Intangibility of administrative acts and duty to indemnify for unilateral dismissal of an AyA employeeIntangibilidad de actos propios y deber de indemnización por cese unilateral de funcionario del AyA

**IV.**— Having analyzed the arguments of the appellant and the judges of the prior instance, it is appropriate to examine what the legal system, in its wording in force when this litigation was filed, establishes regarding the official competent to dismiss personnel at AyA. First, we naturally have the Institute's Creation Law, No. 2726 of April 14, 1961, and its amendments, which, in Article 12, subsection b), provides, where relevant: *"The General Manager shall be responsible before the Board of Directors for the efficient and correct administrative functioning of the Institute and shall have the following powers: (…) b) Agree to the creation of new positions and designate personnel and their removal, which shall be governed by a career ladder (escalafón), to be approved by the Board of Directors; (…)".* It should also be taken into consideration that Law 4646 of 1970 altered the composition of the boards of directors in autonomous institutions by establishing that the Servicio Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillado (now AyA) would be composed, among others, by a Minister of Government designated by the Governing Council (canon 4). Which in turn was amended by Law 5507 of April 19, 1974, called *"Reforma Juntas Directivas de Instituciones Autónomas Creando Presidencias Ejecutivas"* [Reform of Boards of Directors of Autonomous Institutions Creating Executive Presidencies]. This body of law modified the matter related to the designation and formation of senior hierarchies in autonomous institutions, by incorporating the figure of the Executive President. Articles 3 and 6 state the following: Article 3 *"Reform Article 4 of Law No. 4646 of October 20, 1970, so that it reads as follows: 'Article 4.– The Boards of Directors of (…) the Servicio Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, (…) shall be composed in the following manner: 1) An Executive President of recognized experience and knowledge in the field of activities of the corresponding institution, designated by the Governing Council, whose management shall be governed by the following rules: a) They shall be the highest-ranking official for the purposes of governance of the institution and shall be fundamentally responsible for ensuring that the decisions taken by the Board are executed, as well as coordinating the action of the entity whose Board they preside over with that of other State institutions. Likewise, they shall assume the other functions that by law are reserved to the President of the Board of Directors, as well as the others assigned by the Board itself; (…)'."* Article 6 *"The Managers of the institutions shall continue being the principal administrative officials. (…)"*. Likewise, one must take into account Executive Decree No. 11846-p of September 9, 1980, *"Reglamento a la Ley de Presidentes Ejecutivos de las Juntas Directivas del Banco Central de Costa Rica y demás Instituciones Autónomas y Semiautónomas No Bancarias"* [Regulation to the Law of Executive Presidents of the Boards of Directors of the Central Bank of Costa Rica and other Non-Banking Autonomous and Semi-Autonomous Institutions], which establishes in mandate 6 the following: *"Powers and Duties: The Executive President, for purposes of governance, is the highest-ranking official of the respective institution. They are the hierarchical superior of the General Manager, in the terms established by the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP) in its Articles 101 and 102, on behalf of the Board of Directors. The Executive President has the following duties: a) Inform the Board of Directors about the actions of the Management regarding the fulfillment of its functions (…); b) Preside over the Board of Directors; call its ordinary and extraordinary sessions (…); c) Program the general activities required to carry out the policies and achieve the objectives of the institution (…); d) Order the Management to undertake a systematic task of modernizing the entity and rationalizing the use of its resources, in coordination with the Office of National Planning and Economic Policy of the Presidency of the Republic; for this purpose, they shall issue the pertinent directives; e) Submit for approval of the Board of Directors any comprehensive changes in organization and administration; f) Coordinate (…) negotiations aimed at obtaining technical assistance and financing (...); g) Coordinate with other autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions and with the Central Government the policies, objectives, plans, and programs of the entity they preside over; h) Direct and supervise the planning unit (…); i) Be part of the Interinstitutional Coordination Council (…); j) Periodically supervise and evaluate the entity's programs (…); k) Provide a favorable opinion (visto bueno) on the annual and extraordinary budget projects submitted to the Board of Directors for approval, as well as monitor their correct execution (…); l) Timely present to the Office of National Planning and Economic Policy, (...), the budget projects and investment programs, as well as requests for external financing (…); ll) Propose to the Board of Directors, in exercise of their superior governance functions, the technical and administrative organization of the institution, (…); m) Meet as many times as necessary with the relevant minister or the Governing Council (...); n) Others that correspond to them as the highest-ranking official of the institution in matters of governance, as well as those entrusted by the Board of Directors (…) and those imposed by mandate of the pertinent laws and regulations'."* From the transcribed provisions, several conclusions can be drawn. First, the powers of the General Manager of AyA, established in canon 12 of its Constitutive Law, have not been repealed by any normative body; therefore, that official can remove personnel. Second, the Executive President, as the highest authority of the Institution, has been granted broad powers of governance and administration, within which it is possible to infer the competence to dismiss officials.

**IV.-** Having analyzed the arguments of the appellant in cassation (casacionista) and of the judges of the preceding instance, it is necessary to examine what the legal system, in its wording in force when this litigation (lite) was filed, establishes regarding the competent official to dismiss personnel in AyA. In the first place, there is naturally the Institute's Creation Law, No. 2726 of April 14, 1961 and its amendments, which, in Article 12, subsection b) provides in relevant part: <i>"The Manager shall be responsible to the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) for the efficient and correct administrative functioning of the Institute and shall have the following powers: (…) b) To agree to the creation of new positions and to appoint personnel and their removal, which shall be governed by a career ladder system (escalafón), which must be approved by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva); (…)".</i> Consider also that Law 4646 of 1970, changed the composition of the boards of directors (juntas directivas) in autonomous institutions (instituciones autónomas) by establishing that the National Water and Sewer Service (now AyA) would be comprised, among others, of a Government Minister designated by the Government Council (canon 4). Which in turn was amended by Law 5507 of April 19, 1974, called <i>"Reform of Boards of Directors of Autonomous Institutions Creating Executive Presidencies."</i> A normative body that modified the subject matter related to the designation and conformation of the superior hierarchies in autonomous institutions (instituciones autónomas), by incorporating the figure of the Executive President.

Thus, for example, such authority is included within the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria) held by the hierarchical superior, as it practically constitutes the maximum sanction to which an official can be subject. Furthermore, it is a competence linked to budget formulation, direction, and ordering of the entity. So, it is understood to be contained within the powers given to the Executive President (direction and supervision of the institution's planning unit; endorsing the annual and extraordinary budget projects and supervising their correct execution, all to ensure their congruence with the institution's policy; presenting the budget projects and investment programs; proposing the technical and administrative organization of the Institution, etc.). This being the case, this Deciding Body (Órgano Decisor) considers that both the Executive President and the General Manager or in his absence the Deputy General Manager (an aspect in which the appellant is correct), are competent to remove personnel in AyA. Despite this, this issue of competence is useless for the purpose of varying the operative part (dispositivo) of the challenged judgment, since as indicated in the preceding recital (considerando), it is not the only reason for which the Court annulled official letters UE-JBIC-2010-851 and SGG-2010-02293. For the judges, the removal of the plaintiff (actor) was adopted without a prior administrative proceeding (procedimiento administrativo) having been carried out, through which the harmfulness (lesividad) of that act declaring rights (acto declarativo de derechos) was determined. In relation to this, this Chamber considers, by the principle of the intangibility of one's own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios) that emanates from Article 34 of the Magna Carta (la Carta Magna), the Administration is prohibited from annulling or directing itself against the acts issued by it, which declare subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) in favor of the administered individual (administrado). The exception is constituted by the cases of revocation (revocación) and ex officio declaration of absolute, evident, and manifest nullity (declaratoria oficiosa de nulidad absoluta, evidente y manifiesta), contemplated in the LGAP. In this line, one can consult, among others, the judgments of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) numbers 2006-013447 of 10 hours 6 minutes on September 8, 2006 and 2010-016314 of 15 hours 16 minutes on September 29, 2010. This principle therefore stands as a guarantor for administered individuals (administrados) against the Administration, which cannot disregard through a later act the subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) it has granted or recognized to them. By virtue of the foregoing, the power of the former to declare nullity by itself has been configured based on two distinct hypotheses: the ablative act (acto ablativo) and the act declaring rights in favor of the administered individual (acto declarativo de derechos a favor del administrado). In the first, fully compatible with the mentioned principle, the Administration has the possibility to review ex officio and declare the nullity of the act that caused it a situation of disadvantage or burden, because the result will be beneficial for the legal sphere of the administered individual (administrado). From another angle, when subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) granted in the act are at stake, for its nullity to be declared in the administrative venue, it must be absolute, evident, and manifest. If the defect does not possess such characteristics, the Administration cannot ex officio decree its nullity, and must, for the act to be annulled due to its invalidity, resort to the harmfulness process (proceso de lesividad), legally established as a realization of Article 49 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), which in turn, establishes the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso administrativa) as guarantor of the subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) and legitimate interests of administered individuals (administrados). In this respect, one can consult resolution of this Chamber no. 000094-F-S-2011 of 9 hours 10 minutes on February 3, 2011. Based on the foregoing, aside from the discussion regarding the competent official to remove personnel in the defendant Institute, whether called Executive President, General Manager, or both jointly, it cannot be overlooked that in the case at hand AyA issued an administrative act declaring rights (acto administrativo declarativo de derechos) in favor of Mr. Román Matamoros (official letter PRE-2009-0694), by appointing him to the position of Comptroller (Contralor) of the AyA-JBIC Executing Unit (Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC) until December 31, 2011. An act that, by declaring the plaintiff's right to hold said position until the indicated date, could not be left without effect untimely. The Administration, as the Court ordered, had to resort to the mechanisms provided by the legal system for that purpose (annulment in administrative venue when it is evident and manifest, Article 173 of the LGAP or in jurisdictional venue through a harmfulness process (proceso de lesividad), canon 183 of the cited legal body, in the cases of absolute non-evident and non-manifest nullity or relative nullity). A scenario not proven in the case at hand. In any case, to further elaborate on the reasons, consider that in the case under study no administrative proceeding (procedimiento administrativo) was carried out that would allow the plaintiff (actor) to exercise the right of defense and know the reasons for which the decision was made to remove him from his position. Only in official letter UE-JBIC-2010-851 did the Manager of the Unit in which he worked inform him: <i>"I would like to indicate that your employment contract ends on December 31 of this year. The corresponding labor settlement amounts, in accordance with labor legislation, will be processed in the Human Resources Department. I want to thank you for the collaboration provided during the time you worked with the AyA-JBIC Executing Unit (Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC)".</i> A determination endorsed in equal terms by the Deputy General Manager of the Institute (official letter SGG-2010-0229). Within a framework of reasonableness and logic, AyA, by issuing the act contained in official letter PRE-2009-0694 of August 10, 2009 (appointment until December 31, 2011) and subsequently issuing official letters UE-JBIC-2010-851 and SGG-2010-02293, both of December 22, 2010 (termination of the contract and leaving without effect the referred PRE-2009-0694), disregarded the subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) granted to Mr. Román Matamoros in the first act, which without any doubt is contrary to law. For the reasons stated, the grievance must be rejected.

**V.-** As a **second** challenge, it argues that the judges recognized an indemnity (indemnización) that lacks legal support. Considering that the employment contract with the plaintiff (actor) ceased in an anticipated and unjustified manner, being a fixed-term agreement according to canon 26 of the CT, it states that what corresponds in law is compensation as established by precept 31 of that normative body, that is, one day's salary for each seven days worked.

**VI-** This Chamber has expressed: <i>"In accordance with norm 190 of the LGAP … the Administration is responsible when its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning, causes a damage, which the victim does not have the duty to bear, be it patrimonial or extra-patrimonial, and provided that a causal nexus exists between the functioning and the damage. Said responsibility is framed within an objective regime (régimen objetivo), which seeks reparation by means of indemnity (indemnización) for whoever has experienced an injury attributable to the Public Administration (Administración Pública)"</i>. (Judgment no. 1151 of 9 hours 20 minutes on September 13, 2011). In principle, when an injury has been suffered originating from public conduct, be it active or omissive, which the victim has no obligation to bear, the duty to compensate for the detriment is imposed, by virtue of the postulate of integral reparation established by precept 41 of the Political Constitution. For its part, in the matter of interest, the norm whose lack of application is questioned establishes that: <i>"In fixed-term contracts and for specific work, each of the parties may terminate them, without just cause, before the arrival of the term or the conclusion of the work, paying to the other the concrete damages and prejudices (daños y perjuicios) that they demonstrate (…), in addition, they must pay the worker, at the same moment of terminating the contract, the amount corresponding to one day of salary for every seven days of continuous work executed (…)".</i> As can be seen, such provision regulates the hypothesis of an anticipated cessation of the employment relationship. In the case under study, once the nullity of the administrative acts (actos administrativos) was proven, through which the appointment of the plaintiff (actor) was left without effect in the position of Comptroller (Contralor) of the AyA-JBIC Executing Unit (Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC) until December 31, 2011, the Court deemed it appropriate to grant as indemnity (indemnización) (according to what was claimed in the lawsuit, in protection of the principle of party disposition): the material damage (daño material) caused, consisting of lost wages (salarios caídos) from January 1 to December 31, 2011, school bonus (salario escolar), Christmas bonus (aguinaldo) and vacations corresponding to the amount fixed for the 12 recognized salaries, to be liquidated in execution of the judgment. As well as, subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) (¢3,000,000.00), due to the emotional distress suffered by Mr. Román Matamoros upon finding himself without work from one day to the next, having to face family and personal obligations. It should be highlighted that the awarded amounts were granted as indemnity (indemnización) for the damages and prejudices (daños y perjuicios) suffered due to the dismissal, which in the opinion of this Deciding Body (Órgano Decisor) must be seen as a mechanism through which it seeks to equalize the amounts left unperceived as compensation for the services that, had the employment relationship been maintained, would have had to be paid. It is the recognition of damages and prejudices (daños y perjuicios) that operates as a parameter by way of equivalence of lost wages (salarios caídos) (given that there was no effective rendering of work). While it is true that the judges of the preceding instance did not legally justify the indemnity (indemnización) granted to the plaintiff (actor), what is certain is that canon 31 of the CT, to which the appellant in cassation alludes, provides the duty to pay the damages and prejudices (daños y perjuicios) caused to the worker, when he is removed before the expiration of the term. This being the case, the indemnity (indemnización) ordered by the Court is in accordance with the law, as it is indubitable that the period during which Mr. Román Matamoros did not work (from January 1 to December 31, 2011), was due to the illegitimately terminated contract by the Administration. In such scenario, as indicated, lost wages (salarios caídos) are recognized as damages and prejudices (daños y perjuicios) (as a parameter of equivalence), which are pertinent to the material detriment (detrimento material). This latter point, even though the regulation does not say so expressly, and with the understanding that salaries left unperceived by their very nature (remunerative) refer to a purely material aspect, very different from the detriment that the unjustly dismissed servant could have experienced in his intimate sphere. It must be remembered that material damage (daño material) on one hand and moral detriment (menoscabo moral) on the other tend towards indemnities (indemnizaciones) of very diverse kinds, where what is granted for one in no way covers the other, so nothing hinders the judges from granting both aspects, as occurred in the case at hand. In this respect, one can consult the judgment of this Chamber no. 000002-F-S1-2013 of 9 hours on January 17, 2013. For the stated reasons, the appellant in cassation is not correct in the violations it alleges, and therefore the challenge must be dismissed.

**VII.-** Based on the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the appeal without merit, with its costs charged to the appellant (promovente), in accordance with precept 150, subsection 3) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code.

Provisions 3 and 6 state the following: article 3° <i>“Article 4 of Law No. 4646 of October 20, 1970, is amended to read as follows: "Article 4.- The Boards of Directors of the (…) Servicio Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, (…) shall be composed as follows: 1) Executive President with recognized experience and knowledge in the field of the activities of the corresponding institution, appointed by the Government Council, whose management shall be governed by the following rules: a) They shall be the highest-ranking official for purposes of governance of the institution and it shall fundamentally be their responsibility to ensure that the decisions taken by the Board are executed, as well as to coordinate the action of the entity whose Board they preside over, with that of the other State institutions. Likewise, they shall assume the other functions that by law are reserved to the President of the Board of Directors as well as the others assigned to them by the Board itself; (…)”.</i> Article 6°<i> “The Managers of the institutions shall continue to be the principal administrative officials. (…)”. </i>Likewise, Executive Decree no. 11846-p of September 9, 1980, “<i>Reglamento a la Ley de Presidentes Ejecutivos de las Juntas Directivas del Banco Central de Costa Rica y demás Instituciones Autónomas y Semiautónomas No Bancarias”,</i> must be taken into account, which establishes in mandate 6 the following: “<i>Powers and Duties: The Executive President, for purposes of governance, is the highest-ranking official, of the respective institution. They are the hierarchical superior of the Manager, in the terms in which the General Law of Public Administration establishes it in its articles 101 and 102, on behalf of the Board of Directors. The Executive President is in charge of the following duties: a) Inform the Board of Directors about the actions of the Management regarding the fulfillment of its functions (…); b) Preside over the Board of Directors; convene its ordinary and extraordinary sessions (…); c) Program the general activities required to carry out the policies and achieve the objectives of the institution (…); d) Order the Management to carry out a systematic work of modernizing the entity and rationalizing the use of its resources, in coordination with the Oficina de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica de la Presidencia de la República, and for this purpose shall issue the pertinent directives; e) Submit for the approval of the Board of Directors, any integral organizational and administrative changes; f) Coordinate (…) the negotiations aimed at obtaining technical assistance and financing (...); g) Coordinate with the other autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions and with the Central Government the policies, objectives, plans, and programs of the entity they preside over; h) Direct and supervise the planning unit (…); i) Form part of the Interinstitutional Coordination Council (…); j) Periodically supervise and evaluate the entity's programs (…); k) Grant approval to the annual and extraordinary budget projects that are submitted to the Board of Directors for their approval, as well as monitor their correct execution (…); l) Present in a timely manner to the Oficina de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica, (...) the budget projects and investment programs, as well as the requests for external financing (…); ll) Propose to the Board of Directors, in the exercise of their superior governance functions, the technical and administrative organization of the institution, (…); m) Meet as many times as necessary with the relevant minister or the Government Council (...); n) The other functions that correspond to them as the highest-ranking official of the institution in governance matters, as well as those entrusted to them by the Board of Directors (…) and those imposed on them by mandate of the pertinent laws and regulations”. </i>From the transcribed provisions, several conclusions can be drawn. First, the powers of the General Manager of AyA, established in canon 12 of its Constitutive Law, have not been repealed by any regulatory body, therefore, that official can remove personnel. Second, the Executive President, as the highest authority of the Institution, has been granted broad governance and administration functions, within which the competence to dismiss officials can be inferred. For example, such authority is found within the disciplinary power held by the hierarchical superior, since it practically constitutes the maximum sanction that an official can incur. Furthermore, it is a competence linked to budget formulation, direction, and organization of the entity. Thus, it is understood as contained within the powers given to the Executive President (direction and supervision of the institution's planning unit; granting approval to the annual and extraordinary budget projects and monitoring their correct execution, all with the purpose of ensuring their congruence with the institution's policy; presenting the budget projects and investment programs; proposing the technical and administrative organization of the Institution, etc.).<i> </i>Thus the case stands, this Deciding Body considers that both the Executive President and the General Manager, or in their absence the Deputy General Manager (a point on which the appellant is correct), are competent to remove personnel at AyA. Despite this, this issue of competence is useless for the purpose of varying the ruling of the appealed judgment, since as indicated in the preceding recital, it does not constitute the only reason for which the Court annulled the official letters UE-JBIC-2010-851 and SGG-2010-02293. For the judges, the removal of the plaintiff was adopted without previously carrying out an administrative procedure, through which the harmful nature of that declaratory act of rights could be determined. In relation to this, this Chamber considers, based on the principle of intangibility of one's own acts that emanates from article 34 of the Magna Carta, that the Administration is prohibited from annulling or acting against, by itself, acts issued by it that declare individual rights in favor of the administered party. The exceptions are the cases of revocation and ex officio declaration of absolute, evident, and manifest nullity, contemplated in the LGAP. Along these lines, one can consult, among others, the judgments of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice numbers 2006-013447 of 10 hours 6 minutes on September 8, 2006, and 2010-016314 of 15 hours 16 minutes on September 29, 2010. This principle stands, then, as a guarantor of the administered parties before the Administration, which cannot disregard through a subsequent act the individual rights that it has granted or recognized. By virtue of the foregoing, the power of the former to declare nullity on its own has been configured taking into account two different hypotheses: the ablative act and the declaratory act of rights in favor of the administered party. In the first, fully compatible with the principle mentioned, the Administration has the possibility of reviewing ex officio and declaring the nullity of the act that caused it a disadvantage or burden, because the result will be beneficial for the legal sphere of the administered party. From another angle, when individual rights granted in the act are involved, for its nullity to be declared in the administrative process, it must be absolute, evident, and manifest. If the defect does not meet such characteristics, the Administration cannot decree its nullity ex officio, and must, for the act to be suppressed due to its invalidity, resort to the lesivity proceeding, legally established as a concretion of article 49 of the Political Constitution, which, in turn, establishes the contentious-administrative jurisdiction as guarantor of the individual rights and legitimate interests of the administered parties. In this regard, one can consult the resolution of this Chamber no. 000094-F-S-2011 of 9 hours 10 minutes on February 3, 2011. Based on the foregoing, aside from the discussion regarding the competent official to remove personnel in the defendant Institute, be it the Executive President, the General Manager, or both jointly, it is not possible to ignore that in the specific case AyA issued a declaratory administrative act of rights in favor of Mr. Román Matamoros (official letter PRE-2009-0694), by appointing him to the position of Comptroller of the Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC until December 31, 2011. An act that, by declaring the plaintiff's right to hold said position until the indicated date, could not be rendered without effect abruptly. The Administration, as the Court ordered, had to resort to the mechanisms provided by the legal system for that purpose (annulment in administrative proceedings when it is evident and manifest, article 173 of the LGAP, or in jurisdictional proceedings through a lesivity proceeding, canon 183 of the cited legal body, in cases of absolute nullity that is not evident and not manifest, or relative nullity). An assumption not demonstrated in the specific case. In any case, for the sake of further reasoning, consider that in the case under study, no administrative procedure was carried out that allowed the plaintiff to exercise the right of defense and know the reasons for which the decision to remove him from his position was made. Only in the official letter UE-JBIC-2010-851 did the Manager of the Unit in which he worked inform him: <i>“I hereby inform you that your employment contract ends on December 31 of the current year. The corresponding labor amounts, in accordance with labor legislation, will be processed in the Human Resources Department. I want to thank you for the collaboration provided during the time you worked with the Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC”. </i>A determination endorsed in equal terms by the Deputy General Manager of the Institute (official letter SGG-2010-0229). Within a framework of reasonableness and logic, AyA, by issuing the act contained in official letter PRE-2009-0694 of August 10, 2009 (appointment until December 31, 2011) and subsequently issuing official letters UE-JBIC-2010-851 and SGG-2010-02293, both of December 22, 2010 (termination of the contract and rendering without effect the referred PRE-2009-0694), disregarded the individual rights granted to Mr. Román Matamoros in the first act, which without a doubt is contrary to law. For the reasons stated, the grievance must be rejected.

**V.-** As a **second** censure, it argues that the judges recognized an indemnity that lacks legal basis. If it is considered that the employment contract with the plaintiff ceased in an early and unjustified manner, being an agreement for a defined term according to canon 26 of the CT, it states, what legally corresponds is a compensation as established by precept 31 of that regulatory body, that is, one day of salary for each seven worked.

**VI.-** This Chamber has stated: <i>“In accordance with rule 190 of the LGAP … the Administration is liable when its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate operation causes damage, which the victim has no duty to bear, whether material or non-material, and provided that between the operation and the damage there is a causal link. Such liability is framed within an objective regime, which seeks compensatory reparation for the person who has (Judgment no. 1151 of 9 hours 20 minutes on September 13, 2011). In principle, when an injury has been suffered originating from public conduct, whether active or omissive, that the victim has no obligation to bear, the duty to compensate for the harm is imposed, by virtue of the postulate of integral reparation that establishes precept 41 of the Political Constitution. For its part, regarding the matter of interest, the rule whose lack of application is questioned establishes that: <i>“In fixed-term contracts and contracts for specific work, each of the parties may terminate them, without just cause, before the arrival of the term or the conclusion of the work, paying to the other the specific damages and losses that they prove (…); in addition, they must pay the worker, at the same moment of terminating the contract, the amount corresponding to one day of salary for each seven days of continuous work performed (…)”. </i>As can be seen, such provision regulates the hypothesis of an early cessation of the employment relationship. In the case under study, the nullity of the administrative acts through which the plaintiff's appointment, in the position of Comptroller of the Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC until December 31, 2011, was rendered without effect being proven, the Court deemed it appropriate to indemnify (in accordance with what was claimed in the lawsuit, to safeguard the party-presentation principle): the material damage caused, consisting of lost wages from January 1 to December 31, 2011, school bonus, Christmas bonus, and vacations corresponding to the amount established for the 12 recognized salaries, to be liquidated in execution of judgment. As well as, the subjective moral damage (¢3,000,000.00), as a result of the emotional affectation that Mr. Román Matamoros suffered when finding himself out of work from one day to the next, having to face family and personal obligations. It should be highlighted that the granted amounts were by way of indemnity for the damages and losses endured due to the dismissal, which in the opinion of this Deciding Body should be seen as a mechanism through which one seeks to equate the amounts not received as consideration for the services that, had the employment relationship been maintained, would have had to be paid. It is about the recognition of damages and losses that operates as a parameter by way of equivalence of the lost wages (given that there was no effective provision of work). Although it is true that the judges of the preceding instance did not legally base the indemnity granted to the plaintiff, what is true is that canon 31 of the CT, to which the appellant for cassation alludes, provides the duty to pay the damages and losses caused to the worker, when they are removed before the expiration of the term. Thus, the case stands, the indemnity ordered by the Court is in accordance with law, since it is undoubtable that the period during which Mr. Román Matamoros did not work (from January 1 to December 31, 2011), was due to the fact that the Administration illegitimately terminated the contract. Under that premise, as indicated, lost wages are recognized by way of damages and losses (as a parameter of equivalence), which are pertinent to material detriment. This last point, despite the regulation not saying so expressly, and with the understanding that the wages not received by their very nature (retributive), refer to a purely material aspect, very different from the detriment that the unjustly dismissed servant could have experienced in their intimate sphere. It must be remembered that material damage on the one hand and moral impairment on the other lead to indemnities of a very diverse nature, where what is granted for one in no way covers the other, such that nothing prevents the judges from granting both aspects, as occurred in the specific case. In this regard, one can consult the judgment of this Chamber no. 000002-F-S1-2013 of 9 hours on January 17, 2013. For the reasons stated, the appellant for cassation is not correct in the violations they accuse; consequently, the censure must be dismissed.

**VII.-** By virtue of the foregoing, it is proper to declare the appeal without merit, with its costs borne by the promoter, in accordance with precept 150 subsection 3) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.”

“IV.- Analizados los argumentos del casacionista y de los jueces de la instancia precedente, cabe examinar lo que el ordenamiento jurídico, en su redacción vigente cuando se formuló esta lite, establece en torno al funcionario competente para destituir personal en el AyA. En primer término, se tiene naturalmente, la Ley de Creación del Instituto, no. 2726 del 14 de abril de 1961 y sus reformas, la cual, en el artículo 12 inciso b) dispone en lo que interesa: “El Gerente será responsable ante la Junta Directiva del eficiente y correcto funcionamiento administrativo del Instituto y tendrá las siguientes atribuciones: (…) b) Acordar la creación de nuevas plazas y designar el personal y su remoción, el cual se regirá por un escalafón, que deberá ser aprobado por la Junta Directiva; (…)”. Tómese en consideración también que la Ley 4646 de 1970, varió la integración de las juntas directivas en las instituciones autónomas al establecer que, el Servicio Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillado (ahora AyA) estaría integrado, entre otros, por un Ministro de Gobierno designado por el Consejo de Gobierno (canon 4). Lo que a su vez fue reformado por la Ley 5507 del 19 de abril de 1974, denominada “Reforma Juntas Directivas de Instituciones Autónomas Creando Presidencias Ejecutivas”. Cuerpo normativo que modificó la materia relacionada con la designación y conformación de las jerarquías superiores en las instituciones autónomas, al incorporar la figura del Presidente Ejecutivo. Señalan los preceptos 3° y 6° lo siguiente: artículo 3° “Refórmase el artículo 4º de la ley Nº 4646 de 20 de octubre de 1970, para que se lea así: "Artículo 4º.- Las Juntas Directivas del (…) Servicio Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, (…) estarán integradas de la siguiente manera: 1) Presidente Ejecutivo de reconocida experiencia y conocimientos en el campo de las actividades de la correspondiente institución, designado por el Consejo de Gobierno cuya gestión se regirá por las siguientes normas: a) Será el funcionario de mayor jerarquía para efectos de gobierno de la institución y le corresponderá fundamentalmente velar porque las decisiones tomadas por la Junta se ejecuten, así como coordinar la acción de la entidad cuya Junta preside, con la de las demás instituciones del Estado. Asimismo, asumirá las demás funciones que por ley le están reservadas al Presidente de la Junta Directiva así como las otras que le asigne la propia Junta;(…)”. Artículo 6° “Los Gerentes de las instituciones continuarán siendo los principales funcionarios administrativos. (…)". Asimismo, hay que tomar en cuenta el Decreto Ejecutivo no. 11846-p del 9 de setiembre de 1980, “Reglamento a la Ley de Presidentes Ejecutivos de las Juntas Directivas del Banco Central de Costa Rica y demás Instituciones Autónomas y Semiautónomas No Bancarias”, el que establece en el mandato 6° lo siguiente: “Atribuciones y Cometidos: El Presidente Ejecutivo, para efectos de gobierno, es el funcionario de mayor jerarquía, de la respectiva institución. Es el superior jerárquico del Gerente, en los términos en que la Ley General de la Administración Pública, lo establece en sus artículos 101 y 102, en nombre de la Junta Directiva. El Presidente Ejecutivo tiene a su cargo los siguientes cometidos: a) Informar a la Junta Directiva sobre las actuaciones de la Gerencia en cuanto al cumplimiento de sus funciones (…); b) Presidir la Junta Directiva; convocar sus sesiones ordinarias y extraordinarias (…); c) Programar las actividades generales que se requieran para realizar las políticas y alcanzar los objetivos de la institución (…); d) Ordenar a la Gerencia una labor sistemática de modernización de la entidad y racionalización del uso de sus recursos, en coordinación con la Oficina de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica de la Presidencia de la República, al efecto dictará las directrices pertinentes; e) Someter a la aprobación de la Junta Directiva, cualesquiera cambios integrales de organización y administración; f) Coordinar (…) las negociaciones tendientes a obtener asistencia técnica y financiamiento (...); g) Coordinar con las demás instituciones autónomas y semiautónomas y con el Gobierno Central las políticas, objetivos, planes y programas de la entidad que preside; h) Dirigir y supervisar la unidad de planificación (…); i) Formar parte del Consejo de Coordinación Interinstitucional (…); j) Supervisar y evaluar periódicamente los programas de la entidad(…); k) Otorgar el visto bueno a los proyectos de presupuesto anual y extraordinarios que se eleven a la Junta Directiva para su aprobación, así como vigilar su correcta ejecución (…); l) Presentar oportunamente a la Oficina de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica, (...), los proyectos de presupuesto y programas de inversión, así como las solicitudes de financiamiento externo (…); ll) Proponer a la Junta directiva, en ejercicio de sus funciones superiores de gobierno, la organización técnica y administrativa de la institución, (…); m) Reunirse las veces que sean necesarias con el ministro del ramo o el Consejo de Gobierno (...); n) Las demás que le correspondan como funcionario de mayor jerarquía de la institución en materia de gobierno, así como las que le encomiende la Junta Directiva (…) y las que le sean impuestas por mandato de las leyes y reglamentos pertinentes". De las disposiciones transcritas se pueden extraer varias conclusiones. Primero, las atribuciones del Gerente General del AyA, establecidas en el canon 12 de su Ley Constitutiva, no han sido derogadas por ningún cuerpo normativo, por lo tanto, ese funcionario puede remover personal. Segundo, al Presidente Ejecutivo, como máximo jerarca de la Institución, se le han otorgado amplias funciones de gobierno y administración, dentro de las cuales es dable inferir la competencia para destituir funcionarios. Así por ejemplo, tal autoridad se encuentra incluida dentro de la potestad disciplinaria que ostenta el superior jerárquico, pues, prácticamente constituye la máxima sanción a que se puede hacer acreedor un funcionario. Además, se trata de una competencia ligada a la formulación presupuestaria, dirección y ordenación del ente. De manera que, se entiende contenida dentro de las atribuciones dadas al Presidente Ejecutivo (dirección y supervisión de la unidad de planificación de la institución; dar el visto bueno a los proyectos de presupuesto anual y extraordinarios y vigilar su correcta ejecución, todo con el fin de asegurar su congruencia con la política de la institución; presentar los proyectos de presupuesto y programas de inversión; proponer la organización técnica y administrativa de la Institución, etc.). Así las cosas, estima este Órgano Decisor que tanto el Presidente Ejecutivo como el Gerente General o en su ausencia el Subgerente General (aspecto en el cual lleva razón el recurrente), son competentes para remover el personal en el AyA. Pese a ello, este tema de la competencia, resulta inútil a efectos de variar el dispositivo de la sentencia impugnada, pues como se indicó en el considerando anterior, no constituye la única razón por la cual el Tribunal anuló los oficios UE-JBIC-2010-851 y SGG-2010-02293. Para los juzgadores, la remoción del actor se adoptó sin que previamente se llevara a cabo un procedimiento administrativo, mediante el cual se determinara la lesividad de ese acto declarativo de derechos. En relación, estima esta Cámara, por el principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios que emana del artículo 34 de la Carta Magna, la Administración tiene vedado anular o dirigirse por sí misma, contra los actos por ella emitidos, que declaren derechos subjetivos a favor del administrado. La salvedad la constituyen los supuestos de revocación y declaratoria oficiosa de nulidad absoluta, evidente y manifiesta, contempladas en la LGAP. En esta línea pueden consultarse, entre otras, las sentencias de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia números 2006-013447 de las 10 horas 6 minutos del 8 de setiembre de 2006 y 2010-016314 de las 15 horas 16 minutos del 29 de setiembre de 2010. Este principio se erige entonces, como garante de los administrados frente a la Administración, quien no podrá desconocer mediante un acto posterior, los derechos subjetivos que les ha otorgado o reconocido. En virtud de lo anterior, la potestad de aquélla para declarar por sí la nulidad, se ha configurado atendiendo a dos hipótesis distintas: el acto ablativo y el declarativo de derechos a favor del administrado. En el primero, plenamente compatible con el principio mencionado, la Administración tiene la posibilidad de revisar de oficio y declarar la nulidad del acto que le causaba una situación de desventaja o gravamen, en razón de que el resultado será beneficioso para la esfera jurídica del administrado. Desde otro ángulo, cuando de por medio existen derechos subjetivos otorgados en el acto, para ser declarada su nulidad en la vía administrativa, ésta ha de ser absoluta, evidente y manifiesta. Si el vicio no reviste tales características, la Administración no podrá de oficio decretar su nulidad, y deberá, para que se suprima el acto con motivo de su invalidez, acudir al proceso de lesividad, establecido legalmente como concreción del artículo 49 de la Constitución Política, que a su vez, estatuye a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa, garante de los derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos de los administrados. Al respecto puede consultarse la resolución de esta Sala no. 000094-F-S-2011 de las 9 horas 10 minutos del 3 de febrero de 2011. Con fundamento en lo anterior, al margen de la discusión en torno al funcionario competente para remover el personal en el Instituto demandado, llámese Presidente Ejecutivo, Gerente General o ambos de manera conjunta, no se puede obviar que en la especie el AyA emitió un acto administrativo declarativo de derechos a favor del señor Román Matamoros (oficio PRE-2009-0694), al nombrarlo en el cargo de Contralor de la Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2011. Acto que, al declarar el derecho del actor a desempeñar dicho puesto hasta la fecha indicada, no se podía dejar sin efecto de manera intempestiva. La Administración, tal y como dispuso el Tribunal, debía acudir a los mecanismos que prevé el ordenamiento jurídico para ese fin (anulación en sede administrativa cuando ésta sea evidente y manifiesta, artículo 173 de la LGAP o en sede jurisdiccional por un proceso de lesividad, canon 183 del cuerpo legal citado, en los presupuestos de nulidad absoluta no evidente y no manifiesta o nulidad relativa). Supuesto no acreditado en la especie. En todo caso, a mayor abundamiento de razones, considérese que en el caso en estudio no se llevó a cabo ningún procedimiento administrativo que permitiera al actor ejercer el derecho de defensa y conocer las razones por las cuales se tomó la decisión de ser removido de su cargo. Únicamente en el oficio UE-JBIC-2010-851 el Gerente de la Unidad en la cual laboraba le comunicó: “Me permito indicarle que su contrato laboral finaliza el próximo 31 de diciembre del año en curso. Los extremos laborales correspondientes, de acuerdo a la legislación laboral, se tramitarán en la Dirección de Recursos Humanos. Quiero agradecerle las gracias por la colaboración brindada durante el tiempo que laboró con la Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC”. Determinación avalada en iguales términos por el Subgerente General del Instituto (oficio SGG-2010-0229). Dentro de un marco de razonabilidad y lógica, el AyA al emitir el acto contenido en el oficio PRE-2009-0694 del 10 de agosto de 2009 (nombramiento hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2011) y con posterioridad emanar los oficios UE-JBIC-2010-851 y SGG-2010-02293, ambos del 22 de diciembre de 2010 (terminación del contrato y dejar sin efecto el referido PRE-2009-0694), desconoció los derechos subjetivos concedidos al señor Román Matamoros en el primer acto, lo que sin duda alguna resulta contrario a derecho. Por lo motivos expuestos, el agravio deberá ser rechazado.

V.- Como segunda censura, esgrime que los juzgadores reconocieron una indemnización que no cuenta con sustento jurídico. De considerarse que el contrato laboral con el actor cesó de manera anticipada e injustificada, al ser un convenio por tiempo definido según el canon 26 del CT, expresa, lo que en derecho corresponde es un resarcimiento conforme lo establece el precepto 31 de ese cuerpo normativo, es decir, un día de salario por cada siete laborados.

VI- Esta Cámara ha es responsable cuando su funcionamiento normal o anormal, legítimo o ilegítimo, cause un daño, el cual la víctima no tenga el deber de soportar, sea este patrimonial o extrapatrimonial, y siempre que entre el funcionamiento y el daño exista un nexo causal. La responsabilidad dicha, se enmarca, dentro de un régimen objetivo, que procura la reparación indemnizatoria a quien ha (Sentencia no. 1151 de las 9 horas 20 minutos del 13 de setiembre de 2011). En tesis de principio, cuando se haya sufrido una lesión originada en una conducta pública, sea esta activa u omisiva, que la víctima no tenga la obligación de soportar, se impone el deber de resarcir el menoscabo, en virtud del postulado de reparación integral que establece el precepto 41 de la Constitución Política. Por su parte, en lo de interés, la norma cuya falta de aplicación se cuestiona establece que: “En los contratos a tiempo fijo y para obra determinada, cada una de las partes puede ponerles término, sin justa causa, antes del advenimiento del plazo o de la conclusión de la obra, pagando a la otra los daños y perjuicios concretos que demuestre (…),además deberá pagar al trabajador, en el mismo momento de dar por concluido el contrato, el importe correspondiente a un día de salario por cada siete días de trabajo continuo ejecutado (…)”. Según se aprecia, tal disposición regula la hipótesis de un cese anticipado de la relación laboral. En el caso de estudio, acreditada la nulidad de los actos administrativos por medio de los cuales se dejó sin efecto el nombramiento del actor, en el cargo de Contralor de la Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2011, el Tribunal estimó procedente indemnizar (a tenor de lo reclamado en la demanda, por resguardo al principio dispositivo): el daño material ocasionado, consistente en los salarios caídos del 1° de enero al 31 de diciembre de 2011, salario escolar, aguinaldo y vacaciones correspondientes al monto que se fije por los 12 salarios reconocidos, a liquidar en ejecución de sentencia. Así como, el daño moral subjetivo (¢3.000.000,00), a raíz de la afectación anímica que sufrió el señor Román Matamoros al verse sin trabajo de un día para otro, debiendo afrontar obligaciones familiares y personales. Cabe resaltar, los extremos otorgados lo fueron a título de indemnización por los daños y perjuicios soportados en razón del despido, lo que en criterio de este Órgano Decisor debe verse como un mecanismo mediante el cual se busca equiparar los montos dejados de percibir como contraprestación de los servicios que, de haberse mantenido la relación laboral, se hubieran tenido que cancelar. Se trata del reconocimiento de daños y perjuicios que opera como un parámetro a modo de equivalencia de los salarios caídos (dado que no hubo prestación efectiva del trabajo). Si bien es cierto, los jueces de la instancia precedente no fundamentaron jurídicamente la indemnización concedida al actor, lo cierto es que el canon 31 del CT, al que alude el casacionista, dispone el deber de pagar los daños y perjuicios ocasionados al trabajador, cuando es removido antes del vencimiento del plazo. Así las cosas, la indemnización dispuesta por el Tribunal resulta conforme a derecho, pues es indudable que el período durante el cual el señor Román Matamoros no laboró (del 1° de enero al 31 de diciembre de 2011), lo fue en razón de que la Administración dio por finalizado el contrato ilegítimamente. En dicho presupuesto, como se indicó, se reconocen los salarios caídos a título de daños y perjuicios (como parámetro de equivalencia), los que resultan atinentes al detrimento material. Esto último, pese a que la regulación no lo diga de modo expreso, y en la inteligencia de que los salarios dejados de percibir por su propia naturaleza (retributiva), refieren a un extremo netamente material, muy distinto al detrimento que el servidor despedido injustamente pudo experimentar en su esfera íntima. Ha de recordarse, el daño material por su parte y el menoscabo moral por la otra propenden a indemnizaciones de muy diversa índole, donde lo concedido por una no cubre de modo alguno la otra, de manera que nada obsta, para que los juzgadores concedieran ambos extremos, como ocurrió en la especie. Al respecto puede consultarse la sentencia de esta Sala no. 000002-F-S1-2013 de las 9 horas del 17 de enero de 2013. Por los motivos expuestos, no lleva razón el casacionista en las violaciones que acusa, de manera que, la censura deberá ser desestimada.

VII.- En mérito de lo promovente, conforme al precepto 150 inciso 3) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.”