Unification of criteria on corruptor penalty — meeting of minds and the verb “prometer”Unificación de criterios sobre penalidad del corruptor — acuerdo de voluntades y verbo “prometer”

XVIII.In the fourth ground of the seventh section of the Cassation Appeal of the Public Prosecutor's Office, failure to observe Constitutional articles 33 and 41, article 468 subsection b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is claimed, and numeral 345 of the Penal Code (which currently corresponds to article 352 of the Penal Code) is alleged to have been erroneously applied, regarding the configuration of the penalty of the corrupter for aggravated corruption in the modality of improper bribery charged against Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona. According to the Public Prosecutor's Office, ruling 2012-2550 erroneously ordered the acquittal of Quirós Carmona for the acts attributed by the prosecuting entity, consisting of having corrupted the co-defendant Sibaja Fonseca, under the argument that in this particular case, the configuration of the correlative crime of bribery attributed to the public official was not proven, that is, it was not determined what action was requested of Sibaja Fonseca so that Alcatel could obtain the contract for the 400 thousand cellular lines (Cf. f.175363 of volume XLII of the file), a position that is contrary to the letter of article 345 of the Penal Code itself (currently 352 of the Penal Code), and to rulings 219-98, of nine fifty-five, of March sixth, nineteen ninety-eight; 1475-99, of ten thirty-eight, of November nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, both of the Third Chamber; 2005-00175, of fifteen thirty-three, of January nineteenth, two thousand five, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and to the criterion held by authors such as Warner Molina, in Delitos Funcionales, Guía de Investigación, San José, Supreme Court of Justice, Judicial School, 2009, p.124 and Francisco Muñoz Conde, in Derecho Penal. Parte Especial, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanc, 15th edition, 2008, pp.1003-1004, among others; since the " criminal type in question provides that the crime is configured when the active subject 'gives' or 'allows' an undue gift or advantage to a public official, regardless of whether there is a prior agreement or not for the official to perform an act proper to or contrary to their duties, or as a reward for an act performed or omitted by the public official…" (Cf. f.175366 of volume XLII of the file), as it is a crime of mere activity, specifically of abstract danger, in which the unlawful act is exhausted with the action of the perpetrator or the general dangerousness of the typical action for a specific legal interest and without the need for a concrete result, which contradicts what was stated by the Court of Appeals (Tribunal de Apelación) in the analytical reasoning of the judgment, when it determined that: "…That concrete act that was asked of Sibaja, as interpreted by the appellant, was not indicated in a clear, precise and concrete manner by the court. If this is so, and there is no precision regarding the fact, there would also be doubt as to whether Quirós Carmona was responsible for the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, since both facts are intimately related, and it is for this reason that he must be acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for the facts attributed to him in relation to Quirós Carmona…" (Cf. f.174503 verso)…" (Cf. f.175367 of volume XLII of the file). From the prosecutorial perspective, the previous excerpt harmed its punitive claims, as it presupposes the requirement of typical elements not contemplated by the criminal type for proving the conduct of the penalty of the corrupter attributed to Quirós Carmona, this despite having proven a factual framework that demonstrated the typicity required by the then article 345 of the Penal Code. Finally, the petitioners request the annulment of the second instance ruling and a correct interpretation according to law, maintaining the guilty verdict ordered by the lower court (A quo) against Quirós Carmona, for the three crimes of penalty of the corrupter for which he was convicted. Likewise, in the fifth complaint of the seventh section of the cassation appeal of the Public Prosecutor's Office, in accordance with ordinal 468 subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the existence of a contradiction is invoked between the challenged ruling 2012-2550 and rulings 0256-F-1987, of nine hours forty minutes, of September twenty-fifth, nineteen eighty-seven, and 01475-99, of ten hours thirty-eight minutes, of November nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, since in the first, the Court of Appeals of the Sentence revokes the conviction of Quirós Carmona for the crime of active bribery for aggravated corruption in the modality of improper bribery attributed by the Public Prosecutor's Office and related to the apparent corruption carried out by him on the co-defendant Sibaja Fonseca, as the accused conduct was apparently not proven due to the absence of a meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades) between both co-defendants and the lack of indication of what the functional act requested of co-defendant Guido Sibaja Fonseca was (Cf. f.175369 of volume XLII of the file), while the rulings of the Third Chamber which they transcribe in part, supposedly point out that this criminal type does not require the mentioned meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades), the transfer of the thing, or the co-delinquency of the public official, "as the sole conduct of the corrupter described in the legal type is suitable to endanger the protected legal interest, which is nothing other than the sound and normal functioning and prestige of the public administration through the correctness and integrity of its employees or servants…" (Cf. f.175370 front of volume XLII of the file, Ruling 0256-F-1987, of nine hours forty minutes, of September twenty-fifth, nineteen eighty-seven). Finally, they request that jurisprudence on the figure of the penalty of the corrupter be unified, so that the criterion held by the Third Chamber is applied, since the position assumed by the Court of Appeals (Tribunal de Apelación) causes grievance to their punitive claims, because despite having proven the typicity required by the former article 343 of the Penal Code, the acquittal of the defendant Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona was issued in the second instance. As both grounds are related, they are resolved jointly and both complaints must be declared with merit. From the exhaustive reading of various resolutions cited by the Public Prosecutor's Office and others issued by the Third Chamber, the Courts of Appeals of the Sentence (Tribunales de Apelación de Sentencia) and the former Courts of Cassation, it is possible to deduce the existence of two contrary jurisprudential interpretations regarding the issue of the relationship between the active subject or corrupter and the public official to whom the gift or undue advantage is "given" or "allowed" in the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, that is, what the Court of Appeals of the Criminal Sentence (Tribunal de Apelación de la Sentencia Penal), in the challenged ruling, calls, as part of the element of the criminal type, a "meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades)", indispensable for the configuration of the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, contained in former article 343, today modified in a minimal way and contained in numeral 352 of this same normative body. Thus, according to one sector of the jurisprudence, to which the mentioned judgment 2012-2550 belongs, for the configuration of the illicit action of the penalty of the corrupter, besides proving a meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades) between the active subject and the public official to be corrupted, the description of the conduct expected or performed by the corrupted official is required, or at least a determination of what the functional act would be that would have been asked or expected of that subject, as derived from the reasoning carried out in that regard by the same Court of Appeals of the Sentence (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia), in ruling 2012-2550: "…In fact, and as this Chamber previously analyzed, it is not known what role Guido Sibaja was expected to display in relation to the decision-making procedure internally at ICE, nor regarding the form and content of an abbreviated procedure that, in essence, was not favorable nor did it provide certainty to Alcatel. This company was better served, in terms of the certainty of its participation, by the direct purchases procedure. Guido Sibaja was in charge of coordination functions that had nothing to do with the direct purchases process, and as observed in the succession of decisions of the ICE Board of Directors, the path towards an abbreviated procedure was defined by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and not by ICE. The acceptance made by Guido Sibaja of having received monies from Alcatel does not allow determining, either, whether said sums were delivered rather as payment for a proper and concrete act of his functions. The uncertainty in this regard opens up a great number of possibilities of criminal typicity ranging from the receipt of gifts for a fulfilled act to Illicit Enrichment (Enriquecimiento Ilícito) itself, but not necessarily improper bribery. That concrete act that was asked of Sibaja, as interpreted by the appellant, was not indicated in a clear, precise and concrete manner by the court. If this is so, and there is no precision regarding the fact, there would also be doubt as to whether Quirós Carmona was responsible for the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, since both facts are intimately related, and it is for this reason that he must be acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for the facts attributed to him in relation to Quirós Carmona…" (Cf. 174503 verso of volume XLI of the file). However, the requirement of such a requirement for proving the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, in the criterion of another sector of the jurisprudence, would not be necessary or essential, considering the crime of active bribery or penalty of the corrupter as one of those called crimes of mere activity that are consummated at the moment the corrupter performs, -according to article 352 without the reforms implemented by laws, No. 8630, of January 17, 2008 and number 8422, of October 6, 2004), the verbs "give" or "allow" a gift or undue advantage, without an effective meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades) or the description of the functional act requested by the corrupter being important for its consummation, just as the Third Chamber held in its day, when pointing out that the crime of penalty of the corrupter or active bribery "…does not assume for its consummation the co-delinquency of the public official nor the transfer of the thing, as the sole conduct of the corrupter described in the legal type is suitable to endanger the protected legal interest, which is nothing other than the sound and normal functioning and prestige of the public administration through the correctness and integrity of its employees or servants…" (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Ruling 183-F-95, of eleven hours twenty minutes, of March twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-five). A position that this same Chamber also recently reproduced, upon resolving a case in which one of two defendants attributed the crime of aggravated robbery of a cellular telephone, upon being apprehended by officers of the Fuerza Pública (Public Force) and with the intention that these carry out an act contrary to their duties or omit to carry out an act proper to their duties, accosted them to let him go, offering them in exchange the appropriation of the seized cellular telephone. In said ruling, this Cassation Chamber admitted the consummation of the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, even though a meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades) between the active subject and the acting officers of the Fuerza Pública (Public Force) had not occurred, echoing for this purpose ruling 219-98, of nine hours fifty-five minutes, of March sixth, nineteen ninety-eight, with the integration of Magistrates Daniel González, Mario Houed, Alfonso Chaves, Rodrigo Castro and Carlos Luis Redondo, which regarding the application of the former norm 345 of the Penal Code, established: "…(the) active bribery does not require the effective transfer of ownership of the good, much less that it be delivered or placed under the possession of the public official whom one wants to corrupt, but rather the mere direct or indirect offering by oneself or through an intermediary to receive a gift or any advantage of retribution to perform an act contrary to their duties, to not perform it or to delay an act proper to their functions is sufficient for the injury to the legal interest to be produced and therefore for that illicit act to be configured…" (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, ruling 2012-001665, of ten hours thirteen minutes, of November sixteenth, two thousand twelve. The supplied text does not belong to the original, with the integration of Magistrates José Manuel Arroyo, Jesús Ramírez, Magda Pereira, Carlos Chinchilla and Doris Arias. In the same sense, Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, rulings 2004-00451, of twelve hours, of May seventh, two thousand four, with the integration of Magistrates Daniel González, Jesús Ramírez, José Manuel Arroyo, Ronald Salazar, and Alfredo Chirino, the latter acting as Substitute Magistrates; 1104-97, of eleven hours twenty-five minutes, of October ninth, nineteen ninety-seven, with the integration of Magistrates Rodrigo Castro and Jesús Ramírez, along with Substitute Magistrates Joaquín Vargas Gené, Carlos Redondo and Henry Issa El Khoury; 024-1996, of fourteen hours, of January twenty-ninth, nineteen ninety-six, with the integration of Magistrates Daniel González, Jesús Ramírez, Mario Houed, Alfonso Chaves and Rodrigo Castro; 256-F-1987, of nine hours, of September twenty-fifth, nineteen eighty-seven, among others. Former Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Antiguo Tribunal de Casación Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José), rulings 2004-0027, of eleven hours, of January twenty-second, two thousand four, with the integration of Judges Ronald Salazar, Jorge Arce and Javier Llobet; 2003-0962, of twelve hours five minutes, of September twenty-second, two thousand three, with the integration of Judges Mario Porras, Carlos Chinchilla and Ulises Zúñiga. Court of Appeals of the Criminal Sentence of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José), rulings 2013-2014, of fourteen hours forty minutes, of September sixth, two thousand thirteen, with the integration of Judges Mario Porras, Jorge Camacho and Frezie Jiménez; 2012-0767, of sixteen hours, of April twenty-third, two thousand twelve, with the integration of Judges Jorge Luis Arce, Alfredo Chirino and Sandra Zúñiga). Now then, once the objective existence of two antagonistic jurisprudential perspectives has been verified, for the sake of safeguarding the principle of legal certainty and under the prerogatives attributed by article 468 subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Third Chamber proceeds to unify and issue the respective criterion, opting to assume the second position, consisting of the fact that for the configuration of the penalty of the corrupter, contemplated in former article 345 of the Penal Code, it is unnecessary to prove a meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades) between the active corrupter subject and the public official, and that said illegality also does not require any special characteristic for its commission, since any person can commit the penalty of the corrupter, performing the typical verbs "give" or "allow" a gift or undue delivery, the injury to the protected legal interest being produced with those actions, which is probity in the performance of public function and without requiring as part of the objective type of said norm, that "…the public official accepts or rejects that undue gift, advantage or promise, since if they accept it, the passive subject would be committing the crimes of proper or improper bribery, as the case may be, and if they do not accept it, their conduct would be atypical, although in both cases the active subject would have equally committed the crime of the penalty of the corrupter…" (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, ruling 2012-001665, of ten hours thirteen minutes, of November sixteenth, two thousand twelve). On the same topic, resolution 1475-1999, of ten hours thirty-eight minutes, of November nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, cited by the prosecutorial body and retaken by this jurisdictional body, upon assuming the present position, was clear in pointing out that: "[…] On the other hand, and now as a matter of substance, it is not true that the configuration of the crime of corruption of public officials provided for in article 343 of the Penal Code requires a meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades), as the defendant erroneously understands it, for said effect it is sufficient that the agent gives or allows the public official a gift or an undue advantage, without it being necessary that, concomitantly, the latter accepts it…". On the other hand, regarding the issue of the lack of indication of what the functional act requested of Sibaja Fonseca was, a questioning that does not derive from the ground of contradictory precedents, but rather from the fourth claim of this seventh section of the prosecutorial appeal, it must be indicated that both the accusation in facts 133 to 137 and the factual reasoning of judgment 167-2011, described in paragraphs 128 to 132, refer to the functional act requested by the co-defendants Valverde Acosta and Christian Sapsizian from the accused Sibaja Fonseca, as that which consisted of the latter carrying out the necessary actions within the scope of his functions as advisor to the Executive Presidency of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (Costa Rican Electricity Institute) and person in charge of the execution of the 400,000 lines project, to make effective the contracting of the company Alcatel to carry out the mentioned project, when they detail in the section "Description of the conduct of the indicted Guido Sibaja Fonseca (Considerando IX)", that: "…128) The defendant Guido Sibaja Fonseca began working at the end of the year 2000 for I.C.E., in the capacity of Executive Assistant of Superior Administration in the Executive Presidency, an appointment that was formalized as of January 1, 2001./129) Within his functions, he was responsible for attending specific matters of the Executive Presidency such as, analyzing documents submitted for the knowledge and approval of the Executive President, providing advice and recommendations on these, coordinating with the different dependencies of the Institute matters related to the execution of projects and directives, coordinating and participating in the special commissions formed, collaborating in the development and implementation of programs and projects promoted by the Presidency, and representing I.C.E in different governmental and non-governmental organizations, related to the field of electricity and telecommunications. Likewise, among the projects he was in charge of, the abbreviated process 1-2002 for leasing the 400,000 GSM cellular lines stood out. / 130) From his entry into the institution, the defendant Guido Sibaja Fonseca, as assistant to the Executive Presidency, became the person in charge of accelerating matters related to the topic of telecommunications. Subsequently, the defendant Guido Sibaja was appointed to preside over a high-level commission formed by a multidisciplinary group of professionals that had under its responsibility the study and execution of the 400,000 thousand lines project, together with Hernán Bravo Trejos, member of the Board of Directors and officials Álvaro Retana, manager of the Mobile Services UEN, and Pablo Cob in his capacity as Executive President of the institution./131) Without specifying a date, but in the period between the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, the indicted Valverde Acosta and Christian Sapsizian requested that the defendant Guido Sibaja Fonseca carry out the necessary actions within the scope of his functions as advisor to the Executive Presidency of the I.C.E., and person in charge of the execution of the 400,000 lines project, to make said contracting effective by favoring Alcatel; in exchange for the above, Sapsizian and Valverde promised Sibaja Fonseca the delivery of a gift consisting of money, whose exact amount was not set at that time. Said promise was accepted by the defendant Sibaja Fonseca, it was also agreed that the delivery would be conditional on the effective award of the offer that Alcatel would present to I.C.E./ 132) For having fulfilled the indicted Guido Sibaja Fonseca with the agreed actions, once he managed together with other I.C.E. officials, to open the bidding for the purchase of cellular telephony and the award of the contract for the 400,000 GSM lines in favor of Alcatel, as previously agreed with the indicted Edgar Valverde Acosta and the indictee Christian Sapsizian, he received the promised gift corresponding to a percentage of the contract that Alcatel obtained with I.C.E., a payment that was made in a segmented manner through the intermediation of the co-indicted Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona with the money coming from Alcatel Cit…" (Cf. f.00015454-00015456 of volume XXXII of the file. The supplied text is ours), so that the factual accusation does contain the description of the functional act requested of Sibaja Fonseca. Based on what has been set forth here, ruling 2012-2550 of the Court of Appeals of the Sentence of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José) is annulled, insofar as it proceeded to acquit the defendants Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona and Guido Sibaja Fonseca, holding a criterion different from the one unified here. The remand of the case is ordered so that the Court of Appeals of the Sentence (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia), with a different panel, resolves the filed appeals anew.

XIX.Under the protection of article 468 subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the sixth ground of the seventh section of the Appeal of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the existence of contradictory precedents is alleged, at the time of carrying out the analysis of typicity of the crime contemplated in article 345 of the Penal Code (currently article 352 of the Penal Code) and justifying the acquittal of co-defendant Edgar Valverde Acosta. For the managing prosecutors, judgment 2012-2550, of the Court of Appeals (Tribunal de Apelación) and ruling 580-1991, of nine hours forty-five minutes, of October twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-one, of the Third Chamber, are contradictory, with precedents 2004-0451, of twelve hours, of May seventh, two thousand four; 0256-F-1987, of nine hours forty minutes, of September twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-five, and 1475-1999, of ten hours thirty-eight minutes, of November nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, all of the Third Chamber, given that the questioned ruling acquits Valverde Acosta of four crimes of the penalty of the corrupter, "for considering that he could not be convicted for having made a promise of the delivery of the gift to perform an act proper to their functions to the other co-defendants in the process" (Cf. f.175372 of volume XLII of the file), since article 345 of the Penal Code in force at the date of the facts, did not contemplate the typical action of "promise" and from the terms "give" or "offer" it was not possible to sustain, semantically or legally, the inclusion of the word "promise", without violating the principle of criminal legality. Yet, a contrary position is held in the mentioned ruling 2004-0451, in which within the scope of article 345, in force at the time of the facts, the meanings of "propose", "offer" and "promise" are included under the term "give" (Cf. f.175374 of volume XLII of the file), a criterion they put forward as correct and on which they petition the integration of the unification of the jurisprudence of the Chamber, so that the scope of the criminal type of the penalty of the corrupter is interpreted (Cf. f.175377 of volume XLII of the file). Apart, they maintain that the appealed judgment acquits Valverde Acosta for an additional erroneous reason: the lack of proof of a co-delinquency of the participating public officials, as can be deduced from folio 174523, of volume XLII of the file, when it is recorded that: "…as has been resolved in relation to the other indictees, it has not been possible to determine what the concrete action was that he had to deploy, or whether the gifts were as a reward for a fulfilled act. In other words, there is a favoring effect for the legal positions of Edgar Valverde regarding the indetermination of the facts accused against the alleged persons affected by the corrupting act, which undoubtedly must concur to produce the nullity of the ruling and declare the acquittal (See folio 174523 of the main file)…" (Cf. f.175376 of volume XLII of the file). Reasoning that is contrary to the criterion followed by the Third Chamber in rulings 0256-1987 and 01475-99, in which it was held, respectively, that the penalty of the corrupter does not presuppose, for its consummation, a meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades) between the corrupter and the corrupted public official; nor much less that the co-delinquency of the public official or the transfer of the thing must exist for proving the criminal type, so that, as active bribery is a "type of imperfect execution", in which: "… the mere offering or acceptance is sufficient, since the materialization of proper or improper bribery does not belong to the type, rendering the arguments outlined in the challenged ruling to acquit the indicted Valverde Acosta for the crimes of the penalty of the corrupter that have been attributed to him inappropriate…" (Cf. f.175377 of volume XLII of the file). Ultimately, they petition that the Third Chamber assume the position defended by the Public Prosecutor's Office in the unification of jurisprudence through rulings 0256-1987 and 01475-99, supra cited and as prejudice, they externalize a detriment to the prosecutorial claims, due to the fact that even though the facts that demonstrated the typicity required by former article 345 were proven, Valverde Acosta was acquitted for four crimes of the penalty of the corrupter, and as a claim they outline the maintenance of the guilty verdict issued by the Trial Court through a correct interpretation as corresponds by law. The complaint is declared with merit. Before resolving the claim raised by the prosecutorial entity, it is necessary to make some considerations regarding the history of the criminal type of the penalty of the corrupter contemplated in the former article 345 of the Penal Code, which in its original wording established: "…The penalties established in the five previous articles are applicable to whoever gives or allows the public official a gift or undue advantage", and our Courts of Justice, from the entry into force of the Penal Code and until ruling 461-91, of fifteen hours fourteen minutes, of February twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-one, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), had interpreted that among the actions comprised by said norm, was the verb "promise", insofar as it seemed a drafting error of the norm, having recorded "allow" instead of "promise". However, in the year 1991, regarding a habeas corpus appeal, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) had the opportunity to retake the issue, discarding in that interpretation a legislative material error of the verb "allow" for "promise", to finally establish that both terms did not constitute synonyms nor could be used by the Judges in an equivalent manner without violating the principle of legality. At that time, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in what is of interest, established regarding the supposed similarity of the verbs "allow" and "promise", that: "…Article 39 of the Political Constitution enshrines the principle of legality in criminal matters, a guiding and inspiring principle of our legal system. By virtue of it, the sole source creating crimes and penalties is the law.

In this matter, analogy and custom are excluded, and the Courts lack the authority to consider as criminal acts other than those defined in the law, such that any conduct that cannot be subsumed under it shall be unpunished, even if it is very serious. Consequently, a judicial interpretation that encompasses conduct not specifically described in the law violates the principle of legality. The plaintiff points out that in case No. 104-3-91 being pursued against his client in the Sixth Examining Magistrate's Court of San José, the accused's conduct has been improperly classified, because Article 343 of the Criminal Code speaks of "shall permit" (permitiere) and not "shall promise" (prometiere), as it should be in order to consider the conduct of Mr. B.O. as typical. Let us see how the accused, in common agreement with the co-accused A.C., contacted officials of the Judicial Investigation Department, to whom they promised a bribe if the alteration of the blood alcohol levels of his son, accused in another case for the crime of Culpable Homicide, was achieved. The original legislative file signed by the President of the Republic shows that Article 343 was approved and ordered to be published with the verb "shall permit" (permitiere) without there having been any legislative reform regarding that article. Given the foregoing, it is the criterion of this Constitutional Chamber that Article 343 of the Criminal Code cannot be interpreted without violating the constitutional principle of legality, in the sense that what the legislator meant to say is not "shall promise" (prometiere) but rather "shall permit" (permitiere)..." (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote 461-91, at fifteen hours fourteen minutes, on the twenty-seventh of February, nineteen ninety-one. The emphasis is ours). As a result of the aforementioned ruling, the prohibition of equating "to permit" with "to promise" was maintained as the dominant criterion in the resolutions issued by the Third Chamber, pursuant to Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. However, in 1995, this Cassation Chamber, with regard to the challenge raised by the Public Prosecutor's Office, in the same case that gave rise to vote 461-91, at fifteen hours fourteen minutes, on the twenty-seventh of February, nineteen ninety-one, of the Constitutional Chamber, conducted a new examination of the matter, only now from a different perspective: although for this jurisdictional body, the term "to promise" could never be equated with the verb "to permit", according to the designs of the Constitutional Chamber, under the principle of legality, the norm of Article 345 also presented the verb "to give" (dar), which within its meanings did contain the action of "to promise", so that, to factual frameworks that contained the aforementioned criminal action in their description, the mentioned numeral could indeed be applied. On that occasion, the Third Chamber, composed of Judges Alfonso Chaves Ramírez, Joaquín Vargas Gené, Rafael Medaglia Gómez, José Luis Quesada Fonseca, and Hernán Vega Miranda, held: "... This Cassation Chamber agrees with the Constitutional Chamber that, regarding Article 343 of the Criminal Code, it is not legitimate to modify the criminal type (tipo penal) by substituting the verb "shall permit" (permitiere) for "shall promise" (prometiere), because this contravenes the guarantee function of the type and violates the principle of legality. However, the claim raised by Licda. S.M. is acceptable, as the reasons she adduces to justify it are valid and in no way contravene the terms of the resolution in question from the Constitutional Chamber. Indeed, the Constitutional Chamber's analysis—with the exception of the note from Judge Piza Escalante—is merely formal, it does not extend beyond the mere literalness of the legal type, that is, it does not include the semantic analysis of it. In other words, the Constitutional Chamber established that it is not legitimate to read "shall promise" (prometiere) where it says "shall permit" (permitiere), but the truth is that it did not establish anything regarding the meaning of the words that make up the criminal type: it does not tell us what we must understand or what we must not understand from those words. And what the appellant argues is, precisely, that when the Constitutional Chamber establishes that the verb "shall permit" (permitiere) cannot be substituted for the word "shall promise" (prometiere), it is not excluding the "offer" or the "promise" as a possible semantic content of the word "shall give" (diere) set forth in the referenced numeral of the Criminal Code. Consulting various dictionaries proves the challenger right. Thus, the twenty-first edition of the Dictionary of the Spanish Language (1992), prepared by the Royal Spanish Academy (Real Academia Española), indicates that the third meaning in common usage of the word "to give" (dar) is "to propose, to indicate". This same meaning is endorsed by other common dictionaries (see, for example, Vol. II of the 1991 edition of the Diccionario Enciclopédico Éxito, by Editorial Océano), some of them even add the word "to offer" as a synonym for "to give" (dar) (thus, the dictionaries Pequeño Larousse Ilustrado, Ediciones Larousse, 1994, p. 316 and the Diccionario Abreviado de la Lengua Española, Vox, Bibliograf S.A., p. 146) and yet another states that "to give" (dar) is "to propose: to give an idea" (Diccionario Práctico Español Moderno, Ediciones Larousse, México, 1983, p. 148), so that one must agree with the challenger that whoever promises, offers, or proposes a bribe to a public official, present or future, for the latter to perform an act contrary to their duties (or to incur in any of the hypotheses of Articles 338 to 342 of the Criminal Code), adapts their conduct to the hypothesis provided for and sanctioned in Article 343 of the Criminal Code, regardless of whether the public official accepts or rejects the bribe or undue advantage, and regardless of whether the object has been shown to them, delivered to them, or placed under their possession or mere tenure, because the Penalty of the Corruptor (Penalidad del Corruptor) (active bribery (cohecho activo)) does not require, for its consummation, the complicity of the public official or the delivery of the thing, as the sole conduct of the corruptor described in the legal type is suitable to endanger the protected legal right, which is nothing other than the sound and normal functioning and prestige of the public administration through the correctness and integrity of its employees or servants. This is how our case law has understood it: ...what the law protects is the correct performance of duty by the official before the Public Administration, removing them at all costs, for the sake of the fulfillment of the obligations that concern them, from venality" (Third Chamber, V-256-F at 9:40 a.m. on September 25, 1987) (...) Excluding promises, offers, or proposals of bribes or undue advantages as a possible content of the typical action provided for in Article 343 of the Criminal Code not only denies the common meaning of the words used in the legal type, but also attacks the intelligibility of the legal system, since it constitutes a fraud upon the law, given that thereby the spirit of the norm would also be infringed (cf. Article 20 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code)..." (See in the same sense, Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote 183-F-95, at eleven hours twenty minutes, on the twenty-fourth of March, nineteen ninety-five. The emphasis is ours), this position being reiterated years later, by this same Third Chamber, in vote 2004-00451, at twelve hours, on the seventh of May, two thousand four, with the composition of Judges Daniel González, Jesús Alberto Ramírez, José Manuel Arroyo, and Substitute Judges Ronald Salazar and Alfredo Chirino. On that occasion, upon ruling on a request for acquittal raised by the Public Prosecutor's Office, it was determined that: "….This Chamber considers that Licentiate G.M. is not correct: In the first place, it must be said that it is true that the Constitutional Chamber warned in Resolution No. 461-91 at 3:14 p.m. on February 27, 1991, that the judicial interpretation according to which Article 345 should be read "shall promise" (prometiere) instead of "shall permit" (permitiere) was not admissible from a constitutional standpoint (the ruling of that Office refers to Article 343 of the Criminal Code, but it is the same one regulating the penalty of the corruptor; what happens is that the current numbering is the product of a reform subsequent to the issuance of the ruling just mentioned). Thus, in the legal text it is only possible to read "shall permit" (permitiere) where that word is written (therefore, the criterion of the lower court (a quo) is erroneous, according to which the Constitutional Chamber equated this word with "shall promise" (prometiere), because that is precisely what that body considered unconstitutional). What happens is that, although it is true that the verbs contemplated in Article 345 of the Criminal Code are "to give" (dar) and "to promise" (prometer), the truth is that "to offer" (ofrecer) is indeed covered by them, not by the verb "to promise" (prometer), but by the verb "to give" (dar). This being the case, it is clear that although the Constitutional Chamber resolved that it is unconstitutional to read "shall promise" (prometiere) where it says "shall permit" (permitiere), the truth is that it never delimited the scope of the verb "to give" (dar) and within this verb, the action of "offering" the bribe is framed. That criterion is still maintained today, because although the penalty of the corruptor is not regulated in Article 343 of the Criminal Code but in Article 345 of the same normative body, the legal text remains the same. Moreover, even today the Royal Spanish Academy (Real Academia Española) accepts that the verb "to give" (dar) means, in its third meaning, "to offer material for something", so the quotation made in 1995 from the twenty-first edition of the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy (from 1992) continues to be in accordance with what is indicated in the twenty-second edition of the same, published in 2001. For all the foregoing, the criterion of Licentiate G.M. is not acceptable to this Chamber..." (The emphasis is ours). Now then, although the criterion expressed in rulings 183-F-95 and 2004-00451 dominated in subsequent judgments of the same Third Chamber, it must be recognized that the controversy was finalized with the incorporation of Article 1 of Law No. 8630, published in the Gazette No. 33, on the fifteenth of February, two thousand eight, which repealed Article 343 bis and amended the norm of Article 345, both of the Criminal Code, since with that reform the wording of said Article 345 underwent the incorporation of the verb "to promise" (prometer) as part of the typical actions of the crime of penalty of the corruptor. However, despite the aforementioned legal reform, it must also be noted that the position of this Third Chamber, especially for those cases committed before the year two thousand eight, has remained unchanged. It is not until the issuance of the now-challenged ruling 2012-2550, that the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia), composed of Judges Alfredo Chirino, Jorge Arce, and Sandra Zúñiga, maintained a thesis totally opposed to that sustained in vote 2004-00451, at twelve hours, on the seventh of May, two thousand four, of this Chamber. In this second ruling, in obvious opposition to vote 2004-00451 of this Chamber, the atypicality (atipicidad) of the facts attributed to the co-accused Valverde Acosta was declared due to the lack of description in the criminal type of the penalty of the corruptor of the term "shall promise" (prometiere), when what is relevant established: "... Indeed, the word "shall permit" (permitiere) cannot be given a criminal legal application as if it said "shall promise" (prometiere), as this changes the meaning of the prohibition. The principle of criminal legality, contemplated in Article 39 of the Constitution and in Article first of the Criminal Code, demands great care from the judge not to assume legislative functions, which would well occur, for example, through amending eventual errors in the publication of a law, or promoting readings of the structure of the criminal type that are aberrant from the conventional use of the terms. Attempting a reading, for example, of the verb "to give" (dar) based on far-fetched semantic elaborations that could depart from the correct interpretation of the term from the conventional understanding of said verb, could lead to a substitution of the punitive objective of the criminal law, which has the objective of being understood by the addressees of the norm and understood in such a way that the prohibition is complied with. This being the case, understanding the word "to give" (dar) as if it were "to promise" (prometer) or "to offer" (ofrecer) is an interpretation that contravenes the principle of legality, not only because it gives the semantic interpretation a turn that departs from the conventional use of said term, but because it implies extending the scope of coverage of the criminal type beyond where the limits of the punishable permit. Doing so would be to incur an extensive interpretation of the contents of the criminal type that is prohibited by the Political Constitution, which is inspired by several centuries of construction of criminal guarantees that have been developed to prevent this type of judicial actions that affect the legal security of the citizens of a Democratic and Social State of Law like the Costa Rican one, according to the programmatic reading of Article 1 of the Political Constitution…"(Cf. f.174521 vto to 174522 of volume XLI of the file. The emphasis is ours). Once both opposing jurisprudential positions have been clarified, it remains to be determined—in view of the powers that Article 468 subsection a) of the Criminal Procedure Code grants this Third Chamber in the unification of jurisprudential criteria—the jurisprudential position that the undersigned Female and Male Judges maintain, leading to the determination that the criterion followed by this composition is that expressed by this Chamber in votes 183-F-95, at eleven hours twenty minutes, on the twenty-fourth of March, nineteen ninety-five, and 2004-00451, at twelve hours, on the seventh of May, two thousand four, since although the aforementioned Resolution 461-91, at fifteen hours fourteen minutes, on the twenty-seventh of February, nineteen ninety-one, of the Constitutional Chamber prevents equating the terms "shall permit" (permitiere) and "shall promise" (prometiere), it is nevertheless true that, as part of the meaning of the verb "to give" (dar) contained in the description of the criminal type, the meanings that contemplate that act can also be considered as conduct prohibited by the norm, among which the actions of "to offer" (ofrecer) and "to promise" (prometer) undoubtedly stand out, so that any conduct specified under that criminal action could not be considered atypical, as the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal erroneously established in the challenged ruling.

Finally, regarding the lack of evidence of complicity by the participating public officials as an additional reason to acquit the defendant Valverde Acosta, it is clear that this Chamber, in section XVIII of this resolution, upon verifying divergences between the jurisprudential precedents 0256-1987 and 01475-99 and those criteria outlined in the challenged ruling 2012-2550, assumed the position contained in the former, insofar as for the evidence of the crime of penalty of the corruptor, it was established that it is not necessary to verify the conduct allegedly carried out by the public officials intended to be corrupted, it being sufficient only to accredit the actions of "shall give" (diere) or "shall permit" (permitiere).

On the other hand, regarding the prosecutorial claim presented when filing the present challenge, consisting of maintaining the judgment issued by the Trial Court on the particular matter, it must be indicated that this Chamber is legally prevented from accepting such request, because the accused and their defense counsels, in the ordinary Appeal stage, presented other arguments and grievances on this same issue that must be resolved in that venue, under the postulates of the right to technical and material defense. For these reasons, it is appropriate to order the nullity of the challenged resolution with respect to the accused Edgar Valverde Acosta, for which purpose a remand regarding this point and a new proceeding in accordance with the corresponding law is ordered.

From an exhaustive reading of various resolutions cited by the Public Prosecutor's Office and others issued by the Third Chamber, the Sentencing Appeals Tribunals, and the former Cassation Tribunals, it is possible to discern the existence of two contrary jurisprudential interpretations regarding the issue of the relationship between the active subject or corrupter and the public official to whom the undue gift or advantage is "<i>given</i>" or "<i>allowed</i>" in the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, that is, to what the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal, in the challenged ruling, calls, as part of the element of the criminal type, the "<i>meeting of minds</i>," indispensable for the configuration of the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, contained in the former Article 343, today modified minimally and contained in numeral 352 of this same normative body. Thus, according to one sector of jurisprudence, to which the mentioned ruling 2012-2550 belongs, for the configuration of the illicit action of the penalty of the corrupter, besides the accreditation of a meeting of minds between the active subject and the public official to be corrupted, the description of the conduct expected or performed by the corrupted official or at least a determination of what the functional act that would have been requested or expected of that subject would be is required, as derived from the reasoning that the same Sentencing Appeals Tribunal provided in this regard, in ruling 2012-2550:<i> “…In fact, and as this Chamber analyzes previously, <b><u>it is not known what role was expected of Guido Sibaja in relation to the decision-making procedure within ICE, nor about the form and content of an abbreviated procedure that, in essence, was not favorable nor provided certainty to Alcatel</u></b>. For this company, in terms of certainty of its participation, the direct purchasing procedure was more convenient. Guido Sibaja was in charge of coordination functions that had nothing to do with the direct purchasing process, and as observed in the succession of decisions by the ICE Board of Directors, the path towards an abbreviated procedure was defined by the General Comptrollership of the Republic and not by ICE. The acceptance that Guido Sibaja made of having received money from Alcatel does not allow for determining, either, if said sums were delivered rather as payment for a specific, concrete act of his functions. The uncertainty in this regard opens a great number of possibilities of criminal typicity that range from the receipt of gifts for an act fulfilled to Illicit Enrichment itself, but not necessarily to improper bribery. </i><b> <i><u>That specific act that was requested of Sibaja, as interpreted by the appellant, was not indicated in a clear, precise, and concrete manner by the tribunal. If this is so, and there is no precision regarding the fact, there would also be doubt as to whether Quirós Carmona was responsible for the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, since both facts are intimately related,</u></i></b><i> and it is for this reason that he must be acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for the facts attributed to him in relation to Quirós Carmona…” (Cf.174503 folio of volume XLI of the file). </i>However, the requirement of such a requisite for the accreditation of the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, in the opinion of another sector of jurisprudence, would not be necessary nor essential, for considering the crime of active bribery or penalty of the corrupter as a so-called crime of mere activity that is consummated at the moment the corrupter carries out, -in accordance with Article 352 without the reforms implemented by laws No. 8630, of January 17, 2008, and number 8422, of October 6, 2004), the verbs "<i>to give</i>" or "<i>to allow</i>" an undue gift or advantage, without an effective meeting of minds or the description of the functional act requested by the corrupter being important for its consummation, as the Third Chamber once held, by pointing out that the crime of the penalty of the corrupter or active bribery "…<b><i><u>does not suppose for its consummation the co-delinquency of the public official nor the tradition of the thing, insofar as the sole conduct of the corrupter described in the legal type is suitable to endanger the protected legal right, which is none other than the healthy and normal functioning and prestige of the public administration through the correctness and integrity of its employees or servants</u></i></b><i>…" (<b>Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice,</b> Voto 183-F-95, of eleven hours twenty minutes, of March twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-five). </i>A position, which this same Chamber also recently reproduced, when resolving a case, in which one of the two accused to whom the crime of aggravated robbery of a cellular phone was attributed, upon being apprehended by officers of the Public Force and with the intention that they would perform an act contrary to their duties or omit an act proper to their duties, challenged them to let him go, offering them in exchange the appropriation of the seized cellular phone. In said ruling, this Cassation Chamber admitted the consummation of the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, even when a meeting of minds between the active subject and the acting officers of the Public Force had not occurred, echoing for this purpose Voto 219-98, of nine hours fifty-five minutes, of March sixth, nineteen ninety-eight, with an integration of Magistrates Daniel González, Mario Houed, Alfonso Chaves, Rodrigo Castro, and Carlos Luis Redondo, which regarding the application of the former norm 345 of the Penal Code, established: <i>“…(the) <b><u>active bribery does not require the effective transfer of the domain of the good, nor less that it be delivered or placed under the possession of the public official one wishes to corrupt, but rather it is sufficient for the injury to the legal right to be produced and therefore for that illicit act to be configured, the mere direct or indirect offering by oneself or by an intermediary person to receive a gift or any advantage of retribution for doing an act contrary to one's duties, for not doing it, or for delaying an act proper to one's functions</u></b></i>…” <i>(</i> <b><i>Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice</i></b><i>, voto 2012-001665, of ten hours and thirteen minutes, of November sixteenth, two thousand twelve. The inserted text does not belong to the original, with an integration of Magistrates José Manuel Arroyo, Jesús Ramírez, Magda Pereira, Carlos Chinchilla, and Doris Arias. In the same sense, <b>Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, </b>votos 2004-00451, of twelve hours, of May seventh, two thousand four, with an integration of Magistrates Daniel González, Jesús Ramírez, José Manuel Arroyo, Ronald Salazar, and Alfredo Chirino, the latter acting as Substitute Magistrates; 1104-97, of eleven hours twenty-five minutes, of October ninth, nineteen ninety-seven, with an integration of Magistrates Rodrigo Castro and Jesús Ramírez, together with Substitute Magistrates Joaquín Vargas Gené, Carlos Redondo, and Henry Issa El Khoury; 024-1996, of fourteen hours, of January twenty-ninth, nineteen ninety-six, with an integration of Magistrates Daniel González, Jesús Ramírez, Mario Houed, Alfonso Chaves, and Rodrigo Castro; 256-F-1987, of nine hours, of September twenty-fifth of nineteen eighty-seven, among others. <b>Former Cassation Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José</b>, votos 2004-0027, of eleven hours, of January twenty-second, two thousand four, with an integration of Judges Ronald Salazar, Jorge Arce, and Javier Llobet; 2003-0962, of twelve hours five minutes, of September twenty-second, two thousand three, with an integration of Judges Mario Porras, Carlos Chinchilla, and Ulises Zúñiga. <b>Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, </b>votos 2013-2014, of fourteen hours forty minutes, of September sixth, two thousand thirteen, with an integration of Judges Mario Porras, Jorge Camacho, and Frezie Jiménez; 2012-0767, of sixteen hours, of April twenty-third, two thousand twelve, with an integration of Judges Jorge Luis Arce, Alfredo Chirino, and Sandra Zúñiga). </i>That said, <b>once the objective existence of two antagonistic jurisprudential perspectives has been verified, for the sake of safeguarding the principle of legal certainty and under the prerogatives attributed by Article 468 subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Third Chamber proceeds to unify and issue the respective criterion, opting to assume the second position, consisting of the fact that for the configuration of the penalty of the corrupter, contemplated in the former Article 345 of the Penal Code, it is unnecessary to prove a meeting of minds between the active corrupter subject and the public official</b>, given that said illegality also does not require any special characteristic for its commission, since any person can commit the penalty of the corrupter by carrying out the typical verbs "<i>to give</i>" or "<i>to allow</i>" an undue gift or advantage, with the injury to the protected legal right, which is probity in the performance of public function, being produced by those actions and without requiring as part of the objective type of said norm, that <i>“…the public official accept or reject that undue gift, advantage, or promise, because if he accepts it, the passive subject would be committing the crimes of proper or improper bribery, as the case may be, and if he does not accept it, his conduct would be atypical, although in both cases the active subject would have equally committed the crime of the penalty of the corrupter…” (<b>Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice,</b> voto 2012-001665, of ten hours and thirteen minutes, of November sixteenth, two thousand twelve). </i>On the same topic, resolution 1475-1999, of ten hours thirty-eight minutes, of November nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, cited by the prosecutorial body and retaken by this jurisdictional body, in assuming this position, was clear in pointing out that: <i>“[…] On the other hand, and now as a substantive issue, it is not true that the configuration of the crime of corruption of public officials provided for in Article 343 of the Penal Code requires a meeting of minds, as the accused erroneously understands it, because for said effect it is sufficient that the agent give or allow the public official a gift or an undue advantage, without it being necessary that, concomitantly, the latter accept it…”.</i> On the other hand, regarding the issue of the lack of indication of what the functional act requested of Sibaja Fonseca was, a question that does not derive from the ground of contradictory precedents, but from the fourth claim of this seventh section of the prosecutorial appeal, it must be indicated that both the accusation in facts 133 to 137 and the factual reasoning of judgment 167-2011, described in paragraphs 128 to 132, refer to the functional act requested by co-defendants Valverde Acosta and Christian Sapsizian from the accused Sibaja Fonseca, that which consisted of the latter carrying out the necessary actions within the scope of his functions as advisor to the Executive Presidency of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and person in charge of the execution of the 400,000 lines project, to make the contracting of the company Alcatel effective for carrying out the mentioned project, when they detail in section “<b>Description of the conduct of the accused Guido Sibaja Fonseca (Considerando IX)”</b>, that: <i>“…128) The accused Guido Sibaja Fonseca began working at the end of the year 2000 for I.C.E., as an Executive Assistant of Senior Administration in the Executive Presidency, a designation that was formalized as of January 1, 2001./129) <b><u>Among his functions, he was responsible for attending to specific matters of the Executive Presidency such as, analyzing documents submitted for the knowledge and approval of the Executive President, providing advice and recommendations on these, coordinating with the different branches of the Institute matters related to the execution of projects and directives, coordinating and participating in the special commissions formed, collaborating in the preparation and implementation of programs and projects promoted by the Presidency, and representing I.C.E. in different governmental and non-governmental organizations, related to the field of electricity and telecommunications. Likewise, among the projects he was in charge of, the abbreviated process 1-2002 for the lease of the 400,000 GSM cellular lines stood out.</u></b></i> <i>/ 130) From his entry into the institution, the accused Guido Sibaja Fonseca, as assistant to the Executive Presidency, became the person in charge of accelerating matters related to telecommunications. Subsequently, the accused Guido Sibaja was named to preside over a high-level commission made up of an interdisciplinary group of professionals that had under its responsibility the study and execution of the 400,000 thousand lines project, jointly with Hernán Bravo Trejos, member of the Board of Directors, and officials Álvaro Retana, manager of the UEN of Mobile Services, and Pablo Cob in his capacity as Executive President of the institution./131) <b><u>Without specifying a date, but in the period between the end of the year 2000 and the beginning of 2001, the accused Valverde Acosta and Christian Sapsizian requested that the accused Guido Sibaja Fonseca carry out the necessary actions within the scope of his functions as advisor to the Executive Presidency of I.C.E., and person in charge of the execution of the project of the 400,000 lines, to make said contracting effective, favoring Alcatel; in exchange for the above, Sapsizian and Valverde promised Sibaja Fonseca the delivery of a gift consisting of money</u></b>, the exact amount of which was not fixed at that time. Said promise was accepted by the accused Sibaja Fonseca, it was also agreed that the delivery would be conditional on the effective awarding of the offer that Alcatel would present to I.C.E./ 132) For having complied the accused Guido Sibaja Fonseca with the agreed-upon actions, once he achieved, together with other officials of I.C.E., the opening of the tender for the purchase of cellular telephony and the awarding of the contract for the 400,000 GSM lines in favor of Alcatel, in accordance with what was previously agreed with the accused Edgar Valverde Acosta and the indictee Christian Sapsizian, he received the promised gift corresponding to a percentage of the contract that Alcatel obtained with I.C.E., a payment that was made in a segmented manner through the intermediation of the co-accused Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona with the money coming from Alcatel Cit…” (Cf.f.00015454-00015456 of volume XXXII of the file. The inserted text is ours), </i>so that the factual imputation does contain the description of the functional act requested of Sibaja Fonseca. Based on what has been set forth here, Voto 2012-2550, of the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of the Second Circuit Judicial of San José, is annulled, insofar as it proceeded to acquit the accused Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona and Guido Sibaja Fonseca, holding a criterion different from the one unified here. The remand of the case is ordered so that the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal, with a different integration, may resolve the appeals filed anew.

XIX.Under Article 468 subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the sixth ground of the seventh section of the Appeal of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the existence of contradictory precedents is alleged, at the time of carrying out the typicality analysis of the crime contemplated in Article 345 of the Penal Code (currently Article 352 of the Penal Code) and justifying the acquittal of the co-accused Edgar Valverde Acosta. For the petitioning prosecutors, judgment 2012-2550, of the Appeals Tribunal and Voto 580-1991, of nine hours forty-five minutes, of October twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-one, of the Third Chamber, are contradictory with precedents 2004-0451, of twelve hours, of May seventh, two thousand four; 0256-F-1987, of nine hours forty minutes, of September twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-five, and 1475-1999, of ten hours thirty-eight minutes, of November nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, all of the Third Chamber, given that the questioned ruling acquits Valverde Acosta of four crimes of the penalty of the corrupter, “<i>for considering that he could not be convicted for having made a promise to deliver the gift to perform an act proper to his functions to the other co-accused of the process” (Cf.f.175372 of volume XLII of the file)</i>, since Article 345 of the Penal Code in force at the date of the facts did not contemplate the typical action of “<i>promising</i>” and from the terms “<i>to give</i>” or “<i>to offer</i>” it was not possible to sustain, semantically or legally, the inclusion of the word “<i>promise</i> ,” without infringing the principle of criminal legality. However, a contrary position is held in the mentioned Voto 2004-0451, in which, within the scope of Article 345, in force at the time of the facts, the term “<i>to give</i>” includes the meanings of <i>“proposing”</i>, <i>“offering”</i>, and <i>“promising”</i> <i>(Cf.f.175374 of volume XLII of the file)</i>, a criterion they put forward as correct and on which they petition the integration of the unification of the jurisprudence of the Chamber, so that the scope of the criminal type of the penalty of the corrupter may be interpreted <i>(Cf.f.175377 of volume XLII of the file).</i> Separately, they argue that the appealed judgment acquits Valverde Acosta for an additional, erroneous reason: the lack of accreditation of co-delinquency by the participating public officials, as can be inferred from folio 174523, of volume XLII of the file, when it is stated that: <i>“…as has been resolved in relation to the other accused, it has not been possible to determine what the concrete action was that he had to carry out, or if the gifts were a reward for an act fulfilled. In other words, there is a favoring effect on the legal positions of Edgar Valverde regarding the indeterminacy of the facts accused to the presumed subjects affected by the corruptive act, which undoubtedly must concur to produce the nullity of the ruling and declare the acquittal (See folio 174523 of the principal file)…”(Cf.f.175376 of volume XLII of the file).</i> A reasoning that is contrary to the criterion followed by the Third Chamber in Votos 0256-1987 and 01475-99, in which it was held, respectively, that the penalty of the corrupter does not suppose, for its consummation, a meeting of minds between the corrupter and the corrupted public official; much less that co-delinquency of the public official or the tradition of the thing must exist for the accreditation of the criminal type, so that, since it is active bribery of a “<i>type of imperfect execution</i>,” in which: “… <i>the mere offering or acceptance is sufficient, because the materialization of proper or improper bribery does not belong to the type, making the arguments outlined in the challenged ruling to acquit the accused Valverde Acosta for the crimes of the penalty of the corrupter attributed to him inadmissible…”(Cf.f.175377 of volume XLII of the file).</i> In short, they petition that the Third Chamber assume the position defended by the Public Prosecutor's Office in the unification of the jurisprudence through rulings 0256-1987 and 01475-99, supra cited, and as prejudice, they externalize a detriment to the prosecutorial claims, because even though the facts demonstrating the typicality required by the former Article 345 were accredited, Valverde Acosta was acquitted of four crimes of the penalty of the corrupter, while as a claim they outline the maintenance of the conviction judgment handed down by the Trial Court through a correct interpretation according to law. The complaint is granted. Before resolving the claim raised by the prosecutorial entity, it is necessary to make some considerations regarding the history of the criminal type of the penalty of the corrupter contemplated in the former Article 345 of the Penal Code, which in its original wording established: <i>“…The penalties established in the five previous articles are applicable to whoever <b><u>gives</u></b></i> <i>or <b><u>allows</u></b> a public official a gift or undue advantage,” </i>our Courts of Justice, from the entry into force of the Penal Code until Voto 461-91, of fifteen hours fourteen minutes, of February twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-one, of the Constitutional Chamber, had interpreted that within the actions covered by said norm, there was the verb “<i>to promise</i>,” insofar as it seemed a drafting error of the norm to have recorded “<i>permits</i>” instead of “<i>promises</i>.” However, in the year 1991, regarding a writ of habeas corpus, the Constitutional Chamber had the opportunity to retake the topic, discarding in that interpretation a material legislative error of the verb “<i>permits</i>” for “<i>promises</i>,” to finally establish that both terms did not constitute synonyms nor could they be used by the Judges in an equivalent manner without violating the principle of legality. At that time, the Constitutional Chamber, regarding what is of interest, established concerning the supposed similarity of the verbs “<i>permits</i>” and “<i>promises</i>,” that: <i>“…Article 39 of the Political Constitution enshrines the principle of legality in criminal matters, the guiding and inspiring principle of our legal system. By virtue of it, the only creative source of crimes and penalties is the law. In this matter, analogy and custom are excluded, the Courts lacking the faculties to consider as criminal acts different from those typified in the law, such that any conduct that is not subsumable in it, will be unpunished; even when it is very serious. Consequently, a judicial interpretation that covers conduct not specifically described in the law injures the principle of legality. The petitioner points out that in case No. 104-3-91 being processed against his client in the Sixth Examining Magistrate's Court of San José, the conduct of the accused has been poorly framed, because Article 343 of the Penal Code speaks of 'permits' and not 'promises' as it should be to have the conduct of Mr. B.O. configured as typical. Let us see how the accused, by mutual agreement with co-accused A.C., contacted officers of the Judicial Investigation Agency, to whom they promised a gift if the alteration of the blood alcohol tests of his son, accused in another case for the crime of Culpable Homicide, was achieved.

**XVIII**. *In the fourth ground of the seventh section of the Public Prosecutor's Office's cassation appeal (Recurso de Casación)*, it is claimed that Articles 33 and 41 of the Constitution, Article 468 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) were disregarded, and that numeral 345 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) (*which currently corresponds to Article 352 of the Penal Code*) was erroneously applied, regarding the configuration of the penalty of the corruptor for aggravated corruption in the modality of improper bribery (cohecho impropio) charged against Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona. According to the Public Prosecutor's Office, ruling 2012-2550 erroneously ordered the acquittal of Quirós Carmona for the acts attributed to him by the prosecuting entity, consisting of having corrupted the co-defendant Sibaja Fonseca, under the argument that, in this particular case, the configuration of the correlative crime of bribery attributed to the public official was not proven, that is, it was not determined what action was requested of Sibaja Fonseca so that Alcatel could obtain the contract for the 400 thousand cellular lines (*Cf.f. 175363 of volume XLII of the file*). This position is contrary to the letter of Article 345 of the Penal Code itself (currently Article 352 of the Penal Code), and to votes 219-98, of nine hours fifty-five minutes, of March 6, 1998; 1475-99, of ten hours thirty-eight minutes, of November 19, 1999, both of the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera); 2005-00175, of fifteen hours thirty-three minutes, of January 19, 2005, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), and to the criterion held by authors such as Warner Molina, in *Delitos Funcionales, Guía de Investigación*, San José, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Escuela Judicial, 2009, p.124, and Francisco Muñoz Conde, in *Derecho Penal.

**The original legislative file signed by the President of the Republic shows that Article 343 was approved and ordered to be published with the verb "permitiere" without there having been any legislative reform regarding that article. Therefore, it is the criterion of this Constitutional Chamber that Article 343 of the Penal Code cannot be interpreted without harming the constitutional principle of legality (principio de legalidad), in the sense that what the legislator meant to say is not "prometiere" but "permitiere"**…" (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), vote 461-91, of fifteen hours fourteen minutes, of February 27, 1991. The emphasis is ours). As a result of the previous ruling, the prohibition of equating "permitir" with "prometer" remained the dominant criterion in the resolutions issued by the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera), in accordance with Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). However, in 1995, this Cassation Chamber, regarding the challenge filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office in the same case that gave rise to vote 461-91, of fifteen hours fourteen minutes, of February 27, 1991, of the Constitutional Chamber, conducted a new examination of the question, only now from a different perspective: although for this jurisdictional body, the term "prometer" could never be equated to the verb "permitir", according to the dictates of the Constitutional Chamber under the principle of legality, the norm of Article 345 also presented the verb "dar", which, within its meanings, did contain the action of "prometer", so that, in factual frameworks whose description contained the mentioned criminal action, the mentioned numeral could indeed be applied. On that occasion, the Third Chamber, composed of Magistrates Alfonso Chaves Ramírez, Joaquín Vargas Gené, Rafael Medaglia Gómez, José Luis Quesada Fonseca, and Hernán Vega Miranda, held: *"…* **This Cassation Chamber agrees with the Constitutional Chamber that, regarding Article 343 of the Penal Code, it is not legitimate to modify the criminal type (tipo penal) by substituting the verb "permitiere" with "prometiere", because this contravenes the guaranteeing function of the criminal type and violates the principle of legality**. *However, the claim filed by Licda. S.M. is admissible, as the reasons she adduces to motivate it are valid and in no way contravene the terms of the resolution in question by the Constitutional Chamber. Indeed, the analysis of the Constitutional Chamber—with the exception of the note by Magistrate Piza Escalante—is merely formal; it does not extend beyond the mere literalness of the legal type, that is, it does not include its semantic analysis.* **In other words, the Constitutional Chamber established that it is not legitimate to read "prometiere" where it says "permitiere", but the fact is that it established nothing regarding the meaning of the words that comprise the criminal type: it does not tell us what we should or should not understand from these words. And what the appellant maintains is, precisely, that when the Constitutional Chamber establishes that the verb "permitiere" cannot be substituted with the word "prometiere", it is not excluding the "offering" (ofrecimiento) or the "promise" (promesa) as possible semantic content of the word "diere" set forth in the referred numeral of the Penal Code**. **The consultation of various dictionaries proves the appellant right. Thus, the twenty-first edition of the Dictionary of the Spanish Language (1992), prepared by the Royal Spanish Academy (Real Academia Española), indicates that the third common-use meaning of the word "dar" is "to propose, to indicate". This same meaning is endorsed by other common dictionaries (see, for example, Vol. II of the 1991 edition of the Diccionario Enciclopédico Éxito, by Editorial Océano), and some of them even add the word "offer" (ofrecer) as a synonym for "dar" (thus, the Pequeño Larousse Ilustrado dictionaries, Ediciones Larousse, 1994, p. 316, and the Diccionario Abreviado de la Lengua Española, Vox, Bibliograf S.A., p. 146), and yet another says that "dar" is "to propose: dar una idea" (Diccionario Práctico Español Moderno, Ediciones Larousse, Mexico, 1983, p. 148). Therefore, one must agree with the appellant that whoever promises (promete), offers (ofrece), or proposes (propone) a gift, present or future, to a public official, so that the latter performs an act contrary to his duties (or incurs in any of the hypotheses of Articles 338 to 342 of the Penal Code), adapts his conduct to the hypothesis provided for and sanctioned in Article 343 of the Penal Code**, regardless of whether the public official accepts or rejects the improper gift or advantage, and regardless of whether the object has been shown to him, delivered to him, or placed under his possession or mere tenancy, since the penalty of the corruptor (active bribery, cohecho activo) does not presuppose, for its consummation, the joint criminal conduct of the public official nor the delivery (tradición) of the thing, insofar as the sole conduct of the corruptor described in the legal type is suitable to endanger the protected legal interest, which is nothing other than the sound and normal functioning and prestige of the public administration through the correctness and integrity of its employees or servants. This is how our jurisprudence has understood it: ...what the law protects is the correct performance of the office by the official before the Public Administration (Administración Pública), removing him at all costs, for the sake of fulfilling the obligations that concern him, from venality" (Third Chamber, V-256-F of 9:40 hours on September 25, 1987) (...) Excluding promises, offers, or proposals of improper gifts or advantages as possible content of the typical action provided for in Article 343 of the Penal Code not only denies the common meaning of the words used in the legal type but also attacks the coherence of the legal system, as it constitutes a fraud upon the law (fraude a la ley), given that it would also infringe the spirit of the norm (cfr. Article 20 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code)…" (See in the same sense, Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote 183-F-95, of eleven hours twenty minutes, of March 24, 1995. The emphasis is ours). This position was reiterated years later by this same Third Chamber, in vote 2004-00451, of twelve hours, of May 7, 2004, with the composition of Magistrates Daniel González, Jesús Alberto Ramírez, José Manuel Arroyo, and Substitute Magistrates Ronald Salazar and Alfredo Chirino. On that occasion, when resolving a petition for acquittal filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office, it was determined that: *"….This Chamber considers that Lic. G.M. is not correct: Firstly, it must be said that* **it is true that the Constitutional Chamber warned in Resolution No. 461-91 of 15:14 hours on February 27, 1991, that it was not admissible, from a constitutional point of view, the judicial interpretation according to which in Article 345 (the judgment of that Office refers to Article 343 of the Penal Code, but it is the same one that regulates the penalty of the corruptor; what happens is that the current numbering is the product of a reform subsequent to the issuance of the ruling just mentioned) one must read "prometiere" instead of "permitiere"**. *Thus, in the legal text it is only possible to read "permitiere" where such a word is written (therefore, the criterion of the a quo is erroneous, according to which the Constitutional Chamber equated this word with "prometiere", since that is precisely what that body considered unconstitutional).* **What happens is that, although it is true the verbs contemplated in Article 345 of the Penal Code are "dar" and "prometer", the truth is that "ofrecer" is indeed covered by them, not by the verb "prometer", but by the verb "dar"**. **Thus, it is clear that although the Constitutional Chamber resolved that it is unconstitutional to read "prometiere" where it says "permitiere", the fact is that it never delimited the scope of the verb "dar", and within this, the act of "offering" (ofrecer) the gift is encompassed**. *This criterion continues to be maintained today, because although the penalty of the corruptor is not regulated in Article 343 of the Penal Code but in Article 345 of the same normative body, the legal text remains the same. Furthermore, even today the Royal Spanish Academy accepts that the verb "dar" means, in its third meaning, "to offer material for something", so the citation made in 1995 of the twenty-first edition of the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy (from 1992) remains in accordance with what is indicated in the twenty-second edition of the same, published in 2001. For all the foregoing, the criterion of Lic. G.M. is not receivable for this Chamber…" (The emphasis is ours).* Now, although the criterion expressed in judgments 183-F-95 and 2004-00451 dominated subsequent rulings of the same Third Chamber, it must be recognized that the controversy was concluded with the incorporation of Article 1 of Law No. 8630 (Ley No. 8630), published in La Gaceta No. 33, on February 15, 2008, which repealed Article 343 bis and reformed the norm of Article 345, both of the Penal Code, since with this reform the wording of the mentioned Article 345 underwent the incorporation of the verb "prometer" as part of the typical actions of the crime of penalty of the corruptor. However, despite the mentioned legal reform, it must also be noted that the position of this Third Chamber, especially for those cases committed before the year 2008, has remained unchanged. It is not until the issuance of ruling 2012-2550, now challenged, that the Court of Appeal of the Judgment (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia), composed of Judges Alfredo Chirino, Jorge Arce, and Sandra Zúñiga, held a thesis totally opposed to that maintained in vote 2004-00451, of twelve hours, of May 7, 2004, of this Chamber. In this second judgment, in evident opposition to vote 2004-00451 of this Chamber, the atypicality (atipicidad) of the facts attributed to the co-defendant Valverde Acosta was declared due to the lack of description in the criminal type of penalty of the corruptor of the term "prometiere", when it was established in the relevant part: *"…* **Indeed, the word "permitiere" cannot be given the criminal-legal application as if it said "prometiere", because this changes the meaning of the prohibition**. *The principle of criminal legality (principio de legalidad criminal), enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution and in the first article of the Penal Code, demands from the judge great care not to assume the functions of a legislator, which would certainly occur, for example, by amending eventual errors in the publication of a law, or by promoting readings of the structure of the type that are aberrant from the conventional use of the terms.* **Attempting a reading, for example, of the verb "dar" based on far-fetched semantic elaborations, which could deviate the correct interpretation of the term from the conventional understanding of said verb, could lead to a substitution of the punitive objective of the criminal law, whose objective is to be understood by the recipients of the norm, and understood in such a way that the prohibition is obeyed. Thus, understanding the word "dar" as if it were "prometer" or "ofrecer" is an interpretation that contravenes the principle of legality**, *not only by giving the semantic interpretation a twist that departs from the conventional use of said term, but also because it implies extending the scope of coverage of the criminal type beyond where the limits of punishability allow.* **To do so would be to incur an extensive interpretation (interpretación extensiva) of the contents of the criminal type that is prohibited by the Political Constitution (Constitución Política)**, *which is inspired by several centuries of construction of criminal guarantees that have been developed to prevent this type of judicial actions, which affect the legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) of the citizens of a Democratic and Social State of Law such as the Costa Rican, according to the programmatic reading of Article 1 of the Political Constitution…" (Cf.f. 174521 vto to 174522 of volume XLI of the file. The emphasis is ours).* Having clarified both opposing jurisprudential positions, **it remains to be determined—considering the powers that Article 468 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants to this Third Chamber in the unification of jurisprudential criteria—the jurisprudential position that the undersigned Magistrates maintain, leading to the determination that the criterion followed by this composition is that expressed by this Chamber in votes 183-F-95, of eleven hours and twenty minutes, of March 24, 1995, and 2004-00451, of twelve hours, of May 7, 2004**, since although resolution 461-91, of fifteen hours and fourteen minutes, of February 27, 1991, of the Constitutional Chamber, cited *supra*, prevents likening the terms "permitiere" and "prometiere", it is true that, as part of the meaning of the verb "dar" contained in the description of the type, the meanings that contemplate that act can also be considered as conduct prohibited by the norm, among which undoubtedly stand out the actions of "ofrecer" and "prometer". Thus, any conduct specified under that criminal act could not be considered atypical, as the Court of Appeal erroneously established in the challenged ruling. Finally, regarding the lack of accreditation of a joint criminal conduct of the participating public officials as an additional reason to acquit the defendant Valverde Acosta, it is clear that this Chamber, in section XVIII of this resolution, before the verification of divergences between the jurisprudential precedents 0256-1987 and 01475-99 and those criteria outlined in the questioned judgment 2012-2550, assumed the position contained in the former, insofar as for the accreditation of the crime of penalty of the corruptor, it was established that the verification of the conduct supposedly performed by the public officials whom one intends to corrupt is not necessary, being sufficient only the accreditation of the actions "diere" or "permitiere". On the other hand, with regard to the prosecutorial claim presented when filing the present challenge, and consisting of maintaining the judgment issued by the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) in this particular matter, it must be indicated that this Chamber is legally impeded from accepting such a request, because the defendants and their technical defenses, in the ordinary Appeal stage, raised other arguments and grievances on this same issue, which must be resolved in that venue, under the postulates of the right to technical and material defense. For these reasons, the appropriate course is to order the nullity of the challenged resolution with respect to the defendant Edgar Valverde Acosta, for which purpose a remand is ordered with regard to this aspect and a new substantiation in accordance with the corresponding law." Special Part</u>, Valencia, <span class=SpellE>Tirant</span> lo <span class=SpellE>Blanc</span>, 15th edition, 2008, pp.1003-1004,</i> among others; since the <span class=GramE>“ <i>criminal</i></span><i> statute in question provides that the crime is configured when the active subject “gives” or “permits” an undue gift or advantage to a public official, regardless of whether there is a prior agreement or not for the official to perform an act proper or contrary to their duties, or as a reward for an act performed or omitted by the public official…”</i> <i>(<span class=SpellE>Cf.f</span>.175366 of volume <span class=SpellE>XLII</span> of the case file),</i> since it is a crime of mere activity, specifically of abstract danger, in which the wrong is exhausted by the author's action or the general dangerousness of the typical action for a specific legal interest, without requiring a concrete result, which contradicts what was stated by the Court of Appeals in the analytical <span class=SpellE>reasoning</span> of the judgment, when it determined that: <i>“…That concrete act that was requested of <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span>, as interpreted by the appellant, was not indicated in a clear, precise, and concrete manner by the court. If this is so, and there is no precision regarding the fact, there would also be doubt whether Quirós Carmona was responsible for the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, since both facts are intimately related, and it is for this reason that he must be acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for the facts attributed to him in relation to Quirós Carmona…” (<span class=SpellE>Cf.f</span>.174503 verso)…” (<span class=SpellE>Cf.f</span>.175367 of volume <span class=SpellE>XLII</span> of the case file)</i>. From the prosecutorial perspective, the preceding excerpt caused prejudice to its punitive claims, as it presupposes the requirement of typical elements not contemplated by the criminal statute for the accreditation of the conduct of the penalty of the corrupter imputed to Quirós Carmona, this despite having accredited a factual framework that demonstrated the criminality (tipicidad) required by the then Article 345 of the Criminal Code. Finally, the petitioners request the nullity of the second instance ruling and a correct interpretation in accordance with the law, maintaining the conviction ordered by the lower court (<i>A quo</i>) against Quirós Carmona, for the three crimes of the penalty of the corrupter for which he was convicted. <b>Similarly, in&nbsp;<i> the fifth complaint of the seventh section of the&nbsp; cassation appeal of the Public Ministry</i></b>, in accordance with subsection 468(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the existence of a contradiction is invoked between the challenged ruling 2012-2550 and decisions 0256-F-1987, of nine hours and forty minutes, of the twenty-fifth of <span class=SpellE>September</span>, nineteen eighty-seven, and 01475-99, of ten hours thirty-eight minutes, of the nineteenth of November, nineteen ninety-nine, since in the first, the Court of Appeals of Sentence, revokes the conviction of Quirós Carmona for the crime of active bribery by aggravated corruption in the modality of improper bribery attributed by the Public Ministry and related to the apparent corruption carried out by him upon the co-defendant <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> Fonseca, by apparently not accrediting the accused conduct due to the absence of a meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades) between both co-defendants and lacking the indication of what was the functional act requested of the co-defendant Guido <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> Fonseca <i>(<span class=SpellE>Cf.f</span>.175369 of volume <span class=SpellE>XLII</span> of the case file),</i> while the rulings of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Sala Tercera" w:st="on">the Third Chamber</st1:PersonName> that they partially transcribe, supposedly indicate that this criminal statute does not require the mentioned meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades), the tradition of the thing, or the co-delinquency of the public official, “ <i>as the sole conduct of the corrupter described in the legal statute is suitable to endanger the protected legal interest, which is nothing other than the healthy and normal functioning and prestige of the public administration through the correctness and integrity of its employees or servants…”(<span class=SpellE>Cf.f</span>.175370 <span class=SpellE>front</span> of volume <span class=SpellE>XLII</span> of the case file, Decision 0256-F-1987, of nine hours and forty minutes, of the twenty-fifth of <span class=SpellE>September</span> of nineteen eighty-seven).</i> Finally, they request that the jurisprudence on the figure of the penalty of the corrupter be unified, so that the criterion sustained by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Sala Tercera" w:st="on">the Third Chamber</st1:PersonName> is applied, since the position assumed by the Court of Appeals causes grievance to their punitive claims, because despite having accredited the criminality (tipicidad) required by the former Article 343 of the Criminal Code, the acquittal of the defendant Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona was issued in the second instance. <b><i>Since both grounds are related, they are resolved jointly and both complaints must be declared with merit. </i></b>From the exhaustive reading of various resolutions cited by the Public Ministry and others issued by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Sala Tercera" w:st="on">the Third Chamber</st1:PersonName>, the Courts of Appeals of Sentence, and the former Courts of Cassation, it is possible to infer the existence of two contrary jurisprudential interpretations regarding the issue of the relationship between the active subject or corrupter and the public official to whom a gift or undue advantage is “ <i>given</i>” or “<i>permitted</i>” in the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, that is, regarding what the Court of Appeals of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Sentencia Penal" w:st="on">the Criminal Sentence</st1:PersonName>, in the challenged ruling, calls, as part of the element of the criminal statute, “<i>meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades)</i>”, indispensable for the configuration of the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, contained in the former Article 343, today minimally modified and contained in numeral 352 of this same normative body. Thus, according to one sector of jurisprudence, to which the mentioned judgment 2012-2550 belongs, for the configuration of the illicit action of the penalty of the corrupter, in addition to the accreditation of a meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades) between the active subject and the public official to be corrupted, the description of the conduct expected or performed by the corrupted official or at least a determination of what would be the functional act that would have been requested or expected of that subject is required, as derived from the <span class=SpellE>reasoning</span> that the same Court of Appeals of Sentence carried out in this regard, in ruling 2012-2550:<i> “…In fact, and as this Chamber analyzes previously, <b><u>it is not known what role Guido <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> was expected to deploy in relation to the decision-making procedure within ICE, nor regarding the form and content of an abbreviated procedure that, in essence, was not favorable nor provided certainty to <span class=SpellE>Alcatel</span></u></b>. In terms of the certainty of its participation, the direct procurement procedure was more convenient for this company. Guido <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> was in charge of coordination functions that were not related to the direct procurement process, and as observed in the succession of decisions of the Board of Directors of ICE, the path towards an abbreviated procedure was defined by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Contraloría General" w:st="on">the General Comptroller's Office</st1:PersonName> of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la República" w:st="on">the Republic</st1:PersonName> and not by ICE. The acceptance that Guido <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> made of having received money from <span class=SpellE>Alcatel</span> does not allow determining, either, if said sums were delivered rather as payment for a proper and concrete act of his functions. The uncertainty in this regard opens a great number of possibilities of criminal characterization (tipicidad penal) that range from the receipt of gifts for a performed act to Unlawful Enrichment itself, but not necessarily to an improper bribery.&nbsp;&nbsp;</i><b> <i><u>That concrete act that was requested of <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span>, as interpreted by the appellant, was not indicated in a clear, precise, and concrete manner by the court. If this is so, and there is no precision regarding the fact, there would also be doubt whether Quirós Carmona was responsible for the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, since both facts are intimately <span class=GramE>related<span style='font-weight:normal;font-style:normal;text-decoration:none;text-underline: none'> </span><span style='font-weight:normal;text-decoration:none;text-underline: none'>,</span></span></u></i></b><i> and it is for this reason that he must be acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for the facts attributed to him in relation to Quirós Carmona…” (Cf.174503 <span class=SpellE>vto</span> of volume <span class=SpellE>XLI</span> of the case file). </i>However, the requirement of such a requisite for the accreditation of the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, in the opinion of another sector of jurisprudence, would not be necessary or essential, as the crime of active bribery or penalty of the corrupter is considered a so-called crime of mere activity that is consummated at the moment the corrupter performs, -in accordance with Article 352 without the reforms implemented by laws No. 8630, of January 17, 2008, and number 8422, of October 6, 2004), the verbs “<i>give</i>” or “ <i>permit</i>” an undue gift or advantage, without an effective meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades) or the description of the functional act requested by the corrupter being important for its consummation, as <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Sala Tercera" w:st="on">the Third Chamber</st1:PersonName> held in its time, when pointing out that the crime of the penalty of the corrupter or active bribery “…<b><i><u>does not suppose for its consummation the co-delinquency of the public official nor the tradition of the thing, as the sole conduct of the corrupter described in the legal statute is suitable to endanger the protected legal interest, which is nothing other than the healthy and normal functioning and prestige of the public administration through the correctness and integrity of its employees or servants</u></i></b><i>…&quot;\n(<b>Third Chamber of <st1:PersonName ProductID="LA CORTE SUPREMA" w:st="on">the Supreme Court</st1:PersonName> of <span class=GramE>Justice<span style='font-weight:normal;font-style:normal'> </span><span style='font-weight: normal'>,</span></span></b> Decision 183-F-95, of eleven hours twenty minutes, of the twenty-fourth of March, nineteen ninety-five). </i>A position that this same Chamber also recently reproduced, when resolving a case in which one of the two defendants attributed with the crime of aggravated robbery of a cellular phone, upon being apprehended by officers of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Fuerza Pública" w:st="on">the Fuerza Pública</st1:PersonName> and with the intention that they perform an act contrary to their duties or fail to perform an act proper to their duties, accosted them to let him go, offering them in exchange the appropriation of the seized cellular phone. In said ruling, this Cassation Chamber admitted the consummation of the crime of the penalty of the corrupter, even though a meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades) had not occurred between the active subject and the acting officers of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Fuerza Pública" w:st="on">the Fuerza Pública</st1:PersonName>, echoing for that purpose decision 219-98, of nine hours fifty-five minutes, of the sixth of March, nineteen ninety-eight, with a panel of Judges Daniel González, Mario <span class=SpellE>Houed</span>, Alfonso Chaves, Rodrigo Castro, and Carlos Luis Redondo, which regarding the application of the former norm 345 of the Criminal Code, established: <i>“…(the) <b><u>active bribery does not require the effective transfer of ownership of the good, much less that it be delivered or placed under the possession of the public official one wishes to corrupt, but rather the mere direct or indirect offering by oneself or through an intermediary person to receive a gift or any advantage of remuneration to do an act contrary to their duties, to not do it, or to delay an act proper to their functions is sufficient for the injury to the legal interest to occur and therefore for that illicit act to be configured</u></b></i>…” <span class=GramE><i>(</i> <b><i>Third</i></b></span><b><i> Chamber of <st1:PersonName ProductID="LA CORTE SUPREMA" w:st="on">the Supreme Court</st1:PersonName> of Justice</i></b><i>, decision 2012-001665, of ten hours and thirteen minutes, of the sixteenth of November, two thousand twelve. The supplied text does not belong to the original, with a panel of Judges José Manuel Arroyo, Jesús Ramírez, <span class=SpellE>Magda</span> Pereira, Carlos Chinchilla, and <span class=SpellE>Doris</span> Arias. In the same sense, <b>Third Chamber of <st1:PersonName ProductID="LA CORTE SUPREMA" w:st="on">the Supreme Court</st1:PersonName> of Justice, </b>decisions 2004-00451, of twelve hours, of the seventh of May, two thousand four, with a panel of Judges Daniel González, Jesús Ramírez, José Manuel Arroyo, <span class=SpellE>Ronald</span> Salazar, and Alfredo Chirino, the latter acting as Substitute Judges; 1104-97, of eleven hours twenty-five minutes, of the ninth of October, nineteen ninety-seven, with a panel of Judges Rodrigo Castro and Jesús Ramírez, together with Substitute Judges Joaquín Vargas <span class=SpellE>Gené</span>, Carlos Redondo, and Henry <span class=SpellE>Issa</span> El <span class=SpellE>Khoury</span>;&nbsp;024-1996, of fourteen hours, of the twenty-ninth of January, nineteen ninety-six, with a panel of Judges Daniel González, Jesús Ramírez, Mario <span class=SpellE>Houed</span>, Alfonso Chaves, and Rodrigo Castro; 256-F-1987, of nine hours, of the twenty-fifth of <span class=SpellE>September</span>, nineteen eighty-seven, among others. <b>Former Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José</b>, decisions 2004-0027, of eleven hours, of the twenty-second of January, two thousand four, with a panel of Judges <span class=SpellE>Ronald</span> Salazar, Jorge Arce, and Javier <span class=SpellE>Llobet</span>; 2003-0962, of twelve hours five minutes, of the twenty-second of <span class=SpellE>September</span>, two thousand three, with a panel of Judges Mario Porras, Carlos Chinchilla, and Ulises Zúñiga. <b>Court of Appeals of Sentence <span class=SpellE>Penaldel</span> Second Judicial Circuit of San José, </b>decisions 2013-2014, of fourteen hours forty minutes, of the sixth of <span class=SpellE>September</span>, two thousand thirteen, with a panel of Judges Mario Porras, Jorge Camacho, and <span class=SpellE>Frezie</span> Jiménez; 2012-0767, of sixteen hours, of the twenty-third of April, two thousand twelve, with a panel of Judges Jorge Luis Arce, Alfredo Chirino, and Sandra Zúñiga).\n</i>Now, <b>once the objective existence of two antagonistic jurisprudential perspectives has been verified, in order to safeguard the principle of legal certainty and under the prerogatives attributed by Article 468 subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Third Chamber proceeds to unify and issue the respective criterion, opting to assume the second position, consisting in that for the configuration of the penalty of the corrupter, contemplated in the former Article 345 of the Criminal Code, it is unnecessary to prove a meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades) between the active corrupter subject and the public official</b>, as said illicit act also does not require any special characteristic for its commission, since any person can commit the penalty of the corrupter, executing the typical verbs “<i>give</i>” or “ <i>permit</i>” an undue gift or delivery, as with these actions the injury to the protected legal interest occurs, which is probity in the performance of public function, and without it being required as part of the objective element (tipo objetivo) of said norm, that <i>“…the public official accept or reject that undue gift, advantage, or promise, because if they accept it, the passive subject would be committing the crimes of proper or improper bribery, as the case may be, and if they do not accept it, their conduct would be atypical, although in both cases the active subject would have equally committed the crime of the penalty of the corrupter…” (<b>Third Chamber of <st1:PersonName ProductID="LA CORTE SUPREMA" w:st="on">the Supreme Court</st1:PersonName> of <span class=GramE>Justice<span style='font-weight: normal;font-style:normal'> </span><span style='font-weight:normal'>,</span></span></b> decision 2012-001665, of ten hours and thirteen minutes, of the sixteenth of November, two thousand twelve). </i>On the same topic, resolution 1475-1999, of ten hours thirty-eight minutes, of the nineteenth of November, nineteen ninety-nine, cited by the prosecutorial body and retaken by this jurisdictional body, upon assuming the present position, was clear in pointing out that: <i>“[…] On the other hand, and now as a substantive issue, it is not true that the configuration of the crime of corruption of public officials provided for in Article 343 of the Criminal Code requires a meeting of minds (acuerdo de voluntades), as the defendant erroneously understands it, since for that effect it suffices that the agent gives or permits the public official an undue gift or advantage, without it being necessary that, concomitantly, the latter accept it…”.</i> On the other hand, regarding the issue of the lack of indication of what was the functional act requested of <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> Fonseca, a questioning that does not derive from the ground of contradictory precedents, but from the fourth claim of this seventh section of the prosecutorial appeal, it must be indicated that both the accusation in facts 133 to 137 and the factual <span class=SpellE>reasoning</span> of judgment 167-2011, described in paragraphs 128 to 132, refer as the functional act requested by the co-defendants Valverde Acosta and <span class=SpellE>Christian</span> <span class=SpellE>Sapsizian</span> from the indictee <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> Fonseca, that which consisted in the latter performing the necessary actions within the scope of his functions as advisor to <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Presidencia Ejecutiva" w:st="on">the Executive Presidency</st1:PersonName> of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and in charge of the execution of the 400,000 lines project, to make effective the contracting of the company <span class=SpellE>Alcatel</span> to carry out the mentioned project, when they detail in the section “<b>Description of the conduct of the accused Guido <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> Fonseca (Considering <span class=SpellE>IX</span>)”</b>, that: <i>“…128) The accused Guido <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> Fonseca began working at the end of the year 2000 for <span class=SpellE>I.C.E</span>., as Executive Assistant of Superior Administration in <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Presidencia Ejecutiva" w:st="on">the Executive Presidency</st1:PersonName>, an appointment that was formalized as of January 1, 2001./129) <b><u>Among his functions was attending specific matters of the Executive Presidency such as, analyzing documents submitted for the knowledge and approval of the Executive President, providing advice and recommendations on these, coordinating with the different dependencies of the Institute matters related to the execution of projects and directives, coordinating and participating in the special commissions formed, collaborating in the elaboration and implementation of programs and projects promoted by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Presidencia" w:st="on">the Presidency</st1:PersonName>, and representing <span class=SpellE>I.C.E</span> in different governmental and non-governmental bodies related to the field of electricity and telecommunications. Likewise among the projects he was in charge of, the abbreviated process 1-2002 for the leasing of 400,000 <span class=SpellE>GSM</span> cellular lines stood out.</u></b></i> <i>/ 130) From his entry to the institution, the defendant Guido <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> Fonseca, as assistant to <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Presidencia Ejecutiva" w:st="on">the Executive Presidency</st1:PersonName>, became the person in charge of accelerating matters related to telecommunications. Subsequently, the defendant Guido <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> was appointed to chair a high-level commission composed of an interdisciplinary group of professionals who were responsible for the study and execution of the 400,000 line project, together with Hernán Bravo <span class=SpellE>Trejos</span>, member of the Board of Directors, and officials Álvaro Retana, manager of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la UEN" w:st="on">the <span class=SpellE>UEN</span></st1:PersonName> of Mobile Services, and Pablo <span class=SpellE>Cob</span> in his capacity as Executive President of the institution./131) <b><u>Without specifying a date, but within the period between the end of the year 2000 and the beginning of 2001, the accused Valverde Acosta and <span class=SpellE>Christian</span> <span class=SpellE>Sapsizian</span> requested the defendant Guido <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> Fonseca to perform the necessary actions within the scope of his functions as advisor to <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Presidencia Ejecutiva" w:st="on">the Executive Presidency</st1:PersonName> of <span class=SpellE>I.C.E</span>., and in charge of the execution of the 400,000 lines project, to make said contracting effective, favoring <span class=SpellE>Alcatel</span>; in exchange for the above, <span class=SpellE>Sapsizian</span> and Valverde promised <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> Fonseca the delivery of a gift consisting of money</u></b>, the exact amount of which was not set at that moment. Said promise was accepted by the defendant <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> Fonseca, it was also agreed that the delivery would be conditional upon the effective awarding of the offer that <span class=SpellE>Alcatel</span> would present to <span class=SpellE>I.C.E</span>./ 132) Having fulfilled the accused Guido <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> Fonseca with the agreed actions, once he managed together with other officials of <span class=SpellE>I.C.E</span>., that the bidding process for the purchase of cellular telephony be opened and the awarding of the contract for the 400,000 <span class=SpellE>GSM</span> lines in favor of <span class=SpellE>Alcatel</span>, as previously agreed with the accused Edgar Valverde Acosta and the investigated <span class=SpellE>Christian</span> <span class=SpellE>Sapsizian</span>, he received the promised gift corresponding to a percentage of the contract that <span class=SpellE>Alcatel</span> obtained with <span class=SpellE>I.C.E</span>., a payment that was made in a segmented form through the intermediation of the <span class=SpellE>co-accused</span> Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona with the money coming from <span class=SpellE>Alcatel</span> <span class=SpellE>Cit</span>…” (<span class=SpellE>Cf.f</span>.00015454-00015456 of volume <span class=SpellE>XXXII</span> of the case file. The supplied text is ours), </i>so that the factual accusation does contain the description of the functional act requested of <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> Fonseca. Based on what is set forth here, decision 2012-2550 of the Court of Appeals of Sentence of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José is annulled, insofar as it proceeded to acquit the defendants Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona and Guido <span class=SpellE>Sibaja</span> Fonseca, sustaining a criterion different from the one unified herein. The referral of the case is ordered so that the Court of Appeals of Sentence, with a different panel, resolves the filed appeals anew.

<p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span class=SpellE><b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>XIX</span></b></span><b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>.<i> </i></span></b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;color:#010101; mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>Under the protection of Article 468 subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in <b><i>the sixth ground of the seventh section of the Public Ministry's Appeal, </i></b>the existence of contradictory precedents is alleged, at the time of carrying out the analysis of criminality (tipicidad) of the crime contemplated in Article 345 of the Criminal Code <i>(currently Article 352 of the Criminal Code)</i> and justifying the acquittal of the co-defendant Edgar Valverde Acosta. For the petitioning prosecutors, judgment 2012-2550 of the Court of Appeals and decision 580-1991, of nine hours forty-five minutes, of the twenty-fifth of October, nineteen ninety-one, of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Sala Tercera" w:st="on">the Third Chamber</st1:PersonName>, are contradictory with the precedents 2004-0451, of twelve hours, of the seventh of May, two thousand four; 0256-F-1987, of nine hours forty minutes, of the twenty-fifth of <span class=SpellE>September</span>, nineteen ninety-five, and 1475-1999, of ten hours thirty-eight minutes, of the nineteenth of November, nineteen ninety-nine, all of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Sala Tercera" w:st="on">the Third Chamber</st1:PersonName>, given that the challenged ruling acquits Valverde Acosta of four crimes of the penalty of the corrupter, “<i>for considering that he could not be convicted for having made a promise of the delivery of a gift to perform an act proper to their functions to the other co-defendants of the process” (<span class=SpellE>Cf.f</span>.175372 of volume <span class=SpellE>XLII</span> of the case file)</i>, since Article 345 of the Criminal Code in force at the date of the facts did not contemplate the typical action of “<i>promising</i>” and from the terms “ <i>give</i>” or “ <i>offer</i>” it was not possible to sustain, semantically nor legally, the inclusion of the word “<i>promise</i>”, without infringing the principle of criminal legality. However, a contrary position is sustained in the mentioned decision 2004-0451, in which within the scope of Article 345, in force at the time of the facts, the meanings of <i>“propose”</i>, <i>“offer”</i>, and <i>“promise”</i> are included under the term “<i>give</i>” <i>(<span class=SpellE>Cf.f</span>.175374 of volume <span class=SpellE>XLII</span> of the case file)</i>, a criterion that they put forward as correct and on which they petition for the integration of the unification of the jurisprudence of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Sala" w:st="on">the Chamber</st1:PersonName>, so that the scope of the criminal statute of the penalty of the corrupter be interpreted <i>(<span class=SpellE>Cf.f</span>.175377 of volume <span class=SpellE>XLII</span> of the case file).</i> Separately, they maintain that the appealed judgment acquits Valverde Acosta for an additional erroneous reason: the lack of accreditation of a co-delinquency of the participating public officials, as is possible to infer from folio 174523 of volume <span class=SpellE>XLII</span> of the case file, when it is stated that: <i>“…as has been resolved in relation to the other accused, it has not been possible to determine what is the concrete action he had to deploy, or if the gifts were as a reward for an act performed.</i> In other words, there is an effect favoring the legal positions of Edgar Valverde regarding the indeterminacy of the acts charged to the alleged affected parties by the corrupt act, which undoubtedly must concur to produce the nullity of the ruling and declare the acquittal (See folio 174523 of the main expediente)…” (Cf.f. 175376 of volume XLII of the expediente). Reasoning that is contrary to the criterion followed by the Third Chamber in votes 0256-1987 and 01475-99, in which it was held, respectively, that the penalty of the corrupter does not require, for its consummation, a meeting of the minds between the corrupter and the corrupted public official; nor that there must exist, for the accreditation of the criminal type, the co-perpetration of the public official or the delivery of the thing, such that, when dealing with the active bribery of an “imperfect execution type,” in which: “… the mere offer or acceptance is sufficient, since the materialization of bribery proper or improper does not belong to the type, rendering the arguments outlined in the challenged ruling to acquit the accused Valverde Acosta for the crimes of penalty of the corrupter attributed to him improper…” (Cf.f. 175377 of volume XLII of the expediente). Ultimately, they petition that the Third Chamber adopt the position defended by the Public Ministry in the unification of jurisprudence through the rulings 0256-1987 and 01475-99, supra cited, and as prejudice, they manifest a detriment to the prosecutorial claims, due to the fact that even though the facts demonstrating the criminality required by former Article 345 were accredited, Valverde Acosta was acquitted of four crimes of penalty of the corrupter, and as a claim, they outline the maintenance of the condemnatory sentence issued by the Trial Court through a correct interpretation in accordance with the applicable law. The complaint is declared with merit. Before resolving the claim raised by the prosecutorial entity, it is necessary to make some considerations regarding the history of the criminal type of the penalty of the corrupter contemplated in former Article 345 of the Penal Code, which in its original wording established: “…The penalties established in the five preceding articles are applicable to whoever gives or permits a gift or undue advantage to a public official,” it being that our Courts of Justice, from the entry into force of the Penal Code until vote 461-91, of fifteen hours fourteen minutes, of February twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-one, of the Constitutional Chamber, had interpreted that within the actions encompassed by said norm was found the verb “promises,” insofar as it appeared to be a drafting error of the norm to have recorded “permits” instead of “promises.” However, in 1991, regarding an appeal of habeas corpus, the Constitutional Chamber had the opportunity to resume the issue, discarding in that interpretation a material legislative error of the verb “permits” for “promises,” to finally establish that both terms did not constitute synonyms nor could they be used by Judges in an equivalent manner without violating the principle of legality. At that time, the Constitutional Chamber, in what is of interest, established regarding the supposed similarity of the verbs “permits” and “promises,” that: “…Article 39 of the Political Constitution enshrines the principle of legality in criminal matters, a guiding and inspiring principle of our legal system. By virtue thereof, the sole source creating crimes and penalties is the law. In this matter, analogy and custom are excluded, the Courts lacking the faculties to consider as criminal acts different from those typified in the law, such that any conduct not subsumable therein shall be unpunished; even when it is very serious. Consequently, a judicial interpretation that encompasses conduct not specifically described in the law injures the principle of legality. The petitioner indicates that in Case No. 104-3-91 being pursued against his defendant in the Sixth Instruction Court of San José, the conduct of the accused has been poorly framed, since Article 343 of the Penal Code speaks of ‘permits’ and not of ‘promises’ as it should be to have the conduct of Mr. B.O. configured as typical. Let us see how the accused, by mutual agreement with co-accused A.C., contacted officials of the Judicial Investigation Agency, to whom they promised a gift if the alteration of the blood alcohol levels of his son, accused in another case for the crime of Culpable Homicide, was achieved. The original legislative file signed by the President of the Republic shows that Article 343 was approved and ordered published with the verb ‘permits’ without there having been any legislative reform regarding that article. For the foregoing, it is the criterion of this Constitutional Chamber that Article 343 of the Penal Code cannot be interpreted without injuring the principle of constitutional legality, in the sense that what the legislator meant to say is not ‘promises’ but ‘permits’…” (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote 461-91, of fifteen hours fourteen minutes, of February twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-one. Emphasis supplied is ours). As a result of the preceding ruling, the prohibition against equating “to permit” with “to promise” was maintained as the dominant criterion in resolutions issued by the Third Chamber, in accordance with Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. However, by 1995, this Chamber of Cassation, regarding the challenge brought by the Public Ministry, in the same case that gave rise to vote 461-91, of fifteen hours fourteen minutes, of February twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-one, of the Constitutional Chamber, conducted a new examination of the issue, only now from a different perspective: although for this jurisdictional entity, the term “to promise” could never be equated to the verb “to permit,” according to the designs of the Constitutional Chamber, under the principle of legality, the norm of Article 345 also presented the verb “to give,” the same which within its meanings did contain the action of “to promise,” such that, to factual frameworks containing in their description the aforementioned criminal action, the mentioned numeral could indeed be applied. On that occasion, the Third Chamber, with the integration of Judges Alfonso Chaves Ramírez, Joaquín Vargas Gené, Rafael Medaglia Gómez, José Luis Quesada Fonseca, and Hernán Vega Miranda, held: “…This Chamber of Cassation agrees with the Constitutional Chamber that, regarding Article 343 of the Penal Code, it is not legitimate to modify the criminal type by substituting the verb ‘permits’ with ‘promises,’ because this contravenes the guaranteeing function of the type and violates the principle of legality. However, the claim brought by Licda. S.M. is admissible, because the reasons she adduces to motivate it are valid and in no way contravene the terms of the resolution in comment of the Constitutional Chamber. Indeed, the analysis of the Constitutional Chamber—with the exception of the note of Judge Piza Escalante—is merely formal, it does not extend beyond the mere literalness of the legal type, that is, it does not comprise the semantic analysis thereof. Said in other words, the Constitutional Chamber established that it is not legitimate to read ‘promises’ where it says ‘permits,’ but the truth is that it established nothing regarding the meaning of the words composing the criminal type: it does not tell us what we should understand or not understand from those words. And what the appellant maintains is, precisely, that when the Constitutional Chamber establishes that the verb ‘permits’ cannot be substituted by the word ‘promises,’ it is not excluding the ‘offer’ or the ‘promise’ as possible semantic content of the word ‘gives’ recorded in the referred numeral of the Penal Code. The consultation of various dictionaries proves the appellant right. Thus, the twenty-first edition of the Dictionary of the Spanish Language (1992), prepared by the Royal Spanish Academy, indicates that the third commonly used meaning of the word ‘give’ is ‘to propose, to indicate.’ This same meaning is endorsed by other common dictionaries (see, for example, Vol. II of the 1991 edition of the Diccionario Enciclopédico Éxito, by Editorial Océano), even some of them add the word ‘offer’ as a synonym for ‘give’ (thus, the dictionaries Pequeño Larousse Ilustrado, Ediciones Larousse, 1994, p. 316 and the Diccionario Abreviado de la Lengua Española, Vox, Bibliograf S.A., p. 146) and yet another says that ‘give’ is ‘to propose: to give an idea’ (Diccionario Práctico Español Moderno, Ediciones Larousse, Mexico, 1983, p. 148), such that one must agree with the appellant that whoever promises, offers, or proposes to a public official a gift, present or future, so that he performs an act contrary to his duties (or incurs in any of the hypotheses of Articles 338 to 342 of the Penal Code), adapts his conduct to the hypothesis provided for and sanctioned in Article 343 of the Penal Code, independently of whether the public official accepts or rejects the gift or undue advantage, and independently of whether the object has been shown to him, has been delivered to him, or placed under his possession or mere holding, since the Penalty of the Corrupter (active bribery) does not suppose for its consummation the co-perpetration of the public official nor the delivery of the thing, insofar as the sole conduct of the corrupter described in the legal type is suitable to endanger the protected legal right, which is none other than the healthy and normal functioning and prestige of the public administration through the correctness and integrity of its employees or servants, so has our jurisprudence understood it: ...what the law protects is the correct performance of the position by the official before the Public Administration, removing him at all costs, for the sake of fulfilling the obligations that concern him, from venality» (Third Chamber, V-256-F of 9:40 hours of September 25, 1987) (…) Excluding the promises, offers, or proposals of gifts or undue advantages as possible content of the typical action provided for in Article 343 of the Penal Code, not only denies the common meaning of the words used in the legal type, but also attacks the intelligence of the legal system, since it configures a fraud to the law, given that thus the spirit of the norm would also be infringed (cfr. Article 20 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code)…” (See in the same sense, Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote 183-F-95, of eleven hours twenty minutes, of March twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-five. The emphasis supplied is ours), it being that said position was reiterated years later, by this same Third Chamber, in vote 2004-00451, of twelve hours, of May seventh, two thousand four, with the integration of Judges Daniel González, Jesús Alberto Ramírez, José Manuel Arroyo, and Substitute Judges Ronald Salazar and Alfredo Chirino. On that occasion, when resolving a petition for acquittal brought by the Public Ministry, it was determined that: “….This Chamber considers that Lic. G.M. is not correct: In the first place, it must be said that it is true that the Constitutional Chamber warned in Resolution No. 461-91 of 15:14 hours of February 27, 1991, that the judicial interpretation according to which in Article 345 (the sentence of that Office refers to Article 343 of the Penal Code, but it is the same one in which the penalty of the corrupter is regulated; what happens is that the current numbering is the product of a reform subsequent to the issuance of the ruling just mentioned) should read ‘promises’ instead of ‘permits’ was not admissible, from a constitutional point of view. Thus, in the legal text it is only possible to read ‘permits’ where such a word is written (therefore, the criterion of the a quo, according to which the Constitutional Chamber equated this word with ‘promises,’ is erroneous, because that is precisely what that body considered unconstitutional). What happens is that although it is true the verbs contemplated in Article 345 of the Penal Code are ‘to give’ and ‘to promise,’ the truth is that ‘to offer’ is indeed covered by them, not by the verb ‘to promise,’ but by the verb ‘to give.’ Thus, it is clear that although the Constitutional Chamber resolved that it is unconstitutional to read ‘promises’ where it says ‘permits,’ the truth is that it never delimited the scope of the verb ‘to give’ and within this, ‘offering’ the gift is framed. That criterion is still maintained today, because although the penalty of the corrupter is not regulated in Article 343 of the Penal Code but in Article 345 of the same normative body, the legal text remains the same. Furthermore, even today the Royal Spanish Academy accepts that the verb ‘to give’ means, in its third meaning, ‘to offer material for something,’ so the citation made in 1995 of the twenty-first edition of the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy (of 1992) continues to be in accordance with what is indicated in the twenty-second edition of the same, published in 2001. For all the foregoing, the criterion of Lic. G.M. is not acceptable to this Chamber…” (The emphasis supplied is ours). Now, although the criterion expressed in sentences 183-F-95 and 2004-00451 dominated in subsequent rulings of the same Third Chamber, it must be recognized that the controversy was ended, with the incorporation of Article 1 of Law No. 8630, published in La Gaceta No. 33, on February fifteenth, two thousand eight, which repealed Article 343 bis and reformed the norm of Article 345, both of the Penal Code, since with that reform the wording of the mentioned Article 345 suffered the incorporation of the verb “to promise” as part of the typical actions of the crime of penalty of the corrupter. However, despite the mentioned legal reform, it must also be noted that the position of this Third Chamber, especially for those cases committed before the year two thousand eight, has been kept invariable. It is until the issuance of ruling 2012-2550 now questioned, that the Court of Appeals of Sentence, under the integration of Judges Alfredo Chirino, Jorge Arce and Sandra Zúñiga, held a thesis totally opposed to that maintained in vote 2004-00451, of twelve hours, of May seventh, two thousand four, of this Chamber. In this second sentence, in evident opposition to vote 2004-00451 of this Chamber, the atypicality of the facts attributed to co-accused Valverde Acosta was declared for the lack of description in the criminal type of penalty of the corrupter of the term “promises,” when in what is of interest it was established: “…Indeed, the criminal legal application cannot be given to the word ‘permits’ as if it said ‘promises,’ because this changes the meaning of the prohibition. The principle of criminal legality, contemplated in Article 39 of the Constitution and in Article 1 of the Penal Code, demand from the judge great care not to assume legislative functions, which would well occur, for example, through amending eventual errors in the publication of a law, or promoting readings of the structure of the type that result aberrant from the conventional use of the terms. Attempting a reading, for example, of the verb ‘to give’ from far-fetched semantic elaborations, that could separate the correct interpretation of the term from the conventional understanding of said verb, could lead to a substitution of the punitive objective of the criminal law, which has as its objective to be understood by the recipients of the norm, and understood in such a way that the prohibition is obeyed. Thus, understanding the word ‘to give’ as if it were ‘to promise’ or ‘to offer’ is an interpretation that contravenes the principle of legality, not only because it gives the semantic interpretation a turn that deviates from the conventional use of said term, but because it implies extending the scope of coverage of the criminal type beyond where the limits of the punishable allow it. To do so would be to incur an extensive interpretation of the contents of the criminal type that is prohibited by the Political Constitution, which is inspired by several centuries of construction of the criminal guarantees that have been developed to prevent this type of judicial actions, which affect the legal certainty of the citizens of a Democratic and Social State of Law like the Costa Rican one, according to the programmatic reading of Article 1 of the Political Constitution…” (Cf.f. 174521 rev. to 174522 of volume XLI of the expediente. The emphasis supplied is ours). Once both opposing jurisprudential positions are clarified, it remains to determine—in light of the powers that Article 468 subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants this Third Chamber in the unification of jurisprudential criteria—the jurisprudential position that the undersigned Judges maintain, leading to determine that the criterion followed by this integration is that expressed by this Chamber, in votes 183-F-95, of eleven hours twenty minutes, of March twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-five and 2004-00451, of twelve hours, of May seventh, two thousand four, because even though resolution 461-91, of fifteen hours fourteen minutes, of February twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-one, of the Constitutional Chamber supra cited, prevents likening the terms “permits” and “promises,” it is certain that, as part of the meaning of the verb “to give” contained in the description of the type, the meanings that this act contemplates can also be considered as conduct prohibited by the norm, within which stand out, without doubt, the actions of “to offer” and “to promise,” with which any conduct specified under that criminal behavior could not be considered atypical, as the Court of Appeals erroneously established in the challenged ruling. Finally, regarding the lack of accreditation of a co-perpetration of the participating public officials as an additional reason to acquit the accused Valverde Acosta, it is clear that this Chamber, in section XVIII of this resolution, in view of the verification of divergences between the jurisprudential precedents 0256-1987 and 01475-99 and those criteria outlined in the questioned sentence 2012-2550, assumed the position contained in the former, insofar as for the accreditation of the crime of penalty of the corrupter, it was established that verification of the conduct supposedly performed by the public officials sought to be corrupted is not necessary, the accreditation of the actions “gives” or “permits” being sufficient alone. On the other hand, regarding the prosecutorial claim expressed upon filing the present complaint, consisting of maintaining the sentence issued by the Trial Court in this particular, it must be indicated that this Chamber is legally impeded from accepting such a request, because the accused and their technical defenses, in the ordinary stage of Appeal, exposed other arguments and grievances on this same issue, which must be resolved in that venue, under the postulates of the right to technical and material defense. For these reasons, the appropriate course is to order the nullity of the challenged resolution with respect to the accused Edgar Valverde Acosta, for which the remand is ordered regarding this point and a new substantiation in accordance with the applicable law.”

“XVIII. En el cuarto motivo de la sección sétima del recurso de Casación del Ministerio Público, se reclaman inobservados los artículos 33 y 41 Constitucionales, 468 inciso b) del Código Procesal Penal y erróneamente aplicado el numeral 345 del Código Penal ( que actualmente corresponde al artículo 352 del Código Penal), en cuanto a la configuración de la penalidad de corruptor por corrupción agravada en la modalidad de cohecho impropio acusado a Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona. Según el Ministerio Público, el fallo 2012-2550, dispuso erróneamente absolver a Quirós Carmona por los hechos que el ente fiscal le atribuyó, consistentes en haber corrompido al coimputado Sibaja Fonseca, bajo el argumento que en el particular no se acreditó la configuración del correlativo delito de cohecho atribuido al funcionario público, sea que, no se determinó cuál fue el actuar pedido a Sibaja Fonseca para que Alcatel consiguiera el contrato de las 400 mil líneas celulares (Cf.f.175363 del tomo XLII del expediente), posición que se muestra contraria a la letra del propio artículo 345 del Código Penal (actualmente 352 del Código Penal), y a los votos 219-98, de las nueve con cincuenta y cinco minutos, del seis de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y ocho; 1475-99, de las diez horas treinta y ocho minutos, del diecinueve de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, ambos de la Sala Tercera; 2005-00175, de las quince horas treinta y tres minutos, del diecinueve de enero de dos mil cinco, de la Sala Constitucional y al criterio sostenido por autores como Warner Molina, en Delitos Funcionales, Guía de Investigación, San José, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Escuela Judicial, 2009, p.124 y Francisco Muñoz Conde, en Derecho Penal. Parte Especial, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanc, 15ª edición, 2008, pp.1003-1004, entre otros; ya que el “ tipo penal en mención, dispone que el delito se configura cuando el sujeto activo “dé” o “permita” una dádiva o ventaja indebida a un funcionario público, independientemente de que exista un acuerdo previo o no para que el funcionario realice algún acto propio o contrario a sus deberes, o bien como premio por un acto cumplido u omitido por el funcionario público…” (Cf.f.175366 del tomo XLII del expediente), pues se trata de un delito de mera actividad, concretamente de peligro abstracto, en el que el injusto se agota con la acción del autor o la peligrosidad general de la acción típica para un determinado bien jurídico y sin que sea necesario un resultado concreto, lo que contraría lo expuesto por el Tribunal de Apelación en la fundamentación analítica de la sentencia, cuando determinó que: “…Ese acto concreto que se le pidió a Sibaja, según lo interpreta el recurrente, no fue señalado de manera clara, precisa y concreta por el tribunal. Si esto es así, y no hay precisión sobre el hecho, también habría duda si Quirós Carmona fue responsable del delito de penalidad del corruptor, pues ambos hechos están íntimamente relacionados, y es por ello que por esta razón que se le debe absolver de toda pena y responsabilidad por los hechos que se le atribuyen en relación a Quirós Carmona…” (Cf.f.174503 vuelto)…” (Cf.f.175367 del tomo XLII del expediente). Desde la perspectiva fiscal, el extracto anterior le causó perjuicio a sus pretensiones punitivas, pues presupone la exigencia de requisitos típicos no contemplados por el tipo penal para la acreditación de la conducta de la penalidad del corruptor imputada a Quirós Carmona, esto a pesar que haberse acreditado un cuadro fáctico, que demostraba la tipicidad requerida por el entonces artículo 345 del Código Penal. Finalmente, solicitan los accionantes, la nulidad del fallo de segunda instancia y una correcta interpretación conforme a derecho, manteniendo la sentencia condenatoria ordenada por el A quo en contra de Quirós Carmona, por los tres delitos de penalidad del corruptor por los que se le condenó. De igual forma, en la queja quinta de la sección sétima del recurso de casación del Ministerio Público, de conformidad con el ordinal 468 inciso a) del Código Procesal Penal, se invoca la existencia de contradicción entre el fallo impugnado 2012-2550 y los votos 0256-F-1987, de las nueve horas con cuarenta minutos, del veinticinco de setiembre de mil novecientos ochenta y siete, y 01475-99, de las diez horas treinta y ocho minutos, del diecinueve de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, ya que en la primera, el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, revoca la condenatoria de Quirós Carmona por el delito de cohecho activo por corrupción agravada en la modalidad de cohecho impropio atribuido por el Ministerio Público y relacionado con la aparente corrupción realizada por éste al coimputado Sibaja Fonseca, al aparentemente no acreditarse la conducta acusada por ausencia de un acuerdo de voluntades entre ambos coimputados y faltar el señalamiento sobre cuál fue el acto funcional pedido al coimputado Guido Sibaja Fonseca (Cf.f.175369 del tomo XLII del expediente), mientras que los fallos de la Sala Tercera que transcriben en parte, supuestamente apuntan a que ese tipo penal, no requiere del mencionado acuerdo de voluntades, de la tradición de la cosa o de la codelincuencia del funcionario público, “ en tanto la sola conducta del corruptor descrita en el tipo legal es idónea para poner en peligro el bien jurídico tutelado, que no es otra cosa que el sano y normal funcionamiento y prestigio de la administración pública a través de la corrección e integridad de sus empleados o servidores…”(Cf.f.175370 fte del tomo XLII del expediente, Voto 0256-F-1987, de las nueve horas con cuarenta minutos, del veinticinco de setiembre de mil novecientos ochenta y siete). Finalmente, solicitan se unifique la jurisprudencia sobre la figura de la penalidad del corruptor, a fin de que se aplique el criterio sostenido por la Sala Tercera, ya que la posición asumida por el Tribunal de Apelación les causa agravio a sus pretensiones punitivas, pues a pesar de haberse acreditado la tipicidad requerida por el antiguo artículo 343 del Código Penal, fue dictada en segunda instancia la absolutoria del imputado Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona. Por estar relacionados ambos motivos, se resuelven conjuntamente y ambas quejas deben ser declaradas con lugar. De la lectura exhaustiva de diversas resoluciones citadas por el Ministerio Público y de otras emitidas por la Sala Tercera, los Tribunales de Apelación de Sentencia y los antiguos Tribunales de Casación, es posible desprender, la existencia de dos interpretaciones jurisprudenciales contrarias, con respecto al tema de la relación entre el sujeto activo o corruptor y el funcionario público al que se le “ da” o “permite” la dádiva o la ventaja indebida en el delito de la penalidad de corruptor, es decir, a lo que el Tribunal de Apelación de la Sentencia Penal, en el fallo impugnado denomina, como parte del elemento del tipo penal, “acuerdo de voluntades”, indispensable para la configuración del delito de la penalidad del corruptor, contenida en el antiguo artículo 343, hoy modificado de manera mínima y contenido en el numeral 352 de este mismo cuerpo normativo. Así, de acuerdo con un sector de la jurisprudencia, al que pertenece la sentencia 2012-2550 mencionada, para la configuración de la acción ilícita de penalidad de corruptor, se requiere además de la acreditación de un acuerdo de voluntades entre el sujeto activo y el funcionario público a corromper, la descripción de la conducta esperada o realizada por el funcionario corrompido o por lo menos una determinación de cuál sería el acto funcional que se habría pedido o esperado de ese sujeto, según se deriva de la fundamentación que al respecto realizó el mismo Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, en la fallo 2012-2550: “…De hecho, y como esta Cámara lo analiza con anterioridad, no se sabe qué papel se esperaba desplegara Guido Sibaja en relación con el procedimiento de toma de decisión a lo interno del ICE, como tampoco sobre la forma y contenido de un procedimiento abreviado que, en esencia, no era favorable ni brindaba certidumbre a Alcatel. A esta empresa le convenía más, en términos de la certeza de su participación, el procedimiento de compras directas. Guido Sibaja tenía a su cargo las funciones de coordinación que no tenían que ver con el proceso de compras directas, y cómo se observó en la sucesión de decisiones del Consejo Directivo del ICE, el camino hacia un procedimiento abreviado vino definido por la Contraloría General de la República y no por el ICE. La aceptación que hizo Guido Sibaja de haber recibido dineros de Alcatel no permite determinar, tampoco, si dichas sumas fueron entregadas más bien como pago por un acto propio y concreto de sus funciones. La incertidumbre al respecto abre una gran cantidad de posibilidades de tipicidad penal que van desde la recepción de dádivas por acto cumplido hasta el propio Enriquecimiento Ilícito, pero no necesariamente a un cohecho impropio. Ese acto concreto que se le pidió a Sibaja, según lo interpreta el recurrente, no fue señalado de manera clara, precisa y concreta por el tribunal. Si esto es así, y no hay precisión sobre el hecho, también habría duda si Quirós Carmona fue responsable del delito de penalidad del corruptor, pues ambos hechos están íntimamente relacionados , y es por ello que por esta razón que se le debe absolver de toda pena y responsabilidad por los hechos que se le atribuyen en relación a Quirós Carmona…” (Cf.174503 vto del tomo XLI del expediente). Sin embargo, la exigencia de tal requisito para la acreditación del delito de la penalidad del corruptor, en criterio de otro sector de la jurisprudencia, no sería necesaria ni esencial, por considerarse al delito de cohecho activo o penalidad del corruptor como un delito de los llamados de mera actividad que se consuman en el momento en que el corruptor realiza, -de acuerdo con el artículo 352 sin las reformas implementadas por las leyes, No. 8630, del 17 de enero del 2008 y número 8422, de 6 de octubre del 2004), los verbos “dar” o “ permitir” una dádiva o ventaja indebida, sin que sea importante para su consumación un acuerdo efectivo de voluntades o la descripción del acto funcional pedido por el corruptor, tal y como lo sostuvo en su oportunidad, la Sala Tercera, al señalar que el delito de penalidad del corruptor o cohecho activo “…no supone para su consumación la codelincuencia del funcionario público ni la tradición de la cosa, en tanto la sola conducta del corruptor descrita en el tipo legal es idónea para poner en peligro el bien jurídico tutelado, que no es otra cosa que el sano y normal funcionamiento y prestigio de la administración pública a través de la corrección e integridad de sus empleados o servidores…" (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia , Voto 183-F-95, de las once horas veinte minutos, del veinticuatro de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco). Posición, que esta misma Cámara también reprodujo recientemente, al momento de resolver una causa, en el que uno de los dos imputados a los que se les atribuía el delito de robo agravado de un teléfono celular, al ser aprehendido por oficiales de la Fuerza Pública y con la intención que éstos realizaran un acto contrario a sus deberes o dejaran de realizar un acto propio de sus deberes, los interpeló para que lo dejaran ir, ofreciéndoles a cambio la apropiación del teléfono celular decomisado. En dicho fallo, esta Sala de Casación, admitió la consumación del delito de la penalidad del corruptor, aún cuando no se hubiese producido un acuerdo de voluntades entre el sujeto activo y los oficiales de la Fuerza Pública actuantes, haciendo para ello eco del voto 219-98, de las nueve horas con cincuenta y cinco minutos, del seis de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, con integración de los Magistrados Daniel González, Mario Houed, Alfonso Chaves, Rodrigo Castro y Carlos Luis Redondo, que a propósito de la aplicación de la antigua norma 345 del Código Penal, estableció: “…(el) cohecho activo no requiere el efectivo traslado del dominio del bien, ni menos que sea entregado o puesto bajo la tenencia del funcionario público al que se quiere corromper, sino que basta para que se produzca la lesión al bien jurídico y por ende para que se configure ese ilícito, el mero ofrecimiento directo o indirecto por sí o por interpósita persona para recibir una dádiva o cualquier ventaja de retribución para hacer un acto contrario a sus deberes, para no hacerlo o para retardar un acto propio de sus funciones…” ( Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto 2012-001665, de las diez horas y trece minutos, del dieciséis de noviembre de dos mil doce. El suplido no pertenece al original, con integración de los(as) Magistrados(as) José Manuel Arroyo, Jesús Ramírez, Magda Pereira, Carlos Chinchilla y Doris Arias. En igual sentido, Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, votos 2004-00451, de las doce horas, del siete de mayo de dos mil cuatro, con integración de los Magistrados Daniel González, Jesús Ramírez, José Manuel Arroyo, Ronald Salazar, y Alfredo Chirino, estos últimos actuando como Magistrados Suplentes; 1104-97, de las once horas con veinticinco minutos, del nueve de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y siete, con integración de los Magistrados Rodrigo Castro y Jesús Ramírez, junto a los Magistrados Suplentes Joaquín Vargas Gené, Carlos Redondo y Henry Issa El Khoury; 024-1996, de las catorce horas, del veintinueve de enero de mil novecientos noventa y seis, con integración de los Magistrados Daniel González, Jesús Ramírez, Mario Houed, Alfonso Chaves y Rodrigo Castro; 256-F-1987, de las nueve hora, del veinticinco de setiembre de mil novecientos ochenta y siete, entre otros. Antiguo Tribunal de Casación Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, votos 2004-0027, de las once horas, del veintidós de enero de dos mil cuatro, con integración de los Jueces Ronald Salazar, Jorge Arce y Javier Llobet; 2003-0962, de las doce horas cinco minutos, del veintidós de setiembre de dos mil tres, con integración de los Jueces Mario Porras, Carlos Chinchilla y Ulises Zúñiga. Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penaldel Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, votos 2013-2014, de las catorce horas cuarenta minutos, del seis de setiembre de dos mil trece, con integración de los Jueces Mario Porras, Jorge Camacho y Frezie Jiménez; 2012-0767, de las dieciséis horas, del veintitrés de abril de dos mil doce, con integración de los Jueces Jorge Luis Arce, Alfredo Chirino y Sandra Zúñiga). Ahora bien, una vez verificada la existencia objetiva de dos perspectivas jurisprudenciales antagónicas, en aras de salvaguardar el principio de seguridad jurídica y bajo las prerrogativas atribuidas por el artículo 468 inciso a) del Código Procesal Penal, esta Sala Tercera, procede a unificar y dictar el criterio respectivo, decantándose por asumir la posición segunda, consistente en que para la configuración de la penalidad del corruptor, contemplada en el antiguo artículo 345 del Código Penal, es innecesario acreditar un acuerdo de voluntades entre el sujeto activo corruptor y el funcionario público, siendo que dicha ilicitud tampoco requiere de ninguna característica especial para su comisión, puesto que cualquier persona puede cometer la penalidad del corruptor, realizando los verbos típicos “dar” o “ permitir” una dádiva o entrega indebida, al producirse con esas acciones la lesión al bien jurídico tutelado, que es la probidad en el desempeño de la función pública y sin que exija como parte del tipo objetivo de dicha norma, que “…el funcionario público acepte o rechace esa dádiva, ventaja o promesa indebidas, pues si lo acepta, el sujeto pasivo estaría realizando los delitos de cohecho propio o impropio, según sea el caso, y si no lo acepta su conducta sería atípica, aunque en ambos casos el sujeto activo igualmente habría cometido el delito de penalidad de corruptor…” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia , voto 2012-001665, de las diez horas y trece minutos, del dieciséis de noviembre de dos mil doce). Sobre el mismo tema, la resolución 1475-1999, de las diez horas con treinta y ocho minutos, del diecinueve de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, citada por el órgano fiscal y retomada por este órgano jurisdiccional, al asumir la presente posición, fue clara en señalar que: “[…] Por otra parte, y ya como una cuestión de fondo, no es cierto que para la configuración del delito de corrupción de funcionarios público previsto en el artículo 343 del Código Penal requiera de un acuerdo de voluntades, como erróneamente lo entiende el imputado, pues dicho efecto basta con que el agente dé o permita al funcionario público una dádiva o una ventaja indebida, sin que sea necesario que, concomitantemente, este último la acepte…”. Por otra parte, en cuanto al tema de la falta de señalamiento de cuál fue el acto funcional pedido a Sibaja Fonseca, cuestionamiento que no se deriva del motivo de precedentes contradictorios, sino del cuarto reclamo de esta sección sétima del recurso fiscal, debe indicarse que tanto la acusación en los hechos 133 al 137 como la fundamentación fáctica de la sentencia 167-2011, descrita en los parágrafos 128 al 132, refieren como el acto funcional solicitado por los coimputados Valverde Acosta y Christian Sapsizian al sindicado Sibaja Fonseca, aquel que consistió en que este último realizara las acciones necesarias dentro del ámbito de sus funciones como asesor de la Presidencia Ejecutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y encargado de la ejecución del proyecto de las 400.000 líneas, para hacer efectiva la contratación de la empresa Alcatel para que realizará el mencionado proyecto, cuando detallan en el apartado “Descripción de la conducta del encartado Guido Sibaja Fonseca (Considerando IX)”, que: “…128) El acusado Guido Sibaja Fonseca ingresó a laborar a finales del años 2000 para el I.C.E., en calidad de Asistente Ejecutivo de Administración Superior en la Presidencia Ejecutiva, designación que se formalizó a partir del 01 de enero de 2001./129) Dentro de sus funciones le correspondía atender asuntos específicos de la Presidencia Ejecutiva tales como, analizar documentos sometidos a conocimiento y aprobación del Presidente Ejecutivo, brindar asesoría y recomendaciones sobre éstos, coordinar con las diferentes dependencias del Instituto lo relacionado con la ejecución de proyectos y directrices, coordinar y participar en las comisiones especiales conformadas, colaborar en la elaboración e implementación de programas y proyectos impulsados por la Presidencia, y representar al I.C.E en diferentes organismos gubernamentales y no gubernamentales, relacionados con el campo de la electricidad y las telecomunicaciones. Asimismo dentro de los proyectos que tuvo a cargo, se destacó el proceso abreviado 1-2002 de arrendamiento de las 400.000 líneas celulares GSM. / 130) Desde su ingreso a la institución, el imputado Guido Sibaja Fonseca, como asistente de la Presidencia Ejecutiva, pasó a ser el encargado de acelerar lo relacionado al tema de las telecomunicaciones. Posteriormente el imputado Guido Sibaja fue nombrado para presidir una comisión de alto nivel integrada por un grupo interdisciplinario de profesionales que tuvo bajo su responsabilidad el estudio y ejecución del proyecto de las 400.000 mil líneas, en conjunto con Hernán Bravo Trejos, miembro del Consejo Directivo y los funcionarios Álvaro Retana, gerente de la UEN de Servicios Móviles, y Pablo Cob en su calidad de Presidente Ejecutivo de la institución./131) Sin precisarse fecha, pero en el período comprendido entre finales del año 2000 e inicios de 2001, los encartados Valverde Acosta y Christian Sapsizian le solicitaron al imputado Guido Sibaja Fonseca que realizara las acciones necesarias dentro del ámbito de sus funciones como asesor de la Presidencia Ejecutiva del I.C.E., y encargado de la ejecución del proyecto de las 400.000 líneas, para hacer efectiva dicha contratación favoreciendo a Alcatel; a cambio de lo anterior, Sapsizian y Valverde le prometieron a Sibaja Fonseca la entrega de una dádiva consistente en dinero, cuyo monto exacto no se fijó en ese momento. Dicha promesa fue aceptada por el imputado Sibaja Fonseca, se acordó asimismo que la entrega estaría condicionada a la efectiva adjudicación de la oferta que presentaría Alcatel al I.C.E./ 132) Por haber cumplido el encartado Guido Sibaja Fonseca con las acciones acordadas, una vez que logró junto con otros funcionarios del I.C.E., que se abriera el concurso para la compra de la telefonía celular y la adjudicación del contrato de las 400.000 líneas GSM a favor de Alcatel, conforme lo pactado con anterioridad con el encartado Edgar Valverde Acosta y el indiciado Christian Sapsizian, recibió la dádiva prometida correspondiente a un porcentaje del contrato que obtuvo Alcatel con el I.C.E., pago que fue realizado en forma segmentada por intermediación del coencartado Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona con el dinero provenientes de Alcatel Cit…” (Cf.f.00015454-00015456 del tomo XXXII del expediente. El suplido es nuestro), de manera que la imputación fáctica, sí contiene la descripción del acto funcional peticionado a Sibaja Fonseca. Con base a lo aquí expuesto, se anula el voto 2012-2550, del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, en cuanto procedió a absolver a los imputados Luis Adrián Quirós Carmona y Guido Sibaja Fonseca, sosteniendo un criterio diverso al aquí unificado. Se ordena el reenvío de la causa para que el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, con diversa integración, resuelva nuevamente los recursos planteados.

XIX.Al amparo del artículo 468 inciso a) del Código Procesal Penal, en el motivo sexto de la sección sétima del Recurso del Ministerio Público, se alega la existencia de precedentes contradictorios, al momento del realizar el análisis de tipicidad del delito contemplado en el artículo 345 del Código Penal (actualmente artículo 352 del Código Penal) y justificar la absolutoria del coimputado Edgar Valverde Acosta. Para los fiscales gestionantes, la sentencia 2012-2550, del Tribunal de Apelación y el voto 580-1991, de las nueve horas cuarenta y cinco minutos, del veinticinco de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y uno, de la Sala Tercera, son contradictorios, con los precedentes 2004-0451, de las doce horas, del siete de mayo de dos mil cuatro; 0256-F-1987, de las nueve horas cuarenta minutos, del veinticinco de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, y 1475-1999, de las diez horas treinta y ocho minutos, del diecinueve de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, todos de la Sala Tercera, dado que el fallo cuestionado, absuelve a Valverde Acosta de cuatro delitos de penalidad del corruptor, “por considerar que no podía condenársele por haber realizado una promesa de la entrega de la dádiva para realizar un acto propio de sus funciones a los otros coimputados del proceso” (Cf.f.175372 del tomo XLII del expediente), ya que el artículo 345 del Código Penal vigente a la fecha de los hechos, no contemplaba la acción típica de “prometer” y de los términos “ dar” u “ ofrecer” no era posible sostener, semántica ni legalmente la inclusión del vocablo “promesa ”, sin infringir el principio de legalidad criminal. Con todo, una posición contraria es sostenida en el voto 2004-0451, mencionado, en el cual dentro de los alcances del artículo 345, vigente al momento de los hechos, se incluye bajo el término “dar”, las acepciones de “proponer”, “ofrecer” y “prometer” (Cf.f.175374 del tomo XLII del expediente), criterio que esgrimen como correcto y sobre el que peticionan la integración de la unificación de la jurisprudencia de la Sala, a fin que se interpreten los alcances del tipo penal de la penalidad del corruptor (Cf.f.175377 del tomo XLII del expediente). Aparte, sostienen que la sentencia recurrida absuelve a Valverde Acosta por una razón adicional errónea: la falta de acreditación de una codelincuencia de los funcionarios públicos participantes, según es posible desprender del folio 174523, del tomo XLII del expediente, cuando se consigna que: “…como se ha resuelto en relación con los otros encartados, no se ha podido determinar cuál es la acción concreta que tenía que desplegar, o si las dádivas fueron como premio por un acto cumplido. En otras palabras, existe un efecto favorecedor a las posiciones jurídicas de Edgar Valverde en cuanto a la indeterminación de los hechos acusados a los presuntos afectados por el acto corruptor, que indudablemente deben concurrir a producir la nulidad del fallo y declarar la absolutoria (Ver folio 174523 del expediente principal)…”(Cf.f.175376 del tomo XLII del votos 0256-1987 y 01475-99, en los que se sostuvo, respectivamente, que la penalidad del corruptor no supone, para su consumación, un acuerdo de voluntades entre el corruptor y el funcionario público corrompido; ni menos que deba existir para la acreditación del tipo penal, la codelincuencia del funcionario público o la tradición de la cosa, de forma que, al tratarse del cohecho activo de un “tipo de imperfecta ejecución”, en el que: “… basta el mero ofrecimiento o aceptación, puesto que la materialización del cohecho propio o impropio, no pertenece al tipo, resultando improcedentes los argumentos esbozados en el fallo impugnado para absolver al encartado Valverde Acosta por los delitos de penalidad del corruptor que se le han atribuido…”(Cf.f.175377 del tomo XLII del expediente). En definitiva, peticionan que la Sala Tercera asuma la posición defendida por el Ministerio Público en la unificación de la jurisprudencia a través de los fallos 0256-1987 y 01475-99, supra citados y como perjuicio, exteriorizan un menoscabo a las pretensiones fiscales, debido a que aún cuando se acreditaron los hechos que demostraban la tipicidad requerida por el antiguo artículo 345, se absolvió a Valverde Acosta por cuatro delitos de penalidad de corruptor, siendo que como pretensión esbozan el mantenimiento de la sentencia condenatoria dictada por el Tribunal de Juicio a través de una correcta interpretación conforme a derecho corresponda. La queja se declara con lugar. Antes de resolver el reclamo planteado por el ente fiscal, se hace necesario realizar algunas consideraciones con respecto al historial del tipo penal de la penalidad de corruptor contemplado en el antiguo artículo 345 del Código Penal, que en su redacción original establecía: “…Las penas establecidas en los cinco artículos anteriores son aplicables al que diere o permitiere al funcionario público una dádiva o la ventaja indebida”, siendo que nuestros Tribunales de Justicia, desde la entrada en vigencia del Código Penal y hasta el voto 461-91, de las quince horas catorce minutos, del veintisiete de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y uno, de la Sala Constitucional, habían interpretado que dentro de las acciones comprendidas por dicha norma, se encontraba el verbo “prometiere”, en el tanto, parecía un error de redacción de la norma, haber consignado “permitiere” en lugar de “ prometiere”. Sin embargo, en el año 1991, a propósito de un recurso de hábeas corpus, la Sala Constitucional tuvo la oportunidad de retomar el tema, descartando en esa interpretación un error material legislativo del verbo “permitiere ” por “prometiere”, para establecer finalmente que ambos términos no constituían sinónimos ni podían ser utilizados por los Juzgadores de manera equivalente sin violentar el principio de legalidad. En esa época, la Sala Constitucional, en lo que interesa, estableció a propósito de la supuesta similitud de los verbos “permitiere” y “ prometiere”, que: “…El artículo 39 de la Constitución Política consagra el principio de legalidad en materia penal, principio rector e inspirador de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. En virtud de él la única fuente creadora de los delitos y la de las penas es la ley. En esta materia queda excluida la analogía y la costumbre, careciendo los Tribunales de facultades para considerar como delictivos hechos distintos a los tipificados en la ley, de tal forma que cualquier conducta que no sea subsumible en ella, será impune; aún cuando ésta sea muy grave. Consecuentemente lesiona el principio de legalidad una interpretación judicial que abarque conductas no especialmente descritas en la ley. Señala el accionante que en la causa No. 104-3-91 que se sigue contra su defendido en el Juzgado Sexto de Instrucción de San José, se ha encuadrado mal la conducta del imputado, pues el artículo 343 del Código Penal habla de "permitiere" y no de "prometiere" como debería de ser para tener por configurada como típica la conducta del señor B.O. Veamos como el imputado de común acuerdo con el co-imputado A.C. se pusieron en contacto con oficiales del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, a quienes prometieron una dádiva sí se lograba la alteración de las alcoholemias de su hijo imputado en otra causa por el delito de Homicidio Culposo. El muestra que el artículo 343 fue aprobado y se ordenó publicar con el verbo "permitiere" sin que haya habido ninguna reforma legislativa referente a ese artículo. Por lo expuesto es criterio de esta Sala Constitucional que el artículo 343 del Código Penal no se puede interpretar sin lesionar el principio de legalidad constitucional, en el sentido de que lo que el legislador quiso decir no es "prometiere" sino "permitiere"…” ( Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto 461-91, de las quince horas catorce minutos, del veintisiete de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y uno. Ell suplido es nuestro). A raíz del anterior fallo, la prohibición de equiparar “permitir” por “prometer" se mantuvo como el criterio dominante en las resoluciones emitidas por la Sala Tercera, al tenor del artículo 13 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional. Empero, para el año 1995, esta Sala de Casación, a propósito de la impugnación incoada por el Ministerio Público, en el mismo caso que dio pie al voto 461-91, de las quince horas catorce minutos, del veintisiete de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y uno, de la Sala Constitucional, realizó un nuevo examen de la cuestión, solo que ahora desde una perspectiva diferente: si bien para este ente jurisdiccional, el término “prometer” jamás podría equipararse al verbo “ permitir”, según los designios de la Sala Constitucional, bajo el principio de legalidad, la norma del artículo 345 también presentaba el verbo “dar”, mismo que dentro de sus acepciones, sí contenía la acción de “ prometer”, de modo que, a marcos fácticos que contuvieran en su descripción la mencionada acción delictiva, si podía aplicarse el numeral mencionado. En aquella oportunidad, la Sala Tercera, con integración de los Magistrados Alfonso Chaves Ramírez, Joaquín Vargas Gené, Rafael Medaglia Gómez, José Luis Quesada Fonseca y Hernán Vega Miranda, sostuvo: “… Esta Sala de Casación conviene con la Sala Constitucional en que, respecto al artículo 343 del Código Penal, no es legítimo modificar el tipo penal mediante la substitución del verbo "permitiere" por "prometiere", porque ello contraviene la función garantizadora del tipo y violenta el principio de legalidad. Sin embargo, el reclamo incoado por la Licda. S.M. es atendible, pues las razones que aduce para motivarlo son valederas y en forma alguna contravienen los términos de la resolución en comentario de la Sala Constitucional. En efecto, el análisis de la Sala Constitucional -con excepción de la nota del Magistrado Piza Escalante- es meramente formal, no se extiende más allá de la mera literalidad del tipo legal, es decir no comprende el análisis semántico del mismo. Dicho en otras palabras, la Sala Constitucional estableció que no es legítimo leer "prometiere" donde dice "permitiere", pero lo cierto es que no estableció nada respecto a la significación de las palabras que componen el tipo penal: no nos dice qué debemos entender o qué no debemos entender de esas palabras. Y lo que la recurrente sostiene es, precisamente, que cuando la Sala Constitucional establece que no se puede sustituir el verbo "permitiere" por la palabra "prometiere", no está excluyendo el "ofrecimiento" o la "promesa" como posible contenido semántico de la palabra "diere" consignada en el referido numeral del Código Penal. La consulta de diversos diccionarios da la razón a la impugnante. Así, la vigésimo primera edición del Diccionario de Lengua Española (1992), elaborado por la Real Academia Española, señala que la tercera acepción de uso corriente de la palabra "dar" es "proponer, indicar". Esta misma significación es avalada por otros diccionarios comunes (véase, por ejemplo, el Vol. II de la edición de 1991 del Diccionario Enciclopédico Éxito, de la Editorial Océano), incluso algunos de ellos agregan la palabra "ofrecer" como sinónimo de "dar" (así, los diccionarios Pequeño Larousse Ilustrado, Ediciones Larousse, 1994, p. 316 y el Diccionario Abreviado de la Lengua Española, Vox, Bibliograf S.A., pág. 146) y aún otro dice que "dar" es "proponer: dar una idea" (Diccionario Práctico Español Moderno, Ediciones Larousse, México, 1983, pág. 148), de tal forma que debe convenirse con la impugnante en que quien promete, ofrece o propone a un funcionario público una dádiva, presente o futura, para que este haga un acto contrario a sus deberes (o incurra en cualquiera de las hipótesis de los artículos 338 a 342 del Código Penal), adecua su conducta a la hipótesis prevista y sancionada en el artículo 343 del Código Penal, independientemente de que el funcionario público acepte o rechace la dádiva o ventaja indebida, e independientemente de que el objeto le haya sido exhibido, le haya sido entregado o puesto bajo su posesión o mera tenencia, pues la Penalidad del corruptor (cohecho activo) no supone para su consumación la codelincuencia del funcionario público ni la tradición de la cosa, en tanto la sola conducta del corruptor descrita en el tipo legal es idónea para poner en peligro el bien jurídico tutelado, que no es otra cosa que el sano y normal funcionamiento y prestigio de la administración pública a través de la corrección e integridad de sus empleados o servidores, así lo ha entendido nuestra jurisprudencia: ...lo que la ley ampara es el correcto desempeño del cargo por el funcionario frente a la Administración Pública, sustrayéndolo a toda costa, en aras del cumplimiento de las obligaciones que le conciernen, de la venalidad» (Sala Tercera, V-256-F de las 9:40 horas del 25 de setiembre de 1987) (…) Excluir las promesas, ofrecimientos o propuestas de dádivas o ventajas indebidas como contenido posible de la acción típica prevista en el artículo 343 del Código Penal, no sólo niega el significado común de las palabras utilizadas en el tipo legal, sino que además atenta contra la inteligencia del ordenamiento jurídico, ya que configura un fraude a la ley, toda vez que así además se infringiría el espíritu de la norma (cfr. el artículo 20 del Título Preliminar del Código Civil)…” (Ver en igual sentido, Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto 183-F-95, de las once horas veinte minutos, del veinticuatro de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco. El suplido es nuestro), siendo que dicha posición fue reiterada años después, por esta misma Sala Tercera, en el voto 2004-00451, de las doce horas, del siete de mayo de dos mil cuatro, con la integración de los Magistrados Daniel González, Jesús Alberto Ramírez, José Manuel Arroyo y los Magistrados Suplentes Ronald Salazar y Alfredo Chirino. En aquella oportunidad, al resolverse una petición de absolutoria incoada por el Ministerio Público, se determinó que: “….Estima esta Sala que al licenciado G.M. no le asiste razón: En primer lugar, debe decirse que es cierto que la Sala Constitucional advirtió en la resolución Nº 461-91 de las 15:14 horas del 27 de febrero de 1991 que no era admisible, desde el punto de vista constitucional, la interpretación judicial según la cual en el artículo 345 (la sentencia de ese Despacho se refiere al artículo 343 del Código Penal, pero es el mismo en el que se regula la penalidad del corruptor; lo que sucede es que la numeración actual es producto de una reforma posterior a la emisión del fallo que recién se mencionó) debe leerse “prometiere” en lugar de “permitiere”. Así, en el texto legal sólo es posible leer “permitiere” donde está escrita tal palabra (por ello, resulta errado el criterio del a quo, según el cual la Sala Constitucional equiparó esta palabra con “prometiere”, pues eso es precisamente lo que consideró inconstitucional ese órgano). Lo que sucede es que si bien es cierto los verbos contemplados en el artículo 345 del Código Penal son “dar” y “prometer”, lo cierto es que “ofrecer” sí está cubierto por ellos, no por el verbo “prometer”, sino por el verbo “dar”. Así las cosas, queda claro que aunque la Sala Constitucional haya resuelto que es inconstitucional leer “prometiere” donde dice “permitiere”, lo cierto es que nunca delimitó los alcances del verbo “dar” y dentro de éste se enmarca el “ofrecer” la dádiva. Ese criterio sigue manteniéndose hoy día, pues aunque la penalidad del corruptor no se regula en el artículo 343 del Código Penal sino en el artículo 345 del mismo cuerpo normativo, el texto legal sigue siendo el mismo. Además, aún hoy la Real Academia Española acepta que el verbo “dar” significa, en su tercera acepción, “ofrecer materia para algo”, por lo que la cita que se hizo en 1995 de la vigésimo primera edición del Diccionario de la Real Academia Española (de 1992) sigue estando acorde con lo que se indica en la vigésima segunda edición del mismo, publicada en el 2001. Por todo lo expuesto, el criterio del licenciado G.M. no es de recibo para esta Sala…” (El suplido es nuestro). Ahora bien, aunque el criterio externado en las sentencias 183-F-95 y 2004-00451, dominó en posteriores fallos de la misma Sala Tercera, debe reconocerse que la controversia fue finalizada, con la incorporación del artículo 1 de la Ley No.8630, publicada en la Gaceta No.33, el quince de febrero del dos mil ocho, que derogó el artículo 343 bis y reformó la norma del artículo 345, ambas del Código Penal, ya que con dicha reforma la redacción del mencionado artículo 345 sufrió la incorporación del verbo “ prometer” como parte de las acciones típicas del delito de penalidad del corruptor. Sin embargo, a pesar de la mencionada reforma legal, también debe advertirse que la posición de esta Sala Tercera, sobre todo para aquellos casos cometidos antes del año dos mil ocho, se ha conservado invariable. Es hasta la emisión del fallo 2012-2550 ahora cuestionado, en que Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, bajo la integración de los Jueces Alfredo Chirino, Jorge Arce y Sandra Zúñiga, que sostiene una tesis totalmente opuesta a la mantenida en el voto 2004-00451, de las doce horas, del siete de mayo de dos mil cuatro, de esta Sala. En esta segunda sentencia, en oposición evidente al voto 2004-00451 de esta Sala, se declaró la atipicidad de los hechos atribuidos al coimputado Valverde Acosta por la falta de descripción en el tipo penal de penalidad del corruptor del término “prometiere” , cuando en lo que interesa se estableció: “… En efecto, no puede dársele a la palabra “permitiere” la aplicación jurídico penal como si dijera “prometiere”, pues esto cambia el sentido de la prohibición. El principio de legalidad criminal, contemplado en el artículo 39 constitucional y en el artículo primero del Código Penal, exigen del juez un gran cuidado de no asumir funciones de legislador, las cuales bien se producirían, por ejemplo, a través de enmendar eventuales errores en la publicación de una ley, o promover lecturas de la estructura del tipo que resulten aberrantes desde el uso convencional de los términos. Intentar una lectura, por ejemplo, del verbo “dar” a partir de rebuscadas elaboraciones semánticas, que pudieran apartar la correcta interpretación del término del entendimiento convencional de dicho verbo, podría llevar a una sustitución del objetivo punitivo de la ley penal, que tiene como objetivo ser comprendida por los destinatarios de la norma, y comprendida de tal manera que sea acatada la prohibición. Así las cosas, entender la palabra “dar” como si fuere “prometer” u “ofrecer” es una interpretación que contraría el principio de legalidad, no sólo por dar a la interpretación semántica un giro que se aparta del uso convencional de dicho término, como porque implica extender el ámbito de cobertura del tipo penal más allá de donde los límites de lo punible lo permite. Hacerlo sería incurrir en una interpretación extensiva de los contenidos del tipo penal que se encuentra prohibida por la Constitución Política, que se inspira en varios siglos de construcción de las garantías penales que han sido desarrolladas para impedir este tipo de actuaciones judiciales, que afectan la seguridad jurídica de los ciudadanos y ciudadanas de un Estado Democrático y Social de Derecho como es el costarricense, según la lectura programática del artículo 1 de la Constitución Política…”(Cf.f.174521 vto a 174522 del tomo XLI del jurisprudenciales opuestas entre sí, resta por determinar -atendiendo a las facultades que el artículo 468 inciso a) del Código Procesal Penal le otorga a esta Sala Tercera en la unificación de los criterios jurisprudenciales-, la posición jurisprudencial que mantienen los suscritos Magistradas y Magistrados, conllevando a determinar que el criterio que sigue esta integración es el vertido por esta Sala, en los votos 183-F-95,de las once horas con veinte minutos, del veinticuatro de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco y 2004-00451, de las doce horas, del siete de mayo de dos mil cuatro, ya que si bien la resolución 461-91, de las quince horas con catorce minutos, del veintisiete de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y uno, de la Sala Constitucional supra citado, impide asemejar los términos “permitiere” y “prometiere”, es lo cierto, que como parte del significado del verbo “dar” contenido en la descripción del tipo, pueden considerarse también como conductas prohibidas por la norma, las acepciones que contempla ese acto, dentro de las que destacan, sin duda, las acciones de “ofrecer” y “ prometer”, con lo que cualquier conducta especificada bajo ese actuar delictivo no podría ser considerada atípica, como erróneamente lo estableció el Tribunal de Apelación en el fallo impugnado. Por último, con relación a la falta de acreditación de una codelincuencia de los funcionarios públicos participantes como motivo adicional para absolver al justiciable Valverde Acosta, es claro, que esta Sala en el apartado XVIII de esta resolución, ante la verificación de divergencias entre los antecedentes jurisprudenciales 0256-1987 y 01475-99 y aquellos criterios esbozados en la sentencia 2012-2550, cuestionada, asumió la posición contenida en los primeros, en tanto para la acreditación del delito de penalidad del corruptor, en la que se estableció que no es necesaria la verificación de las conductas supuestamente realizadas por los funcionarios públicos a los que se pretende corromper, bastando únicamente la acreditación de las acciones “diere” o “ permitiere”. Por otra parte, en cuanto a la pretensión fiscal expuesta al interponer el presente reclamo, y consistente en que se mantenga la sentencia dictada por el Tribunal de Juicio en el particular, debe indicarse que esta Sala esta impedida legalmente para acoger tal gestión, debido a que los imputados y sus defensas técnicas, en la etapa ordinaria de Apelación, expusieron otros argumentos y agravios sobre este mismo tema, que deben ser resueltos en esa sede, bajo los postulados del derecho de defensa técnica y material. Por tales motivos, lo procedente es ordenar la nulidad de la resolución impugnada con respecto al imputado Edgar Valverde Acosta, para lo cual se dispone el reenvió en cuanto a este extremo y una nueva sustanciación conforme a derecho corresponda.”