Prescription of Disciplinary Power and Civil Liability of Public OfficialsPrescripción de la potestad disciplinaria y responsabilidad civil del funcionario público

**IV.- On the temporal element in the exercise of administrative corrective powers of a disciplinary nature.** The validity analysis of the challenged resolution has as its fundamental point to determine the statute of limitations (prescripción) regime applicable to the disciplinary administrative proceeding (procedimiento administrativo disciplinario) initiated against the plaintiff and within which, given the exception formulated at the time, the Administration considered the allegation inadmissible. The petitioner considers the one-month period established by canon 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) to have expired. INA, for its part, indicates that this period has not been violated since the Internal Audit report AI00535-2011 of June 6, 2011, was received on June 13, 2011, by the Executive Presidency, and the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) of the proceeding was communicated on July 7, 2011. The substance of the summarized allegations requires entering into an analysis of various issues of the temporal element that affects the exercise of the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria), as well as the administrative proceeding. In this regard, the following must be stated. In employment relationships, the exercise of the corrective power of the superior (jerarca) against officials who have committed punishable offenses is subject to a temporality factor, after which such exercise may not be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be seen, varies depending on the regulated matter and the existence of a special legal regime that configures particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, this disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of article 102 of the LGAP) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that are considered imprescriptible due to finalistic aspects, those referring to internal sanctioning exercise—like the one examined in this case—are subject to temporality rules by virtue of which they may expire due to the lapse of time established by the legal system without being realized. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative superior and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which his or her faculty to demand recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power emerges. Now, for the purposes of the present case, it is necessary to distinguish between various scenarios that occur in this type of disciplinary proceedings, all of which apply rules of temporal exercise of faculties or powers, but with different nuances. This involves the necessary establishment, for purposes of clarity, of demarcation criteria that allow the approach to the discussed issues, according to the scenario in question. In this line, the temporal lapse of various stages must be distinguished: 1) Statute of limitations (Prescripción) for the exercise of the disciplinary power: refers to the period set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the procedural measures of the case that allow him/her to issue the final decision. At this level, it is the maximum period initiated by the legal system for the administrative superior to order the opening of the pertinent proceeding, aimed at establishing the pertinence or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the proceeding that seeks the establishment of the facts (material truth, verdad real) that serve as the basis for the motive of the act, generates an interrupting effect on that margin of temporality, insofar as it consists of an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of that power. It could not be considered that the cited period for the exercise of the power is interrupted by the issuance of the final act because, as a derivation of the principle of due process (debido proceso), it is necessary for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative cause, it is insisted, to establish if the sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of the provisions of articles 214, 221, 297, 308 of the LGAP. In this analyzed hypothesis, the disciplinary power of the administrative superior is subject to a statute-of-limitations period (whose treatment in practice is actually very close to the figure of expiration (caducidad) insofar as in certain scenarios it is customary to declare this aspect ex officio), generically regulated by mandate 603 of the Labor Code, a norm that sets a period of one month for the exercise of that repressive power, which, it is insisted, is interrupted by the communication of the statement of charges. The foregoing is without prejudice to offenses that are regulated by the special norms specified by the internal control (control interno) regime, probity in public service (probidad en la función pública), and public finance management, in which, according to the provisions of the General Law on Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno), No. 8292 (art. 43), Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública), No. 8422 (art. 44), and article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, a special period of five years applies (according to the scenarios and from the moments those norms provide), and not the monthly period established by the Labor Code, it is insisted, as it is a special and later regulation that prevails over the general labor regime. Now, the starting point for computing this statute-of-limitations period is decisive. In this regard, numeral 603 of the Labor Code states that the period runs from when the cause for separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the one-month period is computed from the moment in which the holder of the corrective power is in an objective possibility of knowing the offense and, therefore, undertaking the exercise of his/her power. Therefore, when the particularities of the case require the carrying out of a prior stage of preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar), the aforementioned monthly period runs from the moment in which the results of that exercise are made known to the superior. This is also the case for offenses that are evidenced in Internal Audit reports, but whose prosecution for sanctioning purposes must be submitted to the respective superior. In such a scenario, the indicated period is computed from the moment of reception or effective communication of said report to the superior, since it is only then that this holder can validly adopt decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary actions. Nonetheless, the necessity or not of that phase (preliminary investigation) must be distinguished in each case, as otherwise it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that such investigation would not be necessary in all scenarios, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of opening the sanctioning proceeding, or to gather indications that tend to clarify its necessity or not. This issue will be addressed later as it is a core subject of debate by the plaintiff. 2) Statute of limitations (Prescripción) for the power to adopt the sanction within the proceeding: refers to the maximum temporal limit available to the holder of the corrective power to adopt the sanction once the file has been submitted to his/her knowledge by the directing body (órgano director), in which case, what remains is the issuance of the final act. In this hypothesis, the superior or holder has a maximum period of one month to decide the applicable sanction, from the moment the directing body of the cause formally brings its recommendation to his/her knowledge. In this case, without prejudice to the provisions of numeral 319 of the LGAP, the holder of the power would have a maximum period (of statute of limitations) of one month to adopt that final act, after which the statute of limitations on that power would inevitably occur, and therefore, the final act would be null due to harm to the competence element, conditioned in that case by preclusion factors. Such a scenario, in the concrete dynamics of disciplinary sanctioning proceedings, given the content of article 603 of the Labor Code, constitutes a special treatment that overrides the provisions of canon 329.3 of the LGAP. This point does not refer to the two-month period imposed by article 261 of the LGAP to conclude the ordinary proceeding, a period that in any case is directory (ordenatorio) and not peremptory (perentorio). Even so, this Section has established that the unjustified delay of the proceeding, despite the directory connotation of the temporal element, can lead to the nullity of that iter, due to harm to the principle of prompt and complete administrative justice. However, at this point, the period discussed above refers to the one held by the superior so that, once the report of the directing body is rendered, the final decision is imposed. 3) Statute of limitations (Prescripción) for the power to execute the imposed sanction: Refers to the period available to the administrative superior to order the application of the imposed sanction. It therefore consists of the material execution of the act that provides a disciplinary sanction as its content. In this case, by analogical integration, the applicable period, unless a special norm dictates otherwise, would be the one-month period provided for in numeral 603 of the Labor Code. Denial of such a period would imply the perpetual possibility for the superior to apply the previously ordered sanction, under the allegation of a kind of imprescriptibility of that power. Thus, one thing is the period to order the final act once the final report of the directing body has been issued, and another is the period to materialize the firm sanction ordered. At this point, the period must be computed from the finality (firmeza) of that act, which can originate from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary appeals available against the act as applicable, or, if after the period established by the legal system to formulate those appeals, they have not been filed, in which case, administrative finality occurs due to the inertia of the recipient of the effects of the conduct. Another element subject to temporality rules is that referring to the Processing of the proceeding (Tramitación del procedimiento). It refers to the maximum time the administrative proceeding, established to determine the facts that allow the holder of the public repressive power to adopt the final decision, may last. This matter, unless a special norm dictates otherwise, is regulated by article 261, in relation to 319 and 340, all of Law No. 6227. However, the two-month period provided therein consists of a period of a directory nature, not peremptory, which of course does not include or permit proceedings with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid due to harm to the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice. In this sense, ruling No. 199-2011-VI of this Section VI, at 16:20 hours on September 12, 2011, can be consulted. At this point, reference must also be made to the provisions of precept 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the institute of expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding, in cases where the instructing Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months for causes attributable to it. In this scenario, expiration applies even in cases where the proceeding is ready for the issuance of the final act, as the restriction of subsection 2 of the cited canon 340, regarding the impossibility of expiration when the matter is ready for the issuance of that final act, only applies when the proceeding has commenced at the request of a party, given that the following stage only pertains to the Administration, which cannot shield itself behind its inertia. This does not occur when it has been processed ex officio, because in that case, the delay actually benefits the administrated party, insofar as such delay would be solely attributable to the public office.

**V.- Concrete analysis of the temporal aspects of the internal administrative corrective power.** In this case, the plaintiff alleges the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the corrective power for two reasons. First, due to the lapse of one month since the occurrence of the facts; second, because nine months had passed since the investigations were concluded. Addressing the issue of the statute of limitations in this case requires presenting a brief recount of what happened. As has been established as proven, through check No. 75451-9 of May 19, 2010, a check was issued for an amount of ¢1,018,488.00 (one million eighteen thousand four hundred eighty-eight colones), in favor of the plaintiff for the concept of per diem (viáticos), transportation, and purchase of perishable products for a field trip to La Cruz for the purpose of teaching the room service modules (code TUGT289) and the food and beverage service in special events module (code TUGT515) of the Professional Bartender and Waiter program. To settle the advance corresponding to the purchase of perishable goods, the petitioner submitted invoice No. 10770 dated June 6, 2010, from the business "Flor Arte Floristería", for an amount of ¢182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones), and which corresponds to the purchase of 10 units of roses, 10 of pomas, 10 carnations, and 10 of other natural flowers. As a result of these facts, through report AI-00535-2011 dated June 6, 2011, issued by the Internal Audit of the public entity, and sent to the Executive Presidency by official letter No. 23-2011, received on June 13, 2011, the supposed irregular facts in the purchase of perishable products, just detailed, are brought to its attention. As a first aspect, it must be specified, according to article 9 of the Organic Law of INA, No. 6868, that the highest-ranking official within that institution corresponds to the executive presidency, an instance which, in accordance with the provisions of article 102 subsection c) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), is therefore the one who holds the disciplinary corrective power. The foregoing supposes, in light of what was stated in the preceding recital (considerando), that the statute-of-limitations period for the exercise of that power is computed from the moment in which that superior is in an objective possibility of knowing the factual cause that would give basis to internal discipline. In the present case, the petitioner indicates that from the moment the evidence-gathering phase was concluded, specifically, the sworn statement of Ivette Sáenz Faerron, owner of the premises where the flowers were settled, on August 31, 2010, and of employee Seidy Murillo Villagra, on September 7, 2010, the proceeding was ready to adopt decisions regarding the aforementioned power. Such a position is respected by this Court, but ultimately not shared. For the purposes of understanding the starting point of the statute-of-limitations period, the date on which the Internal Audit investigations were carried out is not the reference point for such purposes. As has been said, it is when the superior who holds the corrective power is made aware, that the computation of the statute-of-limitations period must begin, unless it can be proven that there was another opportunity in which it was objectively possible for that hierarchy to know of the existence of those particular facts, so that specific actions could be adopted. However, this latter exception is not on record. Now, it was not until June 13, 2011, that the Internal Audit informed the executive presidency of the alleged offenses committed, through a report recommending the opening of an ordinary disciplinary proceeding, for having settled an advance for the purchase of perishable goods with an altered invoice. As is on record, after that communication, through act AL-NOD-068-2011 dated June 24, 2011, the Executive Presidency designated the directing body of the proceeding and established the statement of charges, which was communicated to the plaintiff on July 7, 2011. The recount of these dates leads this Court to establish that in the case under examination, from the date on which the holder of the corrective power was informed of the facts theoretically committed by the plaintiff and the date on which the disciplinary proceeding was ordered and notified, no more than the month claimed by the plaintiff elapsed, so the exercise of that power would be timely, even applying the one-month period set by article 603 of the Labor Code. In this sense, as has been stated ut supra, the communication of that administrative proceeding generates an interrupting effect on the mentioned statute-of-limitations regime. It is worth noting that the plaintiff invokes in his favor numeral 51 of the Autonomous Service Regulations of INA (which he provided with the complaint), a rule that regulates the statute-of-limitations period of the sanctioning regime. However, upon close inspection, said mandate regulates the statute-of-limitations period for imposing sanctions within the month following the commission of the acts or, failing that, from the date on which the superior becomes aware of the offense. On the other hand, it indicates that this term is computed from the moment the ordinary proceeding concludes, which shall not exceed two months. The analysis of this rule allows concluding that it sets out the same temporality criteria already formulated above in this ruling, so it does not constitute any element that allows disregarding what has been said so far on the subject under examination. Thus, the communication of the opening of the proceeding occurred within the month indicated by the plaintiff, without any defect being evident in this aspect. On the other hand, regarding the duration of the sanctioning proceeding, it is noted that the statement of charges was made on July 7, 2011, the oral and private hearing was held on August 18, 2011, having been moved from the original date at the express request of the investigated official. Ultimately, the final act was issued through resolution LA-106-2011 at 3:00 p.m. on September 7, 2011. The foregoing allows concluding that no unreasonable delay occurred in the processing of the proceeding in this case. Likewise, regarding the period to impose the sanction, resolution LA-106-2011 was therefore issued within the one-month period imposed by article 51 of the Internal Regulations, after the private hearing was held. It should be noted, even using the previous internal regulations, such periods have not been violated, given that article 70 stated that the statute of limitations was governed by the Regulations of the Civil Service Statute and the Labor Code, both norms that follow the same treatment already set forth. Fundamentally, when resolving the statute-of-limitations defense in resolution LA-106-2011 of September 7, 2011, the Executive Presidency relied on the application of article 51 of the Autonomous Regulations of INA, indicating that the one-month period had not been violated insofar as the proceeding was processed within the period of one month following the receipt of the Internal Audit report. In essence, this criterion is shared for the reasons given, and therefore, it is reiterated, no incorrectness is observed regarding the temporality regime analyzed, which is why the objection must be dismissed.

**VI.- On the duty of probity in the exercise of public positions.** Without prejudice to the foregoing, it should be noted that, given the alleged application of a more stringent five-year statute-of-limitations regime is being reproached, it should be pointed out that the identification of the offenses imputed to him refers to possible harm to the internal control regime, as was advised by the superior within the statement of charges. For clarity on the foregoing, it is worth briefly referring to the probity regime in the exercise of public service. Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration defines a public official as the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf and on account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of appointment, with complete independence of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. For its part, canon 113 ejusdem clearly establishes that the functional framework of the public agent must be carried out in a way that primarily satisfies the public interest, understood as the coinciding interest of the administered parties. To that end, the public servant is inevitably subject to the principle of legality, both in its negative and positive vision, as inferred, at the legal level, from articles 11, 12, 13, 59, and 66 of the cited General Law and Article 11 of the Constitution (Carta Magna). As part of this orientation, the performance of the official is oriented and delimited by norms of transparency and probity, whose legal basis is expressly found in numeral 3 of Law No. 8422. Said norm states: "Duty of probity. The public official shall be obliged to orient his/her management towards the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall manifest itself, fundamentally, in identifying and attending to the priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner, and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, in demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; ensuring that the decisions adopted in compliance with his/her attributions conform to impartiality and the specific objectives of the institution in which he/she works and, finally, in administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily." From this perspective, as a complement to the finalistic orientation of the public official that requires him/her to prioritize the satisfaction of public interests over personal interests, even over the interests of the Administration (113.2 ibidem), which is proper to the service-oriented nature of his/her competencies, the duty of probity aims to provide aspects of greater concreteness that in some way guide the actions of the public agent (or are lines that should do so), so that his/her conduct responds to that teleological dimension, not only at the level of result, but through the incorporation of moral and ethical duties that guarantee transparency and objectivity in his/her behavior. That is, this public morality demands the adequate and efficient handling of public resources and, in general, the public assets assigned to him/her and placed at his/her disposal for the performance of the position and exercise of his/her functions. This includes not only the monetary resources that are advanced to him/her to carry out specific activities and intended to finance expenses inherent to assigned activities, as is the case with per diems or advances for the purchase of goods or acquisition of services necessary for those tasks, but also the property entrusted to him/her to execute his/her actions, such as vehicles, general movable property, such as computer equipment, office equipment, among others. Similarly, in the event of conflicts of interest, he/she must withdraw from the matter at hand, so as not to pollute or jeopardize the objectivity that must be proper to the conduct, but also, in his/her actions, he/she must strive for the satisfaction of that higher interest. More simply, the duty of probity regulated in article three of Law No. 8422 obliges every public servant to exercise his/her position in adherence to the principle of efficiency in the administration of public resources, as well as objectivity and impartiality in the face of personal or family, economic, and other interests, so that in his/her performance he/she must demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law. This is indeed evident from canon one of the Regulations to the cited Law No. 8422. Therefore, it is clear that the condition of a public agent implies subjection to and due compliance with duties of moral and ethical orientation that the legal system itself enshrines and imposes, requiring him/her to conduct his/her management with rectitude and solidity. Hence, the infraction of the aforementioned duty of probity is not immune to the disciplinary liability framework of the public agent. Precept 4 of the mentioned Law No. 8422 establishes: "Without prejudice to the civil and criminal liabilities that may apply, the infraction of the duty of probity, duly proven and after a defense, shall constitute just cause for separation from public office without employer liability." Such conditional effect finds meaning, in the context under analysis, for acts of open improvisation, poor administration of resources, or total evidence of conflicts of interest perfectly discernible from a given situation, without the official having adopted voluntary separation actions. Of course, the application and interpretation of that norm must proceed along the paths of rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, parameters that must be assessed in each specific case. To this end, mandate 38 of the cited legislation establishes grounds for administrative liability, which then find their correlative possible sanctions in the letter of norm 39 iusibid, which, to that extent, would be applicable against infractions of the duty of probity in the terms already developed. The synergy of these provisions incorporates a flexible system that allows for the emergence of a public official's liability upon the commission of conduct transgressing ethical norms. Nonetheless, the correct application of this system implies the necessary processing of an administrative proceeding, as a mandatory and unavoidable prior step to apply a sanction for harm to that framework of official obligations, with full and integral respect for the guarantees of defense and due process, which becomes fundamental to avoid arbitrary and illegal actions. The facts imputed to the plaintiff, such as the settlement of anticipated expenses using a presumably altered invoice, undeniably presuppose facts that conflict with the internal control regime that has been explained. The plaintiff confuses the responsibilities of those who directly administer public finances, called hierarchical superiors or subordinate holders, with the responsibility that pertains to him by his mere condition as a public official, and therefore, subject to the internal control and illicit enrichment regulations. Thus, it is the judgment of this Chamber, they would lead to harm to the cited regime. Nonetheless, the statute-of-limitations rules have not been violated, even without resorting to the stringent rules set by Law No. 7428 for these matters. Therefore, it is reiterated, the reproach under examination should be dismissed.

**VII.- Generalities on administrative proceeding.** In a second order of grievances, the plaintiff claims the application of a regime that was not in effect at the time of conducting the administrative proceeding against him. Given the issue raised, it is necessary to make some general considerations regarding the minimum formalities that a disciplinary administrative proceeding (procedimiento administrativo de corte disciplinario) must meet. The administrative proceeding constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It fulfills a dual purpose.

On one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a particular decision, guiding its conduct. On the other, it imposes itself as a frame of reference that allows the administered party to carry out a comparison of public conduct, in order to establish a check that its actions have been manifested in accordance with the rules that guide that conduct. It therefore seeks to constitute a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. As indicated by canon 214 of Law No. 6227, its purpose is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the final case. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the better fulfillment of the Administration’s purposes and the protection of the individual’s rights, as expressed in Article 225.1 of the General Law of Public Administration. Hence, canon 216.1 ibidem requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure with strict adherence to the legal system. In its course, the procedure aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party the full exercise of the right of defense and the adversarial principle, to arrive at establishing the aforementioned real truth of the facts (within which may be seen those established in canons 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the cited General Law). This acquires even greater relevance in so-called control or sanctioning procedures, given that in those cases, the final decision may impose a repressive framework on a person’s legal sphere. The same regulatory plexus provides for the substantial nature of these minimum guarantees, considering the procedure that does not satisfy those minimum requirements to be invalid. This follows from mandate 223 of the Law of reference, in that it indicates that the omission of substantial formalities will cause the nullity of the procedure. From this standpoint, this Court has already indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred on this jurisdiction by canon 49 of the Magna Carta implies a comparison to ensure that the Administration, in the course of those procedures (of a sanctioning nature in this case), satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that, in essence, due process has been safeguarded, which must be inviolable in that conduct. Now, by virtue of what has been alleged, it is necessary to address the issue of the functions that are proper to the directing body and the decision-making body of the procedure. The competence to issue the final act within a procedure corresponds to the decision-making body, that is, to whoever has been granted the legal competence to issue the act that causes state. However, for the sake of administrative efficiency, instructional competences are delegable to a body tasked with carrying out the instruction of the procedure, which has come to be called the "directing or instructional body." It is evident that the designation of the latter corresponds to the decision-making body, for which its validity is subject to it falling upon an assigned official, regularly designated and in possession of the position. Exceptionally, it has been tolerated that persons who are not regular officials be constituted as the directing body of the procedure; however, in that specific function, they must be understood to be performing a public function, with the inherent obligations. As for its competences, the instructional body represents the Administration in the procedure and holds an instructional role. It is responsible for issuing a factual analysis. Although it may render recommendations, they certainly would not be binding, so its determinations regarding the adoption of a final decision are considered procedural acts (actos de trámite). Therefore, it is responsible for issuing the opening act, giving procedural impetus, all the instructional work of the procedure, directing the hearing, resolving preliminary issues, resolving the appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed against the procedural acts, rendering a report to the decision-making body at the moment of referring the case file (expediente) for the issuance of the final act. Within its competences, one can see Articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all of the General Law of reference. For its part, the decision-making body is the competent hierarchical superior who meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act that resolves the procedure.

VIII.- After analyzing the processing given to this matter, this collegiate body finds that in the substantiation of the proceeding, no harm to due process is observed, and the plaintiff has been guaranteed the set of minimum phases that make up the disciplinary administrative procedure. In this regard, the plaintiff indicates that a version of the internal regulations was applied to him that was not in force at the time the facts occurred. From the analysis of the case records (autos), it is found that by means of agreement 187-2010 of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of the INA, published in La Gaceta No. 5 of January 11, 2011, a modification was made to the Reglamento Autónomo de Servicio of that public entity, a reform that included the procedure to follow in disciplinary regime matters. However, the applicable regulation is that in force at the moment the possibility of exercising disciplinary power emerges for the hierarchical superior, whether due to the notoriety of the facts or due to the receipt of reports that alert him to the existence of facts that may be subject to the application of the internal corrective regime. As has been indicated, the report from the Internal Audit that brought to the attention of the Executive Presidency the investigated facts attributed to the plaintiff was notified on June 13, 2011. As of that date, the internal regulations had already been modified, which is why the applicable rule is that which governed on that date and which, definitively, was the one applied to the plaintiff. This is not a case of retroactive application to the detriment as the plaintiff alleges, but rather the use of the rules that, in time and space, are pertinent to the matter. Nevertheless, the plaintiff does not specify the manner in which harm has been caused to the maxim of due process or, in general, a substantial infraction has been produced to his detriment in the terms required by canon 223 LGAP. At this point, it is worth indicating, according to the tenor of that referred precept, that the invalidity that must be declared within administrative procedures is only that which can be considered a substantial infraction of the legal system, including actions or omissions generating states of defenselessness or which, had they been addressed, would have generated a different criterion or decision. The plaintiff does not explain how those substantial imperfections have been produced to the detriment of his legal situation. Even so, having analyzed the procedure followed, compliance is observed with the relevant stages that must make up any procedure of this nature, briefly set forth above. The right of defense has been safeguarded, the oral and private hearing was held, a reasoned act was issued on the merits of the matter, and the ordinary appeals filed regarding each of the debated points were resolved, which later constituted the grievances on appeal. From what has been said, it follows that in this case, all the stages established by Article 74 of the Reglamento Autónomo del INA were fulfilled. In summary, no nullities are detected in the procedure, nor does the plaintiff provide an argumentative detail (as would be his duty) regarding the pathologies that would lead to a possible estimation of his annulment claim. From that perspective of examination, the charge must be rejected.

IX.- Regarding the allegation of lack of accreditation of the facts. In another line of objections, the lack of accreditation of the alleged faults in the administrative venue is argued. The charge itself seeks for this Court to determine a supposed non-existence of the grounds (motivo) for the administrative act (acto administrativo), considered as the factual and/or legal antecedent that allows or makes possible the issuance of the public decision. In the case of disciplinary sanctions, that grounds would consist of the conditioning premise consisting of the accreditation of the faults that were charged and therefore, subject to investigation. As a starting point, it must be said that through official letter No. AI-00535-2011 of June 6, 2011, the Internal Audit forwarded report No. 23-2011 on alleged irregular acts in the purchase of perishable products (roses, pomas, carnations, and natural flowers) to teach the modules of “Room Services,” code TUGT289 and “A and B Services in Special Events, code TUGT515 of the professional bartender and waiter program, attributed to the official Juan Pablo Córdoba López. By means of a resolution of 12:00 hours on July 1, 2011, communicated on July 7, 2011, the following facts were charged in the notice of charges (traslado de cargos): “1. That as a teacher you were assigned to teach the modules of room services …, of the Professional Bartender and Waiter Program… 2. That check number 75454-9 dated May 19, 2010, for an amount of C.1,018,488… was issued in your name for the concept of per diem (viáticos), transportation, and purchase of perishable products to conduct the field trip to La Cruz to teach the modules of food and beverage services in special events (code TUGT515) of the Professional Bartender and Waiter Program… 3. That you did not purchase the flowers indicated in invoice number 10770, given that it was a woman called “Magaly” who did so. 4. That the woman called “Magaly” at the beginning of June requested from the establishment “Flor Arte Floristería” a blank invoice, which turned out to be invoice number 10770. 5. That to settle the advance corresponding to the purchase of perishable goods, you used invoice No. 10770 of June 6, 2010, for an amount of C.182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones exactly) for the purchase of forty units of Roses, Pomas, Carnations, and Natural Flowers, from the supplier “Flor Arte Floristería”. 6. That you presented invoice No. 10770, with a date corresponding to Sunday, June 6, 2010, a day on which the business “Flor Arte Floristería” is closed, given that the establishment’s business hours are Monday to Saturday from 8:00 am to 6:30 pm. 7. That you presented invoice No. 10770 dated June 6, 2010, for an amount of C.182,600.00, in which the sales prices of the acquired flowers are detailed, which do not correspond to the prices that said flowers had at that time at the business “Flor Arte Floristería”. For its part, in act LA-106-2011 of 15:00 hours on September 7, 2011, of the Executive Presidency of the INA, the following were held as proven facts, relevantly: that check No. 75451-9 was issued in the plaintiff’s name; that to settle the advance corresponding to the purchase of perishable goods, the claimant used invoice No. 10770 of June 6, 2010, from the business Flor Arte Floristería; that said invoice for an amount of C.182,600.00 corresponds to the purchase of 10 units of roses, 10 pomas, 10 carnations, and 10 other natural flowers; that the cited invoice does not detail unit prices for each of the acquired products; that the date of the invoice corresponds to a Sunday; that the business Flor Arte Floristería has business hours from Monday to Saturday from 8:00 am to 6:30 pm and does not open on Sundays; that the defendant did not verify the prices of the flowers; that for the month of June 2010, the price of the flowers at that business was C.800.00 per unit of roses, C.350.00 per unit of carnations, C.1,800.00 per bunch of pomas, and C.500.00 for the highest-priced unit of other natural flowers. Likewise, it was held as proven that Mrs. Magaly Alvarado is recognized at the referred business as a frequent customer; that invoice No. 10770 was handed over blank by Mrs. Seidy Murillo Villagra, an employee of the cited business, to Mrs. Magaly Alvarado; that the sale described in the cited invoice was not made by the company Flor Arte Floristería; that neither the owner nor the employee of the referred business recognize the plaintiff as a customer, and that the cited business is under the simplified regime of the Tax Administration. In each one of these facts, reference was made to the evidentiary element that supported them. The plaintiff claims that the business owner was not present on the day of the flower purchase nor on the day of the supposed blank delivery of invoice 10770 to Magaly Alvarado, pointing out that it is strange for a business to give blank invoices. Likewise, he indicates that the process is based on the employee’s version, who seeks to justify that she made the sale and did not report it, or that she did so for an amount greater than what corresponded. Furthermore, that the business owner indicates a different price than what was invoiced to him in April and May 2010, one month before the supposed false sale. He adds, it is indicated that Magaly Alvarado stated that she does not know the establishment, which he affirms she never said, but rather stated that the visits to the florist were not constant. On this point, the following should be set forth.

X.- In resolution LA-106-2011, the Executive Presidency of the INA clearly sets out the reasons and considerations that led it to hold as accredited the chain of facts on the basis of which it determined the existence of an irregularity in the actions of Mr. Córdoba López and that led to imposing the sanction discussed in this case. Although in this process the plaintiff formulates a series of questions about the weighing of the evidentiary elements that the directing body produced and the decision-making body assessed in the disciplinary procedure, his statements are limited to pointing out subjective and imprecise impressions that do not permit a proper refutation of the evidentiary analysis set forth in the act under reference. In effect, in what is the subject of analysis, the plaintiff limits himself to formulating generic reproaches that fail to specify in a detailed and concrete manner the reasons why the analysis carried out by the sued Administration contravenes the rules of sound critical reasoning and the real truth of the facts that must prevail in the topic of this type of procedures (Articles 214, 221, 223, 308, 297 and 298 LGAP). Likewise, nor do his arguments manage to express defects in the determination of the grounds element or the way in which the final decision has been reasoned in the sub examine. On the contrary, the facts that gave rise to the sanction were analyzed in the first instance by the Internal Audit in report No. 23-2011, in which it suggests the opening of the disciplinary procedure for presumed irregularities presented in the purchase of perishable products, specifically, roses, pomas, carnations, and natural flowers, in the judgment of that internal unit, acquired at an overprice. From that report, in resolution LA-106-2011, a specific analysis is made of each of the factual circumstances considered as the basis for the imposed sanction. As a first point, it is concluded that the flowers were bought by Mrs. Magaly Alvarado and not by the plaintiff, which was concluded from the declarations of the business owner and the employee, as well as from the statements of the defendant himself, according to instruments appearing at folios 17 through 23 and 52 of the administrative file. Likewise, the business employee, Mrs. Seidy Murillo, stated that Mrs. Magaly had never taken the flowers, but rather that she had only been given blank invoice 10770. Similarly, both the employee and the establishment owner, Mrs. Ivette Saénz, indicated that they did not know the plaintiff and that the only time they saw him was when he appeared with INA officials. From this, it is concluded in the final act that, although the invoice in question corresponds to the business Flor Arte Floristería, the flowers that this title expresses were never sold by that business to the plaintiff or to his wife, Mrs. Magaly Alvarado. Likewise, from the testimony of the establishment owner and her employee, it is extracted that the invoice was handed over blank to Mrs. Magaly Alvarado so that she could prepare a proforma invoice, from which it follows that it is not an instrument that was issued to the plaintiff for the concept of the sale of perishable goods as was reported in his expense settlement. On the other hand, regarding the price of the flowers, the Administration determined that unit prices were not established on the invoice. From the declaration of the business owner, it is indicated that the roses had a value of ¢800.00, the carnations ¢350.00, the pomas (rollito) ¢1800.00, and the natural flowers, the most expensive at ¢500.00. Even in the sworn declaration visible at folios 17-18 of the administrative file, the establishment owner states that dividing the invoice amount among the indicated units reflects prices that do not correspond to those she sells in her business, and also that to reach that amount, she would have had to sell a quantity far exceeding 40 units, a quantity she says she does not have in stock. From those data, the Administration concluded on the report of excessive prices in the cost of the flowers relative to the amounts provided by the establishment owner. On the other hand, the inconsistency in the invoice date was determined, issued on June 6, 2010, which corresponded to a Sunday, a day on which the cited business was closed. On this point, the INA noted the inconsistencies in the petitioner’s declarations, since in a first declaration he stated that although he made the purchase on a Saturday, he asked the business employee to please put Sunday’s date on it so he wouldn’t have problems, since he was not going to use the flowers until Monday (folio 23 of the administrative file). However, later in the hearing of August 18, 2011, he expressed that he bought the flowers on Saturday and that he did not notice the date, so he made a mistake by not realizing it. This, as stated by the INA, reveals an inconsistency, from which it then emerges, together with the declarations of the establishment owner and her employee, that the business in question did not open on Sundays, an aspect that was not successfully refuted. As a derivation, the INA concluded on the use of an invoice that did not correspond to a real sale made by the cited business Flor Arte Floristería, for the purposes of a settlement of sums disbursed, and with an amount that exceeds the prices that business handles for those supposedly acquired products. In the judgment of this Court, the foregoing recount reveals the due accreditation within the administrative procedure of the facts that served as the basis for the sanction and that have been detailed. Although what was produced within the administrative case file does not constitute full proof in judicial causes, after its weighing and the analysis of the allegations formulated by the plaintiff, this collegiate body does not observe the argumentative defects alleged in the complaint regarding the accreditation of the factual causes that gave basis to the sanction. After the analysis of the evidence, the plaintiff has not managed to refute the considerations adopted by the Executive Presidency of the INA. On the contrary, the weighing of that statement of reasons in the questioned act reveals the due demonstration of the facts that were the basis of the notice of charges. Therefore, this point must be rejected.

XI.- Regarding the allegation of unregulated sanctions. In another grievance, the application of a sanction not provided for in the applicable regulations is reproached, citing for this purpose numeral 49 of the Reglamento Autónomo del INA, which indicated that for one fault, suspension without pay for 8 days, and for two, dismissal without employer liability. However, as correctly pointed out by the INA’s representation, even within the context of that same rule, it is indicated "The previous sanctions will be applied without prejudice to a greater sanction being imposed if the faults merit it." In the version in force (and applicable to the case) of those internal regulations, the subject is regulated in Article 47, a mandate that establishes as disciplinary measures verbal reprimand, written warning, suspension without pay for up to fifteen days, without prejudice to the application of a suspension for a longer period when provided for by special laws and according to the nature of the fault, as well as dismissal without employer liability. Subsequently, the rule establishes grading criteria for imposing sanctions. For its part, precept 48 regulates minor faults, 49 regulates grave faults, and 50 those that permit dismissal. From that standpoint, the content of the act finds due support in the rules that regulate the INA’s actions in this type of case. It should be noted that within the notice of charges, the petitioner was informed of the possibility of dismissal as a consequence of the charged facts, as possible harms to Article 81 subsections d) and l) of the Labor Code were expressed, as well as infractions of the regime of the Law of Internal Control and the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment. In resolution LA-106-2011 of the Executive Presidency, it is indicated that the accredited facts implied a breach of the obligations imposed by the Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios, specifically, Article 43, subsections 3, 14, by not having executed the tasks and functions with full capacity, dedication, diligence, and effort, by not having consulted the prior prices of the flowers and using an invoice that had irregularities, by having used an invoice knowing that it did not correspond to a real sale by the business. It also indicated a transgression of subsection 37 of that same rule, given a lack of dignity in the exercise of the position, as well as harm to Article 45 subsection 8) ibidem, by using an altered invoice to settle an advance corresponding to the purchase of perishable goods knowing it contained an excessive amount. Likewise, harm to canon 39 of the General Law of Internal Control. Ergo, it concluded that by infringing Article 43, subsections 3, 14, 37 and 40, numeral 45 subsections 8 and 27, a grave fault was produced in light of Article 49 of the cited regulation, in addition to the disregard of Article 39 of the General Law of Internal Control, classified as a grave fault by mandate 41 subsection c) of that same legal source. The analysis of the invoked rules and the charged facts allows the conclusion that the imposed sanction finds support and legitimizing basis in those normative references. In this way, having accredited the grounds for the act, which, it is insisted, configures the conditioning fact of the disciplinary regime, the application of the conditioned effect is feasible, constituted in this case by the content of the act, which, under Article 132 LGAP, must be lawful and possible, in addition to corresponding to the grounds. Such harmony is evidenced in this case, since the gravity of the investigated facts in light of the internal regulations allows them to be considered grave faults that give rise to imposing sanctions such as the one that was definitively imposed, namely, a suspension without pay for 15 days, even though the charging notice warned of a possible dismissal. Thus, there is no contradiction or pathology as reproached by the plaintiff, before which, the charge must be dismissed. In this way, resolution LA-106-2011 of 15:00 hours on September 7, 2011, of the Executive Presidency of the INA does not present the alleged inaccuracies, and the annulment petition must therefore be denied. For the same reasons stated, that invalidity claim also does not proceed with respect to resolution No. LA-201-2011 of 13:00 hours on September 29, 2011, of the INA, which addresses the appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed by the plaintiff. That act is limited to analyzing each of the grievances formulated against that final act, confirming what was already resolved in the prior stage, fundamentally, supporting the reasoning set forth therein. The analyses indicated in that confirmatory act conform to the parameters set forth in this ruling, so under mandates 128 and 158 LGAP, the invalidity claim filed against that decision must be dismissed. In summary, the rejection of the complaint filed by Mr. Juan Pablo Córdoba López against the INA must be ordered in all its points.

XII.- Regarding the counterclaim (contrademanda) filed by the INA. Regarding the liability regime of public officials for damages caused to the Public Administration. Generalities. The INA filed a counterclaim, for which purpose it expressed the following claims: "... I request your authority to declare this counterclaim with merit and to establish in the judgment the civil liability of the official Juan Pablo Córdoba López for the amount of ¢182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones), disbursed by the INA for the purchase of flowers, which never occurred and yet he still arranged the respective payment with an invoice that does not correspond to the establishment where he says he acquired the goods. 2. That Mr. Juan Pablo Córdoba López be ordered to pay the Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje the sum of ¢182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones) or, failing that, the difference of ¢148,600.00 (one hundred forty-eight thousand six hundred colones). Duly updated in order to compensate for the variation in purchasing power occurring during the period between the date the obligation became exigible and its extinguishment by effective payment. I request that said update be set in the judgment itself. 3. We request that Mr. Córdoba be ordered to pay the costs of this proceeding." (Folios 145-153 of the main file) Regarding that counterclaim, by an order of 9:40 a.m. on February 5, 2013, the plaintiff-counterclaimed was declared in default (estado de rebeldía). (Folio 223 of the main file) On this matter, the following should be noted. The actions or omissions of the public official that cause damages are subject to a special liability regime whose development is set out in the General Law of Public Administration. Such a liability framework may well arise from damages to third parties properly speaking, or from damages without a third party, that is, when the unlawful harm that one is not obliged to bear has been caused to the Administration itself. Liability with damage to third parties: In the first case, that is, harm to third parties, the imputation of liability can be made personally against the official or jointly and severally against the Administration, depending on the type of fault committed. The legal parameter for this liability system is found in numeral 199.1 LGAP, which indicates: "1. The public servant who has acted with willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the performance of his duties or on the occasion thereof shall be personally liable to third parties, even if he only used the means and opportunities that the position offers him." However, those harms caused by an official in the stated terms generate a system of joint and several liability with the public entity in whose name and on whose account he acts (Art. 199.4 LGAP). Nevertheless, for this, one must differentiate the impure personal fault from the pure one. a) Impure Personal Fault: In the impure one, one is faced with a harmful effect produced by the official’s actions or omissions that are associated or linked, totally or partially, with the public service, that is, those produced on the occasion of the position, even if for purposes or activities unrelated to his functions. Included within this scope are damages caused by criteria of causal occasionality, that is, the use of means and opportunities that the position offers him or that the Administration places at his disposal and that enable him to cause the harm. Such causal use of means may well be instrumental, circumstantial, or teleological. In these cases, the victim can undertake the indemnity action personally against the official or jointly and severally against the Administration, by virtue of the system of strict liability for the conduct of another (the official) established by Articles 190, 191, 199, and 201 of the cited General Law.

This solidarity regime is justified by the connection, even an instrumental one, that characterizes this type of personal fault (falta personal), giving rise to a right of the victim to pursue claims against the Administration, the official, or both (scope of solidarity provided for in Article 1046 of the Civil Code). It is a matter of true joint and several liability (solidaridad propia) (that is, created or imposed by law or agreement) that empowers the creditor, within the external relations of solidarity, to demand the debt from both debtors or one of them, who is liable for the entire debt. This jointly liable party, once condemned, may then pursue recourse actions (acciones de regreso) against their co-debtors, thanks to the internal relations that this type of solidarity entails. When the claim is against the Administration, the objectivized liability system (the development of which can be seen in decision 584-2005 of the First Chamber) applies, provided for by Article 190 of the aforementioned General Law, which dispenses with the need to prove subjective factors as a condition for the duty to compensate, being a system centered on the unlawful harm (daño antijurídico) at its base and the created risk. In these cases, consistent with Article 203 ibidem, when the Administration has been ordered to pay for damages caused by the deficiencies of its servants, it must imperatively initiate the corresponding recourse action (acción de regreso) against them, in order to recover what was disbursed for that concept, through the mechanisms established by Law No. 6227 itself. In this vein, according to Article 208 of Law No. 6227/78, the period for exercising the recourse action (acción de regreso) against the official is one year from the finality of the judgment, through a procedure aimed at establishing the existence or not of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the causation of the harm, their degree of participation in the compensated injury, and the amount the Administration must collect from that official, should the concurrence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) have been proven, except in those cases where manifest illegality has been judicially declared, in which case, proof of such subjective factors shall not be necessary (Article 199.3 LGAP). On the contrary, when liability is sought to be attributed personally to the official (whether under a concurrent or individual regime), to ascribe the disruptive effect claimed to them, willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in their conduct must be proven, as stipulated by Article 199.1 of that same legislation. b) Pure Personal Fault (Falta Personal Pura): Now, when these presuppositions of impure personal fault (falta personal impura) do not concur, pure personal fault (falta personal pura) arises, which implies a total disconnection from the public service and the non-concurrence of causal occasion, giving way to what is called a separable fault —from the service and from the Administration— which makes them personally liable to the affected party. In this dynamic, when harm is caused to a third party, the latter could only exercise their claim against the official personally, with no duty of the administration to answer for those actions existing in that case, since given the lack of connection with the public service, the system of joint and several liability does not apply. Liability without harm to third parties: When the official's conduct causes no harm to third parties, that is, an injury is caused to the Administration itself, as provided by Article 210 ibidem, it is clear that the official shall be liable to the Administration, provided they acted with willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). In this eventuality, which is especially relevant to the case, it is imperative that the Administration exercise its legal power and proceed to initiate, in the administrative venue, an ordinary procedure (procedimiento ordinario) in which it proves, with due solvency, the concurrence of the aforementioned subjective factors, as an elementary prerequisite for imputing the injury claimed. That is to say, without proof of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave), it is not legally feasible to impose liability on the official. Such proof as a relational framework between the injurious effect and the public agent is imperative, requiring proof of causation (which is, as a matter of principle, more flexible when that liability derives from cases of manifest illegality). In this line, the rules that govern the topic of internal distribution of liability (Articles 203-213 of the same law) require the opening of an administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo), which must necessarily be the ordinary procedure (procedimiento ordinario) referred to in Articles 214 and 308 of the aforementioned Law No. 6227, the purpose of which shall be to determine the existence of the harm, its magnitude, the concurrence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) of the investigated official, the proportion of incidence that the actions ascribed to the official have on the harm, as well as their degree of participation in that injurious effect. Within this course, the official may challenge both the amount of the debt and its very existence, as well as factors excluding their liability. Nevertheless, it should be noted, in that procedure, the burden of proof regarding the existence of the harm, the effective proof of their gross negligence (culpa grave) or willful misconduct (dolo), as well as the degree of participation of the official in the analyzed facts, unfailingly falls on the Administration, as the object of the procedure is precisely to establish the real truth of the facts. It is worth adding, within this procedure, respect for due process in all its phases, as well as for the various principles relevant to that type of procedure, is mandatory. It deserves emphasis that the official's liability is subject to the existence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in their conduct. This entails an analysis of their conduct in order to establish the concurrence of an intent to cause harm (willful misconduct - dolo), or else, gross negligence (culpa grave). Note that not just any negligence gives rise to the imputation of liability, but only that which can be understood or reputed as severe or gross. It should be highlighted, as provided by Article 210, subsection 3) LGAP, that the recovery action (acción de recuperación), once the procedure has concluded and the concurrence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave), the amount of harm, and the degree of participation of the official have been established, shall be executive, with the title to be executed being the certification of the amount of harm (see Article 149 LGAP). However, this recovery power is subject to the four-year statute of limitations indicated by Article 207 in relation to 198 ibidem, which is computed from the occurrence of the harmful event, or else, from the moment the Administration is in an objective position to know the cause of the harm, on the understanding that the opening of the aforementioned administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo) constitutes a ground for interruption of the limitation period, an effect produced by each act issued within that procedure. It must be clarified that no confusion exists between the four-year period set forth in Article 207 LGAP and the one-year period established by Article 208 ibidem. The first is a period for demanding civil liability from an official for damages to the Administration (and not to third parties). The one-year period regulated by Article 208 LGAP is for exercising the recourse action (acción de regreso) when the Administration has been judicially condemned for harm to third parties due to actions or omissions of its officials, as a result of the true joint and several liability (solidaridad propia) system imposed by Law No. 6227/78. Thus, the recourse action is not technically harm to the Administration, but only an internal distribution of liabilities assumed fully by one of the solidary debtors (the Administration in this case). Hence, the collection period for damages (four years) is not extendable to the exercise of the recourse action, in which case, it is reiterated, the one-year period applies. Now then, the same interrupting effect is produced by any of the causes provided for in Articles 977 of the Commercial Code and 876 of the Civil Code. Ergo, any judicial collection proceeding notified to the alleged debtor interrupts that period, pursuant to subsections a and b respectively of those articles. However, it must be insisted, the exercise of that action is only legitimate when the existence of the harm, its attribution to the official, and the concurrence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) have been duly proven. Finally, subsection 3 of the aforementioned Article 210 ibidem stipulates that the recovery action (acción de recuperación) shall be executive and the title shall be the certification on the amount of the harm issued by the head of the respective entity, which, of course, is subject to the concurrence of the presuppositions already discussed. Having set forth this general scheme, the examination of the case follows.

XIII.- Now then, in the specific case, the defendant-counterclaimant Administration seeks for this venue to order the civil liability of the plaintiff official, for what it considers are damages caused to the patrimony of that public entity. However, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that the regulation of the matter provided by Law No. 6227/78 requires that such actions be exercised within an administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo) as a manifestation and materialization of an administrative power that is considered unwaivable, in accordance with Article 66 of said Law. Indeed, as has been demonstrated, in light of the provisions of Articles 198.2, 207, and 210 (as well as the doctrine underlying Article 203), all of the LGAP, the Administration must undertake the corresponding actions to determine the civil liability of its officials, whether for injuries caused to third parties and for which, within the true joint and several liability (solidaridad propia) regime imposed by Articles 190, 191, 199, 207, and 208 LGAP, it has had to make disbursements, or for the damages that the official has caused to the patrimony of the Administration. To this end, as has been noted, the legal system establishes the administrative power to initiate internal administrative procedures (procedimientos administrativos) to determine the concurrence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) of the public agent, as well as the due proof of the harm and its amount. In the judgment of this Tribunal, the exercise of that power is unwaivable, such that seeking to have that analysis addressed directly in the judicial venue, through the mechanism of the counterclaim, seeks to transfer to this venue a debate that by mandate of law must be initiated in the administrative venue. This is, it is insisted, a power regulated in Law No. 6227/78, and this Chamber does not observe viable reasons for the Administration to decline that exercise. It must be clarified, although Article 10, first subsection, sub-subsection e) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code establishes the active legal standing of the Public Administration to claim damages and losses to public interests and the Public Treasury, and to demand contractual and non-contractual liability, it must be clear that in this specific case, we are dealing with an internal employment relationship of the Administration, which generates a bond whose particularities mean the Administration holds an intense power that enables it to determine internally, in the administrative venue, as a derivation of disciplinary liability, the economic consequences in terms of damages that may have been caused by conduct of an official that has been subject to punitive correction. The opening of the disciplinary procedure and the clarity of the facts upon which it is based must project the internal actions to establish the existence or not of patrimonial harm. Otherwise, the benefit of the executive action stipulated by Article 210 LGAP would have no meaning, if to establish that liability, it were necessary for the public entity to resort to judicial instances. That treatment only makes sense within a sphere of the exercise of an exorbitant power that allows the Administration to resolve those questions internally. Of course, once the public conduct is issued, those points can be addressed in a contentious administrative proceeding, within which the validity of the public conduct can be examined, but this does not imply permissibility to decline the exercise of public powers that have been conferred to make the actions the public hierarch may undertake within the framework of public employment relations more efficient. Thus, the inadmissibility of the analyzed claim must be ordered.

XIV.- For greater precision of reasoning. In any event, for further abundance of reasons, even on the merits, what is claimed by the counterclaimant entity could not be granted. The allocation of civil liability to the official depends on the concurrence of several circumstances. As noted previously (ut supra), the official's liability before the Administration for conduct that has caused harm to the latter without injury to third parties is subject to conclusive demonstration of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in their conduct, as conditioned by Article 210 of the General Law of Public Administration. Such aspects must imperatively be proven by the Administration itself, which bears the demonstrative burden in this particular, within an administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo), with full guarantee of due process, a topic already addressed above. First, the existence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) of the public official. Second, the due proof of the harm suffered by the Administration seeking its reparation. Third, the exercise of the compensation claim within the period established for those purposes. In this case, INA seeks for the civil liability of the plaintiff official to be declared, based on the same facts that have been the subject of analysis in this ruling, for an amount of ¢182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones). In that sense, after setting forth what occurred within the administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo), the counterclaimant entity states that liability arises because it was not proven that the flowers were actually purchased by the official. In a supplementary manner, it says, based on the price indicated by the owner of the premises and the amount reported in invoice 10770, the amount to be invoiced should have been ¢34,000.00 (thirty-four thousand colones), hence the difference being ¢148,600.00 (one hundred forty-eight thousand six hundred colones). Unlike what the public entity states, the factual picture analyzed does not allow for the conclusion that in this case, the plaintiff did not acquire the flowers for teaching the bartender and waiter course in the Chorotega Region and which was intended to be covered by check number 75451-9. If examined carefully, the object of the administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo) was to establish disciplinary liability for having settled the advance for the purchase of perishables with an altered invoice that presented, in the judgment of INA, the following basic inconsistencies: it was not issued by the business Flor Arte Floristería, the invoice date is a Sunday, when the business was closed, and the amount does not correspond to the prices the flowers actually had at that business at the time the events occurred. From that perspective, proof of the commission of the fault does not automatically entail the existence of the harm claimed. While it can be conjectured that the improper use of an altered invoice could generate economic harm to the Administration, to determine the real magnitude of the harm, it is necessary to determine whether the flowers were actually acquired. It is clear that they were not acquired from the business Flor Arte Floristería through invoice 10770, however, it is necessary to establish whether those items were acquired, or if they definitively were not, as a prior and fundamental element for establishing the amount of a possible compensable harm. This aspect has not been proven in this case. Even in resolution No. LA-106-2011, in Considerando IV, it is indicated that at the oral hearing, the plaintiff stated the event for which the flowers were purchased took place and these (the flowers) were used. In response to that allegation, the Executive Presidency indicated that the disciplinary procedure did not concern whether or not the event took place, or whether the flowers were used or not, but rather that what was being investigated was whether the invoice had been delivered blank and whether that business (Flor Arte Floristería) had dispatched the indicated quantity of flowers. This can be seen on folio 24 of the main file. Therefore, there is no clarity regarding the actual acquisition of the flowers and the real purchase amount for those items, if they were in fact acquired. These are questions that must be weighed in the administrative phase, in the procedure that must be instituted for those purposes, but which, in this case, have not been proven. This being so, this Tribunal does not consider the relational framework between a possible harm claimed by the Administration and the official's conduct, to which that claim is sought to be associated, to have been proven. Nor can it be conjectured that the harm consists of the difference between the cost reflected in invoice 10770 and the price of the flowers declared by the owner of the business for those dates, since if the basis of the sanction was using an invoice from a commercial establishment from which, it is said, the flowers were not acquired, there would be an evident contradiction in supporting the harm on price differences provided by a business from which the items were not purchased. This being the case, the request could not be granted, due to the absence of the minimum elements that would enable that examination." 44) and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, a special five-year statute of limitations applies (according to the circumstances and from the moments those rules provide), and not the monthly statute established by the Labor Code, it is reiterated, as it is a special and subsequent regulation that prevails over the general labor regime. However, the starting point for calculating this prescriptive period is decisive. On this matter, section 603 of the Labor Code indicates that the period runs from when the cause for the separation occurred, or failing that, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly period is computed from the moment the holder of the corrective power is in an objective position to know of the fault and, therefore, to undertake the exercise of their power. Consequently, when the particularities of the case require a prior stage of preliminary investigation, the aforementioned monthly period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are brought to the attention of the superior (jerarca). This is also the case for faults that are evidenced in Internal Audit reports, but whose prosecution for sanctioning purposes must be submitted to the respective superior. In such a scenario, the indicated period is computed from the moment of receipt or effective communication of said report to the superior, since it is only at that moment that this holder can validly make decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless, the necessity or not of that phase (preliminary investigation) must be differentiated in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is essential to determine the pertinence or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or to gather evidence aimed at clarifying its necessity or not. This subject will be addressed later as it is a core object of debate by the plaintiff. 2) <u>Statute of limitations for the power to adopt the sanction within the procedure:</u> this refers to the maximum time limit available to the holder of the corrective power to adopt the sanction once the case file has been submitted for their consideration by the directing body, in which case, what remains is the issuance of the final act. In this hypothesis, the superior or holder has a maximum period of one month to decide the applicable sanction, from the moment the directing body of the case formally brings its recommendation to their attention. In this case, without prejudice to what is regulated by section 319 of the LGAP, the holder of the power would have a maximum period (of statute of limitations) of one month to adopt that final act, after which, the statute of limitations for that power would inevitably occur, and therefore, the final act would be null due to infringement of the competence element, conditioned in that case by preclusion factors. Such a circumstance, in the specific dynamic of disciplinary sanctioning procedures, given the content of section 603 of the Labor Code, constitutes a special treatment that overrides what is stipulated by canon 329.3 of the LGAP. It is not a matter, at this point, of the two-month period imposed by section 261 LGAP to conclude the ordinary procedure, a period that is in any case directory (ordenatorio) and not peremptory. Nevertheless, this Section has established that the unjustified delay of the procedure, even with that directory connotation of the temporal element, can lead to the nullity of that process, due to infringement of the principle of prompt and complete administrative justice. However, on this point, the term commented on above refers to the one held by the superior so that, once the report of the directing body is rendered, the final decision is imposed. 3) <u>Statute of limitations for the power to execute the imposed sanction</u>: This refers to the period available to the administrative superior to order the application of the dictated sanction. It therefore consists of the material execution of the act that orders a disciplinary sanction as its content. In this case, by analogical integration, the applicable period, except for a special rule, would be the monthly period provided for in section 603 of the Labor Code. The denial of such a period would imply the perpetual possibility for the superior to apply a sanction ordered beforehand, under the allegation of a sort of imprescriptibility of that power. Thus, one thing is the period to order the final act once the final report of the directing body is issued, and another is the period to materialize the firm sanction ordered. On this point, the period must be computed from the firmness of that act, which may originate from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary appeals that may be filed against the act as appropriate, or, if after the period established by the legal system to formulate those appeals, they have not been filed, in which event, administrative firmness occurs due to the inertia of the recipient of the effects of the conduct. Another element subject to temporality rules is that referring to the <u>Processing</u> of the procedure. This refers to the maximum time that an instituted administrative procedure may last to establish the facts that allow the holder of the public repressive power to adopt the final decision. This subject, except for a special rule, is regulated by section 261, in relation to 319 and 340, all of Law No. 6227. However, that two-month period provided there consists of a period of a directory nature, not peremptory, which of course does not include nor permit procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid due to infringement of the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice. In this sense, see ruling No. 199-2011-VI of this Section VI, at 16:20 hours on September 12, 2011. On this point, reference must also be made to what is stipulated by precept 340 of the LGAP which regulates the institution of the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure, in cases where the investigating Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months for causes attributable to it. In this case, expiration applies even in cases where the procedure is ready for the issuance of the final act, since the restriction of subsection 2 of the cited canon 340, regarding the impossibility of expiration when the matter is ready for the issuance of that final act, only applies when the procedure was initiated at the request of a party, given that the following stage only falls to the Administration, which could not shield itself in its inertia. This does not occur when it was initiated ex officio, because in that case, the delay does benefit the administered party, to the extent that it would, in that case, be a delay solely attributable to the public office.

V.- Concrete analysis of the temporal aspects of the internal administrative corrective power. In the present case, the plaintiff alleges the statute of limitations for the corrective power for two reasons. The first, for exceeding one month from the occurrence of the facts; the second, because nine months have passed since the investigations were concluded. Addressing the issue of the statute of limitations in this case requires setting forth a brief account of what happened. As has been accredited, through check No. 75451-9 of May 19, 2010, a check was issued for an amount of ¢1,018,488.00 (one million eighteen thousand four hundred eighty-eight colones), in favor of the plaintiff for per diem (viáticos), transportation, and purchase of perishable products to conduct a field trip to La Cruz in order to teach the modules on room service (code TUGT289) and food and beverage services for special events (code TUGT515) of the Professional Bartender and Waiter program. To settle the advance corresponding to the purchase of perishables, the promoter provided invoice No. 10770 of June 6, 2010, from the business "Flor Arte Floristería", for an amount of ¢182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones), corresponding to the purchase of 10 units of roses, 10 of apples, 10 carnations, and 10 of other natural flowers. As a result of these facts, through report AI-00535-2011 of June 6, 2011, issued by the Internal Audit of the public entity, and sent to the Executive Presidency by official letter No. 23-2011, received on June 13, 2011, the Executive Presidency was informed of the alleged irregular acts in the purchase of perishable products, just detailed. As a first aspect, it must be specified, as established by section 9 of the Organic Law of INA, No. 6868, that the highest-ranking official within that institution corresponds to the Executive Presidency, an instance which, in accordance with what section 102 subsection c) of the General Law of Public Administration stipulates, is therefore the one who holds the corrective power of a disciplinary nature. The foregoing implies, in light of what was stated in the preceding recital, that the prescriptive period for the exercise of that power is computed from the moment that superior is in an objective position to know the factual cause that would give basis to internal discipline. In the present case, the promoter indicates that once the evidence-gathering phase was completed, specifically, the sworn statement of Ivette Sáenz Faerron, owner of the premises where the flowers were booked on August 31, 2010, and of the employee Seidy Murillo Villagra, on September 7, 2010, the procedure was ready to adopt decisions regarding the aforementioned power. Such position is respected by this Tribunal, but is definitively not shared. For the purposes of understanding the starting point of the prescriptive period, the date on which the Internal Audit's investigations were conducted is not the reference point for such purposes. As has been stated, it is when the superior who holds the corrective power is informed that the computation of the prescriptive period must begin, unless it can be proven that there was another opportunity in which, objectively, it was possible for that hierarchy to know of the existence of those particular facts, such that they could adopt concrete actions. However, this last exception does not appear in the case file. Now, it was not until June 13, 2011, that the Internal Audit informed the Executive Presidency of the alleged committed faults, through a report recommending the opening of an ordinary disciplinary proceeding, for having settled an advance for the purchase of perishables with an altered invoice. As recorded in the case file, after that communication, through act AL-NOD-068-2011 of June 24, 2011, the Executive Presidency designated the directing body for the procedure and formulated the statement of charges (traslado de cargos), which was communicated to the appellant on July 7, 2011. The recounting of these dates leads this Tribunal to establish that in the sub-examine, from the date when the holder of the corrective power was notified of the facts allegedly committed by the plaintiff and the date when the disciplinary procedure was instructed and notified, no more than the month claimed by the plaintiff elapsed, so the exercise of that power would be timely, even applying the monthly period set by section 603 of the Labor Code. In this sense, as has been set forth supra, the communication of that administrative procedure generates an interrupting effect on the mentioned statute of limitations regime. It is worth noting, the plaintiff invokes in his favor section 51 of the Autonomous Service Regulations of INA (which he provided with the lawsuit), a rule that regulates the prescriptive period of the sanctioning regime. However, when closely examined, said mandate regulates the prescriptive period for imposing sanctions within the month following the commission of the facts or, failing that, the date on which the superior becomes aware of the fault. On the other hand, it indicates that this term is computed from the moment the ordinary procedure concludes, which shall not exceed two months. The analysis of that rule allows concluding that it sets forth the same temporality criteria already formulated above in this ruling, so it does not constitute any element that would disregard what has been said so far on the subject under examination. Thus, the communication of the opening of the procedure occurred within the month indicated by the plaintiff, without any defect being evident in that aspect. On the other hand, regarding the duration of the sanctioning procedure, it is found that the statement of charges was made on July 7, 2011, the private oral hearing was held on August 18, 2011, having been moved from the original date at the express request of the investigated official. In conclusion, the final act was issued through resolution LA-106-2011 at 15:00 hours on September 7, 2011. The foregoing allows concluding that no unreasonable delay occurred in this case in the substantiation of the proceeding. Likewise, regarding the period to impose the sanction, resolution LA-106-2011 was therefore issued within the one-month period imposed by section 51 of the Internal Regulations, after the private hearing was held. It should be noted, even using the previous internal regulations, such periods have not been violated, given that Article 70 stated that the statute of limitations was governed by the Regulations of the Civil Service Statute and the Labor Code, both rules that follow the same treatment already set forth. In essence, when resolving the statute of limitations defense in resolution LA-106-2011 of September 07, 2011, the Executive Presidency relied on the application of section 51 of the Autonomous Regulations of INA, noting that the one-month period had not been violated because the procedure was instructed within the month following the receipt of the Internal Audit report. Fundamentally, that criterion is shared for the reasons given, so it is reiterated, no incorrectness is observed regarding the temporality regime analyzed, for which reason the objection must be rejected.

VI.- On the duty of probity within the exercise of public office. Without prejudice to the foregoing, it should be noted that, given the alleged application of a more intense five-year statute of limitations regime is criticized, the identification of the faults attributed refers to possible harm to the internal control regime as warned by the superior in the statement of charges. For clarity on the above, it is worth briefly referring to the probity regime in the exercise of the public function. Section 111 of the General Law of Public Administration defines a public official as the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf and on account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. For its part, canon 113 ejusdem clearly establishes that the functional framework of the public agent must be carried out in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, understood as the coinciding interest of the administered parties. To this end, the public servant is unavoidably bound to the principle of legality, both in its negative and positive view, as inferred, at the legal level, from sections 11, 12, 13, 59, and 66 of the cited General Law and Article 11 of the Magna Carta. As part of this orientation, the performance of the official is oriented and delimited by rules of transparency and probity, whose legal basis is expressly found in section 3 of Law No. 8422. Said rule states: " <b><i>Duty of probity</i></b><i>. The public official shall be obliged to orient their management towards satisfying the public interest. This duty shall manifest itself, fundamentally, in identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, in demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; ensuring that the decisions adopted in fulfillment of their attributions conform to impartiality and the objectives proper to the institution in which they perform; and, finally, in administering public resources in accordance with the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, satisfactorily rendering accounts.</i> " From this angle, as a complement to the finalist orientation of the public official which requires them to prioritize the satisfaction of public interests over personal ones, even over the interests of the Administration (113.2 ibidem), which is characteristic of the service nature of their competencies, the duty of probity aims to provide aspects of greater specificity that in some way guide the actions of the public agent (or are lines that should guide them), so that their conduct responds to that teleological dimension, not only at the result level, but through the incorporation of moral and ethical duties that guarantee transparency and objectivity in their conduct. That is, this public morality demands the adequate and efficient management of public resources and, in general, the public assets assigned to them and placed at their disposal for the performance of their duties and exercise of their functions. This includes not only monetary resources provided to them to develop specific activities and intended to finance expenses inherent to assigned activities, such as per diem or advances for the purchase of goods or acquisition of services necessary for those tasks, but also the goods entrusted to them to execute their actions, such as vehicles, general movable property, such as computer equipment, office equipment, among others. Likewise, in case of conflicts of interest, they must recuse themselves from the matter, in order not to pollute or put at risk the objectivity that must be characteristic of their conduct, but also, in their actions, they must tend towards satisfying that greater interest. More simply, the duty of probity regulated in article three of Law No. 8422 obliges every public servant to perform their duties in accordance with the principle of efficiency in the administration of public resources, as well as objectivity and impartiality in the face of personal or family, economic, or other interests, so in their performance they must demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law. This is indeed derived from canon one of the Regulation to the cited Law No. 8422. Therefore, it is clear that the condition of a public agent involves subjection to and due compliance with duties of a moral and ethical orientation that the same legal system enshrines and imposes, requiring them to conduct themselves in their management with rectitude and soundness. Hence, the infringement of the mentioned duty of probity is not immune from the disciplinary liability framework of the public agent. Precept 4 of the mentioned Law No. 8422 establishes: " <i>Without prejudice to any civil and criminal liabilities that may apply, the infringement of the duty of probity, duly proven and after prior defense, shall constitute just cause for separation from public office without employer liability.</i> " Such conditioned effect finds meaning, in the context being analyzed, for acts of open improvisation, poor administration of resources, or total evidence of conflicts of interest perfectly inferable from a specific situation, without the official having adopted voluntary recusal actions. Of course, the application and interpretation of that rule must follow paths of rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, parameters that must be evaluated in each specific case. For this, mandate 38 of the cited legislation establishes causes for administrative liability, which later find their correlative possible sanctions in the letter of rule 39 iusibid, which would, in that regard, be applicable to infringements of the duty of probity under the terms already developed. The synergy of these provisions incorporates a flexible system that allows the liability of an official to arise from the issuance of conduct that violates ethical rules. Nevertheless, the correct application of this system implies the necessary instruction of an administrative procedure, as a prior and insurmountable step to apply a sanction for harm to that framework of official obligations, with full and complete respect for the guarantees of defense and due process, which is fundamental to avoiding arbitrary and illegal actions. The facts attributed to the plaintiff, such as the settlement of advanced expenses through an allegedly altered invoice, undoubtedly imply facts that antagonize the internal control regime that has been explained. The appellant confuses the responsibilities of those who directly administer public treasury, called hierarchical superiors or subordinate holders, with the responsibility that is proper to them by their mere condition as a public official, therefore, subject to internal control regulations and illicit enrichment. Thus, it is the judgment of this Chamber, they would lead to the infringement of the cited regime.

Nonetheless, the limitation rules have not been violated, even without resorting to the strict rules established by Law No. 7428 for these matters. Therefore, it is reiterated, the reproach under examination must be dismissed.

**VII.- Generalities regarding the administrative procedure.** In a second set of grievances, the claimant objects to the application of a regime that was not in force at the time the administrative procedure was conducted against him. Given the issue raised, it is necessary to make some general considerations regarding the minimum formalities that a disciplinary administrative procedure must meet. The administrative procedure constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It serves a dual purpose. On one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a specific decision, guiding its actions. On the other, it stands as a frame of reference that allows the administered party to compare public action, in order to establish a control ensuring that its actions have been manifested in accordance with the rules guiding that procedure. It therefore seeks to become a mechanism for safeguarding subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as guaranteeing the legality, timeliness, and advisability of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. As indicated by canon 214 of Law No. 6227, its purpose is to establish the real truth of the facts serving as the basis for the final case. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the better fulfillment of the Administration's goals and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in article 225.1 of the General Law of Public Administration. Hence, canon 216.1 ibidem requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure with strict adherence to the legal system. During its course, the procedure aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party the full exercise of the right of defense and the adversarial process, in order to establish the aforementioned real truth of the facts (within which those established in canons 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all from the cited General Law, can be seen). This acquires even greater relevance in what are known as control or sanctioning procedures, given that in those cases, the final decision may impose a punitive framework on the legal sphere of a person. The same regulatory body stipulates the substantial nature of these minimum guarantees, considering the procedure invalid if it does not satisfy those minimum issues. This is derived from mandate 223 of the referenced Law, as it indicates that the omission of substantial formalities will cause the nullity of the procedure. From this standpoint, this Tribunal has already indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred upon this jurisdiction by canon 49 of the Magna Carta, implies a verification that the Administration, in the course of those procedures (of a sanctioning nature in this case), satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that, at its core, the due process that must be insurmountable in that proceeding has been protected. Now then, by virtue of what has been alleged, it is necessary to address the issue of the functions specific to the directing body and the decision-making body of the procedure. The competence to issue the final act within a procedure corresponds to the decision-making body, that is, to the one that has been granted the legal competence to issue the act that resolves the matter. However, in the interests of administrative efficiency, the investigative competences are delegable to a body charged with carrying out the instruction of the procedure, which has come to be called the "directing or instructing body". It is evident that the designation of the latter corresponds to the decision-making body, for which its validity is subject to it falling upon an assigned official, regularly designated and in possession of the post. As an exception, it has been tolerated that persons who are not regular officials act as the directing body of the procedure; however, in that specific function, they must be understood to be performing a public function, with the inherent obligations. Regarding its competences, the instructing body represents the Administration in the procedure and holds an instructional role. It is responsible for issuing a factual analysis. Although it may render recommendations, these would certainly not be binding, meaning its determinations regarding the adoption of a final decision are considered procedural acts. Therefore, it is responsible for issuing the opening act, giving procedural impulse, all the instructional work of the procedure, directing the hearing, resolving preliminary issues, resolving the revocation appeal filed against procedural acts, rendering a report to the decision-making body at the time of submitting the case file for the issuance of the final act. Among its competences, articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all from the referenced General Law, can be seen. For its part, the decision-making body is the competent hierarchical superior who meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act that resolves the procedure.

**VIII.-** After analyzing the processing given to the present matter, this collegiate body finds that in the substantiation of the proceeding, no injury to due process is observed, given that the set of minimum phases comprising the disciplinary administrative procedure has been guaranteed to the claimant. In this regard, the actor indicates that a version of the internal regulation that was not in force at the time the events occurred was applied to him. From the analysis of the case file, it is evident that through agreement 187-2010 of the Board of Directors of the INA, published in La Gaceta No. 5 of January 11, 2011, a modification was made to the Autonomous Service Regulation of that public entity, a reform that included the procedure to follow in matters of the disciplinary regime. However, the applicable regulation is the one in force at the moment when the possibility of exercising disciplinary power by the hierarchical superior arises, whether due to the notoriety of the facts or due to the receipt of reports that warn him of the existence of facts that may be subject to the application of the internal corrective regime. As has been indicated, the Internal Audit report that brought to the attention of the Executive Presidency the investigated facts attributed to the claimant was notified on June 13, 2011. On that date, the internal regulation had already been modified, which is why the applicable norm is the one that governed on that date and that, ultimately, was the one applied to the claimant. It is not a matter of retroactive application to the detriment as claimed by the actor, but rather the use of the norms that, in time and space, are pertinent to the matter. Nonetheless, the claimant does not specify the manner in which injury to the principle of due process has been caused to him, or in general, how a substantial procedural breach (infracción sustancial) has occurred to his detriment, in the terms required by canon 223 LGAP. On this point, it is worth indicating, in line with that referenced precept, that the invalidity that must be declared within administrative procedures is only that which can be considered a substantial procedural breach (infracción sustancial) of the legal system, among these, actions or omissions generating states of defenselessness or which, had they been addressed, would have generated a different criterion or decision. The plaintiff does not explain how those substantial imperfections have occurred to the detriment of his legal situation. Even so, having analyzed the procedure followed, compliance with the relevant stages that must make up any procedure of this nature, briefly set forth above, is observed. The right of defense has been protected, the oral and private hearing was conducted, a reasoned and motivated act on the merits of the matter was issued, and the ordinary appeals filed regarding each of the debated points, and later, constituting the appellate grievances, were resolved. From the foregoing, it follows that in this case, all the stages established by ordinal 74 of the INA Autonomous Regulation were complied with. In sum, no nullities are detected in the procedure, nor does the actor provide an argumentative detail (as would be his duty) regarding the pathologies that could lead to a possible estimation of his annulment claim. From that angle of examination, the charge must be rejected.

**IX.- Regarding the allegation of lack of accreditation of the facts.** In another set of reproaches, the lack of accreditation in the administrative venue of the alleged faults is argued. The charge itself seeks for this Tribunal to determine a supposed inexistence of the grounds (motivo) of the administrative act, considered as the factual and/or legal antecedent that allows or enables the issuance of the public decision. In the case of disciplinary sanctions, that grounds (motivo) would consist of the conditioning premise consisting of the accreditation of the faults that were charged and, therefore, the object of investigation. As a starting point, it must be said, through official letter No. AI-00535-2011 of June 06, 2011, the Internal Audit sent report No. 23-2011 regarding alleged irregular events in the purchase of perishable products (roses, pomas, carnations, and natural flowers) for teaching the modules of "Room Services", code TUGT289, and "Food and Beverage Services at special events", code TUGT515, of the professional bartender and waiter program, attributed to the official Juan Pablo Córdoba López. By resolution as of 12 o'clock on July 01, 2011, communicated on July 07, 2011, the following facts were charged in the statement of objections: "*1. That as a teacher you were assigned to teach the room services modules …, of the Professional Bartender and Waiter program… 2. That check number 75454-9 dated May 19, 2010, for an amount of C.1,018,488… was issued in your name for the concept of per diems, transportation, and purchase of perishable products to carry out the trip to La Cruz to teach the modules and food and beverage services at special events (code TUGT515) of the Professional Bartender and Waiter Program… 3. That you did not make the purchase of the flowers indicated in invoice number 10770, since it was a lady named “Magaly” who did it. 4. That the lady named “Magaly” at the beginning of June requested a blank invoice from the shop “Flor Arte Floristería”, which turned out to be invoice number 10770. 5. That to settle the advance corresponding to the purchase of perishables, you used Invoice No. 10770 of June 06, 2010, for an amount of C.182,600.00 (exactly one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones) for the purchase of forty units of Roses, Pomas, Carnations, and Natural Flowers, from the supplier “Flor Arte Floristería”. 6. That you presented Invoice No. 10770, with a date corresponding to Sunday, June 06, 2010, a day on which the business “Flor Arte Floristería” is closed, since the shop's business hours are Monday to Saturday from 8:00 am to 6:30 pm. 7. That you presented Invoice No. 10770 dated June 06, 2010, for an amount of C.182,600.00, in which the sale prices of the flowers acquired are detailed, which do not correspond to the prices that said flowers had at that time at the business “Flor Arte Floristería”*". For its part, in act LA-106-2011 as of 15 o'clock on September 07, 2011, of the Executive Presidency of the INA, the following, in what is relevant, were taken as proven facts: that check No. 75451-9 was issued in the name of the claimant; that to settle the advance corresponding to the purchase of perishables, the claimant used Invoice No. 10770 of June 06, 2010, from the business Flor Arte Floristería; that said invoice for an amount of C.182,600.00 corresponds to the purchase of 10 units of roses, 10 pomas, 10 carnations, and 10 of other natural flowers; that the cited invoice does not detail unit prices for each of the products acquired; that the date of the invoice corresponds to a Sunday; that the business Flor Arte Floristería has business hours from Monday to Saturday from 08 am to 06:30 pm and does not open on Sundays; that the plaintiff did not verify the prices of the flowers; that for the month of June 2010, the price of flowers in that business was C.800.00 per unit of roses, C.350.00 per unit of carnations, C.1,800.00 per bunch of pomas, and C.500.00 per unit of the highest-priced other natural flowers. It was likewise taken as proven that Mrs. Magaly Alvarado is recognized in the alluded business as a frequent customer; that Invoice No. 10770 was delivered blank by Mrs. Seidy Murillo Villagra, an employee of the cited business, to Mrs. Magaly Alvarado; that the sale described in the cited invoice was not made by the company Flor Arte Floristería; that neither the owner nor the employee of the referenced business recognize the actor as a customer; and that the cited business is under the simplified regime of the Tax Administration. In each of these facts, reference was made to the evidentiary element that supported them. The actor claims that the owner of the business was not present on the day of the purchase of the flowers nor the supposed blank delivery of invoice 10770 to Magaly Alvarado, stating that it is strange for a business to give blank invoices. He also indicates that the process is based on the version of the employee, who seeks to justify that she made the sale and did not report it, or that she did it for a sum greater than what corresponded. Furthermore, that the owner of the business indicates a different price than what was invoiced to him in April and May 2010, one month before the supposedly false sale. He adds that it is indicated that Magaly Alvarado stated that she does not know the shop, which he affirms she never said, but rather expressed that her visits to the flower shop were not constant. Regarding this point, the following must be set forth.

**X.-** In resolution LA-106-2011, the Executive Presidency of the INA clearly sets forth the reasons and considerations that led it to consider the chain of events as accredited, based on which it determined the existence of an irregularity in the actions of Mr. Córdoba López, which led to imposing the sanction disputed in this case. Although in this process the claimant formulates a series of questions about the weighting of the evidentiary elements that the instructing body produced and the decision-making body of the disciplinary procedure assessed, his expositions are limited to pointing out subjective and imprecise impressions that do not allow for a proper refutation of the evidentiary analysis presented by the act under reference. Indeed, in what is the object of analysis, the claimant limits himself to formulating generic reproaches that fail to specify in a detailed and concrete manner the reasons why the analysis performed by the respondent Administration contravenes the rules of sound rational criticism and the real truth of the facts that must prevail in the topic of this type of procedures (articles 214, 221, 223, 308, 297, and 298 LGAP), nor do his arguments express defects in the determination of the grounds (motivo) element, or in the way the final decision has been justified in the sub examine. On the contrary, the facts that gave rise to the sanction were first analyzed by the Internal Audit in report No. 23-2011, in which it suggests the opening of the disciplinary procedure for alleged irregularities presented in the purchase of perishable products, specifically, roses, pomas, carnations, and natural flowers, in the judgment of that internal unit, acquired at an overprice. Based on that report, in resolution LA-106-2011, a specific analysis is made of each one of the factual circumstances considered as the basis for the imposed sanction. In the first point, it is concluded that the flowers were purchased by Mrs. Magaly Alvarado and not by the claimant, a conclusion reached from the statements of the business owner and the employee, as well as the manifestations of the plaintiff himself, according to documents found at folios 17 to 23 and 52 of the administrative file. Likewise, the business employee, Mrs. Seidy Murillo, stated that Mrs. Magaly had never taken the flowers, but rather that she had only been given blank invoice 10770. Similarly, both the employee and the owner of the shop, Mrs. Ivette Saénz, indicated they did not know the claimant and that the only time they saw him was when he appeared with INA officials. From this, it is concluded in the final act that although the invoice in question belongs to the business Flor Arte Floristería, the flowers that this document expresses were never sold by that business to the claimant or to his wife, Mrs. Magaly Alvarado. Likewise, from the testimony of the shop owner and her employee, it is extracted that the invoice was delivered blank to Mrs. Magaly Alvarado so that she could prepare a proforma invoice, from which it follows that it is not a document that was issued to the actor for the concept of the sale of perishables as was reported in his expense settlement. On the other hand, regarding the price of the flowers, the Administration determined that unit prices were not established in the invoice. From the statement of the business owner, it is noted that roses had a value of ¢800.00, carnations ¢350.00, pomas (rollito) ¢1800.00, and natural flowers, the most expensive at ¢500.00. Even in the sworn statement visible at folios 17-18 of the administrative file, the shop owner states that dividing the invoice amount among the indicated units reflects prices that do not correspond to those she sells in her business, and furthermore, that to reach that amount, she would have had to sell a quantity much greater than 40 units, a quantity she says she does not keep in stock. From those data, the Administration concluded on the reporting of excessive prices in the cost of the flowers relative to the amounts provided by the shop owner. On the other hand, the inconsistency in the invoice date was determined, issued on June 06, 2010, which corresponded to a Sunday, a day on which the cited business was closed. On this point, the INA warned about the inconsistencies in the petitioner's statements, since in a first statement, he indicated that although he made the purchase on a Saturday, he asked the shop employee to do him the favor of putting Sunday's date to avoid problems, since he was going to use the flowers until Monday (folio 23 of the administrative file); however, later, at the hearing on August 18, 2011, he expressed that he bought the flowers on Saturday and that he did not check the date, thus committing an error by not realizing it. This, as the INA stated, demonstrates an inconsistency, from which it then emerges, together with the statements of the shop owner and her employee, that the business in question did not open on Sundays, an aspect that could not be refuted. As a derivation, the INA concluded on the use of an invoice that did not correspond to a real sale made by the cited business Flor Arte Floristería, for the purposes of settling disbursed sums, and with an amount that exceeds the prices that business handles for those supposedly acquired products. In the judgment of this Tribunal, the foregoing account demonstrates the proper accreditation within the administrative procedure of the facts that served as the basis for the sanction and that have been detailed. Although what was produced within the administrative file does not constitute full proof in judicial cases, after its weighing and the analysis of the allegations formulated by the claimant, this collegiate body does not observe the argumentative defects alleged in the lawsuit regarding the accreditation of the factual causes that gave basis to the sanction. After the analysis of the evidence, the claimant has not managed to refute the considerations adopted by the Executive Presidency of the INA. On the contrary, the weighing of that statement of reasons in the questioned act demonstrates the proper demonstration of the facts that were the basis of the statement of objections. Therefore, this point must be rejected.

**XI.- Regarding the allegation of unregulated sanctions.** In another grievance, the application of a sanction not provided for in the regulations applicable to him is reproached, citing to that effect numeral 49 of the INA Autonomous Regulation, which indicated that for one fault, suspension without pay for 8 days, and for two, dismissal without employer liability. However, as the INA's representation correctly points out, even within the context of that same norm, it is indicated "*The foregoing sanctions shall be applied without prejudice to a greater sanction being imposed if the faults warrant it.*" In the version in force (and applicable to the case) of that internal regulation, the matter is regulated in ordinal 47, a mandate that establishes as disciplinary measures verbal reprimand, written warning, suspension without pay for up to fifteen days, without prejudice to the application of a suspension for a longer period when foreseen by special laws and according to the nature of the fault, as well as dismissal without employer liability. Subsequently, the norm establishes criteria for graduation to impose the sanctions. For its part, precept 48 regulates minor faults, 49 the serious ones, and 50 those that permit dismissal. From that standpoint, the content of the act finds due support in the norms that regulate the actions of the INA in this type of case. It is worth noting that within the statement of objections, the possibility of dismissal was indicated to the petitioner as a consequence of the charged facts, having expressed possible injuries to article 81, subsections d) and l) of the Labor Code, as well as infractions of the regime of the Internal Control Law and the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment. In resolution LA-106-2011 of the Executive Presidency, it is indicated that the accredited facts constituted a breach of the obligations imposed by the Autonomous Service Regulation, specifically, ordinals 43, subsections 3, 14, by not having executed the tasks and functions with full capacity, dedication, diligence and effort; by not having consulted the prices of the flowers and using an invoice that had irregularities; by having used an invoice knowing it did not correspond to a real sale by the business.

It also pointed out a violation of subsection 37 of that same rule, due to a lack of dignity in the exercise of the position, as well as an injury to Article 45, subsection 8) ibidem, by using an altered invoice to settle an advance corresponding to the purchase of perishable goods, knowing it contained an excessive amount. Likewise, an injury to canon 39 of the General Law of Internal Control. Ergo, it concluded that by infringing Article 43, subsections 3, 14, 37, and 40, numeral 45, subsections 8 and 27, a serious misconduct (falta grave) was produced in light of ordinal 49 of the cited regulation, in addition to the disregard of Article 39 of the General Law of Internal Control, classified as a serious misconduct by mandate 41, subsection c) of that same legal source.&nbsp; The analysis of the invoked norms and the alleged facts allows the conclusion that the imposed sanction finds support and legitimizing basis in those normative references. In this way, having accredited the grounds for the act, which, it is insisted, constitutes the conditioning fact of the disciplinary regime, the application of the conditioned effect is feasible, constituted in this case by the content of the act, which, under the protection of ordinal 132 LGAP, must be lawful and possible, in addition to corresponding to the grounds. Such harmony is evident in this case, since the seriousness of the facts investigated in light of the internal regulation allows them to be considered serious misconducts (faltas graves) that give rise to imposing sanctions such as the one that was ultimately imposed, that is, a suspension without pay for 15 days, despite the fact that the statement of objections warned of a possible dismissal. In this way, the contradiction and pathology that the plaintiff alleges do not exist, in view of which, the charge must be dismissed. In this way, resolution LA-106-2011 of 3:00 p.m. on September 7, 2011, from the Executive Presidency of INA does not present the accused inaccuracies, and the annulment petition must therefore be denied. For the same stated reasons, this claim of invalidity also does not proceed with respect to resolution No. LA-201-2011 of 1:00 p.m. on September 29, 2011, from INA, which hears the appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed by the claimant. This act is limited to analyzing each of the grievances formulated against that final act, confirming what was already resolved in the previous stage, essentially, upholding the reasoning set forth therein. The analyses indicated in that confirmatory act conform to the parameters set forth in this ruling, so under the protection of mandates 128 and 158 LGAP, the claim of invalidity filed against that decision must be rejected. In sum, the rejection of the lawsuit filed by Mr. Juan Pablo Córdoba López against INA must be ordered in all its aspects. </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:5.05pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:5.05pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial;color:#010101; mso-ansi-language:EN'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;XII.- On the Counterclaim (Contrademanda) filed by INA.</span></b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>On the liability regime of public officials for damages caused to the Public Administration. Generalities. </span></b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>INA </span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>filed a counterclaim (contrademanda), for which purpose, it expressed the following claims: &quot;<i>... I request your authority to declare this claim granted and to establish in judgment the civil liability of the official Juan Pablo Córdoba López for the amount of ¢182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones), disbursed by INA for the purchase of flowers, which never occurred and yet he made the respective collection with an invoice that does not correspond to the premises where he claims to have acquired the goods. 2. That Mr. Juan Pablo Córdoba López be ordered to pay the National Learning Institute the sum of ¢182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones) or alternatively the difference of ¢148,600.00 (one hundred forty-eight thousand six hundred colones). Duly updated to compensate for the variation in purchasing power occurring during the period between the date the obligation became due and that of its extinction by effective payment. I request that said update be fixed in the judgment itself. 3. We request that Mr. Córdoba be ordered to pay both costs of the process</i>.&quot; (Folios 145-153 of the main file) Regarding such counterclaim (reconvención), by order of 09:40 a.m. on February 5, 2013, the plaintiff-counterdefendant was declared in default (en estado de rebeldía). (Folio 223 of the main file) Regarding this matter, it is appropriate to state the following. The actions or omissions of a public official that cause damages are subject to a special liability regime, the development of which is set forth in the General Law of Public Administration. Such a liability framework may well arise from damages to third parties properly speaking, or without damage to third parties, that is, when the unlawful injury that one does not have the duty to bear has been caused to the Administration itself. <b>Liability with damage to third parties: </b>In the first case, that is, injury to third parties, the imputation of liability may be performed personally against the official or, jointly and severally against the Administration, depending on the type of fault committed. The legal parameter of this liability system is found in numeral 199.1 LGAP, which states: &quot;<span style='color:#010101'> <i>1. The public servant who has acted with willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the performance of their duties or on the occasion thereof, even if they have only used the means and opportunities offered by the position, shall be personally liable to third parties.&quot; </i>However, those injuries caused by an official under the stated terms generate a system of joint and several liability with the public entity in whose name and on whose account they act (Art. 199.4 LGAP). Nevertheless, p</span>for this, a distinction must be made between impure personal fault (falta personal impura) and pure personal fault (falta personal pura). <b>a) Impure Personal Fault (Falta Personal Impura): </b>In the impure fault, one is facing a harmful effect produced by actions or omissions of the official that are associated or linked totally or partially with the public service, that is, those produced on the occasion of the position, even if for purposes or activities unrelated to their functions. Incorporated within this scope are damages caused by criteria of causal occasionality, that is, the use of means and opportunities that the position offers or the Administration makes available to them and that enable them to cause the injury. Such causal use of means may well be instrumental, circumstantial, or teleological. In these cases, the victim may undertake the indemnity action personally against the official or jointly and severally against the Administration, by virtue of the system of strict liability for the conduct of another (the official) established by ordinals 190, 191, 199, and 201 of the cited General Law. Such joint and several regime is justified by the connection, even instrumental, that characterizes this type of personal fault, giving way to a right of the victim to undertake the claims pathways against the Administration, the official, or both (scope of joint and several liability foreseen in numeral 1046 of the Civil Code). This is a proper joint and several liability (that is, created or imposed by law or agreement) that empowers the creditor, within the external relations of joint and several liability, to demand the debt against both debtors or one of them, who is responsible for the entire debt. This jointly and severally liable party may then undertake actions for contribution (acciones de regreso) against their co-debtors, thanks to the internal relations that this type of joint and several liability supposes. When the claim is against the Administration, the objectified liability system is applicable (the development of which can be seen in ruling 584-2005 of the First Chamber), foreseen from canon 190 of the cited General Law, which dispenses with the accreditation of subjective factors as a condition for the duty to indemnify, being a system whose epicenter is the unlawful damage (daño antijurídico) at its base and the created risk. In these cases, in accordance with what is set forth in Article 203 ibidem, when the Administration has been ordered to pay damages caused by the deficiencies of its servants, it must imperatively initiate the corresponding action for contribution against them, in order to recover what was disbursed for that concept, through the mechanisms established by the same Law No. 6227. Along these lines, in accordance with ordinal 208 of Law No. 6227/78, the period to exercise the action for contribution against the official is one year from the finality of the judgment, through a procedure directed at establishing the existence or not of willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the generation of the damage, their degree of participation in the injury compensated, as well as the amount that the Administration must collect from that official, in the event of having accredited the concurrence of willful intent or gross negligence, except for those cases in which manifest illegality has been judicially declared, in which case, the accreditation of such subjective factors will not be necessary (numeral 199.3 LGAP). Conversely, when liability is sought to be attributed personally to the official (whether in a concurrent or individual regime), to attribute the disturbing effect being claimed to them, willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in their behavior must be accredited, as stipulated by mandate 199.1 of that same legislation. <b>b) Pure Personal Fault (Falta Personal Pura):</b> Now, when these assumptions of impure personal fault do not concur, pure personal fault arises, which implies a total disconnection from the public service and the non-concurrence of causal occasionality, giving way to what is called separable fault -from the service and from the Administration- which makes them personally liable to the affected party. In this dynamic, when damage is caused to a third party, the latter could only exercise their claim against the official personally, with no duty of the administration existing in that case to answer for those actions, since given the lack of connection with the public service, the joint and several liability system does not apply. <b>Liability without damage to third parties:</b> When the conduct of the official is without damage to third parties, that is, that an injury is generated to the Administration itself, as provided by numeral 210 ibidem, it is clear that the official will be liable to the Administration, provided they have acted with willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). In this eventuality, which is especially relevant to the case, it is imperative that the Administration exercises its legal power and proceeds to initiate, in administrative venue, an ordinary procedure in which, with due solvency, it accredits the concurrence of the mentioned subjective factors, as an elementary prerequisite for imputing the injury being claimed. That is, without the accreditation of willful intent or gross negligence, it is not legally feasible to impose liability on the official. Such accreditation as a relational framework between the harmful effect and the public agent is imperative, having to prove causation (which is, in principle, more flexible when that liability derives from cases of manifest illegality). Along these lines, the rules governing the issue of internal distribution of liability (Arts. 203-213 ejusdem), require the opening of an administrative procedure, which must necessarily be the ordinary one referred to by precepts 214 and 308 of the cited Law No. 6227, which will aim to determine the existence of the damage, its magnitude, the concurrence of willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) on the part of the investigated official, the proportion of incidence that the actions attributed to the official have on the damage, as well as their degree of participation in that harmful effect. Within this course, the official may question both the amount of the debt and its very existence, as well as factors excluding their liability. Nevertheless, in that procedure, the burden of proof regarding the existence of the damage, the effective accreditation of their gross negligence (culpa grave) or willful intent (dolo), as well as the degree of participation of the official in the analyzed facts, inevitably falls on the Administration, the object of the procedure being precisely to establish the real truth of the facts. It should be noted, within this procedure, that respect for due process in all its phases is rigorous, as well as for the various principles pertinent to that type of procedure. It is worth emphasizing that the liability of the official is subject to the existence of willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in their conduct. This supposes an analysis of their behaviors in order to establish the concurrence of an intentionality to produce the damage (willful intent - dolo), or else, gross negligence (culpa grave). Note that it is not any negligence that gives way to the imputation of liability, but only that which can be understood or reputed as severe or grave. It should be highlighted, as provided by mandate 210 subsection 3) LGAP, that the recovery action, once the procedure is concluded and the concurrence of willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave), the amount of the damage, and the official's degree of participation are established, shall be executory, the title to be executed being the certification of the amount of the damage (see Article 149 LGAP). Nevertheless, this recovery power is subject to the four-year statute of limitations indicated by mandate 207 in relation to 198 ibidem, which is computed from the occurrence of the harmful event, or else, from the moment when the Administration is in an objective position to know the cause of the damage, on the understanding that the opening of the commented administrative procedure constitutes a cause for interruption of the prescriptive period, an effect produced by each act issued within that procedure. It is worth clarifying that there is no confusion between the four-year period indicated in canon 207 LGAP and the one-year period established by ordinal 208 ibidem. The first is a period to demand from an official their civil liability for damages to the Administration (and not to third parties). The one-year period regulated by Article 208 LGAP is for exercising the action for contribution when the Administration has been judicially condemned for damage to third parties due to actions or omissions of its officials, a product of the proper joint and several liability system imposed by Law No. 6227/78. In this way, the action for contribution is not technically damage to the Administration, but only an internal distribution of liabilities assumed in full by one of the joint and several debtors (the Administration in this case). Hence, the period for collecting for damages (four years) is not extensible to the exercise of the action for contribution, in which case, it is insisted, the one-year period applies. Now, the same interrupting effect must be produced by any of the causes foreseen in ordinals 977 of the Commercial Code and 876 of the Civil Code. Ergo, any judicial collection proceeding notified to the alleged debtor interrupts that lapse, pursuant to subsections a and b respectively of those numerals. However, it must be insisted upon, the exercise of that action is only legitimate when the existence of the damage, its attribution to the official, and the concurrence of willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) have been duly accredited. Finally, subsection 3 of the cited mandate 210 ibidem stipulates that the recovery action shall be executory and the title shall be the certification of the amount of the damage issued by the head of the respective entity, which, of course, is subject to the concurrence of the already commented prerequisites. Having set forth this general outline, the examination of the case follows.</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:5.05pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:5.05pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language: EN'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;XIII.- </span></b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Now, in the specific case, the defendant-counterclaimant Administration intends for this venue to order the civil liability of the claimant official, for what it considers are damages caused to the assets of that public entity. However, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that the regulation on the matter made by Law No. 6227/78 requires that such actions be exercised within an administrative procedure as a manifestation and materialization of an administrative power considered inalienable, pursuant to precept 66 of the cited Law. Indeed, as has been evidenced, in light of what is regulated by ordinals 198.2, 207, and 210 (as well as the doctrine underlying canon 203) all of the LGAP, the Administration must undertake the corresponding actions to determine the civil liability of its officials, whether for injuries caused to third parties and for which, within the proper joint and several liability regime imposed by Articles 190, 191, 199, 207, and 208 LGAP, it has had to make expenditures, or for damages that the official has caused to the Administration's assets. For this, as has been indicated, the legal system establishes the administrative power to initiate internal administrative procedures in order to determine the concurrence of willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) on the part of the public agent, as well as the proper accreditation of the damage and its amount. In the judgment of this Tribunal, the exercise of that power is inalienable, such that attempting to have that analysis addressed directly in judicial venue, through the mechanism of counterclaim (reconvención), seeks to transfer to this venue a debate that by force of law must be brought in administrative venue. It is, it is insisted, a power regulated in Law No. 6227/78, and this Chamber does not observe viable reasons for the Administration to decline that exercise. It is necessary to specify, although numeral 10, first subsection, sub-subsection e) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code establishes the active standing of the Public Administration to claim damages against public interests, the Public Treasury, and to demand contractual and extra-contractual liability, it must be clear that in this case, one is facing an internal employment relationship of the Administration, which generates a bond by whose particularities, the Administration holds an intense power that enables it to determine internally, in administrative venue, as a derivation of disciplinary liability, the economic consequences in terms of damages that could have been caused by a conduct of the official that has been the object of sanctioning correction. The opening of the disciplinary procedure and the clarity of the facts giving it basis, must project the internal actions to establish the existence or not of patrimonial damage. Otherwise, the executive action grace stipulated by canon 210 LGAP would have no meaning if, to establish that liability, it were necessary for the public entity to resort to judicial instances. That treatment only makes sense within a scope of exercise of exorbitant power that allows the Administration to resolve those issues internally. Of course, once the public conduct is issued, those aspects can be addressed in a contentious-administrative process, within which the validity of the public conduct can be examined, but that does not suppose permissibility to decline the exercise of public powers that have been conferred to streamline the actions that the public head can undertake within the framework of public employment relations. In this way, the inadmissibility of the analyzed claim must be ordered. </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-family: Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;XIV. For greater precision of reasons. </span></b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial; mso-ansi-language:EN'>In any case, for greater abundance of reasons, the claim sought by the counterclaimant entity could not proceed on the merits either. The assignment of civil liability to the official depends on the concurrence of several circumstances. As has been indicated ut supra, the liability of the official to the Administration for their conduct that has caused damages to the latter without injury to third parties, is subject to the reliable demonstration of willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in their behavior, as conditioned by precept 210 of the General Law of Public Administration. Such aspects must necessarily be accredited by the Administration itself, which bears the demonstrative burden on this point, within an administrative procedure, with full guarantee of due process, a topic already addressed above. First, the existence of willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) on the part of the public official. Second, the proper accreditation of the damage suffered by the Administration claiming its reparation. Third, exercise of the indemnity claim within the period established for those effects. In this case, INA seeks that, based on the same facts that have been the subject of analysis in this ruling, the civil liability of the claimant official be declared for an amount of ¢182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones). In that sense, after setting forth what occurred within the administrative procedure, the counterclaimant entity states that the liability arises because it was not accredited that the flowers were actually purchased by the official. Supplementarily, it says, based on the price indicated by the owner of the premises and the amount reported in invoice 10770, the amount to be invoiced should have been ¢34,000.00 (thirty-four thousand colones), the difference therefore being ¢148,600.00 (one hundred forty-eight thousand six hundred). Contrary to what the public entity states, the analyzed factual framework does not allow one to deduce that, in this case, the claimant did not acquire the flowers to teach the bartender and waiter course in the Chorotega Region and that was intended to be paid with check number 75451-9. On closer inspection, the object of the administrative procedure was to establish disciplinary liability for having settled the advance for the purchase of perishable goods with an altered invoice that presented, in INA's judgment, the following basic inconsistencies: it was not issued by the premises Flor Arte Floristería, the invoice date is a Sunday, when the premises was closed, and the amount does not correspond to the prices that the flowers actually had at that premises at the time the events occurred. From that perspective, the accreditation of the commission of the misconduct (falta) does not automatically suppose the existence of the damage being claimed. While one can conjecture that the improper use of an altered invoice may cause economic damage to the Administration, to determine the real magnitude of the damage it is necessary to determine whether the flowers were actually acquired. It is clear that they were not acquired at the business Flor Arte Floristería through invoice 10770, however, it is necessary to establish whether those items were acquired, or if they were definitively not, as a prior and fundamental element to establish the amount of a possible compensable damage. Such an aspect has not been accredited in this case. Even in resolution No. LA-106-2011, in considerando IV, it is indicated that in the oral hearing the claimant stated the event for which the flowers were purchased took place and they (the flowers) were used. Faced with this allegation, the Executive Presidency indicated that the disciplinary procedure did not concern whether the event took place or not, whether the flowers were used or not, but rather what was investigated was whether the invoice had been delivered blank and whether that premises (Flor Arte Floristería) had dispatched the indicated quantity of flowers. This can be seen on folio 24 of the main file. Therefore, there is no clarity regarding the actual acquisition of the flowers and the actual purchase amount of those items, if they were indeed acquired. These are questions that must be weighed in the administrative phase in the procedure that must be instituted for those purposes, but which, in this case, have not been accredited. This being so, this Tribunal does not consider the relational framework between a possible damage claimed by the Administration and the official's conduct to which that claim is sought to be associated as accredited. Nor can it be conjectured that the damage consists of the difference between the cost reflected in invoice 10770 and the price of the flowers declared by the owner of the premises for those dates, since if the basis of the sanction was using an invoice from a commercial premises where, it is said, the flowers were not acquired, there would be an evident contradiction in sustaining the damage on price differences provided by a business from which the items were not purchased.

Thus, the request could not be granted, due to the absence of the minimum elements that would make such an examination possible.” **IV.- Regarding the temporal element in the exercise of administrative corrective powers of a disciplinary nature.** The analysis of the validity of the challenged resolution has as its fundamental point the determination of the statute of limitations (prescripción) regime applicable to the disciplinary administrative procedure initiated against the claimant and within which, given the exception raised at the time, the Administration considered the claim unfounded. The petitioner considers the one-month period established by canon 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) to be precluded. INA, for its part, indicates that this period has not been violated since Internal Audit report AI00535-2011 of June 6, 2011, was received on June 13, 2011, by the Executive Presidency (Presidencia Ejecutiva), and the formal statement of charges (traslado de cargos) of the procedure was communicated on July 7, 2011. The substance of the summarized arguments requires entering into an analysis of several questions of the temporal element that affects the exercise of disciplinary power, as well as the administrative procedure. On this point, what follows must be indicated. In employment relationships, the exercise of the corrective power of the hierarchical superior against officials who have committed punishable offenses is subject to a temporality factor, after which, such exercise cannot be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be seen, varies depending on the regulated subject matter and the existence of a special legal regime that configures particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, this disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of article 102 of the LGAP) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that for finalistic purposes are considered imprescriptible, those referring to internal sanctioning power—such as that examined in this case—are subject to rules of temporality by virtue of which they may lapse due to the passage of the time established by the legal system without being realized. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative hierarchical superior and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which, their power to request recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power emerges. Now, for the purposes of the present case, it is necessary to distinguish between various scenarios that occur in this type of disciplinary proceedings, in all of which, rules for the temporal exercise of faculties or powers apply, but with different nuances. This involves the necessary establishment, for clarity's sake, of demarcation criteria that allow the discussion topics to be addressed, according to the scenario in question. Along these lines, the lapse of time in various stages must be distinguished: 1) Statute of limitations for the exercise of disciplinary power: This refers to the period set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the procedural measures of the case that allow them to issue the final decision. In this context, it concerns the maximum period initiated by the legal system for the administrative hierarchical superior to order the opening of the relevant procedure, aimed at establishing the appropriateness or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure seeking to establish the facts (material truth) that serve as the basis for the grounds of the act, generates an interrupting effect on that margin of temporality, insofar as it constitutes an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of that power. It could not be considered that the cited period for the exercise of the power is interrupted by the issuance of the final act, since as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is necessary for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative case, it is insisted, to establish whether the sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of what is established in articles 214, 221, 297, 308 of the LGAP. In this analyzed hypothesis, the disciplinary power of the administrative hierarchical superior is subject to a statute of limitations period (whose treatment in practice is actually very close to the figure of expiration (caducidad) insofar as in certain scenarios it is customary to declare that aspect *ex officio*), generically regulated by mandate 603 of the Labor Code, a norm that sets a period of one month for the exercise of that repressive power, which, it is insisted, is interrupted by the communication of the formal statement of charges. This is without prejudice to offenses that are regulated by the special norms specified by the internal control regime, probity in public service, and public treasury management, in which, according to what is regulated by the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno), No. 8292 (art. 43), the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública), No. 8422 (art. 44), and article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, a special five-year period operates (according to the scenarios and from the moments that those norms stipulate), and not the one-month period established by the Labor Code, it is insisted, as it is a special and later regulation that prevails over the general labor regime. Now, the starting point for the calculation of that prescriptive period is decisive. On this matter, article 603 of the Labor Code indicates that the period runs from when the cause for separation arose, or failing that, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the one-month period is calculated from the moment in which the holder of the corrective power is in an objective position to know of the offense and therefore, undertake the exercise of their power. Therefore, when the particularities of the case require the completion of a prior stage of preliminary investigation, the aforementioned one-month period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are brought to the knowledge of the hierarchical superior. This is also the case for offenses that are evidenced in Internal Audit reports, but whose prosecution for sanctioning purposes must be submitted to the respective hierarchical superior. In such a scenario, the indicated period is calculated from the moment of the reception or effective communication of said report to the hierarchical superior, since it is only at that moment that this holder can validly adopt decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary provisions. However, the need or not for that phase (preliminary investigation) must be distinguished in each case, as otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the appropriateness or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or to gather evidence tending to clarify its necessity or not. This topic will be addressed later as it is a core subject of debate by the claimant. 2) Statute of limitations for the power to adopt the sanction within the procedure: This refers to the maximum temporal limit that the holder of the corrective power has to adopt the sanction once the case file has been submitted to their knowledge by the directing body, in which case, what remains is the issuance of the final act. In this hypothesis, the hierarchical superior or holder has a maximum period of one month to decide the applicable sanction, from the moment the case's directing body formally brings its recommendation to their knowledge. In this case, without prejudice to what is regulated by article 319 of the LGAP, the holder of the power would have a maximum period (of statute of limitations) of one month to adopt that final act, after which, the statute of limitations for that power would inevitably occur and therefore, the final act would be null and void for injury to the element of competence, conditioned in that case by preclusion factors. Such a scenario, in the specific dynamics of disciplinary sanctioning procedures, given the content of article 603 of the Labor Code, constitutes a special treatment that supersedes what is established by canon 329.3 of the LGAP. It is not about the two-month period imposed by article 261 LGAP to conclude the ordinary procedure, a period that in any case is directory and not peremptory. Even so, this Section has established that the unjustified delay of the procedure, even with that directory connotation of the temporal element, can lead to the nullity of that process, for injury to the principle of prompt and fulfilled administrative justice. However, on this point, the period discussed above refers to that held by the hierarchical superior so that once the report of the directing body is rendered, the final decision is imposed. 3) Statute of limitations for the power to execute the imposed sanction: This refers to the period the administrative hierarchical superior has to order the application of the dictated sanction. It consists, therefore, of the material execution of the act that orders a disciplinary sanction as its content. In this case, by analogical integration, the applicable period, unless a special rule exists, would be the one-month period provided in article 603 of the Labor Code. The denial of such a period would imply the perennial possibility of the hierarchical superior to apply the previously ordered sanction, under the claim of a sort of imprescriptibility of that power. Thus, one thing is the period to order the final act once the final report of the directing body is issued, and another is the period to materialize the ordered final sanction. On this point, the period must be calculated from the moment the act becomes final (firmeza), which can originate from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary appeals that are available against the act as applicable, or, if after the period established by the legal system to file such appeals, they have not been raised, in which event, administrative finality occurs through the inaction of the addressee of the effects of the conduct. Another element that is subject to rules of temporality is that concerning the Processing (Tramitación) of the procedure. It refers to the maximum time that the administrative procedure initiated to establish the facts that allow the holder of the public repressive power to adopt the final decision may last. This matter, unless a special rule exists, is regulated by article 261, in relation to articles 319 and 340, all of Law No. 6227. However, that two-month period established therein consists of a directory, not peremptory, period, which of course does not include nor allow procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid for injury to the maxim of prompt and fulfilled administrative justice. In this sense, see ruling No. 199-2011-VI of this Section VI, at 4:20 p.m. on September 12, 2011. On this point, reference must also be made to what is established by precept 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the institute of the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure, in cases where the instructing Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or exceeding six months for causes attributable to it. In this scenario, expiration applies even in cases where the procedure is ready for the issuance of the final act, since the restriction of subsection 2 of the cited canon 340, regarding the impossibility of expiration when the matter is ready for the issuance of that final act, only applies when the procedure was initiated at the request of a party, given that the next stage only pertains to the Administration, which could not shield itself in its inaction. This does not occur when it has been initiated ex officio, since in that case, the delay does benefit the administered party, insofar as it would involve, in that case, a delay only attributable to the public office.

V.- Concrete analysis of the temporal aspects of the internal administrative corrective power. In the specific case, the claimant alleges the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the corrective power for two reasons. The first, due to the exceeding of the month from the occurrence of the facts; the second, because nine months had passed since the investigations were concluded. Addressing the issue of the statute of limitations in this case requires setting out a brief account of what happened. As has been taken as proven, by check No. 75451-9 of May 19, 2010, a check was issued for an amount of ¢1,018,488.00 (one million eighteen thousand four hundred eighty-eight colones), in favor of the claimant for per diem, transportation, and purchase of perishable products to conduct a trip to La Cruz to teach the modules of room service (code TUGT289) and food and beverage services at special events (code TUGT515) of the professional Bartender and Waiter program. To settle the advance corresponding to the purchase of perishables, the petitioner provided invoice No. 10770 of June 6, 2010, from the business "Flor Arte Floristería", for an amount of ¢182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones), corresponding to the purchase of 10 units of roses, 10 of pomas, 10 carnations, and 10 of other natural flowers. As a result of these facts, through report AI-00535-2011 of June 6, 2011, issued by the Internal Audit (Auditoria Interna) of the public entity, and referred to the Executive Presidency (Presidencia Ejecutiva) by official letter No. 23-2011, received on June 13, 2011, the alleged irregular facts in the purchase of perishable products, just detailed, were brought to its attention. As a first aspect, it must be specified, as established by article 9 of the Organic Law of INA (Ley Orgánica del INA), No. 6868, the highest-ranking official within that institution corresponds to the executive presidency, an instance which, in accordance with what article 102 subsection c) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) establishes, is therefore the one who holds the disciplinary corrective power. The foregoing supposes, in light of what was set forth in the preceding whereas clause (considerando), that the statute of limitations period for the exercise of that power is calculated from the moment that this hierarchical superior is in an objective position to know of the factual cause that would give basis to the internal discipline. In the present case, the petitioner indicates that since the evidence collection phase was completed, specifically, the sworn statement of Ivette Sáenz Faerron, owner of the premises to which the flowers were liquidated on August 31, 2010, and of the employee Seidy Murillo Villagra, on September 7, 2010, the procedure was ready to adopt decisions regarding the aforementioned power. This Tribunal respects that position, but definitively does not share it. For the purposes of understanding the starting point of the prescriptive period, the date on which the investigations of the Internal Audit were conducted is not the referential point for such purposes. As has been stated, the calculation of the prescriptive period must begin when it is brought to the knowledge of the hierarchical superior who holds the corrective power, unless it is possible to prove that there was another opportunity in which, objectively, it was possible for that hierarchy to know of the existence of those particular facts, so that specific actions could be adopted. However, this last exception does not appear in the case file. Now, it was not until June 13, 2011, that the Audit body brought the alleged committed offenses to the attention of the executive presidency, through a report recommending the opening of an ordinary disciplinary procedure, for having settled an advance for the purchase of perishables with an altered invoice. As stated in the case file, after that communication, through act AL-NOD-068-2011 of June 24, 2011, the Executive Presidency designated the directing body of the procedure and established the formal statement of charges (traslado de cargos), which was communicated to the petitioner on July 7, 2011. The recount of these dates leads this Tribunal to establish that in the sub-examine case, from the date on which the holder of the corrective power is notified of the facts theoretically committed by the claimant and the date on which the disciplinary procedure is initiated and notified, no more than the month claimed by the claimant elapsed, so the exercise of that power would be timely, even applying the one-month period set by article 603 of the Labor Code. In this sense, as has been set forth above, the communication of that administrative procedure generates an interrupting effect on the mentioned statute of limitations regime. It is worth noting that the claimant invokes in his favor article 51 of the Autonomous Service Regulations of INA (Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios del INA) (which he provided with the lawsuit), a norm that regulates the prescriptive period of the sanctioning regime. However, if it is carefully observed, said mandate regulates the prescriptive period for imposing sanctions within the month following the commission of the facts or, failing that, from the date on which the hierarchical superior becomes aware of the offense. On the other hand, it indicates that this term is calculated from the moment the ordinary procedure concludes, which shall not exceed two months. The analysis of that norm allows concluding that it sets out the same criteria of temporality already formulated above in this ruling, so it does not constitute any element that allows disregarding what has been said so far on the subject under examination. In this way, the communication of the opening of the procedure occurred within the month indicated by the claimant, without any defect being evident in that aspect. On the other hand, regarding the duration of the sanctioning procedure, it is held that the formal statement of charges was made on July 7, 2011, the oral and private hearing was held on August 18, 2011, it having been rescheduled from the original date at the express request of the investigated official. Definitively, the final act was issued through resolution LA-106-2011 at 3:00 p.m. on September 7, 2011. The foregoing allows concluding that an unreasonable delay in the substantiation of the process did not occur in this case. Likewise, regarding the period to impose the sanction, resolution LA-106-2011 was therefore issued within the one-month period imposed by article 51 of the Internal Regulations, after the private hearing was held. It should be noted that even using the previous internal regulations, such periods have not been violated, given that article 70 stated that the statute of limitations was governed by the Regulations of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil) and the Labor Code, both norms which follow the same treatment already set forth. At its core, when resolving the statute of limitations defense in resolution LA-106-2011 of September 7, 2011, the Executive Presidency relied on the application of article 51 of the Autonomous Regulations of INA, noting that the one-month period had not been violated since the procedure was initiated within the month following the receipt of the Internal Audit report. Fundamentally, that criterion is shared for the reasons given, so it is reiterated, no inaccuracy is observed regarding the analyzed temporality regime, which is why the objection must be dismissed.

VI.- On the duty of probity within the exercise of public offices. Without prejudice to the foregoing, it should be noted, given that the supposed application of a stricter five-year statute of limitations regime is reproached, that the identification of the offenses attributed to the claimant refers to possible injuries to the internal control regime, as was advised to him by the hierarchical superior within the formal statement of charges. For clarity on the above, it is appropriate to briefly refer to the probity regime in the exercise of public service. Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration defines a public official as the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf and account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. For its part, canon 113 ejusdem clearly establishes that the functional framework of the public agent must be carried out in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, understood as the coincident interest of the administered parties. To that end, the public servant is inescapably bound by the principle of legality, both in its negative and positive vision, as can be deduced, at the legal level, from articles 11, 12, 13, 59, and 66 of the cited General Law and from article 11 of the Magna Carta. As part of this orientation, the official's performance is oriented and delimited by norms of transparency and probity, whose legal support is expressly found in article 3 of Law No. 8422. Said norm states: "*Duty of probity*.

The public official shall be obligated to orient their management toward the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall be manifested, fundamentally, by identifying and addressing priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; ensuring that the decisions adopted in fulfillment of their attributions conform to impartiality and the proper objectives of the institution in which they serve and, finally, by administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily. " From this perspective, as a complement to the finalistic orientation of the public official that requires them to prioritize the satisfaction of public interests over personal ones, even over the interests of the Administration (113.2 ibidem), which is characteristic of the service-oriented nature of their competencies, the duty of probity aims to provide aspects of greater specificity that in some way guide the actions of the public agent (or are lines that should do so), so that their conduct responds to that teleological dimension, no longer only at the level of result, but through the incorporation of moral and ethical duties that guarantee transparency and objectivity in their actions. That is, that public morality demands the adequate and efficient handling of public resources and in general the public assets assigned and placed at their disposal for the performance of the position and exercise of their functions. This includes not only the monetary resources disbursed to them to carry out specific activities and intended to finance expenses inherent to assigned activities, such as per diems (viáticos) or advances for the purchase of goods or acquisition of services necessary for those tasks, but also the assets entrusted to them to execute their actions, such as vehicles, movable goods in general, including computer equipment, office equipment, among others. Likewise, in the event of conflicts of interest, they must recuse themselves from hearing the matter, in order not to pollute or jeopardize the objectivity that must be inherent in their conduct, but additionally, in their actions, they must tend towards the satisfaction of that greater interest. More simply, the duty of probity regulated in Article 3 of Law No. 8422 obliges every public servant to exercise their position in adherence to the principle of efficiency in the administration of public resources, as well as objectivity and impartiality in the face of personal, family, economic, or other interests, for which reason in their performance they must demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law. This is indeed inferred from the first canon of the Regulation to the cited Law No. 8422. Therefore, it is clear that the condition of public agent entails subjection and due compliance with duties of moral and ethical orientation that the legal system itself enshrines and imposes, which require them to conduct themselves in their management with rectitude and soundness. Hence, the infraction of the aforementioned duty of probity is not immune from the disciplinary liability framework of the public agent. Precept 4 of the aforementioned Law No. 8422 establishes: " " Without prejudice to the civil and criminal liabilities that may apply, the infraction of the duty of probity, duly proven and following a defense, shall constitute just cause for separation from public office without employer liability. " Such conditioned effect makes sense, in the context being analyzed, for acts of clear improvisation, mismanagement of resources, or total evidence of conflicts of interest perfectly deducible from a given situation, without the official having adopted actions of voluntary recusal. Of course, the application and interpretation of that norm must proceed along the paths of rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, parameters that must be assessed in each specific case. For this, mandate 38 of the cited legislation establishes grounds for administrative liability, which then find their correlative possible sanctions in the letter of norm 39 ibidem, which, in that regard, would be applicable to infractions of the duty of probity under the terms already developed. The synergy of these provisions incorporates a flexible system that allows liability to arise for an official upon the issuance of conduct that transgresses ethical norms. However, the correct application of this system entails the necessary initiation of an administrative proceeding, as a prior and unavoidable step to apply a sanction for injuries to that framework of official obligations, with full and complete respect for defense guarantees and due process, which is fundamental to avoid arbitrary and illegal actions. The facts imputed to the plaintiff, such as the case of liquidation of advance expenses by means of a presumably altered invoice, undoubtedly suppose facts that antagonize the internal control regime that has been explained. The plaintiff confuses the responsibilities of those who directly administer public finances, called hierarchical superiors or subordinate heads, with the responsibility that is his own due solely to his condition as a public official, therefore, subject to internal control regulations and illicit enrichment. In this way, it is the judgment of this Chamber, they would lead to the injury of the cited regime. However, the prescription rules have not been violated, even without resorting to the intense rules that Law No. 7428 sets for these matters. Therefore, it is reiterated, the reproach under examination must be dismissed.

VII .- Generalities on the administrative proceeding. In a second order of grievances, the plaintiff claims the application of a regime that was not in force at the time of carrying out the administrative proceeding against him. Given the issue raised, it is necessary to make some general considerations regarding the minimum formalities that a disciplinary administrative proceeding must satisfy. The administrative proceeding constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It serves a dual purpose. On one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a certain decision, guiding its actions. On the other, it is imposed as a frame of reference that allows the administered party to compare public actions, in order to establish a control that their actions have been manifested in accordance with the norms that guide that proceeding. It seeks, therefore, to constitute a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and advisability of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. As indicated by canon 214 of Law No. 6227, its object is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the final case. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the best fulfillment of the Administration's purposes and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in Article 225.1 of the General Law of Public Administration. Hence, canon 216.1 ibidem requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the proceeding in strict adherence to the legal system. In its course, the proceeding aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party the full exercise of the right of defense and the adversarial principle, in order to establish the referred real truth of the facts (among which can be seen those established in canons 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the cited General Law). This acquires even greater relevance in so-called control or sanctioning proceedings, given that in those cases, the final decision may impose a repressive framework on the legal sphere of a person. The same normative plexus provides for the substantiality of these minimum guarantees, considering invalid any proceeding that does not satisfy these minimum matters. This is inferred from mandate 223 of the Law of reference, as it indicates that the omission of substantial formalities shall cause the nullity of the proceeding. From this standpoint, this Tribunal has already indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred upon this jurisdiction by canon 49 of the Magna Carta, entails a comparison that the Administration, in the course of those proceedings (of a sanctioning nature in this case), satisfies the minimum guarantees set by the applicable regulations, and that in essence, the due process that must be insurmountable in that proceeding has been protected. Now, by virtue of what is alleged, it is necessary to address the issue of the functions proper to the directing body and the decision-making body of the proceeding. The competence to issue the final act within a proceeding corresponds to the decision-making body, that is, to whomever has been granted the legal competence to issue the act that exhausts administrative remedies. However, for the sake of administrative efficiency, the investigative competencies are delegable to a body charged with conducting the investigation of the proceeding, which has come to be called the "directing or investigating body." It is evident that the designation of the latter corresponds to the decision-making body, for which its validity is subject to it falling upon an assigned official, regularly designated and in possession of the position. Exceptionally, it has been tolerated that individuals who are not regular officials may be constituted as the directing body of the proceeding; however, in that specific function, it must be understood that they perform a public function, with the inherent obligations. Regarding its competencies, the investigating body represents the Administration in the proceeding and holds an investigative role. It is responsible for issuing a factual analysis. Although it may render recommendations, they would certainly not be binding, so its determinations regarding the adoption of a final decision are considered procedural acts. Therefore, it is responsible for issuing the opening act, giving procedural impetus, all the investigative work of the proceeding, directing the hearing, resolving preliminary questions, resolving the appeal for reversal filed against procedural acts, and rendering a report to the decision-making body at the time of remitting the file for the issuance of the final act. Within its competencies can be seen Articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all of the General Law of reference. For its part, the decision-making body is the competent hierarchical authority that meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act that resolves the proceeding.

VIII.- After analyzing the procedure given to this matter, this collegiate body considers that in the substantiation of the procedure no injury to due process is observed, given that the plaintiff has been guaranteed the set of minimum phases that comprise the disciplinary administrative proceeding. In this vein, the plaintiff indicates that a version of the internal regulation that was not in force at the time the events occurred was applied to him. From the analysis of the case records, it is established that through agreement 187-2010 of the Board of Directors of INA, published in La Gaceta No. 5 of January 11, 2011, a modification was made to the Autonomous Service Regulation of that public entity, a reform that included the procedure to follow in matters of the disciplinary regime. However, the applicable regulation is the one in force at the moment the possibility of exercising disciplinary authority arises for the hierarchical head, whether through the notoriety of the facts or through the receipt of reports that alert them to the existence of facts that may be subject to application of the internal corrective regime. As has been indicated, the report of the Internal Audit that informed the Executive Presidency of the investigated facts imputed to the plaintiff was notified on June 13, 2011. On that date, the internal regulation had already been modified, which is why the applicable norm is that which governed on that date and which, in definitively, was the one applied to the plaintiff. It is not a matter of retroactive application to the detriment as the plaintiff ascribes, but of the use of the norms that in time and space are pertinent to the matter. However, the plaintiff does not specify the manner in which injury to the maxim of due process has been caused to him, or in general, a substantial infraction has been produced to his detriment in the terms required by canon 223 LGAP. On this point, it is worth indicating that, according to that referred precept, the invalidity that must be declared within administrative proceedings is only that which can be considered a substantial infraction to the legal system, including actions or omissions generating states of defenselessness or which, had they been addressed, would have generated a different criterion or decision. The plaintiff does not explain how these substantial imperfections have been produced to the detriment of his legal situation. Even so, upon analyzing the proceeding followed, compliance is observed with the relevant stages that must integrate every proceeding of this nature, briefly set forth above. The right of defense has been protected, the oral and private hearing was held, a reasoned and motivated act on the merits of the matter was issued, and the ordinary appeals filed regarding each of the debated points and, later, constituting the appellate grievances, were resolved. From the foregoing, it is inferred that in this case all the stages established by ordinal 74 of the Autonomous Regulation of INA were satisfied. In summary, no nullities are detected in the proceeding, nor does the plaintiff provide an argumentative detail (as would be his duty) regarding the pathologies that would lead to a possible estimation of his annulment claim. From that standpoint of examination, the charge must be rejected.

IX.- On the allegation of lack of accreditation of the facts. In another order of reproaches, the lack of accreditation in the administrative venue of the alleged faults is argued. The charge itself seeks for this Tribunal to determine a supposed non-existence of the cause (motivo) of the administrative act, considered as the factual and/or legal antecedent that permits or enables the issuance of the public decision. In the case of disciplinary sanctions, that cause would consist of the conditioning presupposition consisting of the accreditation of the faults that were imputed and, therefore, the object of investigation. As a starting point, it must be said that, through official letter No. AI-00535-2011 of June 6, 2011, the Internal Audit remits report No. 23-2011 on alleged irregular facts in the purchase of perishable products (roses, pompones, carnations, and natural flowers) to deliver the modules of "Room Services," code TUGT289 and "Food and Beverage Services at Special Events," code TUGT515 of the bartender and professional waiter program, attributed to the official Juan Pablo Córdoba López. By resolution of 12:00 hours on July 1, 2011, communicated on July 7, 2011, the following facts were imputed in the statement of charges: "1. That as a teacher he was assigned to deliver the room service modules …, of the Program of Professional Bartender and Waiter… 2. That check number 75454-9 dated May 19, 2010, for an amount of C.1,018,488… was issued in his name for per diems (viáticos), transport, and purchase of perishable products to make the trip to La Cruz to deliver the modules of food and beverage services at special events (code TUGT515) of the Program of Professional Bartender and Waiter… 3. That he did not purchase the flowers indicated in invoice number 10770, given that it was a lady called "Magaly" who did so. 4. That the lady called "Magaly" at the beginning of June requested from the shop "Flor Arte Floristería" a blank invoice, which turned out to be invoice number 10770. 5. That to liquidate the advance corresponding to the purchase of perishables, he used invoice No. 10770 of June 6, 2010, for an amount of C.182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred exact colones) for the purchase of forty units of Roses, Pompones, Carnations, and Natural Flowers, from the supplier "Flor Arte Floristería." 6. That he presented invoice No. 10770, with a date corresponding to Sunday, June 6, 2010, a day on which the business "Flor Arte Floristería" is closed, given that the shop's opening hours are Monday to Saturday from 8:00 am to 6:30 pm. 7. That he presented invoice No. 10770 dated June 6, 2010, for an amount of C.182,600.00, which details the sale prices of the flowers acquired, which do not correspond to the prices those flowers had at that time in the business "Flor Arte Floristería". For its part, in act LA-106-2011 of 15:00 hours on September 7, 2011, of the Executive Presidency of INA, the following were considered proven facts, in relevant part: that check No. 75451-9 was issued in the name of the plaintiff; that to liquidate the advance corresponding to the purchase of perishables, the claimant used invoice No. 10770 of June 6, 2010, from the business Flor Arte Floristería; that said invoice for an amount of C.182,600.00 corresponds to the purchase of 10 units of roses, 10 pompones, 10 carnations, and 10 of other natural flowers; that the cited invoice does not detail unit prices for each of the products acquired; that the date of the invoice corresponds to a Sunday; that the business Flor Arte Floristería has opening hours from Monday to Saturday from 8:00 am to 6:30 pm and does not open on Sundays; that the plaintiff did not verify the prices of the flowers; that for the month of June 2010, the price of flowers in that business was C.800.00 per unit of roses, C.350.00 per unit of carnations, C.1,800.00 per bunch of pompones, and C.500.00 as the highest unit price of other natural flowers. Likewise, it was considered proven that Mrs. Magaly Alvarado is recognized in the alluded business as a frequent customer; that invoice No. 10770 was handed over blank by Mrs. Seidy Murillo Villagra, dependent of the cited business, to Mrs. Magaly Alvarado; that the sale described in the cited invoice was not made by the company Flor Arte Floristería; that neither the owner nor the dependent of the referred business recognize the plaintiff as a customer and that the cited business is covered by the simplified regime of the Tax Administration. In each one of these facts, reference was made to the evidentiary element that gave them support. The plaintiff claims that the owner of the business was not present on the day of the purchase of the flowers nor of the alleged blank handover of invoice 10770 to Magaly Alvarado, pointing out that it is strange for a business to hand out blank invoices. Likewise, he indicates that the process is based on the version of the dependent, who seeks to justify that she made the sale and did not report it or that she did it for a sum higher than what was proper. Furthermore, that the business owner indicates a different price from what was invoiced to him in April and May 2010, one month before the alleged false sale. He adds, it is indicated that Magaly Alvarado stated that she does not know the shop, which, he asserts, she never said, but rather expressed that the visits to the florist were not constant. In this regard, the following must be set forth.

X.- In resolution LA-106-2011, the Executive Presidency of INA clearly sets forth the reasons and considerations that led it to consider accredited the chain of facts based on which it determined the existence of an irregularity in the actions of Mr. Córdoba López and that led to imposing the sanction that is discussed in this case. Although in this process the plaintiff formulates a series of questions regarding the weighing of the elements of conviction that the directing body produced and the decision-making body of the disciplinary proceeding assessed, his expositions are limited to pointing out subjective and imprecise impressions that do not permit the proper refutation of the probative analysis set forth in the act under reference. Indeed, in the matter under analysis, the plaintiff limits himself to formulating generic reproaches that fail to specify in a detailed and concrete manner the reasons why the analysis carried out by the respondent Administration contravenes the norms of rational sound criticism and real truth of the facts that must prevail in the topic of this type of proceeding (Articles 214, 221, 223, 308, 297, and 298 LGAP), just as his arguments also fail to express defects in the determination of the cause element or the manner in which the final decision has been motivated in the sub examine. On the contrary, the facts that gave cause for the sanction were in the first instance analyzed by the Internal Audit in report No. 23-2011, in which it suggests the opening of the disciplinary proceeding for alleged irregularities presented in the purchase of perishable products, specifically, roses, pompones, carnations, and natural flowers, in the judgment of that internal unit, acquired at an overprice. Based on that report, in resolution LA-106-2011, a specific analysis is made of each one of the factual circumstances considered as the basis for the imposed sanction. As a first point, it concludes that the flowers were purchased by Mrs. Magaly Alvarado and not by the plaintiff, which was concluded from the declarations of the business owner and the dependent, as well as from the statements of the plaintiff himself, according to documents contained at folios 17 to 23 and 52 of the administrative file. Likewise, the dependent of the business, Mrs. Seidy Murillo, stated that Mrs. Magaly had never taken the flowers, but rather that she had only been handed invoice 10770 in blank. Similarly, both the dependent and the owner of the shop, Mrs. Ivette Saénz, indicated that they did not know the plaintiff and that the only time they saw him was when he appeared with INA officials. From this, it is concluded in the final act that although the invoice in question corresponds to the business Flor Arte Floristería, the flowers that this title expresses were never sold by that business to the plaintiff or to his wife, Mrs. Magaly Alvarado.

Similarly, from the testimony of the business owner and her employee, it can be deduced that the invoice was delivered blank to Ms. Magaly Alvarado, so that she could prepare a proforma invoice, from which it follows that it is not an instrument that was issued to the plaintiff for the sale of perishable goods as reported in his expense report. On the other hand, regarding the price of the <st1:place w:st="on">flowers</st1:place>, the Administration determined that the invoice did not establish unit prices. From the declaration of the business owner, it is pointed out that the roses had a value of ¢800.00, the carnations ¢350.00, the pomas (rollito) ¢1800.00, and the natural <st1:place w:st="on">flowers</st1:place>, the most expensive being ¢500.00. Even in the sworn statement visible at folios 17-18 of the administrative file, the business owner states that dividing the amount of the invoice among the indicated units reflects prices that do not correspond to those she sells in her business, and furthermore, to reach that amount, she would have had to sell a quantity far exceeding 40 units, a quantity she says she does not have in stock. From these data, the Administration concluded that there was a report of excessive prices in the cost of the flowers in relation to the amounts provided by the business owner. On the other hand, an inconsistency was determined in the date of the invoice, issued on June 6th, 2010, which corresponded to a Sunday, a day on which the said business was closed. On this point, INA warned about inconsistencies in the petitioner's declarations, since in a first declaration he stated that although he made the purchase on a Saturday, he asked the business employee to please put Sunday's date so as not to have problems, since he was not going to use the flowers until Monday (folio 23 of the administrative file), however, later in the hearing of August 18, 2011, he stated that he bought the flowers on Saturday and that he did not notice the date, therefore making a mistake by not realizing it. This, as INA stated, evidences an inconsistency, from which it then emerges, together with the declarations of the business owner and her employee, that the business in question did not open on Sundays, without this aspect having been refuted. As a result, INA concluded that an invoice was used that did not correspond to a real sale made by the said business Flor Arte Floristería, for the purposes of clearing disbursed sums, and with an amount that exceeds the prices that business handles for those supposedly acquired products. In the judgment of this Tribunal, the foregoing account demonstrates the proper accreditation within the administrative procedure of the facts that served as the basis for the sanction and which have been detailed. Although what was produced within the administrative file does not constitute full proof in judicial proceedings, after its consideration and analysis of the arguments made by the plaintiff, this collegiate body does not observe the defects in argumentation raised in the complaint regarding the accreditation of the factual grounds that formed the basis for the sanction. After the analysis of the evidence, the plaintiff has not been able to refute the considerations adopted by the Executive Presidency of INA. On the contrary, the weighing of that statement of reasons in the challenged act demonstrates the proper demonstration of the facts that were the basis for the notice of charges. Therefore, this argument must be rejected.

XI.- Regarding the allegation of unsanctioned penalties. In another grievance, the application of a penalty not provided for in the applicable regulations is reproached, citing to this effect numeral 49 of the INA's Reglamento Autónomo, which stated that for one offense, suspension without pay for 8 days, and for two, dismissal without employer liability. However, as the INA's representation rightly points out, even within the context of that same regulation, it is indicated "The foregoing sanctions shall be applied without prejudice to the imposition of a greater sanction if the offenses warrant it." In the current version (and applicable to the case) of that internal regulation, the matter is regulated in ordinal 47, a mandate that establishes as disciplinary measures verbal reprimand, written warning, suspension without pay for up to fifteen days, without prejudice to the application of a suspension for a longer term, when provided for by special laws and according to the nature of the offense, as well as dismissal without employer liability. Following this, the regulation sets forth graduation criteria for imposing sanctions. For its part, precept 48 regulates minor offenses, 49 serious offenses, and 50 those that permit dismissal. From this perspective, the content of the act finds due support in the rules that regulate the actions of INA in these types of cases. It should be noted that, within the notice of charges, the petitioner was informed of the possibility of dismissal as a consequence of the alleged acts, given that possible violations of article 81, subsections d) and l) of the Código de Trabajo were expressed, as well as infractions of the regime of the Ley de Control Interno and the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito. Resolution LA-106-2011 of the Executive Presidency indicates that the accredited facts constituted a breach of the obligations imposed by the Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios, specifically, ordinals 43, subsections 3 and 14, by not having executed the tasks and functions with full capacity, dedication, diligence, and effort, by not having consulted the prior prices of the flowers and using an invoice that had irregularities, by having used an invoice knowing it did not correspond to a real sale from the business. It also pointed out a transgression of subsection 37 of that same rule, due to a lack of dignity in the exercise of the position, as well as injury to article 45, subsection 8) ibidem, by using an altered invoice to clear an advance corresponding to the purchase of perishable goods, knowing it contained an excessive amount. Likewise, injury to canon 39 of the Ley General de Control Interno. Ergo, it concluded that for violating article 43, subsections 3, 14, 37, and 40, numeral 45, subsections 8 and 27, a serious offense occurred in light of ordinal 49 of the cited regulation, in addition to the disregard of article 39 of the Ley General de Control Interno, typified as a serious offense by mandate 41, subsection c) of that same legal source. The analysis of the invoked rules and the alleged facts allows concluding that the dictated sanction finds support and legitimizing basis in those regulatory references. In this way, having accredited the basis for the act, which, it is insisted, constitutes the conditioning fact of the disciplinary regime, the application of the conditioned effect is feasible, constituted in this case by the content of the act, which, under the protection of ordinal 132 LGAP, must be lawful and possible, in addition to corresponding to the basis. Such harmony is evident in this case, because the seriousness of the investigated facts in light of the internal regulation allows them to be considered as serious offenses that give rise to imposing sanctions such as the one ultimately imposed, namely, a suspension without pay for 15 days, despite the notice of charges warning of a potential dismissal. Thus, the contradiction and pathology that the plaintiff reproaches do not exist, before which, the charge must be dismissed. Consequently, resolution LA-106-2011 of 3:00 p.m. on September 7, 2011, from the Executive Presidency of INA does not present the alleged inaccuracies, and the annulment petition must therefore be denied. For the aforementioned reasons, the claim of invalidity regarding Resolution No. LA-201-2011 of 1:00 p.m. on September 29, 2011, from INA, which hears the appeal for reconsideration presented by the plaintiff, is also not appropriate. This act is limited to analyzing each of the grievances formulated against that final act, confirming what was already resolved in the previous stage, fundamentally endorsing the reasoning set forth therein. The analyses indicated in this confirmatory act conform to the parameters set forth in the present ruling, therefore, under the protection of mandates 128 and 158 LGAP, the claim of invalidity filed against that decision must be dismissed. In summary, the dismissal of the complaint presented by Mr. Juan Pablo Córdoba López against INA must be ordered in its entirety.

XII.- Regarding the counterclaim filed by INA. Regarding the liability regime of public officials for damages caused to the Public Administration. Generalities. INA filed a counterclaim, for which purpose, it expressed the following claims: "... I request your authority to declare this claim admissible and to establish in judgment the civil liability of the official Juan Pablo Córdoba López for the amount of ¢182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones), disbursed by INA for the purchase of flowers, which never occurred and yet the respective collection was made with an invoice that does not correspond to the business where he claims to have acquired the goods. 2. That Mr. Juan Pablo Córdoba López be ordered to pay the Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje the sum of ¢182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones) or failing that, the difference of ¢148,600.00 (one hundred forty-eight thousand six hundred colones). Duly updated in order to compensate for the variation in purchasing power that occurred during the period between the date the obligation became enforceable and its extinction by effective payment. I request that said update be fixed in the judgment itself. 3. We request that Mr. Córdoba be ordered to pay both costs of the process." (Folios 145-153 of the principal file) Regarding said counterclaim, by order issued at 09:40 a.m. on February 5, 2013, the plaintiff-counterdefendant was declared in default. (Folio 223 of the principal file) On this matter, it is appropriate to note the following. The actions or omissions of the public official that cause damages are subject to a special liability regime whose development is set forth in the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Such a liability framework may well arise from damages to third parties properly speaking, or without damage to third parties, that is, when the unlawful injury that one does not have the duty to bear has been caused to the Administration itself. Liability with damage to third parties: In the first case, that is, injury to third parties, the imputation of liability can be made personally to the official or, in a joint and several manner, to the Administration, depending on the type of offense committed. The legal parameter of this liability system is found in numeral 199.1 LGAP, which states: "1. The public servant who has acted with willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the performance of his duties or on the occasion thereof shall be personally liable to third parties, even if he only used the means and opportunities that the position offers him." However, those injuries caused by an official under the terms described generate a system of joint and several liability with the public entity in whose name and on whose behalf he acts (art. 199.4 LGAP). Nonetheless, for this, one must differentiate between impure and pure personal fault. a) Impure Personal Fault: In the impure fault, one is facing a harmful effect produced by actions or omissions of the official that are associated or linked totally or partially with the public service, that is, those produced on the occasion of the position, even if it were for purposes or activities unrelated to his functions. Damages caused by criteria of causal occasion are incorporated within this scope, that is, the use of means and opportunities that the position offers him or that the Administration makes available to him and that enable him to cause the injury. Such causal use of means may well be instrumental, circumstantial, or teleological. In these cases, the victim can pursue the indemnity action personally against the official or jointly and severally against the Administration, by virtue of the system of strict liability for the conduct of another (the official) established by ordinals 190, 191, 199, and 201 of the cited Ley General. Such joint and several regime is justified by the link, even if instrumental, that characterizes this type of personal fault, giving rise to a right of the victim to pursue claims against the Administration, the official, or both (scope of joint and several liability provided for in numeral 1046 of the Código Civil). This is a proper joint and several liability (that is, created or imposed by law or agreement) that empowers the creditor, within the external relations of joint and several liability, to demand the debt against both debtors or one of them, who is liable for the entire debt. This jointly and severally liable party may then pursue recourse actions against its co-debtors, thanks to the internal relations that this type of joint and several liability entails. When the claim is against the Administration, the strict liability system applies (the development of which can be seen in ruling 584-2005 of Sala Primera), provided for in canon 190 of the cited Ley General, which dispenses with the accreditation of subjective factors as a condition of the duty to indemnify, being a system that has as its epicenter the unlawful damage at its base and the risk created. In these cases, in accordance with what is set forth in article 203 ibidem, when the Administration has been ordered to pay the damages caused by the deficiencies of its servants, it must imperatively initiate the corresponding recourse action against them, in order to recover what was disbursed for that concept, through the mechanisms established by Ley No. 6227 itself. In this line, in accordance with ordinal 208 of Ley No. 6227/78, the term to exercise the recourse action against the official is one year from the finality of the judgment, through a procedure aimed at establishing the existence or not of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the generation of the damage, their degree of participation in the indemnified injury, as well as the amount that the Administration must recover from that official, should the concurrence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) have been accredited, except in those cases where manifest illegality has been judicially declared, in which case, the accreditation of such subjective factors will not be necessary (numeral 199.3 LGAP). On the contrary, when liability is sought to be attributed personally to the official (whether in a concurrent or individual regime), to refer the claimed disturbing effect to him, willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in his conduct must be accredited, as stipulated by mandate 199.1 of that same legislation. b) Pure Personal Fault: Now, when these presuppositions of impure personal fault do not concur, pure personal fault arises, which implies a total disconnection from the public service and the non-concurrence of causal occasion, giving way to what is called a separable fault - from the service and the Administration - which makes him personally liable to the affected party. In this dynamic, when damage is caused to a third party, the latter could only exercise his claim against the official personally, there being in that case no duty of the administration to respond for those actions, since given the non-existence of a link with the public service, the system of joint and several liability does not apply. Liability without damage to third parties: When the official's conduct is without damage to third parties, that is, an injury is caused to the Administration itself, as provided in numeral 210 ibidem, it is clear that the official will be liable to the Administration, provided he has acted with willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). In this eventuality, which is especially relevant to the case, it is imperative that the Administration exercises its legal power and proceeds to initiate, in administrative venue, an ordinary procedure in which it accredits, with due solvency, the concurrence of the mentioned subjective factors, as an elementary prerequisite for imputing the claimed injury. That is, without the accreditation of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave), it is not legally feasible to impose liability on the official. Such accreditation as a relational framework of the harmful effect to the public agent is imperative, having to accredit the causation (which is, in principle, more flexible when that liability derives from cases of manifest illegality). In this line, the rules that prevail in the subject matter of internal distribution of liability (arts. 203-213 ejusdem), require the opening of an administrative procedure, which must necessarily be the ordinary one referred to in precepts 214 and 308 of the cited Ley No. 6227, which will aim to determine the existence of the damage, its magnitude, the concurrence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) of the investigated official, the proportion of incidence that the actions attributed to the official have on the damage, as well as their degree of participation in that harmful effect. Within this course, the official may question both the amount of the debt and its very existence, as well as factors excluding his liability. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized, in that procedure, the burden of proof regarding the existence of the damage, the effective accreditation of his gross negligence (culpa grave) or willful misconduct (dolo), as well as the degree of participation of the official in the analyzed events, inevitably falls on the Administration, given that the purpose of the procedure is precisely to establish the real truth of the facts. It should be noted, within this procedure, the respect of due process in all its phases is rigorous, as well as the various principles that are pertinent to that type of procedure. It is worth emphasizing that the official's liability is subject to the existence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in his conduct. This entails an analysis of his behaviors in order to establish the concurrence of an intentionality to produce the damage (willful misconduct, dolo), or gross negligence (culpa grave). Note that not just any negligence gives way to the imputation of liability, but only that which can be understood or deemed as severe or grave. It should be highlighted, as provided by mandate 210, subsection 3) LGAP, the recovery action, once the procedure is concluded and the concurrence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave), amount of the damage, and degree of participation of the official are established, shall be enforceable (ejecutiva), the title to be executed being the certification of the amount of the damage (see article 149 LGAP). Nonetheless, this recovery power is subject to the four-year statute of limitations indicated by mandate 207 in relation to 198 ibidem, which is computed from the occurrence of the harmful event, or from the moment the Administration is in an objective position to know the cause of the damage, with the understanding that the opening of the aforementioned administrative procedure constitutes a cause for interruption of the statutory limitation period, an effect produced by each act issued within that procedure. It should be clarified, no confusion exists between the four-year term indicated in canon 207 LGAP and the one-year term established by ordinal 208 ibidem. The first is a term to demand civil liability from an official for damages to the Administration (and not to third parties). The one-year term regulated by article 208 LGAP is for exercising the recourse action when the Administration has been judicially condemned for damage to third parties due to actions or omissions of its officials, resulting from the proper joint and several liability system imposed by Ley No. 6227/78. In this way, the recourse action is not technically a damage to the Administration, but only an internal distribution of liabilities assumed in full by one of the joint and several debtors (the Administration in this case). Hence, the collection term for damages (four years) is not extendable to the exercise of the recourse action, in which case, it is insisted, the one-year term applies. Now, the same interrupting effect must be produced by any of the causes provided in ordinals 977 of the Código de Comercio and 876 of the Código Civil. Ergo, any judicial collection action notified to the alleged debtor interrupts that period, in accordance with subsections a and b respectively of those numerals. However, it must be insisted, the exercise of that action is only legitimate when the existence of the damage, its attribution to the official, and the concurrence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) have been duly accredited. Finally, subsection 3 of the cited mandate 210 ibidem mandates that the recovery action shall be enforceable (ejecutiva) and the title shall be the certification of the amount of the damage issued by the head of the respective entity, which, of course, is subject to the concurrence of the already discussed prerequisites. Having set forth this general scheme, the examination of the case follows.

XIII.- Now, in the specific case, the defendant-counterclaimant Administration seeks that civil liability of the plaintiff official be ordered in this venue, for what it considers to be damages caused to the patrimony of that public entity. However, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that the regulation of this matter under Ley No. 6227/78 requires that such actions be brought within an administrative procedure as a manifestation and materialization of an administrative power that is considered unwaivable, in accordance with precept 66 of the cited Law. Indeed, as has been demonstrated, in light of what is regulated by ordinals 198.2, 207, and 210 (as well as the doctrine underlying canon 203), all of the LGAP, the Administration must undertake the corresponding actions to determine the civil liability of its officials, whether for injuries caused to third parties and for which, within the proper joint and several liability regime imposed by articles 190, 191, 199, 207, and 208 LGAP, it has had to make disbursements, or for damages that said official has caused to the Administration's patrimony. For this, as has been pointed out, the legal system establishes the administrative power to initiate internal administrative procedures in order to determine the concurrence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) of the public agent, as well as the due accreditation of the damage and its amount. In the judgment of this Tribunal, the exercise of that power is unwaivable, such that attempting to have this analysis addressed directly in judicial venue, through the mechanism of counterclaim, seeks to transfer to this venue a debate that by mandate of law must be initiated in administrative venue. It involves, it is insisted, a power regulated in Ley No. 6227/78 and this Chamber does not observe viable reasons for the Administration to decline that exercise. It should be noted, while numeral 10, first subsection, sub-subsection e) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establishes the active legal standing of the Public Administration to claim damages and losses to public interests, to the Public Treasury, and to demand contractual and non-contractual liability, one must be clear that in the specific case, we are facing an internal employment relationship of the Administration, which generates a bond whose particularities grant the Administration an intense power that enables it to determine internally, in administrative venue, as a derivation of disciplinary liability, the economic consequences in terms of damages that could have been caused by conduct of the official that has been subject to punitive correction. The opening of the disciplinary procedure and the clarity of the facts upon which it is based must project the internal actions to establish the existence or absence of pecuniary damage. Otherwise, the advantage of the enforceable action (acción ejecutiva) mandated by canon 210 LGAP would make no sense if, to establish that liability, it were necessary for the public entity to resort to judicial instances. This treatment only makes sense within a sphere of exercise of exorbitant power that allows the Administration to resolve these issues internally. Of course, once the public conduct is issued, those aspects can be addressed in a contentious-administrative proceeding, within which the validity of the public conduct can be examined, but this does not imply permissibility to decline the exercise of public powers that have been conferred to make the actions that the public head can undertake within the framework of public employment relations more efficient. Consequently, the inadmissibility of the analyzed claim must be ordered.

XIV.For greater precision of reasons. In any case, for greater abundance of reasons, the claim by the counterclaimant entity could also not be granted on the merits. The assignment of civil liability to the official depends on the concurrence of several circumstances. As stated ut supra, the liability of the official to the Administration for his conduct that has caused damages to it without injury to third parties is subject to the conclusive demonstration of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in his conduct, as conditioned by precept 210 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Such aspects must imperatively be accredited by the Administration itself, which bears the demonstrative burden in this matter, within an administrative procedure, with full guarantee of due process, a topic already addressed above. On the one hand, the existence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) of the public official.

Second, the proper accreditation of the damage suffered by the Administration that seeks its reparation. Third, the exercise of the indemnity claim within the time period established for such purposes. In this case, the INA seeks that, based on the same facts that have been the subject of analysis in this ruling, the civil liability of the plaintiff official be declared in the amount of ¢182,600.00 (one hundred eighty-two thousand six hundred colones). In that regard, after setting forth what occurred during the administrative procedure, the counterclaiming entity states that the liability arises because it was not proven that the flowers were actually purchased by the official. In the alternative, it says, based on the price indicated by the owner of the shop and the amount reported on invoice 10770, the amount to be invoiced should have been ¢34,000.00 (thirty-four thousand colones), the difference therefore being ¢148,600.00 (one hundred forty-eight thousand six hundred). Contrary to what the public entity states, the factual scenario analyzed does not permit the inference that in this case, the plaintiff did not acquire the flowers to teach the bartender and waiter course in the Chorotega Region, which was intended to be covered by check number 75451-9. Upon close examination, the purpose of the administrative procedure was to establish disciplinary liability for having liquidated the advance for the purchase of perishable goods with an altered invoice that presented, in the judgment of the INA, the following basic inconsistencies: it was not issued by the shop Flor Arte Floristería, the date of the invoice is a Sunday, when the shop was closed, and the amount does not correspond to the actual prices of the flowers at that shop at the time the events occurred. From that perspective, the proof of the commission of the infraction does not automatically imply the existence of the damage claimed. While it can be conjectured that the improper use of an altered invoice may generate economic harm to the Administration, to determine the actual magnitude of the damage, it is necessary to determine whether the flowers were actually acquired. It is clear that they were not acquired at the business Flor Arte Floristería through invoice 10770; however, it is essential to establish whether those species were acquired, or whether they were definitively not, as a preliminary and fundamental element for determining the amount of a possible indemnifiable damage. Such an aspect has not been proven in this case. Indeed, in resolution No. LA-106-2011, in Considerando IV, it is indicated that during the oral hearing, the plaintiff stated that the event for which the flowers were purchased took place, and that they (the flowers) were used. In response to that assertion, the Executive Presidency noted that the disciplinary procedure did not concern whether the event was held or not, whether the flowers were used or not, but rather that the investigation focused on whether the invoice had been provided blank and whether that shop (Flor Arte Floristería) had dispatched the quantity of flowers indicated. This can be seen at folio 24 of the main case file. Therefore, there is no clarity regarding the actual acquisition of the flowers or the actual purchase amount of those species, if they were acquired. These are matters that must be weighed in the administrative phase, in the procedure that must be instituted for such purposes, but which, in this cause, have not been proven. That being the case, this Court does not find the relational framework between a possible damage claimed by the Administration and the conduct of the official to which that claim is sought to be linked to be proven. Nor can it be conjectured that the damage consists of the difference between the cost reflected in invoice 10770 and the price of the flowers declared by the shop owner for those dates, because if the basis of the sanction was using an invoice from a commercial establishment from which, it is stated, the flowers were not acquired, there would be an evident contradiction in supporting the damage on price differences provided by a business from which the species were not purchased. This being so, the request could not be granted, due to the absence of the minimum elements that would enable such an examination."

“IV.- Sobre el elemento temporal en el ejercicio de las potestades correctivas administrativas de corte disciplinario. El análisis de validez de la resolución cuestionada tiene como punto fundamental determinar el régimen de prescripción aplicable al procedimiento administrativo disciplinario instaurado contra el accionante y dentro cual, ante la excepción en su momento formulada, la Administración consideró improcedente lo alegado. El promovente considera precluido el plazo mensual que estatuye el canon 603 del Código de Trabajo. El INA por su lado, indica que ese plazo no se ha vulnerado ya que el informe de Auditoria Interna AI00535-2011 del 06 de junio del 2011, fue recibido en fecha 13 de junio del 2011, por parte de la Presidencia Ejecutiva y el traslado de cargos del procedimiento fue comunicado el 07 de julio del 2011. El trasfondo de los alegatos resumidos exige ingresar a analizar cuestiones varias del elemento temporal que incide en el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria, así como en el procedimiento administrativo. Sobre el particular debe indicarse lo que de seguido se expone. En las relaciones funcionariales, el ejercicio de la potestad correctiva del jerarca frente a los funcionarios que han cometido faltas sancionables, se encuentra sujeto a un factor de temporalidad, luego del cual, tal ejercicio no podrá ser emprendido. Este límite temporal, según se verá varía según se trae de la materia regulada y de la existencia de un régimen jurídico especial que configure reglas particulares para tipos específicos de relaciones de empleo público. En consecuencia, esa potestad disciplinaria (que se basa en la doctrina del ordinal 102 de la LGAP) no es irrestricta en el tiempo. A diferencia de otras potestades públicas que por aspectos finalistas se consideran imprescriptibles, las que se refieren al ejercicio sancionatorio interno -como el que se examina en este caso- están sujetas a reglas de temporalidad en virtud de lo cual, puede fenecer por el decurso del tiempo establecido por el ordenamiento jurídico sin concretarlas. Por ende, en este tipo de relaciones, el titular del poder correctivo es el jerarca administrativo y el sujeto pasivo el funcionario público, quien en esa medida, se encuentra sujeto a la potestad correctiva interna solo por el plazo que de requerir el reconocimiento de la pérdida de la potestad jerárquica. Ahora bien, para los efectos del presente caso es necesario discriminar entre diversos supuestos que se producen en este tipo de procedimientos disciplinarios, todos en los cuales, aplican reglas de ejercicio temporal de facultades o potestades, pero con matices diversos. Se trata del establecimiento necesario, para fines de claridad, de criterios de demarcación que permitan el abordaje de los temas discutidos, según el supuesto de que se trate. En esta línea, ha de distinguirse el decurso temporal de etapas diversas: 1) Prescripción del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria: se refiere al plazo que fija el ordenamiento jurídico para que el titular de la potestad correctiva interna adopte las medidas procedimentales del caso que le permitan emitir la decisión final. En este plano, se trata del plazo máximo incoado por el ordenamiento jurídico para que el jerarca administrativo disponga la apertura del procedimiento pertinente, direccionado a establecer la pertinencia o no de la imposición de una sanción. En este caso, es claro que la notificación de la apertura del procedimiento que busca el establecimiento de los hechos (verdad real) que sirven de base al motivo del acto, genera un efecto interruptor de ese margen de temporalidad, en la medida en que consiste un acto expreso y una medida que directamente propende al ejercicio de esa potestad. No podría considerarse que el citado plazo del ejercicio de la potestad se interrumpe con el dictado del acto final pues como derivación del principio del debido proceso, es menester que la Administración disponga la apertura de una causa administrativa, se insiste, para establecer si corresponde la sanción, como derivación de lo establecido en los ordinales 214, 221, 297, 308 de la LGAP. En esta hipótesis analizada, la potestad disciplinaria del jerarca administrativo se encuentra sujeta a plazo prescriptivo (cuyo tratamiento en la praxis es en realidad muy próximo a la figura de la caducidad en la medida en que en determinados supuestos se estila declarar ese aspecto ex officio), genéricamente regulado por el mandato 603 del Código de Trabajo, norma que fija un plazo de un mes para el ejercicio de esa potestad represiva, el que se insiste, se interrumpe con la comunicación del traslado de cargos. Lo anterior sin perjuicio de las faltas que se encuentren reguladas por las normas especiales precisadas por el régimen de control interno, probidad en la función pública y gestión de la hacienda pública, en los cuales, acorde a lo regulado por la Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292 (art. 43), Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública, No. 8422 (art. 44) y el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, opera un plazo especial de cinco años (según los supuestos y desde los momentos en que esas normas disponen), y no el plazo mensual estatuido por el Código de Trabajo, se insiste, al ser una normativa especial y posterior que prevalece sobre el régimen general laboral. Ahora bien, resulta determinante el punto de partida del cómputo de ese plazo prescriptivo. Sobre el particular, el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo señala que el plazo corre desde que se dio la causa para la separación o en su defecto, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria. En este sentido, el plazo mensual se computa desde el momento en que el titular de la potestad correctiva se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la falta y por ende, emprender el ejercicio de su potestad. Por ende, cuando las particularidades del caso exijan la realización de una etapa previa de investigación preliminar, el plazo mensual aludido corre desde el momento en que se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca los resultados de ese ejercicio. Es el caso además de faltas que sean evidenciadas en informes de Auditoria Interna, pero cuya prosecución para efectos de sancionar, deban ser sometidas al jerarca respectivo. En tal escenario, el plazo señalado se computa desde el momento de la recepción o comunicación efectiva al jerarca de dicho informe, pues es hasta ese momento que ese titular puede válidamente adoptar las decisiones respecto de la apertura o no de disposiciones disciplinarias. Con todo, debe discriminarse en cada caso la necesidad o no de esa fase (investigación preliminar), pues de otro modo, podría utilizarse como estrategia para evadir la prescripción, siendo que no en todos los escenarios, esa investigación sería necesaria, sino solo aquellos en que por las particularidades del caso, esa fase sea indispensable para determinar pertinencia o no de la apertura del procedimiento sancionatorio, o bien, para recabar indicios que propendan a clarificar su necesidad o no. Este tema será abordado con posterioridad por ser objeto medular de debate por parte del accionante. 2)Prescripción de la potestad de adoptar la sanción dentro del procedimiento: se refiere al límite máximo temporal con que cuenta el titular de la potestad correctiva para adoptar la sanción una vez que el expediente ha sido sometido a su conocimiento por el órgano director, en cuyo caso, lo que resta es la emisión del acto final. En esta hipótesis, el jerarca o titular cuenta con un plazo máximo de un mes para decidir la sanción aplicable, desde el momento en que el órgano director de la causa le ponga formalmente en conocimiento de su recomendación. En este caso, sin perjuicio de lo regulado por el numeral 319 de la LGAP, el titular de la potestad contaría con un plazo máximo (de prescripción) de un mes para adoptar ese acto final, vencido el cual, ocurría indefectiblemente la prescripción de esa potestad y por ende, el acto final sería nulo por lesión al elemento competencial, condicionado en ese caso por factores de preclusión. Tal supuesto, en la dinámica concreta de los procedimientos de corte sancionatorio disciplinario, dado el contenido del ordinal 603 del Código de Trabajo, constituye un tratamiento especial que se sobrepone a lo estatuido por el canon 329.3 de la LGAP. No se trata en este punto del plazo bimensual que impone el ordinal 261 LGAP para culminar el procedimiento ordinario, plazo que en todo caso es ordenatorio y no perentorio. Con todo, esta sección ha establecido que la dilación injustificada del procedimiento, aún esa connotación ordenatoria del elemento temporal, puede llevar a la nulidad de ese iter, por lesión al principio de justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida. Empero, en este punto, el plazo arriba comentado se refiere al que ostenta el jerarca para que una vez rendido el informe del órgano director, se imponga la decisión final. 3) Prescripción de la potestad de ejecutar la sanción impuesta: Se refiere al plazo con que cuenta el jerarca administrativo para disponer la aplicación de la sanción dictada. Consiste por ende en la ejecución material del acto que dispone como contenido una sanción disciplinaria. En este caso, por integración analógica, el plazo aplicable, salvo norma especial, sería el plazo mensual previsto en el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo. La negación de semejante plazo supondría la posibilidad perenne del jerarca de aplicar la sanción dispuesta de antemano, bajo el alegato de una suerte de imprescriptibilidad de esa potestad. Así, una cosa es el plazo para disponer el acto final una vez emitido el informe final del órgano director, y otro el plazo para materializar la sanción firme dispuesta. En este punto, el plazo ha de computarse desde la firmeza de ese acto, lo que puede originarse por la confirmación de la sanción luego del ejercicio y resolución de los recursos ordinarios que quepan contra el acto según corresponda, o bien, si luego del plazo establecido por el ordenamiento jurídico para formular esos recursos, no han sido planteados, en cuya eventualidad, la firmeza administrativa se produce por la inercia del destinatario de los efectos de la conducta. Otro elemento que se encuentra sujeto a reglas de temporalidad es el referente a la Tramitación del procedimiento. Se refiere al tiempo máximo que puede durar el procedimiento administrativo instaurado para establecer los hechos que permitan adoptar la decisión final del titular de la potestad represiva pública. Este tema, salvo norma especial, se encuentra regulado por el ordinal 261, en relación con el 319 y el 340, todos de la Ley No. 6227. Sin embargo, ese plazo bimensual que allí se dispone consiste en un plazo de naturaleza ordenatoria, no perentoria, lo que desde luego no incluye ni permite procedimientos con dilaciones injustificadas, arbitrarias y desproporcionadas, los que serían inválidos por lesión a la máxima de justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida. En este sentido, puede verse el fallo No. 199-2011-VI de esta Sección VI, de las las 16: 20 horas del 12 de septiembre del 2011. En este punto ha de remitirse además a lo estatuido por el precepto 340 de la LGAP que regula el instituto de la caducidad del procedimiento, en los casos en que la Administración instructora que lo inicio, lo someta a estado de abandono por un plazo igual o superior de seis meses por causas imputables a aquella. En este supuesto, la caducidad aplica incluso en los casos en que el procedimiento se encuentra listo para el dictado del acto final, pues la restricción del inciso 2 del citado canon 340, en cuanto a la imposibilidad de la caducidad cuando el asunto se encuentra listo para el dictado de ese acto final, solo aplica cuando el procedimiento ha iniciado a instancia de parte, dado que la etapa siguiente solo compete a la Administración, la que no podría escudarse en su inercia. Esto no ocurre cuando se ha instruido de oficio, pues en ese caso, la dilación si beneficia al administrado, en la medida en que se trataría en ese caso, de un retraso solo imputable a la oficina pública.

V.- Análisis concreto de los aspectos temporales de la potestad correctiva interna administrativa. En la especie, la parte accionante alega la prescripción de la potestad correctiva por dos razones. La primera, por la superación del mes desde la ocurrencia de los hechos; la segunda, por haber pasado nueve meses desde que se terminaron las investigaciones. El abordaje del tema de la prescripción en este caso exige exponer el breve recuento de lo sucedido. Según se ha tenido por acreditado, mediante el cheque No. 75451-9 del 19 de mayo del 2010, se emitió el cheque por un monto de ¢1.018.488.00 (un millón dieciocho mil cuatrocientos ochenta y ocho colones), a favor del accionante por concepto de viáticos, transporte, compra de productos perecederos para realizar gira a la Cruz con el fin de impartir los módulos de servicio en las habitaciones (código TUGT289) y el de servicios de alimentos y bebidas en eventos especiales (código TUGT515) del programa de Bartender y Salonero profesional. Para liquidar el adelanto correspondiente a la compra de perecederos, el promovente aportó la factura No. 10770 del 06 de junio del 2010 del negocio "Flor Arte Floristería", por un monto de ¢182.600.00 (ciento ochenta y dos mil seiscientos colones), y que corresponde a la compra de 10 unidades de rosas, 10 de pomas, 10 claveles y 10 de otras flores naturales. A raíz de estos hechos, mediante el informe AI-00535-2011 del 06 de junio del 2011, emitido por la Auditoria Interna del ente público, y remitido a la Presidencia Ejecutiva por oficio No. 23-2011, recibido el 13 de junio del 2011, se pone en conocimiento sobre los supuestos hechos irregulares en la compra de productos perecederos, recién detallados. Como primer aspecto, debe precisarse, conforme lo establece el numeral 9 de la Ley Orgánica del INA, No. 6868, el funcionario de mayor jerarquía dentro de esa institución corresponde a la presidencia ejecutiva, instancia a la cual, de consuno con lo que estatuye el ordinal 102 inciso c) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, es por ende quien ostenta la potestad correctiva de corte disciplinario. Lo anterior supone, a la luz de lo expuesto en el considerando precedente, el plazo de prescripción para el ejercicio de esa potestad se computa desde el momento en que ese jerarca se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la causa fáctica que daría base a la disciplina interna. En el presente caso, el promovente señala que desde que se culminó la fase de recolección de pruebas, en concreto, la declaración jurada de Ivette Sáenz Faerron, dueña del local al que se liquida las flores el 31 de agosto del 2010 y de la empleada Seidy Murillo Villagra, en fecha 07 de septiembre del 2010, el procedimiento se encontraba listo para adoptar decisiones en cuanto a la potestad aludida. Tal postura se respeta por este Tribunal, pero en definitiva no se comparte. Para los efectos de la comprensión del punto de inicio del plazo prescriptivo, no es la fecha en que las investigaciones de la Auditoria Interna fueron realizadas, el punto referencial para tales fines. Como se ha dicho, es cuando se pone en conocimiento del jerarca que ostenta la potestad correctiva, que ha de iniciarse el cómputo del plazo prescritivo, salvo que se logre acreditar que existía otra oportunidad en la que de manera objetiva, fuese posible para esa jerarquía conocer de la existencia de esos hechos en particular, de suerte que pudiera adoptar acciones concretas. Sin embargo, esta última excepción no consta en autos. Ahora bien, es hasta el 13 de junio del 2011 que la Auditoria pone en conocimiento de la presidencia ejecutiva de las supuestas faltas cometidas, mediante un informe que recomienda la apertura de un procedimiento ordinario disciplinario, por haber liquidado un anticipo de la compra de perecederos con una factura alterada. Según consta en autos, luego de esa comunicación, mediante el acto AL-NOD-068-2011 del 24 de junio del 2011, la Presidencia Ejecutiva designa al órgano director del procedimiento y establece el traslado de cargos, lo cual fue comunicado al actor en fecha 07 de julio del 2011. El recuento de estas fechas lleva a este Tribunal a establecer que en el subexámine, desde la fecha en que se comunica al titular de la potestad correctiva de los hechos en teoría cometidos por el accionante y la data en que se instruye y notifica el procedimiento disciplinario, no corrió más allá del mes que reclama el accionante, por lo que el ejercicio de esa potestad se encontraría en tiempo, aun aplicando el plazo mensual fijado por el ordinal 603 del Código de Trabajo. En este sentido, como se ha expuesto ut supra, la comunicación de ese procedimiento administrativo genera un efecto interruptor en el régimen de prescripción mencionado. Vale señalar, el accionante invoca en su favor el numeral 51 del Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios del INA (que aportó con la demanda), norma que regula el plazo prescriptivo del régimen sancionatorio. Sin embargo, si bien se mira, dicho mandato regula el plazo prescriptivo para imponer las sanciones dentro del mes posterior a la comisión de los hechos o en su defecto de la fecha en que el jerarca tenga conocimiento de la falta. Por otro lado, señala que ese término se computa desde el momento en que concluya el procedimiento ordinario, que no será superior a dos meses. El análisis de esa norma permite concluir que expone los mismos criterios de temporalidad ya formulados arriba en este fallo, por lo que no viene a constituir ningún elemento que permita desconocer lo dicho hasta ahora sobre el tema objeto de examen. De ese modo, la comunicación de la apertura del procedimiento se produjo dentro del mes que señala el accionante, sin que se evidencie defecto alguno en ese aspecto. Por otro lado, en cuanto a la duración del procedimiento sancionatorio, se tiene que el traslado de cargos se hizo en fecha 07 de julio del 2011, la audiencia oral y privada se celebró el 18 de agosto del 2011, siendo que fue trasladada de la fecha original a petición expresa del funcionario investigado. En definitiva, se dictó acto final mediante la resolución LA-106-2011 de las 15 horas del 07 de septiembre del 2011. Lo anterior permite concluir que no ocurrió en este caso una dilación irrazonable en la sustanciación del trámite. De igual modo, en cuanto al plazo para imponer la sanción, la resolución LA-106-2011 se dicta por ende dentro del plazo de un mes que impone el ordinal 51 del Reglamento Interno, luego de realizada la audiencia privada. Cabe destacar, incluso utilizando el anterior reglamento interno, tales plazos no se han visto vulnerados, siendo que en el artículo 70 se señalaba que la prescripción se regía por el Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil y del Código de Trabajo, ambas normas que siguen el mismos tratamiento ya expuesto. En lo medular, al momento de resolver la defensa de prescripción en la resolución LA-106-2011 del 07 de septiembre del 2011, la Presidencia Ejecutiva se sustentó en la aplicación del ordinal 51 del Reglamento Autónomo del INA, señalando que el plazo de un mes no se había vulnerado por cuanto el procedimiento se instruyó dentro del plazo del mes posterior a la recepción del informe de la Auditoria Interna. En lo fundamental, ese criterio se comparte por las razones dadas, por lo que se reitera, no se observa incorrección alguna en cuanto al régimen de temporalidad analizado, razón por la cual, el reparo ha de ser declinado.

VI.- Sobre el deber de probidad dentro del ejercicio de los cargos públicos. Sin perjuicio de lo señalado, cabe destacar, siendo que se reprocha la supuesta aplicación de un régimen de prescripción más intenso de cinco años, cabe señalar, la identificación de las faltas que se le imputan se refieren a posibles lesiones al régimen de control interno como le fuese advertido por el jerarca dentro del traslado de cargos. Para claridad de lo anterior, merece referirse con brevedad al régimen de probidad en el ejercicio de la función pública. El numeral 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública define al funcionario público como la persona que presta servicios a la Administración o a nombre y por cuenta de ésta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia de su carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva. Por su parte, el canon 113 ejusdem establece con claridad que el marco funcional del agente público ha de realizarse de manera que satisfaga primordialmente el interés público, entendido como el interés coincidente de los administrados. Para tal efecto, el servidor público se encuentra impostergablemente afecto al principio de legalidad, tanto en su visión negativa como positiva, según se colige, a nivel legal, de los ordinales 11, 12, 13, 59 y 66 de la citada Ley General y del artículo 11 de la Carta Magna. Como parte de esta orientación, el desempeño del funcionario se encuentra orientado y delimitado por normas de transparencia y probidad, cuyo sustento legal se encuentra expreso en el numeral 3 de la Ley no. 8422. Dicha norma señala: " Deber de probidad. El funcionario público estará obligado a orientar su gestión a la satisfacción del interés público. Este deber se manifestará, fundamentalmente, al identificar y atender las necesidades colectivas prioritarias, de manera planificada, regular, eficiente, continua y en condiciones de igualdad para los habitantes de la República; asimismo, al demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley; asegurarse de que las decisiones que adopte en cumplimiento de sus atribuciones se ajustan a la imparcialidad y a los objetivos propios de la institución en la que se desempeña y, finalmente, al administrar los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad, eficacia, economía y eficiencia, rindiendo cuentas satisfactoriamente. " Desde esta arista, como complemento de la orientación finalista del funcionario público que le exige potenciar la satisfacción de los intereses públicos por encima de los personales, incluso de los intereses de la Administración (113.2 ibídem), lo que es propio de la naturaleza servicial de sus competencias, el deber de probidad pretende aportar aspectos de mayor concreción que de alguna manera orientan las acciones del agente público (o son líneas que deben hacerlo), a fin de que su conducta responda a esa dimensión teleológica, ya no solo a nivel de resultado, sino mediante la incorporación de deberes morales y éticos que garantizan transparencia y objetividad en su proceder. Es decir, esa moral pública exige el manejo adecuado y eficiente de los recursos públicos y en general el patrimonio público que le es asignado y puesto a su disposición para el desarrollo del cargo y ejercicio de sus funciones. Esto incluye no solo los recursos monetarios que le son girados para desarrollar actividades concretas y que buscan financiar gastos propios de actividades que le son asignadas, como es el caso de los viáticos o anticipos para compra de bienes o adquisición de servicios necesarios para esas tareas, sino además, los bienes que le son confiados para ejecutar sus acciones, como es el caso de vehículos, bienes muebles en general, tal como equipo de cómputo, equipo de oficina, entre otros. Igualmente, en caso de conflictos de intereses, deba separarse del conocimiento del asunto, a efecto de no polucionar o poner en riesgo la objetividad que ha de ser propia de la conducta, pero además, en sus acciones, ha de propender la satisfacción de aquel interés mayor. Más simple, el deber de probidad regulado en el artículo tercero de la Ley No.8422 obliga a todo servidor público a ejercer su cargo con apego al principio de eficiencia en la administración de recursos públicos, así como de objetividad e imparcialidad frente a intereses personales o familiares, económicos, y de otra naturaleza, por lo que en su desempeño debe demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley. Así en efecto se desprende del canon primero del Reglamento a la citada Ley No. 8422. Por tanto, es claro que la condición de agente público supone la sujeción y el debido cumplimiento de deberes de orientación moral y ética que el mismo ordenamiento jurídico consagra e impone, que le exigen conducirse en su gestión con rectitud y solidez. De ahí que la infracción al mencionado deber de probidad no se encuentra inmune al marco de responsabilidad disciplinaria del agente público. El precepto 4 de la mencionada Ley No. 8422 establece: " Sin perjuicio de las responsabilidades civiles y penales que procedan, la infracción del deber de probidad, debidamente comprobada y previa defensa, constituirá justa causa para la separación del cargo público sin responsabilidad patronal. “ Tal efecto condicionado encuentra sentido, en el contexto que se analiza, para actos de abierta improvisación, mala administración de recursos o total evidencia de conflictos de intereses perfectamente desprendibles de una determinada situación, sin que hayan adoptado las acciones de separación voluntaria del funcionario. Desde luego que la aplicación e interpretación de esa norma ha de transitar por las sendas de la racionalidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, parámetros que deben ser valorados en cada caso concreto. Para ello, el mandato 38 de la citada legislación establece causales de responsabilidad administrativa, que luego, encuentran sus correlativas sanciones posibles en la letra de la norma 39 iusibid, la que en ese tanto, sería aplicable ante las infracciones al deber de probidad en los términos ya desarrollados. La sinergia de estas disposiciones incorpora un sistema flexible que permite hacer surgir la responsabilidad de un funcionario ante la emisión de conductas transgresoras de las normas de la ética. Con todo, la aplicación correcta de este sistema, implica la necesaria instrucción de un procedimiento administrativo, como paso previo e infranqueable para aplicar una sanción por las lesiones a ese marco de obligaciones funcionariales, con respeto pleno e íntegro de las garantías de defensa y el debido proceso, lo que viene a ser fundamental para eludir actuaciones arbitrarias e ilegales. Los hechos que le fueron imputados al accionante, como es el caso de liquidación de gastos anticipados mediante una factura presuntamente alterada, supone, a no dudarlo, hechos que antagonizan con el régimen de control interno que se ha explicitado. El actor confunde las responsabilidades de quienes administran hacienda pública de manera directa, denominados superiores jerárquicos o titulares subordinados, con la responsabilidad que le resulta propia por su sola condición de funcionario público, por tanto, sujeto a las regulaciones de control interno y el enriquecimiento ilícito. De ese modo, es juicio de esta Cámara, llevarían a la lesión del citado régimen. Con todo, no se han vulnerado las normas de prescripción, aún sin acudir a las reglas intensas que fija la Ley No. 7428 para estas lides. Por ende, se insiste, cabe declinar el reproche bajo examen.

VII .- Generalidades sobre el procedimiento administrativo. En un segundo orden de agravios, el accionante reclama la aplicación de un régimen que no se encontraba vigente al momento de llevar el procedimiento administrativo en su contra. Dado el tema planteado, es necesario realizar algunas consideraciones generales en torno a las formalidades mínimas que debe reunir un procedimiento administrativo de corte disciplinario. El procedimiento administrativo constituye un importante elemento formal de la conducta pública. Cumple una doble finalidad. Por un lado, establece el camino que ha de seguir la Administración para adoptar una determinada decisión, orientando su proceder. Por otro, se impone como un marco de referencia que permite al administrado, establecer un cotejo del proceder público, a fin de fijar un control de que sus actuaciones se hayan manifestado acorde a las normas que orientan ese proceder. Busca por ende, constituirse en un mecanismo de tutela de derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos frente a poder público, así como garantizar la legalidad, oportunidad y conveniencia de la decisión administrativa y correcto funcionamiento de la función pública. Conforme lo señala el canon 214 de la Ley No. 6227, su objeto es establecer la verdad real de los hechos que sirven de motivo al caso final. Este elemento formal resulta imperativo para lograr un equilibrio entre el mejor cumplimiento de los fines de la Administración y la tutela de los derechos del particular, tal y como se expresa en el artículo 225.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. De ahí que el canon 216.1 ibidem, exija a la Administración adoptar sus decisiones dentro del procedimiento con estricto apego al ordenamiento jurídico. En su curso, el procedimiento pretende establecer las formalidades básicas que permitan al administrado el ejercicio pleno del derecho de defensa y el contradictorio, para llegar a establecer la referida verdad real de los hechos (dentro de las cuales pueden verse las estatuidas en los cánones 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, entre otros, todos de la citada Ley General). Ello adquiere aún mayor relevancia en los denominados procedimientos de control o sancionatorios, siendo que en esos caso, la decisión final puede imponer un marco represivo en la esfera jurídica de una persona. El mismo plexo normativo dispone la sustancialidad de estas garantías mínimas, considerando inválido el procedimiento que no satisfaga esas cuestiones mínimas. Así se desprende del mandato 223 de la Ley de referencia, en cuanto señala que la omisión de formalidades sustanciales causará nulidad del procedimiento. Desde este plano, esta Tribunal ya ha señalado que el control de la función administrativa que confiere a esta jurisdicción el canon 49 de la Carta Magna, supone un cotejo de que la Administración en el curso de esos procedimientos (de corte sancionatorio para este caso), satisfacen las garantías mínimas fijadas por la normativa aplicable, y que en lo medular, se ha tutelado el debido proceso que ha de ser infranqueable en ese proceder. Ahora bien, en virtud de lo alegado, es menester abordar el tema de las funciones que le son propias al órgano director y al órgano decisor del procedimiento. La competencia para emitir el acto final dentro de un procedimiento corresponde al órgano decisor, sea, a quien se ha otorgado la competencia legal para emitir el acto que causa estado. Empero, en aras de la eficiencia administrativa, las competencias de instrucción son delegables en un órgano encargado de llevar a cabo la instrucción del procedimiento, el que se ha tendido en denominar "órgano director o instructor". Es evidente que la designación de este último corresponde al órgano decisor, para lo cual, su validez se encuentra sujeta a que recaiga en un funcionario adscrito, designado regularmente y en posesión del cargo. De manera excepcional, se ha tolerado que se constituya como órgano director del procedimiento a personas que no son funcionarios regulares, sin embargo, en esa función específica, debe entenderse que cumplen una función pública, con las obligaciones inherentes. En cuanto a sus competencias, el órgano instructor representa a la Administración en el procedimiento y ostenta un rol de instrucción. Le corresponde emitir un análisis fáctico. Si bien puede rendir recomendaciones, ciertamente no serían vinculantes, por lo que sus determinaciones de cara a la adopción de una decisión final se consideran actos de trámite. Por ende, le corresponde dictar el acto de apertura, dar impulso procesal, toda la labor de instrucción del procedimiento, dirigir la comparecencia, resolver cuestiones previas, resolver el recurso de revocatoria que se interponga contra los actos de trámite, rendir un informe al órgano decisor al momento de remitir el expediente para el dictado del acto final. Dentro de sus competencias pueden verse los artículos 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, todos de la Ley General de referencia. Por su parte, el órgano decisor es el jerarca competente que reúne las condiciones necesarias para dictar el acto final que resuelve el procedimiento.

VIII.- Luego de analizar el trámite dado al presente asunto, estima este cuerpo colegiado, en la sustanciación del trámite no se observa lesión alguna al debido proceso, siendo que se ha garantizado al accionante el conjunto de fases mínimas que componen el procedimiento administrativo de corte disciplinario. En este orden, el actor señala que se le ha aplicado una versión del reglamento interno que no estaba vigente al momento de producirse los hechos. Del análisis de los autos se tiene que mediante el acuerdo 187-2010 de la Junta Directiva del INA, publicado en La Gaceta No. 5 del 11 de enero del 2011, se realizó una modificación al Reglamento Autónomo de Servicio de ese ente público, reforma que incluyó el procedimiento a seguir en cuestiones de régimen disciplinario. Sin embargo, la normativa aplicable es la vigente al momento de que emerge la posibilidad de ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria por parte del jerarca, sea por la notoriedad de los hechos o bien por la recepción de informes que le ponen en advertencia de la existencia de hechos que pueden ser objeto de aplicación del régimen correctivo interno. Como se ha señalado, el informe de la Auditoria Interna que ponía en conocimiento de la Presidencia Ejecutiva los hechos investigados imputados al accionante, fue notificado el 13 de junio del 2011. Para esa fecha, el reglamento interno ya había sido modificado, razón por la cual, la norma aplicable es la que a esa fecha regía y que en definitiva, fue la aplicada al accionante. No se trata de la aplicación retroactiva en perjuicio como endilga el actor, sino del uso de las normas que en el tiempo y espacio resultan atinentes al asunto. Con todo, no explicita el accionante la forma en que se le ha ocasionado lesión a la máxima del debido proceso o en general, se ha producido en su perjuicio, una infracción sustancial en los términos que exige el canon 223 LGAP. En este punto merece indicarse, al tenor de ese precepto referido, la invalidez que debe declararse dentro de los procedimientos administrativos, es solo aquella que pueda ser considerada una infracción sustancial al ordenamiento jurídico, dentro de estas, acciones u omisiones generadoras de estados de indefensión o que en caso de haberse atendido, hubieran generado un criterio o decisión diversa. No esas imperfecciones sustanciales se han producido en mengua de su situación jurídica. Aun ello, analizado el procedimiento seguido, se observa el cumplimiento de las etapas relevantes que deben integrar todo procedimiento de esta naturaleza, arriba expuestas de manera breve. Se ha tutelado el derecho de defensa, se realizó la audiencia oral y privada, se emitió acto motivado y razonado sobre el fondo del asunto y fueron resueltos los recursos ordinarios planteados respecto de cada uno de los puntos debatidos y luego, constituyentes de los agravios recursivos. De lo dicho se colige que en este caso se cumplieron todas las etapas que establece el ordinal 74 del Reglamento Autónomo del INA. En suma, no se detectan nulidades en el procedimiento, ni aporta el actor un detalle argumentativo (como sería su deber) sobre las patologías que lleven a una posible estimación de su pretensión anulatoria. Desde esa arista de examen, el cargo debe ser rechazado.

IX.- Sobre el alegato de falta de acreditación de los hechos. En otro orden de reproches, se arguye la falta de acreditación en sede administrativas de las supuestas faltas. El cargo en sí pretende que este Tribunal determine una supuesta inexistencia del motivo del acto administrativo, considerado como el antecedente fáctico y/o jurídico que permite o posibilita la emisión de la decisión pública. En el caso de las sanciones disciplinarias, ese motivo consistiría en el presupuesto condicionante consistente en la acreditación de las faltas que fueron intimadas y por ende, objeto de investigación. Como punto de partida, cabe decir, mediante el oficio No. AI-00535-2011 del 06 de junio del 2011, la Auditoria Interna remite el informe No. 23-2011 sobre supuestos hechos irregulares en la compra de productos perecederos (rosas, pomas, claveles y flores naturales) para impartir los módulos de “Servicios en las habitaciones”, código TUGT289 y “Servicios de A y B en eventos especiales, código TUGT515 del programa de bartender y salonero profesional, atribuidos al funcionario Juan Pablo Córdoba López. Mediante resolución de las 12 horas del 01 de julio del 2011, comunicada el 07 de julio del 2011, se intimaron los siguientes hechos en el traslado de cargos: “1. Que como docente tenía asignado impartir los módulos de servicios de habitaciones …, del programa de Bartender y Salonero Profesional… 2. Que el cheque número 75454-9 de fecha 19 de mayo del 2010, por un monto de C.1.018.488… fue girado a su nombre por concepto de viáticos, transporte y compra de productos perecederos para realizar la gira a la Cruz a impartir los módulos y de servicios de alimentación y bebidas en eventos especiales (código TUGT515) del Programa de Bartender y Salonero Profesional… 3. Que no realizó la compra de las flores indicadas en la factura número 10770, toda vez que fue una señora llamada “Magaly”, quien lo hizo. 4. Que la señora llamada “Magaly” a inicios del mes de junio solicitó al local “Flor Arte Floristería”, una factura en blanco, que resultó ser la factura número 10770. 5. Que para liquidar el adelanto correspondiente a la compra de perecederos, utilizó la factura No. 10770 del 06 de junio del 2010, por un monto de C.182.600,00 (ciento ochenta y dos mil seiscientos colones exactos) por la compra de cuarenta unidades de Rosas, Pomas, Claveles y Flores Naturales, al proveedor “Flor Arte Floristería”. 6. Que presentó la factura No. 10770, con una fecha que corresponde al domingo 06 de junio del 2010, día en que el negocio “Flor Arte Floristería”, está cerrado, toda vez que el horario de atención del local es de lunes a sábado de 8:00 am a 6:30 pm. 7. Que presentó la factura No. 10770 de fecha 06 de junio del 2010, por un monto de C.182.600.00, en la cual se detallan los precios de venta de las flores adquiridas, los cuales no corresponden a los precios que en ese momento tenían dichas flores en el negocio “Flor Arte Floristería”. Por su parte, en el acto LA-106-2011 de las 15 horas del 07 de septiembre del 2011 de la Presidencia Ejecutiva del INA, se tuvo por hechos probados, en lo relevante, que el cheque No. 75451-9 fue girado a nombre del accionante; que para liquidar el adelanto correspondiente a la compra de perecederos, el reclamante utilizó la factura No. 10770 del 06 de junio del 2010 del negocio Flor Arte Floristería; que dicha factura por un monto de C.182.600,00 corresponde a la compra de 10 unidades de rosas, 10 pomas, 10 claveles y 10 de otras flores naturales; que la citada factura no detalla precios unitarios de cada uno de los productos adquiridos; que la fecha de la factura corresponde a un domingo; que el negocio Flor Arte Floristería tiene un horario de atención de lunes a sábado de las 08 am a las 06:30 pm y no abre los domingos; que el demandante no verificó los precios de las flores; que para el mes de junio del 2010 el precio de las flores en ese negocio era de C.800.00 la unidad de rosas, C.350.00 la unidad de claveles, C.1.800.00 el ramo de pomas y de C.500.00 la unidad de mayor precio de otras flores naturales. De igual modo se tuvo por probado que la señora Magaly Alvarado es reconocida en el negocio aludido como cliente frecuente; que la factura No. 10770 fue entregada en blanco por la señora Seidy Murillo Villagra, dependiente del citado negocio a la señora Magaly Alvarado; que la venta que se describe en la citada factura no fue realizada por la empresa Flor Arte Floristería; que ni la dueña ni la dependiente del referido negocio reconocen al actor como cliente y que el citado negocio está acogido al régimen simplificado de la Administración Tributaria. En cada uno de estos hechos se hizo referencia al elemento probatorio que les daba sustento. El actor reclama que la dueña del negocio no estaba el día de la compra de las flores ni de la supuesta entrega en blanco de la factura 10770 a Magaly Alvarado, señalando que es extraño que un negocio de facturas en blanco. Asimismo indica, el proceso se basa en la versión de la dependiente, que lo que busca es justificar que ella hizo la venta y no la reportó o que lo hizo por una suma mayor a lo que correspondía. Además, que la dueña del negocio indica un precio diferente al que le facturaron en abril y mayo del 2010, un mes antes de la supuesta falsa venta. Agrega, se indica que Magaly Alvarado señaló que ella no conoce el local, lo que afirma, nunca dijo, sino que externó que las visitas a la floristería no eran constantes. Sobre el particular cabe exponer lo siguiente.

X.- En la resolución LA-106-2011, la Presidencia Ejecutiva del INA expone con claridad las razones y consideraciones que le llevaron a tener por acreditada la cadena de hechos con fundamento en los cuales determinó la existencia de una irregularidad en las acciones del señor Córdoba López y que llevaron a imponerle la sanción que en esta causa se discute. Si bien en este proceso el accionante formula una serie de interrogantes sobre la ponderación de los elementos de convicción que evacuó el órgano director y valoró el órgano decisor del procedimiento disciplinario, sus exposiciones se limitan a señalar impresiones subjetivas e imprecisas que no permiten refutar de manera debida el análisis probatorio que expone el acto objeto de referencia. En efecto, en lo que es objeto de análisis, el accionante se supedita a formular reproches genéricos que no llegan a puntualizar de manera detallada y concreta, las razones por las cuales el análisis realizado por la Administración accionada, contraviene las normas de la sana crítica racional y verdad real de los hechos que ha de imperar en la tópica de este tipo de procedimientos (artículos 214, 221, 223, 308, 297 y 298 LGAP), así como tampoco, sus argumentos llegan a expresar defectos en la determinación del elemento motivo o bien, de la forma en que la decisión final ha sido motivada en el sub exámine. Por el contrario, los hechos que dieron motivo a la sanción fueron en primera instancia analizados por la Auditoria Interna en el informe No. 23-2011, en el cual, sugiere la apertura del procedimiento disciplinario por presuntas irregularidades presentadas en la compra de productos perecederos, en concreto, rosas, pomas, claveles y flores naturales, a juicio de esa unidad internas, adquiridas con sobreprecio. A partir de ese informe, en la resolución LA-106-2011, se hace un análisis puntual de cada una de las circunstancias fácticas consideradas como base de la sanción impuesta. En un primer punto, se concluye que las flores fueron compradas por la señora Magaly Alvarado y no por el accionante, lo que se concluyó a partir de las declaraciones de la dueña del negocio y de la dependiente, así como de las manifestaciones del propio demandante, según instrumentos que rolan a folios 17 al 23 y 52 del legajo administrativo. De igual modo, la dependiente del negocio, señora Seidy Murillo expuso que la señora Magaly nunca se había llevado las flores, sino que solamente se le había entregado la factura 10770 en blanco. De igual manera, tanto la dependiente como la dueña del local, señora Ivette Saénz, señalaron que no conocía al accionante y que la única vez que lo vieron fue cuando se apersonó con funcionarios del INA. A partir de ello se concluye en el acto final que aunque la factura en cuestión corresponde al negocio Flor Arte Floristería, las flores que ese título expresa nunca fueron vendidas por ese negocio al accionante ni a su esposa, señora Magaly Alvarado. De igual manera, de la deposición de la dueña del local y de su dependiente se extrae que la factura fue entregada en blanco a la señora Magaly Alvarado, a fin de que elaborara una factura proforma, de lo que viene que no es un instrumento que haya sido emitido al actor por concepto de la venta de perecederos como fue reportado en su liquidación de gastos. Por otro lado, en cuanto al precio de las flores, la Administración determinó que en la factura no se establecieron precios unitarios. De la declaración de la dueña del negocio, se señala que las rosas tenían un valor de ¢800.00, los claveles ¢350.00, las pomas (rollito) ¢1800.00 y las flores naturales, la más cara de ¢500.00. Incluso en la declaración jurada visible a folios 17-18 del administrativo ,la dueña del local expone que de dividir el monto de la factura entre las unidades indicadas, se reflejan precios que no corresponden a los que ella vende en su negocio, además que para llegar a ese monto tuvo que haber vendido una cantidad muy superior a las 40 unidades, cantidad que dice no manejar en existencia. De esos datos la Administración concluyó sobre el reporte de precios excesivos en el costo de las flores con relación a los montos proporcionados por la dueña del local. Por otro lado, se determinó la inconsistencia en la fecha de la factura, expedida en data 06 de junio del 2010, que correspondía a un domingo, día en que el citado negocio estaba cerrado. En este punto, el INA advirtió sobre las inconsistencias en las declaraciones del gestionante, ya que en una primera declaración señaló que aunque la compra la realizó un sábado, le pidió a la dependiente del local que le hiciera el favor de ponerle fecha del domingo para no tener problemas, ya que las flores las iba a utilizar hasta el lunes (folio 23 del administrativo), empero, luego en la audiencia del 18 de agosto del 2011 expresó que compró las flores el sábado y que no se fijó en la fecha por lo que cometió un error al no percatarse. Ello tal y como lo expuso el INA evidencia una inconsistencia, de la que surge entonces, junto con las declaraciones de la dueña del local y su dependiente, que el negocio en cuestión no abría los domingos, sin que tal aspecto se haya logrado refutar. Como derivación, el INA concluyó sobre el uso de una factura que no se correspondía con una venta real realizada por el citado negocio Flor Arte Floristería, para los efectos de una liquidación de sumas giradas, y con un monto que supera los precios que ese negocio maneja para esos productos supuestamente adquiridos. A juicio de este Tribunal, el anterior recuento pone en evidencia la debida acreditación dentro del procedimiento administrativo, de los hechos que sirvieron de base a la sanción y que han sido detallados. Si bien lo evacuado dentro del su ponderación y del análisis de los alegatos formulados por el accionante, no observa este cuerpo colegiado los defectos de argumentación que se plantean en la demanda en cuanto a la acreditación de las causas fácticas que dieron base a la sanción. Luego del análisis de la prueba, el accionante no ha logrado refutar las consideraciones adoptadas por la Presidencia Ejecutiva del INA. Por el contrario, la ponderación de esa exposición de motivos en el acto cuestionado, pone en evidencia la debida demostración de los hechos que fueron base del traslado de cargos. Por ende, el extremo debe ser rechazado.

XI.- Sobre el alegato de sanciones no reguladas. En otro agravio, se reprocha la aplicación de una sanción no prevista en la normativa que le resultaba aplicable, citando al efecto el numeral 49 del Reglamento Autónomo del INA, que señalaba que por una falta, suspensión sin goce de sueldo por 8 días y por dos, despido sin responsabilidad patronal. Sin embargo, como bien lo apunta la representación del INA, incluso en el contexto de esa misma norma, se indica "Las anteriores sanciones se aplicarán sin perjuicio de que si las faltas lo ameriten, se imponga una sanción mayor." En la versión vigente (y aplicable al caso) de ese reglamento interno, el tema se regula en el ordinal 47, mandato que establece como medidas disciplinarias la amonestación verbal, apercibimiento escrito, suspensión sin goce de sueldo hasta por quince días, sin perjuicio de aplicación de una suspensión por un plazo mayor, cuando lo prevean leyes especiales y según la naturaleza de la falta, así como el despido sin responsabilidad patronal. De seguido la norma fija criterios de graduación para imponer las sanciones. Por su parte, el precepto 48 regula las faltas leves, el 49 las graves y el 50 las que permiten el despido. Desde ese plano, el contenido del acto encuentra respaldo debido en las normas que regulan el accionar del INA en este tipo de casos. Cabe señalar, dentro del traslado de cargos se indicó al promovente de la posibilidad de despido como consecuencia de los hechos intimados, al haberse expresado posibles lesiones al artículo 81 incisos d) y l) del Código de Trabajo, así como infracciones al régimen de la Ley de Control Interno y la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito. En la resolución LA-106-2011 de la Presidencia Ejecutiva se indica que los hechos acreditados suponían un incumplimiento de las obligaciones que impone el Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios, en específico, ordinales 43, incisos 3, 14, al no haber ejecutado las tareas y funciones con toda la capacidad, dedicación, diligencia y esfuerzo, al no haber consultado los previos de las flores y utilizar una factura que tenía irregularidades, al haber utilizado una factura a sabiendas de que no correspondía a una venta real del negocio. Señaló además una trasgresión al inciso 37 de esa misma norma, al existir falta de dignidad en el ejercicio del cargo, lo mismo que lesión al artículo 45 inciso 8) ibídem, al utilizar una factura alterada para liquidar un adelanto correspondiente a la compra de perecederos a sabiendas que contenía un monto excesivo. Asimismo, lesión al canon 39 de la Ley General de Control Interno. Ergo, concluyó que por infringir el artículo 43, incisos 3, 14, 37 y 40, numeral 45 inciso 8 y 27, se producía una falta grave a la luz del ordinal 49 del citado reglamento, además de la desatención del artículo 39 de la Ley General de Control Interno, tipificado como falta grave por el mandato 41 inciso c) de esa misma fuente legal. El análisis de las normas invocadas y de los hechos intimados permiten concluir que la sanción dictada encuentra respaldo y base legitimante en esas referencias normativas. De ese modo, al haberse acreditado el motivo del acto, que se insiste, configura el hecho condicionante del régimen disciplinario, es factible la aplicación del efecto condicionado, constituido en este caso por el contenido del acto, que al amparo del ordinal 132 LGAP ha de ser lícito y posible, además de correspondiente al motivo. Tal armonía se evidencia en este caso, pues la gravedad de los hechos investigados a la luz del reglamento interno, permiten tenerle como faltas graves que dan pie a imponer sanciones como la que en definitiva se impuso, sea, una suspensión sin goce de sueldo por 15 días, pese a que en la intimación se advertía de un eventual despido. De ese modo, no existe la contradicción y patología que reprocha el actor, ante lo cual, cabe desestimar el cargo. De ese modo, la resolución LA-106-2011 de las 15 horas del 07 de septiembre del 2011 de la Presidencia Ejecutiva del INA no presenta las incorrecciones acusadas, debiendo por ende denegarse el pedimento anulatorio. Por las mismas razones dichas, tampoco procede esa pretensión de invalidez respecto de la resolución No. LA-201-2011 de las 13 horas del 29 de septiembre del 2011 del INA que conoce el recurso de revocatoria presentado por el accionante. Tal acto se limita a analizar cada uno de los agravios formulados contra aquel acto final, confirmando lo ya resuelto en la etapa previa, en lo fundamental, acuerpando los razonamientos allí planteados. Los análisis que en ese acto confirmatorio se señalan, se ajustan a los parámetros expuestos en el presente fallo, por lo que al amparo de los mandatos 128 y 158 LGAP, debe desecharse la pretensión de invalidez interpuesta contra esa decisión. En suma, debe disponerse el rechazo de la demanda presentada por el señor Juan Pablo Córdoba López contra el INA en todos sus extremos.

XII.- Sobre la contrademanda planteada por el INA. Sobre el régimen de responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos por daños cometidos a la Administración Pública. Generalidades. El INA presentó contrademanda, a efectos de lo cual, expresó las siguientes pretensiones: "... solicito a su autoridad, se declare la presente demanda con lugar y se establezca en sentencia la responsabilidad civil del funcionario Juan Pablo Córdoba López por el monto de ¢182.600.00 (ciento ochenta y dos mil seiscientos colones), girado por el INA para la compra de flores, la cual nunca se dio y aun así realizó el cobro respectivo con una factura que no corresponde al local donde dice haber adquirido los bienes. 2. Que se le ordene al señor Juan Pablo Córdoba López pagar al Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje la suma de ¢182.600.00 (ciento ochenta y dos mil seiscientos colones) o en su defecto la diferencia de ¢148.600.00 (ciento cuarenta y ocho mil seiscientos colones). Debidamente actualizado a fin de compensar la variación en el poder adquisitivo ocurrida durante el lapso que media entre la fecha de exigibilidad de la obligación y la de su extinción por pago efectivo. Solicito que dicha actualización sea fijada en la propia sentencia. 3. Solicitamos se condene al señor Córdoba al pago de ambas costas del proceso." (Folios 145-153 del principal) Respecto de tal reconvención, por auto de las 09 horas 40 minutos del 05 de febrero del 2013, se declaró al actor reconvenido en estado de rebeldía. (Folio 223 del principal) Sobre el particular conviene señalar lo siguiente. Las acciones u omisiones del funcionario público que ocasionen daños se encuentran sujetas a un régimen especial de responsabilidad cuyo desarrollo se plasma en la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Tal marco de responsabilidad bien puede darse por daños a terceros propiamente, o bien sin daño a terceros, sea, cuando la lesión antijurídica que no se tiene el deber de soportar, ha sido ocasionada a la misma Administración. Responsabilidad con daño a terceros: En el primer caso, sea, lesión a terceros, la imputación de responsabilidad puede realizarse personalmente al funcionario o bien, de manera solidaria a la Administración, según el tipo de falta cometida. El parámetro legal de este sistema de responsabilidad se encuentra en el numeral 199.1 LGAP,que señala: " 1. Será responsable personalmente ante terceros el servidor público que haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave en el desempeño de sus deberes o con ocasión del mismo, aunque sólo haya utilizado los medios y oportunidades que le ofrece el cargo." Sin embargo, esas lesiones ocasionadas por un funcionario en los términos dichos genera un sistema de responsabilidad solidaria con el ente público a cuyo nombre y cuenta actua (art. 199.4 LGAP). Con todo, para ello, debe diferenciarse de la falta personal impura de la pura. a) Falta personal Impura: En la impura, se está frente a un efecto lesivo que se produce por acciones u omisiones del funcionario que se asocian o vinculan total o parcialmente con el servicio público, sea, los producidos con ocasión del cargo, aun cuando fuere para fines o actividades ajenos a sus funciones. Se incorporan dentro de este ámbito los daños ocasionados por criterios de ocasionalidad causal, sea, la utilización de medios y oportunidades que el cargo le ofrece o la Administración pone a su disposición y que le posibilitan ocasionar la lesión. Tal utilización causal de medios bien puede ser instrumental, circunstancial o teleológica. En estos supuestos, la víctima puede emprender la acción indemnizatoria personalmente contra el funcionario o solidariamente contra la Administración, en virtud del sistema de responsabilidad objetiva por conducta ajena (del funcionario) que establecen los ordinales 190, 191, 199 y 201 de la citada Ley General. Tal régimen solidario se justifica en la vinculación, aún instrumental que caracteriza a este tipo de falta personal, dando paso a un derecho de la víctima de emprender las sendas reclamatorias contra la Administración, el funcionario, o ambos (alcances de la solidaridad previstos en el numeral 1046 del Código Civil). Se trata de una responsabilidad solidaria propia (sea, creada o impuesta por ley o convenio) que faculta al acreedor, dentro de las relaciones externas de la solidaridad, a exigir la deuda contra ambos deudores o uno de ellos, quien responde por toda la deuda. Este condenado solidario, puede luego emprender las acciones de regreso contra sus homónimos, merced de las relaciones internas que este tipo de solidaridad supone. Cuando el reproche sea contra la Administración, resulta aplicable el sistema objetivizado de responsabilidad (cuyo desarrollo puede verse en el fallo 584-2005 de la Sala Primera), previsto a partir del canon 190 de la citada Ley General, que prescinde de la acreditación de factores subjetivos como condicionante del deber indemnizatorio, siendo un sistema que tiene como epicentro el daño antijurídico en su base y el riesgo creado. En estos casos, a tono con lo condenada a cancelar los daños causados por las deficiencias de sus servidores, debe imperativamente iniciar contra estos la correspondiente acción de regreso, a fin de recuperar lo girado por ese concepto, mediante los mecanismos que fija la misma Ley No. 6227. En esa línea, a tono con el ordinal 208 de la Ley No. 6227/78, el plazo para ejercer la acción de regreso contra el funcionario es un año desde la firmeza de la condena, mediante procedimiento direccionado a establecer la existencia o no de dolo o culpa grave en la generación del daño, su grado de participación en la lesión indemnizada, así como el monto que ha de cobrar la Administración a ese funcionario, caso de haber acreditado la concurrencia de dolo o culpa grave, salvo aquellos casos en que se hubiere declarado judicialmente la ilegalidad manifiesta, supuesto en el cual, no será necesaria la acreditación de tales factores subjetivos (numeral 199.3 LGAP). Por el contrario, cuando la responsabilidad se pretende endilgar personalmente al funcionario (sea en régimen concurrente o individual), para referirle el efecto perturbador que se reclama, ha de acreditarse el dolo o culpa grave en su proceder, tal y como lo estatuye el mandato 199.1 de esa misma legislación. b) Falta personal Pura: Ahora bien, cuando no concurran estos presupuestos de la falta personal impura, surge la falta personal pura, que implica una desvinculación total con el servicio público y la no concurrencia de ocasionalidad causal, dando paso a lo que se denomina falta separable -del servicio y de la Administración- que le hacen personalmente responsable frente al afectado. En esta dinámica, cuando se ocasiona un daño a tercero, este último solo podría ejercer su reclamo contra el funcionario en lo personal, no existiendo en ese caso deber de la administración de responder por esas acciones, pues dada la inexistencia de vinculación con el servicio público, no viene aplicable el sistema de responsabilidad solidaria. Responsabilidad sin daño a terceros: Cuando el proceder del funcionario sea sin daño a tercero, sea, que se genera una lesión a la misma Administración, conforme lo dispone el numeral 210 ibídem, es claro que el funcionario será responsable frente a la Administración, siempre que haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave. En esta eventualidad, que resulta especialmente relevante al caso, resulta impostergable que la Administración ejerza su potestad legal y proceda a iniciar en sede administrativa, un procedimiento ordinario en el cual, acredite con la debida solvencia, la concurrencia de los factores subjetivos mencionados, como presupuesto elemental para imputar la lesión que se reclama. Es decir, sin la acreditación del dolo o culpa grave, no es factible jurídicamente imponer responsabilidad al funcionario. Tal acreditación como marco relacional del efecto lesivo con el agente público resulta impostergable, debiendo acreditarse la causal (lo que resulta, en tesis de principio, más flexible cuando esa responsabilidad derive de los supuestos de ilegalidad manifiesta). En esta línea, las reglas que imperan en la temática de la distribución interna de responsabilidad (arts. 203-213 ejusdem), exigen la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo, que necesariamente debe ser el ordinario a que hace referencia los preceptos 214 y 308 de la citada Ley No. 6227, que tendrá por fin determinar la existencia del daño, su magnitud, la concurrencia de dolo o culpa grave del funcionario investigado, la proporción de incidencia que las acciones endilgadas al funcionario tengan en el daño, así como su grado de participación en ese efecto lesivo. Dentro de este curso, el funcionario podrá cuestionar tanto la cuantía de la deuda como su existencia misma, así como factores excluyentes de su responsabilidad. Con todo, cabe destacar, en ese procedimiento, la carga de la prueba respecto de la existencia del daño, la acreditación efectiva de su culpa grave o dolo, así como el grado de participación del funcionario en los hechos analizados, indefectiblemente corre a cargo de la Administración, siendo que el objeto del procedimiento es precisamente establecer la verdad real de los hechos. Cabe acotar, dentro de este procedimiento, es de rigor el respeto del debido proceso en todas sus fases, así como de los diversos principios que son atinentes a ese tipo de procedimientos. Merece enfatizar, la responsabilidad del funcionario está sujeta a la existencia de dolo o culpa grave en su proceder. Ello supone un análisis de sus conductas a fin de establecer la concurrencia de una intencionalidad de producir el daño (dolo), o bien, culpa grave. Nótese que no es cualquier culpa la que da paso a la imputación de responsabilidad, sino solo aquella que pueda entenderse o reputarse como severa o grave. Cabe destacar, conforme lo dispone el mandato 210 inciso 3) LGAP, la acción de recuperación, una vez culminado el procedimiento y establecida la concurrencia de dolo o culpa grave, cuantía del daño y grado de participación del funcionario, será ejecutiva, siendo el título a ejecutar la certificación sobre el monto del daño (ver artículo 149 LGAP). Con todo, esta potestad de recuperación se encuentra sujeta a la prescripción cuatrienal que señala el mandato 207 en relación al 198 ibidem, que se computa desde la ocurrencia del hecho dañoso, o bien, desde el momento en que la Administración se encuentre en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la causa del daño, en el entendido que la apertura del procedimiento administrativo comentado configura una causal de interrupción del plazo prescriptivo, efecto que produce cada acto emitido dentro de ese procedimiento. Cabe aclarar, ninguna confusión existe entre el plazo cuatrienal señalado en el canon 207 LGAP y el anual establecido por el ordinal 208 ibídem. El primero es un plazo para exigir a un funcionario su responsabilidad civil por daños a la Administración (que no a terceros). El plazo anual regulado por el artículo 208 LGAP, lo es para ejercitar la acción de regreso cuando la Administración ha sido condenada judicialmente por daño a terceros por acciones u omisiones de sus funcionarios, producto del sistema de responsabilidad solidaria propia que impone la Ley No. 6227/78. De ese modo, la acción de regreso no es técnicamente un daño a la Administración, sino solamente una distribución interna de responsabilidades asumidas de manera plenaria por uno de los deudores solidarios (la Administración en este caso). De ahí que el plazo de cobro por daños (cuatro años), no sea extensible al ejercicio de la acción de regreso, caso en el cual, se insiste, aplica el plazo de un año. Ahora bien, el mismo efecto interruptor ha de producir cualquiera de las causas previstas en los ordinales 977 del Código de Comercio y 876 del Código Civil. Ergo, toda gestión judicial cobratoria notificada al presunto deudor, interrumpe ese lapso, conforme a los incisos a y b respectivamente de esos numerales. Empero, ha de insistirse, el ejercicio de esa acción solo es legítima cuando se ha acreditado debidamente la existencia del daño, su atribución al funcionario y la concurrencia de dolo o culpa grave. Finalmente, el inciso 3 del citado mandato 210 ibidem estatuye que la acción de recuperación será ejecutiva y el título será la certificación sobre el monto del daño expedida por el jerarca del ente respectivo, lo que, desde luego, está sujeto a la concurrencia de los presupuestos ya comentados. Planteado este esquema general, de seguido se ingresa al examen del caso.

XIII.- Ahora bien, en el caso concreto, la Administración accionada-reconventora pretende que en esta sede se disponga la responsabilidad civil del funcionario accionante, por lo que considera, son daños ocasionados al patrimonio de ese ente público. Sin embargo, es criterio de este órgano colegiado, la regulación que del tema hace la Ley No. 6227/78, exige que tales acciones se ejerciten dentro de un procedimiento administrativo como manifestación y materialización de una potestad administrativa que se considera, irrenunciable, de conformidad con el precepto 66 de la citada Ley. En efecto, como se ha puesto en evidencia, a la luz de lo regulado por los ordinales 198.2, 207 y 210 (así como de la doctrina que subyace en el canon 203) todos de la LGAP, la Administración debe emprender las acciones correspondientes para determinar la responsabilidad civil de sus funcionarios, sea por lesiones cometidas a terceros y por las cuales, dentro del régimen de solidaridad propia que imponen los artículos 190, 191, 199, 207 y 208 LGAP, ha tenido que realizar erogaciones, o bien, por los daños que ese funcionario ha cometido al patrimonio de la Administración. Para ello, como se ha señalado, el ordenamiento jurídico establece la potestad administrativa de iniciar procedimientos administrativos internos con el fin de determinar la concurrencia dolo o culpa grave del agente público, así como la acreditación debida del daño y de su cuantía. A juicio de este Tribunal, el ejercicio de esa potestad resulta irrenunciable, de suerte que pretender que ese análisis se aborde de manera directa en sede judicial, mediante el mecanismo de la reconvención, busca trasladar a esta sede un debate que por imperio de ley ha de entablarse en sede administrativa. Se trata, se insiste, de una potestad regulada en la Ley No. 6227/78 y que no observa esta Cámara, las razones viables para que la Administración decline ese ejercicio. Cabe precisar, si bien el numeral 10 inciso primero, sub inciso e) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establece la legitimación activa de la Administración Pública, para reclamar daños y perjuicios a los intereses públicos, a la Hacienda Pública y para exigir responsabilidad contractual y extracontractual, hay que tener claro que en la especie, se está frente a una relación interna de empleo de la Administración, que genera un vínculo por cuyas particularidades, la Administración ostenta una potestad intensa que le habilita para determinar a lo interno, en sede administrativa, como derivación de la responsabilidad disciplinaria, las consecuencias económicas en términos de daños, que pudiera haber ocasionado una conducta del funcionario que ha sido objeto de corrección sancionatoria. La apertura del procedimiento disciplinario y la claridad de los hechos que le dan base, debe proyectar las acciones internas para establecer la existencia o no de daño patrimonial. De otro modo, la gracia de acción ejecutiva que estatuye el canon 210 LGAP no tendría sentido alguno, si para establecer esa responsabilidad, fuese necesario que el ente público acuda a instancias judiciales. Ese tratamiento solo guarda lógica dentro de un ámbito de ejercicio de potestad exorbitante que permite que la Administración dirima a lo interno esas cuestiones. Desde luego que una vez emitida la conducta pública, esos extremos pueden ser abordados en proceso contencioso administrativo, dentro del cual, se puede examinar la validez de la conducta pública, pero ello no supone una permisibilidad para declinar el ejercicio de potestades públicas que han sido conferidas para eficientar las acciones que el jerarca público puede emprender dentro de l marco de las relaciones de empleo público. De ese modo, debe disponerse la inadmisibilidad de la pretensión analizada.

XIV.A mayor precisión de motivos. En todo caso, a mayor abundamiento de razones, tampoco por el fondo podría accederse a lo reclamado por la entidad reconventora. La asignación de responsabilidad civil al funcionario depende de la concurrencia de varias circunstancias. Como se ha señalado ut supra, la responsabilidad del funcionario frente a la Administración por conductas suyas que han ocasionado daños a aquella sin lesión a terceros, se encuentra sujeta a la demostración fehaciente de dolo o culpa grave en su proceder, según lo condiciona el precepto 210 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Tales aspectos deben ser de manera impostergable acreditados por la misma Administración, a quien incumbe la carga demostrativa en este particular, dentro de un procedimiento administrativo, con plena garantía del debido proceso, tema ya abordado arriba. Por un lado, la existencia de dolo o culpa grave del funcionario público. Segundo, la acreditación debida del daño padecido por la Administración que reclama su reparación. Tercero, ejercicio del reclamo indemnizatorio dentro del plazo establecido para esos efectos. En la especie, el INA busca que a partir de los mismos hechos que han sido objeto de análisis en este fallo, se declare la responsabilidad civil del funcionario accionante por un monto de ¢182.600.00 (ciento ochenta y dos mil seiscientos colones). En ese sentido, luego de exponer lo acontecido dentro del procedimiento administrativo, el ente reconventor manera supletoria, dice, sobre la base del precio señalada por la propietaria del local y el monto reportado en la factura 10770, el monto a facturar debía ser de ¢34.000.00 (treinta y cuatro mil colones), siendo por ende la diferencia de ¢148.600.00 (ciento cuarenta y ocho mil seiscientos). A diferencia de lo que la especie, el accionante no haya adquirido las flores para impartir el curso de bartender y salonero en la Región Chorotega y que pretendía ser costeado con el cheque número 75451-9. Si bien se mira, el objeto del procedimiento administrativo fue establecer la responsabilidad disciplinaria por haber liquidado el adelanto de compra de perecederos con una factura alterada y que presentaba, a juicio del INA, las siguientes inconsistencias básicas: no fue entregada por el local Flor Arte Floristería, la fecha de la factura es de un domingo, cuando el local estaba cerrado, así como que el monto no corresponde a los precios que realmente tenían las flores en ese local para el momento en que acaecieron los hechos. Desde ese plano, la acreditación de la comisión de la falta no supone de manera automática, la existencia del daño que se reclama. Si bien se puede conjeturar que el uso indebido de una factura alterada puede generar un daño económico a la Administración, para determinar la magnitud real del daño es menester determinar si las flores fueron realmente adquiridas. Está claro que no lo fueron en el negocio Flor Arte Floristería mediante la factura 10770, empero, es preciso establecer si esas especies fueron adquiridas, o si en definitiva no lo fueron, como elemento previo y fundamental para establecer la cuantía de un posible daño indemnizable. Tal aspecto no se ha acreditado en la especie. Incluso, en la resolución No. LA-106-2011 en el considerando IV se indica que en la audiencia oral el accionante señaló el evento para el cual se compraron las flores se realizó y éstas (las flores), fueron utilizadas. Ante ese alegato, la Presidencia Ejecutiva señaló que el procedimiento disciplinario no versaba sobre la realización o no del evento, si las flores fueron utilizadas o no, sino que lo investigado era si la factura había sido entregada en blanco y si ese local /Flor Arte Floristería) había despachado la cantidad de flores indicada. Así se puede ver a folio 24 del las flores y monto real de compra de esas especies, si es que fueron adquiridas. Son cuestiones que han de ponderarse en fase administrativa en el procedimiento que debe instaurarse para esos efectos, pero que en esta causa, no han sido acreditados. Siendo así, no tiene este Tribunal por acreditado el marco relacional entre un posible daño que reclama la Administración y las conductas del funcionario a las cuales se pretende asociar ese reclamo. Tampoco puede conjeturarse que el daño consiste en la diferencia entre el costo reflejado en la factura 10770 y el precio de las flores declarado por la dueña del local para esas fechas, por cuanto si la base de la sanción fue utilizar una factura de un local comercial en el que se dice, no fueron adquiridas las flores, se daría una evidente contradicción en sustentar el daño sobre diferencias de precios aportados por un negocio del cual, no se compraron las especies. Así las cosas, no podría accederse a lo pedido, por la ausencia de los elementos mínimos que posibilitarían ese examen.”