Discriminatory dismissal of pregnant worker and judicial review of administrative authorisationDespido discriminatorio de trabajadora embarazada y revisión judicial de la autorización administrativa

**III.- DISMISSAL OF THE PREGNANT WORKER.** The Political Constitution devotes Title V to the guardianship and protection of social rights and guarantees. Article 51 enshrines the family as the natural element and essential foundation of society, granting it a right to special protection by the State, a right that is expressly extended to the mother, children, elderly persons, and the helpless sick. In turn, Article 71 establishes that laws must afford special protection to women and minors in their work. The so-called Law for the Promotion of Women's Social Equality, No. 7142 of March 2, 1990, which partially developed said constitutional provisions, as well as the provisions contemplated in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (ratified by our country through Law No. 6968 of October 2, 1984). This Law, through its article 32, reformed, among others, Article 94 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and introduced article 94 bis. This Chamber has had the opportunity to rule, in consideration of what is established in such articles. In this regard, it has indicated that the first of these articles imposes a prohibition on employers from dismissing workers who are pregnant or in a breastfeeding period. The exception it establishes for this is that there be a justified cause to proceed with the dismissal originating from a serious breach of the duties derived from the employment contract, for which purpose the employer must carry out the respective proceeding before the Ministry of Labor in order to verify the breach. Thus, in accordance with Article 94 bis, in the event that the dismissal occurs without following the established procedure, the worker may request immediate reinstatement, with full enjoyment of her rights. Consequently, a protection regime is established in favor of pregnant and breastfeeding workers, which derives from the aforementioned national regulations and from the various international instruments approved by the country, among which are Convention 102 concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security of 1952, as well as the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, known as the "Convención de Belém do Pará", adopted by the Organization of American States on June 9, 1994. What is sought with this protection is precisely to protect workers from discriminatory dismissals against them, firstly, because of their condition as women, and secondly, because they are pregnant or in a breastfeeding period. However, as is clear from the regulations themselves, this immunity (fuero) does not mean complete irremovability for workers in this state, since if they commit a serious breach, they can still be dismissed after having verified such breach through the procedure provided in the Code. Rather, what these regulations seek is to establish an exception to the principle of free dismissal contemplated in Article 63 of the Political Constitution, in protection of a group as vulnerable as pregnant workers. For her part, in order to enjoy the stability established in that article, or the benefits contemplated in Article 94 bis, the worker must comply with the requirement of notifying the employer of her pregnancy status. If the sanction were imposed in contradiction with what is established in that Article 94, as stated, the worker has the right to be reinstated in her position, with full enjoyment of all her rights. In the event that the worker decides not to opt for reinstatement, she may then request payment of the severance pay (cesantía) and, as damages (daños y perjuicios), the payment of the amounts corresponding to the pre- and post-natal subsidy, as well as the wages she has ceased to receive from the moment of dismissal until completing eight months of pregnancy. In the vote of this Chamber No. 645-01 of 9:50 a.m. on October 31, 2001, it was indicated that the authorization issued by the National Directorate and General Inspection of Labor (Dirección Nacional e Inspección General de Trabajo) constitutes a fundamental requirement to validly execute the dismissal. Likewise, in vote No. 693-04 of 9:30 a.m. on August 27, 2004, it was indicated: *“… It must be emphasized that the law makes no exceptions, so whatever the breach attributed to the worker, authorization for the dismissal must be processed beforehand, even when it involves a temporary unjustified abandonment of work”.* **IV.- BACKGROUND.** The plaintiff was hired in the position of payroll clerk (planillera) on August 20, 2009, and on December 12 of the aforementioned year she learned of her pregnancy, which she notified her employer of on the following December 14. As of that communication, in January 2010, the employer modified her location and functions within the company without giving her reasons. In view of these facts, the plaintiff reported her employer for workplace harassment and discrimination to the National Directorate of Inspection of the Ministry of Labor (folio 127), which was deemed proven on April 28, 2010, and the correction of the faults was ordered. By official communication dated May 12, 2010, the employer communicated compliance with the prevention, consisting of the relocation of the plaintiff to a cubicle in the accounting area. Within this framework, the representative of the defendant processed before the National Directorate of Labor Inspection (Dirección Nacional de Inspección del Trabajo) the procedure for authorization to dismiss the worker, due to alleged unjustified absences on January 8 and 30 and February 12 and 17, and for refusing to obey orders and directives issued by her immediate boss. The procedure at that venue presents the following vicissitudes. Through official communication dated April 9, 2010, the National Directorate of Labor Inspection, Central Region, communicates the formation of the investigating body in charge of the dismissal proceeding for the pregnant worker, composed of inspectors Margarita Valverde Chavarría and José A. [Nombre1] (folio 137). By resolution of 8:00 a.m. on May 6, 2010, the parties are summoned to a hearing (comparecencia), to be held on May 26, 2010, at the Office of the Labor Inspection, and which was notified to the plaintiff on May 13, 2010 (folios 164 and 165). In a writing sent to the Directorate of Labor Inspection, one day before the scheduled hearing, namely, on May 25, 2010, the plaintiff stated: *“Dear sirs, by this means I inform you that I… ID… cannot appear at the hearing to be held regarding the complaint filed by my employer to dismiss me without employer liability in my pregnancy status, this is because I am incapacitated until May 28 of the current year and with an assessment appointment that same day, for the reason of “ABORTION SYMPTOMS”, since due to all this pressure it has worn me down mentally and physically to the point of having signs of bleeding, so I request you to postpone the date so that I can be present at the hearing, since I consider it is a duty and a right on my part to be there and that due to my baby's health problems I have not been able to”* (sic); additionally, she provided incapacity certificate No. 0199241 (folios 169 and 170). By resolution at 9:00 a.m. on May 26, 2010, the Directing Body (Órgano Director) resolved: *“… The worker did not appear; she had a copy of the incapacity from May 24 to 28 delivered; however, she does not present any request for suspension of the hearing. The Attorney is made aware of Mrs. [[Nombre2] ]'s incapacity, for which reason jointly with the Directing Body it is decided to suspend the hearing so as not to cause defenselessness. A new hearing date is set, which is scheduled for nine o'clock on June 3, 2010, under the terms of the initial summons, which is notified in this same act”* (sic) (folio 168). At 9:00 a.m. on June 3, 2010, the respective hearing began, which the employer and the witnesses provided by it attended. The worker did not appear, and the hearing was concluded at 11:30 a.m. (folios 171 to 181). In report No. SJ-GE-0473-10 of June 10, 2010, the Directing Body resolved *“… On the grounds of the refusal to repeatedly and manifestly obey the work direction norms, the elements that support the request filed by Messrs. … in their capacity as President and Secretary of [[Nombre3] ] were formally proven. Based on this fact, this Directing Body recommends authorizing the dismissal without employer liability of the pregnant worker…”* (sic) (folios 183 to 188). In view of the Directing Body's report, the National Directorate of Labor Inspection, by resolution DNI-216-2010 at 10:30 a.m. on July 7, 2010, denied authorization for the dismissal of the worker for the alleged absences; and authorized it for disobeying orders from her superiors, for which it resolved: *“…Based on the grounds stated in fact and in law, it is proceeded TO AUTHORIZE the dismissal of the worker… who is pregnant…”* (folios 195 to 204). The trial court considered that the worker's dismissal was due to harassment or persecution by her employer as a consequence of her pregnancy and constant incapacities, and it granted the lawsuit. The appeals court, in addition to endorsing what was decided, considered that when the administrative authorization procedure was carried out, due process was violated and, therefore, the procedure and the final act that authorized the dismissal are null, and for this reason the dismissal became unjustified, and it confirmed the ruling.

**V.- ON THE MERITS.** As this Chamber has repeatedly stated, in the case of the dismissal of a pregnant or breastfeeding woman, the indications derived from the evidentiary material brought to the case file deserve special assessment, taking into account that it is not easy to gather evidence demonstrating that the dismissal is due to the pregnancy. On this subject, in judgment No. 434 at 8:50 a.m. on June 1, 2005, it was indicated: *“…when dealing with pregnant or breastfeeding workers, there must exist, at the moment of assessing the evidence, a special awareness and understanding of the prevailing labor reality in the country, allowing its full appreciation, giving prominent value to the indications that emerge from the evidentiary material provided…”* (emphasis is not from the original; in the same sense, see judgments 351 at 10:20 a.m. on May 12, 2004; 117 at 3:30 p.m. on March 14; 387 at 9:00 a.m. on August 6, both from 2003, and 55 at 9:45 a.m. on February 8, 2006). This Chamber shares what was decided in the preceding instances, insofar as it has been considered that the worker's dismissal was truly due to the existence of her pregnancy and incapacities. From the evidence in the case file, it is clear, with total clarity, that from the moment the defendant learned of the plaintiff's pregnancy status, it modified her functions without any explanation, stripped her of her office and work tools —acts evidently considered harassment of the worker, and verified by the Ministry of Labor (see inspection report on folio 132)— even hiring, barely a week after the notification of the pregnancy, another person to perform the tasks assigned to the plaintiff. In that sense, the hired worker herself, [[Nombre4] ], stated: “I have worked for the defendant company since December twenty-first, two thousand nine…, when I arrived at the company the plaintiff worked in an office with her computer… as of January the plaintiff was relocated to a cubicle and later they gave her a workplace… in January the plaintiff had to help me but she did not do the things she had to do”; additionally, she indicated: “…the plaintiff was moved to that cubicle because she began to have incapacities and be absent…”. From the statements made, it is clear that the employer, from the notice the plaintiff gave of her pregnancy status, sought a way to get rid of her as a worker, marginalizing her from the tasks for which she had been hired, relocating her to a completely inadequate place for performing her functions, and demoting her to the position of assistant from the position she previously held. The witness and plaintiff's boss, [[Nombre5] ], stated: “…in the other space, the plaintiff had no equipment… since she took so many incapacities, the idea was that when she came to work she would come help us… I am almost certain that the plaintiff was not assigned computer equipment in any of the other positions she was in”. Likewise, the witness [[Nombre6] ], stated: “…when the company learned that the plaintiff was pregnant, they sent her to a warehouse with me… it was different treatment for her… before it was known she was pregnant, the plaintiff was a payroll clerk… in the warehouse she held no position… they did not have her do anything… since they did not have her do anything, I would have her help me, but later they forbade me from having her do anything… (sic)”. From the foregoing, it is reasonable to deduce that conclusion, that the true reason for the plaintiff's dismissal was due to the existence of her pregnancy and the incapacities resulting from it, and not those invoked by the employer and authorized in its proceeding before the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the disciplinary reasons alleged by the employer being disguised reasons for obtaining a dismissal authorization, which is clearly discriminatory, since from the analysis of the evidence in the case file, no objective cause is seen that would justify the request for dismissal authorization and the dismissal carried out by the defendant. Note that the authorization for the termination was given by that Ministry due to her not following instructions from her bosses (folio 31); however, in the sub lite this was not demonstrated by the defendant; even the witness [[Nombre4] ] only remembers that the immediate boss ordered her to teach the plaintiff the work, and her own boss does not specify which instructions, apart from that one, the plaintiff breached. It must be pointed out that in these cases, where a preparatory act or condition is required, that is, a prior dismissal authorization, the dismissal itself may be reviewed by the courts of justice, whether for formal issues or on the merits, since it has been indicated that what is resolved in a proceeding of that nature does not produce res judicata (cosa juzgada), so it does not bind the ordinary labor jurisdiction (Article 163, Code of Civil Procedure) (judgments numbers 325, at 9:30 a.m. on July 4, 2003; and 897, at 10:25 a.m. on November 2, 2005). Although it is true that the employer complied with the procedure established in Articles 94 and 94 bis of the Labor Code by requesting authorization for the dismissal of the pregnant worker, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security authorized it, regardless of the validity or not of the administrative procedure, it is clear from the factual picture verified in this process, as stated, that the true reason the defendant had for dismissing the plaintiff was her pregnancy and incapacities. This being the case, there is no alternative but to confirm the appealed ruling.” From the evidence in the case file, it is clear that the defendant, from the moment she learned of the plaintiff's pregnancy, modified her duties without any explanation, stripped her of her office and work tools—acts evidently considered harassment toward the worker, and confirmed by the Ministry of Labor (see inspection record on folio 132)—even hiring another person to perform the tasks assigned to the plaintiff barely a week after the notice of pregnancy. In this regard, that same hired worker, [[Nombre4]], stated: "I have worked for the defendant company since December twenty-first, two thousand nine… when I arrived at the company, the plaintiff worked in an office with her computer… starting in January, the plaintiff was relocated to a cubicle and later given a workspace… by January, the plaintiff had to help me, but she did not do the things she was supposed to do"; she further indicated: "…the plaintiff was moved to that cubicle because she began taking sick leave and being absent…". From these statements, it is clear that the employer, from the moment the plaintiff gave notice of her pregnancy, sought a way to get rid of her as a worker, marginalizing her from the duties for which she had been hired, relocating her to a completely inadequate place to perform her functions, and demoting her to the position of assistant from the position she previously held. The witness and the plaintiff's boss, [[Nombre5]], stated: "…in the other space, the plaintiff was not given any equipment… since she took so many sick leaves, the idea was that when she came to work, she would come help us… I am almost certain that the plaintiff was not assigned computer equipment in any of the other positions she was in". Likewise, the witness [[Nombre6]] stated: "…when the company learned that the plaintiff was pregnant, they sent her to a warehouse with me… the treatment of her was different… before it was known she was pregnant, the plaintiff was a payroll clerk… in the warehouse, she held no position… they did not put her to do anything… since they did not put her to do anything, I would put her to help me, but later they forbade me from putting her to do anything… (sic)". From the foregoing, it is reasonable to deduce that conclusion, that the true reason for the plaintiff's dismissal was due to her pregnancy and the sick leaves resulting from it, and not the reasons invoked by the employer and authorized in its proceeding before the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, with the disciplinary reasons alleged by the employer being concealed reasons for obtaining a dismissal authorization, which is clearly discriminatory, since from the analysis of the evidence in the case file, no objective cause is apparent that would justify the request for dismissal authorization and the dismissal carried out by the defendant.

Note that the authorization for the termination was granted by that Ministry on the grounds of not following her superiors' instructions (folio 31); however, in the sub lite, this was not demonstrated by the defendant. Indeed, the witness [[Nombre4]] only remembers that the immediate boss ordered her to teach the plaintiff the work, and her own boss does not specify which instructions, apart from that one, the plaintiff failed to comply with.

It must be pointed out that in these cases, where a preparatory act or condition is required, that is, a prior dismissal authorization, the dismissal itself can be reviewed by the courts of justice, whether on procedural grounds or on the merits, as it has been indicated that what is resolved in a proceeding of that nature does not produce res judicata, and therefore is not binding on the ordinary labor jurisdiction (article 163, Código Procesal Civil) (judgments number 325, of 9:30 a.m. on July 4, 2003; and 897, of 10:25 a.m. on November 2, 2005). While it is true that the employer complied with the procedure established in articles 94 and 94 bis of the Código de Trabajo, by requesting authorization for the dismissal of the pregnant worker, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security authorized it, regardless of the validity or not of the administrative procedure, from the factual picture confirmed in this proceeding it is evident, as stated, that the true reason the defendant had for dismissing the plaintiff was her pregnancy and sick leaves. Thus, there is no alternative but to uphold the appealed judgment." From the foregoing, it is reasonable to draw the conclusion that the true reason for the plaintiff’s dismissal was the existence of her pregnancy and the resulting medical leaves (incapacidades), and not those invoked by the employer and authorized in its proceeding before the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social). The disciplinary grounds alleged by the employer were concealed reasons for obtaining a dismissal authorization, which by all appearances is discriminatory, since from the analysis of the evidence on record, no objective cause is discerned that would justify the request for dismissal authorization and the dismissal carried out by the defendant.

It should be noted that the Ministry granted the termination authorization on the grounds of failing to follow her supervisors' instructions (folio 31); however, in the sub lite, this was not demonstrated by the defendant. Even the witness [Name4] only recalls that the immediate supervisor ordered her to teach the plaintiff the work, and that same supervisor did not specify which instructions, apart from that one, the plaintiff failed to follow.

It must be pointed out that in these cases, where a preparatory act or condition is required, that is, a prior dismissal authorization, the dismissal itself may be reviewed by the courts of justice, whether on formal grounds or on the merits, for it has been indicated that what is resolved in a proceeding of that nature does not produce res judicata (cosa juzgada), and therefore does not bind the ordinary labor jurisdiction (article 163, Código Procesal Civil) (judgments number 325, of 9:30 a.m. on July 4, 2003; and 897, of 10:25 a.m. on November 2, 2005). While it is true that the employer complied with the procedure established in articles 94 and 94 bis of the Código de Trabajo by requesting authorization to dismiss the pregnant worker, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security authorized it, regardless of the validity or invalidity of the administrative proceeding, it emerges from the factual framework verified in this process, as stated, that the true reason the defendant had for dismissing the plaintiff was her pregnancy and medical leaves. This being the case, there is no alternative but to uphold the appealed ruling.”

“III.- EL DESPIDO DE LA TRABAJADORA EMBARAZADA. La Constitución Política dedica el Título V, a la tutela y protección de los derechos y garantías sociales. El artículo 51 consagra a la familia como el elemento natural y fundamento esencial de la sociedad, estableciéndole un derecho de protección especial por parte del Estado, derecho que, expresamente, se hace extensivo a la madre, a la niñez, a las personas adultas mayores, y a los enfermos desvalidos. Por su parte, el artículo 71 establece que las leyes deben dar una protección especial a las mujeres y a las personas menores de edad en su trabajo. La denominada Ley de Promoción de la Igualdad Social de la Mujer, n.° 7142 de 2 de marzo de 1990, que vino a desarrollar, en parte, dichos numerales constitucionales, así como las disposiciones contempladas en la Convención sobre la Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (ratificada por nuestro país mediante Ley n.° 6968 de 2 de octubre de 1984). Esta Ley, a través de su numeral 32, reformó, entre otros, el artículo 94 del Código de Trabajo e introdujo el numeral 94 bis. Esta Sala ha tenido la oportunidad de pronunciarse, en atención a lo establecido en tales ordinales. Al respecto ha indicado que el primero de estos artículos impone una prohibición a los patronos para despedir a las trabajadoras que se encuentren en estado de embarazo, o en período de lactancia. La excepción que establece para ello, es que exista una causa justificada para proceder con el despido que se origine en una falta grave a los deberes derivados del contrato de trabajo, para lo cual, debe realizar la respectiva gestión ante el Ministerio de Trabajo con el fin de comprobar la falta. Así, de acuerdo con el artículo 94 bis, en caso de que se dé el despido sin seguirse el procedimiento establecido, la trabajadora puede solicitar la reinstalación inmediata, con el pleno goce de sus derechos. Consecuentemente, se establece un régimen de protección a favor de las trabajadoras embarazadas y en período de lactancia, que se deriva de la normativa nacional ya mencionada, y de los diversos instrumentos internacionales aprobados por el país, entre los que se cuenta el Convenio 102, sobre la seguridad social (norma mínima), de 1952, así como la Convención Interamericana para prevenir, sancionar y erradicar la violencia contra la mujer, conocida como la "Convención de Belém do Pará" , adoptada por la Organización de Estados Americanos el 9 de junio de 1994. Lo que se busca con esta protección, es precisamente, proteger a las trabajadoras de despidos discriminatorios en su contra, en primer lugar, por su condición de mujeres, y en segundo lugar, por encontrarse en estado de embarazo, o en período de lactancia. No obstante, tal y como se desprende de la propia normativa, este fuero no significa una completa inamovilidad de las trabajadoras en este estado, ya que si cometen alguna falta grave, igualmente pueden ser despedidas después de haber comprobado tal falta mediante el procedimiento previsto en el Código. Más bien, lo que busca la normativa dicha, es establecer una excepción al principio del libre despido contemplado en el artículo 63 de la Constitución Política, en protección de un grupo tan vulnerable como lo son las trabajadoras embarazadas. Por su parte, para poder gozar de la estabilidad establecida en ese numeral, o de los beneficios contemplados en el artículo 94 bis, la trabajadora debe cumplir con el requisito de darle aviso al empleador de su estado de gravidez. Si la sanción se impusiera en contradicción con lo establecido en ese artículo 94, como se expuso, nace para la trabajadora el derecho a ser reinstalada en su puesto, con goce pleno de todos sus derechos. En el supuesto de que la trabajadora decidiere no optar por la reinstalación, entonces podrá solicitar el pago de la cesantía y, por concepto de daños y perjuicios, la cancelación de las sumas correspondientes al subsidio de pre y post parto, así como los salarios que haya dejado de percibir, desde el momento del despido y hasta completar ocho meses de embarazo. En el voto de esta Sala n.º 645-01 de las 9 horas 50 minutos del 31 de octubre de 2001, se indicó que la autorización que extiende la Dirección Nacional e Inspección General de Trabajo constituye un requisito fundamental, para poder válidamente ejecutar el despido. Asimismo, en el voto n.° 693-04 de las 9 horas 30 minutos del 27 de agosto de 2004, se indicó: “… Debe recalcarse que la ley no hace excepciones, por lo que sea cual sea la falta que se le impute a la trabajadora, debe tramitarse previamente la autorización del despido, incluso cuando se trate de un abandono temporal injustificado del trabajo”.

IV.- ANTECEDENTES. La actora fue contratada en el puesto de planillera el 20 de agosto de 2009, y el 12 de diciembre del referido año tuvo conocimiento de su estado de embarazo, de lo que dio aviso a su patrono el 14 de diciembre siguiente. A partir de esa comunicación, en enero de 2010, el patrono le modificó su ubicación y funciones dentro de la empresa, sin darle razones para ello. En vista de esos hechos, la actora denunció ante la Dirección Nacional del Inspección del Ministerio de Trabajo, a su empleador por hostigamiento y discriminación laboral (folio 127), el cual se tuvo por probado el 28 de abril de 2010, ordenándose la corrección de las faltas. Mediante oficio de fecha 12 de mayo de 2010, la parte patronal comunicó el cumplimiento de la prevención, consistente en la reubicación de la actora en un cubículo del área contable. Dentro de este marco, el representante de la demandada gestionó ante la Dirección Nacional de Inspección del Trabajo el procedimiento para la autorización de despido de la trabajadora, por supuestas ausencias injustificadas de los días 8 y 30 de enero y 12 y 17 de febrero, y por negarse a acatar órdenes y directrices emitidas por su jefe inmediato. El procedimiento en aquella sede presenta las siguientes vicisitudes. Mediante oficio del 09 de abril de 2010, la Dirección Nacional de Inspección del Trabajo, Región Central, comunica la conformación del órgano de investigación encargado de la gestión de despido de la trabajadora embarazada, integrado por los inspectores Margarita Valverde Chavarría y José A. [Nombre1] (folio 137). Por resolución de las 8 horas del 6 de mayo de 2010, se convoca a las partes a una comparecencia, a realizarse el 26 de mayo 2010 en la Oficina de la Inspección de Trabajo, y que fuera notificada a la actora el 13 de mayo de 2010 (folios 164 y 165). En escrito remitido a la Dirección de Inspección del Trabajo, un día antes de la audiencia señalada, a saber, el 25 de mayo de 2010, la actora manifestó: “Estimados señores por este medio les comunico que yo… cédula… no me puedo presentar a la audiencia que se realizara para ver la denuncia interpuesta por mi patrono de despedirme sin responsabilidad patronal en mi estado de embarazo, esto debido a que me encuentro incapacitada hasta el día 28 de mayo del presenta año y con cita de valoración ese mismo día, por el motivo de “SINTOMAS DE ABORTO”, ya que debido a toda esta presión me ha desgastado mental y físicamente hasta llegar a estar con muestras de sangrando, por lo que les solicito aplazar la fecha para poder estar presente en la audiencia, ya que considero es una deber y un derecho de mi parte estarlo y que por problemas de salud de mi bebé no he podido” (sic); además, aportó boleta de incapacidad n.º 0199241 (folios 169 y 170). Por resolución de las 9 horas del 26 de mayo de 2010, el Órgano Director, resolvió: “… No se presentó la trabajadora hizo llegar una copia de la incapacidad del 24 al 28 de mayo sin embargo no presenta ninguna solicitud de suspensión de la audiencia. Se le hace del conocimiento del Licdo. La incapacidad de la señora [[Nombre2] ] por lo que conjuntamente con el órgano Director se decide suspender la audiencia para no causar indefensión. Se señala nueva fecha de audiencia la cual se fija para las nueve horas del día 3 de junio del 2010 bajo los términos de la convocatoria inicial, la cual se notifica en este mismo acto” (sic) (folio 168). A las 9 horas del 3 de junio de 2010, se inició la respectiva audiencia, a la cual asistió la parte patronal y los testigos por ésta aportados. La trabajadora no se presentó, y se dio por concluida la audiencia a las 11 horas con 30 minutos (folios 171 a 181). En informe n.° SJ-GE-0473-10 del 10 de junio de 2010, el Órgano Director, resolvió “…Por la causal de la negación de acatar de forma reiterada y manifiesta las normas de la dirección del trabajo quedaron formalmente probados los elementos que sustentan la solicitud interpuesta por los señores… en su condición de Presidente y Secretario de [[Nombre3] ]. Basado en este hecho este Órgano Director recomienda autorizar el despido sin responsabilidad patronal de la trabajadora en estado de embarazo…” (sic) (folios 183 a 188). En vista del informe del Órgano Director, la Dirección Nacional de Inspección de Trabajo, por resolución DNI-216-2010 de las 10 horas 30 minutos del 7 de julio de 2010, desautorizó el despido de la trabajadora por las supuestas ausencias; y lo autorizó por desacatar órdenes de su jefatura, para lo cual resolvió: “…Con base en los motivos expuestos de hecho y de derecho, se procede A AUTORIZAR el despido de la trabajadora… quien se encuentra en estado de embarazo…” (folios 195 a 204). El juzgado consideró que el despido de la trabajadora obedeció a un hostigamiento o persecución por parte de su patrono, a consecuencia de su estado de embarazo y constantes incapacidades, y declaró con lugar la demanda. El tribunal, además de avalar lo resuelto, consideró que al momento de llevarse acabo el procedimiento administrativo de autorización, se violentó el debido proceso y por ende el procedimiento y el acto final que autorizó el despido es nulo, y por tal razón el despido devino en injustificado y confirmó el fallo.

V.- SOBRE EL FONDO. Según lo ha dicho reiteradamente esta Sala, en el caso de despido de la mujer embarazada o en período de lactancia, los indicios que se derivan del material probatorio allegado a los autos, merecen una valoración especial tomando en cuenta que no es fácil recabar prueba que demuestre que el despido obedece al embarazo. Sobre este tema, en la sentencia n.° 434 de las 8:50 horas del 1 de junio de 2005, se indicó: “cuando se trate de trabajadoras embarazadas o en período de lactancia, debe existir, al momento de valorar la prueba, una especial sensibilización y comprensión de la realidad laboral imperante en el país, que permita su plena apreciación, dando un valor prominente a los indicios que se desprenden del material probatorio aportado…” (el destacado no es del original, en igual sentido véanse las sentencias 351 de las 10:20 horas del 12 de mayo del 2004; 117 de las 15:30 horas del 14 de marzo; 387 de las 9:00 del 6 de agosto, ambas del 2003, y 55 de las 09:45 del 8 de febrero de 2006). Esta Sala comparte lo resuelto en las instancias precedentes, en cuanto se ha considerado que el despido de la trabajadora realmente obedeció a la existencia de su estado de embarazo e incapacidades. De las pruebas que obran en autos, se desprende, con total claridad, que la demandada desde que tuvo conocimiento del estado de gravidez de la actora, le modificó sin explicación alguna sus funciones, la despojó de su oficina y herramientas de trabajo, actos evidentemente considerados como acoso hacia la trabajadora, y comprobados por el Ministerio de Trabajo (véase acta de inspección a folio 132), contratando inclusive, al escaso transcurso de una semana del aviso del estado de embarazo, a otra persona para que realizara las tareas encargadas a la actora. En ese sentido, la misma trabajadora contratada [[Nombre4] ], señaló: “laboro para la empresa demandada desde el veintiuno de diciembre de dos mil nueve…, cuando yo llegué a la empresa la actora laboraba en una oficina con su computadora… a partir de enero a la actora la reubicaron en un cubículo y después le dieron un lugar de trabajo… ya en enero la actora tenia que ayudarme pero ella no hacía las cosas que tenía que hacer”; además, indicó: “…a la actora se le trasladó a ese cubículo porque empezó a incapacitarse y ausentarse…”. De las manifestaciones hechas, es claro que la empleadora desde el aviso que hiciera la actora de su estado de gravidez, buscó la manera de deshacerse de ella como trabajadora, marginándola de las labores por las cuales había sido contratada, reubicándola en un lugar completamente inadecuado para la realización de sus funciones y degradándola al puesto de asistente, del puesto que antes ostentaba. El testigo y jefe de la actora, [[Nombre5] ], señaló: “…en el otro espacio a la actora no se le tenía ningún equipo… como ella se incapacitaba tanto, la idea era que ella cuando se presentaba a laborar nos viniera ayudar… estoy casi seguro que a la actora no se le asignó equipo de cómputo en ninguno de los otros puestos en que estuvo”. Asímismo, la testigo [[Nombre6] ], señaló: “…cuando en la empresa se supo que la actora estaba embarazada la mandaron a una bodega conmigo… era otro trato para ella… antes de saberse que estaba embarazada, la actora era planillera… en la bodega ella no ocupaba ningún puesto… no la ponían hacer nada… como no la ponían hacer nada, entonces yo la ponía a ayudarme, pero después me prohibieron ponerla hacer nada… (sic)”. De lo expuesto es razonable deducir aquella conclusión, de que la verdadera razón del despido de la actora obedeció a la existencia de su estado de embarazo y a las incapacidades consecuencia de éste, y no las invocadas por el patrono y autorizadas en su gestión ante el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, resultando los motivos disciplinarios alegados por la parte patronal razones encubiertas para la consecución de una autorización de despido, que a todas luces deviene en discriminatorio, pues del análisis de la prueba que obra en autos, no se aprecia ninguna causa objetiva que justificara la solicitud de autorización de despido y el despido realizado por la demandada. Nótese que la autorización del cese la dio ese Ministerio en razón de no seguir las instrucciones de sus jefes (folio 31); sin embargo, en el subliten esto no fue demostrado por la demandada, incluso la testiga [[Nombre4] ] solo recuerda que el jefe inmediato le ordenó que le enseñara el trabajo y, su mismos jefe, no especifica cuales instrucciones, a parte de esa, incumplió la actora. Se ha de hacer ver, que en estos casos, donde se requiere de un acto preparatorio o condición, es decir una autorización previa de despido, el despido en sí, puede ser revisado por los tribunales de justicia, ya sea por cuestiones formales o por el fondo, pues, se ha indicado que lo que en un proceso de esa naturaleza se resuelva no produce cosa juzgada, de manera que no vincula a la vía ordinaria laboral (artículo 163, Código Procesal Civil) (sentencias números 325, de las 9:30 horas del 4 de julio del 2003; y, 897, de las 10:25 horas del 2 de noviembre del 2005). Si bien es cierto la parte patronal cumplió con el procedimiento establecido en los artículos 94 y 94 bis del Código de Trabajo, al solicitar la autorización del despido de la trabajadora embarazada, y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social lo autorizó, con independencia de la validez o no del procedimiento administrativo, del cuadro fáctico constatado en este proceso se desprende, como se dijo, que la verdadera razón que tuvo la demandada para despedir a la actora fue su embarazo e incapacidades. Así las cosas, no queda más que confirmar el fallo recurrido.”