Prescription of Disciplinary Power in the CCSSPrescripción de la potestad disciplinaria en la CCSS

IV. ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF THE DISCIPLINARY POWER (POTESTAD DISCIPLINARIA)

The first charge raised by the plaintiff that must be analyzed refers to the claim of extinction of the Administration's power to sanction him based on the public employment relationship he maintained with the defendant entity. Should this argument be true, it will imply the absolute nullity of the administrative proceeding that culminated in the dismissal being challenged in this process, consequently making it unnecessary to address the remaining complaints raised against the conduct of the agents of the CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL in this sanctioning procedural path. Regarding this grievance, it must be kept in mind that the Administration's disciplinary power, as a manifestation of the State's ius puniendi, refers to its power, authority, or capacity to control the conduct of its servants, in order to investigate and, eventually, sanction that official who fails to comply with the duties of the position to which they were appointed, thereby seeking a guarantee for the exercise of public function. Parallel to this power, the duty of supervision and adoption of necessary measures for good administration also arises (Article 102, subsections c and d of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), which speaks not only of a protection of administrative functioning, but also of a timely action by the Administration for the exercise of such power which, if not acted upon within the corresponding period by the management, supervisory, and sanctioning bodies, an extinctive term for that disciplinary power arises as a limit and defense of the principle of legal certainty (principio de seguridad jurídica). For these purposes, the legislation stipulates an ordinary period that is determined by Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo and corresponds to one month, a timeframe within which the disciplinary proceeding must be initiated, after the administrative head or the person competent to sanction becomes aware of the alleged fault; that is, once the official who can exercise the power of correction is informed of the facts, so that it does not expire, the act initiating the proceeding must be notified to the person under investigation within the following month. Now, the legal system contemplates exceptional situations, such as, for example, a period of five years set forth in Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Ley Nº 7428. Precisely, the discussion in this administrative proceeding has revolved around both periods. The plaintiff insists that the applicable one is one month, while the Administration has leaned toward the five-year period. It is now appropriate to define the controversy. To do so, it must be kept in mind that the possibility of overriding the ordinary period—one month—is defined by the specialty of the facts under investigation, in this particular case, as will be explained below, the need for the oversight (fiscalización) of the public treasury (hacienda pública) to be involved. Indeed, as indicated by the Sala Constitucional through its rulings Voto Nº 2011-010121 of 15:23 hours on 03 de agosto del 2011 and Voto Nº 6750-97 of 11:12 hours on 17 de octubre de 1997, the protection of public funds is the reason for justifying such a significant variation in the statute of limitations for the sanctioning power. The first of those rulings states, referring to Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República: “… said rule must be applied only in the cases of those public servants who are «directly related to the handling and disposal of public funds», an aspect whose definition or determination must occur in each specific case; in other words, determining that a person is a public servant or official who handles, administers, or guards public treasury funds is a matter within the competence of the technical jurisdiction in each case submitted to its knowledge. Seeking a generic interpretation like the one attempted by the plaintiff by alleging the unconstitutionality of the jurisprudence of the Sala Segunda, is to prejudge in this venue particular cases that must be resolved by the ordinary jurisdiction, in accordance with the evidence filed in the case records and according to the applicable facts and regulations. Indeed, the Sala Constitucional has already been clear and precise in defining to which officials the cited Article 71 should be applied; now, establishing whether a specific person fits the assumptions of said rule is an aspect that must be elucidated, discussed, questioned, and defined in each specific case, therefore it is improper to seek that, in an a priori manner, the constitutional jurisdiction issue a pronouncement qualifying or defining whether the rule should be applied in cases where one of the procedural subjects is a specific servant or official of the national banking system.” Prior to the modification of the cited Article 71 by subsection a) of Article 45 of the Ley Nº 8292 of 31 de julio del 2002, Ley de Control Interno, the applicability of that provision was more restricted. Before that reform, it read: “STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF DISCIPLINARY RESPONSIBILITY The disciplinary responsibility of the servant of the Hacienda Pública shall prescribe within the period of two years, counted from the confirmed knowledge of the fault by the competent body to initiate the respective sanctioning proceeding. For these purposes, Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo and any other legal provisions that oppose it are hereby reformed, with respect to officials or public servants. The confirmation of knowledge of the fault may be made by any means of proof, with the value it holds, in accordance with the Ley General de la Administración Pública and, supplementarily, in accordance with common law. When the author of the fault is the head of the entity, the period shall begin to run from the date on which they terminate their service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. It shall be deemed a serious fault of the competent official to initiate the sanctioning proceeding, to not initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the responsibility of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause.” With that wording, there was not only a shorter extraordinary period (two years), but also its application was limited to officials of the Hacienda Pública, based on a subjective criterion. With the modification, the text was as follows: “Statute of limitations (Prescripción) of disciplinary responsibility. The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight (fiscalización) legal framework, shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as that act which requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the inquiry or the respective audit is made known to the head of the entity or the competent official to initiate the respective proceeding. The statute of limitations (prescripción) shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible person of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding. When the author of the fault is the head of the entity, the period shall begin to run from the date on which they terminate their service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. It shall be deemed a serious fault of the competent official to initiate the sanctioning proceeding, to not initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the responsibility of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause.” In this way, not only was the period extended from two to five years, but also the scope of application of the rule, by incorporating public officials in general, insofar as their actions entail an infraction of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría, or the current control and oversight provisions. Consequently, it transmuted to a material-objective vision, where the transcendence of the protection of public funds prevails over the direct link of the official with the Hacienda Pública. The Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, confirming the judgment Nº 101-2011-V of 15:30 hours on 24 de octubre del 2012 of the Sección Quinta of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, endorsed this position by stating: “… in relation to the transgression of the control and oversight legal framework or that relating to the Hacienda Pública, the 5-year statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power applies. This criterion allows the statute of limitations (prescripción) … applicable in cases of a labor nature to be differentiated, in accordance with the provisions of Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo. That with the reform undergone by Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, the assessment criterion was changed to determine the applicable statute of limitations (prescripción) period, since it shifts from a subjective regime to an objective one. That is, it is no longer necessary to perform the assessment exercise of whether the servant is of the Hacienda Pública (subjective aspect). Since it is sufficient to determine the transgression of the control and oversight legal framework of the Hacienda Pública, which follows an objective material criterion …” (Voto Nº 623-A-S1-2013 of 10:25 hours on 16 de mayo de 2013). In the case at hand, the administrative proceeding aimed to determine, in relation to Mr. PEDRO DAMIÁN SALAZAR JAIME, the inadequate management of the controls established for the disbursement of public funds based on his potential participation in the repair and purchase of spare parts for the vehicle assigned to him at the Sucursal de Quepos, the place where he worked. Through this, he had access to the handling of public monies that, as was being questioned, could imply a direct benefit. Consequently, it is the criterion of this Jurisdictional Body that the applicable prescriptive period is the special one of five years, so much so that when the corresponding charge was made, the potential breach of provisions such as Article 8 of the Ley de Control Interno, 3 and 49 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, 110 of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuesto Públicos, among others, was indicated as the basis, related precisely to the control and oversight of public funds. Thus, given that the results of the Internal Audit report were made known to the Director General de Sucursales Brunca, the official competent to exercise disciplinary power over the plaintiff here, on 07 de abril del 2010, and the Investigating Body (Órgano Director) of the Administrative Disciplinary Proceeding notified the order initiating proceedings on 03 de diciembre del 2010, that is, slightly less than eight months later, the term stipulated in Article 71, subsection b)—the act not being notorious and having required an audit study—of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, as well as Article 43 of the Ley General de Control Interno and 44 of the Ley de Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito was satisfied. Therefore, contrary to the plaintiff's thesis, the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power did not operate in the sanctioning proceeding conducted against Mr. SALAZAR JAIME.

V.- ON THE APPLICABLE REGULATION IN THIS MATTER: Once the non-extinction of the sanctioning power in this matter has been determined, it is necessary to define which administrative procedure must be satisfied. It is clear that the procedure provided by the Ley General de la Administración Pública, at least regarding principles, is applicable in this case; however, it must be kept in mind that by agreement adopted by the Junta Directiva of the CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL, Article 5 of Session No. 8474 of 21 de octubre del 2010, the Normativa de Relaciones Laborales of the CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL was issued (modifying the previous regulation enacted by the Junta Directiva in Article 23 and Article 1 of Sessions Nos. 7217 and 7234, held, respectively, on 23 de mayo and 30 de junio, both in 1998). Article 1 of that legal body, when setting the scope of application, states: "The provisions contained in this Normativa de Relaciones Laborales are mandatory for all workers of the Caja and the unions' relations with the institution, regardless of their location and headquarters where they provide services to the CCSS." Consequently, it is this rule that stipulates the disciplinary procedure for the officials of that institution, as long as it does not conflict with provisions of higher hierarchy, in which case the non-application, in protection of the legal system, would be appropriate under Article 8 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. In this case, the issue of the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power within the five-year period is covered by Article 146, third paragraph, meaning there is no confrontation with the first paragraph of that same article, nor with Article 116 and 118, so no conflict arises on this point. Now, Articles 118 through 141 regulate the so-called Processing of the Ordinary Procedure (Trámite del Procedimiento Ordinario) which, broadly, has the following important elements: a) The deciding body must order the opening of the administrative proceeding within a period of one month or five years (Articles 118 and 146.3); b) The deciding body shall form the investigating body (órgano director) of the proceeding (119 and 120); c) The investigating body must notify the act initiating proceedings, which shall contain a series of specifications seeking due process defense (121); d) Breadth of evidentiary elements (124); e) Impossibility of conciliation in disciplinary matters (125); f) Summons to a hearing under the parameters of Article 311 of the LGAP (126); g) The hearing shall be oral and private, exceptionally public (129); h) The parties shall present final arguments after receiving all the evidence according to 317 of the LGAP (131); i) Submission of a conclusions report by the Investigating Body (132); j) Communication of the conclusions report (133); k) Archiving of the matter or proposal of sanction, informing in the latter case that the party has five business days to challenge the decision before the Comisión de Relaciones Laborales (134); l) If no opposition to being heard by the Comisión is shown within five days after notification, the final act shall be issued; if opposed, a hearing may even be requested. What that body resolves must be notified to the interested party and the deciding body, a proposal that may be challenged within the subsequent five days, in the given competence scenarios—dismissals and suspensions of three days or more—before the Junta Nacional de Relaciones Laborales (135, 136 and 137); ll) Issuance and notification of the final act of the proceeding (138); m) Motions for reconsideration (revocatoria) and appeal (apelación) (139). Based on the foregoing normative framework, it is appropriate to evaluate the complaints raised by the plaintiff, in order to determine the existence of defects implying nullity of the challenged dismissal […].

The verification of knowledge of the fault may be carried out by any means of proof, with the value that it holds, in accordance with the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and, supplementarily, in accordance with common law. When the author of the fault is the head of the entity (jerarca), the period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. The failure of the competent official to initiate the sanctioning procedure in a timely manner or to allow the responsibility of the offender to prescribe, without just cause, shall be considered a serious fault (falta grave) of that official.” With that wording, not only was there an extraordinary shorter period (two years), but its application was also limited to officials of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), based on a subjective criterion. With the amendment, the text was left as follows: “Prescription (Prescripción) of disciplinary responsibility. The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight legal system, shall prescribe according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious – understood as that act which requires an investigation or an audit study to report on its possible irregularity – responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is made known to the head of the entity (jerarca) or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. Prescription shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible party of the act that orders the initiation of the administrative procedure. When the author of the fault is the head of the entity (jerarca), the period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. The failure of the competent official to initiate the sanctioning procedure in a timely manner or to allow the responsibility of the offender to prescribe, without just cause, shall be considered a serious fault (falta grave) of that official.” In this way, not only was the period extended from two to five years, but also the scope of application of the norm, by incorporating public officials in general, insofar as their actions entail an infraction of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría), or the current control and oversight provisions. Consequently, it transmuted to a material-objective vision, where the transcendence of the protection of public funds prevails over the direct link of the official with the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), confirming judgment No. 101-2011-V of 15:30 hours of October 24, 2012, of the Fifth Section (Sección Quinta) of the Contentious Administrative Tribunal, endorsed such a position by stating: “… in relation to the transgression of the control and oversight legal system or relating to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), the 5-year prescription period for the disciplinary power applies. This criterion allows differentiating the prescription … applicable in cases of a labor nature, in accordance with the provisions of article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). That with the reform that article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) underwent, the assessment criterion was varied, to determine the applicable prescription period, inasmuch as it moves from a subjective regime to an objective one. That is, it is no longer necessary to make the assessment exercise of whether the servant is from the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) (subjective aspect). For it is enough to determine the transgression of the control and oversight legal system of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), which obeys an objective material criterion …” (Voto Nº 623-A-S1-2013 of 10:25 hours of May 16, 2013). In the specific case, the administrative procedure had the purpose of determining, in relation to Mr. PEDRO DAMIÁN SALAZAR JAIME, the inadequate handling of the controls determined for the disbursement of public funds based on his possibility of participating in the repair and purchase procedure for the vehicle assigned to him at the Branch (Sucursal) of Quepos, the place where he worked. With this, he maintained access to the handling of public monies which, as was questioned, could imply a direct benefit. Consequently, it is the criterion of this Jurisdictional Body that the applicable prescriptive period is the special one of five years, so much so that when making the corresponding notification (intimación), the basis indicated was the eventual violation of provisions such as article 8 of the Law of Internal Control (Ley de Control Interno), 3 and 49 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), 110 of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets (Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuesto Públicos), among others, related precisely to the control and oversight of public funds, thus, given that the results of the Internal Audit (Auditoría Interna) report were made known to the Director General of Branches Brunca, the competent official to exercise the disciplinary power over the plaintiff here, on April 7, 2010 and the Directing Body of the Administrative Disciplinary Procedure notified the commencement order on December 3, 2010, that is, a little less than eight months later, by which, the term stipulated in numeral 71, subsection b) –since the act was not notorious and required an audit study–, of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), as well as numerals 43 of the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno) and 44 of the Law of Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Ley de Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito). Consequently, contrary to the thesis of the plaintiff, the prescription of the disciplinary power did not operate in the sanctioning procedure processed against Mr. SALAZAR JAIME.- V.- ON THE REGULATION APPLICABLE IN THIS MATTER: Once the non-extinction of the sanctioning power in this matter has been determined, it is necessary to define which administrative procedure must be satisfied. It is clear that the one provided by the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), at least as to principles, is applicable in this case, however, it must be borne in mind that by agreement adopted by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of the COSTA RICAN SOCIAL SECURITY FUND (CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL), article 5 of Session number 8474 of October 21, 2010, the Labor Relations Regulations (Normativa de Relaciones Laborales) of the COSTA RICAN SOCIAL SECURITY FUND (CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL) was issued (it modifies the previous regulation issued by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) in articles 23 and 1 of sessions numbers 7217 and 7234, held, in that order, on May 23 and June 30, both of the year 1998). Article 1 of that legal body, when setting the scope of application, indicates: “The provisions contained in these Labor Relations Regulations are of mandatory application for all workers of the Fund (Caja) and the relations of the unions with the institution, independently of their place and headquarters where they provide their services to the CCSS.” Hence it is that said norm is what stipulates the disciplinary procedure for the officials of that institution, as long as, certainly, it does not conflict with provisions of higher hierarchy, in which case the non-application (desaplicación), in protection of the legal system, would be appropriate under article 8 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). In this case, the issue of the prescription of the disciplinary power within the five-year period is covered by article 146, third paragraph, with which there is no conflict with the first paragraph of that same numeral, and ordinals 116 and 118, so no conflict arises on the matter. Now then, from article 118 to 141, the so-called Ordinary Procedure Process (Trámite del Procedimiento Ordinario) is regulated which, roughly, has the following important elements: a) The decision-making body must order the opening of the administrative procedure within a period of one month or five years (numerals 118 and 146.3); b) The decision-making body shall form the directing body of the procedure (119 and 120); c) The directing body shall notify the commencement act, which shall contain a series of specifications in pursuit of the defense of due process (121); d) Breadth of the evidence elements (124); e) Impossibility of conciliation in disciplinary matters (125); f) Summons to an appearance under the parameters of article 311 of the LGAP (126); g) The appearance shall be oral and private, exceptionally public (129); h) The parties shall deliver closing arguments (alegato de conclusiones) after receiving all the evidence according to 317 LGAP (131); i) Submission of a conclusions report by the Directing Body (132); j) Communication of the conclusions report (133); k) Archiving of the matter or a sanction proposal, informing in this last case that the party has five business days to challenge the decision before the Labor Relations Commission (Comisión de Relaciones Laborales) (134); l) If no opposition to be heard by the Commission (Comisión) is shown within five days after notification, the final act shall be issued; if opposed, a hearing may even be requested.

What that body resolves must be notified to the interested party and to the deciding body, a proposal that may be challenged within five days thereafter, in the given jurisdictional scenarios—dismissals and suspensions of three days or more—before the National Labor Relations Board (Junta Nacional de Relaciones Laborales) (135, 136 and 137); ll) Issuance and notification of the final act of the proceeding (138); m) Motions for reconsideration and appeal (revocatoria y apelación) (139). Based on the foregoing regulatory framework, it is appropriate to assess the objections raised by the plaintiff, in order to determine the existence of defects that imply the nullity of the challenged dismissal […].” That is to say, it is no longer necessary to carry out the assessment exercise of whether the server belongs to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) (subjective aspect). It is sufficient to determine the transgression of the control and oversight system of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), which follows an objective material criterion…” (*Voto Nº 623-A-S1-2013 de 10:25 horas de 16 de mayo de 2013*). In the case at hand, the administrative procedure aimed to determine, in relation to Mr. **PEDRO DAMIÁN SALAZAR JAIME**, the inadequate management of the controls determined for the disbursement of public funds arising from his potential participation in the procedure for repairing and purchasing spare parts for the vehicle assigned to him at the Quepos Branch (Sucursal), where he worked. In doing so, he maintained access to the management of public funds which, as was being questioned, could entail a direct benefit. Consequently, it is the opinion of this Court that the applicable prescriptive period is the special five-year period, so much so that when the corresponding notification (intimación) was made, the basis indicated was the eventual violation of provisions such as article 8 of the Internal Control Law (Ley de Control Interno), 3 and 49 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), 110 of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets (Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuesto Públicos), among others, precisely related to the control and oversight of public funds; thus, given that the results of the report of the Internal Audit Office (Auditoría Interna) were brought to the attention of the General Director of Brunca Branches, the competent official to exercise disciplinary authority over the plaintiff here, on **07 April 2010**, and the Directing Body of the Disciplinary Administrative Procedure notified the opening order on **03 December 2010**, that is, just under eight months later, whereby the term stipulated in numeral 71, subsection b) –***since the fact was not notorious and required an audit study***–, of the Organic Law of the General Comptrollership of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), as well as numerals 43 of the General Internal Control Law (Ley General de Control Interno) and 44 of the Law of Corruption and Illicit Enrichment. Consequently, contrary to the plaintiff's thesis, the prescriptive extinction of the disciplinary authority did not operate in the sanctioning procedure processed against Mr. **SALAZAR JAIME**.

**V.- ON THE APPLICABLE REGULATION IN THIS MATTER:** Having determined that the sanctioning authority in this matter has not been extinguished, it is necessary to define which administrative procedure must be satisfied. It is clear that the procedure provided by the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), at least regarding principles, applies in this case; however, it must be kept in mind that through an agreement adopted by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of **COSTA RICAN SOCIAL SECURITY FUND (CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL)**, article 5 of Session (Sesión) number 8474 of **21 October 2010**, the Labor Relations Regulation (Normativa de Relaciones Laborales) of the **COSTA RICAN SOCIAL SECURITY FUND (CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL)** was issued (***modifying the previous regulation issued by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) in articles 23 and 1 of sessions numbers 7217 and 7234, held, in that order, on 23 May and on 30 June, both of the year 1998***). Article 1 of that legal body, when setting the scope of application, indicates: “**The provisions contained in this Labor Relations Regulation are mandatorily applicable to all employees of the Fund (Caja) and the relations of the unions with the institution, regardless of their location and headquarters where they provide services to the CCSS.**” Hence, it is that regulation which stipulates the disciplinary procedure for officials of that institution, as long as, certainly, it does not conflict with provisions of higher hierarchy, in which case the disapplication, in protection of the legal system, would be appropriate under the protection of article 8 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). In this case, the issue of the prescriptive extinction of disciplinary authority within the five-year period is covered by article 146, third paragraph, thereby there is no confrontation with the first paragraph of that same numeral, and ordinals 116 and 118, so no conflict arises on this point. Now then, from article 118 to 141, the so-called Ordinary Procedure is regulated, which, broadly speaking, has the following important elements: a) The decision-making body must order the opening of the administrative procedure within the period of one month or five years (numerals 118 and 146.3); b) The decision-making body shall form the directing body of the procedure (119 and 120); c) The directing body shall notify the opening act, which shall contain a series of specifications in pursuit of the defense of due process (121); d) Ample evidentiary elements (124); e) Impossibility of conciliation in disciplinary matters (125); f) Summons to a hearing under the parameters of article 311 of the LGAP (126); g) The hearing shall be oral and private, exceptionally public (129); h) The parties shall make closing arguments after receiving all the evidence according to 317 LGAP (131); i) Rendering of a conclusions report by the Directing Body (132); j) Communication of the conclusions report (133); k) Archiving of the matter or proposal for a sanction, informing in the latter case that the party has five working days to challenge the decision before the Labor Relations Commission (Comisión de Relaciones Laborales) (134); l) If no opposition to the Labor Relations Commission (Comisión de Relaciones Laborales) hearing the matter is shown within five days after notification, the final act shall be issued; if opposed, a hearing may even be requested. The decision of that body must be notified to the interested party and the decision-making body, a proposal that may be challenged within the subsequent five days, in the given jurisdictional cases—dismissals and suspensions from three days onward—before the National Labor Relations Board (Junta Nacional de Relaciones Laborales) (135, 136 and 137); ll) Issuance and notification of the final act of the procedure (138); m) Appeals for reversal and hierarchical appeal (139). Based on the aforementioned regulatory framework, it is appropriate to assess the complaints formulated by the plaintiff, in order to determine the existence of defects that entail nullity of the challenged dismissal […].”

“IV. SOBRE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN DE LA POTESTAD DISCIPLINARIA: El primer cargo formulado por el actor que debe ser objeto de análisis, refiere al alegato de extinción de la potestad de la Administración para sancionarle con base en la relación de empleo público que mantenía con la entidad demandada. De ser tal argumento cierto, implicará la nulidad absoluta del procedimiento administrativo que culminó con el despido objeto de cuestionamiento en este proceso, resultando, por consiguiente, innecesario abordar el resto de reproches formulados contra la conducta de los agentes de la CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL en este iter procedimental sancionador. Puntualizando sobre dicho agravio, debe tenerse presente que la potestad disciplinaria de la Administración como manifestación del ius puniendi estatal, refiere al poder, autoridad o capacidad de control de ésta sobre la conducta de sus servidores, a efectos de investigar y, eventualmente, sancionar a aquel funcionario que incumpla las obligaciones del cargo en que fue nombrado, procurando con ello una garantía del ejercicio de la función pública. Paralelamente a ese poder, surge también el deber de supervisión y adopción de medidas necesarias para una buena administración (artículo 102 incisos c y d de la Ley General de la Administración Pública ), lo que dice no sólo de una protección del funcionamiento administrativo, sino además de una actuación oportuna de la Administración para el ejercicio de tal potestad que, de no ser actuada en el período correspondiente por parte de los órganos de dirección, supervisión y sancionadores, surge como límite y defensa del principio de seguridad jurídica un término extintivo de esa potestad disciplinaria. A esos efectos, la legislación estipula un plazo ordinario que se encuentra determinado por el ordinal 603 del Código de Trabajo y corresponde a un mes, lapso temporal dentro del que debe de iniciarse el procedimiento disciplinario, luego de que el jerarca administrativo o el competente para sancionar, tenga conocimiento de la presunta falta, es decir, una vez informado de los hechos el funcionario que puede ejercer la potestad de corrección, para que ésta no se extinga, debe notificarse el acto de apertura al investigado dentro del mes siguiente. Ahora bien, el ordenamiento jurídico contempla situaciones de excepción, como por ejemplo, un período de cinco años plasmado en el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Ley Nº 7428. Precisamente, la discusión en este procedimiento administrativo ha girado en torno a ambos plazos. El actor insiste que el aplicable es el de un mes, entretanto, la Administración se ha inclinado por el de cinco años. Corresponde ahora definir la controversia. Para ello, téngase presente que la posibilidad de sobreponerse al plazo ordinario –un mes- está definida por la especialidad de los hechos investigados, en este caso particular, como se explicará de seguido, la necesidad de estar involucrada la fiscalización de la hacienda pública. En efecto, tal y como lo ha indicado la Sala Constitucional mediante sus votos Nº 2011-010121 de 15:23 horas de 03 de agosto del 2011 y Nº 6750-97 de 11:12 horas de 17 de octubre de 1997, la protección de los fondos públicos es la razón para justificar una variación tan significativa del plazo de prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria. Indica el primero de dichos fallos refiriéndose al numeral 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República: “… dicha norma debe ser aplicada únicamente en los casos de aquellos servidores públicos que estén «directamente relacionados con el manejo y disposición de los fondos públicos», aspecto cuya definición o determinación debe producirse en cada caso concreto; en otras palabras, determinar que una persona es un servidor o funcionario público que maneja, administra o custodia fondos de la hacienda pública, es un asunto de competencia de la jurisdicción técnica en cada caso sometido a su conocimiento. Procurar una interpretación genérica como la pretendida por el accionante al aducir la inconstitucionalidad de la jurisprudencia de la Sala Segunda, es prejuzgar en esta sede casos particulares que deben ser resueltos por la jurisdicción ordinaria, de conformidad con la prueba allegada a los autos y de acuerdo a los hechos y normativa aplicable. En efecto, ya la Sala Constitucional ha sido clara y precisa en definir a cuáles funcionarios debe aplicarse el citado artículo 71; ahora, establecer si una persona determinada encaja en los supuestos de dicha norma, es un aspecto que debe dilucidarse, discutirse, cuestionarse y definirse en cada caso concreto, por lo que resulta impropio pretender que de manera a priorística, la jurisdicción constitucional emita un pronunciamiento calificando o definiendo si la norma debe ser aplicada en los casos donde uno de los sujetos procesales sea un determinado servidor o funcionario del sistema bancario nacional.” Con anterioridad a la modificación del citado numeral 71 por el inciso a) del artículo 45 de la Ley Nº 8292 de 31 de julio del 2002, Ley de Control Interno, la aplicabilidad de tal disposición era más restringida. Rezaba con anterioridad a esa reforma: “PRESCRIPCION DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD DISCIPLINARIA La responsabilidad disciplinaria del servidor de la Hacienda Pública prescribirá en el plazo de dos años, contados a partir del conocimiento comprobado de la falta por parte del órgano competente, para iniciar el respectivo procedimiento sancionatorio. Para estos efectos, quedan reformados, respecto de los funcionarios o de los servidores públicos, el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo y cualesquiera otras disposiciones jurídicas que se le opongan. La comprobación del conocimiento de la falta podrá efectuarse por cualquier medio de prueba, con el valor que esta tenga, de acuerdo con la Ley General de la Administración Pública y, supletoriamente, de acuerdo con el derecho común. Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo. Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente, para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a éste oportunamente o el dejar prescribir la responsabilidad del infractor, sin causa justificada.” Con esa redacción, no sólo se contaba con un plazo extraordinario menor (dos años), sino también su aplicación estaba limitada para los funcionarios de la Hacienda Pública, con base en un criterio subjetivo. Con la modificación, el texto quedó de la siguiente manera: “ Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: a) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho. b) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea notorio –entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad- la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo. La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo. Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo. Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar que la responsabilidad del infractor prescriba, sin causa justificada.” De esa forma, no sólo se amplió el plazo de dos a cinco años, sino también el ámbito de aplicación de la norma, al incorporarse a los funcionarios públicos en general, en tanto sus acciones conlleven infracción a la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría, o bien, las disposiciones de control y fiscalización vigentes. En consecuencia, transmutó a una visión material-objetiva, donde la trascendencia de la tutela de los fondos públicos priva respecto de la vinculación directa del funcionario con la Hacienda Pública. La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, confirmando la sentencia Nº 101-2011-V de 15:30 horas de 24 de octubre del 2012 de la Sección Quinta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, avaló tal posición al exponer: “… en relación a la transgresión del ordenamiento de control y fiscalización o relativo a la Hacienda Pública, aplica el plazo de los 5 años de prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria. Este criterio permite diferenciar la prescripción … aplicable en casos de naturaleza laboral, de acuerdo con lo que dispone el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo. Que con la reforma que sufrió el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, se varió el criterio de valoración, para determinar el plazo de prescripción aplicable, por cuanto se pasa de un régimen subjetivo a uno objetivo. Es decir, ya no es necesario hacer el ejercicio de valoración de si el servidor es de la Hacienda Pública (aspecto subjetivo). Pues basta con determinar la transgresión al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública, lo cual obedece a un criterio material objetivo …” (Voto Nº 623-A-S1-2013 de 10:25 horas de 16 de mayo de 2013). En la especie, el procedimiento administrativo tenía como finalidad determinar, en relación con el señor PEDRO DAMIÁN SALAZAR JAIME, el manejo inadecuado de los controles determinados para la erogación de fondos públicos a partir de su posibilidad de participación en el procedimiento de reparación y compra de repuestos para el vehículo que tenía asignado en la Sucursal de Quepos, lugar donde laboraba. Con ello, mantenía acceso al manejo de dineros públicos qué, según se cuestionaba, podría implicar un beneficio directo. Por consiguiente, es criterio de este Órgano Jurisdiccional que el plazo prescriptivo aplicable lo es el especial de cinco años, tanto es así que al hacerse la correspondiente intimación, se indicó como base el eventual quebranto de disposiciones como el artículo 8 de la Ley de Control Interno, 3 y 49 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, 110 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuesto Públicos, entre otras, relacionadas precisamente con el control y fiscalización de fondos públicos, así, dado que los resultados del informe de la Auditoría Interna fueron puestos en conocimiento del Director General de Sucursales Brunca, funcionario competente para ejercer la potestad disciplinaria sobre el aquí actor, el 07 de abril del 2010 y el Órgano Director del Procedimiento Administrativo disciplinario notificó el auto de apertura el día 03 de diciembre del 2010, sea, poco menos de ocho meses después, con lo cual, el término estipulado en el numeral 71, inciso b) –al no ser notorio el hecho y haber requerido de un estudio de auditoría-, de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, así como los numerales 43 de la Ley General de Control Interno y 44 de la Ley de Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito. Por consiguiente, contrario a la tesis de la parte actora, no operó la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria en el procedimiento sancionador tramitado en contra del señor SALAZAR JAIME.- V.- SOBRE LA REGULACIÓN APLICABLE EN ESTE ASUNTO: Una vez determinada la no extinción de la potestad sancionatoria en este asunto, se impone definir cuál es el procedimiento administrativo que debe ser satisfecho. Es claro que el proporcionado por la Ley General de la Administración Pública, al menos en cuanto a principios, es de aplicación en este caso, empero, debe tenerse presente que mediante acuerdo adoptado por la Junta Directiva de la CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL, artículo 5º de la Sesión número 8474 de 21 de octubre del 2010, fue emitida la Normativa de Relaciones Laborales de la CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL (modifica la anterior regulación dictada por la Junta Directiva en los artículo 23º y 1º de las sesiones números 7217 y 7234, celebradas, en su orden, el 23 de mayo y el 30 de junio, ambas del año 1998). El artículo 1 de ese cuerpo legal, al fijar el ámbito de aplicación, indica: “Las disposiciones contenidas en la presente Normativa de Relaciones Laborales son de aplicación obligatoria para todos los trabajadores y todas las trabajadoras de la Caja y las relaciones de los sindicatos con la institución, independientemente de su lugar y sede donde presten sus servicios a la CCSS.” De allí que sea dicha norma la que estipula el procedimiento disciplinario para los funcionarios de esa institución, en tanto, ciertamente, no entre en conflicto con disposiciones de jerarquía superior, en cuyo caso la desaplicación, en tutela del ordenamiento jurídico, sería lo procedente al amparo del artículo 8 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. En este supuesto, el tema de la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria en el plazo de cinco años es cubierta por el artículo 146, párrafo tercero, con lo que no existe confrontación con el párrafo primero de ese mismo numeral, y los ordinales 116 y 118, por lo que no se presenta conflicto alguno sobre el particular. Ahora bien, del artículo 118 al 141 se regula el denominado Trámite del Procedimiento Ordinario que, grosso modo, cuenta con los siguientes elementos de importancia: a) El órgano decisor debe ordenar la apertura del procedimiento administrativo dentro del plazo de un mes o de cinco años (numeral 118 y 146.3); b) El órgano decisor conformará el órgano director del procedimiento (119 y 120); c) El órgano director deberá notificar el acto de apertura, el cual contendrá una serie de especificaciones en procura de la defensa del debido proceso (121); d) Amplitud de los elementos de prueba (124); e) Imposibilidad de conciliar en materia disciplinaria (125); f) Citación a comparecencia bajo los parámetros del artículo 311 de la LGAP (126); g) La comparecencia será oral y privada, excepcionalmente pública (129); h) Las partes realizarán alegato de conclusiones luego de recepcionar la totalidad de la prueba según 317 LGAP (131); i) Rendición de informe de conclusiones por parte del Órgano Director (132); j) Comunicación del informe de conclusiones (133); k) Archivo del asunto o propuesta de sanción informando en este último caso que cuenta la parte con cinco días hábiles para cuestionar la decisión ante la Comisión de Relaciones Laborales (134); l) Si no muestra oposición a conocer por la Comisión en cinco días después de notificado, se dictará el acto final, si se opone, podrá incluso solicitar audiencia. Lo que resuelva dicho órgano deberá ser notificado al interesado y al órgano decisor, propuesta que podrá ser cuestionada dentro de los cinco días posteriores, en los supuestos de competencia dados –despidos y suspensiones a partir de tres días- ante la Junta Nacional de Relaciones Laborales (135, 136 y 137); ll) Dictado y notificación del acto final del procedimiento (138); m) Recursos de revocatoria y apelación (139). Con base en el marco normativo anterior, procede valorar los reproches formulados por el actor, a efectos de determinar la existencia de vicios que impliquen nulidad del despido cuestionado […].”