Nullity of disciplinary sanction against CCSS worker for academic activities during post-partum sick leaveNulidad de sanción disciplinaria a trabajadora de la CCSS por actividades académicas durante incapacidad post parto

**Fourth: Regarding the basis of disciplinary power.** That the sanctioning disciplinary power has always been linked and substantially justified by the principle of hierarchy; the discipline that the superior has the obligation to maintain over his subordinates has always had this instrument (Cf. Ramón PARADA, Derecho del Empleo Público, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2007, pages 215 to 235). The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in ruling # 5594-94 of 3:48 p.m. on September 27, 1994, stated:

“II. THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME. Administrative or disciplinary liability is that which arises from the violation of an administrative obligation or a duty imposed on an official or employee, which is made effective when the subject commits a fault in service or behavior, violating the rules of public service. The violation of administrative duties has its characteristic penalty in the administrative liability of the official, which is made effective through the procedure aimed at enforcing the due obligation, or through the administrative sanction imposed. Therefore, the concept of disciplinary sanction necessarily refers to the official or employee, or rather, to the rights of the official. This regime is a type of the State's 'sanctioning' power, from which it originates, a power that is inherent and typical of the Public Administration, translating into the authority for, at least, a 'minimum' of power so that it applies disciplinary sanctions to its officials or employees when they fail in their duties. Nevertheless, disciplinary power is not exclusive to the public law regime. For example, it occurs in the family, where parents exercise this power, not only for the correction of children but also for the preservation of the moral unity of the family, and one is reprimanded not for what has been done, but so it is not done again; in the private labor field—industrial and commercial—the employer exercises it in defense of regularity in the work sphere; in professional associations, etc. It can be concluded that in reality, the purpose of disciplinary liability is to ensure compliance with the rules of subordination and, in general, the exact fulfillment of all the duties of the office. Thus, disciplinary law presupposes a relationship of subordination between the body subject to discipline and the body that establishes or applies it, not so much to punish, but to correct, and even educate the violator of the rule, hence the corrective nature of disciplinary sanctions. …”.

Later, in ruling #1265-95 of 3:36 p.m. on March 7, 1995, recital (Considerando) III, in fine, cited in ruling #2005-02995 of 2:41 p.m. on March 16, recital V, the Chamber indicated:

“… In contrast, the disciplinary power of the public sector is created by virtue of a bilateral act, but in its development, the activity of the public official remains exclusively subject to the will of the Public Administration, from the creation to the extinction of the relationship, such that the public servant finds himself in a status of special dependence with respect to the State. The individual voluntarily accepts the designation, but places himself in a sphere of subjection with respect to the Administration, regulated by Objective Law, where the situation of legal inequality of the parties in the public employment relationship is unquestionable; the Public Administration assumes, consequently, a superiority or preeminence that translates into hierarchical power, whose correlative is disciplinary power. This power, by its very purpose, stops at the circle of the functional duties of the agent, and therefore, disciplinary sanctions cannot, legally, be imposed on him except during the existence of the employment relationship, that is, while the status of dependence persists. So, disciplinary power and its sanctions are always conditioned upon the legal exercise of the public employment or function, for which, without the existence of the vinculum iuris between the Administration and the agent, disciplinary sanctions are inapplicable.”.

**Fifth: On the alleged statute of limitations.** That, regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) alleged in the complaint, it is appropriate to address its examination ab initio, because if it prevails, it would be useless to deal with the other substantive issues raised.

1.- This Tribunal has established in its case law that the Administration's power to sanction or discipline the faults of its servants can be enervated for temporal reasons, whether these occur before, during, or after the initiation of the administrative proceeding (Cf. Ruling # 28-2012 of 9:48 a.m. on February 17, 2012, recital III, file folder #11-003789-1027-CA, and ruling # 25-2014-VI of 11:00 a.m. on February 17, 2014, file folder #13-002772-1027-CA). In the ruling first cited, it was expressed:

“Third: That since the initial complaint, the plaintiff has been alleging a violation of the one-month period provided in Article 603 of the Labor Code (CT) for the exercise of the sanctioning disciplinary power by the employer against his subordinate. As is well understood, in disciplinary matters in general, there are at least three identifiable periods in the actions of the Administration; an initial period to open the investigation from the moment the fact or fault becomes known; another to prepare, substantiate, or process the respective proceeding, and another to impose the sanction and its execution (Cf. Constitutional Chamber, ruling 2006-13926 of 2:44 p.m. on September 20, 2006, recital VII, and Chamber II of the Supreme Court of Justice, ruling #2004-00671 of 9:20 a.m. on August 18). That Article 603, insofar as it provides: “The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults shall prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from the moment a cause for separation arose or, as the case may be, from the moment the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known.”, indeed blocks the late initiation of actions aimed at sanctioning or punishing faults, whether active or omissive. The brevity or fugacity of the period is due to the need to give continuity to the employer-employee relationship; it is inspired by reasons of public order linked to the reinforced protection that the fundamental rights involved constitutionally receive (Title V, Social Rights and Guarantees, single chapter, Articles 50 to 74), and that at the legal level, ordinary legislation develops through the protective principle underlying Article 17 of the Labor Code, which obliges interpreting and applying the norms in the most favorable sense to the worker (Cf. Constitutional Chamber, ruling #5969-93 of 3:21 p.m. on November 16, 1993, recital I). Thus, those known faults that are not timely pursued must be considered forgiven. That is, if the sanctioning disciplinary power is not exercised within the legally established period, it is extinguished, perimates, or terminates. And if it were exercised timely, it is interrupted with a continued effect during the processing, preparation, or substantiation of the proceeding, and is reborn from the moment the person who must decide or resolve is in objective conditions to exercise the decision-making power (doctrine of Articles 51 of the Autonomous Service Regulation of INA of January 28, 1982 and its amendments, in relation to numerals 211 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, 164 of the Notarial Code, and 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic; ruling #2006-013926 supra cited).”.

2.- The preliminary investigation is a power that the Administration has for the purpose of determining the degree of probability of the existence of a fault, or to identify the person presumably responsible, or to gather the evidentiary elements that allow for an adequate, suitable notice of charges (intimación) (Cf. Constitutional Chamber, ruling #8841-01 of 9:03 a.m. on August 31, 2001). Among the purposes of that preliminary phase is to determine if there is merit to initiate a useful administrative proceeding or not to initiate it (Cf. Constitutional Chamber, ruling #9125-03 of 9:21 a.m. on August 29, 2003), which is naturally based on principles of economy, efficiency, and administrative rationality. This investigation is especially significant when in the presence of anonymous complaints that harbor elements worthy of consideration.

3.- In our legal system, the preliminary investigation appears regulated in some legal provisions, which account for its characteristic features, scopes, and consequences. The Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, #7428 of September 7, 1994, indicates that it “may order administrative summary proceedings or conduct special investigations ex officio, at the request of a taxpayer or any interested party. … it must also order summary proceedings or conduct special investigations when requested by the parliamentary bodies of the Legislative Assembly or when jointly requested by at least five deputies” (Article 22). The General Law of Internal Control, #8292 of July 31, 2002, establishes among the duties of the audit office:

“e) Not to reveal to third parties who are not directly related to the matters addressed in its reports, information about audits or special audit studies being conducted or information about that which determines possible civil, administrative, or potentially criminal liability of officials of the entities and bodies subject to this Law.” (Article 32).

Regarding internal audit reports, it is expressed:

“Article 35.— Matters subject to internal audit reports. Internal audit reports shall deal with various matters within its competence, as well as matters from which possible liabilities may derive for officials, former officials of the institution, and third parties. When recommendations on liability matters and other matters derive from a study, the internal audit office must communicate them in independent reports for each matter.

The findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the studies conducted by the internal audit office must be officially communicated, through reports to the head of the entity or the subordinate heads of the active administration, with competence and authority to order the implementation of the respective recommendations.

The official communication of the results of an audit report shall be governed by the guidelines issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic.”.

4.- Obviously, among those conclusions and recommendations of the internal audit reports, the opening of administrative proceedings can appear, which would be in a position to be implemented when the report, with its findings, is received and made known by the body or official called upon to put them into practice. Even those internal control rules deem it a serious fault for the official competent to initiate the sanctioning proceeding, not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the liability of the violator to prescribe, without justified cause (Article 43, paragraph 2°, ibidem), which ratifies the moment from which one is obliged to act.

5.- According to the foregoing, it is possible to affirm that it is upon review of the respective report when the body called to open the investigation is in objective conditions to adopt a decision, with seriousness and responsibility. For this reason, the Tribunal has established that the initial statute of limitations period, when a preliminary investigation is involved, shall be from the moment the respective report is delivered to the referred body, which is when it has knowledge of the facts and is compelled to act (Cf. aforementioned ruling # 25-2014-VI, recital IX).

6.- The plaintiff bases the request for a declaration of statute of limitations on the fact that the Administration had knowledge of the attributed fact before October 20, 2009. However, the evidentiary elements gathered in these proceedings indicate that the triggering event for the preliminary investigation was the anonymous complaint received, with no specified date, according to which the plaintiff here was pursuing university studies while on sick leave (incapacitada); that is, the rumor reached the employer authorities that Salas Fernández was studying at the same time she was on sick leave, as declared in the administrative venue by the witness Pacheco Blanco (folios 97 to 99 of the administrative file). More specifically: an official of the CCSS asked the Medical Director, Dr. Hernández, for time to study, to which the latter explained the limitations that existed for such purposes; however, “the colleague mentioned that other officials took sick leave to study, and it is as a result of this that the colleague's name came up” (declaration of Mena Chavarría, folios 104 to 106 ibidem). The first agreement adopted by the Medical Directorate is dated October 20, 2009, by means of which it requested information from the Santa Paula University, regarding the schedule, major, courses enrolled by the defendant, which was provided according to official communication received on the following November 20; based on that information and the sick leave documents, it was requested to open the preliminary investigation to determine possible sick leaves used for purposes other than the ordered medical criteria and rest. The respective report was presented on January 26, 2010.

7.- In a case like this, where the initial act is an anonymous complaint, the conduct of the preliminary investigation was both timely and necessary; the information at hand was scarce, and the reported act was of a seriousness capable of activating the disciplinary regime; what existed was a rumor, pure noise. Thus, it was necessary to investigate documents and in the field, to determine the degree of verisimilitude thereof, before opening the proceeding; it was necessary to have greater and better evidentiary elements to sustain the notice of charges. And it is upon review of the preliminary report or study that the body called to implement the investigation could determine the advisability of initiating the administrative disciplinary proceeding.

8.- Since the period of one month provided in Article 603 of the Labor Code did not elapse between the moment the competent body learned of the facts, that is, from the moment it received the preliminary investigation report, and the opening of the proceeding, the Tribunal rejects the alleged peremption of the disciplinary power ab initio of the investigation.

**Sixth: On the reason and content of the challenged act.** That as has been accepted as true in these proceedings, the plaintiff was on sick leave, initially for maternity, and later for illness; the total period comprises from March 24 to October 12, 2009. While enjoying that leave, the CCSS authorities became aware of an apparent improper use of the sick leave, by dedicating herself to university studies. The preliminary investigation revealed some important findings: i) that the plaintiff was enrolled at the Santa Paula University since the year 2001, in the Physical Therapy program; ii) that the plaintiff was enrolled during the III quarter of 2009, period August – December, at the same time she was on sick leave; iii) that the plaintiff attended without problems the therapy internship at the Puriscal Nursing Home, during the last quarter of 2009, in a schedule from eight in the morning to twelve-thirty in the afternoon, while on sick leave. From which it concluded that it was “necessary to conduct a due process and the respective sanction against Mrs. Cindy Salas Fernández because it is considered that she incurred a significant fault by conducting studies during work hours while she was on sick leave …”. The Tribunal considers that the CCSS did have a legitimate reason to initiate said administrative disciplinary proceeding, in the interest of finding out the real truth. Now then, given that the plaintiff jointly and severally sues both the employer entity and the official responsible for adopting the final act in the first instance, it is appropriate to examine that liability separately.

**Seventh: On the personal liability attributed to HERNANDEZ CHAVARRIA.** That certainly, by express provision of the LGAP, the public servant who has acted with willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the performance of his duties or on the occasion thereof, even if he has only used the means and opportunities offered by the position, is personally liable before third parties (Article 199.1); in that event, the Administration is jointly and severally liable for the damages he causes, under the conditions provided (Article 200 ibidem). But in this case, there is a particularity that, in our understanding, excludes the liability attributed, which was noted by the co-defendant in his defense arguments. The issue consists in that the final act issued by Hernández Chavarría was challenged by the defendant, the plaintiff here, via remedies of reconsideration (revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación subsidiaria); the Regional Directorate of Health Services, Central South, when hearing the case on appeal, confirmed what was resolved. Facing a hierarchical administrative legality control, via appeal remedy, that is, in exercise of the right to a double instance in the administrative venue (Articles 345.1 and 350.1 LGAP), it is appropriate to apply supplementary (Article 229 LGAP), by parity of reason, the rule provided in Article 89 of the Civil Procedure Code [CPC], according to which, in matters of civil liability, “confirmation by the superior relieves of liability the judge who issued the judgment or order that is the subject of the liability claim.”. If the hierarchical superior considers that the challenged ablative act conforms to law and, therefore, instead of annulling, revoking, or modifying it, according to the appellant's claim, leans towards confirming it, dismissing the grievances deduced, he assumes the consequences of that legal control, and relieves the inferior of liability (doctrine of Articles 102, letter d], 162, and 180 LGAP, the latter understood in the opposite sense). It is not possible to hold liable an official who is not the author of the definitive act challenged in the jurisdictional venue (Articles 49 of the Constitution, and 36, letter c], CPCA). Hence, for this purely technical-procedural reason, the complaint must be denied insofar as it is directed against Hernández Chavarría, without it being necessary to analyze other issues raised, as it is unnecessary.

**Eighth: On the liability attributed to the CCSS.** That the facts that gave rise to the opening of the administrative disciplinary proceeding can be classified as mere verification; it was sufficient to contrast the data contained in some forms (sick leave notice) with the University records, to determine the behavior of the defendant worker. But the classification or legal assessment of those same facts is a matter of another nature. In the initial resolution of notification of charges, those facts were conceived as potentially constituting the following labor faults: i) disloyalty to the employer, and ii) committing acts contrary to the probity and ethics of public officials and moral prejudice to the CCSS. It was specified that: “both charges seen in her action of carrying out personal and private activities during periods of sick leave, granted for rest and relief from the illness and ailments she presented at the time of their issuance, according to the mentioned facts, thereby causing potential moral prejudice to the institutional image and lacking in probity and ethics in her condition as a public official”. Therefore, the most important purpose of the administrative proceeding undertaken was the verification of the real truth of such facts, insofar as they served and would serve as the reason for the final act (Article 214.2 LGAP). This jurisdiction operates as a negative Administration, whose intervention depends on whether the existence of a legal infraction is truly appreciated (Cf. PAREJO ALFONSO, Luciano. ADMINISTRAR Y JUZGAR: DOS FUNCIONES CONSTITUCIONALES DISTINTAS Y COMPLEMENTARIAS, Editorial Tecnos, S. A., Madrid, 1993, pages 58 and 59). What is imposed now, therefore, is to determine if the Administration adopted that final act within the proceeding “in strict adherence to the legal order” (Article 216.1 LGAP), and that its resolution is not the mere fruit of the bare will of the one who adopted it.

1.- The resolution of June 29, 2010, that decided the proceeding on the merits and imposed on the plaintiff the sanction of three days of suspension without pay, is truly laconic, as it omits to analyze in detail the witness evidence received in the oral and private hearing. Although it cites legal rules, it lacks the required factual substance. But the appeal resolution of November 2, 2010, that confirmed the former, does contain an acceptable reasoning. The foregoing is pointed out to note that the Administration skirted the scope of the technical evidence received, that is, basically the declaration of Mrs. Victoria Chávez Ramírez, who declared as an expert psychologist, and that of Dr. Claudia Salazar Castro, the physician responsible for the sick leaves due to illness.

2.- As indicated by the consulted Labor Relations bodies in their opinions, the academic university activities undertaken by the plaintiff during her post-partum sick leave were compatible with the health problems that gave rise to its issuance. The aforementioned technical declarations suggested carrying out activities that would allow the plaintiff to emerge from the state of sadness or post-partum depression in which she found herself, not confining herself or remaining locked up in her home, incorporating herself into social activities; it was a priority to do the opposite: carry out activities that would lead to achieving significant degrees of happiness and joy; although university study generates stress, it is positive, good stress, not contraindicated. In recital d] of its opinion, the National Board of Labor Relations, expresses specifically: “Article 2 of the Regulation for the Granting of Sick Leaves and Licenses, insofar as it is relevant, mentions: ‘the granting of a sick leave formalizes a reciprocal commitment between the treating medical sciences professional authorized by the Caja and the worker, whose ultimate purpose is to foster the recovery of the worker's health and their return to work.’ The same article mentions ‘the incapacitated worker is legally disqualified from performing their work and from carrying out other activities that are paid or that go against the principles of loyalty and good faith ...’. In view of the declarations issued in points d and e of the Whereas clauses [Claudia Salazar Castro and Victoria Chávez Ramírez] and taking into consideration the previously cited article, it is demonstrated that the conduct of the investigated official was in accordance with the legal order, with the recommendation issued by the professionals, and she did not perform any disloyal act or act contrary to the ethical principles of the public servants of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund.”.

3.- Hence, the academic activity carried out by the plaintiff during her sick leave was sheltered within a sort of post-partum curative therapy, aimed at alleviating and overcoming the illness and ailments experienced; its purpose transcended the fulfillment of purely personal goals; there was no divorce or dissociation between the reason for the sick leave and the practiced activity, which rules out the violation of Article 10 of the Health Insurance Regulation. In the resolution of November 2, 2010, the value and scopes of those technical medical opinions are disregarded, but it is done without the aid of any other evidentiary element of equal or superior lineage; so it is no more than a mere conjecture.

4.- Indeed, the reason must be legitimate and “exist as it has been taken into account to issue the act” (Article 133.1 LGAP). There must be an adequate relationship between this and the content; the content must also be lawful, possible, clear, and precise (Article 132 LGAP). In this case, the evidence received during the preparation of the proceeding demonstrates that the facts that gave rise to the opening are not true or certain; those facts that served as antecedents and that justified the initiation of the proceeding did not occur or take place in the way they were initially assessed, which means that the Administration had no reason or cause to sanction its worker. The behavior followed by the plaintiff during her post-partum sick leave is compatible with the medical recommendations issued, which prevents classifying them as acts of disloyalty towards the employer, or violations of the probity and ethics that must inspire the exercise of public [and private] function (Articles 113 LGAP and 3 of the Law against Corruption and Unlawful Enrichment in Public Office, #8422/2004).

5.- It is important to point out that the plaintiff in her oral conclusions questioned the witness evidence received in the administrative venue, because the witnesses were not sworn in, as inferred from the respective records. The introduction of this argument was questioned by both defendants, basically for reasons of timeliness, indicating that such questioning should have been raised in the complaint; otherwise, the right of defense would be violated. The Tribunal does not consider that this argument raised in the oral conclusions phase, verbally, is a source of defenselessness. Precisely that is the opportunity to refer to all the filtered evidentiary material, admitted in that same preliminary hearing; it is a matter of pointing out to the sentencing Tribunal how and where the legal defects that make the deduced claim procedurally appropriate would have been configured in the course of the proceeding and in specific acts. It is not a factual or matter-of-fact proposition; these remain unaltered; it is a legal question, a defect of this kind in which the Administration would have incurred during the development of the proceeding. Regardless of the foregoing, the Tribunal notes that the argument is both unfortunate and unacceptable. Unfortunate because if from the alleged lack of swearing-in of witnesses one wants to derive an essential defect, violative of the right of defense, irremediable and invalidating the act, this would have as an effect and would produce as a result the absence of evidence favorable to the claim of the same plaintiff. But it is unacceptable because that defect, if true, does not have the scopes and consequences attributed to it, as the defendants argued. The reason for being of the oath is “the creation of a bond, and consequently, an action, the reason for being of the sworn affirmation is to inform someone of something.” (CAPPELLETTI, Mauro. LA ORALIDAD Y LAS PRUEBAS EN EL PROCESO CIVIL, translation by Santiago Sentís Melendo, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, Buenos Aires, 1972, page 178). The form and content of the oath are regulated in Article 954 CPC. The lack of swearing-in of the witness gives rise to the non-existence of that bond, in which case one would be facing a free declaration, assessable in the case according to the rules of sound criticism. It is not, therefore, a problem of [in]validity.

Finally, one must ask what defenselessness the lack of oath-taking could have caused the accused if she was present during the deposition and questioned the deponent. That is, in the oral and private hearing, the party was present with her technical advisor, and not only heard but saw the witness testify.

Furthermore, the party appealed the final act, where she could equally have protested the irregularity she now reports. By not doing so in a timely manner, she consented to the wrong, since consent purifies the process. Therefore, this argument must be set aside.

6.- In her closing arguments, the plaintiff also made reference to an alleged violation of the privacy of the clinical record, regarding the preliminary investigation report. The Court does not perceive in that report any sensitive data capable of compromising the dignity of the plaintiff or her fundamental rights to privacy, intimacy, or informational self-determination, etc.

Ninth: Conclusions, claims, and defenses. That in harmony with what has been set forth, the Court confirms the violations alleged in the complaint and its conclusions, relating to the lack of grounds to sanction. Strictly speaking, the CCSS had no grounds to suspend the accused worker. The acts attributed as violations of the disciplinary regime were not established; the evidence presented demonstrates that the plaintiff made use of the incapacity in accordance with the technical-medical guidelines issued; all of which leads to granting the claim against the CCSS, annulling and expelling the challenged act that ordered the suspension, and the defense of lack of right must be denied.

1.- The plaintiff claims material damage (daño material), consisting of the amount resulting for the three days of suspension, with interest from the date of execution until its effective payment. This claim is admissible, as a natural consequence of the nullity and expulsion of the challenged act, in order to restore things to the state they were in before its adoption (article 41 of the Political Constitution; 158, 165, 166, 170 and 171 LGAP, and 1163 of the Civil Code). The interest shall be calculated from the date the salary deduction was given [executed], which is when the plaintiff should have received payment.

2.- Subjective or affliction moral damage (daño moral) is also claimed. It is stated that this stems from the subjection, without cause, to a disciplinary procedure, at a critical moment, when she was suffering from postpartum depression. On this point, it is pertinent to observe what this Section of the Court expressed in a case analogous to the present one, according to judgment #76-2012 of 15:00 hours on May 8, 2012, file #11-003489-1027-CA:

"Seventh: That by express provision of article 102, subsections b] and c] LGAP, the hierarchical superior has the power to monitor the action of the inferior to verify its legality and appropriateness, and to use all necessary or useful means for that purpose that are not legally prohibited, as well as to exercise the disciplinary power. In this sense, it is noted that the inferior [server, worker, official] is in a relationship of subordination and subjection with respect to his superior, the latter being responsible not only for the duty to monitor the inferior's action but also for exercising the disciplinary sanctioning power, which is a matter of sound administration, command, direction, and order. From which it follows that every public servant is subject to the disciplinary power of his immediate boss, and consequently, is obliged to bear the inconveniences, anxieties, uncertainties, and distresses that derive therefrom. In the opinion of this Court, the exercise of that power could only generate the Administration's patrimonial liability when its exercise is due to reasons alien to its nature and raison d'être, or when it becomes arbitrary and illegitimate, due to the spurious purposes that drive it (article 130 LGAP). But under normal conditions, it cannot generate an obligation to repair the alleged emotional disturbances, as moral damage (daño moral). ...".

3.- In this case, it is evident that the Administration certainly had no cause or legitimate grounds to sanction the accused, but it did have reasonable grounds to initiate the preliminary investigation and the subsequent opening of the administrative procedure. However, that lack of grounds became evident through the testimonial evidence gathered during the substantiation of the procedure, and this can only be determined in the final act. Of course, there is no objective evidence demonstrating an abusive, arbitrary, or illegitimate exercise of the disciplinary power. Therefore, it is not possible to grant the requested reparation, and although the postpartum health condition is understood, this reason by itself does not have sufficient motivating force to award the claimed compensation.

4.- As for the co-defendant Hernández Chavarría, the claim must be denied in all its aspects, and the defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) must be granted. The other defense raised of lack of right shall be denied, without further analysis, as unnecessary." When a study yields recommendations on matters of responsibility and other subjects, the internal auditing (auditoría interna) unit must communicate them in separate reports for each subject.

The findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the studies carried out by the internal auditing unit must be officially communicated, through reports, to the head of the entity or to the subordinate officials of the active administration who have the competence and authority to order the implementation of the respective recommendations.

The official communication of the results of an audit report shall be governed by the guidelines issued by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República).

4.- Obviously, within those conclusions and recommendations of the internal audit reports, the opening of administrative procedures may be included, which would be in a position to be implemented when the body or official called upon to put them into practice receives and becomes aware of the report, with its findings. Even those internal control standards consider it a serious fault on the part of the competent official to initiate the punitive (sancionatorio) procedure not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the infractor's responsibility to prescribe, without justified cause (Article 43, paragraph 2, ibidem), which ratifies the moment from which one is obligated to act.

5.- In accordance with the foregoing, it is fitting to state that it is upon review of the respective report that the body called upon to open the investigation (investigacdión) is in an objective position to make a decision, with seriousness and responsibility. For this reason, the Court has established that the initial prescription period, when a preliminary investigation is involved, shall run from the time the respective report is delivered to the referred body, which is when it becomes aware of the facts and is compelled to act (Cf. aforementioned judgment # 25-2014-VI, considering IX).

6.- The plaintiff bases the request for a declaration of prescription on the fact that the Administration became aware of the attributed act prior to October 20, 2009. However, the elements of judgment gathered in this case file indicate that the triggering act for the preliminary investigation was the anonymous complaint received, without specifying a date, according to which the plaintiff here was undertaking university studies while on sick leave; that is, the rumor reached the employer authorities that Salas Fernández was studying at the same time she was on sick leave, as testified in the administrative venue by the witness Pacheco Blanco (folios 97 a 99 of the administrative file). More specifically: an official of the CCSS asked the Medical Director, Dr. Hernández, for time to study, to which the latter explained the limitations that existed for such purposes; however, “the colleague mentioned that other officials took sick leave to study and it is as a result of this that the colleague's name came up” (declaration of Mena Chavarría, folios 104 a 106 ibidem). The first agreement adopted by the Medical Directorate is dated October 20, 2009, through which it requested information from the Universidad Santa Paula, regarding the schedule, career, and courses enrolled in by the defendant, which was provided to it according to an official communication received the following November 20th; based on that information and the sick leave documents, it requested the opening of the preliminary investigation to determine possible sick leaves used for purposes other than the prescribed medical criteria and rest. The respective report was presented on January 26, 2010.

7.- In a case like this, where the initial act is an anonymous complaint, conducting the preliminary investigation was both timely and necessary; the information at hand was scarce, and the reported act was of a gravity capable of activating the disciplinary regime; what existed was a rumor, pure noise. Therefore, it was necessary to inquire into documents and in the field, to determine the degree of verisimilitude of that rumor, before opening the procedure; it was necessary to have greater and better elements of judgment to support the formal notification of charges. And it is upon review of the report or preliminary study that the body called upon to implement the investigation could determine the appropriateness of initiating the administrative disciplinary procedure.

8.- Since one month, as provided in Article 603 of the Labor Code, did not elapse between the moment the competent body became aware of the facts, that is, from the time it receives the preliminary investigation report, and the opening of the procedure, the Court dismisses the alleged peremption of the disciplinary power ab initio of the investigation.

Sixth: Regarding the motive and content of the challenged act. As has been established as true in this case file, the plaintiff was on sick leave, initially for maternity, and later for illness; the total period runs from March 24 to October 12, 2009. While enjoying that leave, the authorities of the CCSS learned of an apparent misuse of the sick leave, by engaging in university studies. The preliminary investigation revealed some important findings: i) that the plaintiff was enrolled at the Universidad Santa Paula since 2001, in the Physical Therapy program; ii) that the plaintiff was enrolled during the III quarter of 2009, period August – December, at the same time she was on sick leave; iii) that the plaintiff attended without problems the therapy practice at the Hogar de Ancianos de Puriscal, during the last quarter of 2009, in a schedule from eight in the morning to twelve thirty noon, while being on sick leave. From which it concluded that it was “necessary to carry out due process and the respective sanction against Mrs. Cindy Salas Fernández because it is considered that she incurred a significant fault by undertaking studies during work hours while she was on sick leave …”. The Court deems that the CCSS did have a legitimate motive to initiate said administrative disciplinary procedure, in order to ascertain the real truth. Now, given that the plaintiff jointly and severally sues both the employer entity and the official responsible for adopting the final act in the first instance, it is appropriate to examine that responsibility separately.

Seventh: Regarding the personal responsibility attributed to HERNANDEZ CHAVARRIA. That certainly, by express provision of the LGAP, the public servant who acted with intent or gross negligence in the performance of his duties or on the occasion thereof is personally liable before third parties, even if he only used the means and opportunities offered by the position (Article 199.1); in that event, the Administration is jointly and severally liable for the damages caused, under the conditions stipulated (Article 200 ibidem). But in this case, there is a particularity that, in our understanding, excludes the attributed responsibility, which was noted by the co-defendant in his defense arguments. The issue consists of the fact that the final act issued by Hernández Chavarría was challenged by the defendant, here the plaintiff, via an appeal for reversal with a subsidiary appeal; the Dirección Regional de Servicios de Salud, Central Sur, upon hearing the case on appeal, confirmed the decision. Faced with a hierarchical administrative legality control, via an appeal, that is, in exercise of the right to a second instance in the administrative venue (Articles 345.1 and 350.1 LGAP), it is fitting to apply supplementarily (Article 229 LGAP), by parity of reason, the rule provided in Article 89 of the Civil Procedure Code [CPC], according to which, in matters of civil liability, “the superior's confirmation exempts from liability the judge who issued the judgment or order that is the subject of the liability claim.” If the hierarchical superior deems that the appealed ablative act conforms to law and, therefore, instead of annulling, reversing, or modifying it, according to the appellant party's claim, leans towards confirming it, dismissing the alleged grievances, he assumes the consequences of that legal control and exempts the inferior from liability (doctrine of Articles 102, subsection d], 162 and 180 LGAP, the latter understood in the opposite sense). It is not possible to hold liable an official who is not the author of the definitive act challenged in the jurisdictional venue (Articles 49 of the Constitution, and 36, subsection c], CPCA). Hence, for this merely technical-procedural reason, the claim must be denied insofar as it is directed against Hernández Chavarría, without it being necessary to analyze other issues raised, as it is unnecessary.

Eighth: Regarding the responsibility attributed to the CCSS. That the facts that motivated the opening of the administrative disciplinary procedure can be classified as mere verification; it was enough to contrast the data contained in some forms (sick leave notice) with the records of the University, to determine the behavior of the defendant worker. But the legal qualification or assessment of those same facts is a matter of another nature. In the initial resolution of notification of charges, those facts were conceived as potentially configurative of the following labor faults: i) employer disloyalty, and ii) committing acts contrary to the probity and ethics of public officials and moral harm to the CCSS. It was specified that: “both charges seen in her performance of personal and private activities during periods of sick leave, granted for rest and relief from the illness and ailments she presented at the time of their issuance, according to the mentioned facts, thereby causing a potential moral harm to the institutional image and failing in probity and ethics in her condition as a public official”. Therefore, the most important object of the administrative procedure undertaken was the verification of the real truth of such facts, insofar as they served and would serve as a motive for the final act (Article 214.2 LGAP). This jurisdiction operates as a negative Administration, whose intervention depends on the actual appreciation of the existence of a legal infraction (Cf. PAREJO ALFONSO, Luciano. ADMINISTRAR Y JUZGAR: DOS FUNCIONES CONSTITUCIONALES DISTINTAS Y COMPLEMENTARIAS, Editorial Tecnos, S. A., Madrid, 1993, pages 58 and 59). What is now imperative, therefore, is to determine whether the Administration adopted that final act within the procedure “with strict adherence to the legal order” (Article 216.1 LGAP), and that its resolution is not the simple fruit of the bare will of whoever adopted it.

1.- The resolution of June 29, 2010, which decided the procedure on the merits and imposed on the plaintiff the sanction of three days of suspension without pay, is truly laconic, omitting to analyze in detail the testimonial evidence received in the oral and private hearing. Although it cites legal norms, it lacks the required factual substance. But the appellate resolution of November 2, 2010, which confirmed the former, does contain an acceptable justification. The foregoing is noted to warn that the Administration skirted the scope of the technical evidence received, basically the declaration of Mrs. Victoria Chávez Ramírez, who testified as a psychologist expert, and that of Dr. Claudia Salazar Castro, the physician responsible for the sick leave licenses.

2.- As indicated by the consulted Labor Relations bodies in their opinions, the university academic activities undertaken by the plaintiff during her post-partum sick leave were compatible with the health ailments that gave rise to their issuance. The aforementioned technical declarations suggested performing activities that would allow the plaintiff to emerge from the state of sadness or post-partum depression she was in, not to confine herself or remain shut in her dwelling, to join social activities; it was a priority to do the complete opposite: to perform activities leading to achieving important degrees of happiness and joy; although university study generates stress, it is positive, good stress, not contraindicated. In its opinion's considering d], the National Board of Labor Relations (Junta Nacional de Relaciones Laborales) specifically states: “Article 2 of the Regulation for the Granting of Sick Leaves and Licenses (Reglamento para el Otorgamiento de Incapacidades y Licencias), in relevant part, mentions: ‘the granting of a sick leave formalizes a reciprocal commitment between the treating medical sciences professional authorized by the Caja and the worker, whose ultimate purpose is to promote the recovery of the worker’s health and his/her reintegration to work’. The same article mentions ‘the incapacitated worker is legally disabled from performing his/her duties and from carrying out other activities that are remunerated or that go against the principles of loyalty and good faith ...’. In view of the declarations issued in points d and e of the Whereas Clauses (Resultandos) [Claudia Salazar Castro and Victoria Chávez Ramírez] and taking into consideration the previously cited article, it is demonstrated that the investigated official's conduct was in accordance with the legal order, with the recommendation issued by the professionals, and she did not perform any disloyal act or one contrary to the ethical principles of the public servants of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.”.

3.- Hence, the academic activity carried out by the plaintiff during her sick leave was housed within a sort of curative post-partum therapy, aimed at relieving and overcoming the illness and ailments experienced; its purpose transcended the achievement of merely personal goals; there was no divorce or decoupling between the reason for the sick leave and the activity practiced, which rules out the violation of Article 10 of the Health Insurance Regulation (Reglamento del Seguro de Salud). In the resolution of November 2, 2010, the value and scope of those technical-medical opinions are ignored, but this is done without the aid of any other piece of evidence of equal or superior lineage; therefore, it is nothing more than a mere conjecture.

4.- Indeed, the motive must be legitimate and “exist as it has been taken into account to issue the act” (Article 133.1 LGAP). Between the motive and the content, an adequate relationship must exist; the content must also be lawful, possible, clear, and precise (Article 132 LGAP). In this case, the evidence received during the instruction of the procedure demonstrates that the facts that motivated the opening are not true, not certain; those facts that served as background and justified the initiation of the procedure did not occur or did not take place in the manner they were initially assessed, which means that the Administration had no motive or cause to sanction its worker. The behavior followed by the plaintiff during her post-partum sick leave is compatible with the medical recommendations issued, which prevents them from being classified as acts of disloyalty towards the employer, or as violations of the probity and ethics that must inspire the exercise of the public [and private] function (Articles 113 LGAP and 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), #8422/2004).

5.- It is important to note that the plaintiff, in her oral conclusions, questioned the testimonial evidence received in the administrative venue, because the witnesses were not sworn in, as inferred from the respective records. The introduction of this allegation was challenged by both defendants, basically for reasons of timeliness, noting that such challenge should have been raised in the claim; otherwise, the right of defense would be violated. The Court does not find that this argument raised in the oral conclusions phase, verbally, is a source of defenselessness. Precisely, this is the opportunity to refer to all the admitted evidence, filtered and admitted in that same preliminary hearing; it is a matter of pointing out to the sentencing Court how and where the legal defects that make the submitted claim admissible would have been configured in the course of the procedure and in specific acts. It is not a factual proposition or a question of fact; these remain unaltered; it is a legal question, a defect of this kind that the Administration would have incurred during the development of the procedure. Apart from what has been stated, the Court warns that the allegation is both unfortunate and unacceptable. Unfortunate because if from the alleged lack of swearing of witnesses one seeks to derive an essential defect, violating the right of defense, irremediable and invalidating the act, this would have as an effect and would produce as a result the absence of evidence favorable to the plaintiff's own claim. But it is unacceptable because that defect, if true, does not have the scopes and consequences attributed to it, as the defendants argued. The reason for the oath is “the creation of a bond, and consequently, an acting, reason for the sworn affirmation is to inform someone of something.” (CAPPELLETTI, Mauro. LA ORALIDAD Y LAS PRUEBAS EN EL PROCESO CIVIL, translation by Santiago Sentís Milendo, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, Buenos Aires, 1972, page 178). The form and content of the oath are regulated in Article 954 CPC. The lack of swearing of the witness gives rise to the non-existence of that bond, in which case one would be faced with a free declaration, assessable in the case under the rules of sound criticism. It is not, therefore, a problem of [in]validity. Finally, it is worth asking what defenselessness that lack of swearing could have caused the defendant if she was present during the deposition and questioned the deponent. That is, in the oral and private hearing, the party was present with her technical advisor, and not only heard but also saw the witness testify. Moreover, the party appealed the final act, where she could equally have protested the irregularity she now denounces. By not doing so in a timely manner, she consented to the wrong, for consent purifies the process.

Accordingly, this argument must be put aside.

6.- In its closing arguments, the plaintiff also made reference to an alleged violation of the privacy of the clinical record, regarding the preliminary investigation report. The Court does not discern in that report any sensitive data capable of compromising the dignity of the plaintiff or her fundamental rights to privacy, intimacy, or informational self-determination, etc.

Ninth: Conclusions, claims, and defenses. In harmony with the foregoing, the Court verifies the violations alleged in the complaint and its conclusions, relating to the lack of grounds for sanctioning. Strictly speaking, the CCSS had no grounds to suspend the accused worker. The acts attributed as violating the disciplinary regime were not established; the evidence adduced demonstrates that the plaintiff used the sick leave in accordance with the medical-technical guidelines issued; all of which leads to upholding the claim against the CCSS, annulling and expelling the challenged act that ordered the suspension, and the defense of lack of right must be denied.

1.- The plaintiff claims material damage, consisting of the amount resulting from the three days of suspension, with interest from the date of execution until its effective payment. This claim is admissible, as a natural consequence of the nullity and expulsion of the challenged act, in order to restore matters to the state they were in before its adoption (article 41 of the Constitución Política; 158, 165, 166, 170, and 171 LGAP, and 1163 of the Civil Code). Interest shall be calculated from the date on which the salary deduction was [executed], which is when the plaintiff should have received payment.

2.- Subjective or affliction-based non-material damage (daño moral) is also claimed. It is asserted that this stems from being subjected without cause to a disciplinary proceeding, at a critical time, when she was suffering from postpartum depression. On this point, it is appropriate to observe what this Section of the Court expressed in a case analogous to the present one, according to judgment #76-2012 of 3:00 p.m. on May 8, 2012, file #11-003489-1027-CA:

“Seventh: That by express provision of article 102, subsections b] and c] LGAP, the hierarchical superior has the power to monitor the action of the subordinate to verify its legality and appropriateness, and to use all necessary or useful means for that purpose that are not legally prohibited, as well as to exercise disciplinary power. In this sense, it is noted that the [public servant, worker, official] subordinate is in a relationship of subordination and subjection with respect to their superior, and it is incumbent upon the latter not only the duty to monitor the action of the subordinate but also to exercise disciplinary sanctioning power, which responds to matters of sound administration, command, direction, and order. Whence it follows that every public servant is subject to the disciplinary power of their immediate boss, and consequently, is obliged to bear the inconveniences, anxieties, uncertainties, and distress that may derive therefrom. In the opinion of this Court, the exercise of that power could only give rise to the patrimonial liability of the Administration when its exercise is due to reasons foreign to its nature and purpose, or when it becomes arbitrary and illegitimate, due to the spurious ends that motivate it (article 130 LGAP). But under normal conditions, it cannot generate an obligation to repair the alleged emotional disturbances, as non-material damage (daño moral). ...”.

3.- In this case, it is on record that the Administration certainly had no lawful cause or reason to sanction the accused, but it did have a reasonable motive to initiate the preliminary investigation and subsequent opening of the administrative proceeding. However, this lack became evident through the testimonial evidence collected during the substantiation of the proceeding, and this could only be determined in the final act. Of course, there is no objective evidence demonstrating an abusive, arbitrary, or illegitimate exercise of disciplinary power. Therefore, it is not possible to grant the sought-after reparation, and although the postpartum health condition is understood, this reason by itself does not have sufficient compelling force to award the claimed compensation.

4.- Regarding the co-defendant Hernández Chavarría, the claim must be denied in all its aspects, and the defense of lack of passive standing must be upheld. 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from civil liability of the State", "Damages in administrative matters", "Liability of the Administration for non-material and material damage" ], "sourceName": "Documents", "subDocumentNumber": "1", "TopicsAndSubtopics": [ { "id": 2, "name": "Nullity of the administrative procedure", "Subtopics": [ { "id": 1, "name": "Lack of grounds or cause to sanction an employee who performs academic activities during post-partum sick leave" }, { "id": 2, "name": "Non-existence of liability of the official who is not the author of the final act challenged in the judicial venue" }, { "id": 3, "name": "Prerequisites for non-material damages in the exercise of the sanctioning power" } ] }, { "id": 8, "name": "Contentious administrative proceeding", "Subtopics": [ { "id": 1, "name": "Reference in oral closing arguments to evidence received at the administrative venue does not cause defenselessness" } ] }, { "id": 11, "name": "Non-material damage", "Subtopics": [ { "id": 1, "name": "Prerequisites for its appropriateness in the exercise of the administrative sanctioning power" } ] }, { "id": 9, "name": "Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social", "Subtopics": [ { "id": 1, "name": "Lack of grounds or cause to sanction an employee who performs academic activities during post-partum sick leave" }, { "id": 2, "name": "Determination of material damages and inappropriateness of non-material damages in light of the nullity of the disciplinary administrative procedure" } ] }, { "id": 6, "name": "Incapacitated worker", "Subtopics": [ { "id": 1, "name": "Lack of grounds or cause to sanction an employee who performs academic activities during post-partum sick leave results in nullity of the disciplinary administrative procedure" } ] }, { "id": 4, "name": "Disciplinary administrative sanction", "Subtopics": [ { "id": 1, "name": "Computation of the limitation period when a preliminary investigation is involved" }, { "id": 3, "name": "Prerequisites for non-material damages in the exercise of the sanctioning power" }, { "id": 2, "name": "Nullity with respect to an employee who performs academic activities during post-partum sick leave" } ] }, { "id": 10, "name": "Damages arising from civil liability of the Administration", "Subtopics": [ { "id": 2, "name": "Determination of material damages and inappropriateness of non-material damages in light of the nullity of the disciplinary administrative procedure" }, { "id": 1, "name": "Lack of grounds or cause to sanction a CCSS employee who performs academic activities during post-partum sick leave" } ] }, { "id": 3, "name": "Statute of limitations for disciplinary administrative sanctions", "Subtopics": [ { "id": 1, "name": "Computation of the limitation period when a preliminary investigation is involved" } ] }, { "id": 1, "name": "Disciplinary administrative procedure", "Subtopics": [ { "id": 1, "name": "Computation of the statute of limitations period when a preliminary investigation is involved" }, { "id": 2, "name": "Lack of grounds or cause to sanction an employee who performs academic activities during post-partum sick leave results in nullity" }, { "id": 3, "name": "Prerequisites for non-material damages in the exercise of the sanctioning power" } ] }, { "id": 5, "name": "Administrative sanctioning power", "Subtopics": [ { "id": 1, "name": "Basis and computation of the statute of limitations period when a preliminary investigation is involved" }, { "id": 2, "name": "Prerequisites for the appropriateness of non-material damages" } ] }, { "id": 7, "name": "Closing arguments in the contentious administrative proceeding", "Subtopics": [ { "id": 1, "name": "Reference to evidence received at the administrative venue does not cause defenselessness" } ] } ], "contentType": "Majority Vote", "documentType": "EXT", "informationType": "Judicial Resolution", "resolutionType": "On the Merits", "textType": "1", "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [], "html": "<html 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gte mso 10]>\r\n<style>\r\n /* Style Definitions */\r\n table.MsoNormalTable\r\n\t{mso-style-name:\"Tabla normal\";\r\n\tmso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;\r\n\tmso-tstyle-colband-size:0;\r\n\tmso-style-noshow:yes;\r\n\tmso-style-parent:\"\";\r\n\tmso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;\r\n\tmso-para-margin:0cm;\r\n\tmso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;\r\n\tmso-pagination:widow-orphan;\r\n\tfont-size:10.0pt;\r\n\tfont-family:\"Times New Roman\";\r\n\tmso-ansi-language:#0400;\r\n\tmso-fareast-language:#0400;\r\n\tmso-bidi-language:#0400;}\r\n</style>\r\n<![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\r\n <o:shapedefaults v:ext=\"edit\" spidmax=\"3074\"/>\r\n</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\r\n <o:shapelayout v:ext=\"edit\">\r\n <o:idmap v:ext=\"edit\" data=\"1\"/>\r\n </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->\r\n</head>\r\n\r\n<body lang=ES style='tab-interval:35.4pt'>\r\n\r\n<div class=Section1>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='text-align:justify;line-height:150%;tab-stops:3.0cm'><span\r\nlang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'>“</span><b><u><span lang=ES-CR\r\nstyle='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";mso-fareast-font-family:\r\nCalibri;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR;mso-fareast-language:AR-SA'>Fourth:</span></u></b><b><span\r\nlang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";\r\nmso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR;mso-fareast-language:\r\nAR-SA'> On the basis of the disciplinary power</span></b><span\r\nlang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";\r\nmso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR;mso-fareast-language:\r\nAR-SA'>. The sanctioning disciplinary power has always been linked to and substantially justified by the principle of hierarchy; the discipline that the superior has the obligation to maintain over his subordinates has always relied on this instrument (Cfr. Ramón PARADA, Derecho del Empleo Público, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2007, pages 215 to 235). The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in judgment # 5594-94 of 3:48 p.m. of September 27, 1994, stated:<o:p></o:p></span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:84.8pt;text-align:justify;line-height:\r\n150%;mso-hyphenate:none;tab-stops:3.0cm'><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:\r\n\"Courier New\";mso-fareast-font-family:\"DejaVu Serif Condensed\";mso-ansi-language:\r\nES-CR;mso-fareast-language:AR-SA'>“</span></i><span class=SpellE><b\r\nstyle='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:\r\n\"Courier New\";mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR;\r\nmso-fareast-language:AR-SA'>II</span></i></b></span><b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nnormal'><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:\"Courier New\";mso-fareast-font-family:\r\nCalibri;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR;mso-fareast-language:AR-SA'>. THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME</span></i></b><i><span lang=ES-CR\r\nstyle='font-family:\"Courier New\";mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-ansi-language:\r\nES-CR;mso-fareast-language:AR-SA'>. Administrative or disciplinary liability is that which arises from the transgression of an administrative obligation or a duty imposed on an official or employee, which becomes effective when the subject commits a fault in service or behavior, transgressing the rules of the public function. The transgression of administrative duties has its characteristic sanction in the administrative liability of the official, which is made effective through the procedure aimed at enforcing the owed obligation, or by the administrative sanction imposed. Therefore, the concept of disciplinary sanction necessarily refers to the official or employee, or rather, to the rights of the official. This regime is a species of the "sanctioning" power of the State, from which it emanates, a power that is inherent and proper to the Public Administration, translating into the faculty of, at least, a "minimum" of power for it to apply disciplinary sanctions to its officials or employees when they fail in their duties. However, disciplinary power is not exclusive to the public law regime. For example, it occurs in the family, where parents exercise this power, not only for the correction of children, but also for the preservation of the moral unity of the family, and reproach is made not for what has been done, but so that it is not done again; in the private labor field -industrial and commercial-, it is exercised by the employer in defense of regularity in the workplace; in professional associations, etc. It can be concluded that in reality, the purpose of disciplinary liability is to ensure the observance of the norms of subordination and, in general, the exact fulfillment of all the duties of the function. Thus, disciplinary law presupposes a relationship of subordination between the body subject to discipline and the body that establishes or applies it, more to correct, and even educate the infringer of the norm, hence the corrective nature of disciplinary sanctions.

…".</i></span></p> Later, in ruling #1265-95 of 3:36 p.m. on March 7, 1995, Considerando III, *in fine*, cited in #2005-02995 of 2:41 p.m. on March 16, Considerando V, the Chamber stated:

> "… In contrast, the disciplinary power of the public sector is created by virtue of a bilateral act, but in its development, the activity of the public official remains exclusively subject to the will of the Public Administration, from the creation to the extinction of the relationship, so that the servant finds himself in a status of special dependence with respect to the State. The individual voluntarily accepts the appointment, but places himself in a sphere of subjection with respect to the Administration, governed by Objective Law, where the situation of legal inequality of the parties in the public employment relationship is unquestionable; the Public Administration consequently assumes a superiority or preeminence that translates into hierarchical power, the correlative of which is disciplinary power. This power, by its very purpose, is confined to the circle of the agent's functional duties, and therefore, disciplinary sanctions cannot, legally, be imposed upon him except during the existence of the employment relationship, that is, while the status of dependence endures. Thus, disciplinary power and its sanctions are always conditioned on the legal exercise of public employment or function, such that, without the existence of the *vinculum iuris* between the Administration and the agent, disciplinary sanctions are inapplicable.".

**Fifth**: **On the alleged statute of limitations**. As regards the statute of limitations alleged in the complaint, it is appropriate to undertake its examination *ab initio*, for if it succeeds, it would be useless to address the other substantive issues alleged.

**1.-** This Tribunal has established in its jurisprudence that the Administration's power to sanction or discipline the faults of its servants may be nullified for temporal reasons, whether these occur before, during, or after the administrative procedure has commenced (Cfr. Ruling # 28-2012 of 9:48 a.m. on February 17, 2012, Considerando III, file #11-003789-1027-CA, and ruling # 25-2014-VI of 11:00 a.m. on February 17, 2014, file #13-002772-1027-CA). In the first-cited ruling, it was stated:

> "**Third**: That since the initial complaint brief, the plaintiff has been alleging a violation of the one-month period set forth in article 603 CT, for the exercise of the employer's disciplinary sanctioning power against its subordinate. As is well understood, in disciplinary matters in general there are at least three identifiable time periods in the actions of the Administration; an initial period to open the investigation once the act or fault becomes known; another to instruct, substantiate, or process the respective procedure, and another to impose the sanction and its execution (Cfr. Constitutional Chamber, ruling 2006-13926 of 2:44 p.m. on September 20, 2006, Considerando VII, and Chamber II of the Supreme Court of Justice, ruling #2004-00671 of 9:20 a.m. on August 18). That article 603, insofar as it provides 'The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from the moment there was cause for the separation or, as the case may be, from the moment the acts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known,' effectively blocks the belated initiation of actions aimed at sanctioning or punishing faults, whether active or omissive. The brevity or fleetingness of the period is due to the need to provide continuity to the employer-employee relationship; it is inspired by reasons of public order linked to the reinforced protection that the fundamental rights involved constitutionally receive (Title V, Social Rights and Guarantees, sole chapter, articles 50 to 74), and which ordinary legislation develops at the legal level through the protective principle underlying article 17 CT, which obliges the interpretation and application of norms in the manner most favorable to the worker (Cfr. Constitutional Chamber, ruling #5969-93 of 3:21 p.m. on November 16, 1993, Considerando I). Thus, those known faults that are not timely pursued must be deemed forgiven. That is, if the disciplinary sanctioning power is not exercised within the legally established period, it extinguishes, perimes, or expires. And if it is exercised timely, it is interrupted with a continued effect during the processing, instruction, or substantiation of the procedure, and is born again from the moment that whoever must decide or resolve is in objective conditions to exercise the decisional power (doctrine of articles 51 of the Autonomous Service Regulation of the INA of January 28, 1982 and its amendments, in relation to numerals 211 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, 164 of the Notarial Code, and 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic; ruling #2006-013926 cited *supra*).".

**2.-** The preliminary investigation is a faculty that the Administration possesses, with the purpose of determining the degree of probability of the existence of a fault, or to identify the person presumably responsible, or else, to gather the evidentiary elements that permit ordering an appropriate, suitable indictment (Cfr. Constitutional Chamber, ruling #8841-01 of 9:03 a.m. on August 31, 2001). Among the purposes of that preliminary phase is to determine whether there is merit to initiate a useful administrative procedure or not to initiate it (Cfr. Constitutional Chamber, ruling #9125-03 of 9:21 a.m. on August 29, 2003), which of course is based on principles of economy, efficiency, and administrative rationality. This investigation is especially significant when in the presence of anonymous complaints that harbor elements worthy of consideration.

**3.-** In our system, the preliminary investigation is regulated by some legal provisions, which account for its characteristic notes, scope, and consequences. The Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, #7428 of September 7, 1994, indicates that it "may instruct administrative summaries or conduct special investigations ex officio, at the request of a passive subject or any interested party. … it shall also instruct summaries or conduct special investigations, when requested by the parliamentary bodies of the Legislative Assembly or when jointly requested by at least five deputies" (article 22). The General Law of Internal Control, #8292 of July 31, 2002, establishes among the duties of the audit function:

> "e) Not to reveal to third parties who are not directly related to the matters dealt with in their reports, information about the audits or the special audit studies being carried out, nor information about that which determines a possible civil, administrative, or eventually criminal liability of the officials of the entities and bodies subject to this Law." (article 32).

Regarding internal audit reports, it states:

> "Article 35.— Matters subject to internal audit reports. Internal audit reports shall address various matters within their competence, as well as matters from which possible liabilities may arise for officials, former officials of the institution, and third parties. When from a study recommendations arise on matters of liability and other matters, the internal audit must communicate them in independent reports for each matter. > > The findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the studies carried out by the internal audit must be officially communicated, through reports, to the hierarch or the subordinate heads of the active administration, with competence and authority to order the implementation of the respective recommendations. > > The official communication of the results of an audit report shall be governed by the guidelines issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic.".

**4.-** Obviously, within those conclusions and recommendations of the internal audit reports, the opening of administrative procedures may figure, which one would be in conditions to implement when the report, with its findings, is received and known by the body or official charged with putting them into practice. Even those internal control norms deem it a serious fault for the competent official to initiate the sanctioning procedure, not to initiate it timely, or to allow the responsibility of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause (article 43, paragraph 2, ibidem), which ratifies the moment from which one is obliged to act.

**5.-** In accordance with the above, it is appropriate to affirm that it is upon review of the respective report that the body charged with opening the investigation is in objective conditions to adopt a decision, with seriousness and responsibility. For this reason, the Tribunal has established that the initial prescription period, when a preliminary investigation intervenes, shall run from the moment the respective report is delivered to the referred body, which is when it has knowledge of the facts and is compelled to act (Cfr. ruling # 25-2014-VI cited above, Considerando IX).

**6.-** The plaintiff bases the request for a declaration of prescription on the fact that the Administration had knowledge of the attributed act since before October 20, 2009. However, the elements of judgment gathered in these proceedings indicate that the triggering act for the preliminary investigation was the anonymous complaint received, without specifying a date, according to which the plaintiff here was pursuing university studies while on sick leave; that is, the *rumor* reached the employer authorities that Salas Fernández was studying at the same time she was on sick leave, as stated in the administrative proceeding by witness Pacheco Blanco (folios 97 to 99 of the administrative file). More specifically: an official of the CCSS asked the Medical Director, Dr. Hernández, for time to study, to which the latter explained the limitations they had for those purposes; however, "the colleague mentioned that other officials took sick leave to study and it is in light of this that the colleague's name came up" (declaration of Mena Chavarría, folios 104 to 106 ibidem). The first agreement adopted by the Medical Directorate is dated October 20, 2009, by means of which it requested information from Universidad Santa Paula, regarding the schedule, major, and courses enrolled in by the accused, which was provided according to an official communication received on the following November 20; based on that information and on the sick leave documents, it was requested to open the preliminary investigation *to determine possible sick leaves used for purposes different from the medical criteria and prescribed rest*. The respective report was presented on January 26, 2010.

**7.-** In a case like this, where the initial act is an anonymous complaint, the carrying out of the preliminary investigation was both timely and necessary; the information at hand was scarce, and the fact reported was of such gravity as to be capable of activating the disciplinary regime; what there was was a *rumor*, pure noise. Thus, it was necessary to investigate documents and in the field, to determine the degree of plausibility of that rumor, before opening the procedure; it was necessary to have more and better elements of judgment to support the formal statement of charges. And it is upon review of the preliminary report or study that the body charged with implementing the investigation could determine the advisability of initiating the disciplinary administrative procedure.

**8.-** Since between the moment the competent body learned of the facts, that is, from when it received the preliminary investigation report, and the opening of the procedure, the month provided for in article 603 of the Labor Code did not elapse, the Tribunal dismisses the alleged expiration of disciplinary power *ab initio* of the investigation.

**Sixth**: **On the motive for and content of the challenged act**. As has been taken as true in these proceedings, the plaintiff was on sick leave, initially for maternity, and later for illness; the total period covers from March 24 to October 12, 2009. While enjoying that leave, the authorities of the CCSS received notice of an apparently improper use of the sick leave, by engaging in university studies. The preliminary investigation revealed some important findings: i) that the plaintiff was enrolled at Universidad Santa Paula since 2001, in the Physical Therapy major; ii) that the plaintiff was enrolled during the III quarter of 2009, August – December period, at the same time she was on sick leave; iii) that the plaintiff attended without problems the physical therapy practice at the Hogar de Ancianos de Puriscal, during the last quarter of 2009, in a schedule from eight in the morning to twelve thirty in the afternoon, while on sick leave. From which it concluded that it was "necessary to conduct a due process and the respective sanction against Mrs. Cindy Salas Fernández because it is considered that she incurred a significant fault by conducting studies during work hours while on sick leave…". The Tribunal considers that the CCSS did have a legitimate motive to *initiate* said disciplinary administrative procedure, in the interest of ascertaining the real truth. Now then, given that the plaintiff jointly sues both the employer entity and the official responsible for adopting the final act in the first instance, it is appropriate to examine that liability separately.

**Seventh**: **On the personal liability attributed to HERNANDEZ CHAVARRIA**. That certainly, by express provision of the LGAP, the public servant who has acted with intent or gross negligence in the performance of his duties or on occasion thereof is personally liable before third parties, even if he only used the means and opportunities offered by the position (article 199.1); in that event, the Administration is jointly and severally liable for the damages it causes, under the conditions provided (article 200 ibidem). But in this case there is a particularity that in our understanding excludes the liability attributed, which was noted by the co-defendant in his defense pleadings. The issue consists in that the final act issued by Hernández Chavarría was challenged by the accused, plaintiff here, via appeals for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal; the Regional Directorate of Health Services, Central Sur, in hearing the case on appeal, confirmed the decision rendered. Faced with a hierarchical administrative legality control, via an appeal remedy, that is, in exercise of the right to a double instance in administrative proceedings (articles 345.1 and 350.1 LGAP), it is appropriate to apply supplementarily (article 229 LGAP), by parity of reasoning, the rule set forth in article 89 of the Civil Procedure Code [CPC], according to which, in matters of civil liability "the confirmation by the superior relieves of liability the judge who issued the ruling or order that is the subject of the liability claim." If the hierarchical superior considers that the appealed adverse act is in accordance with law and, therefore, instead of annulling, revoking, or modifying it, according to the appellant's claim, he leans toward confirming it, rejecting the grievances alleged, he assumes the consequences of that legal control, and frees the inferior from liability (doctrine of articles 102, paragraph d], 162, and 180 LGAP, the latter two understood in the contrary sense).

It is not possible to hold a public official liable who is not the author of the *definitive* act challenged in court (articles 49 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Constitución" w:st="on">la Constitución</st1:PersonName>, and 36, letter c], <span class=SpellE>CPCA</span>). Hence, for this purely technical-procedural reason, the claim must be denied insofar as it is directed against Hernández <span class=SpellE>Chavarría</span>, without it being necessary to analyze other issues raised, as it is unnecessary.

**Eighth**: **On the liability attributed to <st1:PersonName ProductID="la CCSS. Que" w:st="on">la <span class=SpellE>CCSS</span>. Que</st1:PersonName> the facts that motivated the opening of the disciplinary administrative procedure can be classified as mere verification; it was sufficient to contrast the data contained in some forms (notice of incapacity) with the records of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Universidad" w:st="on">la Universidad</st1:PersonName>, to determine the behavior of the accused worker. But the legal classification or assessment of those same facts is a matter of a different nature. In the initial resolution of the statement of charges, those facts were conceived as potentially <span class=SpellE>configuradores</span> of the following labor offenses: i) employer disloyalty, and <span class=SpellE>ii</span>) committing acts contrary to the probity and ethics of public officials and moral damage to <st1:PersonName ProductID="la CCSS. Se" w:st="on">la <span class=SpellE>CCSS</span>. Se</st1:PersonName> specified that: “*both charges seen in her action of carrying out personal and private activities during periods of incapacity, granted for rest and relief from the illness and ailments she presented at the time of their issuance, according to the mentioned facts, thereby causing potential moral damage to the institutional image and failing in probity and ethics in her condition as a public official*”. Therefore, the most important object of the administrative procedure undertaken was the verification of the real truth of such facts, insofar as they served and would serve as the reason for the final act (article 214.2 <span class=SpellE>LGAP</span>). This jurisdiction operates as a negative Administration, whose intervention depends on the actual appreciation of the existence of a legal infraction (<span class=SpellE>Cfr</span>. PAREJO ALFONSO, Luciano. ADMINISTRAR Y JUZGAR: DOS FUNCIONES CONSTITUCIONALES DISTINTAS Y COMPLEMENTARIAS, Editorial <span class=SpellE>Tecnos</span>, S. A., Madrid, 1993, pages 58 and 59). What is now required, therefore, is to determine whether <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración" w:st="on">la Administración</st1:PersonName> adopted that final act within the procedure “*in strict compliance with the legal system*” (article 216.1 <span class=SpellE>LGAP</span>), and that its resolution is not simply the result of the naked will of the person who adopted it.

**1.-** The resolution of June 29, 2010, which decided the procedure on the merits and imposed on the plaintiff the penalty of three days of suspension without pay, is truly laconic, failing to analyze in detail the testimonial evidence received in the oral and private hearing. Although it cites legal norms, it lacks the required factual substance. But the appeal resolution of November 2, 2010, which confirmed it, does contain an acceptable <span class=SpellE>fundamentación</span>. The foregoing is pointed out to warn that <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración" w:st="on">la Administración</st1:PersonName> skirted the scope of the technical evidence received, that is, basically the statement of Mrs. Victoria Chávez Ramírez, who testified as an expert psychologist, and that of Dr. Claudia Salazar Castro, the physician responsible for the sick leave certifications.

**2.-** As indicated by the consulted Labor Relations bodies, in their opinions, the university academic activities undertaken by the plaintiff during her *post*partum incapacity were compatible with the health ailments that originated its issuance. The aforementioned technical statements suggested carrying out activities that would allow the plaintiff to emerge from the state of sadness or post-partum depression in which she found herself, not to confine herself or remain shut in her home, to engage in social activities; it was a priority to do the complete opposite: to carry out activities that would lead to achieving significant degrees of happiness and joy; although university study generates stress, it is positive, good stress, not contraindicated. In recital d] of its opinion, <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Junta Nacional" w:st="on">la Junta Nacional</st1:PersonName> de Relaciones Laborales, states concretely: “*Article 2 of the Reglamento para el Otorgamiento de Incapacidades y Licencias, insofar as relevant, mentions: “the granting of an incapacity formalizes a reciprocal commitment between the treating medical science professional authorized by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Caja" w:st="on">la Caja</st1:PersonName> and the worker, whose ultimate goal is to promote the recovery of the worker's health and their reincorporation to work”. The same article mentions: “the incapacitated worker is legally disqualified from performing their duties and from carrying out other activities that are remunerated or that go against the principles of loyalty and good <span class=GramE>fe ...</span>”. In view of the statements issued in points d and e of the <span class=SpellE>Resultandos</span> [Claudia Salazar Castro and Victoria Chávez Ramírez] and taking into consideration the previously cited article, it is demonstrated that the investigated official's conduct was in accordance with the legal system, with the recommendation issued by the professionals and she did not carry out any disloyal act or contrary to the ethical principles of the public servants of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Caja Costarricense" w:st="on">la Caja Costarricense</st1:PersonName> de Seguro Social*.” **3.-** Hence, the academic activity carried out by the plaintiff during her incapacity was sheltered within a kind of post-partum curative therapy, directed at alleviating and overcoming the illness and ailments experienced; its purpose transcended the achievement of merely personal goals; there was no divorce or dissociation between the rationale of the incapacity and the activity practiced, which rules out the violation of article 10 of the Reglamento del Seguro de Salud. In the resolution of November 2, 2010, the value and scope of those technical medical opinions are disregarded, but it is done without the aid of any other evidentiary element of equal or superior caliber; so it remains a mere conjecture.

**4.-** Effectively, the reason must be legitimate and “*exist as it has been taken into account to issue the act*” (article 133.1 <span class=SpellE>LGAP</span>). Between this and the content, an adequate relationship must exist; the content must also be lawful, possible, clear, and precise (article 132 <span class=SpellE>LGAP</span>). In this case, the evidence received during the instruction of the procedure demonstrates that the facts that motivated the opening are not true, nor certain; those facts that served as background and justified the initiation of the procedure did not occur or did not take place in the way they were initially appreciated, which means that <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración" w:st="on">la Administración</st1:PersonName> had no reason or cause to sanction its worker. The behavior followed by the plaintiff during her *post*partum incapacity is compatible with the medical recommendations issued, which prevents qualifying them as acts of disloyalty towards the employer, or violations of the probity and ethics that must inspire the exercise of the public [and private] function (articles 113 <span class=SpellE>LGAP</span> and 3 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley" w:st="on">la Ley</st1:PersonName> contra <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Corrupción" w:st="on">la Corrupción</st1:PersonName> y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Función Pública" w:st="on">la Función Pública</st1:PersonName>, #8422/2004).

**5.-** It is important to note that the plaintiff in her oral conclusions questioned the testimonial evidence received in the administrative venue, because the witnesses were not sworn in, as inferred from the respective records. The introduction of this allegation was questioned by both defendants, basically for reasons of timeliness, pointing out that such questioning should have been raised in the complaint; otherwise, the right of defense would be violated. The Court does not appreciate that this argument raised in the oral conclusions phase, verbally, is a source of defenselessness. Precisely, this is the opportunity to refer to all the filtered evidentiary material, admitted in that same preliminary hearing; it is a matter of pointing out to the sentencing Court how and where the legal defects making the deduced claim admissible would have been configured during the course of the procedure and in specific acts. It is not a factual proposition or fact; these remain unaltered; it is a legal question, a defect of this kind in which <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración" w:st="on">la Administración</st1:PersonName> would have incurred during the development of the procedure. Notwithstanding the above, the Court warns that the allegation is both unfortunate and unacceptable. Unfortunate because if from the alleged lack of swearing-in of witnesses one wants to derive an essential defect, violating the right of defense, incurable and <span class=SpellE>invalidante</span> of the act, this would have the effect and would produce as a result the absence of evidence favorable to the claim of the plaintiff herself. But it is unacceptable insofar as that defect, if true, does not have the scope and consequences attributed to it, as the defendants argued. The rationale of the oath is “*the creation of a bond*, and consequently, an *action,* the rationale for the sworn affirmation is to *inform* someone of something.” (<span class=SpellE>CAPPELLETTI</span>, Mauro. <st1:PersonName ProductID="LA ORALIDAD Y" w:st="on">LA <span class=SpellE>ORALIDAD</span> Y</st1:PersonName> LAS PRUEBAS EN EL PROCESO CIVIL, translation by Santiago Sentís <span class=SpellE>Milendo</span>, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, Buenos Aires, 1972, page 178). The form and content of the oath are regulated in article 954 <span class=SpellE>CPC</span>. The lack of swearing-in of the witness gives rise to the non-existence of that bond, in which case one would be facing a *free declaration*, assessable in this case according to the rules of sound criticism. It is not, therefore, a problem of [in] validity. Finally, one must ask what defenselessness that lack of swearing-in could have caused the accused if she was present during the deposition and questioned the deponent. That is, in the oral and private hearing, the party was present with her technical advisor, and not only heard but also <span class=SpellE>vió</span> the witness testify. Furthermore, the party appealed the final act, where she could equally have protested the irregularity she now denounces. By not doing so in a timely manner, she consented to the wrong, for consent purifies the process. So this allegation must be dismissed.

**6.-** In her closing argument, the plaintiff also referred to an alleged violation of the privacy of the clinical record, regarding the preliminary investigation report. The Court does not appreciate in that report any sensitive data capable of compromising the plaintiff's dignity or her fundamental rights to privacy, intimacy, or informational self-determination, etc.

**Ninth**: **Conclusions, claims, and defenses**. That in harmony with what has been stated, the Court confirms the violations alleged in the complaint and its conclusions, relating to the lack of reason to sanction. Strictly speaking, <st1:PersonName ProductID="la CCSS" w:st="on">la <span class=SpellE>CCSS</span></st1:PersonName> had no reason to suspend the accused worker. The acts attributed as violative of the disciplinary regime were not configured; the evidence produced demonstrates that the plaintiff used the incapacity in accordance with the technical medical guidelines given; all of which leads to upholding the claim against <st1:PersonName ProductID="la CCSS" w:st="on">la <span class=SpellE>CCSS</span></st1:PersonName>, nullifying and expelling the challenged act that ordered the suspension, and the exception of lack of right must be denied.

**1.-** The plaintiff claims material damage, consisting of the amount resulting from the three days of suspension, with interest from the date of enforcement until its effective payment. This claim is admissible, as a natural consequence of the nullity and expulsion of the challenged act, in order to restore things to the state they held before its adoption (article 41 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Constitución Política" w:st="on">la Constitución Política</st1:PersonName>; 158, 165, 166, 170 and 171 <span class=SpellE>LGAP</span>, and 1163 of the Civil Code). Interest shall be calculated from the date on which the salary deduction was *[executed]*, which is when the plaintiff should have received payment.

**2.-** Subjective or distress moral damage is also claimed. It is affirmed that this stems from being subjected without cause to a disciplinary procedure, at a critical moment, when she suffered *post*partum depression. On this point, it is pertinent to note what this Section of the Court expressed in a case analogous to the present one, according to judgment #76-2012 of 3:00 PM on May 8, 2012, file #11-003489-1027-<span class=SpellE>CA</span>:

“***Sétimo**: That by express provision of article 102, subsections b] and c] <span class=SpellE>LGAP</span>, the hierarchical superior has the power to monitor the action of the inferior to verify its legality and advisability, and to use all necessary or useful means for that purpose that are not legally prohibited, as well as to exercise the disciplinary power. In this sense, it is noted that the [server, worker, official] inferior is in a relationship of subordination and subjection with respect to their superior, the latter having not only the duty to monitor the inferior's action but also to exercise the disciplinary sanctioning power, which responds to issues of sound administration, command, direction, and order. From which it follows that every public servant is subject to the disciplinary power of their immediate boss, and consequently, is obliged to bear the inconveniences, anxieties, uncertainties, and distresses that derive from it. In the opinion of this Court, the exercise of that power could only generate the patrimonial liability of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración" w:st="on">la Administración</st1:PersonName> when its exercise responds to reasons alien to its nature and rationale, or when it becomes arbitrary and illegitimate, due to the spurious purposes that drive it (article 130 <span class=SpellE>LGAP</span>). But under normal conditions, it cannot generate the obligation to repair the alleged emotional disturbances, as moral damage. ...”.* **3.-** In this case, it is on record that <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración" w:st="on">la Administración</st1:PersonName> indeed had no legitimate cause or reason to *sanction* the accused, but it did have a reasonable reason to *initiate* the preliminary investigation and subsequent opening of the administrative procedure. However, that lack became evident with the testimonial evidence collected during the substantiation of the procedure, and this is only possible to determine in the final act. Of course, there is no objective evidence demonstrating an abusive, arbitrary, or illegitimate exercise of the disciplinary power. Therefore, it is not possible to grant the requested compensation, and although the post-partum health condition is understood, this reason by itself does not have sufficient driving force to award the claimed indemnity.

**4.-** Regarding the co-defendant Hernández <span class=SpellE>Chavarría</span>, the claim must be denied in all its aspects, and the exception of lack of passive legitimacy must be upheld. The other defense raised, lack of right, must be denied, without further analysis, as it is unnecessary.”

“Cuarto: Acerca del fundamento de la potestad discriplinaria. Que la potestad disciplinaria sancionadora siempre ha estado vinculada y se ha justificado substancialmente en función del principio de jerarquía; la disciplina que el superior tiene la obligación de mantener sobre sus subordinados ha contado siempre con este instrumento (Cfr. Ramón PARADA, Derecho del Empleo Público, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2007, páginas 215 a 235). La Sala Constitucional en sentencia # 5594-94 de 15.48 horas de 27 de septiembre de 1994, expresó:

“II. EL REGIMEN DISCIPLINARIO. La responsabilidad administrativa o disciplinaria es la que nace de la transgresión de una obligación administrativa o de un deber impuesto a un funcionario o empleado, que se hace efectiva cuando el sujeto comete una falta de servicio o de comportamiento, transgrediendo las reglas de la función pública. La transgresión de los deberes administrativos tiene su sanción característica en la responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario, que se hace efectiva por el procedimiento dirigido a hacer cumplir la obligación debida, o por la sanción administrativa que se impone. Por ello, el concepto de sanción disciplinaria se refiere necesariamente al funcionario o empleado, o mejor dicho, a los derechos del funcionario. Este régimen es una especie de la potestad "sancionadora" del Estado, de la que dimana, potestad que es inherente y propia de la Administración Pública, traduciéndose en la facultad de, por lo menos, un "mínimo" de poder para que ésta aplique sanciones disciplinarias a sus funcionarios o empleados cuando falten a sus deberes. Sin embargo, el poder disciplinario no es exclusivo del régimen del derecho público. Así por ejemplo, se da en la familia, ejerciendo ese poder los padres, no sólo para la corrección de los hijos, sino también para la preservación de la unidad moral de la familia, y se reprende no por lo que se ha hecho, sino para que no se vuelva a hacer; en el campo laboral privado -industrial y comercial-, lo ejerce el patrón en defensa de la regularidad en la esfera de trabajo; en los colegios profesionales, etc. Se puede concluir que en realidad, el fin de la responsabilidad disciplinaria es asegurar la observancia de las normas de subordinación y, en general, del exacto cumplimiento de todos los deberes de la función. Así, el derecho disciplinario presupone una relación de subordinación entre el órgano sometido a la disciplina y el órgano que la establece o aplica, más que para castigar, para corregir, e incluso educar al infractor de la norma, de ahí el carácter correctivo de las sanciones disciplinarias. …”.

Más tarde en sentencia #1265-95 de 15.36 horas de 7 de marzo de 1995, considerando III, in fine, citada en la #2005-02995 de 14.41 horas de 16 de marzo, considerando V, la Sala señaló:

“… En cambio, el poder disciplinario del sector público es creado en virtud de un acto bilateral, pero en su desenvolvimiento, la actividad del funcionario público queda exclusivamente sujeta a la voluntad de la Administración Pública, desde la creación hasta la extinción de la relación, de manera que el servidor se encuentra en un status de especial dependencia con respecto al Estado. El individuo voluntariamente acepta la designación, pero se sitúa en una esfera de sujeción con respecto a la Administración, reglada por el Derecho Objetivo, donde es incuestionable la situación de desigualdad jurídica de las partes en la relación de empleo público; la Administración Pública asume, en consecuencia, una superioridad o preeminencia que se traduce en el poder jerárquico, cuyo correlativo es el poder disciplinario. Este poder, por su propia finalidad se detiene en el círculo de los deberes funcionales del agente, y por lo tanto, las sanciones disciplinarias no pueden, jurídicamente, serle impuestas sino durante la existencia de la relación de empleo, es decir, mientras perdure el status de dependencia. De manera que, el poder disciplinario y sus sanciones están condicionados siempre al ejercicio jurídico del empleo público o de la función, por lo que, sin la existencia del vinculum iuris entre la Administración y el agente, las sanciones disciplinarias son inaplicables.”.

Quinto: Sobre la prescripción alegada. Que, por lo que concierne a la prescripción alegada en la demanda, conviene abordar su examen ab initio, pues si ella prospera, no tendría utilidad ocuparse de las demás cuestiones de fondo alegadas.

1.- Este Tribunal tiene establecido en su jurisprudencia que la potestad de la Administración para sancionar o disciplinar las faltas de sus servidores, puede verse enervada por razones temporales, sea que estas acontezcan antes, durante o después de iniciado el procedimiento administrativo (Cfr. Sentencia # 28-2012 de 9.48 horas de 17 de febrero de 2012, considerando III, carpeta #11-003789-1027-CA, y sentencia # 25-2014-VI de 11.00 horas de 17 de febrero de 2014, carpeta #13-002772-1027-CA). En la sentencia primeramente citada, se expresó:

“Tercero: Que desde el escrito inicial de demanda, la parte actora viene alegando violación al plazo de un mes previsto en el artículo 603 CT, para el ejercicio de la potestad sancionadora disciplinaria en cabeza del patrono contra su subordinado. Como bien se comprende, en materia disciplinaria en general hay al menos tres plazos identificables en el actuar de la Administración; un plazo inicial para abrir la investigación desde que se tiene conocimiento del hecho o falta; otro para instruir, substanciar o tramitar el procedimiento respectivo, y otro para imponer la sanción y su ejecución (Cfr. Sala Constitucional, sentencia 2006-13926 de 14.44 horas de 20 de septiembre de 2006, considerando VII, y Sala II de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia #2004-00671 de 9.20 horas de 18 de agosto). Ese artículo 603 en cuanto dispone “Los derechos y acciones de los patronos para despedir justificadamente a los trabajadores o para disciplinar sus faltas prescriben en un mes, que comenzará a correr desde que se dio causa para la separación o, en su caso, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria.”, efectivamente bloquea el paso al inicio tardío de acciones encaminadas a sancionar o castigar faltas, activas u omisivas. La brevedad o fugacidad del plazo obedece a la necesidad de darle continuidad a la relación obrero patronal; se inspira en razones de orden público vinculadas a la tutela reforzada que constitucionalmente reciben los derechos fundamentales implicados (Título V, Derechos y garantías sociales, capítulo único, artículos 50 a 74), y que a nivel legal desarrolla la legislación ordinaria a través del principio protector que subyace en el artículo 17 CT que obliga a interpretar y aplicar las normas en el sentido más favorable al trabajador (Cfr. Sala Constitucional, sentencia #5969-93 de 15.21 horas de 16 de noviembre de 1993, considerando I). De modo que aquellas faltas conocidas que no sean oportunamente perseguidas han de tenerse como perdonadas. Es decir, si la potestad sancionadora disciplinaria no se ejercita dentro del plazo legalmente establecido, se extingue, perime o fenece. Y si se ejerciera oportunamente, se interrumpe con efecto continuado durante la tramitación, instrucción o substanciación del procedimiento, y vuelve a nacer a partir de que, quien deba decidir o resolver, esté en condiciones objetivas de ejercer la potestad decisoria (doctrina de los artículos 51 del Reglamento Autónomo de Servicio del INA de 28 de enero de 1982 y sus reformas, en relación con los numerales 211 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, 164 del Código Notarial, y 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República; sentencia #2006-013926 supra citada).”.

2.- La investigación preliminar es una facultad que tiene la Administración con el objeto de determinar el grado de probabilidad de la existencia de una falta, o para identificar a la persona presuntamente responsable, o bien, para hacer acopio de los elementos probatorios que permitan acordar una intimación adecuada, idónea (Cfr. Sala Constitucional, sentencia #8841-01 de 9.03 horas de 31 de agosto de 2001). Entre los fines de esa fase preliminar está determinar si existe mérito para iniciar un procedimiento administrativo útil o no iniciarlo (Cfr. Sala Constitucional, sentencia #9125-03 de 9.21 horas de 29 de agosto de 2003), lo que desde luego se funda en principios de economía, eficiencia y racionalidad administrativa. Esta investigación es especialmente trascendente cuando se está en presencia de denuncias anónimas que abrigan elementos dignos de considerar.

3.- En nuestro medio, la investigación preliminar aparece regulada en algunas disposiciones jurídicas, que dan cuenta acerca de sus notas características, alcances y consecuencias. La Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, #7428 de 7 de septiembre de 1994, señala que ésta “podrá instruir sumarios administrativos o realizar investigaciones especiales de oficio, a petición de un sujeto pasivo o de cualquier interesado. … también deberá instruir sumarios o realizará investigaciones especiales, cuando lo soliciten los órganos parlamentarios de la Asamblea Legislativa o cuando lo soliciten conjuntamente al menos cinco diputados” (artículo 22). La Ley General de Control Interno, #8292 de 31 de julio de 2002, establece entre los deberes de la auditoría:

“e) No revelar a terceros que no tengan relación directa con los asuntos tratados en sus informes, información sobre las auditorías o los estudios especiales de auditoría que se estén realizando ni información sobre aquello que determine una posible responsabilidad civil, administrativa o eventualmente penal de los funcionarios de los entes y órganos sujetos a esta Ley.” (artículo 32).

Respecto de los informes de auditoría interna se expresa:

“Artículo 35.— Materias sujetas a informes de auditoría interna. Los informes de auditoría interna versarán sobre diversos asuntos de su competencia, así como sobre asuntos de los que pueden derivarse posibles responsabilidades para funcionarios, ex funcionarios de la institución y terceros. Cuando de un estudio se deriven recomendaciones sobre asuntos de responsabilidad y otras materias, la auditoría interna deberá comunicarlas en informes independientes para cada materia.

Los hallazgos, las conclusiones y recomendaciones de los estudios realizados por la auditoría interna, deberán comunicarse oficialmente, mediante informes al jerarca o a los titulares subordinados de la administración activa, con competencia y autoridad para ordenar la implantación de las respectivas recomendaciones.

La comunicación oficial de resultados de un informe de auditoría se regirá por las directrices emitidas por la Contraloría General de la República.”.

4.- Obviamente dentro de esas conclusiones y recomendaciones de los informes de auditoría interna, pueden figurar la apertura de procedimientos administrativos, la cual se estaría en condiciones de implementar cuando se recibe y conoce el informe, con sus hallazgos, por parte del órgano o funcionario llamado a ponerlas en práctica. Incluso esas normas de control interno reputan como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar prescribir la responsabilidad del infractor, sin causa justificada (artículo 43, párrafo 2°, ibídem), lo que ratifica el momento a partir del cual se está obligado a actuar.

5.- Conforme a lo expuesto, cabe afirmar que es con vista del informe respectivo cuando el órgano llamado a abrir la investigacdión está en condiciones objetivas de adoptar una decisión, con seriedad y responsabilidad. Por esta razón es que el Tribunal ha establecido que el plazo inicial de prescripción, cuando media investigación preliminar, será desde que se entregue el informe respectivo al órgano referido que es cuando éste tiene conocimiento de los hechos y está compelido a actuar (Cfr. sentencia precitada # 25-2014-VI, considerando IX).

6.- La parte actora fundamenta la solicitud de declaración de prescripción en que la Administración tuvo conocimiento del hecho atribuido, desde antes del 20 de octubre de 2009. Sin embargo, los elementos de juicio de que se hizo acopio en estos autos, señalan que el acto disparador de la investigación preliminar fue la denuncia anónima recibida, sin precisarse fecha, según la cual la aquí actora realizaba estudios universitarios estando incapacitada; es decir, a las autoridades patronales llegó el rumor que Salas Fernández estudiaba al mismo tiempo que estaba incapacitada, según lo declaró en sede administrativa el testigo Pacheco Blanco (folios 97 a 99 del legajo administrativo). Más concretamente: un funcionario de la CCSS le solicitó al Director Médico, Dr. Hernández, tiempo para estudiar, a lo que este le explicó las limitaciones que se tenían para esos efectos; sin embargo “el compañero mencionó que otros funcionarios se incapacitaban para estudiar y es a raíz de esto que el nombre de la compañera salió a relucir” (declaración de Mena Chavarría, folios 104 a 106 ibídem). El primer acuerdo que adoptó la Dirección Médica es de fecha 20 de octubre de 2009, por medio del cual pidió información a la Universidad Santa Paula, respecto del horario, carrera, cursos matriculados por la encausada, la cual le fue suministrada según oficio recibido el 20 de noviembre siguiente; con base en esa información y en los documentos de incapacidad, se pidió abrir la investigación preliminar para determinar posibles incapacidades utilizadas para fines diferentes al criterio y reposo médico ordenado. El informe respectivo se presentó el 26 de enero de 2010.

7.- En un caso como este, donde el acto inicial es una denuncia anónima, la práctica de la investigación preliminar era tanto oportuna como necesaria; la información que se tenía a mano era escasa, y el hecho denunciado, revestía gravedad, capaz de activar el régimen disciplinario; lo que había era un rumor, puro ruido. De modo que era necesario indagar en documentos y en el campo, para determinar el grado de verosimilitud de aquel, antes de abrir el procedimiento; era necesario contar con mayores y mejores elementos de juicio para sustentar la intimación de cargos. Y es con vista del informe o estudio preliminar que el órgano llamado a implementar la investigación, podía determinar la conveniencia de iniciar el procedimiento administrativo disciplinario.

8.- Como entre el momento que el órgano competente se enteró de los hechos, esto es, a partir de que recibe el informe de la investigación previa, y la apertura del procedimiento, no transcurrió el mes, previsto en el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, el Tribunal descarta la aducida perención de la potestad disciplinaria ab initio de la investigación.

Sexto: Sobre el motivo y contenido del acto impugnado. Que conforme se ha tenido por cierto en estos autos, la actora estuvo incapacitada, inicialmente por maternidad, y luego por enfermedad; el periodo total comprende del 24 de marzo al 12 de octubre de 2009. Mientras gozaba de esa licencia, las autoridades de la CCSS tuvieron noticia de un aparente uso indebido de la licencia por incapacidad, al dedicarse a realizar estudios universitarios. La investigación preliminar reveló algunos hallazgos importantes: i) que la actora estuvo matriculada en la Universidad Santa Paula desde el año 2001, en la carrera de Terapia Física; ii) que la actora estuvo matriculada durante el III cuatrimestre de 2009, periodo agosto – diciembre, al mismo tiempo que estaba incapacitada; iii) que la actora asistió sin problemas a la práctica de terapia en el Hogar de Ancianos de Puriscal, durante el último cuatrimestre de 2009, en horario de ocho de la mañana a doce y treinta medio día, estando incapacitada. De donde concluyó que era “necesario hacer un debido proceso y la respectiva sanción en contra de la Sra. Cindy Salas Fernández debido a que se considera que la misma cayó en una falta importante al realizar estudios en horario laboral mientras estaba incapacitada …”. El Tribunal estima que la CCSS sí tuvo motivo legítimo para iniciar dicho procedimiento administrativo disciplinario, en aras de averiguar la verdad real. Ahora bien, dado que la actora demanda solidariamente tanto al ente patronal, como al funcionario responsable de adoptar en primera instancia el acto final, conviene examinar separadamente esa responsabilidad.

Sétimo: Sobre la responsabilidad personal que se atribuye a HERNANDEZ CHAVARRIA. Que ciertamente por expresa disposición de la LGAP, es responsable personal ante terceros, el servidor público que haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave en el desempeño de sus deberes o con ocasión del mismo, aunque solo haya utilizado los medios y oportunidades que le ofrece el cargo (artículo 199.1); en ese evento, la Administración es solidariamente responsable, por los daños que éste cauce, en las condiciones dispuestas (artículo 200 ibídem). Pero en este caso se da una particularidad que a nuestro entender excluye la responsabilidad atribuida, lo cual fue advertido por el codemandado en sus alegaciones de defensa. Consiste la cuestión en que el acto final dictado por Hernández Chavarría, fue impugnado por la encausada, aquí actora, vía recursos de revocatoria con apelación subsidiaria; la Dirección Regional de Servicios de Salud, Central Sur, al conocer en alzada el caso, confirmó lo resuelto. Frente a un control jerárquico administrativo de legalidad, vía recurso de apelación, es decir, en ejercicio del derecho a la doble instancia en sede administrativa (artículos 345.1 y 350.1 LGAP), cabe aplicar supletoriamente (artículo 229 LGAP), por paridad de razón, la regla prevista en el artículo 89 del Código Procesal Civil [CPC], según la cual, en materia de responsabilidad civil “la confirmación del superior libra de responsabilidad al juzgador que dictó la sentencia o auto que sea motivo de la demanda de responsabilidad.”. Si el superior jerárquico estima que el acto ablativo recurrido se ajusta a derecho y, por tanto, en lugar de anularlo, revocarlo o modificarlo, según la pretensión de la parte recurrente, se inclina por confirmarlo, desechando los agravios deducidos, él asume las consecuencias de ese control legal, y libera de responsabilidad al inferior (doctrina de los artículos 102, letra d], 162 y 180 LGAP, estos últimos entendidos en sentido contrario). No es posible mantener sujeto a responsabilidad, a un funcionario que no es autor del acto definitivo impugnado en sede jurisdiccional (artículos 49 de la Constitución, y 36, letra c], CPCA). De ahí que por esta razón meramente técnico-procesal, deba denegarse la demanda en cuanto se dirige contra Hernández Chavarría, sin que sea necesario analizar otras cuestiones planteadas, por innecesario.

Octavo: Sobre la responsabilidad que se atribuye a la CCSS. Que los hechos que motivaron la apertura del procedimiento administrativo disciplinario, pueden calificarse como de mera constatación; bastaba con contrastar los datos que constaban en unos formularios (aviso de incapacidad) con los registros de la Universidad, para determinar el comportamiento de la trabajadora encausada. Pero la calificación o apreciación jurídica de esos mismos hechos, es cuestión de otra índole. En la resolución inicial de traslado de cargos, se concibieron esos hechos como eventualmente configuradores de las siguientes faltas laborales: i) deslealtad patronal, y ii) cometer actos contrarios a la probidad y ética de los funcionarios públicos y perjuicio moral a la CCSS. Se precisó que: “ambos cargos vistos en su actuación de realizar actividades personales y privadas durante períodos de incapacidad, otorgadas para reposo y alivio de la enfermedad y dolencias que presentaba al momento de su emisión, según hechos mencionados, causando con ello un eventual perjuicio moral a la imagen institucional y faltando a la probidad y ética en su condición de funcionaria pública”. Por tanto, el objeto más importante del procedimiento administrativo emprendido, era la verificación de la verdad real de tales hechos, en cuanto servían y servirían de motivo para el acto final (artículo 214.2 LGAP). Esta jurisdicción opera como Administración negativa, cuya intervención depende de que se aprecie realmente la existencia de infracción jurídica (Cfr. PAREJO ALFONSO, Luciano. ADMINISTRAR Y JUZGAR: DOS FUNCIONES CONSTITUCIONALES DISTINTAS Y COMPLEMENTARIAS, Editorial Tecnos, S. A., Madrid, 1993, páginas 58 y 59). Lo que se impone ahora, por ende, es determinar si la Administración adoptó ese acto final dentro del procedimiento “con estricto apego al ordenamiento” (artículo 216.1 LGAP), y que su resolución no es el simple fruto de la voluntad desnuda de quien lo ha adoptado.

1.- La resolución de 29 de junio de 2010 que decidió el procedimiento por el fondo e impuso a la actora la sanción de tres días de suspensión sin goce de salario, es realmente lacónica, al omitir analizar con detalle, la prueba testimonial recibida en la audiencia oral y privada. Si bien cita normas legales, carece del relleno fáctico requerido. Pero la resolución de alzada de 2 de noviembre de 2010 que confirmó aquella, sí contiene una fundamentación aceptable. Lo anterior se señala para advertir que la Administración orilló el alcance de la prueba técnica recibida, sea básicamente la declaración de doña Victoria Chávez Ramírez, quien declaró como perito psicólogo, y la de la doctora Claudia Salazar Castro, médico responsable de las licencias de incapacidad por enfermedad.

2.- Conforme lo señalaron los órganos de Relaciones Laborales consultados, en sus dictámenes, las actividades académicas universitarias emprendidas por la actora, durante su incapacidad post parto, eran compatibles con los males de salud que originaron su emisión. Las precitadas declaraciones técnicas sugerían realizar actividades que permitieran a la actora salir del estado de tristeza o depresión post parto en que se encontraba, no confinarse o permanecer encerrada en su casa de habitación, incorporarse a actividades sociales; era prioritario hacer todo lo opuesto: realizar actividades que condujeran hasta alcanzar grados de felicidad y alegría importantes; si bien el estudio universitario genera estrés, es un estrés positivo, bueno, no contraindicado. En el considerando d] de su dictamen, la Junta Nacional de Relaciones Laborales, expresa en concreto: “El artículo 2 del Reglamento para el Otorgamiento de Incapacidades y Licencias, en lo que interesa menciona: “el otorgamiento de una incapacidad formaliza un compromiso recíproco entre el profesional en ciencias médicas tratante autorizado por la Caja y el trabajador (a), cuyo fin último es propiciar la recuperación de la salud del trabajador (a) y su reincorporación al trabajo”. El mismo artículo menciona “el trabajador (a) incapacitado queda inhabilitado legalmente para el desempeño de sus labores y para realizar otras actividades que sean remuneradas o que vayan en contra de los principios de lealtad y buena fe ...”. En vista de las declaraciones emitidas en los puntos d y e de los Resultandos [Claudia Salazar Castro y Victoria Chávez Ramírez] y tomando en consideración el artículo anteriormente citado queda demostrado que la actuación de la funcionaria investigada fue acorde al ordenamiento jurídico, a la recomendación emitida por los profesionales y no realizó ningún acto desleal o contrario a los principios éticos de los servidores públicos de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.”.

3.- De ahí que la actividad académica realizada por la actora durante su incapacidad, se albergaba dentro de una suerte de terapia curativa post parto, dirigida a aliviar y superar la enfermedad y dolencias experimentadas; su propósito trascendía la realización de metas meramente personales; no hubo divorcio o desvinculación entre la razón de ser de la incapacidad y la actividad practicada, lo que descarta la violación del artículo 10 del Reglamento del Seguro de Salud. En la resolución de 2 de noviembre de 2010, se desconoce el valor y alcances de aquellas opiniones técnico médicas, pero se hace sin auxilio de ningún otro elemento de prueba de igual o superior linaje; de modo que no deja de ser una mera conjetura.

4.- Efectivamente el motivo debe ser legítimo y “existir tal y como ha sido tomado en cuenta para dictar el acto” (artículo 133.1 LGAP). Entre éste y el contenido, debe mediar una relación adecuada; el contenido también debe ser lícito, posible, claro, preciso (artículo 132 LGAP). En este caso, la prueba recibida durante la instrucción del procedimiento, demuestra que los hechos que motivaron la apertura, no son verdaderos, ciertos; esos hechos que sirvieron de antecedentes y que justificaron el inicio del procedimiento, no se dieron o no tuvieron lugar en la forma en que fueron inicialmente apreciados, lo que significa que la Administración no tenía motivo o causa para sancionar a su trabajadora. El comportamiento seguido por la actora durante su incapacidad post parto, es compatible con las recomendaciones médicas emitidas, lo que impide calificarlos como actos de deslealtad hacia el patrono, o violatorios de la probidad y ética que ha de inspirar el ejercicio de la función pública [y privada] (artículos 113 LGAP y 3 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, #8422/2004).

5.- Es importante señalar que la parte actora en sus conclusiones orales cuestionó la prueba testimonial recibida en sede administrativa, por cuanto los testigos no fueron juramentados, según se infiere de las actas respectivas. La introducción de este alegato fue cuestionado por ambos demandados, básicamente por razones de oportunidad, señalando que tal cuestionamiento debió deducirse en la demanda; de lo contrario, se violentaría el derecho de defensa. El Tribunal no aprecia que ese planteamiento deducido en fase de conclusiones orales, de viva voz, sea fuente de indefensión. Precisamente esa es la oportunidad para referirse a todo el material probatorio filtrado, admitido en esa misma audiencia preliminar; se trata de señalarle al Tribunal sentenciador cómo y dónde se habrían configurado en el curso del procedimiento y en actos específicos, los vicios de derecho que hacen procedente la pretensión deducida. No se trata de una proposición fáctica o de hecho; estos permanecen inalterados; es una cuestión jurídica, un vicio de este género en que habría incurrido la Administración durante el desarrollo del procedimiento. Al margen de lo expuesto, el Tribunal advierte que la alegación es tanto desafortunada como inaceptable. Desafortunada porque si de la aducida falta de juramentación de testigos quiere derivarse un vicio esencial, violatorio del derecho de defensa, insanable e invalidante del acto, esto tendría como efecto y produciría por resultado la ausencia de prueba favorable a la pretensión de la misma actora. Pero es inaceptable por cuanto ese vicio, de ser cierto, no tiene los alcances y consecuencias que se le atribuyen, tal cual lo expusieron los demandados. La razón de ser del juramento es “la creación de un vínculo, y por consiguiente, un obrar, razón de ser de la afirmación jurada es informar a alguien de alguna cosa.” (CAPPELLETTI, Mauro. LA ORALIDAD Y LAS PRUEBAS EN EL PROCESO CIVIL, traducción de Santiago Sentís Milendo, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, Buenos Aires, 1972, página 178). La forma y contenido del juramento se regulan en el artículo 954 CPC. La falta de juramentación del testigo, da lugar a la inexistencia de ese vínculo, en cuyo caso se estaría frente a una declaración libre, apreciable en el caso con arreglo a las reglas de la sana crítica. No es por tanto un problema de [in] validez. Finalmente cabe preguntarse qué indefensión pudo causarle a la encausada esa falta de juramentación si ella estuvo presente durante la deposición e interrogó al deponente. Es decir, en la audiencia oral y privada, la parte estuvo presente con su asesor técnico, y no solo escuchó sino que vió al testigo declarar. Además, la parte recurrió el acto final, donde igualmente pudo protestar la irregularidad que ahora denuncia. Al no hacerlo oportunamente consintió el entuerto, pues el consentimiento purifica el proceso. De modo que este alegato debe orillarse.

6.- En su alegato de conclusiones la parte actora también hizo referencia a una supuesta violación a la privacidad del Tribunal no aprecia en ese informe ningún dato sensible capaz de comprometer la dignidad de la actora o sus derechos fundamentales a la privacidad e intimidad o autodeterminación informativa, etc.

Noveno: Conclusiones, pretensiones y excepciones. Que en armonía con lo que viene expuesto, el Tribunal constata las violaciones alegadas en el escrito de demanda y sus conclusiones, relativas a la falta de motivo para sancionar. En rigor la CCSS no tenía motivo para suspender a la trabajadora encausada. Los hechos atribuidos como violatorios del régimen disciplinario, no se configuraron; la prueba evacuada demuestra que la actora hizo uso de la incapacidad conforme a las directrices técnico médicas vertidas; todo lo cual conduce a acoger la demanda contra la CCSS, anular y expulsar el acto impugnado que dispuso la suspensión, debiendo denegarse la excepción de falta de derecho.

1.- La actora reclama daño material, consistente en el monto que resulte por los tres días de la suspensión, con sus intereses desde la fecha de la ejecución hasta su efectivo pago. Este extremo es procedente, como consecuencia natural de la nulidad y expulsión del acto impugnado, en aras de restituir las cosas al estado que guardaban antes de su adopción (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política; 158, 165, 166, 170 y 171 LGAP, y 1163 del Código Civil). Los intereses habrán de calcularse desde la fecha en que se dio [ejecutó] el rebajo salarial que es cuando la actora debió recibir el pago.

2.- También se reclama daño moral subjetivo o de aflicción. Se afirma que este proviene de la sujeción sin causa a un procedimiento disciplinario, en un momento crítico, cuando se sufría depresión post parto. Sobre este punto conviene observar lo que en un caso análogo al presente, expresó esta Sección del Tribunal, según sentencia #76-2012 de 15.00 horas de 8 de mayo de 2012, carpeta #11-003489-1027-CA:

“Sétimo: Que por expresa disposición del artículo 102, incisos b] y c] LGAP, el superior jerárquico tiene la potestad de vigilar la acción del inferior para constatar su legalidad y conveniencia, y utilizar todos los medios necesarios o útiles para ese fin que no estén jurídicamente prohibidos, lo mismo que ejercer la potestad disciplinaria. En este sentido se advierte que el [servidor, trabajador, funcionario] inferior está en una relación de subordinación y sujeción respecto de su superior, correspondiendo a este no solo el deber de vigilar la acción del inferior sino la de ejercer la potestad sancionadora disciplinaria, lo que obedece a cuestiones de sana administración, mando, dirección y orden. De donde resulta que todo servidor público está sujeto al poder disciplinario de su jefe inmediato, y en consecuencia, está obligado a soportar las inconveniencias, angustias, incertidumbres y congojas que de allí se deriven. En opinión de este Tribunal el ejercicio de esa potestad solo podría generar responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración cuando su ejercicio obedezca a razones ajenas a su naturaleza y razón de ser, o cuando devenga arbitraria e ilegítima, por los fines espurios que la animen (artículo 130 LGAP). Pero en condiciones normales no puede generar obligación de reparar las aducidas alteraciones anímicas, a título de daño moral. ...”.

3.- En este caso consta que ciertamente la Administración no tenía causa o motivo legítimo para sancionar a la encausada, pero sí tuvo motivo razonable para iniciar la investigación preliminar y posterior apertura del procedimiento administrativo. Sin embargo, esa carencia quedó de manifiesto con la prueba testimonial recabada durante la substanciación del procedimiento, y esto solo es posible determinarlo en el acto final. Desde luego que no hay evidencia objetiva que demuestre un ejercicio abusivo, arbitrario o ilegítimo de la potestad disciplinaria. De modo que no es posible acceder a la reparación pretendida, y aunque se comprende el estado de salud post parto, este motivo por sí mismo no tiene la suficiente fuerza motriz para acordar la indemnización reclamada.

4.- En cuanto al codemandado Hernández Chavarría, debe denegarse la demanda en todos sus extremos, y acogerse la excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva. La otra defensa opuesta de falta de derecho, habrá de denegarse, sin mayor análisis, por innecesario.”