Employer continuity between Banco de Costa Rica and BCR Corredora de SegurosContinuidad patronal entre el Banco de Costa Rica y BCR Corredora de Seguros

**III.- REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN):** The attorney of Banco de Costa Rica alleges that the plaintiff's right of action is time-barred (prescrito). In labor matters, the legal institute of negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa) establishes that, in general, obligations are extinguished by the mere passage of the time provided by the legal system, when the person who holds the enforceable right does not exercise it within the legally established period. The scholar [Nombre1] states that "All rights, and consequently all actions for their exercise arising from the employment contract, decay with the passage of time. It does not matter if they are inalienable rights or rights over which one cannot validly dispose; inalienability and imprescriptibility are different legal institutes; (...) but once the statute of limitations (prescripción) – or the expiration (caducidad) – has occurred, the right has already been extinguished (...) And the prohibition of waiver refers to the express declaratory act or conduct that one is exercising 'the right to waive the right,' not to the mere inaction that is the basis of the statute of limitations (prescripción). (...)" ([Nombre1] , . *Derecho del Trabajo*. Madrid: Civitas Ediciones, S.L., 2002, p. 520). The statute of limitations (prescripción) finds its foundation in the need for society to establish clear rules for legal transactions, so that they develop within a framework of certainty and security for all participating agents, without leaving issues or matters pending for eternity (see Palomeque López, M. C. and Álvarez de la Rosa, M. (1999). *Derecho del Trabajo*. Madrid: Editorial Centro de Estudios Ramón Areces, S.A., (7th Ed., p. 367 et seq.). In our positive law, the Tenth Title of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) regulates the statute of limitations (prescripción) of workers' labor rights. As relevant here, section 602 regulates the statute of limitations period (plazo de prescripción) for claiming rights arising from employment contracts, which is set at one year (amended by Article 1 of Ley n° 8520, of June 20, 2006), and section 604, added by Article 2 of the cited law, sets forth the causes for interruption of the statute of limitations (prescripción) in labor matters. In the case before us, the appellant argues that the statute of limitations (prescripción) on the claim operated because the employment relationship that Ms. [Nombre2] maintained with Banco de Costa Rica between May 26, 1995, and May 27, 2009, ended by her voluntary resignation, and as of May 28, 2009, a new hiring began with the Corredora de Seguros; and emphasizes that the bank and the company, despite belonging to the same financial conglomerate, are independent and therefore are different employers. In short, in its view, as there was no continuity of employment (continuidad patronal), the right claimed—which derives from the first employment relationship—was barred by the statute of limitations (prescripción). However, both to determine whether the fatal term of the statute of limitations (prescripción) actually elapsed or not, and to ascertain whether it was appropriate to demand the plaintiff return the unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía) paid to her in May 2009, it is necessary to verify if there was continuity of employment (continuidad patronal). That is, whether Banco de Costa Rica and BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. are in reality the same employer. To this end, the legal nature of the aforementioned financial institution and that of the company must be analyzed. The Political Constitution establishes in its Article 188: “*The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of governance. Their directors are liable for their management.*” Likewise, in the following article (189), it provides: “*The following are autonomous institutions: 1)* ***The State Banks*** *; / 2) The State insurance institutions; /3) Those established by this Constitution, and the new bodies that the Legislative Assembly may create by a vote of no less than two-thirds of its total members.*” (Emphasis added by the drafter). For its part, the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional) stipulates in section 2: “*The State banks listed in the preceding article are autonomous institutions of public law, with their own legal personality and independence in administrative matters. They are subject to the law in matters of governance and must act in close collaboration with the Executive Branch, coordinating their efforts and activities. Decisions on the functions placed under their competence may only emanate from their respective boards of directors. In accordance with the foregoing, each bank shall have its own responsibility in the execution of its functions, which imposes on the members of the Board of Directors the obligation to act according to their own judgment in the direction and administration of the bank, within the provisions of the Constitution, the pertinent laws and regulations, and the principles of technical expertise, as well as the obligation to be liable for their management, fully and inescapably, in accordance with Articles 27 and 28 of this law.*” Among the State banks referred to in this article is Banco de Costa Rica. In light of the cited provisions, it is inferred that these entities are part of the state sector, insofar as they have been designated as autonomous institutions. On the other hand, and in relation to BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A., it was created under Article 55 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores), No. 7732 of December 17, 1997. That article provides as follows: “*Article 55.- Incorporation of companies. The National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) and each of the public banks are hereby authorized to incorporate respective companies, under the terms indicated in the preceding article, for the sole purpose of operating their own brokerage house and carrying out, exclusively, the activities indicated in Article 56. Likewise, they are authorized so that each one may incorporate a mutual fund management company and a pension operator, under the terms established in this law and in Law No. 7523 of July 7, 1995, as applicable. / In such cases, the brokerage houses, the mutual fund management companies, and the pension operators must keep their operations and their accounting completely independent from the institution to which they belong. This provision shall equally apply to private brokerage houses, in relation to their partners and with other companies belonging to the same economic interest group. /The State and public institutions and enterprises may acquire securities, make their investments, or place their issuances through any brokerage house, without prejudice to the applicable provisions on public procurement.*” As can be seen, the transcribed provision authorizes public banks and the Instituto Nacional de Seguros to incorporate corporations in three cases: to operate a brokerage house, to operate complementary pension plans, and to manage mutual funds. The purpose pursued by the aforementioned provision is precisely to allow the creation of independent legal entities, so that public entities can separate part of their assets, as well as the respective accounting, in order to maintain transparent resource management, essential in the open, competitive markets in which such companies participate. Regarding the nature of public enterprises, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has stated: “*Through the public enterprise, the Public Administration, centralized or decentralized, intervenes, directly or indirectly, in a sector of the market or the economy by developing an industrial, commercial, or agricultural activity for the purpose of satisfying public purposes.* **III.- REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN):** The legal representative of Banco de Costa Rica alleges that the plaintiff's right to bring an action is time-barred. In labor matters, the legal institution of negative prescription (prescripción negativa) establishes that, in general, obligations are extinguished by the mere passage of time provided for by the legal system, when the person holding the enforceable right does not exercise it within the legally established period. The scholar [Name1] states that *"All rights, and consequently all actions for their enforcement derived from the employment contract, decay over time. It does not matter whether they are non-waivable rights or rights over which one cannot validly dispose; non-waivability and imprescriptibility are different legal institutions; (...) but once the statute of limitations (prescripción) – or the lapse (caducidad) – has occurred, the right has already been extinguished (...) And it is that the prohibition of waiver refers to the express act or conduct declaring that one exercises 'the right to waive the right,' not to the mere inaction that is the basis of the statute of limitations (prescripción). (...)"* ([Name1], . *Derecho del Trabajo*. Madrid: Civitas Ediciones, S.L., 2002, p. 520). The statute of limitations (prescripción) finds its basis in the need for society to establish clear rules for legal transactions, so that they develop within a framework of certainty and security for all participating agents, without leaving matters or issues pending for eternity (see Palomeque López, M. C. y Álvarez de la Rosa, M. (1999). *Derecho del Trabajo*. Madrid: Editorial Centro de Estudios Ramón Areces, S.A., 7th Ed., p. 367 et seq.). In our positive law, Title Ten of the Código de Trabajo regulates matters concerning the statute of limitations (prescripción) for workers' labor rights. As relevant here, Article 602 regulates the prescription period for claiming rights arising from employment contracts, which it sets at one year (amended by Article 1 of Ley n° 8520, of June 20, 2006), and Article 604, added by Article 2 of the cited law, provides for the causes of interruption of the statute of limitations (prescripción) in labor matters. In the case before us, the appellant argues that the statute of limitations (prescripción) on the claim occurred because the employment relationship that Mrs. [Name2] maintained with Banco de Costa Rica between May 26, 1995, and May 27, 2009, ended by her voluntary resignation, and as of May 28, 2009, she began a new contracting with the insurance broker; and he emphasizes that the bank and the company, despite belonging to the same financial conglomerate, are independent and therefore are distinct employers. In short, in his view, since there was no continuity of employer, the right sought—and which derives from the first employment relationship—was time-barred.

Now, both to determine whether the fatal term of the statute of limitations (prescripción) actually elapsed, and to elucidate whether it was appropriate to request the plaintiff to restitute the unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía) that was paid to her in May 2009, it is necessary to verify whether there was continuity of employer. That is, whether Banco de Costa Rica and BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. are in reality the same employer. For this, the legal nature of the aforementioned financial entity and that of the company must be analyzed. The Constitución Política establishes in its Article 188: *"The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of governance. Their directors are responsible for their management."* Likewise, the following article (189) provides: *"The following are autonomous institutions: 1) The Banks of the State; / 2) The insurance institutions of the State; /3) Those established by this Constitution, and the new bodies that the Legislative Assembly may create by a vote of no less than two-thirds of its total members."* The foundation of public initiative or intervention in the economy or the market finds support in Article 50 of the Constitución Política, which establishes that "The State shall procure the greatest well-being for all the inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth," and in the principles of solidarity and social justice. The public enterprise (Empresa pública), in addition to sharing the elements of any enterprise, such as the professional, habitual, and continuous conduct of a line of business, is characterized because the entrepreneur (the holder or owner of an enterprise) is a Public Administration—central or decentralized—which maintains command control and pursues a for-profit objective as an instrument to satisfy certain public interests or purposes. Consequently, the public enterprise (Empresa pública) has a subjective element, which is the participation of a public entity, and an objective element, which is the development of a business activity for the achievement of public purposes. Regarding the reasons that justify the public enterprise (Empresa pública), doctrine has offered several, such as market failures or imperfections in the competitive system, the lack of industrial or commercial enterprises of a certain magnitude and stability, the existence of natural monopolies, the production of public goods and services, the need to redistribute income, the existence of strategic sectors, etc." (Sentencia nº 1556 of 3:35 p.m. on February 7, 2007, of the Sala Constitucional.) (Emphasis supplied by the drafter). From the foregoing, it is corroborated that BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. constitutes a public enterprise (Empresa pública), that is, it is characterized by the provision of services in competition with other private parties and whose ownership—that of the public entity—is state-owned, since it is attached to the founding entity through the ownership of its shares. This also finds constitutional support, to the extent that Article 189 establishes that all insurance entities belonging to the State, from an organizational point of view, shall be autonomous institutions. It cannot be overlooked that, although the public enterprise (Empresa pública) under study is classified as "a sociedad anónima," under no circumstances could it be fully equated to the figure of private law since, as the Constitutional Body points out, it is nonetheless an instrument that the legislator has placed at the disposal of the autonomous entity for the achievement of its purposes (see in this regard resolution nº 6513-2002 of July 3, 2002).

In light of the considerations made, this Chamber concludes that there clearly was continuity of employer in the case under study. That is, despite the fact that the plaintiff was first hired by Banco de Costa Rica and later through the insurance broker, the employer never ceased to be Banco de Costa Rica, the entity for which the plaintiff currently works. Consequently, it is irrefutable that the fatal period of the statute of limitations (prescripción) invoked by the appellant did not occur.

**IV.- REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF THE REIMBURSEMENT OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT (AJUSTE DE CESANTÍA) DEMANDED FROM THE PLAINTIFF:** The plaintiff worked for Banco de Costa Rica starting May 26, 1995, holding the position of Oficial de Seguros 2 in the Insurance Office of that entity. On February 7, 2009, BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. was created as a sociedad anónima, under the protection of Transitory Provision V of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, Ley 8653, which provides for the opening of the insurance monopoly; hence, the functions performed by the plaintiff were transferred to that subsidiary. For that reason, Mrs. Johens Vargas submitted her resignation covered by Article 29, subsection b) of the Second Collective Labor Agreement in force at the bank, and was paid the sum of ₡5,200,112.00 for unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía). She was subsequently hired by BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A., whereupon the bank requested the reimbursement of the unemployment adjustment (ajuste de cesantía). This request was made based on Article 586, subsection b) of the Código de Trabajo. Consequently, the crux of the matter consists of determining whether that article was applicable in the plaintiff's case.

It should be noted that the Código de Trabajo, in its Title VIII, contains special provisions for servants of the State and its institutions. In this regard, Article 585 defines who holds the status of worker of the State or its Institutions, and Article 586 determines the rights of those public officials, establishing that they would be recipients of the benefits contained in Articles 28, 29, and 31 of that normative body. In that sense, Article 585 stipulates: *"A worker of the State or of its Institutions is any person who provides to the former or to the latter a material service; intellectual service; or both, by virtue of an appointment issued by a competent authority or official, or by the fact of appearing on the budget lists or on the payroll payments. Any of these latter circumstances substitutes, for all legal purposes, the written employment contract."* Further on, the following article provides, in what is relevant: *"(…) b) Servants who avail themselves of the benefits of this article may not hold remunerated positions in any dependency of the State, for a period equal to that represented by the sum received as unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía). If within that period they should come to accept one, they shall be obligated to reimburse to the Public Treasury the sums received for that concept, deducting those representing the wages they would have earned during the term they remained unemployed (…)."* Now, it is necessary to clarify the scope of that norm, that is, to establish who its recipients are. In accordance with Article 1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, it is constituted by the State and the other public entities, each with its own legal personality and capacity under public and private law; in such a way that, in their actions, their organs and entities may divest themselves of their powers of authority and carry out a non-public activity, as if they were a private party, without this implying that they cease to belong to its conformation. Now, Articles 111 and following indicate who are public officials, and Article 112 establishes that those who provide services to State enterprises shall be considered as public officials for all purposes, despite the fact that they do not exercise a public function strictly speaking, nor one governed by Public Law. Thus, regardless of the activity they perform, they belong to the Public Administration. In this line of reasoning, the Chamber considers that the recipients of Article 586 of the Código de Trabajo are public servants, in a broad sense and without any distinction, that is, those of the State and of its Institutions, since the norm makes no exception in this regard. It would not be feasible to interpret restrictively a norm that seeks the protection of public funds and that prevents vices or abuses that could arise from instant re-entry into public service. In other words, it does not matter whether it concerns the central or decentralized administration.

As indicated in the previous recital, according to Article 189 of the Magna Carta and Article 2 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, Banco de Costa Rica is part of the state sector, insofar as it has been designated as an autonomous institution. For its part, BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. constitutes a public enterprise (Empresa pública) whose shareholding ownership rests with that financial entity and cannot be seen as an independent sociedad anónima since, as explained above, it was created as an instrument at the disposal of the bank for the achievement of its purposes. Consequently, based on the state nature of the entity for which they work, the employees of state banks are workers of the State and therefore, Article 586, subsection b) of the Código de Trabajo is applicable to them (a circumstance within which the plaintiff finds herself). For further support, the appellant cites sentencia nº 2014-15882 of 9:20 a.m. on September 26, 2014, of the Sala Constitucional, where the case of the workers of the company BCR Valores S.A. is analyzed. In that pronouncement, it is explained that those officials, by not participating in the public management of the Administration, are governed by common labor law, that is, the regulations of the Civil Service Statute are not applicable to them, but rather those of the Código de Trabajo. In the case sub litem, the norm on which the reimbursement of the amount paid for the unemployment adjustment (ajuste de auxilio de cesantía) was based forms part precisely of that code.

In light of the reasoning provided, the Chamber considers that the appellant is correct, and for that reason, the decisions of the preceding instances must be revoked, since Banco de Costa Rica was entitled to request from the plaintiff the reimbursement of the amount paid, given that she continues to provide her services to an entity, be it a public entity or public enterprise (Empresa pública) of the administrative organization, and therefore, upon re-entering to perform functions for this enterprise, she was required to return the amount received for unemployment (cesantía), since it is the same employer to whom she is again providing her services." (Emphasis supplied by the drafter). For its part, the Organic Law of the National Banking System stipulates in article 2: “The State banks enumerated in the preceding article are autonomous institutions under public law, with their own legal personality and independence in administrative matters. They are subject to the law in matters of government and must act in close collaboration with the Executive Branch, coordinating their efforts and activities. Decisions on the functions placed under their competence may only emanate from their respective boards of directors. In accordance with the foregoing, each bank shall have its own responsibility in the execution of its functions, which imposes on the members of the Board of Directors the obligation to act in accordance with their own judgment in the direction and administration of the bank, within the provisions of the Constitution, the pertinent laws and regulations, and the principles of sound practice, as well as the obligation to answer for their management, in a total and inescapable manner, in accordance with articles 27 and 28 of this law.” Among the State banks referred to in this article is the Banco de Costa Rica. In light of the cited provisions, it is inferred that these entities are part of the state sector, insofar as they have been designated as autonomous institutions. On the other hand, and in relation to BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A., it was created under the protection of article 55 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law, No. 7732 of December 17, 1997. That provision states the following: “Article 55.- Incorporation of companies. The Instituto Nacional de Seguros and each of the public banks are hereby authorized to incorporate respective companies, under the terms indicated in the preceding article, for the sole purpose of operating their own brokerage house (puesto de bolsa) and carrying out, exclusively, the activities indicated in article 56. Likewise, they are authorized for each one to incorporate an investment fund management company (sociedad administradora de fondos de inversión) and a pension operator (operadora de pensiones), under the terms established in this law and in Law No. 7523 of July 7, 1995, as applicable. / In such cases, the brokerage houses, the investment fund management companies, and the pension operators must keep their operations and their accounting totally independent of the institution to which they belong. / This provision shall apply equally to private brokerage houses, in relation to their partners and to other companies belonging to the same economic interest group. / The State and public institutions and companies may acquire securities, make their investments, or place their issuances through any brokerage house, without prejudice to the applicable provisions on administrative contracting.” As can be seen, the transcribed provision authorizes public banks and the Instituto Nacional de Seguros to incorporate corporations (sociedades anónimas) in three scenarios: to operate a brokerage house, to operate complementary pension plans, and to manage investment funds. The purpose of the aforementioned provision is precisely to allow the creation of independent legal persons, with the aim that public entities can separate part of their assets, as well as the respective accounting, in order to maintain transparent resource management, which is indispensable in the open, competitive markets in which such companies participate. Regarding the nature of public enterprises (empresas públicas), the Constitutional Chamber has stated: “Through the public enterprise, the Public Administration, whether centralized or decentralized, intervenes, directly or indirectly, in a market or economic sector, developing an industrial, commercial, or agricultural activity for the purpose of satisfying public ends. The basis for public initiative or intervention in the economy or market finds support in article 50 of the Political Constitution, which establishes that ‘The State shall seek the greatest well-being for all the country's inhabitants, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth,’ and in the principles of solidarity and social justice. The public enterprise, in addition to sharing the elements of any enterprise, such as the development of a business activity in a professional, habitual, and continuous manner, is characterized by the fact that the entrepreneur (owner of an enterprise) is a Public Administration—centralized or decentralized—which maintains control of command and pursues a for-profit purpose as an instrument to satisfy certain public interests or ends. Consequently, the public enterprise has a subjective element, which is the participation of a public entity, and an objective element, which is the development of a business activity for the achievement of public ends. As for the reasons that justify the public enterprise, the doctrine has offered several, such as market failures or imperfections of the competitive system, the lack of industrial or commercial enterprises of a certain magnitude and stability, the existence of natural monopolies, the production of public goods and services, the need to redistribute income, the existence of strategic sectors, etc.” (Judgment No. 1556 of 15:35 hours on February 7, 2007, from the Constitutional Chamber.) (Emphasis supplied by the drafter). From the foregoing, it is corroborated that BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. constitutes a public enterprise, that is, it is characterized by the provision of services in competition with other private parties and whose ownership—that of the public entity—is state-owned, since it is linked to the founding entity through the ownership of shares. This also finds constitutional support, to the extent that article 189 establishes that all insurance entities belonging to the State, from an organizational point of view, shall be autonomous institutions. It cannot be overlooked that, although the public enterprise under study is classified as “a corporation,” under no concept could it be fully equated to the private-law figure, since, as the Constitutional Body points out, it is still an instrument that the legislature has placed at the disposal of the autonomous entity for the achievement of its ends (see in this regard resolution No. 6513-2002 of July 3, 2002). In light of the considerations made, this Chamber concludes that there clearly was employer continuity (continuidad patronal) in the case under study. That is, despite the fact that the plaintiff was first hired by the Banco de Costa Rica and subsequently through the insurance brokerage, the employer has never ceased to be the Banco de Costa Rica, the entity for which the plaintiff currently works. Consequently, it is irrefutable that the fatal prescription period invoked by the appellant has not occurred.

**IV.- ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE REIMBURSEMENT OF THE SEVERANCE ADJUSTMENT (AJUSTE DE CESANTÍA) DEMANDED FROM THE PLAINTIFF:** The plaintiff worked for the Banco de Costa Rica starting on May 26, 1995, holding the position of Insurance Officer 2 in the Insurance Office of that entity. On February 7, 2009, BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. was born as a corporation, under the protection of Transitory Provision V of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, Law 8653, which provides for the opening of the insurance monopoly; hence, the functions exercised by the plaintiff were transferred to that subsidiary. For that reason, Mrs. Johens Vargas submitted her resignation, covered by article 29, subsection b) of the Second Collective Bargaining Agreement (Segunda Convención Colectiva de Trabajo) in force at the bank, and was paid the sum of ₡5,200,112.00 as severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía). Subsequently, she was hired by BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A., whereupon the bank requested the reimbursement of the severance adjustment (ajuste de cesantía). Said request was made based on article 586, subsection b) of the Labor Code. Consequently, the crux of the matter is to determine whether that article was applicable in the plaintiff's case. It should be noted that the Labor Code, in its Title VIII, contains special provisions for servants of the State and its institutions. In this regard, article 585 defines who holds the status of worker for the State or its Institutions, and article 586 determines the rights of those public officials, establishing that they would be recipients of the benefits contained in articles 28, 29, and 31 of that normative body. In that sense, article 585 stipulates: “A worker for the State or its Institutions is any person who provides to the former or to the latter a material service, an intellectual service, or both, by virtue of an appointment issued by a competent authority or official, or by the fact of appearing on budget lists or payroll payments. Either of these latter circumstances substitutes, for all legal purposes, the written employment contract.” Further on, the following article provides, in the pertinent part: “(…) b) Servants who avail themselves of the benefits of this article may not hold paid positions in any State agency (dependencia del Estado) for a period equal to that represented by the sum received as severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía). If within that period they should accept one, they shall be obliged to reimburse the Public Treasury the sums received for that concept, deducting those representing the salaries they would have earned during the term they remained unemployed (…).” Now, it is necessary to specify the scope of that provision, i.e., to establish who its recipients are. In accordance with article 1 of the General Law of Public Administration, it is constituted by the State and the other public entities, each with its own legal personality and capacity under public and private law; in such a way that, in their actions, their organs and entities can divest themselves of their sovereign powers (potestades de imperio) and exercise a non-public activity, as if they were a private party, without this implying that they cease to belong to its structure. Now, articles 111 and following indicate who are public officials, and article 112 establishes that those who provide services to State enterprises (empresas del Estado) shall be considered as public officials for all purposes, even though they do not exercise a public function in the strict sense, nor one adhering to Public Law. Thus, regardless of the activity performed by them, they belong to the Public Administration. In this vein, the Chamber considers that the recipients of article 586 of the Labor Code are public servants, in a broad sense and without any distinction, that is, those of the State and its Institutions, since the provision makes no exception in this regard. It would not be feasible to interpret restrictively a provision that seeks the protection of public funds and prevents vices or abuses that could arise from instant re-entry into public service. In other words, it does not matter whether it concerns the centralized or decentralized administration. As indicated in the preceding recital, pursuant to article 189 of the Magna Carta and article 2 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System, the Banco de Costa Rica is part of the state sector, insofar as it has been designated as an autonomous institution. For its part, BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. constitutes a public enterprise whose share ownership rests with that financial entity, and it cannot be seen as an independent corporation since, as explained above, it was created as an instrument at the bank's disposal for the achievement of its ends. Consequently, based on the state nature of the entity for which they work, the employees of state banks are workers for the State and therefore article 586, subsection b) of the Labor Code is applicable to them (a circumstance in which the plaintiff finds herself). For greater abundance, the appellant cites judgment No. 2014-15882 of 9:20 hours on September 26, 2014, from the Constitutional Chamber, where the case of the workers of the company BCR Valores S.A. is analyzed. In that pronouncement, it is explained that those officials, since they do not participate in the public management of the Administration, are governed by common labor law, that is, the regulations of the Civil Service Statute are not applicable to them, but rather those of the Labor Code. In the case at hand, the provision on which the reimbursement of what was paid for severance assistance adjustment (ajuste de auxilio de cesantía) was based is precisely part of that code. In light of the reasoning made, the Chamber considers that the appellant is correct, and for that reason, what was resolved by the preceding instances must be revoked, since the Banco de Costa Rica was entitled to request from the plaintiff the reimbursement of what was paid, given that she continues to provide her services to an entity, be it a public entity or a public enterprise of the administrative organization, such that upon re-entering to exercise functions at this company, she had to return what she received as severance pay (cesantía), since it is the same employer to whom she is once again providing her services.”

“III.- EN CUANTO A LA PRESCRIPCIÓN: El apoderado del Banco de Costa Rica alega que el derecho de la actora para accionar se encuentra prescrito. En materia laboral, el instituto jurídico de la prescripción negativa establece que, en general, las obligaciones se extinguen con sólo el transcurso del tiempo previsto por el ordenamiento jurídico, cuando quien tiene a su haber el derecho exigible, no lo ejerce dentro del plazo legalmente establecido. El tratadista [Nombre1] expresa que “Todos los derechos, y consiguientemente todas las acciones para su ejercicio derivados del contrato de trabajo, decaen en el transcurso del tiempo. No importa que se trate de derechos irrenunciables o sobre los que no pueda válidamente disponer; irrenunciabilidad e imprescriptibilidad son institutos jurídicos diferentes; (...) pero ocurrida la prescripción – o la caducidad-, el derecho se ha extinguido ya (...) Y es que la prohibición de renuncia se refiere al acto o conducta expreso declaratorio de que se ejercita “el derecho a renunciar al derecho”, no a la mera inacción que está en la base de la prescripción. (...)” ([Nombre1] , . Derecho del Trabajo. Madrid: Civitas Ediciones, S.L., 2002, p. 520). La prescripción encuentra su fundamento, en la necesidad de que la sociedad establezca reglas claras para los negocios jurídicos, de manera que se desarrollen en un marco de certeza y seguridad para todos los agentes participantes, sin dejar temas o asuntos pendientes hacia la eternidad (puede verse a Palomeque López, M. C. y Álvarez de la Rosa, M. (1999). Derecho del Trabajo. Madrid: Editorial Centro de Estudios Ramón Areces, S.A., (7ª. Ed., p. 367 s.s.). En nuestro derecho positivo, el Título Décimo del Código de Trabajo, regula lo referente a la prescripción de los derechos laborales de los trabajadores. En lo que interesa, el ordinal 602 regula el plazo de prescripción para el reclamo de los derechos provenientes de los contratos de trabajo, el que fija en un año (reformado por artículo 1° de la Ley n° 8520, del 20 de junio del 2006) y el 604 adicionado mediante el artículo 2 de la citada ley, dispone las causas de interrupción de la prescripción en materia laboral. En el caso que nos ocupa, la parte recurrente argumenta que operó la prescripción del reclamo en virtud de que el vínculo laboral que mantuvo la señora [Nombre2] con el Banco de Costa Rica entre el 26 de mayo de 1995 y el 27 de mayo de 2009 finalizó por su renuncia voluntaria y a partir del 28 de mayo de 2009 inició una nueva contratación con la Corredora de Seguros; y enfatiza en que el banco y la sociedad a pesar de pertenecer a un mismo conglomerado financiero son independientes y por ende se trata de distintos patronos. En pocas palabras, en su criterio, al no haber continuidad patronal el derecho pretendido -y que deriva de la primera relación laboral- prescribió. Ahora bien, tanto para determinar si efectivamente transcurrió o no el término fatal de la prescripción, como para dilucidar si era procedente solicitar a la actora la restitución del auxilio de cesantía que le fue cancelado en mayo de 2009, es necesario comprobar si existió continuidad patronal. Es decir, si el Banco de Costa Rica y BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A., son en realidad un mismo empleador. Para ello debe analizarse la naturaleza jurídica de la entidad financiera mencionada y la de la sociedad. La Constitución Política establece en su canon 188: “Las instituciones autónomas del Estado gozan de independencia administrativa y están sujetas a la ley en materia de gobierno. Sus directores responden por su gestión”. Asimismo en el numeral siguiente (189) se dispone: “Son instituciones autónomas: 1) Los Bancos del Estado; / 2) Las instituciones aseguradoras del Estado; /3) Las que esta Constitución establece, y los nuevos organismos que creare la Asamblea Legislativa por votación no menor de los dos tercios del total de sus miembros”. (Énfasis suplido por la redactora). Por su parte la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional estipula en el ordinal 2: “Los bancos del Estado enumerados en el artículo anterior son instituciones autónomas de derecho público, con personería jurídica propia e independencia en materia de administración. Están sujetos a la ley en materia de gobierno y deben actuar en estrecha colaboración con el Poder Ejecutivo, coordinando sus esfuerzos y actividades. Las decisiones sobre las funciones puestas bajo su competencia sólo podrán emanar de sus respectivas juntas directivas. De acuerdo con lo anterior, cada banco tendrá responsabilidad propia en la ejecución de sus funciones, lo cual impone a los miembros de la Junta Directiva la obligación de actuar conforme con su criterio en la dirección y administración del banco, dentro de las disposiciones de la Constitución, de las leyes y reglamentos pertinentes y de los principios de la técnica, así como la obligación de responder por su gestión, en forma total e ineludible, de acuerdo con los artículos 27 y 28 de esta ley.”. Dentro de los bancos del Estado a los que alude este artículo, se encuentra el Banco de Costa Rica. Al tenor de las normas expuestas se infiere que esos entes son parte del sector estatal, en el tanto se han designado como instituciones autónomas. Por otro lado y en relación con BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A., se tiene que ésta fue creada al amparo del artículo 55 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, Nº 7732 del 17 de diciembre de 1997. Ese canon dispone lo siguiente: “Artículo 55.- Constitución de sociedades. El Instituto Nacional de Seguros y cada uno de los bancos públicos quedarán autorizados para constituir sendas sociedades, en los términos indicados en el artículo anterior, con el fin único de operar su propio puesto de bolsa y realizar, exclusivamente, las actividades indicadas en el artículo 56. Asimismo, se autorizan para que cada uno constituya una sociedad administradora de fondos de inversión y una operadora de pensiones, en los términos establecidos en esta ley y en la Ley No. 7523 de 7 julio de 1995, según corresponda. / En tales casos, los puestos, las sociedades administradoras de fondos de inversión y las operadoras de pensiones, deberán mantener sus operaciones y su contabilidad totalmente independientes de la institución a la que pertenezcan. Esta disposición se aplicará igualmente a los puestos de bolsa privados, en relación con sus socios y con otras sociedades pertenecientes al mismo grupo de interés económico. /El Estado y las instituciones y empresas públicas podrán adquirir títulos, efectuar sus inversiones o colocar sus emisiones, por medio de cualquier puesto de bolsa, sin perjuicio de las disposiciones aplicables en materia de contratación administrativa.” Como se puede apreciar, la norma transcrita autoriza a los bancos públicos y al Instituto Nacional de Seguros para constituir sociedades anónimas en tres supuestos: para operar un puesto de bolsa, para operar planes de pensión complementaria y para administrar fondos de inversión. El objeto que persigue la norma aludida es, precisamente, la de permitir la creación de personas jurídicas independientes, con la finalidad de que los entes públicos puedan separar parte de su patrimonio, así como la contabilidad respectiva, a efecto de mantener una gestión transparente de recursos, indispensable en los mercados abiertos a la competencia en los que participan tales sociedades. Sobre la naturaleza de las empresas públicas, la Sala Constitucional ha manifestado: “Mediante la Empresa pública, la Administración Pública, central o descentralizada, interviene, de forma directa o indirecta, en un sector del mercado o de la economía desarrollando una actividad industrial, mercantil o agropecuaria con el propósito de satisfacer fines públicos. El fundamento de la iniciativa o intervención pública en la economía o el mercado, encuentra asidero en el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política al establecer que “El Estado procurará el mayor bienestar a todos los habitantes del país, organizando y estimulando la producción y el más adecuado reparto de la riqueza” y en los principios de solidaridad y justicia social. La Empresa pública, además de compartir los elementos de toda empresa, como lo son el desarrollo de un giro de forma profesional, habitual y continua, se caracteriza porque el empresario (titular o dueño de una empresa) es una Administración Pública –central o descentralizada-, la cual mantiene el control de mando, y persigue un fin de lucro como un instrumento para satisfacer determinados intereses o fines públicos. Consecuentemente, la Empresa pública tiene un elemento subjetivo que es la participación de un ente público y otro objetivo que es el desarrollo de una actividad empresarial para el logro de fines públicos. En cuanto a las razones que justifican la empresa pública, la doctrina ha ofrecido varias, tales como los fallos del mercado o imperfecciones del sistema competitivo, la carencia de empresas industriales o comerciales de cierta magnitud y estabilidad, la existencia de monopolios naturales, la producción de bienes y servicios públicos, la necesidad de redistribuir los ingresos, la existencia de sectores estratégicos, etc”. (Sentencia nº 1556 de las 15:35 horas del 7 de febrero de 2007 de la Sala Constitucional.) (Énfasis suplido por la redactora). De lo expuesto se corrobora que BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. constituye una empresa pública, es decir, que se caracteriza por la prestación de servicios en concurrencia con otros particulares y cuya titularidad -la del ente público- es estatal, esto por cuanto se encuentra adscrita al ente fundador por la titularidad de las acciones. Esto además encuentra asidero constitucional, en la medida en que el numeral 189 establece que todas las entidades aseguradoras que pertenezcan al Estado, desde el punto de vista organizacional, serán instituciones autónomas. No puede soslayarse que, a pesar de que la empresa pública bajo estudio es catalogada como “una sociedad anónima”, bajo ningún concepto podría equiparársele plenamente a la figura del derecho privado puesto que, tal y como lo apunta el Órgano Constitucional, no deja de ser un instrumento que el legislador a puesto a disposición del ente autónomo para la consecución de sus fines (ver en este sentido la resolución nº 6513-2002 del 3 de julio de 2002). A la luz de las consideraciones realizadas, esta Sala concluye que claramente existió una continuidad patronal en el caso bajo estudio. Es decir, a pesar de que la accionante fue contratada primero por el Banco de Costa Rica y posteriormente a través de la corredora de seguros, el empleador nunca ha dejado de ser el Banco de Costa Rica, entidad para la cual labora actualmente la accionante. Consecuentemente resulta irrebatible que no acaeció el plazo fatal de la prescripción que invoca el recurrente.

IV.- SOBRE LA PROCEDENCIA DEL REINTEGRO DE AJUSTE DE CESANTÍA EXIGIDO A LA ACTORA: La actora laboró para el Banco de Costa Rica a partir del 26 de mayo de 1995 ocupando el puesto de Oficial de Seguros 2 en la Oficina de Seguros de esa entidad. El 7 de febrero del 2009 nace BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A., como sociedad anónima, al amparo del transitorio V de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, Ley 8653, que dispone la apertura del monopolio de seguros; de ahí que las funciones ejercidas por la actora se trasladan a esa subsidiaria. Por ese motivo la señora Johens Vargas presentó su renuncia cobijada por el artículo 29 inciso b) de la Segunda Convención Colectiva de Trabajo vigente en el banco y le fue cancelada la suma de ¢5.200.112,00 por concepto de auxilio de cesantía. Posteriormente es contratada por BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. ante lo cual el banco le solicita el reintegro del ajuste cesantía. Dicho requerimiento se realizó con sustento en el artículo 586 inciso b) del Código de Trabajo. Consecuentemente el quid del asunto consiste en determinar si resultaba aplicable ese numeral en el caso de la accionante. Cabe acotar que el Código de Trabajo, en su Título VIII, contempla disposiciones especiales para los servidores del Estado y sus instituciones. Al respecto el canon 585 define quién ostenta la condición de trabajador del Estado o de sus Instituciones, y el 586 determina los derechos de esos funcionarios públicos, estableciendo que estos serían destinatarios de los beneficios contenidos en los artículos 28, 29 y 31 de ese cuerpo normativo. En ese sentido, el ordinal 585 estipula: “Trabajador del Estado o de sus Instituciones, es toda persona que preste a aquél o a éstas un servicio material; intelectual o de ambos géneros, en virtud del nombramiento que le fuere expedido por autoridad o funcionario competente, o por el hecho de figurar en las listas de presupuestos o en los pagos por planillas. Cualquiera de estas últimas circunstancias sustituye, para todos los efectos legales, al contrato escrito de trabajo”. Más adelante el numeral siguiente dispone en lo que interesa: “(…) b) Los servidores que se acojan a los beneficios de este artículo no podrán ocupar cargos remunerados en ninguna dependencia del Estado, durante un tiempo igual al representado por la suma recibida en calidad de auxilio de cesantía. Si dentro de ese lapso llegaren a aceptarlo, quedarán obligados a reintegrar al Tesoro Público las sumas percibidas por ese concepto, deduciendo aquellas que representen los salarios que habrían devengado durante el término que permanecieron cesantes (…)”. Ahora bien, es necesario precisar el alcance de esa norma, o sea establecer quiénes son sus destinatarios. De conformidadcon el numeral 1 de la Ley Generalde la Administración Pública está constituidaporel Estado y los demás entes públicos cada uno con personería jurídica propia y capacidad de derecho público y privado; de tal manera que, en su actuar pueden sus órganos y entes despojarse de suspotestades de imperio y ejercer una actividad no pública, como su fuese un particular, sin que ello implique que no continúe perteneciendo a la conformación de aquella. Ahora bien, en los numerales 111 y siguientes se indica quienes son funcionarios públicos, y en el artículo 112 se establece que aquellos que prestan labores a las empresas del Estado, serán considerados como funcionarios públicos para todos los efectos, pese a que ellos no ejercen una función pública de manera estricta, ni apegada al Derecho Público. De tal manera que, con independencia de la gestión realizada, por ellos, pertenecen a la Administración Pública. En ese orden de ideas, la Sala estima que los destinatarios del canon 586 del Código de Trabajo son los servidores públicos, en sentido amplio y sin distingo alguno, es decir aquellos del Estado y de sus Instituciones toda vez que la norma no hace salvedad alguna al respecto. No sería factible interpretar restrictivamente una norma que persigue la tutela de fondos públicos y que previene vicios o abusos que podrían suscitarse con el reingreso instantáneo al servicio público. En otras palabras no importa si se trata de la administración central o descentralizada. Tal y como se indicó en el considerando anterior, al tenor del artículo 189 de la Carta Magna y del 2 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, el Banco de Costa Rica es parte del sector estatal, en el tanto se ha designado como institución autónoma. Por su parte, BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. constituye una empresa pública cuya titularidad accionaria recae en esa entidad financiera y no puede verse como una sociedad anónima independiente toda vez que, como se explicara líneas arriba, fue creada como un instrumento a disposición del banco para la consecución de sus fines. Consecuentemente, partiendo de la naturaleza estatal del ente para el que laboran, los empleados de los bancos estatales son trabajadores del Estado y por ende les resulta aplicable el ordinal 586, inciso b) del Código de Trabajo (circunstancia dentro de la cual se encuentra la actora). A mayor abundamiento, el recurrente cita la sentencia nº 2014-15882 de las 9:20 horas del 26 de septiembre de 2014 de la Sala Constitucional donde se analiza el caso de los trabajadores de la sociedad BCR Valores S.A. En ese pronunciamiento se explica que esos funcionarios al no participar de la gestión pública de la Administración se encuentran regidos por el derecho laboral común, es decir no les son aplicables las regulaciones del Estatuto del Servio Civil sino las del Código de Trabajo. En el sub litem, la norma en la cual se sustentó el reintegro de lo pagado por ajuste de auxilio de cesantía, forma parte precisamente de ese código. A la luz de los razonamientos efectuados, la Sala considera que le asiste razón al recurrente y por ese motivo debe revocarse lo resuelto por las instancias precedentes ya que el Banco de Costa Rica estaba legitimado para solicitarle a la accionante el reintegro de lo pagado en vista de que continúa prestando sus servicios a un ente sea este público o empresa pública de la organización administrativa, por lo que al reincorporarse a ejercer funciones a esta empresa, debía devolver lo recibido por concepto de cesantía, pues es un mismo patrono al que está prestado de nuevo sus servicios.”