State civil liability for denial of forest management plan in aquifer recharge zoneResponsabilidad civil del Estado por denegatoria de plan de manejo en zona de recarga acuífera

I.- In this proceeding, the co-plaintiffs, Nombre343 and Nombre10931, both with the surnames Nombre10932, as well as Nombre10933, in their capacity as co-owners of the property registered in the Public Registry of Real Property, Province of Puntarenas, under folio number 98256, sub-folios 001, 002, and 003, alleged that they hired a forestry engineer in 1997 for the purpose of establishing a management and exploitation plan for the forest resources located within their property. The plan was submitted to the Regional Office of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, hereinafter MINAE), on the Osa Peninsula. That office, in Resolution No. 14-98AR, denied approval of the plan, arguing that the land to be utilized is located within a critical area due to high erosion, proximity to the coast, and irregular topography, in addition to being an aquifer recharge zone. The co-plaintiffs appealed it, and through Resolution No. 166-98 MINAE, the appeal was rejected, thus exhausting the administrative channel. The plaintiffs requested that the judgment declare, as a primary claim, the nullity of Resolution No. 14-98 AR, issued at 8:00 a.m. on January 12, 1998, which rejected their request, as well as the subsequent resolutions and actions, in order to be authorized to cut and utilize the timber, according to the management plan submitted. As a subsidiary claim, they sought compensation for the immobilization of the property, under the terms of the Constitutional Chamber's case law on this matter. At the same time, they demanded payment for the damages and losses suffered, due to the inability to dispose of the timber, as per the content of the cited plan, as well as the interest generated on that sum. They also requested that the State be ordered to pay both procedural costs. In opposition, the State, through a representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, answered the lawsuit negatively, without raising substantive defenses. Based on the characteristic of the land, insofar as it serves for the aquifer recharge of various nearby watercourses, it affirmed the legality of the challenged administrative act, which was fully compliant with the relevant regulations. It defended the soundness of the report from the National Service of Groundwater, Irrigation and Drainage (Servicio Nacional de Aguas Subterráneas, Riego y Avenamiento, SENARA), attacked by the plaintiffs, on the basis of which their application was rejected. Likewise, it argued that the lack of a formal declaration of the property as an aquifer recharge area was not an obstacle to denying the logging permit, because the reality of the lands subject to the timber extraction plan should prevail. Finally, it denied the impossibility of the plaintiffs to utilize their property, asserting the existence of economic activities dissimilar to logging, thus upholding the owners' right of use of the thing. It requested that the plaintiffs' claims be dismissed and that they be ordered to pay both procedural costs. At first instance, the lawsuit was dismissed in its entirety, ruling without special condemnation on costs. Upon appeal of that judgment by the losing party, the Court of Appeals decided, in its ruling, to revoke the appealed resolution, upholding the subsidiary claim. It ordered that the value of the physical property be restored, with the property to pass into State ownership, through its notarial services, once its price is set. Likewise, it ordered the defendant to pay the damages and losses caused by the non-disposition of the timber, establishing its value as of the date of the management plan and legal interest until its full value is settled. The amounts shall be determined in the execution of the judgment. It ordered the State to pay both procedural costs.

II.- The defendant filed an appeal in cassation alleging substantive grounds. First. It alleges a direct violation, accusing the breach of Articles 23 and 62 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. The plaintiff in its claim had requested a full jurisdiction ruling, that is, the nullity of the administrative act, the restoration of the individualized legal situation, and the recognition of the damages and losses caused by the State. The Court, it points out, despite confirming the rejection of the claim against the administrative act of the Rincón Office, in the Osa Conservation Area of MINAE, grants a so-called subsidiary petition. On that basis, it grants restitution for the alleged damage caused, requested in the lawsuit, such as compensation for being unable to dispose of the timber they intended to extract, setting its value at the time the management plan for its extraction was prepared, plus legal interest. But, in its view, the cited articles are violated insofar as they provide that damages shall only be recognized to the extent that the illegality of the challenged administrative act is proven. In that sense, it cites case law from this Chamber. Given the manner of the ruling, it claims Article 23 is violated by lack of application. The mentioned Article 62 was violated because it considers that the measure adopted to protect the violated right, in the thesis of the appellate judges, is not viable as no administrative act was declared null. Thus, it concludes, the condemnation for damages and losses contradicts what is provided in the indicated articles. Second. It points out a direct violation, due to misapplication, of Articles 190 and 194 of the General Law of Public Administration. If the liability of the Public Administration can arise from lawful or unlawful action, when it is the former, it indicates, the condemnation must be subject to the requirements demanded in subsection 2 of Article 190 cited. If it is considered that the State's actions produced damages of special intensity, it warns, the granting of this matter should have been analyzed in light of Articles 194 and following of the General Law of Public Administration. The last article is clear when it provides that when civil liability of the State exists for its lawful actions, only the payment of damages can be recognized, but not lost profits; however, it highlights, the Court granted the latter, in terms of the payment of the value of the unutilized timber, according to its value at the time the rejected management plan was prepared. With this, the legal system was improperly violated. Third. It criticizes the transgression of the same Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration, in that Articles 61 and 62 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction were not applied. The second instance judgment, in its view, goes beyond what is permitted in Article 62 cited, because even though the latter allows the adoption of whatever measures are necessary to restore the party affected by a null administrative act, in the current proceeding there is no possibility to order such measures if the invalidity of the MINAE decision was not determined at any time. Thus, it continues, the order against the State to acquire the plaintiffs' land becomes improper; rather, the pertinent action was to dismiss the lawsuit in its entirety, an aspect that made the necessary application of Article 61, first subsection, mentioned, without the possibility of applying that same article in its second subsection, as the lawsuit was not appropriate due to the incorrect legal qualification being given to the facts. Fourth. It points out that the Court's order directly violates Article 228 of the General Law of Public Administration, a rule on which the alleged appropriateness of the State's obligation to acquire the plaintiffs' land is based. In its opinion, this constitutes an improper use of the rule, because it would allow the use of the powers granted to the judge for the execution of final judgments to the extent that the ruling had been based on a full jurisdiction petition. But, it refutes, if the appellate judges in their judgment upheld the administrative act as valid, they could only award the damages proven in the record. Therefore, what was granted to the plaintiff in the challenged ruling is an expropriation order, without this having formed part of the claims of the lawsuit. Fifth. It asserts the infringement, by non-application, of Article 33, subsection d, of the Forestry Law. Said rule imposes on the Public Administration the competence to define the area of the protection zone for the recharge of an aquifer, in accordance with the procedure established in Article 94 of the Regulation concerning that law. But, in its view, the Court disregards the rule and arrogates to itself the specific competence of the Executive Branch to consider which is the water protection zone. The challenged ruling, it details, does not even order the survey of the area to be evaluated, according to Article 94 cited; on the contrary, it orders the expropriation of the property a priori, without having the certainty of which portion of the land is an aquifer zone and which is not. Article 62 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction is also violated, as it would constitute an evident lack of application of the provisions that could validly be adopted in an estimatory ruling of the instance. It would be, it insists, forcing the State to issue acts of a different nature for the benefit of the plaintiff of the proceeding, through the challenge to an administrative act. This is not regulated in the legal system and, therefore, is an infringement thereof. Furthermore, it continues, it was not proven in the record that the plaintiffs' right of property had been emptied of its content or that the total impossibility of use of the land for them existed. The Court was barred from applying the full regime of means for executing the judgment, such as the order to expropriate the entire property, without specific knowledge of the part corresponding to aquifers, with the consequent danger of forcing the State to acquire lands in which, eventually, there may be no need before the non-existence of aquifer mantles to protect, or to grant the payment of losses, when the regulations expressly prohibit it. Finally, it points out, condemnation under the prejudgment of the State's delay in ordering the analysis of the property, for the purpose of deciding its eventual acquisition, is not possible, especially if the plaintiffs filed the judicial action almost simultaneously with the rejection of their forest resources management plan.

III.- In the first charge, the appellant claims the condemnation against the State to pay damages and losses is improper. In its view, Articles 23 and 62, both of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, have been violated because compensation was granted to the plaintiff, when such is only appropriate if the challenged administrative act is declared null. If in this matter no such declaration of invalidity was made, it considers, no pecuniary reparation can be granted. Even though both legal provisions indeed regulate the appropriateness of claiming damages and losses if the nullity of the administrative act under contention is declared, which a contrario sensu would mean the accessory nature of such compensation with respect to what was debated regarding the invalidity of the Public Administration's act, the Court would have erred in this matter only if the plaintiff had limited its claim to the nullity of the administrative act. But, in the material claims of the lawsuit, at folios 56 and 57, it was requested: "...that Resolution 14-98 of 8:00 a.m. on January 12, 1998, be declared illegal and therefore revoked, along with the subsequent resolutions and actions, so that I am authorized to cut and utilize the timber, according to the management plan submitted. In the event that the Court does not consider my action appropriate, I subsidiarily request that the undersigned be compensated for the immobilization of the property, under the terms of the Constitutional Chamber's case law on the subject.- That the damages and losses caused be paid, which involve the non-disposition of the timber, contained in the management plan, and the interest that this has generated (sic). That the State be ordered to pay both procedural costs of this process". (The highlighting is not from the original). As can be deduced from the transcribed text, the plaintiffs did not ask to be compensated jointly with the declaration of nullity of the act that denied their management plan; rather, they requested such reparation if the claim for invalidity of that administrative action was deemed inappropriate. Therefore, save for what will be stated in the following considerando regarding lost profits, there was no error by the appellate judges in upholding the subsidiary claim and the compensation contained therein, since nothing prevents citizens from requesting compensation, under the terms of Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration, which regulates the State's civil liability when, from one of its normal actions, it causes patrimonial detriments to citizens. Consequently, this first objection of the appeal shall be rejected.

IV.- In the second charge, the appellant criticizes that if the Public Administration's conduct was lawful, as declared by the Court, even though civil liability can arise from the normal action of the State, there was a breach of Articles 190 and 194 of the General Law of Public Administration, because the second instance judges granted the plaintiffs lost profits, violating Article 194 cited, in which compensation is limited to damages, expressly denying losses. Indeed, as the State's representative accuses, Article 194, subsection 2, of the cited law regulates that compensation may only cover damages at the time of payment, but not lost profits. The dissimilarity between both legal concepts is characterized, mainly, by what is intended to be repaired by each. Damage (daño) represents a decrease in the injured party's current assets as a consequence of a harmful patrimonial act, represented by those expenses incurred by the victim of the harmful act, as an adequate effect thereof, which come to represent a loss for their patrimony. Also known as consequential damage (daño emergente), it represents an impoverishment in the affected party's pecuniary resources, arising from specific economic expenses incurred later as an unavoidable consequence of the harmful action. In contrast, lost profits (lucro cesante) or loss represent, for the passive subject of the detriment, the impediment, generated by the harmful act, to achieving a gain or economic advantage. Instead of seeing their patrimony diminished at the time of the harmful act, as a result of the economic cost to the victim, they lose the opportunity to increase their patrimony, because had it not been for the conduct of the author of the detriment, they would have been able to access a certain gain and consequent increase in their current assets at the time of the harmful act. In this matter, the plaintiff seeks, in the compensatory realm, two items. First. The immobilization of the property, insofar as this causes them a patrimonial loss by being unable to dispose of it, thus emptying their right of property, in terms of the powers of usufruct and transformation, in the interests of protecting the common welfare. Second. The lack of disposition of the timber, contained in the management plan, as well as the interest generated on that sum. Regarding the initial case, this concerns the claim for damage (daño), that is, the way in which the plaintiffs see their assets diminished by being restricted in the use and enjoyment of the property under their ownership, which implies a decrease in the value of the good. The second case splits in two ways. There will be lost profits (lucro cesante), clearly, in what concerns the claim for legal interest, as it corresponds to the economic gain not received. Likewise, there is such in relation to the obstruction represented by the limitation imposed by the State, insofar as the market price that the timber would have fetched from its sale was not received. But, it must be distinguished that the trees within the land also represent an economic value and, consequently, a current damage (daño) insofar as, if the owners must lose their ownership in the pursuit of nature protection, the trees represent an amount (not necessarily that of their timber in that market branch), which would be lost with the land and; in that circumstance, must be compensated as a decrease in their assets. Therefore, if the Court granted the plaintiff the lost profits (lucro cesante) corresponding to the lack of disposition of the timber, establishing its value as of the date of the management plan, as well as legal interest, it collided with what is provided in Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration. In any case, by not being able to profit from the timber (by exploiting or selling it), they would be compensated with the payment of the price of the good, which must include the value of the land, the trees, and everything that forms part of the property. It must be noted that although the appellate judges considered that every citizen had the right to be compensated for patrimonial detriments suffered due to the State's actions, they did not provide reasons for the non-application of what is provided in subsection 2 of Article 194 cited. Consequently, that specific matter must be overturned by this Chamber and said payment shall be denied to the plaintiffs, based on the existing express legal prohibition on the subject.

V.- The violation of Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration is accused, arising from the breach of Articles 61 and 62 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. But, the appellant's argument continues to be based on the supposed accessory nature of damages and losses, with respect to the main claim of invalidating MINAE's administrative act. As stated supra, the plaintiff never asked for the nullity of the act and their compensation; rather, they sought, if the lawfulness of the State's action was deemed appropriate, to be compensated for not being able to enjoy their property. In other words, to be repaired for a lawful act of the Public Administration, which safeguards the common interest but harms their private interest. Consequently, the alleged oversight of the Court criticized by the appellant does not exist, because the cited rules of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction regulate compensation in those cases where it is requested dependently of the declaration of nullity of the administrative act, and that was not what occurred in this specific case. At the same time, both provisions do not affect Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration, as they correspond to a different legal situation, because while the former govern matters concerning abnormal acts of the Administration, the latter provides what is relevant to lawful acts and the pecuniary liability of the State capable of arising. Consequently, this charge shall be rejected.

VI.- The fourth objection of the State Representative, referring to the alleged infringement of Article 228 of the General Law of Public Administration, starts from considering that the Court is ordering an expropriation, despite this process not being an execution of judgment nor that matter being included within the claims of the lawsuit. Article 94 of the Regulation of the Forestry Law provides: "The declaration of an aquifer recharge area must be determined in each case and for each particular area based on technical studies that determine the direction of the Underground Flows and the importance of the aquifer for human consumption. Once the study is completed, the State Forestry Administration (A.F.E.) shall prepare a survey of the area in question and a study on land tenure, then proceed to carry out the respective appraisals and, through an administrative procedure, shall have them communicated to each owner or possessor so that he or she may decide whether to voluntarily submit to the Forestry Regime or accept payment from the A.F.E., to formalize the direct purchase. Otherwise, the mentioned administrative procedure shall be terminated, and expropriation shall proceed. Only when the voluntary submission of the property or the direct purchase has been accepted shall a resolution be issued delimiting said aquifer; otherwise, one must wait for the competent judge to place the A.F.E. in possession of the corresponding property". As can be seen, the specific rule for cases such as the one sub júdice requires the State Forestry Administration (A.F.E.) to proceed with the acquisition of the land within which the existence of an aquifer recharge area is discovered, if its owner does not voluntarily submit to the limitations that will burden their land. That acquisition could occur through direct purchase, if the State and the citizen agree on a sale price, or through expropriation if no such agreement on the value of the land is reached. In other words, the legal system imposes on the State, once the existence of an aquifer recharge area is declared, the obligation to acquire the land within which it is located, when the owner does not accept bearing the limitations on their property. At the same time, Resolution No. 014-98 A.R. from the Rincón Office of the Osa Conservation Area, of MINAE, stated in its Considerando sixth: "That the corresponding study, carried out by the Groundwater Area of the National Service of Groundwater, Irrigation and Drainage SENARA, determined that the area in which the property is located is an important aquifer recharge zone." The foregoing constitutes a specific declaration by the State, through one of the bodies of the A.F.E., in accordance with what is provided in Article 94 mentioned, regarding the quality of the plaintiffs' property. Furthermore, it was ordered, in the second point of its operative part, to proceed in accordance with Article 94 cited. In Resolution No. R-166-98-MINAE, which exhausted the administrative channel and confirmed the previous challenged resolution, the following was set forth: “The technical report of SENARA constitutes real proof for the administration to verify that the zone requested by the appellant is an aquifer recharge zone and that, in the absence of a document with technical-scientific value demonstrating the contrary or rebutting it, this Ministry must accept it as true and valid.” The State, again, makes an assertion which, being contained in a valid and effective administrative act, constitutes a declaration regarding the nature of the property generating the dispute. Therefore, it must be concluded that the Public Administration, in compliance with the provisions of Article 94 of the Regulation of the Forestry Law, declared the land to be an aquifer recharge area and, for that very reason, decided to continue with the procedure established in said rule. Subsequently, in the judicial channel, the operative part of the Court's ruling ordered the Public Administration “...to restore the value of the physical property, which must pass into the ownership of the defendant through its notarial services, once the price is set...”. As can be seen, the second instance judges ordered the State to acquire the land, given the manifest disagreement of its owners to maintain it under their ownership, with the limitations imposed by the Public Administration. But it is not perceived that the appellate judges directly ordered an expropriation, the accusation being the defendant's own conclusion. The Court limited itself to obligating the State to continue with the procedure established in Article 94 of the mentioned regulation, that is, the area having been declared as an aquifer recharge zone and the reluctance of its owners to voluntarily submit their property being clear, to proceed to acquire it, whether conventionally or through expropriation, in both cases recognizing the damages and losses caused. Consequently, the appellate judges did not overstep by ordering that the land pass into the ownership of the defendant, but rather, what was ordered in that instance must be understood as the State's obligation to continue with the procedure established in the respective Regulation. The Court, in essence, is ordering the execution of the final act (declared valid, despite the accusations by the plaintiff), and therefore Article 228 of the General Law of Public Administration is not violated. At the same time, it corresponds to what was requested by the plaintiff, in the sense of being restored in the value of the land, and this is nothing other than receiving its price, so that it becomes a public domain asset, at the service of the common interest. Regarding the condemnation for losses, the point was already analyzed in the preceding considerando, to which it refers. Likewise, regarding the condemnation for the payment of damages, it is reiterated again that these were not accessory to the nullity of the administrative act, therefore the alleged error does not exist. For the reasons stated, this reproach shall be rejected as grounds for overturning the challenged judgment.

VII.- Regarding the fifth charge, Article 33 of the Forestry Law, as to the indicated subsection, provides: “The following are declared protection areas: [...] d) The recharge areas and aquifers of springs (manantiales), whose limits shall be determined by the competent bodies established in the regulation of this law”. Even though what the appellant stated is true, in that it is the State's responsibility to define the area within which the aquifer recharge is comprised, this Chamber does not find that the Court substituted the specific competence of the Executive Branch or that it ordered payment for the entirety of the plaintiffs' property. The operative part of the challenged judgment at no time orders payment for the entirety of the land; on the contrary, it indicates that the price must be set. Moreover, in Considerando VIII, at folio 235, it establishes: “... it is considered pertinent to uphold the subsidiary claim, and to order the restoration of the value of the physical property, which must pass into the ownership of the defendant through its notarial services, once the price is set (Article 94 of the regulation to the Forestry Law)...”. It seems evident that regarding that payment, the appellate judges even referred to the procedure established in Article 94, such that there is no deviation from the procedure instituted for the State to acquire that type of land. Furthermore, it is not supplanting the Executive Branch in declaring the area as an aquifer recharge zone. The A.F.E., according to Article 2 of the Regulation to the Forestry Law, is constituted by MINAE, the National System of Conservation Areas, and the National Fund for Forestry Development. In this matter, it is clear how the Rincón – Osa Conservation Area, upon denying the logging permit, precisely declared that the lands were for aquifer recharge. This was confirmed by MINAE and was precisely the reason why the management plan for the forest resources of the property was rejected. Therefore, based on the stated rule, there was indeed a declaration by the A.F.E. regarding the land's capacity to allow aquifer recharge and the need for it to be preserved to protect the surrounding hydrographic basin. Therefore, there was no supplantation of the AFE's power, and the only thing the Court orders the Public Administration to do is to proceed to conclude the procedure established in Article 94, also ordered in the challenged act, so that the owners of the land are repaired for the patrimonial damage (daño) constituted by the encumbrance of their right of ownership, as requested in the material claims of the lawsuit. Contrary to what the appellant stated, the limitation imposed by the Rincón – Osa Regional Area does empty the content of that right, because it prevents the exercise of transformation, usufruct, use, and enjoyment by the owners of the property, who must maintain it practically intact, for the purpose of safeguarding the water resource, for the benefit of the entire community. Reasoning that they can give different uses to the land, whether touristic or scientific, or collect firewood from branches and trunks fallen by the effect of nature, is equivalent to saying that the three plaintiffs must voluntarily submit to the limitations, while Article 94 of the Regulation to the Forestry Law itself empowers them to refuse to do so and receive payment for the value of their land, whether by direct purchase or by expropriation. Regarding the losses, it refers to what was expressed in Considerando IV.

Then, with respect to the appellant’s reiteration regarding the alleged violation of Article 62 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), it must be stated once again that the damages are not accessory to the declaration of nullity of the challenged administrative act, as they are different claims, the first being a subsidiary claim and the second a principal claim. But, in any case, modern doctrine has imposed the thesis that the contentious-administrative jurisdiction is not a simple reviewer of acts; hence, a declaration of nullity is not necessary to give way to compensation, if damages were caused to the administered parties. Finally, the appellant’s argument concerning the early manner in which the action was filed, which allegedly prevented the State from carrying out the procedure of the cited numeral 94, is not admissible. It seems clear that six years elapsed between the origin of the conflict and the present, without the Administration being prevented from approaching the plaintiffs and concluding the procedure contained in that regulatory norm, which had even been ordered when the permit for the use (aprovechamiento) of the standing timber on the property was denied. Consequently, this cassation ground will be denied.

VIII.- In light of all the foregoing analysis, the cassation appeal on substantive grounds filed by the State’s representative will be partially granted. The appellate ruling will be partially annulled, only insofar as it granted lost profits (lucro cesante), comprised of the amount left unearned from the non-use of the timber existing on the plaintiffs’ property, as well as the payment of interest, which must be denied, and ruling on the merits, confirming the rejection ordered by the trial court on these points. The remaining points are left intact.” of the Rincón Office of the Osa Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Osa, ACOSA), of MINAE, stated in its sixth whereas clause (considerando sexto): "That the corresponding study, carried out by the Groundwater Area of the National Groundwater, Irrigation, and Drainage Service (Servicio Nacional de Aguas Subterráneas, Riego y Avenamiento, SENARA), determined that the area in which the property is located is of important aquifer recharge (recarga acuífera)". The foregoing constitutes a concrete declaration by the State, through one of the organs of the A.F.E., in accordance with the rules of canon 94 mentioned, regarding the quality of the plaintiffs' real estate. Furthermore, it was ordered, in the second point of its operative part (parte dispositiva), to proceed in accordance with numeral 94 cited. In resolution No. R-166-98-MINAE, which exhausted the administrative remedies and confirmed the previous contested resolution, the following was set forth: "The technical report of SENARA constitutes real evidence for the administration to verify that the area requested by the appellant is an aquifer recharge zone and, since no document with technical-scientific value was provided to prove the contrary or rebut it, this Ministry must accept it as true and valid." The State, once again, makes an assertion which, being contained in a valid and effective administrative act, comes to constitute a declaration regarding the nature of the property giving rise to the dispute. Therefore, it must be concluded that the Public Administration, in compliance with the rules of ordinal 94 of the Forestry Law Regulations (Reglamento de la Ley Forestal), declared the land as one of aquifer recharge and, for that very reason, decided to continue with the procedure established in said regulation. Subsequently, in judicial proceedings, the operative part of the appellate court's (Tribunal) judgment ordered the Public Administration "...to reimburse the value of the real estate, which must pass to the ownership of the defendant through its notary services, once the price is fixed...". As can be seen, the second-instance judges ordered the State to acquire the land, given the manifest disagreement of its owners in maintaining it under their ownership, with the limitations imposed by the Public Administration. But it is not apparent that the appellate judges directly ordered an expropriation, the accusation being a conclusion specific to the defendant. The Tribunal merely obligated the State to continue with the procedure established in canon 94 of the aforementioned regulation, that is, once the area was declared as one of aquifer recharge and the refusal of its owners to voluntarily subject their property being clear, to proceed to acquire it, either conventionally or through expropriation, in both cases, recognizing the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused. Consequently, the appellate judges did not exceed their authority by ordering that the property pass to the ownership of the defendant; rather, what was ordered in that instance must be understood as the State's obligation to continue with the procedure established in the respective Regulations. The Tribunal, in essence, is ordering the execution of a final act (declared valid, despite the accusations of the plaintiff), and therefore, numeral 228 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) is not violated. At the same time, it corresponds to what was requested by the plaintiff, in the sense of being compensated for the value of the land, and that is nothing other than receiving its price, so that it becomes a demanial asset (bien demanial), serving the common interest. Regarding the condemnation for losses (perjuicios), this point was already analyzed in the preceding whereas clause, to which reference is made. Likewise, regarding the condemnation for the payment of damages (daños), it is reiterated once more that these were not accessory to the nullity of the administrative act, and therefore, the alleged error does not exist. For these reasons, this reproach will be denied as grounds to overturn the contested judgment.

VII.- Regarding the fifth charge, article 33 of the Forestry Law, as concerns the indicated subsection, provides: "The following are declared protection areas: [...] d) The recharge areas and aquifers of springs (manantiales), whose limits shall be determined by the competent bodies established in the regulations of this law." While what the appellant asserts is true, in that it is the State's responsibility to delimit the area within which the aquifer recharge (recarga acuífera) is comprised, this Chamber does not find that the Tribunal substituted the specific competence of the Executive Branch, nor that it ordered payment for the entirety of the plaintiffs' property. The operative part of the contested judgment at no point orders payment for the entirety of the land; on the contrary, it indicates that the price must be fixed. Even more, in whereas clause VIII, on sheet 235, it establishes: "...it is considered pertinent to accept the subsidiary claim, and to order reimbursement of the value of the real estate, which must pass to the ownership of the defendant through its notary services, once the price is fixed (article 94 of the regulations to the Forestry Law)...". It seems evident that, regarding that payment, the appellate judges even referred to the procedure established in canon 94, and there is therefore no deviation from the procedure established for the State to acquire this type of land. Furthermore, the Executive Branch is not being supplanted in declaring the area as one of aquifer recharge. The A.F.E., according to article 2 of the Regulations to the Forestry Law, is comprised of MINAE, the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, SINAC), and the National Forest Finance Fund. In this matter, it is clear how the Rincón - Osa Conservation Area, by denying the logging permit, precisely declared that the lands were of aquifer recharge. This was confirmed by MINAE and was precisely the reason why the forest resource management plan (plan de manejo) for the real estate was rejected. Therefore, based on the aforementioned norm, there was indeed a declaration by the AFE regarding the property's suitability for allowing aquifer recharge and the need to preserve it to protect the surrounding watershed (cuenca hidrográfica). For the foregoing, there was no supplanting of the AFE's power, and all the Tribunal orders the Public Administration is to proceed to conclude the procedure established in ordinal 94, also ordered in the contested act, so that the property owners be compensated for the property damage (daño patrimonial) constituted by the encumbrance of their right of ownership, as requested in the material claims of the complaint. Contrary to what the appellant claims, the limitation imposed by the Rincón - Osa Regional Area does indeed empty the content of that right, as it prevents the exercise of transformation, usufruct (usufructo), use, and enjoyment by the owners of the real estate, who must keep it practically intact, for the purpose of safeguarding the water resource (recurso hídrico), for the benefit of the whole community. To reason that they can give diverse uses to the land, whether touristic or scientific, or collect firewood from branches and trunks fallen by forces of nature, is equivalent to saying that the three plaintiffs must voluntarily submit to the limitations, while the very numeral 94 of the Regulations to the Forestry Law empowers them to refuse to do so and receive payment for the value of their property, either by direct purchase or by expropriation. As for the losses (perjuicios), reference is made to what was expressed in whereas clause IV. Then, as regards the appellant's reiteration regarding the alleged transgression of article 62 of the Regulating Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), the non-accessory nature of the damages (daños) relative to the declaration of nullity of the contested administrative act must be indicated once more, as they are separate claims, the first being subsidiary and the second principal. But, in any case, modern doctrine has imposed the thesis that the contentious-administrative jurisdiction is not a simple reviewer of acts; hence, a declaration of nullity is not necessary to allow for compensation if damages were caused to the administered parties. Finally, the appellant's argument regarding the premature manner in which the action was filed, which did not allow the State to carry out the procedure of numeral 94 cited, is not accepted. It seems clear that six years passed between the origin of the conflict and the present, without the Administration being prevented from approaching the plaintiffs and finalizing the procedure contained in that regulatory norm, which had even been ordered when the permit for the use of standing timber (madera en pie) existing on the property was denied. Consequently, this cassation ground will be denied.

VIII.- Based on all the foregoing analysis, the cassation appeal, on grounds of substance, filed by the representative of the State will be partially granted. The appellate judgment will be partially annulled, only insofar as it granted lost profits (lucro cesante), contained in the amounts not received due to the non-utilization of the timber existing on the plaintiff's real estate, as well as the payment of interest, which must be denied, and, resolving on the merits, confirming the rejection ordered by the trial court on these points. The remaining aspects are left intact." Furthermore, it continues, it was not proven in the record that the plaintiffs' property right had been emptied of content nor that total impossibility of use of the land existed for them. The Court was barred from applying the entirety of the regime of means of execution of the judgment, such as the order to expropriate the entire property, without concrete knowledge of the portion corresponding to aquifers, with the consequent danger of obligating the State to acquire lands in which, eventually, there may be no need given the inexistence of aquifer layers (mantos acuíferos) to protect, or to grant payment of damages (perjuicios), when the regulations expressly prohibit it. Finally, it specifies, a condemnatory judgment is not possible under the prejudgment of the State's delay in ordering the analysis of the property, for the purpose of deciding its eventual acquisition, especially since the plaintiffs filed the judicial action almost simultaneously with the rejection of their forest resources management plan (plan de manejo de recursos forestales).

III.- In the first argument, the appellant accuses the condemnatory judgment against the State to pay damages (daños y perjuicios) as improper. In its view, Articles 23 and 62, both of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), have been violated because the plaintiffs were granted compensation, when this is only proper if the challenged administrative act is declared null. If in this matter no such declaration of invalidity was made, it considers, no pecuniary reparation can be granted. Although both legal provisions indeed regulate the propriety of collecting damages if the nullity of the administrative act under dispute is declared, which would mean the accessory nature of that compensation with respect to the debate surrounding the invalidity of the Public Administration's act, the Court would have erred in this matter only if the plaintiffs had limited their claim to the nullity of the administrative act. But, in the material claims of the complaint, at folios 56 and 57, the following was requested: “...that Resolution 14-98 of 8:00 a.m. on January 12, 1998, and the subsequent resolutions and proceedings be declared illegal and therefore revoked, such that the felling and harvesting of timber be authorized, according to the management plan (plan de manejo) submitted. In the event that the Court does not consider my action proper, I request that the undersigned subsidiarily be compensated for the immobilization of the property, according to the terms of the Constitutional Chamber's jurisprudence on the subject.- That the damages caused be paid, which involve the lack of disposition of the timber contained in the management plan and the interest generated thereby (sic). That the State be condemned to pay both costs of this proceeding”. (The highlighting is not from the original). As can be deduced from the transcribed text, the plaintiffs did not request to be compensated jointly with the declaration of nullity of the act that denied their management plan; rather, they requested that reparation if the invalidity of that administrative action was deemed improper. Therefore, except for what will be discussed in the following recital (considerando) regarding lost profits (lucro cesante), there was no error by the appellate judges in granting the subsidiary claim and the compensation contained therein, since nothing prevents those administered from requesting compensation, pursuant to the provisions of Article 194 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which regulates the civil liability of the State when, as a result of one of its normal actions, it causes patrimonial harm to those administered. Consequently, this first objection of the appeal will be rejected.

IV.- In the second argument, the appellant criticizes that if the Public Administration's conduct was lawful, as the Court declared, even though civil liability may arise from the normal action of the State, there was a breach of Articles 190 and 194 of the General Law of the Public Administration, because the second-instance judges granted the plaintiffs lost profits, violating Article 194 cited, which limits compensation to damages (daños), expressly denying damages (perjuicios). Indeed, as the State's representative accuses, Article 194, subsection 2, of the cited law regulates that the indemnification may only cover damages at the time of its payment, but not lost profits. The dissimilarity between both legal figures, damages and damages (daños y perjuicios), is characterized, mainly, by what is intended to be repaired with them. Damages represent a decrease to the harmed party's current patrimony as a consequence of the patrimonial harmful event, represented by those expenses incurred by the victim of the harmful act, as an adequate effect thereof, which come to represent a loss to their patrimony. Also known as actual loss (daño emergente), it represents an impoverishment in the assets of the injured party, arising from specific subsequent economic expenses that must be incurred as an unavoidable consequence of the harmful action. Conversely, lost profits represent, for the passive subject of the harm, the impediment, generated by the harmful act, to achieving an economic gain or advantage. Instead of seeing their patrimony diminished at the moment of the harmful act, as a result of the economic cost to the victim, they lose the opportunity to increase their patrimony, because if it had not been for the conduct of the author of the harm, they could have accessed a certain gain and consequent increase of their current assets at the time of the harmful act. In this matter, the plaintiffs claim, in the indemnification context, two items. First. The immobilization of the property, insofar as this causes them a patrimonial loss by being unable to dispose of it, thus emptying their property right, regarding the powers of usufruct and transformation, for the sake of protecting the common welfare. Second. The lack of disposition of the timber contained in the management plan, as well as the interest generated on that sum. Regarding the first case, it concerns the collection of damages, that is, the manner in which the plaintiffs see their patrimony diminished by being restricted in the use and enjoyment of the lot (predio) under their domain, which implies a decrease in the value of the asset. The second case branches into two paths. There will clearly be lost profits regarding the collection of legal interest, as it corresponds to the economic gain not received. Likewise, it exists regarding the obstruction represented by the limitation imposed by the State, insofar as the market price that the timber would have fetched from its sale was not received. But, it must be distinguished that the trees within the land (fundo) also represent an economic value and, consequently, a current damage insofar as, if the owners must lose their domain in the pursuit of protecting nature, the trees represent an amount (not necessarily that of their timber in that market sector), which would be lost with the land and, in that circumstance, should be compensated as a decrease of their assets. Therefore, if the Court granted the plaintiffs the lost profits corresponding to the lack of disposition of the timber, establishing its value as of the date of the management plan, as well as legal interest, it collided with the provisions of Article 194 of the General Law of the Public Administration. In any event, by not being able to profit from the timber (exploiting or selling it), they would be compensated with the payment of the price of the asset, which must include the value of the land, the trees, and everything forming part of the property. It must be noted that although the appellate judges considered that every administered person had the right to be compensated for patrimonial detriments suffered due to the State's actions, they did not provide reasons for circumventing the provisions of subsection 2 of the cited Article 194. Consequently, that specific portion must be reversed by this Chamber, and that payment will be denied to the plaintiffs, based on the express legal prohibition existing on the subject.

V.- The violation of Article 194 of the General Law of the Public Administration is alleged, based on the breach of Articles 61 and 62 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. However, the appellant's argument continues to be based on the supposed accessory nature of the damages, with respect to the main claim of invalidating the administrative act of MINAE. As stated above, the plaintiffs never requested the nullity of the act and their compensation; rather, they claimed that if the legality of the State's action was deemed proper, they be compensated for not being able to enjoy their property. In other words, to be repaired in the face of a lawful act of the Public Administration, which safeguards the common interest but harms their private one. Consequently, the Court's oversight reproached by the appellant does not exist, because the cited norms of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction regulate compensation in those cases where it is requested dependently on the declaration of nullity of the administrative act, and that was not what occurred in this specific case. At the same time, both provisions do not affect Article 194 of the General Law of the Public Administration, as they correspond to a different legal situation, because while the former regulate what concerns abnormal acts of the Administration, the latter provides for what concerns lawful acts and the pecuniary liability of the State capable of being generated. Consequently, this argument will be rejected.

VI.- The fourth objection of the State Representative, referring to the alleged infringement of Article 228 of the General Law of the Public Administration, is based on considering that the Court is ordering an expropriation, despite this process not being an execution of judgment nor was that point included among the claims of the complaint. Article 94 of the Forest Law Regulation (Reglamento de la Ley Forestal) provides: “The declaration of an aquifer recharge area (área de recarga acuífera) must be determined in each case and for each particular area based on technical studies that determine the direction of the Underground Flows and the importance of the aquifer for human consumption. Once the study is completed, the A.F.E. will prepare a survey of the area in question and a study on land tenure; subsequently, it will proceed to carry out the respective appraisals and, through an administrative procedure, will have them communicated to each owner or possessor so that they may decide whether to voluntarily submit to the Forestry Regime (Régimen Forestal) or whether to accept payment from the A.F.E., to formalize the direct purchase. Otherwise, the cited administrative procedure will be terminated and expropriation will proceed. Only when the voluntary submission of the farm (finca) or direct purchase has been accepted will a resolution be issued delineating said aquifer; otherwise, it must wait for the competent judge to place the A.F.E. in possession of the corresponding farm.” As can be appreciated, the specific norm for cases such as the one sub judice requires the State Forestry Administration (A.F.E.) to proceed with the acquisition of the land within which the existence of an aquifer recharge area is discovered, if its owner does not voluntarily submit to the limitations that will weigh on their land (fundo). That acquisition could occur by direct purchase, if the State and the administered person agree on a sale price, or by expropriation if no agreement is reached on the value of the land. In other words, the legal system imposes on the State, once the existence of an aquifer recharge area is declared, the obligation to acquire the land within which it is located, when the owner does not accept bearing the limitations on their farm. At the same time, in Resolution No. 014-98 A.R. of the Rincón Office of the Osa Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Osa), of MINAE, it stated in its sixth recital: “That the corresponding study, carried out by the Groundwater Area of the National Groundwater, Irrigation and Drainage Service (Servicio Nacional de Aguas Subterráneas, Riego y Avenamiento), SENARA, determined that the area in which the farm is located is an important aquifer recharge area.” The foregoing constitutes a concrete declaration by the State, through one of the organs of the A.F.E., in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned Article 94, regarding the quality of the plaintiffs' property. Furthermore, in the second point of its operative part, it ordered proceeding in accordance with Article 94 cited. In Resolution No. R-166-98-MINAE, which exhausted the administrative channel and confirmed the previously challenged resolution, the following was stated: “The technical report from SENARA constitutes real proof for the administration to verify that the zone requested by the appellant is an aquifer recharge zone and since no document with technical-scientific value demonstrating the contrary or rebutting it was submitted, this Ministry must accept it as true and valid.” The State, again, makes an assertion which, being contained in a valid and effective administrative act, comes to constitute a declaration regarding the nature of the farm generating the dispute. Therefore, it must be concluded that the Public Administration, in compliance with what is regulated in Article 94 of the Forest Law Regulation, declared the land as an aquifer recharge area and, for this very reason, decided to continue with the procedure established in said norm. Subsequently, in the judicial channel, the operative part of the Court's ruling ordered the Public Administration “...to restore the value of the property, which must pass to the domain of the defendant through its notary services, once the price is fixed...”. As can be appreciated, the second-instance judges ordered the State to acquire the land, given the manifest disagreement of its owners to maintain it under their domain, with the limitations imposed by the Public Administration. But it is not appreciated that the appellate judges directly ordered an expropriation, the accusation being a conclusion of the defendant party itself. The Court limited itself to obligating the State to continue with the process established in Article 94 of the mentioned regulation, that is, once the area is declared an aquifer recharge area and the refusal of its owners to voluntarily submit their farm is clear, proceeding to acquire it, whether conventionally or through expropriation, in both cases, recognizing the damages caused. Consequently, the appellate judges did not overstep by ordering that the land pass to the domain of the defendant; rather, what was ordered in that instance must be understood as the State's obligation to continue with the process established in the respective Regulation. The Court, in essence, is ordering the execution of the final act (by declaring it valid, despite the accusations by the plaintiffs), and therefore Article 228 of the General Law of the Public Administration is not violated. At the same time, it corresponds with what was requested by the plaintiffs, in the sense of being restored in the value of the land, and this is nothing other than receiving its price, so that it becomes a public domain asset (bien demanial), in the service of the common interest. Regarding the condemnation for damages (perjuicios), the point was already analyzed in the preceding recital, to which reference is made. Likewise, regarding the condemnation for damages (daños), it is reiterated again that these were not accessory to the nullity of the administrative act, therefore the denounced error does not exist. Based on the foregoing, this reproach will be denied as a ground to reverse the challenged sentence.

VII.- Regarding the fifth argument, Article 33 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), as to the indicated subsection, provides: “The following are declared protection areas (áreas de protección): [...] d) The recharge areas and the aquifers of the springs (manantiales), whose limits shall be determined by the competent organs established in the regulation of this law.” Although what is affirmed by the appellant is true, in that it corresponds to the State to delimit the area within which the aquifer recharge is comprised, this Chamber does not find that the Court substituted the specific competence of the Executive Branch or that it ordered payment for the entirety of the plaintiffs' farm. The operative part of the challenged sentence at no time orders payment for the entirety of the lot; on the contrary, it indicates that the price must be fixed. Even more, in recital VIII, at folio 235, it establishes: “...it is considered pertinent to grant the subsidiary claim, and to order the restoration of the value of the property, which must pass to the domain of the defendant through its notary services, once the price is fixed (Article 94 of the Forest Law Regulation)...”. It seems evident that regarding this payment, the appellate judges even referred to the process established in Article 94, whereby there is no deviation from the process established for the State to acquire this class of lands. Furthermore, it is not supplanting the Executive Branch in declaring the area as an aquifer recharge area. The A.F.E., according to Article 2 of the Forest Law Regulation, is constituted by MINAE, the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación), and the National Forestry Financing Fund (Fondo Nacional de Fomento Forestal). In this matter, it is clear how the Rincón – Osa Conservation Area, by denying the logging permit, precisely declared that the lands were aquifer recharge areas. This was confirmed by MINAE and was precisely the reason why the forest resources management plan for the property was rejected. Therefore, based on the stated norm, there was a declaration by the AFE regarding the land's capacity to permit aquifer recharge and the need to preserve it to protect the surrounding hydrographic basin. Therefore, there was no supplantation of the power of the AFE, and the only thing the Court orders the Public Administration is to proceed to conclude the process established in Article 94, also ordered in the challenged act, so that the landowners are repaired for the patrimonial damage (daño patrimonial) that constitutes the encumbrance of their ownership right, as requested in the material claims of the complaint. Contrary to what is said by the appellant, the limitation imposed by the Rincón – Osa Area does empty the content of that right, as it prevents the exercise of transformation, usufruct, use, and enjoyment by the property's owners, who must maintain it practically intact, for the purpose of safeguarding the water resource, for the benefit of the entire community. To reason that they can give diverse uses to the land, whether touristic or scientific, or collect firewood from branches and trunks fallen by the effect of nature, is equivalent to saying that the three plaintiffs must voluntarily submit to the limitations, while Article 94 of the Forest Law Regulation itself empowers them to refuse this and receive payment for the value of their land, whether by direct purchase or expropriation. Regarding the damages (perjuicios), reference is made to what was expressed in recital IV. Then, regarding the appellant's reiteration about the alleged transgression of Article 62 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, the inexistence of the accessory nature of the damages must be indicated once again, with respect to the declaration of nullity of the challenged administrative act, as they are diverse claims, the first subsidiary and the second principal. But, in any event, modern doctrine has imposed the thesis that the contentious-administrative jurisdiction is not a simple reviewer of acts, hence the declaration of nullity is not necessary to give way to compensation, if damages were caused to those administered. Finally, the argument of the appellant regarding the premature manner in which the action was filed, which did not allow the State to carry out the process of Article 94 cited, is not admissible. It seems clear that six years elapsed between the origin of the conflict and the present, without the Administration being impeded from approaching the plaintiffs and finalizing the procedure contained in that regulatory norm, which had even been ordered when the permit for the harvesting of standing timber existing on the lot was denied. Consequently, this cassation ground will be denied.

VIII.- Pursuant to all that has been analyzed previously, the cassation appeal, filed by the State's representative, will be partially granted on the merits. The appellate ruling will be partially annulled, only insofar as it granted lost profits, contained in the loss of the benefit from the timber on the plaintiffs' property, as well as the payment of interest, which must be denied, and resolving on the merits confirming the rejection ordered by the trial court on these points. The remaining points stand intact.

“I.- En este proceso los coactores, Nombre343 y Nombre10931, ambos de apellidos Nombre10932, así como Nombre10933, en su condición de copropietarios de la finca inscrita en el Registro Público de la Propiedad Inmueble, Provincia de Puntarenas, matrícula 98256, submatrículas 001, 002 y 003, adujeron haber contratado en 1997 a un ingeniero forestal, con la finalidad de establecer un plan de manejo y explotación de los recursos forestales ubicados dentro de su inmueble. El plan fue presentado a la Oficina Regional del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (en adelante MINAE), en la Península de Osa. Esa oficina, en resolución No. 14-98AR, denegó la aprobación del plan, argumentando que el terreno a ser aprovechado se encuentra dentro de un área crítica por existir alta erosión, cercanía a la costa y topografía irregular, además de ser una zona de recarga acuífera. Los coactores la recurrieron y mediante resolución No. 166-98 MINAE, se rechazó el recurso de apelación, dándose por agotada la vía administrativa. La parte demandante solicitó declarar en sentencia, de forma principal, la nulidad de la resolución No. 14-98 AR, de las 8 horas del 12 de enero de 1998, que rechazó su solicitud, así como las resoluciones y actuaciones subsiguientes, a fin de ser autorizados para cortar y aprovechar la madera, según el plan de manejo presentado. De manera subsidiaria pidió resarcimiento por la inmovilización del predio, según los términos de la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional en esa materia. A la vez, exigió el pago de los daños y perjuicios sufridos, al no poder disponer de la madera, según el contenido del plan citado, así como los intereses generados por esa suma. También solicitó condenar al Estado al pago de ambas costas del proceso. En contraposición, el Estado, a través de un representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, contestó negativamente la demanda, sin oponer excepciones de fondo. Fundado en la característica del terreno, en cuanto sirve para la recarga acuífera de distintos cauces cercanos, afirmó la juricidad del acto administrativo impugnado, el cual se ajustaba en un todo a la normativa pertinente al caso. Defendió la seriedad del informe del Servicio Nacional de Aguas Subterráneas (SENARA), atacado por la parte actora, con fundamento en el cual se les rechazó la solicitud . Asimismo, que la falta de declaratoria formal de área de recarga acuífera, respecto de esa finca, no era obstáculo para denegar el permiso de tala, porque debía prevalecer la realidad de los terrenos sujetos al plan de extracción maderera. Por último, negó la imposibilidad de los actores para aprovechar su finca, aseverando la existencia de actividades económicas disímiles de la tala, prevaleciendo la facultad de uso de la cosa por sus condueños. Solicitó se declaren sin lugar las pretensiones de la parte actora y se les condene al pago de ambas costas del proceso. En primera instancia se declaró sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos, resolviendo sin especial condenatoria en costas. Impugnada esa sentencia por la perdidosa, el Tribunal de alzada dispuso, en su fallo, revocar la resolución apelada, acogiendo la pretensión subsidiaria. Ordenó reponer el valor del inmueble, el cual deberá pasar al dominio del Estado, a través de sus servicios de notaría, una vez fijado su precio. Asimismo, impuso a la parte demandada cancelar los daños y perjuicios causados por la no disposición de la madera, estableciéndose su valor a la fecha del plan de manejo y los intereses de ley hasta ser saldada la totalidad de su valor. Los montos serán determinados en ejecución de sentencia. Condenó al Estado al pago de ambas costas del proceso.

II.- La parte demandada interpuso recurso de casación alegando motivos de fondo. Primero. Aduce violación directa por cuanto acusa infringidos los ordinales 23 y 62 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. La actora en su pretensión había pedido un pronunciamiento de plena jurisdicción, es decir, la nulidad del acto administrativo, restaurar la situación jurídica individualizada y el reconocimiento de los daños y perjuicios provocados por el Estado. El Tribunal, señala, pese a confirmar el rechazo del reclamo contra el acto administrativo de la Oficina de Rincón, en el Área de Conservación Osa del MINAE, concede una denominada petitoria subsidiaria. Con fundamento en lo anterior, otorga la restitución del supuesto daño infringido, pedido en la demanda, como el resarcimiento por no poder disponer de la madera que pretendió extraer; fijando su valor al momento en el cual fue elaborado el plan de manejo para la extracción del mismo, más sus intereses legales. Pero, en su criterio, los numerales citados se violan en el tanto disponen que únicamente se reconocerán los extremos de perjuicios en la misma medida se acredite la ilegalidad del acto administrativo contra el cual se ejerce la acción. En ese sentido cita jurisprudencia de esta Sala. Dada la forma como se falló se infringe, por falta de aplicación, el numeral 23 de cita. El canon 62 mencionado se violó por cuanto estima, la medida adoptada para tutelar el derecho vulnerado, en tesis de los juzgadores de alzada, no resulta viable al no declararse nulo acto administrativo alguno. Así, concluye, la condena en daños y perjuicios es contradictoria con lo normado en los numerales señalados. Segundo. Apunta violación directa, por aplicación indebida, de los artículos 190 y 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Si la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública puede ser por actuación lícita e ilícita, cuando se trata de la primera, indica, debe sujetarse la condenatoria a los requisitos exigidos en el inciso 2 del canon 190 de cita. Si se considera que lo actuado por el Estado produjo daños de especial intensidad, advierte, debió analizarse el otorgamiento de este extremo a la luz de los numerales 194 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. El último ordinal es claro cuando dispone que al existir responsabilidad civil del Estado por sus actuaciones lícitas, solamente es posible reconocer el pago de los daños, pero no así del lucro cesante y; sin embargo, destaca, el Tribunal concedió este último, en cuanto al pago del valor de la madera no aprovechable, conforme a su valor al momento de elaborarse el plan de manejo rechazado. Con ello, se violentó de manera indebida el ordenamiento jurídico. Tercero. Reprocha trasgresión del mismo artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en cuanto no se aplicaron los ordinales 61 y 62 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. La sentencia de segunda instancia, en su criterio, va más allá de lo permitido en el numeral 62 de cita, pues aunque éste permite la adopción de cuantas medidas sean necesarias para restaurar al afectado por un acto administrativo nulo, en el actual proceso no existe posibilidad para disponer de esas medidas si en ningún momento se determinó la invalidez de la decisión del MINAE. Así, continúa, se torna improcedente la orden contra el Estado, de adquirir el terreno de los actores; más bien, lo pertinente era declarar sin lugar la demanda en la totalidad de sus extremos, aspecto que tornaba de necesaria aplicación el artículo 61, inciso primero, mencionado, sin la posibilidad de aplicar ese mismo numeral en su inciso segundo, al no resultar procedente la demanda por la incorrecta calificación jurídica que se estaba dando a los hechos. Cuarto. Señala que la orden del Tribunal es violatoria, en forma directa, del canon 228 de la Ley General de Administración Pública, regla en la cual se hace descansar la supuesta procedencia de la obligación del Estado en adquirir el terreno de los actores. En su parecer constituye el empleo indebido de la norma, porque ésta permitiría el uso de las potestades acordadas al juez para la ejecución de las sentencias firmes en la medida en la cual el fallo se hubiere sustentado en una petitoria de plena jurisdicción. Pero, refuta, si los jueces de alzada en su sentencia tuvieron por válido el acto administrativo, sólo podía disponer de los daños acreditados en autos. Por ello, lo otorgado a la parte actora en el fallo impugnado es una orden de expropiación, sin que ésta formara parte de las pretensiones de la demanda. Quinto. Asevera infringido, por inaplicación, el artículo 33, inciso d, de la Ley Forestal. Dicha norma impone a la Administración Pública la competencia para delimitar el área de la zona de protección de recarga de un acuífero, conforme al procedimiento establecido en el numeral 94 del Reglamento concerniente a esa ley. Pero, en su criterio, el Tribunal desaplica la norma y se atribuye la competencia específica del Poder Ejecutivo para considerar cuál es la zona de protección hídrica. El fallo impugnado detalla, ni siquiera ordena el levantamiento del área para ser evaluada, conforme al numeral 94 citado; por el contrario, dispone directamente la expropiación del predio a priori, sin contar con la certeza de cuál porción del terreno es zona de acuíferos y cuál no. Se viola así, también, el canon 62 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa, pues configuraría una evidente falta de empleo de las disposiciones que, válidamente, podría estar adoptando en un fallo estimatorio de la instancia. Sería, insiste, obligar al Estado a la emisión de actos de distinta naturaleza en beneficio del actor del proceso, a través de la impugnación a un acto administrativo. Ello no está regulado en el ordenamiento jurídico y, por ende, es infractor de éste. Además, continúa, no se acreditó en autos que se haya vaciado de contenido el derecho de propiedad de los actores ni la imposibilidad total de uso del fundo para éstos. Le estaba vedado al Tribunal aplicar la totalidad del régimen de medios de ejecución de la sentencia, tal como la orden de expropiar todo el inmueble, sin conocimiento concreto de la parte correspondiente a acuíferos, con el consiguiente peligro de obligar al Estado a adquirir terrenos en los cuales, eventualmente, no haya necesidad ante la inexistencia de mantos acuíferos por proteger o conceder el pago de perjuicios, cuando ello lo prohíbe la normativa en forma expresa. Por último, puntualiza, no es posible la condenatoria bajo el prejuzgamiento del atraso del Estado en disponer el análisis del predio, con la finalidad de decidir su eventual adquisición, máxime si los actores ejercieron la acción judicial casi de manera simultánea al rechazo de su plan de manejo de recursos forestales.

III.- En el primer cargo el casacionista acusa de improcedente la condenatoria contra el Estado a pagar daños y perjuicios. En su criterio, se han violentado los ordinales 23 y 62, ambos de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, porque se concedió a la parte actora resarcimiento, cuando ello solamente es procedente si se declara nulo el acto administrativo impugnado. Si en este asunto no se hizo esa declaratoria de invalidez, estima, no puede ser otorgada reparación pecuniaria alguna. Si bien ambas disposiciones legales regulan, efectivamente, la procedencia del cobro de daños y perjuicios si se declara la nulidad del acto administrativo objeto de contención, lo cual a contrario sensu significaría el carácter accesorio de ese resarcimiento respecto de lo debatido en torno a la invalidez del acto de la Administración Pública, el Tribunal habría errado en este asunto sólo si la parte actora hubiera limitado su pretensión a la nulidad del acto administrativo. Pero, en las pretensiones materiales de la demanda, a folios 56 y 57, se solicitó: “...se declare ilegal y por tanto sea revocada la resolución 14-98 de las 8 horas del 12 de enero de 1998 y las resoluciones y actuaciones sub siguientes, de forma que se me autorice la corta y aprovechamiento de la madera, según el plan de manejo presentado. En caso de que el Juzgado no considere procedente mi gestión, solicito se proceda en forma subsidiaria a indemnizar a los suscritos por la inmovilización del inmueble, según los términos de la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional sobre el tema.- Que se cancelen los daños y perjuicios causados, los cuales implican la no disposición de la madera, contenida en el plan de manejo y los intereses que ello a generado (sic). Que se condene al estado al pago de ambas costas de este proceso”. (El resaltado no es del original). Como logra desprenderse del texto trascrito, los actores no pidieron ser indemnizados de manera conjunta a la declaratoria de nulidad del acto que denegó su plan de manejo; más bien, pidieron esa reparación si se estimaba la improcedencia de la invalidez de esa actuación administrativa. Entonces, salvo lo que se dirá en el siguiente considerando respecto del lucro cesante, no hubo desatino de los juzgadores de alzada en acoger la pretensión subsidiaria y el resarcimiento contenido en la misma, pues nada impide a los administrados solicitar indemnización, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en el cual se regula la responsabilidad civil del Estado cuando, a partir de una de sus actuaciones normales, provoca menoscabos patrimoniales a los administrados. En consecuencia, se rechazará este primer reparo del recurso.

IV.- En el segundo cargo la parte recurrente critica que si la conducta de la Administración Pública fue lícita, como lo declaró el Tribunal, aunque se pueda derivar responsabilidad civil de la actuación normal del Estado, hubo quebrantamiento de los numerales 190 y 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, pues los jueces de segunda instancia le otorgaron a los actores el lucro cesante, violentando el canon 194 de cita, en el cual se limita el resarcimiento a los daños, denegando mediante norma expresa los perjuicios. En efecto, como lo acusa el representante del Estado, el artículo 194, inciso 2, de la ley citada regula que la indemnización sólo podrá cubrir los daños al momento de su pago, pero no el lucro cesante. La disimilitud entre ambas figuras jurídicas, daños y perjuicios, se caracteriza, principalmente, por lo que se pretende reparar con las mismas. El daño representa una disminución al patrimonio actual del perjudicado como consecuencia del hecho dañoso patrimonial representada por aquellos gastos en los cuales incurre la víctima del acto dañino, como efecto adecuado de este, los que vienen a representar una pérdida para su patrimonio. También conocido como daño emergente, representa un empobrecimiento en el peculio del damnificado, devenido de gastos posteriores económicos concretos que se deban realizar como consecuencia ineludible de la acción lesiva. Por el contrario, el lucro cesante o perjuicio representa, para el sujeto pasivo del menoscabo, el impedimento, generado por el acto dañino, para alcanzar una ganancia o ventaja económica. En vez de ver mermado su patrimonio al momento del acto lesivo de éste, a raíz del costo económico para la víctima, pierde la oportunidad de aumentar su patrimonio, porque de no haber sido por la conducta del autor del menoscabo, habría podido acceder a una determinada ganancia y consecuente aumento de su peculio actual al momento del acto dañino. En este asunto la parte actora pretende, en el ámbito indemnizatorio, dos rubros. Primero. La inmovilización del inmueble, en cuanto esto les provoca una pérdida patrimonial al no poder disponer del mismo, vaciándose así su derecho de propiedad, en cuanto a los poderes de usufructo y transformación, en aras de la protección del bienestar común. Segundo. La falta de disposición de la madera, contenida en el plan de manejo, así como los intereses generados por esa suma. En cuanto al caso inicial se trata del cobro de daño, es decir, la forma en que los actores ven disminuido su patrimonio al ser restringidos en el uso y disfrute del predio bajo su dominio, lo que implica una disminución del valor del bien. El segundo caso se bifurca en dos vías. Habrá lucro cesante, de forma clara, en lo concerniente al cobro de intereses legales, por corresponder a la ganancia económica dejada de percibir. Asimismo, lo hay en lo referente a la obstrucción representada por la limitante impuesta por el Estado, en el tanto se dejó de percibir el precio de plaza que habría alcanzado la madera a partir de su venta. Pero, debe distinguirse que los árboles dentro del fundo representan también un valor económico y, por consiguiente, un daño actual en cuanto a que, si los propietarios deben perder su dominio en la búsqueda de la protección de la naturaleza, los árboles representan un importe, (no necesariamente el de su madera en ese ramo de mercado), el cual se perdería con el terreno y; en esa circunstancia, debería ser indemnizado como disminución de su peculio. Por lo anterior, si el Tribunal le otorgó a la parte actora el lucro cesante correspondiente a la falta de disposición de la madera, estableciendo su valor a la fecha del plan de manejo, así como intereses legales, colisionó con lo reglado en el canon 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. En todo caso al no poder lucrar con la madera (explotándola o vendiéndola) quedaría resarcido con el pago del precio del bien, el cual debe comprender el valor del suelo, los árboles y todo lo que forme parte del inmueble. Debe hacerse notar que si bien los jueces de alzada consideraron que todo administrado tenía derecho a ser resarcido por los detrimentos patrimoniales sufridos por las actuaciones del Estado, no acotó razones sobre la desaplicación de lo normado en el inciso 2 del numeral 194 citado. Consecuentemente, ese extremo específico deberá ser casado por esta Sala y se denegará ese pago a los actores, con fundamento en la prohibición legal expresa existente en torno al tema.

V.- Se acusa la violación del artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, a partir del quebrantamiento de los ordinales 61 y 62 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. Pero, el argumento de la recurrente continúa fundándose en el supuesto carácter accesorio de los daños y perjuicios, respecto de la pretensión principal de invalidar el acto administrativo del MINAE. Como se expuso supra, la parte actora nunca pidió la nulidad del acto y su indemnización, más bien, pretendió que si se estimaba la juricidad de la actuación del Estado, se le indemnizara por no poder disfrutar de su inmueble. En otras palabras, ser reparado ante un acto lícito de la Administración Pública, el cual salvaguarda el interés común pero perjudica el suyo particular. Consecuentemente, no existe la inadvertencia del Tribunal reprochada por la recurrente, porque las normas citadas de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa regulan el resarcimiento en aquellos casos donde se pide de manera dependiente de la declaratoria de nulidad del acto administrativo y ello no fue lo acaecido en este caso concreto. A la vez, ambas disposiciones no afectan al artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, por corresponder a una situación jurídica diversa, porque mientras aquellos reglan lo concerniente a actos anormales de la Administración, esta última dispone lo tocante a los actos lícitos y la responsabilidad pecuniaria del Estado capaz de generar. Por consiguiente, se rechazará este cargo.

VI.- El cuarto reparo del Representante estatal, referido a la supuesta infracción del numeral 228 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, parte de considerar que el Tribunal está ordenando una expropiación, pese a no ser este proceso una ejecución de sentencia ni estar ese extremo incluido dentro de las pretensiones de la demanda. El artículo 94 del Reglamento de la Ley Forestal dispone: “La declaración de un área de recarga acuífera, deberá ser determinada en cada caso y para cada área en particular basado en estudios técnicos, que determinen la dirección de los Flujos Subterráneos y la importancia del acuífero para consumo humano. Una vez realizado el estudio, la A.F.E. elaborará un levantamiento del área en cuestión y un estudio sobre la tenencia de la tierra, posteriormente procederá a realizar los respectivos avalúos y mediante un procedimiento administrativo los hará comunicar a cada propietario o propietaria o poseedor a fin de que éste decida si se somete voluntariamente al Régimen Forestal o si acepta el pago por parte de la A.F.E., para formalizar la compra directa. En caso contrario, se dará por terminado el citado procedimiento administrativo y se procederá a la expropiación. Solamente cuando se haya aceptado el sometimiento voluntario de la finca o la compra directa se procederá a emitir una resolución donde delimite dicho acuífero, caso contrario deberá esperarse a que el juez competente ponga en posesión a la A.F.E. de la finca correspondiente”. Como puede apreciarse, la norma específica para casos como el sub júdice impone a la Administración Forestal del Estado (A.F.E.), proceder a la adquisición del terreno dentro del cual se descubre la existencia de un área de recarga acuífera, si su propietario no se somete voluntariamente a las limitaciones que pesarán sobre su fundo. Esa adquisición podría darse por compra directa, si Estado y administrado acuerdan un precio de venta, o bien, mediante expropiación de no llegarse a ese convenio sobre el valor del terreno. En otras palabras, el ordenamiento jurídico le impone al Estado, una vez que se declare la existencia de un área de recarga acuífera, la obligación de adquirir la tierra dentro de la cual se encuentre, cuando el dueño no acepte soportar las limitaciones sobre su finca. A la vez, en la Resolución No. 014-98 A.R. de la Oficina Rincón del Área de Conservación Osa, del MINAE, señaló en su considerando sexto: “Que el estudio correspondiente, efectuado por el Área de Aguas Subterráneas del Servicio Nacional de Aguas Subterráneas, Riego y Avenamiento SENARA, determinó que el área en la cual se ubica la finca es de recarga acuífera importante”. Lo anterior constituye una declaración concreta del Estado, mediante uno de los órganos de la A.F.E., en ajuste con lo reglado en el canon 94 mencionado, acerca de la calidad del inmueble de los actores. Además, se dispuso, en el segundo punto de su parte dispositiva, proceder de acuerdo con el numeral 94 de cita. En la resolución No. R-166-98-MINAE, la cual agotó la vía administrativa y confirmó la resolución anterior impugnada, se expuso lo siguiente: “El informe técnico del SENARA, constituye una prueba real para la administración para comprobar que la zona solicitada por el recurrente, es una zona de recarga acuífera y que al no haberse aportado un documento con valor técnico–científico que demuestre lo contrario o rebata el mismo, este Ministerio debe acogerlo como cierto y valedero”. El Estado, nuevamente, realiza una aseveración la cual, al estar contenida en un acto administrativo válido y eficaz, viene a constituir una declaratoria sobre la naturaleza de la finca generadora de la disputa. Por lo anterior, debe concluirse que la Administración Pública, en apego a lo regulado en el ordinal 94 del Reglamento de la Ley Forestal, declaró el terreno como de recarga acuífera y, por ello mismo, decidió continuar con el procedimiento establecido en dicha norma. Posteriormente, en vía judicial, la parte dispositiva del fallo del Tribunal dispuso ordenar a la Administración Pública “...reponer el valor del inmueble, que deberá pasar a dominio de la demandada mediante sus servicios de notaría, una vez fijado el precio...”. Como se aprecia, los juzgadores de segunda instancia ordenaron al Estado adquirir el terreno, dada la inconformidad manifiesta de sus propietarios en mantenerlo bajo su dominio, con las limitaciones que impuso la Administración Pública. Pero no se aprecia que los jueces de alzada hayan ordenado directamente una expropiación, siendo lo acusado una conclusión propia de la parte demandada. El Tribunal se limitó a obligar al Estado a continuar con el trámite establecido en el canon 94 del reglamento mencionado, es decir, declarada el área como de recarga acuífera y siendo clara la renuencia de sus propietarios en someter su finca de manera voluntaria, proceder a adquirirla, sea de manera convencional o mediante expropiación, en ambos casos, reconociendo los daños y perjuicios causados. En consecuencia, los jueces de alzada no se extralimitaron ordenando que el fundo, pase a dominio de la demandada sino que lo dispuesto en esa instancia debe entenderse como la obligación del Estado de continuar con el trámite establecido en el Reglamento respectivo. El Tribunal, en el fondo, lo que hace es ordenar la ejecución del acto firme, (al declararse válido, pese a lo acusado por la parte actora), y por ello no se viola el numeral 228 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. A la vez, corresponde con lo peticionado por la parte actora, en el sentido de ser repuestos en el valor del terreno y ello no es otra cosa que recibir su precio, a fin de que el mismo se transforme en un bien demanial, al servicio del interés común. Respecto de la condena en perjuicios, el punto ya fue analizado en el considerando trasanterior, al cual se remite. Asimismo, respecto de la condena al pago de daños, se vuelve a reiterar que estos no eran accesorios a la nulidad del acto administrativo, por lo cual no existe el yerro denunciado. En razón de lo expuesto, se denegará este reproche como motivo para casar la sentencia impugnada.

VII.- En lo atinente al quinto cargo, el artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal, en cuanto al inciso indicado, dispone: “Se declaran áreas de protección las siguientes: [...] d) Las áreas de recarga y los acuíferos de los manantiales, cuyos límites serán determinados por los órganos competentes establecidos en el reglamento de esta ley”. Si bien es cierto lo afirmado por la recurrente, en cuanto a que corresponde al Estado delimitar el área en la cual la recarga acuífera está comprendida, no encuentra esta Sala que el Tribunal haya sustituido la competencia específica del Poder Ejecutivo ni que se ordene el pago de la totalidad de la finca de los actores. La parte dispositiva de la sentencia impugnada en ningún momento dispone el pago de la totalidad del predio, por el contrario, indica que el precio debe ser fijado. Aún más, en el considerando VIII, a folio 235, establece: “...se considera pertinente acoger la pretensión subsidiaria, y ordenar reponer el valor del inmueble, que deberá pasar a dominio de la demandada mediante sus servicios de notaría, una vez fijado el precio (artículo 94 de reglamento a Ley Forestal)...”. Parece evidente que respecto de ese pago, incluso, los juzgadores de alzada hicieron remisión al trámite establecido en el canon 94, con lo cual no hay desvío del trámite instaurado para que el Estado adquiera esa clase de terrenos. Además, no se está suplantando al Poder Ejecutivo en declarar el área como de recarga acuífera. La A.F.E., según el artículo 2 del Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, está constituida por el MINAE, el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación y el Fondo Nacional de Fomento Forestal. En este asunto es claro como el Área de Conservación Rincón – Osa, al denegar el permiso de tala, declaró de manera precisa que los terrenos eran de recarga acuífera. Ello lo confirmó el MINAE y fue precisamente la razón por la cual se rechazó el plan de manejo de los recursos forestales del inmueble. Por lo tanto, a partir de la norma expuesta, sí hubo una declaratoria de la AFE en torno a la aptitud del fundo de permitir la recarga acuífera y la necesidad de ser preservado para proteger la cuenca hidrográfica circundante. Por lo anterior, no hubo suplantación de la potestad del AFE y lo único que el Tribunal ordena a la Administración Pública es proceder a concluir con el trámite establecido en el ordinal 94, ordenado además en el acto impugnado, a fin de que los propietarios del fundo sean reparados del daño patrimonial que constituye el encarecimiento de su derecho de dominio, tal como se solicita en las pretensiones materiales de la demanda. Contrario a lo dicho por la recurrente, la limitación impuesta por el Área Regional de Rincón – Osa, sí vacía el contenido de ese derecho, pues impide el ejercicio de transformación, usufructo, uso y disfrute de los dueños del inmueble, quienes deben mantenerlo prácticamente intacto, con la finalidad de salvaguardar el recurso hídrico, en beneficio de toda la comunidad. Razonar que pueden darle usos diversos a la tierra, sean turísticos o científicos, o bien, recoger leña de las ramas y troncos caídos por efecto de la naturaleza, equivale a decir que los tres actores deben someterse voluntariamente a las limitaciones, mientras el propio numeral 94 del Reglamento a la Ley Forestal les faculta negarse a ello y recibir el pago del valor de su fundo, sea por compra directa o por expropiación. En cuanto a los perjuicios, se remite a lo expresado en el considerando IV. Luego, en lo atinente a la reiteración de la recurrente, sobre la presunta trasgresión del artículo 62 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, debe indicarse otra vez la inexistencia de accesoriedad de los daños, respecto de la declaratoria de nulidad del acto administrativo impugnado, por tratarse de pretensiones diversas, la primera subsidiaria y la segunda principal. Pero, en todo caso, la doctrina moderna ha impuesto la tesis de que la jurisdicción de lo contencioso administrativo no es una simple revisora de actos, de ahí que no es necesaria la declaratoria de nulidad para dar paso al resarcimiento, si se causaren daños a los administrados. Por último, no es de recibo el argumento de la recurrente, en el sentido de la forma anticipada en la cual se ejerció la acción, lo cual no le permitió al Estado llevar a cabo el trámite del numeral 94 de cita. Parece claro que trascurrieron seis años entre el origen del conflicto y la actualidad, sin que la Administración estuviera impedida para acercarse a los actores y finalizar el procedimiento contenido en esa norma reglamentaria, el cual incluso se había ordenado al denegarse el permiso de aprovechamiento de la madera en pie existente en el predio. En consecuencia, se denegará este motivo de casación.

VIII.- Al tenor de todo lo analizado con anterioridad, se acogerá parcialmente el recurso de casación, por razones de fondo, interpuesto por el representante del Estado. Se anulará de manera parcial el fallo de alzada, sólo en cuanto otorgó lucro cesante, contenido en lo dejado de percibir por el no aprovechamiento de la madera existente en el inmueble de la parte actora, así como el pago de intereses, los cuales se deberán denegar, y resolviendo sobre el fondo confirmando sobre estos extremos el rechazo dispuesto por el juzgado. Se dejan intactos los demás extremos.”