted with a lack of objectivity and/or with the intention of harming him; therefore, the alleged legal interest to be protected by the regulatory provision we question would not have been affected, and declaring nullity for nullity's sake is not permissible. Moreover, it is clear that the investigation was ordered by the Deputy Director of the Pharmacy Service based solely on the information regarding the shortage of two cans of ENSURE from the transient warehouse and nothing more; therefore, any link to that situation and/or any other circumstance subsequently discovered with Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez was unknown, meaning no impediment existed, when, on the contrary, a duty imposed by law on said official was to investigate, whether on his own or by delegating it to other subordinates, as he indeed proceeded to do. At this same level of analysis, the fact that at some point the Director of the Pharmacy Service appointed an official from the pharmacy service—i.e., from the same service where the plaintiff worked—as a member of the directing body does not constitute a defect based on the same analysis, as there is no evidentiary element whatsoever proving that this official acted improperly and/or motivated by purposes alien to the public interest and the rights of the person involved. It was proven that two officials were appointed, one of whom, namely, Doctor Daniela Aburto Varela, belongs to the Pharmacy Service (See official communication FHM-408-2013 on pages 47 to 51 of the administrative file). However, that official was relieved of that function and replaced prior to the holding of the oral and private hearing, and of course, before the directing body entered into any substantive analysis in evaluating the evidence. This occurred on April 10, 2013, by official communication FHM-0575-13 from the Pharmacy Directorate of Hospital México, through which Doctor Daniela Aburto Varela was excused from her duty to perform tasks as a member of the Directing Body of the procedure, and in her place, Doctor Isela Araya Piedra was designated, the latter whose participation has not been questioned at any level. (Page 131 of the administrative file). Thus, the accusation linked to the idea that a non-observance of the referenced labor relations regulation —which contravenes the law in the stated terms— has the potency to generate any nullity in the proceedings is not admissible, as this Chamber indeed determines in rejection of what was argued by the plaintiff. Consequently, if an attempt was made to associate a defect such as the one related to the individual who ordered that a shortage of ENSURE in the mentioned Warehouse be investigated, and therefore the nullity of the preparatory act identified with the preliminary investigation from which the report of facts subsequently attributed to the plaintiff emerged, namely, official communication FHM-0352-13 dated February 26, 2013, issued by the Deputy Director of Pharmacy of Hospital México, Doctor Federico Jiménez Loría, the rejection of what was requested is required, as is indeed decided. On the other hand, it was also alleged that some irregularity occurred because the person who ordered the preliminary investigation was at the same time received as a witness within the administrative procedure proceedings. Even accepting that the testimony of said official was indeed taken at the oral and private hearing, nothing in the legal system prevents the immediate hierarchical superior of the investigated party from not only supervising the execution of tasks of the personnel under his charge—when, on the contrary, this constitutes one of his obligations—and investigating possible conduct that may generate liability of those officials, but also, if he had contact with the facts to be investigated, from having his statement received as part of the disciplinary administrative procedure. It must be added to the above that, from a legal standpoint, the plaintiff did not outline any argument that allows inferring the basis of the defect that, in his view, arose from the foregoing, so the reproach is also inadmissible.- 5.- Regarding the principles of specificity, imputation, and relative congruence. On other occasions, this Court has had the opportunity to refer to the principles of specificity, imputation, and relative congruence in the matter of public employment and, of course, in administrative matters of interest, which makes it imperative to revisit them for the purposes of the matter at hand. From a criminal law perspective, the principle of specificity has to do with any conduct that involves an action or omission that conforms to the presumptions detailedly established as unlawful within a legal body within the applicable framework of legality. In criminal matters, this means that for conduct to be specific, it must be specifically and detailedly recorded as a crime or infraction within a legal norm, understood in a broad sense, which means a law in the formal sense, duly approved by the legislative body of the State. Specificity is the adequacy of the voluntary human act executed by the subject to the figure described by law as a crime. It is the adequacy, the fit, the subsumption of the voluntary human act to the type or description that the legal system establishes, carrying an associated sanction. If it conforms, it is an indication that we are in the presence of a possible crime, while if the adequacy is not complete, there is no crime. It is said that it must be specifically and detailedly recorded because, in some countries that adopt modern criminal law, analogy is not applicable; therefore, the conduct must be specifically detailed. In summary, the principle of imputation is the right to a formal accusation, so that the body representing the punitive action from the beginning of the process is called upon to individualize the person who could suffer the adverse consequences and to describe in a detailed, precise, and clear manner the fact of which he is accused, as well as to make a clear legal classification of the fact, indicating the legal grounds for the accusation and the specific punitive claim. This right to a formal accusation determines, for the affected person, the scope of the right of defense he wishes to exercise, and it is based on the grounds of this accusation that the person considers the need to provide elements of conviction or reasoning in his favor. A correctly formulated imputation is the opening to the possibility of an adequate defense. In other words, the correct accusation implies the possibility of outlining the defense strategy and, consequently, the full exercise of the right to be heard. Herein lies the importance of the procedural guarantees that seek to limit the punitive power of the State, preventing the person from being subjected to an arbitrary procedure or penalty. Both because the State did not reliably prove his participation in a fact defined by law as a crime, and because the limits imposed by the constitutional system on the state punitive activity aimed at verifying it and applying the sanction were not respected. Congruence is a procedural principle that relates to the guarantee of due process, which marks a path for the Adjudicator to reach the resolution and sets a limit on his discretionary power. The authority, in principle, cannot initiate the prosecution of its powers ex officio without considering facts or evidence not alleged by the parties, and the judgment must be limited to them, that is, only to what was requested by the parties. Congruence here is manifested in the adequacy between what was requested and the judicial decision contained in the judgment. This must be referenced exclusively to the intervening parties, to the object or petition, as well as to the specific cause (grounds) in dispute, without considering aspects or evidence that the parties did not provide. When dealing with sanctioning processes, the limit is found in what was imputed and on which the person linked to the investigation defended himself. An incongruent resolution is arbitrary because it exceeds the power of the public authority, whether it decides more than what was claimed, or less than what was requested, or on matters not raised. It is worth noting that criminal law has been the maximum expression of the State's punitive power, which has been responsible for the greatest development of the subject. In employment matters, and especially in public employment, these principles have undergone an attenuation, what has been called relativity. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in its judgment number 2007-013903 of 3:00 p.m. on October 3, 2007, stated the following: "V.- On the principle of specificity in the disciplinary regime.- The principle of specificity is an application of the principle of legality that requires, on the one hand, the concrete delimitation of the conduct that is made reprehensible for sanctioning purposes, and on the other hand, the concrete delimitation of the possible sanctions to be applied; it can be affirmed that the principle of specificity constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary responsibility. Regarding the concrete delimitation of the reprehensible conduct, this Chamber has previously held (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 of eight forty-eight p.m. on May thirty-first, two thousand five, and 94-5594 of three forty-eight p.m. on September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four) that although certainly this principle in this matter does not have the same form as in the criminal legal field, since faults not literally provided for may be discretionarily sanctioned—it must always be understood that these faults are included in the text—. That is, faults not literally provided for may be discretionarily sanctioned, but that are understood to be included in the text and provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary fault, through a procedure created for this purpose. However, regarding the concrete delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this must be clearly and previously established, and the Administration cannot create new sanctions that are not contemplated in the applicable norms. In summary, although it is inferred that the determining facts of disciplinary faults are innumerable—as they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conduct of the subjects—and that the principles 'nullum crimen sine lege', 'nullum poena sine lege' do not have the rigidity and requirement that characterizes them in substantive criminal law, it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in attention to the principle of specificity, that the conduct be inferred from the normative text and that the sanction be—this one must be—clearly pre-established". (The highlighting and underlining are not from the original). Consequently, both the breach of general functional duties and legally classified conduct (at the level of the Civil Service Statute, the specific statutory norms of the regime, or the Labor Code, for example) are sanctionable, as well as those contemplated in norms of a lower rank, such as those contained in autonomous service regulations or in cases where the classification is given with respect to the sanction to be imposed. This relative classification makes the need for positive norms of formal law more flexible, making it possible for their regulation to be generated by a positive norm of lower rank. Thus, it can be seen that compared to criminal law, the exercise of the State's punitive power, insofar as it can affect the most essential assets of the person, such as life (in places where the death penalty is accepted), physical integrity and freedom of movement (such as deprivation of liberty) and even property (such as confiscation), seeks to guarantee the individual not only the greatest resources but also the most technical mechanisms for compliance with the three principles, which leads to a level of demand not seen in other areas of law. In the remaining areas of sanctioning law, the same principles apply but evidently with a lower level of rigor, the most relevant being attention to the purpose pursued by the public legal system (the exercise of the right of defense) and not the means (the measured exposition of the principle). Therefore, by way of example, while criminal law requires rigorous specificity, administrative sanctioning law allows the norm to be complemented or integrated from regulatory provisions, all based on a relationship of special subjection. Furthermore, the issuance of more generic types is legitimate as long as the right of defense is permitted. The same situation occurs with the principle of imputation, while if not all the elements of manner, time, and place are present when describing the conduct, they may be omitted, as long as, of course, the elements provided allow the exercise of the right of defense. That is to say, in other words, as long as a true state of defenselessness is not generated. Finally, regarding the principle of congruence, the generation of a sanction based on aspects not clearly described in the imputation is permitted, to the extent that the unlawfulness of the conduct is extracted, it was mentioned in the statement of charges, and the exercise of the right of defense was permitted. To this must be added that what is imputed and eventually punished are not legal classifications but human conducts, so that a person could have been charged for one fault and sanctioned for another, as long as the factual description covers them. When it comes to the omission of compliance with official duties, it must also be taken into account that regarding the omissive conduct, there are infinite ways in which it manifests, which can be specified to a greater or lesser degree, so the level of description will always define according to the active conduct that is reproached for not having been deployed. Now then, if we transfer what has been said, mutatis mutandi, to the administrative sphere and more specifically regarding the validity of the administrative act that orders an administrative sanction, there must undoubtedly be a correspondence between the facts imputed and alleged to the alleged offender, their verification and confirmation in the administrative procedure, and their correspondence in the final act, such that a relationship of identity exists between what was accused and the sanction imposed.- 6.- Regarding the non-existence of a defect associated with an improper act of the statement of charges, as well as the obstruction of the right of defense during the administrative procedure proceedings. On this matter, the plaintiff alleged that the statement of charges does not contain a relation in terms of the day and time in which the facts for which he was investigated would have been located, which would have affected the exercise of his defense. Without prejudice to the fact that the reproach was formulated vaguely, according to the evidence on pages 59 to 77 of the administrative file, it is established that by resolution issued at 1:00 p.m. on March 15, 2013, the directing body of the procedure issued the so-called "initial resolution on the statement of charges" as part of the procedure to be followed against Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, in which the following was stated: "Facts: (...) FIRST: At the Hospital México Pharmacy, three shifts are worked; the third shift runs from ten p.m. to six a.m. and only one pharmacist and one technician work. Inside the Central Pharmacy is located (sic) an area called 'transient warehouse' where the medications necessary to supply the main dispensary and other restricted medications are stored (sic); entry is only permitted to pharmacists, therefore access to technicians and any other personnel is prohibited; technicians may only enter with prior authorization from the pharmacist on duty, besides, there is a sign on the door that says 'authorized personnel only'. The protocol for entering that transient warehouse on the third shift is as follows: in case entry is required, the company of the pharmacist and managing pharmacist, and a security guard must be requested. In the month of December two thousand twelve, Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez had a schedule from Sunday to Friday from ten p.m. to six a.m., in the position of Health Technician in Pharmacy 3, where his functions were to enter prescription information into the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA), medication gathering, attending the window, returning medications to the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA), any other function assigned according to service needs, which he had to perform inside the Central Pharmacy of Hospital México. On December 3, two thousand twelve, Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez began his work at ten p.m.; on December 4, two thousand twelve, he entered the transient warehouse on two occasions, as follows: at 01:55:52.75 hours, he enters it; at 01:57:52.7 hours, he leaves the transient warehouse and goes towards the warehouse area. At 01:58:31.55 hours, he leaves the warehouse corridor and goes towards the corridor between Pharmacy Technics (Farmacotecnia) and the transient warehouse and immediately turns left and enters the transient warehouse at 01:58:35.85 hours. He leaves the transient warehouse at 01:58:50.70 hours with a cardboard box in his left hand; said box contained a product inside, and he goes towards the medication gathering area. He does all of the foregoing without authorization from the pharmacist on duty, who was Dr. Ginette Cerna Gutiérrez. At eleven forty-seven a.m. on December 4, two thousand twelve, Miss Adriana Calvo Marín, by email, informed Dr. Federico Jiménez Loría that a shortage of two cans of Lactose-Free Enteral Formula (ENSURE) had been detected, which are stored in the transient warehouse, and that also on that day the door to that warehouse had been found open.

SECOND: The Hospital México Pharmacy operates three shifts. The second shift runs from fourteen hundred hours to twenty-two hundred hours, and only one pharmacist and two technicians work it. On December 5, 2012, Mr. Jorge Matamoros Calvo worked as a technician and Dr. Rafael Chaves Jiménez as a pharmacist, both of whom left at twenty-two hundred hours that day. At twenty-one fifty-five, Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez told Mr. Jorge Matamoros Calvo that he had closed his user session in the Integrated Pharmacy System (Sistema Integrado de Farmacia, SIFA). According to the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA), on December 5, 2012, at twenty-two thirty-four, prescription number 166-A was entered under the name of Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales, identification number (...), who at that time had no clinical file at Hospital México. The prescription included the following medications: two units of lactose-free enteral formula (ENSURE), 25 ampoules of testosterone, 300 tablets of oxymetholone. The prescribing physician is indicated as Dr. Guadalupe Maroto Argüello, a neonatologist from the Newborn Service of Hospital México, who states she did not prepare that prescription and does not know the patient Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales. Prescription 166-A under the name of Mrs. Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales was entered into the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA) on December 5, 2012, but the person who entered it recorded the date as November 5, 2012. Said prescription was entered by the user "JMATAMOROS," which belongs to Mr. Jorge Matamoros Calvo. On December 5, 2012, from twenty-two hundred hours until six hundred hours on December 6, 2012, only Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez and Pharmacist Ginette Cerna Gutiérrez were working in the Central Pharmacy of Hospital México. However, at that time and place, the only person with the knowledge to enter prescriptions into the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA) was Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez. Upon searching for physical prescription number 166-A under the name of Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales, (...), it could not be found, and Pharmacist Ginette Cerna Gutiérrez states she has no knowledge of that prescription. / THIRD: The audit trail report for the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA) shows that prescription 166-A under the name of Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales (...) was deleted from the system on December 17, 2012, at twenty-one fifty-nine, by the user corresponding to Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, who stated in an unnumbered official document dated December 21, 2012, (...) that he did so due to human error. / FOURTH: On January 9, 2013, the inventory conducted by Miss Adriana Calvo Marín reflects a shortage of 2 units of lactose-free enteral formula (ENSURE), 27 ampoules of testosterone, and 234 tablets of oxymetholone. Although two of the products do not exactly match the quantity in prescription 166-A, they can be associated insofar as, prior to December 4, 2012, there was no shortage of ENSURE, the shortage of oxymetholone was 70 tablets, and that of testosterone was 6 ampoules. CHARGES: Based on probability, Jorge Terdencilla Martínez is charged with (...), improper manipulation of the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA), entering information into the Integrated Pharmacy System for a prescription that did not exist, using the password assigned to Mr. Jorge Matamoros Calvo, entering the temporary storage room (bodega de paso) located in the Central Pharmacy without authorization from the Shift Pharmacist-in-Charge, removing products from both a restricted area and the Pharmacy dispensary, failing to inform his immediate supervisor of his error or omission when deleting prescription 166-A under the name of Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales, (...) and thereby harming the interests of the Institution; in addition, failing to remain loyal to the Institution by not refraining from actions that could cause moral or material harm to the Institution. For failing to perform his duties with efficiency, consistency, and diligence. For engaging in matters unrelated to the duties assigned to him. For using the Institution's instruments, tools, utensils, and property improperly and without authorization for purposes unrelated to their true function. For remaining within the Institution's premises and properties without any work-related reason or without express authorization from his immediate supervisor or representatives of the Institution. For using his position to obtain personal advantages. Violating articles: (...) If the facts are proven true, this causes an objective loss of trust on the part of the employer, for the following reason: Through ruling 2002-00234 at 9:30 a.m. on May 22, 2002, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) referred to the necessary trust that must characterize the relations between public sector entities and their workers: (...). / Thus, it has been indicated that the personal qualities valued in a given person for hiring, as well as transparency in the exercise of duties connected or directly related to their work, must be maintained throughout the entire employment period. The investigated party, as a public official, is subject to an essential ethical content in his contractual relationship with the Administration, which requires behavior consistent with the rules of ethics. Therefore, even if there had been no previous complaints about the investigated party's work, the truth is that if the facts are proven, the Pharmacy Directorate could lose the objective trust placed in him, since much trust has been placed in Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez due to his intellectual capacity and willingness to work, he was trained in different areas and sent to courses on the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA), and he was entrusted with system permissions. The foregoing is relevant since SIFA is an institutional program whose purpose is to maintain accounting control of each Pharmacy Service, including the maintenance of the medication inventory, the accounting entry and discharge of each product line, and, at the same time, maintaining pharmacotherapeutic control of each patient," then, the purpose of the procedure was stated, as well as a list of the evidence contained in the administrative file and the testimonial evidence to be presented as part thereof, and his rights were listed, among other things. This Court observes no imprecision or obscurity in the wording of the facts in terms of the elements of time, manner, and place, that could have generated difficulty for the plaintiff in exercising an adequate defense, which he indeed exercised throughout the procedure with the assistance of legal counsel. Rather, the opposite is observed, as derived from what was stated in the document submitted by the plaintiff himself to the directing body of the procedure, on May 27, 2013, visible on folios 256 to 269 of the administrative file. In short, it is clear that at its core, regarding the facts in the initial order, specific dates and times are referenced, in which, to the extent possible, the following were specified at their core: the detection of a shortage of medications that were extracted from the identified temporary storage room (bodega de paso); that the plaintiff allegedly made unauthorized entry to that restricted area on December 4, 2012, on two occasions; that a record of a non-existent prescription was entered into the Integrated Pharmacy System (SIFA) when the official with the credentials to manipulate it was the plaintiff; that the foregoing was done using the user password assigned to an official who had already left the workplace, while the person who remained at the site at that time was Mr. Tardencilla and a Pharmacist not trained in manipulating the indicated system; and that later, on December 17, 2012, the same Mr. Tardencilla proceeded to delete or eliminate the record of that non-existent prescription. In all cases, the information regarding the day and time these events charged against the plaintiff could have occurred was, in this Court's opinion, sufficient and appropriate given the complexity of the matter, and it is not observed from the proceedings that this could have generated the defenseless state alleged by the plaintiff. Based on this, and since his objections are unfounded, declaring the nullity of the resolution issued by the directing body of the procedure at 1:00 p.m. on March 15, 2013 is also inadmissible, and therefore this claim is dismissed. Regarding this particular point, it is considered that the corresponding wording does not represent any obstacle to understanding what facts are involved, what legal classification applies to them, and what consequences their being proven would entail for the plaintiff; therefore, an adequate defense based on that act was perfectly possible. Finally, the plaintiff was allowed to participate in all phases of the process, his rights were explained and respected, he was adequately informed of the nature and scope of the procedure, the objections and appeals he raised at the time were considered, all procedural instances were respected, including the knowledge of the case by the bipartite body with representation of the workers and the employer, to which is added that no bias was observed in the proceedings that would allow affirming a vice related to the purpose of the proceedings, and the principle of innocence of the plaintiff was also respected; therefore, his objection in this regard is also unacceptable.- 7.- Regarding the nonexistence of a vice associated with bringing into the administrative procedure evidence consisting of elements from a prior investigation. The plaintiff claims a vice linked to the fact that during the procedure brought against him, documentation from a prior investigation conducted by the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) was brought in as evidence. This investigation had allegedly been carried out without determining any responsibility on his part for the occurrence of events in 2010 similar to those at issue, related to the theft of medications. In the plaintiff's opinion, this action aimed to harm his honor and bias the opinion of those who would hear his case, without reason and/or explanation. The plaintiff's objection is unfounded. Although it was indeed proven that among the evidence added to the administrative file processed against Mr. Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, there was documentation related to an investigation conducted by the Judicial Investigation Agency in 2010, unrelated to the events that occurred in 2012 but of the same nature, i.e., linked to the possible theft of medications from the temporary storage room (bodega de paso), based on information reported at the time by the Head of Hospital Pharmacy Supply, Mr. Álvaro Bogarín, as documented on folios 35 to 44 of the administrative file, it suffices to state that, first, it is not proven that this had any incidence within the administrative procedure brought against him, even if it is regarding the assertion that it was brought into the procedure with the intention of harming him—an intention that is not demonstrated, nor is the alleged harm observed, nor any effect that could have influenced the objectivity of the persons in charge of the procedural instruction, much less of the decision-making body. None of them even proceeded to assess that evidence, either for rendering the final report or for issuing the final act, both part of the procedure's course. Consequently, no vice whatsoever, much less nullity in the proceedings at any level, can be derived from this.- 8.- Regarding the vices associated with the nonexistence or falsehood of the facts for which the plaintiff was dismissed. The plaintiff alleged that the facts for which he was dismissed resulted from a fabrication by the Administration, which does not correspond to reality. In relation to this point, the statement given in due course by Mr. Federico Jiménez was denounced as false. It is claimed that he not only would have been the one who illegitimately ordered the investigation against the plaintiff, but also proposed himself as a witness, asserting that he had seen the plaintiff leave the temporary storage room (bodega de paso) carrying a box, and inside that box, some medications or products.- 8.1.- Some generalities regarding the legal regime governing the conduct of a public official. This Section IV, in its judgment number 33-2013-IV at 14:45 on April 23, 2013, indicated the following on the subject at hand: "V.- (...) it is necessary to start from the consideration that in Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, different from that of the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations emanate. Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction by establishing the following: Article 191.- A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration, and Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed on the basis of proven suitability and may only be removed on the grounds of justified dismissal expressed in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof. In accordance with the aforementioned constitutional rules, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of a specific regulatory framework, job stability—limiting the free removal regime characteristic of private labor regulation—and an administrative career, along with the other guarantees existing for persons covered by a subordinate regime, such as payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strikes, etc. (making an exception for the right to collective bargaining, excluded by rulings 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)). Correlative to the aforementioned rights, they also possess a series of official duties inherent to the public purposes sought through their activity, which must always guide their management so as not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary liability. Without intending to be exhaustive, some of the duties inherent to the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (Art. 3 Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Administration), b) duty to comply with the principles of public service—continuity, efficiency, adaptation to changes in the legal regime, and equality of treatment—(Art. 4 General Law of Public Administration), c) duty to safeguard an adequate internal control environment (Art. 39 of the General Law of Internal Control); d) duty to protect the best interests of children (Art. 4 and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code); e) duty to comply with the legal system (Art. 13 and related articles of the General Law of Public Administration, Art. 39.a of the Civil Service Statute); f) duty to provide prompt response and information to the user (Art. 5 and 10 of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from the Excess of Administrative Requirements and Procedures); g) duty of obedience (Art. 108 of the General Law of Public Administration); h) duty to act effectively (Art. 5 of the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets); i) duty to maintain decorum and provide due attention to the user (Art. 114 of the General Law of Public Administration and Art. 39 d) and e) of the Civil Service Statute); j) duty to answer in case of having acted with intent or gross negligence (Art. 199 and 211 General Law of Public Administration); k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (Art. 11 of said normative body). Additionally, in a supplementary manner and based on Article 9 of the General Law of Public Administration and Article 51 of the indicated Statute, the provisions of the Labor Code and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship, such as, for example, the Law on Sexual Harassment in Employment and Education, the Law Regulating Smoking, the Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, among others. In this order of ideas, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles in labor matters given the existence of a statutory and not a contractual relationship (Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration), the existence of general guiding principles for the relationship that are common cannot be ignored, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in Article 19 of the Labor Code. In relation to the disciplinary regime applicable in case of breach of said duties, according to various rulings of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the principle of specificity or 'tipicidad' becomes more flexible, so a specific legal classification of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of the servants. In this sense, ruling 2007-013903 at fifteen twenty-five on October 3, 2007, from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), indicates the following: 'V.- On the principle of specificity ('tipicidad') in the disciplinary regime.- The principle of specificity is an application of the principle of legality which requires, on one hand, the specific delimitation of the conducts that are deemed reprehensible for the purpose of sanction, and on the other hand, the specific delimitation of the possible sanctions to be applied. It can be affirmed that the principle of specificity constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary liability. Regarding the specific delimitation of reprehensible conduct, this Chamber has maintained on previous occasions (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 at twenty fifty-eight on May 31, 2005, and 94-5594 at fifteen forty-eight on September 27, 1994) that although this principle in this matter certainly does not have the same form as in the criminal legal field, since faults not literally provided for can be sanctioned discretionally, it must always be understood that these faults are included in the text. That is, faults not literally provided for, but understood to be included in the text, may be discretionally sanctioned, provided they result from the confirmation of the disciplinary fault through a procedure created for that purpose. Now then, regarding the specific delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this must be clearly and previously established, without the Administration being able to create new sanctions not contemplated in the applicable rules. In summary, although it is inferred that the determining facts of disciplinary faults are innumerable—as they depend on the nature of the subjects' behaviors or conduct—and that the principles "nullum crimen sine lege," "nullum poena sine lege" do not have the rigidity and strictness that characterizes them in substantive criminal law, it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in accordance with the principle of specificity, that the conduct be inferred from the normative text and that the sanction be—this one, yes—clearly pre-established.' The foregoing generates what is known in doctrine as the principle of relative specification, in the understanding that the fault must be provided for in the disciplinary system, but without the level of rigor characteristic of criminal matters insofar as it derives from the service relationship specifically. By reason of the above, both the breach of general functional duties and legally classified conducts (at the level of the Civil Service Statute, specific statutory rules of the regime, or the Labor Code, for example), and those found in lower-ranking norms, such as those contained in autonomous service regulations or in cases where the classification is given with respect to the sanction to be imposed, are sanctionable. This relative specification makes the need for positive rules with the status of formal law more flexible, making it possible for their regulation to be generated by a positive rule of lower rank. The foregoing considerations are without prejudice to the existence of a series of principles of sanctioning law derived from criminal law, which must necessarily be complied with in all cases, e.g., proportionality, ne bis in idem, innocence, due process, due reasoning in the respective resolution. In this order of ideas, it must be noted that regarding the definition of conducts that may be considered part of the duties of public officials or subject to sanction in case of breach, our country has a diffuse system, given that they are not detailed in a single normative body, but are scattered among different rules of different ranks, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to dictate, according to Article 27 of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute. The foregoing, in accordance with the self-regulatory powers of the Public Administration, and given the impossibility that all and each of the specific conducts incurred by public servants can be regulated through law, and in the understanding that the exercise of regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal system. Transversally to this set of principles and norms of different ranks, in this matter we find the public interest as a constant reference in the adoption of any decision or formal or informal conduct by the Administration with respect to its servants. Said interest, understood in accordance with Article 113 of the General Law of Public Administration, provides: "1. The public servant must perform their duties in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coincident individual interests of the administered persons. 2." The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In assessing the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, first and foremost, to which mere convenience can under no circumstances be preferred." By reason of the foregoing, any analysis regarding public employment must not omit the analysis of compliance with the public interest when adopting the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference of its underlying motivation. Complementing the foregoing, the aforementioned regulations and principles are the sine qua non basis for determining the admissibility or otherwise of a specific annulment claim, filed by a public servant against an administration". With respect to the matter of liability, the aforementioned ruling continued to state that: "From said liability emanates a sanctions (sancionatorio) regime, to which, as with the rest of the servants, the following provisions are applicable: "Article 211.- 1. The public servant shall be subject to disciplinary liability for actions, acts, or contracts contrary to the legal order, when they have acted with intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave), without prejudice to the more severe disciplinary regime provided for by other laws. 2. The superior shall also be disciplinarily liable for the acts of their direct subordinates, when they and the latter have acted with intent or gross negligence. 3. The corresponding sanction may not be imposed without the prior formation of an expediente, with ample hearing for the servant so that they may assert their rights and demonstrate their innocence". "Article 213.- For the purposes of determining the existence and degree of the fault or negligence of the official, when assessing the alleged defect of the act to which it is opposed, or which it dictates or executes, the nature and hierarchy of the functions performed must be taken into account, it being understood that the higher the hierarchy of the official and the more technical their functions, in relation to the defect of the act, the greater is their duty to know and duly assess it". It is relevant to note that in the General Law of the Public Administration, there are some cases where the Law expressly qualifies the seriousness of the infraction, such as the issuance of manifestly illegal acts (Art. 199), obeying said acts (Art. 199), ordering the execution of an absolutely null act (Art. 170), and grave and unjustified delay in the conclusion of an administrative procedure (Art. 225). In other cases, including the omission to act with due diligence or the omission of a functional duty, it is necessary to analyze in each specific case whether the servant acted with gross negligence or intent in order to determine their administrative liability. As noted, unlike the private employment regime where a system of imputation of certain more or less open conducts deemed unlawful is established, in the case under examination, there are subjective criteria of liability - existence of "intent or gross negligence" in the conduct. Regarding the scope of said liability, during the discussion of the draft General Law, the following was stated: "The official will be liable before the administration and will be liable to the individual. We have sought to take all of that evolution which we consider to be sound. In principle, soundness consists of the official knowing that, despite being an official, they must have the same duty of prudence or diligence and respect for the rights of others as the ordinary citizen. There is no reason for an ordinary citizen who causes harm to another to be punished with liability, and for a public employee who imprudently, negligently causes harm to an individual not to be punished with equal liability. The latter seems even more punishable to us because it is assumed that by their condition they must have not only a more exemplary but also a more controlled conduct. The point is that one who gravely violates their duties of office actually commits punishable negligence. However, we have opted to use two terms that in Costa Rica have always been used in the Civil Code and in many of our legal systems. Intent or gross negligence, which effectively means a fault that is already well-defined by the courts. Depending on each case, it is that case where either intentionally or running a risk, or with obvious awareness that elementary rules are being violated, harm was caused. In those cases, we consider it moral and also convenient for the good functioning of the administration, from the standpoint that it creates responsibility in an official and that they be personally liable to the individual for the harm they cause. Apart from the disciplinary liability they may have, this person will be liable to the administration if the administration has to pay the individual. It is a brake on carelessness and gross negligence of the administration in the performance of its functions. That is why we speak of intent or gross negligence. What might be called slight fault or professional fault or habitual fault, those explainable carelessnesses in an official are not sanctioned. But what is a grave carelessness, a forgetting of elementary rules of prudence in the performance of their duties, that is sanctioned to the offended party and before the administration..." (Minutes No. 104 of the Permanent Commission of Government and Administration of April 3, 1970, p. 10). (...) By reason of the foregoing, it is evident to this Tribunal that for gross negligence to exist, there must be a clear, objective, and serious departure (apartamiento) from a duty of care emanating from the law, attributable to a specific servant, which has a harmful consequence for the public interests. That grave conduct or omission which departs from that legal duty may or may not have a result, given that the General Law and the administrative order provide for scenarios in which, regardless of the result, liability operates. However, it is evident that in the majority of cases, the determination of the existence of gross negligence is associated with some type of affectation, be it to the administration itself, to third parties, or to both. With respect to determining its occurrence or otherwise in these latter scenarios, it is viable to refer to the mechanisms used in criminal proceedings to determine whether a negligent conduct has occurred in cases where there is a harmful result, which are termed the theory of equivalence of conditions and the theory of conditio sine qua non, through which the necessary causal relationship between the omission of the objective duty of care (cause) and the harmful result (effect) is established or ruled out, necessary for the configuration of fault. In this sense, vote 696-2003 of 11:55 a.m. on July 18, 2003, of the Criminal Cassation Tribunal states: "... According to the said theories (...) the judge must make a posthumous prognosis ex ante facto (objective), also called hypothetical suppression and inclusion, so that faced with several omissions of the objective duties of care, the act is mentally reconstructed but fulfilling said duties, one at a time, that is, as many reconstructions as breaches of duties are verified, with the following results: (i) if, having fulfilled the duty, the result occurs, the causal relationship is ruled out; or (ii) if, having fulfilled the duty of care, the result does not ensue, the cause-and-effect relationship between omission of the objective duty of care and result is verified...". In the same sense, it is stated: "... the judicial mechanism for ascertaining negligent conduct is that through which the analyst places a conduct in the factual scenario where the required duties of care exist and observes whether the result still occurs. If the latter happens, the evident conclusion is that even with all the duty of care, the Result would have occurred, therefore the conduct is not typical of fault. Conversely, if the analyst places the proper conduct in the factual scenario and the Result does not occur, then the conclusion is that the breach of the duty of care was efficient in producing that Result and therefore the conduct is typical of fault" (Issa El Khoury Jacob (Henry), Chirino Sánchez (Alfredo). Methodology of Legal Conflict Resolution in Criminal Matters, Ilanud, San José, 1991 page 114). Based on the foregoing considerations, this Tribunal estimates that the determination of the existence of gross negligence in an administrative conduct or specific omission attributed to a public servant starts from a verification of the following circumstances: a) Existence of general or specific job duties (deberes funcionariales), which are enforceable against a servant, by virtue of their determination in norms of legal or regulatory scope. b) Existence of a real, objective, specific, attributable, and demonstrated departure by the servant from said enforceable duty, such that it occurred by not conforming to the expected average fulfillment of their duty in a conscious and deliberate manner. c) Determination of the existence or otherwise of conducts which, by their mere occurrence, may be considered as generating liability, regardless of the result caused. d) Verification of whether, by reason of the conduct, a result was caused or not for the Administration or third parties, of an administrative (e.g., weakening of the entity's internal control system), economic, or other nature. e) Assessment of the seriousness of the departure of the conduct or omission from the indicated duties. For this purpose, consideration must be taken of the environment in which the conduct or omission operated, the hierarchical level of the servant, any eventual damages caused, the concurrence of other acts by third parties, and the technical nature of the conduct that was owed and was not performed. It will be through the integrated assessment of these considerations that it can be determined whether, in a specific case or not, disciplinary liability could be attributed to a particular servant, bearing in mind that one could well engage in conduct without fault, or despite its existence, it could be considered as slight, which would not generate administrative liability." Having made these considerations, the substantive analysis of the case subject to this resolution proceeds. In which it was alleged that the acts for which the plaintiff's dismissal was ordered did not exist.- 8.2.- On the objective loss of confidence as a cause for dismissal. This is a topic to which, although central for having founded the act of dismissal of the plaintiff, no reference is made by the plaintiff. It concerns one of the grounds for dismissal that, although not expressly provided for in the Labor Code in its Article 81, has been recognized as such mainly by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice according to uniform case law on the matter. This premise is not restricted to those positions identified as "of confidence," but covers all modalities of entry into public employment. By way of example, we cite the Judgment of that Cassation Chamber number 2004-00967, of 10:35 a.m. on November 10, 2004, which reads as follows in the pertinent part: "It has been repeatedly stated that the personal conditions valued in a given worker, in order to be hired, as well as the transparency in the exercise of tasks connected to or directly related to their work, due to their nature of 'intuitu personae,' must be maintained throughout the entire employment, in addition to taking into account the type of work the servant performs; and, in the present case, the defendant entity justifiably objectively lost confidence in the official, due to the serious anomalies discovered in the process of settling the policies, which were recalculated in amounts far smaller than those that actually corresponded and that had initially been correctly set by another official. On this subject, Cabanellas has pointed out that 'When the acts that the worker causes justify the loss of confidence, it is evident that the harmony that should prevail in the employment contract disappears, thus justifying dismissal, especially if the totality of the subordinate's acts creates insurmountable distrust. Such is the case of conducts that, without constituting a crime, give rise to the loss of that element which is basic in the labor relationship; even when the sanctioned disloyalty does not constitute a criminal offense or a fault of such nature, it is sufficient reason to render impossible the continuation of the employment contract. Due to this nature of the employment bond, the worker must maintain an impeccable conduct inside and outside of work; when this is not so, the element of confidence deposited in him disappears, and he may be dismissed with just cause... In conclusion, any act that is capable of sowing the employer's distrust and that prevents the continuation of the labor relationship - within an environment without misgivings - can serve to ground the breach of the employment contract.'" (CABANELLAS DE TORRES, Guillermo. Compendio de Derecho Laboral, Tomo I, Buenos Aires, Editorial Heliasta S.R.L., third edition, 1992, pp. 973-974)". Nevertheless, in order for it to be instrumentalized as a ground for dismissal without employer liability, although the term confidence refers to a subjective situation of the employer, this does not mean that it can be arrived at by intuition or simple suspicion, subjectively and arbitrarily. Rather, it must be backed by objectively appreciable circumstances, which in more cases than not affect, in the employment relationship, the good faith and fidelity that the employee owes to their employer, such that the continuation of the relationship is not possible within the framework of the interests that must prevail, when dealing with relationships of the kind maintained with the Public Administration, which are none other than public interests. Furthermore, the decision must be congruent and proportional to the facts found proven, which must be of sufficient gravity.-

“VII.- Sobre la improcedencia de la demanda en todos sus extremos. Es criterio de este Tribunal que se impone en el caso concreto declarar sin lugar las pretensiones formuladas en su totalidad, a partir de los siguientes razonamientos:

1.- Sobre la prescripción para el ejercicio del poder sancionatorio disciplinario por parte de la Administración Pública. Dentro de la gama de posibles manifestaciones de la voluntad de la Administración Pública se encuentra aquella que corresponde con su poder sancionatorio, correctivo y/o disciplinario. En doctrina, se podría definir como "una potestad de signo auténticamente represivo, que se ejercita a partir de una vulneración o perturbación de reglas preestablecidas" con fundamento en el reconocimiento de una potestad de imperio natural o consustancial al Estado, esto es, el "ius puniendi único del Estado". (CANO CAMPOS (Tomás). Derecho Administrativo Sancionador, Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, Madrid, Nº43, enero-abril de 1995, p.339 . Además, Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencias Nº 1265-95 de las 15:36 horas del 7 de marzo de 1995; 1264-95 de las 15:03 horas del 7 de marzo del mismo año y 8193-2000 de las 15:05 hrs. del 13 de setiembre del 2000). Esta potestad -claro está- se puede proyectar en el marco de una relación jurídica de empleo público (potestad disciplinaria ) en lo relativo a las actividades del individuo en su carácter de agente o funcionario público, caso en el cual por principio finalista, se despliega con el objeto de compeler y asegurar, preventiva y represivamente, el cumplimiento de los deberes jurídicos que imponen al servidor este tipo de relaciones conforme la función o cargo que se desempeñe. (Véanse al respecto la resolución Nº 479-97 de la Sala Constitucional, así como el dictamen C-159-2000 de 20 de julio del 2000 de la Procuraduría General de la República ). Ahora bien, ejercicio de un poder de imperio o no, el ordenamiento jurídico prevé para su ejercicio ciertas limitaciones, una de las cuales es de carácter temporal, esto es, determinada en función del tiempo para su ejercicio, lo que nos conduce al análisis de dos posibles institutos jurídicos que comparten ciertos rasgos comunes como lo son la caducidad y prescripción, del que nos interesa el último. Quien demanda en cuanto a este tópico, se limitó a afirmar que en el caso concreto habría de declararse que operó la prescripción para el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria en su contra en función de lo previsto en el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, para lo que parte en cuanto al cómputo previsto en la norma, de la data de la ocurrencia de los hechos por los que fue investigado el actor. Pues bien, el instituto jurídico de la prescripción negativa se encuentra previsto como uno de los modos de extinción de obligaciones y la correlativa acción para que opere es suficiente el transcurso de determinado tiempo sin que el titular del derecho promueva algún tipo de acción para su reclamo. Mediante esta figura, se pretende proveer a las relaciones jurídicas de un marco dentro del cual, cada uno de los sujetos vinculados se pueda desenvolver en un marco de certeza, al ser esta uno de los valores que se encuentra tutelado por el ordenamiento jurídico como principio. Así, prescriben de conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico tanto obligaciones, como el derecho de acción correlativo y en esa medida también, la posibilidad de ejercicio de potestades, aún y cuando en casos específicos lo sean de imperio, cuando su titular lo es la Administración Pública. La prescripción en términos generales supone la concurrencia de tres presupuestos fundamentales: a) la inercia del titular de un derecho en ejercitarlo cuando se encuentre en posición de hacerlo ; b) el transcurso del tiempo fijado por el ordenamiento jurídico al efecto; y, c) la alegación o excepción del sujeto pasivo de la relación jurídica, haciendo valer esa prescripción. Esto conduce a afirmar que no existe efecto liberatorio , si pese a concurrir los dos primeros presupuestos la alegación no es articulada o no se formula, pues resulta renunciable o disponible hacer valer ese efecto prescriptivo o no. Esto es, que la prescripción atiende a un principio rogatorio , situación diversa a la que ocurre en el caso de la caducidad (en términos procesales como el que nos ocupa), marco en el que es dable decir, que siendo la caducidad susceptible de ser declarada de oficio , la prescripción debe ser alegada por la parte . En lo que toca a las relaciones de empleo público el ejercicio de esta potestad en tesis de principio se encuentra residenciada en el jerarca de cada organización frente a sus funcionarios, con ocasión de haber cometido faltas sancionables . La prescripción se yergue frente a esto, como factor de temporalidad luego del cual, si quien tiene potestad para disciplinar no lo ha hecho en forma debida , tal ejercicio no podrá ser emprendido. Este límite temporal según se dirá, varía según se trate de la materia regulada, pues no existe un sólo régimen jurídico de empleo público según nos encontramos ante tipos específicos de relaciones de empleo público. En consecuencia, esa potestad disciplinaria (que se basa en la doctrina del ordinal 102 inciso c) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública no es irrestricta en el tiempo. A diferencia de otras potestades públicas que por aspectos finalistas se consideran imprescriptibles, las que se refieren al ejercicio sancionatorio interno como el que se examina en este caso están sujetas a reglas de temporalidad en virtud de las cuales pueden fenecer. En este tipo de relaciones el titular de esta atribución es en principio el jerarca administrativo , mientras que el sujeto pasivo es el funcionario público, quien en esa medida, se encuentra sujeto a la potestad correctiva interna solo por el plazo que expresamente fije la normativa aplicable, vencido el cual, emerge su facultad de requerir el reconocimiento de la pérdida de la potestad jerárquica. Resulta necesario apuntar a la existencia de diversos supuestos en que puede hacerse operar el instituto en materia disciplinaria. La prescripción del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria, refiere al plazo que fija el ordenamiento jurídico para que el titular de la potestad correctiva interna adopte las medidas procedimentales del caso que le permitan emitir la decisión final. Es el plazo máximo dentro del que debe disponerse la apertura del procedimiento administrativo direccionado a establecer la procedencia o no de sancionar. En esta línea de ideas, debe tenerse presente que la notificación al investigado de la apertura del procedimiento es la que sería susceptible de generar un efecto interruptor de ese margen de temporalidad, en la medida en que constituye un acto expreso y una medida que directamente propende al ejercicio de la potestad referida; efecto interruptor que se mantendrá mientras el procedimiento administrativo esté en trámite, en curso, activo y no haya caducado (artículo 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Debe tenerse presente que como derivación del principio del debido proceso, es condición insalvable para la Administración el disponer la apertura de una causa administrativa -el procedimiento previo al dictado del acto final se insiste- para establecer si corresponde la sanción o no, como derivación de lo establecido en los ordinales 214, 221, 297 y 308 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Para el caso específico de los servidores sujetos al régimen de Servicio Civil, por remisión expresa del artículo 51 del Estatuto de esa materia, el plazo de prescripción se encuentra previsto en el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo, que reza así: “Los derechos y acciones de los patronos para despedir justificadamente a los trabajadores o para disciplinar sus faltas prescriben en un mes, que comenzará a correr desde que se dio causa para la separación o, en su caso, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria “ . Sin embargo, ha de advertirse que se trata de una norma que cede frente a regulaciones particulares y especiales, que incorporan reglas diversas en cuanto a ese extremo, como lo es el caso previsto en la Ley General de Policía, N° 7410 del 26 de mayo de 1994, así como en las leyes N° 8292 (en su artículo 43), 8422 (artículo 44) y 8131 (artículo 112) en materia de fiscalización de la hacienda pública. Ahora bien, es claro que el fenecimiento del plazo conferido para ejercer la potestad correctiva se encuentra sujeto a las causales de interrupción que fija el ordinal 876 del Código Civil, por remisión que hace el ordinal 601, párrafo primero, del Código de Trabajo. La interrupción solo se produce claro está, en la medida en que ocurra antes del vencimiento del plazo a interrumpir, pues aún ocurridas, si lo es vencido el plazo la simple alegación de prescripción negativa lleva a la pérdida del ejercicio del derecho precluido por inercia en su ejercicio. Es doctrina jurídica bien establecida que solo la prescripción no cumplida puede interrumpirse. Con todo, se debe insistir en que la interrupción no se produce con la simple apertura del procedimiento, sino con la debida comunicación del auto que tiene por instruida la causa, de conformidad con los ordinales 140, 239, 240, 243 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Finalmente, operada la interrupción, el plazo vuelve a computarse. Otro aspecto que debe precisarse es el vinculado con el momento a partir del cual debe hacerse computar el plazo. El numeral 603 de cita arriba señala que el plazo corre desde que se dio la causa para la separación o en su defecto, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria . En este sentido, el plazo mensual se computa desde el momento en que el titular de la potestad correctiva se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la falta y por ende, en posición de poder emprender el ejercicio de su potestad , ante de ello por lógica consecuencia, no le sería exigible el ejercicio de tal potestad, so pena de admitirse márgenes odiosos de impunidad a partir del ocultamiento en más que menos de los casos, natural del infractor, de su conducta reprochable . También debe considerarse que cuando las particularidades del caso exijan la realización de una investigación preliminar previa para poder colocar al titular de la potestad en posición de ejercerla, cuya duración se advierte, tampoco puede ser injustificadamente excesiva, el plazo mensual aludido corre desde el momento en que se ponga o se esté en condiciones de poner en conocimiento del jerarca los resultados de ese ejercicio preparatorio que no forma parte del procedimiento administrativo formal regulado en el numeral 308 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Con todo, debe discriminarse en cada caso la necesidad o no de esa fase, pues de otro modo, podría utilizarse como estrategia dilatoria para evadir la prescripción, siendo que no en todos los escenarios sería necesaria esa investigación, sino solo en aquellos en que por las particularidades del caso, esa fase sea indispensable para determinar entre otras cosas, la existencia de una conducta sancionable, la individualización del autor de la misma o de quien teniendo alguna participación en la conducta, le sea reprochable responsabilidad en grado, así como la pertinencia o no en función del mérito y probanzas e indicios existentes para la apertura del procedimiento sancionatorio disciplinario.- 2.- Sobre la prescripción alegada por la parte actora. Estima este Tribunal que no es de recibo el alegato del accionante tendiente a la anulación de todo lo actuado a partir de haber sido ejercida la potestad sancionatoria disciplinaria en su caso, fuera del plazo previsto en el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo. Sólo a efectos de mayor precisión, deberá indicarse que en igual forma que lo reguló el Código de Trabajo en el numeral 603, el artículo 116 de la Normativa de Relaciones Laborales de la entidad demandada, en lo conducente dispone lo que sigue: "El órgano competente para ejercer la potestad disciplinaria tendrá el plazo de un mes , para ordenar el inicio de una investigación preliminar, a partir del momento en que conoce de una presunta irregularidad que deba ser investigada". (El resaltado no es del original). Lo anterior es sin perjuicio de que el mismo punto se vuelve a normar en el artículo 118, con alguna falta de rigor en técnica normativa reglamentaria. Baste con indicar en un primer orden de ideas, que ha resultado pacífico entre las partes que en quien se encontró residenciado el ejercicio de la potestad administrativa sancionatoria disciplinaria en relación con el señor Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, lo fue quien ocupa el cargo de Directora del Servicio de Farmacia del Hospital México. Luego, conforme así se han tenido como hechos probados en lo que interesa, pese a que las conductas por las que fue investigado el actor datan de principios del mes de diciembre del 2012, a saber, entre los días 03 y el 05, y sin perjuicio de lo sucedido el día 17, fue el 04 de diciembre del 2012 el día en que se puso en conocimiento, pero de la Subdirección de Farmacia del Hospital México en la persona del señor Federico Jiménez Loría, exclusivamente de la existencia de un faltante de 2 unidades (latas) de Fórmula Enteral libre de lactosa (ENSURE) en lo que se identificó como la "bodega de paso" ubicada en la Farmacia Central, por lo que procedió ese funcionario a efectuar una investigación preliminar al respecto al tenor del ejercicio de una función natural en el ejercicio de un cargo que supone encontrarse a cargo en grado, del servicio o proceso institucional de farmacia. (Ver el oficio FHM-0352-13 a folios del 01 al 05 del agregar la inexistencia de prueba que permita afirmar lo contrario). Esta investigación preliminar transcurrió, y no fue sino a partir del día 26 de febrero del 2013 que rendido por parte del Subdirector de Farmacia un informe con los resultados, fue remitido el informe por oficio FHM-0352-13 a la Directora de Farmacia del mismo centro hospitalario, Margarita Dall´anese Ruiz. Fue a partir de este momento entonces, que por primera ocasión accede quien ostenta la potestad para disciplinar al actor, a la información que le permitió ordenar la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo disciplinario. El texto del informe obra a folios del 01 al 05, y el material probatorio recabado durante la investigación preliminar, en los que van del 06 al 44, todos del compactos que comprendieron unas imágenes de video captadas a través de las cámaras de seguridad colocadas en la infraestructura de la Farmacia. Es esa la fecha a partir de la cual habría de computarse el plazo prescriptivo en consecuencia. Por otro lado, más allá de un faltante de ENSURE, fueron detectados algunos hechos diversos a ese, que hasta ese momento fueron asociados al señor Tardencilla Martínez como fruto de la investigación, constituidos por la presunta sustracción de medicamentos haciendo acceso sin autorización a áreas restringidas dentro de la infraestructura que comprende la Farmacia Central, así como el registro en el sistema informático con que se controla el ingreso y salida de medicamentos de la farmacia en uso de un usuario y clave asignados a otro funcionario, de información falsa a partir de una receta inexistente, para luego borrarla haciendo uso de su propio usuario y clave. La fecha del 26 de febrero del 2013 y no otra, constituye el punto de partida del cómputo del plazo de prescripción del mes referido -se insiste- por lo que habiéndose designado a los miembros del órgano director que habría de instruir el procedimiento el 28 de febrero del 2013 (folios del 47 al 51 del expediente administrativo) éste órgano dictó el auto inicial del procedimiento el 15 de marzo del 2013 (folios del 59 al 77 del expediente administrativo) y se lo notificó al actor conforme el acta levantada al efecto del registro correspondiente que obra a folio 78 del expediente administrativo, el día 15 de marzo del 2013, con lo que siendo más que evidentemente, el plazo del mes a que refiere el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo no fue excedido, por lo que no resulta procedente el alegato referido a la ilegalidad en lo actuado desde esta perspectiva, de modo que el reproche no lleva sustento ni lo pretendido en ese tanto, y así se declara su improcedencia. No esta demás indicar que en lo que refiere a la investigación preliminar, tampoco se ubican dilaciones exageradas e injustificadas que pudieran hacer pensar que habría ocurrido el instituto prescriptivo, como tampoco en los trámites que implicaron el poner en conocimiento de la Junta de Relaciones laborales el caso del actor, que en todo caso, corresponde a otra instancia más, frente a la que lo que podría hacerse operar es la caducidad a que refiere el numeral 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, cosa que no constituye reproche de quien demanda. De este modo, prescripción no se observa en ningún nivel.- 3.- Algunas consideraciones sobre las reglas que informan el procedimiento administrativo de corte sancionatorio disciplinario. El procedimiento administrativo (artículos 308 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) cuando es de corte sancionatorio disciplinario, inicia en tesis de principio con el dictado de un auto inicial, que cuando se trata de un procedimiento dirigido a determinar si resulta procedente sancionar a un administrado, se suele denominar traslado de cargos. La adecuada formulación de este auto inicial dentro del procedimiento de la especie tiene un vínculo muy estrecho con la necesidad de que el principio de defensa y contradictorio, tanto como en general las reglas que informan el principio del debido proceso, sean todos observados. En un procedimiento administrativo de corte sancionatorio (disciplinario o correctivo) el traslado de cargos constituye el imprescindible acto de puesta en conocimiento al investigado de los hechos que son objeto de investigación en su contra, así como de las probanzas que amparan la apertura de un procedimiento semejante así como su calificación jurídica, pero a la vez, la mención de los derechos que le asisten dentro de ese iter y la posible consecuencia jurídica que habría de emerger del resultado del final del procedimiento en caso de acreditarse esos hechos objeto de escrutinio. Como estructura fundamental ha de contener al menos, los siguientes aspectos: a) identificación del órgano, lo que implica el señalamiento claro que permita la individualización e identificación de los agentes públicos personas físicas que integran el órgano director. Ello posibilita la tutela el derecho de recusar a los agentes públicos como derivación de la máxima de objetividad: artículos 230-238 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP); b) traslado de cargos; c) fines del procedimiento administrativo, sin que sea válida la fórmula abierta de para buscar la verdad real de los hechos, sin identificar y precisarlos en concreto; d) puesta a disposición del expediente administrativo; e) citación a comparencia oral y privada con la debida antelación (artículo 311 de la LGAP); f) prevenciones de designación de representante legal, definición de lugar o medio para atender notificaciones; g) recursos que proceden contra el acto, con detalle del plazo en que proceden y órgano competente. En cuanto al detalle fáctico, resulta primario que ese traslado ponga en conocimiento del destinatario el conjunto de hechos concretos y detallados que van a ser objeto de investigación en el procedimiento. Si bien el objeto es el establecimiento de lo que la LGAP denomina verdad real de los hechos (numerales 214, 221, 297 y 308 de ese cuerpo legal), es evidente que el procedimiento se establece como un instrumento (que no un fin en sí mismo) para verificar los hechos que sirven de motivo al acto final en la forma más fiel y completa posible según se dispone en el precepto 221 ibídem. No podría ser de otra forma sin que tal tratamiento llegue a lesionar el mencionado principio de defensa material y contradictorio. El acto final por otro lado, viene a constituir la culminación del procedimiento administrativo, a decir de la terminología de la LGAP en su forma normal de terminación (sin perjuicio de algunas modalidades diversas de terminación que se consideran anticipadas). Desde esa arista de examen, el motivo del acto final como elemento material objetivo del mismo entendido como los presupuestos fácticos o jurídicos que posibilitan la emisión del acto y por ende, su efecto dispositivo contenido se determina mediante el procedimiento, el que en esa lógica se erige como el medio instrumental para colegir si en el caso particular se produce o no el presupuesto fáctico o jurídico que legitima el proceder público y da sustento al contenido, sea, a la parte dispositiva del acto, el efecto que éste pretende generar en la realidad material. Es decir, a través del procedimiento se busca verificar si en la especie concurren o no los hechos que dan base al motivo del acto; el procedimiento determina si concurre o no el presupuesto fáctico previsto por el ordenamiento para amparar la conducta pública en otros términos dicho lo anterior. Así las cosas, con resguardo del debido proceso y el conjunto de principios que le son propios, este procedimiento sirve para fijar si se produjo o no el hecho y su calificación legal (motivo) que justifique y valide una determinada voluntad administrativa. Si el hecho no se acredita el efecto previsto para esa causa fáctica no puede producirse. Así por ejemplo, la sanción procede por el incumplimiento demostrado, en donde éste se configura por la acreditación de hechos concretos (en este caso por omisión) de modo que, si no se acreditan esos hechos que configuran hipotéticamente el incumplimiento, no puede afirmarse que se ha quebrantad o obligación alguna, ergo, no cabría la sanción. Se trata de la relación inescindible entre motivo y contenido del acto (ordinales 132 y 133 de la LGAP) en este caso nutrida por el procedimiento, instrumento para determinar la existencia del motivo del acto. De esa manera, en los procedimientos sancionatorios como aquel en el que se examina la correcta imputación de cargos esgrimida al inicio del mismo, supone comunicar al destinatario con detalle preciso los hechos concretos que se le imputan y que a juicio de la Administración configuran una desatención de normativa aplicable; deberes, obligaciones o en general, situaciones jurídicas de deber. Así, es una pieza fundamental dentro del debido proceso. Con todo, dentro de su contenido y como derivación lógica de ese necesario detalle de hechos investigados es además necesario que el órgano directo r o instructor del procedimiento indique cuáles serán las posibles consecuencias jurídicas de los hechos investigados o posible sanción, pues lo relevante es la descripción del o los supuestos fácticos que provocan la aparente falta, a partir de los cuales se realiza el examen de sus implicaciones materiales y la consecuencia que a ese efecto le asigna el ordenamiento jurídico. Lo anterior es así, ya que es el análisis de ese cuadro fáctico el que determinará una vez esclarecido y ponderadas las particularidades del caso, la procedencia o no de la sanción propuesta conforme a los parámetros punitivos inicialmente imputados. Pero además, constituirá el eje lógico dentro del que se esperaría que el sujeto investigado ejerza su defensa, esto es, que del detalle de los hechos y las sanciones probables se insiste estriba en lo que constituirán los elementos a partir de los cuales el destinatario realizará su efectiva defensa. Podría señalarse como objeción a lo expuesto que basta con señalar los hechos objeto de la causa administrativa, pues a fin de cuentas, el objeto del procedimiento es verificar esos hechos que sirven de base al motivo. No obstante, esa postura deja de lado que si bien el esclarecimiento de los hechos permite verificar el motivo del acto, el efecto del acto que dimana de su contenido depende de la calificación jurídica que se realice de esos hechos. El sujeto pasivo del procedimiento se defiende de los hechos que se le imputan, de ello no hay duda, pero además, de su calificación jurídica. Sin embargo y por un lado, debe comprenderse que esos hechos base de un efecto eventual sancionatorio, corresponden en tesis de principio ser demostrados por la Administración y no a la inversa, siendo que el objeto de la causa es establecer si concurren o no esos hechos, no así instaurar un procedimiento para que el investigado desacredite las hipotéticas verdades hechos supuestamente ya demostrados Fijadas a priori por la Administración instructora. Con todo, habrán supuestos ante los cuales -particularmente cuando del reproche de responsabilidad disciplinaria corresponda de alguna omisión o incumplimiento de debere s- respecto de los que la más elemental lógica racional conduciría a afirmar que es aquel administrado o agente al que se le acusa una conducta de la especie, quien por encontrarse en mejor posición de hacerlo, debe demostrar lo propio al amparo del principio constitucionalmente dispuesto a partir del artículo 11 de la Constitución política identificado como el de rendición de cuentas. Esto sin perjuicio , de un principio elemental en la gestión pública, relacionado con la transparencia, que no habría de violar el principio de inocencia cuando las circunstancias así lo impongan. En fin, el procedimiento no nace bajo este entendido para definir la sanción aplicable, como sí y en su lugar, para determinar si se cometieron los hechos imputados o no, y si los mismos una vez demostrados -de suceder esto- habrían de conducir a la adopción de una sanción previamente advertida en el traslado de cargos. No se trata de un excesivo formalismo como podría pensarse, sino del resguardo de lo que se considera una característica básica del debido proceso. Omitir ese aspecto es de los hechos investigados, lo que lleva a no dudarlo, a un estado de vulnerabilidad dentro de aquel procedimiento. No es el mismo ejercicio de defensa el que se otorga a una posible sanción de amonestación, que el que se concede a una separación del cargo, al margen de que los hechos reprochados sean los mismos. En esencia, no basta trasladar hechos, debe añadirse además, el destino disciplinario de esos aspectos fácticos, pues bien puede darse el caso de que la defensa en esa oportunidad sea que la calificación de los hechos no es la correcta. Si en el curso del procedimiento aparecen hechos nuevos relevantes para el objeto de la causa, o bien se replantea la calificación jurídica, la Administración está llamada a poner en conocimiento de esas variaciones al destinatario a fin de que ejercite su defensa, so pena de lesión del debido proceso y generar invalidez de lo actuado acorde al precepto 223 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Ahora bien, siendo todo lo anterior así, es notorio que la sanción que en definitiva se adopte debe haber cumplido varios presupuestos: a) que sea por hechos que fueron debidamente intimados desde el traslado de cargos o en general, que le fueron trasladados para su descargo al investigado; b) que los hechos constitutivos de la sanción administrativa se hubieren acreditado dentro del procedimiento administrativo; c) que de antemano se hubiere intimado a la persona que ese conjunto fáctico investigado podría llegar a producir esa sanción como efecto condicionado; y, d) que la sanción impuesta sea la consecuencia que el ordenamiento asigne a ese motivo fáctico al acto que sea adoptado. De ahí que una infracción a esos deberes, supone sin duda una lesión a los principios del procedimiento que llevan a una nulidad de lo actuado conforme al ordinal 223 precitado. Sobre tema específico vinculado con la intimación e imputación, ha señalado la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia: "El debido proceso es un derecho complejo, conformado por una serie de elementos o sub-principios, tales como intimación e imputación de cargos, defensa, acceso al expediente administrativo, a formular agravios y ofrecer pruebas, derecho a la contradicción y a la mediación, debida fundamentación de la resolución administrativa, a recurrir dichas resoluciones, entre otros. De interés particular para la resolución de esta litis, resulta necesario analizar los alcances que contiene el principio de intimación. Cuando la Administración inicia de oficio un procedimiento a alguna persona física o jurídica debe señalarle de manera expresa, precisa y particularizada los hechos o conductas que se le atribuyen, así como las posibles consecuencias jurídicas que le causaría de resultar ciertos; lo anterior es lo que se entiende por el principio de intimación. Nótese que es una exigencia para la Administración detallar claramente los hechos y conductas que se le reputan a un sujeto. Lo anterior con el fin de que éste prepare adecuadamente su defensa y no llegue desprovisto de las pruebas y argumentos necesarios para refutar lo que se le atribuye, o bien para garantizar que son únicamente esos hechos o conductas los que se entrarán a conocer dentro del procedimiento y no otros nuevos para los cuales no estaba preparado a debatir. Ahora bien, es necesario, que la Administración describa las posibles consecuencias jurídicas que le acarrearían esos hechos o conductas si se demuestran que son ciertas. Se dice posibles consecuencias, debido a que es perfectamente dable que en el desarrollo del proceso los efectos jurídicos que se preveían sufran algún tipo modificaciones en razón a los elementos fácticos que se tuvieron por demostrados dentro del procedimiento respectivo, lo cual implicaría un cambio en las consecuencias legales que al inicio del proceso antes de analizarse adecuadamente se habían previsto como posibles. Lo anterior se da por sencilla razón de que el procedimiento administrativo tiene como objeto encontrar la verdad real de los hechos, de modo que una vez establecidos claramente éstos o las conductas que se le atribuyen a una persona en el cauce normal del procedimiento, si se llegase a comprobar que las circunstancias no se dieron de la forma como la Administración las había contemplado y por ende los efectos jurídicos que en su momento se le advirtieron al administrado como posibles no llegasen a suceder, por la razón de que surgieron otros hechos que fueron debidamente discutidos dentro del desarrollo del iter procesal, aquellas consecuencia jurídicas pueden variar sin que se violenten los derechos fundamentales. Así las cosas, si bien no necesariamente habrá correspondencia entre lo que se intimó al inicio y lo que finalmente se disponga, siempre habrá correlación entre los hechos probados y las consecuencias jurídicas que se deriven de aquellos". (N° 950-F-S1-2010 de las 9:50 horas del 12 de agosto del 2010). Debe tenerse presente desde una óptica de interpretación sistemática y finalista del ordenamiento jurídico, que si bien resulta ser una exigencia el que al inicio del procedimiento se haya puesto en conocimiento del investigado los hechos por los que se le investiga de forma clara y circunstanciada en términos de elementos como el modo, tiempo y lugar, ello lo es y lleva sentido, únicamente para que no se genere indefensión en el administrado, ergo, en aquellos casos en que alguna inconsistencia al respecto pese a serlo, no genere aquel estado, un vicio en lo actuado no se habrá de evidenciar.- 4.- Sobre el vicio asociado al funcionario que ordenó el inicio de la investigación. Reprochó el demandante que el procedimiento administrativo seguido en su contra inició viciado por cuanto quien dio apertura al mismo, tenía impedimento para ello por tratarse de quien ocupaba la jefatura inmediata del actor, y conforme la Normativa de Relaciones Laborales institucional, a saber, el señor Federico Jiménez, quien actuó al amparo de un nombramiento interino en suplencia de la señora Margarita Rosa Francisca Dall´anese Ruiz, esto según lo dispuesto en el artículo 115, párrafo 4 de esa normativa. Además, reprochó que en su caso, existieron intereses creados dirigidos a promover su despido. De entrada este alegato no es de recibo, aunque es notorio que existe regulación al respecto en la Normativa de Relaciones Laborales de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social en su artículo 115, párrafo 4, que pasamos a transcribir en lo conducente, al regularse la eventual fase de investigación preliminar previa al inicio del procedimiento administrativo formal, en lo que refiere a los funcionarios que habrían de llevarla a cabo. El numeral dice así: "Los funcionarios que integren la Comisión de Investigación Preliminar bajo ninguna circunstancia serán del mismo servicio donde se genere el presunto hecho o presunta falta por investigar ". No puede dejar de observarse que la norma reglamentaria es abiertamente ilegal como se verá, y parte de una premisa falsa, cual es que una investigación realizada por funcionarios del mismo servicio en que ocurren los hechos, se debe presumir como regla, no serán objetivos e imparciales al realizar esa tarea. Primero debe indicarse que según lo dispuesto en el artículo 102 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, el superior jerárquico no solo tiene la potestad de dar órdenes a sus inferiores (inciso a) y disciplinar sus faltas (inciso c), sino y como es lógico y razonable, tiene la de "vigilar la acción del inferior para constatar su legalidad y conveniencia, y utilizar todos los medios necesarios o útiles para ese fin que no estén jurídicamente prohibidos ", inciso b). Baste con indicar que ese superior jerárquico en relación con el señor Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, como él mismo lo afirma, lo era el Subdirector del Servicio de Farmacia, sin perjuicio que la potestad para despedir se encontró residenciada en un superior común a ambos, cual es la Directora del mismo servicio. De manera que cuando el superior jerárquico estaba investigando que fue lo ocurrido con un producto que faltaba, lo estaba haciendo en cumplimiento de las obligaciones de su cargo y no en procura de perjudicar al señor actor, que sobre el camino se generara este último resultado es una situación coyuntural. Con todo, la norma indicada entra en franca colusión además con lo que dispone la Ley General de Control Interno N° 8292 en relación con los deberes que debe observar quien se encuentra a cargo de un proceso, como en este caso lo es el de farmacia, así como la Ley número 8422 contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función Pública, artículo 38, inciso d). Las facultades-deberes que en una doble dimensión corresponde al superior jerárquico ejercer frente a los procesos a su cargo, llevan sin dude la obligación de investigar cualquiera circunstancia que pueda debilitar el sistema de control interno y no existe norma reglamentaria alguna que en abierta colusión con el este sistema y el artículo 102 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, se superponga sobre ambos cuerpos normativos. El superior jerárquico siempre será parte del servicio para el que preste servicios el inferior, por lo que la antitécnica disposición reglamentaria mencionada no será de aplicación, so pena de propiciar su aplicación en violatoria de la ley, norma de rango, potencia y resistencia superior. En todo caso, otra facultad inherente del superior lo es la dirección, ordenación y delegación de funciones en los inferiores, de modo que nada impide que un informe de investigación, sobre cualquier tópico que ponga en riesgo el sistema de control interno, sea efectuado al amparo de las mismas fuentes de orden legal citadas. Finalmente, si del principio de interpretación y aplicación finalista del ordenamiento jurídico se trata, ningún elemento que haya traído quien demanda, siquiera a nivel argumentativo demuestra que los funcionarios que participaron en la investigación preliminar llevada a cabo -no en su contra como se verá- hayan actuado con falta de objetividad y/o con la intención de perjudicarle, por lo que siquiera el presunto bien jurídico a tutelar con la norma reglamentaria que cuestionamos, se habría visto afectado, no siendo potable declarar la nulidad por la nulidad misma. Por lo demás, es claro que la investigación fue ordenada por el Subdirector del Servicio de farmacia a partir de la exclusiva información referente al faltante de dos latas de ENSURE de la bodega de paso y nada más, por lo que se desconocía vínculo alguno con esa situación y/o cualquiera otra circunstancia descubierta posteriormente, con el señor Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, de modo que no mediaba ningún impedimento, cuando antes bien, si un deber impuesto por ley en el funcionario dicho, de investigar, ya por su cuenta ya delegando en otros subordinados lo propio, como en efecto así procedió. En este mismo nivel de análisis, el hecho de que el algún momento la Directora del Servicio de Farmacia nombrara como miembro del órgano director a una funcionaria del servicio de farmacia, sea, del mismo servicio en que laboraba el actor, no constituye un vicio en función del mismo análisis, al no mediar elemento de prueba alguna que acredite que ese funcionario haya actuado indebidamente y/o motivado por fines ajenos al interés público y los derechos de la persona involucrada. Se acreditó que los nombrados fueron dos funcionarias, de las que una, a saber, la Doctora Daniela Aburto Varela pertenece al Servicio de Farmacia (Ver el oficio número FHM-408-2013 que rola a folios del 47 al 51 del expediente administrativo). Con todo, esa funcionaria fue relevada de esa función y sustituida previo a la celebración de la audiencia oral y privada, y por supuesto, previo a que el órgano director entrara en análisis de fondo alguno en valoración de la prueba. Esto ocurrió el día 10 de abril del 2013, por oficio FHM-0575-13 de la Dirección de Farmacia del Hospital México, mediante el que se eximió a la doctora Daniela Aburto Varela del deber de cumplir labores como miembro integrante del Órgano Director del procedimiento, y en su lugar se designó a la Doctora Isela Araya Piedra, ésta última cuya participación no ha sido cuestionada en ningún nivel. (Folio 131 del expediente administrativo). Así las cosas, no es de recibo el acuse vinculado con que una inobservancia a la norma de relaciones laborales referida -que contraviene a la ley en los términos dichos- tenga la potencia de generar nulidad alguna en lo actuado, como en efecto así lo determina esta Cámara en rechazo de lo argumentado por el actor. En forma consecuente con lo anterior, si es que se pretendió asociar un vicio como el relacionado con el sujeto que ordenó se investigara un faltante de ENSURE en la Bodega mencionada, y en ese tanto la nulidad del acto preparatorio identificado con la investigación preliminar de la que emergió el informe de los hechos que luego, le fueron imputados al actor, a saber, el oficio número FHM-0352-13 de fecha 26 de febrero del 2013 rendido por el Subdirector de Farmacia del Hospital México, Doctor Federico Jiménez Loría, se impone el rechazo de lo peticionado, como en efecto así se falla. Por otro lado, se acusó también que ocurrió alguna irregularidad a partir de que quien ordenó la investigación preliminar, al tiempo fue recibido como testigo dentro del trámite del procedimiento administrativo. Aún y aceptando que efectivamente la declaración de ese funcionario fue evacuada en la audiencia oral y privada, nada en el ordenamiento jurídico impide que el superior jerárquico inmediato del investigado, no solo fiscalice la ejecución de las tareas del personal bajo cargo -cuando antes bien ello constituye una de sus obligaciones-, indague sobre eventuales conductas que puedan generar responsabilidad de esos funcionarios, como y eventualmente si tuvo contacto con los hechos a investigar, se le reciba declaración como parte del procedimiento administrativo disciplinario. Se debe adicionar a lo anterior que desde el plano jurídico ningún argumento esbozó quien demanda que permita inferir el fundamento de ese corte del vicio que a su entender emergió a partir de lo anterior, por lo que el reproche tampoco es de recibo.- 5.- Sobre los principios de tipicidad, imputación y congruencia relativa. En otras ocasiones este Tribunal ha tenido la oportunidad de referirse a los principios de tipicidad, imputación y congruencia relativa en materia de empleo público y claro está, en materia administrativa en lo que lleva interés, lo que se hace imperativo retomarlos a los efectos del asunto que nos ocupa. Desde la óptica penal el principio de tipicidad tiene que ver con toda conducta que conlleve una acción u omisión que se ajuste a los presupuestos detalladamente establecidos como antijurídica dentro de un cuerpo legal en el marco del bloque de legalidad que resulte aplicable. En materia penal esto quiere decir que para que una conducta sea típica, debe constar específica y detalladamente como delito o falta dentro en una norma legal, entendida ésta en una acepción lata, lo que quiere decir, ley en sentido formal, debidamente aprobada por el órgano legislativo del Estado. Tipicidad es la adecuación del acto humano voluntario efectuado por el sujeto a la figura descrita por la ley como delito. Es la adecuación, el encaje, la subsunción del acto humano voluntario al tipo o descripción que establece el ordenamiento jurídico, llevando aparejado a ello una sanción. Si se adecua, es indicio de estamos en presencia de un posible delito, mientras que si la adecuación no es completa no hay delito. Se dice que debe constar de forma específica y detalladamente, en virtud que en algunos países que adoptan un derecho penal moderno no es aplicable la analogía, por lo tanto, la conducta debe ser específicamente detallada. En síntesis, el principio de imputación es el derecho a una acusación formal, de manera que el órgano que representa la acción punitiva desde el inicio del proceso, está llamado a individualizar a la persona que podría sufrir las consecuencias adversas y a describir detallada, precisa y claramente el hecho de que se le acusa, así como a hacer una clara calificación legal del hecho, señalando los fundamentos de derecho de la acusación y concreta pretensión punitiva. Ese derecho a tener una acusación formal determina en la persona afectada los alcances del derecho de defensa que desea ejercer y es sobre los fundamentos de esta, que lleva a la persona a considerar la necesidad de aportar elementos de convicción o razonamientos en su beneficio. Una imputación correctamente formulada es la apertura a la posibilidad de una defensa adecuada. En otros términos dicho lo mismo, la correcta acusación implica la posibilidad de plantear la estrategia de defensa y por consiguiente, el pleno ejercicio del derecho a ser oído. En esto radica la importancia de las garantías procesales que procuran limitar el poder punitivo del Estado, evitando que la persona pueda ser sometida a un procedimiento o pena arbitraria. Tanto porque el Estado no probó fehacientemente su participación en un hecho definido por la ley como delito, como porque no se respetaron los límites impuestos por el sistema constitucional a la actividad punitiva estatal destinada a comprobarlo y a aplicar la sanción. La congruencia es un principio procesal que hace a la garantía del debido proceso, que marcan al Juzgador un camino para poder llegar a la resolución, y fija un límite a su poder discrecional. La autoridad en principio no puede iniciar de oficio la prosecución de sus facultades, sin tomar en cuenta hechos o pruebas no alegados por las partes, y a ellos debe limitarse la sentencia, sea, solo a lo peticionado por las partes. La congruencia aquí se manifiesta en la adecuación entre lo pedido y la decisión judicial contenida en la sentencia. Ésta debe estar referenciada exclusivamente a las partes intervinientes, al objeto o petición, así como a la causa (fundamentos) concretos en litigio, sin considerar aspectos o probanzas que las partes no hayan aportado. Cuando se trata de procesos sancionatorios el límite se encuentra en aquello que fue imputado y sobre lo cual se defendió la persona vinculada con la investigación. Una resolución incongruente es arbitraria pues excede la potestad de la autoridad pública, ya sea que decida más de lo reclamado, o menos de lo que fuera pedido, o sobre cuestiones no articuladas. No está demás advertir que ha sido del derecho penal la máxima expresión de la facultad punitiva del Estado, quien se ha encargado del mayor desarrollo del tema. En materia de empleo y en especial en empleo público, estos principios han sufrido una atenuación, lo que se ha dado en llamar una relatividad. La Sala Constitucional en su sentencia número 2007-013903 de las 15:00 horas del 03 de octubre del 2007, indicó lo siguiente: "V.- Sobre el principio de tipicidad en el régimen disciplinario.- El principio de tipicidad es una aplicación del principio de legalidad que exige por un lado, la delimitación concreta de las conductas que se hacen reprochables a efectos de su sanción, y por otro lado, la delimitación concreta de las posibles sanciones a aplicar, pudiendo afirmarse que el principio de tipicidad constituye un principio fundamental en la responsabilidad disciplinaria. En cuanto a la delimitación concreta de la conducta reprochable, esta Sala ha sostenido en anteriores oportunidades (ver al respecto la resolución 2005-06616 de las veinte horas con cincuenta y ocho minutos del treinta y uno de mayo del dos mil cinco y 94-5594 de las quince horas cuarenta y ocho minutos del veintisiete de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro) que aunque ciertamente este principio en esta materia no tiene la misma forma que en el ámbito jurídico penal, ya que pueden sancionarse discrecionalmente las faltas no previstas literalmente -siempre debe entenderse que estas faltas están incluidas en el texto-. Es decir, pueden sancionarse discrecionalmente las faltas no previstas literalmente, pero que se entienden incluidas en el texto y siempre y cuando resulten de la comprobación de la falta disciplinaria, mediante un procedimiento creado al efecto. Ahora bien, en cuanto a la delimitación concreta de la sanción, a diferencia de lo que se viene de decir, ésta sí debe estar clara y previamente establecida sin que pueda la Administración crear sanciones nuevas que no estén contempladas en las normas aplicables . En resumen, aunque se infiere que los hechos determinantes de las faltas disciplinarias son innumerables -pues dependen de la índole de los comportamientos o conductas de los sujetos- y que los principios "nullum crimen sine lege", "nullum poena sine lege", no tienen la rigidez y exigencia que les caracteriza en el derecho penal sustantivo, siempre es necesario en materia disciplinaria, en atención al principio de tipicidad, que la conducta se infiera del texto normativo y que la sanción esté -está si- claramente preestablecida ". (El resaltado y subrayado no es del original). En razón de lo anterior, son sancionables tanto el incumplimiento de los deberes funcionales generales, como las conductas tipificadas legalmente (a nivel de Estatuto de Servicio Civil, normas estatutarias propias del régimen o Código de Trabajo, por ejemplo), así como aquellas que se encuentren contempladas en normas de carácter inferior, como las contenidas en los reglamentos autónomos de servicio o en los casos en los cuales la tipificación se dé con respecto a la sanción a imponer. Esta tipificación relativa flexibiliza la necesidad de normas positivas en carácter de ley formal, siendo posible que su regulación se genere por norma positiva de menor rango. Del modo indicado, véase que frente al derecho penal el ejercicio de la facultad punitiva del Estado, en tanto puede afectar los bienes más esenciales de la persona, como la vida (en lugares donde aceptan la pena de muerte), la integridad física y la capacidad de movimiento (como la pena privativa de libertad) y hasta el patrimonio (como el comiso), se procura garantizar en cabeza del Administrado no solo de los los mayores recursos, sino también de los mecanismos más técnicos para el cumplimiento de los tres principios, lo que lleva a un nivel de exigencia que no se conoce en otras áreas del derecho. En los restantes ámbitos del derecho sancionatorio, los mismos principios se aplican pero evidentemente con menor nivel de rigurosidad, siendo lo más relevante la atención del fin que persigue el ordenamiento jurídico público (el ejercicio del derecho de defensa) y no el medio (la exposición mesurada del principio). A título de ejemplo entonces, mientras en el derecho penal exige una tipicidad rigurosa, en el derecho administrativo sancionatorio se permite que la norma sea complementada o integrada a partir de disposiciones reglamentarias, todo a partir de una relación de sujeción especial. Además, resulta legítima la emisión de tipos más genéricos en tanto se permita el derecho de defensa. Igual situación ocurre con el principio de imputación, en tanto si no están presentes todos los elementos de modo, tiempo y lugar a la hora de describir la conducta, se pueden omitir estos, en tanto claro está, de los elementos aportados permita el ejercicio del derecho de defensa. Sea dicho lo anterior en otros términos, siempre y cuando no se genere un verdadero estado de indefensión. Por último, en cuanto al principio de congruencia se permite la generación de sanción a partir de aspectos no claramente descritos en la imputación, en la medida que se extraiga la ilicitud de la conducta, se hubiera mencionado en el traslado de cargos y sehubiera permitido el ejercicio del derecho de defensa. A lo que debe sumarse que lo imputado y eventualmente castigado, no son tipificaciones legales sino conductas humanas, de manera que se pudo haber imputado por una falta y sancionado por otro, en la medida que la descripción fáctica las cubra. Cuando se trata de la omisión del cumplimiento de deberes funcionariales, debe también tomarse en cuenta que ante la conducta omisiva, existen infinidad de formas en que se manifiesta, que en menor o mayor grado pueden ser precisadas, por lo que el nivel de descripción definirá siempre según de la conducta activa que se reproche no haber sido desplegada. Ahora bien, si trasladamos lo dicho, mutatis mutandi , al ámbito administrativo y más concretamente en cuanto a la validez del acto administrativo que dispone una sanción administrativa, indudablemente debe haber una correspondencia entre los hechos imputados e intimados al supuesto infractor, su verificación y comprobación en el procedimiento administrativo y su correspondencia en el acto final, de manera tal que exista una relación de identidad entre lo acusado y la sanción impuesta.- 6.- Sobre la inexistencia de un vicio asociado a un indebido acto de traslado de cargos, así como a la obstaculización del derecho de defensa durante el trámite procedimiento administrativo. Sobre este particular, alegó quien demanda que en el traslado de cargos no se hace una relación en términos del día y la hora en la que se habrían de ubicar los hechos por los que fue investigado, lo que habría de haber afectado el ejercicio de su defensa. Sin perjuicio de que el reproche se encontró siendo formulado de forma vaga, conforme la prueba que obra a folios del 59 al 77 del expediente administrativo se tiene que por resolución dictada al ser las 13:00 horas del 15 de marzo del 2013, el órgano director del procedimiento dictó el denominado "auto inicial de traslado de cargos" como parte del procedimiento a seguir en contra del señor Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, mismo en el que se informó lo siguiente: "Hechos: (...) PRIMERO: En la Farmacia del Hospital México se laboran tres turnos, el tercerturno transcurre de las veintidós horas a las seis horas y solamente trabaja un farmacéutico y un técnico. Dentro de la Farmacia Central se encuentra ubicado (sic) un área denominada "bodega de paso" en donde se almacena (sic) los medicamentos necesarios para surtir el despacho principal y otros medicamentos restringidos, únicamente está permitido el ingreso a los farmacéuticos, por lo tanto el acceso a los técnicos y cualquier otro personal les está prohibido el paso, únicamente pueden ingresar los técnicos con autorización previa del farmacéutico de turno, además existe un rótulo en la puerta que dice "sólo personal autorizado". El protocolo para ingresar a esa bodega de paso en el tercer turno es el siguiente: en caso de que se requiera entrar, debe pedirse la compañía del farmacéutico y regente y un guarda de seguridad. En el mes de diciembre del dos mil doce, el señor Jorge Tardencilla Martínez tenía el horario domingo a viernes de las veintidós horas a las seis horas, en el puesto de Técnico de Salud en Farmacia 3, donde sus funciones eran ingresar la información de las recetas en el Sistema Integrado de Farmacia (SIFA), Acopio de medicamentos, atender la ventana, Reintegro de medicamentos al Sistema Integrado de Farmacia (SIFA), cualquier otra función asignada según necesidades del servicio, las cuales debía desempeñar dentro de la Farmacia Central del Hospital México. El día 03 de diciembre del dos mil doce, el señor Jorge Tardencilla Martínez inició sus labores a las veintidós horas; el día cuatro de diciembre del dos mil doce, ingresó en dos oportunidades a la bodega de paso, de la siguiente forma: al ser la 01:55:52.75 horas, ingresa a la misma, a las 01:57:52.7 horas sale de la bodega de paso y se dirige hacia el área de bodegas. A las 01:58:31.55 horas sale del pasillo de bodegas y se dirige hacia el pasillo entre Farmacotecnia y bodega de paso e inmediatamente gira hacia la izquierda e ingresa a la bodega de paso a la 01:58:35.85 horas. Sale de la bodega de paso a la 01:58:50.70 horas con una caja de cartón en su mano izquierda, dicha caja contenía un producto adentro y se dirige hacia el área de acopio de medicamentos. Todo lo anterior lo realiza sin autorizaciónb del farmacéucico de turno el cual era la Dra. Ginette Cerna Gutiérrez. Al ser las once horas cuarenta y siete minutos, del cuatro de diciembre del dos mil doce, la señorita Adriana Calvo Marín, mediante correo electrónico informó al Dr. Federico Jiménez Loría que se había detectado un faltante de dos tarros de Fórmula enteral libre de lactosa (ENSURE), los cuales se almacenan en la bodega de paso además que para ese día se había encontrado la puerta de esa bodega abierta. / SEGUNDO: Que en la Farmacia del Hospital México se laboran los tres turnos, el segundo turno transcurre de las catorce horas a las veintidós horas y solamente trabaja un farmacéutico y dos técnico (sic). El día 05 de diciembre del dos mil doce, como técnico trabajó el señor Jorge Matamoros Calvo y como Farmacéutico el Dr. Rafael Chaves Jiménez, quienes para ese día salieron a las veintidós horas. Al ser las veintiuna horas cincuenta y cinco minutos, el señor Jorge Tardencilla Martínez le indicó al señor Jorge Matamoros Calvo que había cerrado su clave del Sistema Integrado de Farmacia (SIFA). Según el Sistema Integrado de Farmacia, el día cinco de diciembre del dos mil doce, al ser las veintidós horas treinta y cuatro minutos, se ingresó la receta número 166-A a nombre de Zoila Hortencia Thorpe MOrales, cédula (...), quien para esa fecha no tenía siguientes medicamentos: dos unidades de fórmula enteral libre de lactosa (ENSURE), 25 ampollas de testosterona, 300 tabletas de oximetalona, se indica que el médico prescriptor es la Dra. Guadalupe Maroto Argüello, neonatóloga del Servicio de Recién nacidos del Hospital México, quien manifiesta no haber confeccionado esa receta y no conocer a la paciente Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales. La receta 166-A a nombre de la señora Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales fue digitada en el Sistema Integrado de Farmacia (SIFA) el día cinco de diciembre del dos mil doce, pero que (sic) la digitó registró fecha cinco de noviembre del dos mil doce, dicha receta fue ingresada por el usuario "JMATAMOROS" el cual le pertenece al señor Jorge Matamoros Calvo. El día cinco de diciembre del dos mil doce, a partir de las veintidós horas hasta las seis horas del día seis de diciembre del dos mil doce, en la Farmacia Central del Hospital México únicamente se encontraban trabajando el señor Jorge Tardencilla Martínez y la Farmacéutica Ginette Cerna Gutiérrez, sin embargo a esa hora y en ese lugar, la única persona con el conocimiento para ingresar recetas al Sistema Integrado de Farmacia (SIFA) era el señor Jorge Tardencilla Martínez. Al buscar la receta física número 166-A a nombre de Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales, (...), no fue posible encontrarla y la Farmacéutica Ginette Cerna Gutiérrez manifiesta no tener conocimiento de esa receta. / TERCERO: El reporte de procesos de Bitácora del Sistema Integrado de Farmacia (SIFA) muestra que la receta 166-A a nombre de Zoila Hortencia Thorpe Morales (...), fue borrada del sistema el día diecisiete de diciembre del dos mil doce, al ser las veintiuna hora y cincuenta y nueve minutos, por el usuario que corresponde al señor Jorge Tardencilla Martínez, quien manifestó mediante documento sin número de oficio, de fecha veintiuno de diciembre del dos mil doce, (...) que lo realizó por error humano. / CUARTO: El nueve de enero del dos mil trece, el inventario realizado por la señorita Adriana Calvo Marín refleja un faltante de 2 unidades de fórmula enteral libre de lactosa (ENSURE), 27 ampollas de testosterona, 234 tabletas de oximetalona, que si bien dos de (sic) productos no coinciden con la cantidad exacta de la receta 166-A sí pueden ser asociadas en el tanto previo al día cuatro de diciembre del dos mil doce, no existía faltante de ENSURE, el faltante de oximetalona era igual a 70 tabletas y testosterona igual a 6 ampollas. IMPUTACIÓN: Se les imputa en grado de probabilidad a Jorge Terdencilla Martínez (...), manipulación indebida del Sistema Integrado de Farmacia (SIFA), ingresar al sistema Integrado de Farmacia información de una receta que no existió, utilizar la contraseña asignada al señor Jorge Matamoros Calvo, ingresar a la bodega de paso ubicada en la Farmacia Central sin contar con la autorización del Regente de Turno, sustraer productos tanto de un área restringida, como del despacho de la Farmacia, por no informar a la jefatura inmediata de su error u omisión al borrar la receta 166-A a nombre de Zoila Hortencia Thorpe MOrales, (...) y de esa forma perjudicar los intereses de la Institución, además no guardar lealtad a la institución, al no abstenerse de actuaciones que puedan causar perjuicio moral o material a la institución. Por ejecutar las labores con eficiencia, constancia y diligencia. Por dedicarse a asuntos ajenos a las funciones que le encomendaron. Por hacer uso indebido y no autorizado de los instrumentos, herramientas, utensilios y pertenencias de la institución; para fines ajenos a su verdadero cometido. Permanecer dentro de los locales y propiedades de la institución, sin ningún motivo relacionado con el trabajo o sin autorización expresa de su jefe inmediato ni de representantes de la institución. Hacer uso del cargo que desempeña para obtener ventajas de carácter personal. Incumpliendo los artículos: (...) De lograrse demostrar como ciertos los hechos se provoca la pérdida objetiva de confianza por parte del patrono, por lo siguiente: Mediante resolución 2002-00234 de las 9:30 horas del 22 de mayo del dos mil dos, la Sala Constitucional hizo referencia a la necesaria confianza que debe caracterizar las relaciones entre los entes del sector público y sus trabajadores: (...). / De esta manera se ha indicado que las condiciones personales que se valoran en una determinada persona, para ser contratada, así como la transparencia en el ejercicio de las labores conexas o directamente relacionadas con su trabajo, deben mantenerse a lo largo de toda contratación. El investigado, como funcionario público, está sujeto a un contenido ético esencial en su relación contractual con la Administración, que le exige un comportamiento acorde con las normas de la ética. Por lo tanto, si antes no se había tenido queja del trabajo del investigado lo cierto es que de demostrarse los hechos en ese momento la Dirección de Farmacia podría perder la confianza objetiva depositada en él, ya que en el señor Jorge Tardencilla Martínez se ha depositado mucha confianza por su capacidad intelectual y disposición para el trabajo, se le capacitó en diferentes áreas y se le envió a cursos sobre el Sistema Integrado de Farmacia SIFA y se le confió (sic) permisos en el sistema. Lo anterior tiene relevancia ya que el SIFA es un programa institucional que tiene como finalidad llevar un control contable de cada Servicio de Farmacia que es mantenimiento del inventario de medicamentos, el ingreso y el egreso contable de cada línea de producto y a la vez llevar un control farmacoterapéutico de cada paciente", luego, se expresó cuál sería la finalidad del procedimiento, así como un listado de la prueba que obra en el expediente administrativo y de la testimonial que habría de ser evacuada como parte del mismo y se le elencaron sus derechos, entre otras cosas. Ninguna imprecisión u oscuridad en la redacción de los hechos en términos de los elementos de tiempo, modo y lugar observa este Tribunal, podría haber generado dificultad en el actor para ejercer una adecuada defensa, que de hecho ejerció a lo largo del procedimiento con la asistencia de patrocinio letrado. Antes bien, se observa todo lo contrario como derivación de lo expresado en el escrito presentado por el propio actor ante el órgano director del procedimiento, el día 27 de mayo del 2013, visible a folios del 256 al 269 del los hechos en el auto inicial, se hace referencia a fechas y horas específicas, en las que dentro de lo que resultó posible, fueron precisados en lo medular, la detección de un faltante de medicamentos que fueron extraídos de la identificada como bodega de paso, que el actor habría hecho ingreso no autorizado a esa área siendo restringida el 04 de diciembre del 2012 en dos ocasiones, que se ingresó un registro de una receta inexistente en el Sistema Integrado de Farmacia (SIFA) cuando el funcionario con condiciones para manipularlo era el actor; que lo anterior se efectuó haciendo uso de la clave correspondiente al usuario asignadas a un funcionario que ya se había retirado del centro de trabajo, mientras que el que permanecía a esa hora en el sitio era el señor Tardencilla y una Farmacéutica no capacitada en manipulación del sistema indicado; y que luego, al día 17 de diciembre del 2012, el mismo señor Tardencilla procedió a borrar o eliminar el registro de esa receta inexistente. En todos los casos la información en términos del día y hora en que se estimó que podrían haber ocurrido estos hechos imputados al actor, fue en criterio de este Tribunal suficiente y adecuada al merito de la complejidad del asunto, no observándose de lo actuado que haya podido generar el estado de indefensión en que acusó el actor, se encontró a partir de ello, por lo que no llevando razón en sus reproches, tampoco resulta procedente declarar la anulación de la resolución dictada por el órgano director del procedimiento a las 13:00 horas del 15 de marzo del 2013 por lo que se declara sin lugar el extremo. Sobre el particular se estima que la redacción de lo correspondiente, ni representa obstáculo alguno para comprender qué hechos y qué calificación legal respecto de los mismos, así como las consecuencias de tenerse por demostrados acarrearían para el actor, por lo que una adecuada defensa a partir del acto, era perfectamente posible. Finalmente, al actor le fue permitido participar en todas las fases del proceso, le fueron advertidos sus derechos y fueron respetados, fue informado adecuadamente de la naturaleza y alcances del procedimiento, fueron observadas las oposiciones y remedios recursivos que planteó en su momento, fueron respetadas todas las instancias procedimentales, incluyendo el conocimiento del caso por parte del órgano bipartita con representación de los trabajadores y del patrono, a lo que se suma, que no se observó sesgo en lo actuado que permita afirmar in vicio asociado al fin en lo actuado, habiéndose además respetado el principio de inocencia en el actor, por lo que su reproche al respecto tampoco es de recibo.- 7.- Sobre la inexistencia de un vicio asociado a la traída al procedimiento administrativo, de prueba constituida por los elementos correspondientes a una investigación anterior. Refiere quien demanda a un vicio que vincula por el hecho de que al procedimiento seguido en su contra, se trajo como prueba, documentación sobre una investigación anterior que efectuada por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial, habría sido llevada a cabo, sin que se determinase responsabilidad alguna de su parte, por la ocurrencia de hechos ocurridos en el año 2010 como los que son de interés, relacionados con la sustracción de medicamentos. En criterio del actor, esta acción habría de acreditar el interés de perjudicarle en su honor y formar un criterio sobre él en las personas que habrían de conocer su asunto, sin motivo y/o explicación para ello. No lleva razón el actor en su reproche, aunque efectivamente se tuvo por acreditado que entre la prueba que fue agregada al con una investigación efectuada por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial en el año 2010, ajena a los hechos ocurridos en el 2012 pero de la misma naturaleza, sea, vinculados con la posible sustracción de medicamentos de la bodega de paso, con ocasión de información que fue denunciada en su momento por parte del Jefe de Proveeduría de Farmacia Hospitalaria, señor Álvaro Bogarín conforme obra de folios del 35 al 44 del expediente administrativo, bastando con indicar que no se acredita primero, que haya tenido alguna incidencia dentro del procedimiento administrativo seguido en su contra, incluso si lo es a efecto de la afirmación que se hizo en el sentido de que se trajo al procedimiento con la intención de perjudicarle, intención que no se demuestra ni se observa el perjuicio mencionado, así como tampoco algún efecto que haya incidido en la objetividad de las personas a cargo de la instrucción del proceso, menos del órgano decisor, ninguno de los cuales, siquiera entró a valorar esa prueba, ya para rendir el informe final, ya para el dictado del acto final, ambos como parte del trámite dado al procedimiento. En consecuencia, de ello no se extrae vicio alguno, menos nulidad en lo actuado en ningún nivel.- 8.- Sobre los vicios asociados a la inexistencia o falsedad de los hechos por los que fue despedido el actor. Se alegó por el actor que los hechos por los que fue despedido obedecieron a una fabricación de los mismos por parte de la Administración, que no guarda correspondencia con la realidad. En relación con este punto se acusó de falsa la declaración rendida en su oportunidad por el señor Federico Jiménez, -quien se afirma, no sólo habría sido quien ordenó ilegítimamente la investigación en su contra, sino que además, se habría propuesto a sí mismo como testigo- en lo que afirmó haber visto al actor salir de la bodega de paso portando una caja y dentro de una caja que portaba, unos medicamentos o productos.- 8.1.- Algunas generalidades sobre el régimen jurídico que ampara la conducta del funcionario público. Esta Sección IV en su sentencia número 33- 2013-IV de las 14:45 horas minutos del 23 de abril del año 2013, indicó lo siguiente sobre el tema que nos ocupa: "V.- (...) es menester partir de la consideración de que en Costa Rica el servidor público se encuentra sometido a un régimen particular, diferenciado del trabajador privado y del cual dimanan una serie de derechos y obligaciones específicas. Los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política son la base fundamental para establecer tal distinción al establecer lo siguiente: Artículo 191.- Un estatuto de servicio civil regulará las relaciones entre el Estado y los servidores públicos, con el propósito de garantizar la eficiencia de la administración y Artículo 192.- Con las excepciones que esta Constitución y el estatuto de servicio civil determinen, los servidores públicos serán nombrados a base de idoneidad comprobada y sólo podrán ser removidos por las causales de despido justificado que exprese la legislación de trabajo, o en el caso de reducción forzosa de servicios, ya sea por falta de fondos o para conseguir una mejor organización de los mismos. De conformidad con las indicadas normas de rango constitucional se evidencia que el servidor del Estado y sus Instituciones, goza de los derechos de una regulación normativa propia, estabilidad en el empleo - limitando el régimen de libre remoción propio de la regulación laboral privada- y de una carrera administrativa, junto con los demás garantías existentes para las personas amparadas a un régimen de subordinación, como son el pago de un salario, vacaciones, jornadas máximas, huelga, etc. (haciendo la salvedad del derecho a la negociación colectiva, excluida por votos 4453-2000 y 9690-2000 de la Sala Constitucional). Correlativo con los anteriores derechos, posee además una serie de obligaciones de carácter funcionarial inherentes a los fines públicos buscados con su actividad y que deben orientar siempre su gestión a fin de no incurrir en una falta personal generadora de responsabilidad disciplinaria. Sin pretender ser exhaustivos, algunos de los deberes propios del régimen de empleo público, son: a) deber de probidad (art. 3 Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Administración Pública), b) deber de cumplimiento de los principios del servicio público - continuidad, eficiencia, adaptación al cambio en el régimen legal e igualdad de trato- (art. 4 Ley General de la Administración Pública), c) deber de cautelar un adecuado ambiente de control interno (art. 39 de la Ley General de Control Interno); d) deber de proteger el interés superior de los niños y las niñas (art. 4 y 5 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia) e) deber de cumplir el ordenamiento jurídico (art. 13 y concordantes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, art. 39.a del Estatuto de Servicio Civil), f) deber de dar pronta respuesta e información al usuario (art. 5 y 10 de la Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos), g) deber de obediencia (art. 108 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), h) deber de actuar con eficacia (art. 5 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos); i) deber de guardar decoro y de brindar debida atención al usuario (art. 114 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y art. 39. d) y e) del Estatuto de Servicio Civil); j) deber de responder en caso de haber actuado con dolo o culpa grave (art. 199 y 211 Ley General de la Administración Pública) k) deber de acatar la Constitución Política (art. 11 de dicho cuerpo normativo). Adicionalmente, de manera supletoria y con base en el artículo 9 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 51 del indicado Estatuto, le son aplicables a dicha relación de empleo público las disposiciones propias del Código de Trabajo y demás disposiciones relacionadas con la relación de trabajo, como por empleo la Ley de Hostigamiento Sexual en el Empleo y la Docencia, Ley de Regulación del Fumado, Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para Personas con Discapacidad, entre otras. En este orden de ideas, si bien en materia de empleo público no podemos hablar de una plena integración del ordenamiento jurídico y principios en materia laboral habida cuenta de la existencia de una relación estatutaria y no contractual, (artículo 111de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) no puede obviarse la existencia de líneas generales de orientación de la relación que son comunes, como por ejemplo, la aplicación del principio de buena fe entre ambas partes, contemplado en el artículo 19 del Código de Trabajo. Con relación al régimen disciplinario a aplicar en caso de incumplimiento de dichos deberes, de conformidad con sendos votos de la Sala Constitucional el principio de tipicidad se torna más laxo, por lo que no se requiere una específica tipificación legal de la conducta, dada la naturaleza misma de la situación jurídica de los servidores. En este sentido, el voto 2007-013903 de las quince horas y veinticinco minutos del tres de octubre del dos mil siete de la Sala Constitucional, indica lo siguiente: "V.- Sobre el principio de tipicidad en el régimen disciplinario.- El principio de tipicidad es una aplicación del principio de legalidad que exige por un lado, la delimitación concreta de las conductas que se hacen reprochables a efectos de su sanción, y por otro lado, la delimitación concreta de las posibles sanciones a aplicar, pudiendo afirmarse que el principio de tipicidad constituye un principio fundamental en la responsabilidad disciplinaria. En cuanto a la delimitación concreta de la conducta reprochable, esta Sala ha sostenido en anteriores oportunidades (ver al respecto la resolución 2005-06616 de las veinte horas con cincuenta y ocho minutos del treinta y uno de mayo del dos mil cinco y 94-5594 de las quince horas cuarenta y ocho minutos del veintisiete de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro) que aunque ciertamente este principio en esta materia no tiene la misma forma que en el ámbito jurídico penal, ya que puede sancionarse discrecionalmente las faltas no previstas literalmente, siempre debe entenderse que estas faltas están incluidas en el texto. Es decir, pueden sancionarse discrecionalmente las faltas no previstas literalmente, pero que se entienden incluidas en el texto y siempre y cuando resulten de la comprobación de la falta disciplinaria, mediante un procedimiento creado al efecto . Ahora bien, en cuanto a la delimitación concreta de la sanción, a diferencia de lo que se viene de decir, ésta sí debe estar clara y previamente establecida, sin que pueda la Administración crear sanciones nuevas que no estén contempladas en las normas aplicables . En resumen, aunque se infiere que los hechos determinantes de las faltas disciplinarias son innumerables -pues dependen de la índole de los comportamientos o conductas de los sujetos- y que los principios "nullum crimen sine lege", "nullum poena sine lege" no tienen la rigidez y exigencia que les caracteriza en el derecho penal sustantivo, siempre es necesario en materia disciplinaria, en atención al principio de tipicidad, que la conducta se infiera del texto normativo y que la sanción esté -está sí- claramente preestablecida". Lo anterior genera lo que en doctrina es conocido como el principio de tipificación relativa en el entendido que la falta debe estar prevista en el ordenamiento disciplinario, pero sin el nivel de rigurosidad propio de la materia penal en cuanto se derive de la relación de servicio en concreto. En razón de lo anterior, son sancionables tanto el incumplimiento de los deberes funcionales generales como las conductas tipificadas legalmente (a nivel de Estatuto de Servicio Civil, normas estatutarias propias del régimen o Código de Trabajo, por ejemplo), y aquellas que se encuentren contempladas en normas de carácter inferior, como las contenidas en los reglamentos autónomos de servicio o en los casos en los cuales la tipificación se dé con respecto a la sanción a imponer. Esta tipificación relativa flexibiliza la necesidad de normas positiva en carácter de ley formal, siendo posible que su regulación se genere por norma positiva de menor rango. Las anteriores consideraciones lo son sin perjuicio de que existen una serie de principios del derecho sancionatorio derivados del derecho penal, de necesario cumplimiento en todos los casos, v.g. proporcionalidad, non bis in idem, inocencia, debido proceso, debida fundamentación de la resolución respectiva. En este orden de ideas, es de advertir que en materia de definición de conductas que pueden ser consideradas como parte de los deberes propios de los funcionarios públicos u objeto de sanción en caso de incumplimiento, nuestro país posee un sistema difuso, habida cuenta que las mismas no se encuentran detalladas en un solo cuerpo normativo, sino dispersas entre diferentes normas de distinto rango, privando mayor especificidad en las normas reglamentarias que cada ente opte por dictar, según el artículo 27 del Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Lo anterior, de conformidad con las potestades auto normativas de la Administración Pública, y habida cuenta de la imposibilidad de que por la vía legal se puedan normar todas y cada una de las conductas concretas en que incurren los servidores públicos, y en el entendido de que el ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria se encuentra limitado por el marco general del ordenamiento supra legal. De manera transversal a este conjunto de principios y normas de diferente rango, en esta materia encontramos el interés público como un referente constante en la adopción de cualquier decisión o conducta formal o informal de la Administración con respecto a sus servidores. Dicho interés entendido de conformidad con el artículo 113 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, dispone: "1. El servidor público deberá desempeñar sus funciones de modo que satisfagan primordialmente el interés público, el cual será considerado como la expresión de los intereses individuales coincidentes de los administrados. 2. El interés público prevalecerá sobre el interés de la Administración Pública cuando pueda estar en conflicto. 3. En la apreciación del interés público se tendrá en cuenta, en primer lugar, los valores de seguridad jurídica y justicia para la comunidad y el individuo, a los que no puede en ningún caso anteponerse la mera conveniencia". En razón de lo anterior, todo análisis en materia de empleo público no debe obviar el análisis del cumplimiento del interés público en la adopción de la respectiva decisión administrativa, como fundamental referente de su motivación subyacente. Complementario con lo anterior, la normativa y principios dichos, son la base sine qua non para determinar la procedencia o no de una pretensión anulatoria específica, presentada por un servidor público frente a una administración”. En lo que toca a la materia de responsabilidad, se continuó indicando en el fallo indicado que: “De dichas responsabilidad emanan un régimen sancionatorio, al cual le es aplicable, al igual que el resto de los servidores las siguientes disposiciones: "Artículo 211.- 1. El servidor público estará sujeto a responsabilidad disciplinaria por sus acciones, actos o contratos opuestos al ordenamiento, cuando haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave, sin perjuicio del régimen disciplinario más grave previsto por otras leyes. 2. El superior responderá también disciplinariamente por los actos de sus inmediatos inferiores, cuando él y estos últimos hayan actuado con dolo o culpa grave. 3. La sanción que corresponda no podrá imponerse sin formación previa de expediente, con amplia audiencia al servidor para que haga valer sus derechos y demuestre su inocencia". "Artículo 213.- A los efectos de determinar la existencia y el grado de la culpa o negligencia del funcionario, al apreciar el presunto vicio del acto al que se opone, o que dicta o ejecuta, deberá tomarse en cuenta la naturaleza y jerarquía de las funciones desempeñadas, entendiéndose que cuanto mayor sea la jerarquía del funcionario y más técnicas sus funciones, en relación al vicio del acto, mayor es su deber de conocerlo y apreciarlo debidamente". Es de relevancia indicar que en la Ley General de la Administración Pública, existen algunos casos donde la Ley expresamente califica la gravedad de la infracción, como por ejemplo la emisión de actos manifiestamente ilegales (art. 199), obedecer dichos actos (art. 199), ordenar la ejecución de un acto absolutamente nulo ( art. 170) y el retardo grave e injustificado en la conclusión de un procedimiento administrativo (art. 225). En otros casos, incluidos la omisión de actuar con una diligencia debida o la omisión de un deber funcional, es necesario analizar en cada caso concreto si el servidor actuó con culpa grave o dolo a efectos de determinar su responsabilidad administrativa. Como se advierte, a diferencia del régimen de empleo privado en donde se establece un sistema de imputación de determinadas conductas más o menos abiertas que se estiman como antijurídicas, en el caso en examen, hay criterios subjetivos de responsabilidad - existencia de "dolo o culpa grave" en la conducta. Con respecto a los alcances de dicha responsabilidad en la discusión del proyecto de Ley General se indicó lo siguiente: "El funcionario va a responder ante la administración y va a responder al particular. Nosotros hemos querido coger toda esa evolución lo que consideramos que es sano. En principio sano consiste en que el funcionario sepa que no obstante que es funcionario debe tener el mismo deber de prudencia o diligencia y respeto a los derechos ajenos que el ciudadano común. No hay razón para que se castigue con responsabilidad a un ciudadano común que le causa un daño a otro, y no se castigue con igual responsabilidad a un empleado público que imprudentemente, negligentemente le causa un daño a un particular. Todavía es más punible nos parece éste último porque se supone que por su condición ha de tener no solo una conducta más ejemplar sino más controlada. El término tal (sic), es que el que viola gravemente sus deberes del cargo en realidad comete una negligencia punible. Sin embargo hemos optado por emplear dos términos que en Costa Rica se han empleado siempre en el Código Civil y en muchos ordenamientos nuestros. El dolo o culpa grave, que significa efectivamente una culpa que ya está muy definida por los tribunales. Dependiendo de cada caso, es aquella caso (sic) en dónde o intencionalmente o corriéndose (sic) un riesgo, o con obvia conciencia de que se están violando reglas elementales se causó un daño. En esos casos nosotros consideramos que es moral y además conveniente para el buen andamiento de la administración, desde el punto de vista y que crea y responsabilidad en un funcionario y que éste sea personalmente responsable ante el particular por el daño que le causa. Aparte de la responsabilidad disciplinaria que puede tener, éste señor le va a responder a la administración si la administración tiene que pagarle al particular. Es un freno para el descuido la negligencia grave de la administración, en el desempeño de sus funciones. Por eso hablamos de dolo o culpa grave. Lo que se podría llamar culpa leve o culpa profesional o culpa habitual, esos descuidos explicables en un funcionario esos no se sancionan. Pero lo que es un descuido grave, un olvido de reglas elementales de prudencia en el desempeño de su cargo, esos es sancionado por ofendido y frente a la administración..." (Acta Nº 104 de la Comisión Permanente de Gobierno y Administración de 3 de abril de 1970, pág. 10). (...) En razón de lo anterior, es evidente para este Tribunal que para que exista culpa grave, debe existir un apartamiento claro, objetivo y serio de un deber de cuidado emanado de la ley, imputable a un servidor determinado que tenga una consecuencia lesiva a los intereses públicos. Esa conducta u omisión grave que se aparta de ese deber legal, puede tener o no un resultado, en tanto que la Ley General y el ordenamiento administrativo prevé supuestos en que indistintamente del resultado, opera la responsabilidad. Empero es evidente que en la mayoría de los casos la determinación sobre la existencia de una culpa grave va asociada a algún tipo de afectación, sea a la propia administración, sea a terceros o a ambos. Con respecto a la determinación sobre su acaecimiento o no en estos últimos supuestos, resulta viable referir a los mecanismos empleados en sede penal para determinar si ha ocurrido una conducta culposa en los casos en que hay resultado dañoso y que son denominados como la teoría de la equivalencia de condiciones y la teoría de la conditio sine qua non mediante las cuales se establece o se descarta la necesaria relación de causalidad entre la omisión al deber objetivo de cuidado (causa) y el resultado dañoso (efecto), necesaria para la configuración de la culpa. En este sentido, el voto 696-2003 de 11:55 de 18 de julio de 2003 del Tribunal de Casación Penal indica: "... De acuerdo a las teorías dichas (...) el juez debe hacer una prognosis postuma ex ante facto (objetiva) también llamada supresión e inclusión hipotética, de manera que frente a varias omisiones a los deberes objetivos de cuidado, se reconstruye mentalmente el hecho, pero cumpliendo dichos deberes, uno a la vez es decir tantas reconstrucciones como incumplimientos a los deberes se constaten, con los siguientes resultados: (i) si cumplido el deber el resultado se produce, se descarta la relación de causalidad; o (ii) si cumplido el deber de cuidado el resultado no sobreviene, se constata la relación causa a efecto entre omisión al deber objetivo de cuidado y resultado...". En el mismo sentido, se indica: "... el mecanismo judicial de averiguación de la conducta culposa es aquél mediante el cual el analista pone una conducta en el supuesto de hecho en donde se dan los deberes de cuidado exigidos y observar si el resultado siempre se produce. Si esto último ocurre, la conclusión evidente es que aún con todo el deber de cuidado el Resultado se hubiera producido, entonces la conducta no resulta típica de culpa. Por el contrario, si el analista ubica en el supuesto de hecho la conducta debida y el Resultado no se produce entonces la conclusión es que la infracción al deber de cuidado fue eficiente para la producción de ese Resultado y por tanto la conducta es típica de culpa" (Issa El Koury Jacob (Henry), Chirino Sánchez (Alfredo). Metodología de Resolución de Conflictos Jurídicos en Materia Penal, Ilanud, San José, 1991 página 114). Con base en las anteriores consideraciones, estima este Tribunal que la determinación de la existencia de culpa grave en una conducta administrativa u omisión concreta que le sea imputada a un servidor público, parte de una verificación de los siguientes supuestos: a) Existencia de deberes funcionariales generales o específicos, que le sean exigibles a un servidor, en virtud de su determinación en normas de alcance legal o reglamentario. b) Existencia de un apartamiento real, objetivo, concreto, imputable y demostrado al servidor de dicho deber exigible, siendo así que el mismo se dio al no ajustarse al cumplimiento medio esperado de su deber de manera consiente y deliberada c) Determinación de la existencia o no de conductas que por su mero acaecimiento puedan ser consideradas como generadoras de responsabilidad, indistintamente del resultado ocasionado. d) Verificación de si con motivo de la conducta se ocasionó o no un resultado para la Administración o terceros, de tipo administrativo (v.g. debilitamiento del sistema de control interno del ente), económico o de otro orden. e) Valoración de la gravedad del apartamiento de la conducta u omisión de los deberes indicados. Para tal fin, se debe tomar en consideración, tanto el entorno en donde operó la conducta u omisión, el nivel jerárquico del servidor, los eventuales daños ocasionados, la concurrencia de otros actos de terceros y el carácter técnico de la conducta que era debida y que no se realizó. Será mediante la valoración integrada de estas consideraciones que se podrá determinar si en un caso concreto o no, podría imputarse responsabilidad disciplinaria a un servidor en particular, habida cuenta que bien podría incurrirse en una conducta sin culpa, o a pesar de existir ésta, podría ser considerada como leve, con lo cual no se generaría responsabilidad administrativa “. Hechas estas consideraciones, procede el análisis de fondo del caso objeto de la presente resolución. En lo que se reprochó que los hechos por los que se dispuso el despido del actor, no existieron.- […]

8.2.- Sobre la pérdida objetiva de confianza como causal de despido. Este es un tema, al que aunque medular por haber fundado el acto de despido del actor, ninguna referencia hace quien demanda. Se trata de una de las causales de despido que aunque no prevista expresamente en el Código de Trabajo en su artículo 81, si ha sido reconocida como tal principalmente por parte de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia conforme jurisprudencia lineal al respecto. Este presupuesto no se restringe a aquellos cargos identificados como “de confianza”, sino que cubre a la totalidad de las modalidades de ingreso al empleo público. A título de ejemplo, hacemos cita de la Sentencia de esa Sala de Casación número 2004-00967, de las 10:35 horas del 10 de noviembre del 2004, que reza así en lo conducente: “De manera reiterada se ha indicado que las condiciones personales que se valoran en un determinado trabajador, para ser contratado, así como la transparencia en el ejercicio de las labores conexas o directamente relacionadas con su trabajo, por su naturaleza de “intuitu personae”, deben mantenerse a lo largo de toda la contratación, además de tomarse en cuenta el tipo de trabajo que despliega el o la servidora; y, en el caso presente, justificadamente, la entidad demandada perdió objetivamente la confianza en la funcionaria, por las graves anomalías que se descubrieron en el trámite de la liquidación de las pólizas, que se recalcularon en montos, por mucho, menores a los que realmente correspondían y que inicialmente habían sido fijados de manera correcta por otro funcionario. En cuanto a este tema, Cabanellas ha señalado que “Cuando los actos que el trabajador provoca justifican la pérdida de la confianza, es evidente que desaparece la armonía que debe predominar en el contrato de trabajo, por lo que se justifica el despido, principalmente si el conjunto de los actos del subordinado crea insuperable recelo. Tal es el caso de las conductas que, sin constituir delito, originan la pérdida de ese elemento que es básico en la relación laboral; aun cuando la deslealtad sancionada no constituya delito criminal ni falta de tal carácter y razón suficiente para imposibilitar la continuidad del contrato de trabajo. Debido a esa naturaleza del vínculo laboral, el trabajador debe mantener una conducta intachable dentro y fuera del trabajo; cuando no es así, desaparece el elemento de confianza en él depositado, y puede ser despedido con justa causa... En conclusión, todo hecho que sea susceptible de sembrar la desconfianza del empresario y que impida la prosecución de la relación laboral -dentro de un ambiente sin recelos- puede servir para fundar la ruptura del contrato de trabajo.” (CABANELLAS DE TORRES, Guillermo. Compendio de Derecho Laboral, Tomo I, Buenos Aires, Editorial Heliasta, S.R.L., tercera edición, 1.992, pp. 973-974)”. Con todo, para que pueda ser instrumentalizada como causal de despido sin responsabilidad patronal, si bien el término confianza remite a una situación subjetiva del empleador; esto no quiere decir que se pueda arribar a ella por intuición o simple sospecha, subjetiva y arbitrariamente. Antes bien, debe encontrarse respaldada en circunstancias objetivamente apreciables, que en más que menos de los casos afectan en la relación de empleo la buena fe y la fidelidad que el empleado debe a su patrono, de forma tal que la continuación de la relación no es posible en el marco de los intereses que deben privar, en tratándose de relaciones de la especie que se mantienen con la Administración Pública, que no son otros que los públicos. Además, la decisión debe ser congruente y proporcional con los hechos que se tengan por probados, que deben ser de gravedad suficiente.-“