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Res. 00108-2013 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV · 2013
OutcomeResultado
The Tribunal dismissed the lawsuit, upholding the validity of the dismissal with employer liability of labor risk inspectors hired by Insurance Servicios S.A., as they were under a private employment regime.El Tribunal declaró sin lugar la demanda, confirmando la validez del despido con responsabilidad patronal de los inspectores de riesgos del trabajo contratados por Insurance Servicios S.A., por ser sujetos de un régimen de empleo privado.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Litigation Tribunal, Section IV, dismissed the lawsuit filed by a group of labor risk inspectors against Insurance Servicios S.A. and the National Insurance Institute (INS). The plaintiffs claimed they were INS public employees—given their inspection and closure functions—and that their dismissal without due process was null. After an extensive analysis of public-sector outsourcing, sovereign powers, and the State's private employment regime, the Tribunal held that Insurance Servicios S.A.—legally created by INS for auxiliary purposes—was a private-law entity and its employees fell under the private employment regime (Arts. 111 and 112 LGAP). It found that all labor severance payments had been made and that the dismissal was based on the employer's power under Art. 85.d) of the Labor Code, which does not require due process. The economic interest group between INS and the subsidiary was not deemed fraudulent.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección IV, rechazó la demanda de un grupo de inspectores de riesgos del trabajo contra Insurance Servicios S.A. y el Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS). Los actores sostenían que eran empleados públicos del INS —por la naturaleza de sus funciones (inspección, clausura de centros de trabajo)— y que su despido sin debido proceso era nulo. El Tribunal, tras un extenso análisis de la tercerización en la Administración, las potestades de imperio y el régimen de empleo privado del Estado, concluyó que Insurance Servicios S.A. —constituida legalmente por el INS para fines auxiliares— era un sujeto de derecho privado y que sus trabajadores estaban bajo el régimen de empleo privado (Art. 111 y 112 LGAP). Acreditó que todos los extremos laborales fueron cancelados y que el despido se fundó en la facultad patronal del Art. 85.d) del Código de Trabajo, sin requerirse debido proceso. La existencia de un grupo de interés económico entre INS y la sociedad no fue considerada fraudulenta.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Therefore, the claims of the lawsuit seeking to establish that the INS is the employer in the relationship and to declare the dismissal without employer liability null must be rejected.Así las cosas deben rechazarse los extremos de la demanda referentes a que se establezca que el patrono en la relación es el INS y que se declare nulo el despido sin responsabilidad patronal de los actores.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"En Costa Rica el servidor público se encuentra sometido a un régimen particular, diferenciado del trabajador privado, y del cual dimanan una serie de derechos y obligaciones específicas."
"In Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations arise."
Considerando VII.II.II
"En Costa Rica el servidor público se encuentra sometido a un régimen particular, diferenciado del trabajador privado, y del cual dimanan una serie de derechos y obligaciones específicas."
Considerando VII.II.II
"Las potestades de imperio y su ejercicio son irrenunciables, intransmisibles e imprescriptibles."
"Sovereign powers and their exercise are inalienable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible."
Art. 66 LGAP citado en Considerando VII.II.I
"Las potestades de imperio y su ejercicio son irrenunciables, intransmisibles e imprescriptibles."
Art. 66 LGAP citado en Considerando VII.II.I
"No se consideran servidores públicos los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común."
"Employees of State enterprises or economic services charged with tasks subject to common law are not considered public servants."
Art. 111.3 LGAP citado en Considerando VII.II.II
"No se consideran servidores públicos los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común."
Art. 111.3 LGAP citado en Considerando VII.II.II
Full documentDocumento completo
VII.II.I- General considerations regarding the subcontracting (tercerización) of services in the Public Administration: The Public Administration employs various means for the fulfillment of public purposes, which are not exhausted in mere material actions or formal administrative acts, as it also resorts to the technique of administrative contracting, in which the completion of an object is agreed upon with a contractor, as a collaborating subject in achieving the sought-after public interest. However, unlike a private contract, in administrative contracting there is a series of elements that transcend the mere agreement of wills signed in a document and that condition its origin, development, and extinction. Thus, the administrative contract is conditioned in its origin, evolution, and termination by the specific legal framework governing the matter and the specific contracting. In this sense, the free and sovereign act of will of the contractor is filtered by the administrative legal framework, and fundamentally by the contracting regulations, be it the tender document or specifications, the basis thereof. Furthermore, a series of principles will always underlie any administrative contracting procedure, which have been delimited by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) based on vote 0998-98 at 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, and reiterated in subsequent rulings, and which are summarized basically as free concurrence, equal treatment among bidders, publicity, legal certainty, legality and transparency, good faith, balance of interests, mutability of the contract, intangibility of assets, and control in procedures. From the standpoint of positive law, the general regulatory framework for the obligations of both contracting entities and contracting companies is contemplated in the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), notwithstanding which, depending on the contracting entity and the matter in question, another sui generis regulatory framework could apply. In any case, administrative contracting is oriented toward the satisfaction of one or several public interests and arises from a need of such nature, in response to which the Administration makes the decision, for reasons of public interest, to turn to a public or private third party to supply a good or provide a good or service for its satisfaction. Originally conceived for the simple acquisition of goods, over time, contracting has been displacing direct management in different areas of the Public Administration, with an expansive force characteristic of the prevailing ideological conception of the moment. Doctrinally, a distinction has been made between the so-called direct management of the public service provided by an Administration, and indirect management. In the former, the service is provided by the Administration itself, or through another public or private legal entity, exclusively dependent upon it. In the latter, the services of a private third party who assumes all or part of the risk that they entail are contracted. In this line of thought, administrative contracting mechanisms have also come to be used as a means to avoid the growth of the public servant payroll, through the contracting of private parties, whether individual natural persons, through figures not characteristic of public employment (service contracts) or subjects created under a corporate structure, as is the case of subcontracting (tercerización) of certain activities. In the private sphere, also applicable to the public sphere, subcontracting is understood as follows: "‘Subcontracting (Tercerización)’, ‘Outsourcing’ (‘producing outside’), ‘Externalization’, ‘Offshoring’ or ‘Exteriorization’ is a ‘second step’ of Decentralization as it implies the transfer of certain functions or activities from an integrated productive process to other economic units (natural or legal persons) that are actually or fictitiously outside the company. This is the result of the firm identifying a position in its business process that could be performed more efficiently by another person or legal entity, allowing it to concentrate on the part of the business it considers most suitable." (Ermida Uriarte Oscar. OUTSOURCING /TERCERIZACIÓN: UN RECORRIDO ENTRE DEFINICIONES Y APLICACIONES. In Outsourcing. Respuestas desde los trabajadores. www.csa-csi.org). It has been indicated that this mechanism is assumed by the employer in order to maximize profits and reduce losses, through the transfer to a third party of the risk element in the subcontracted employment relationship and the fact that the latter will assume the costs inherent to it. Thus, not only the economic risk but also the legal risk is not assumed by the contracting party, but is displaced to the contracting company which is responsible to the Worker for fulfilling labor obligations and covering the respective insurance and indemnities. The company uses this mechanism to seek specialization and concentration of its workers in core and essential activities (hard business core), with bifrontal results in terms of efficacy, on the one hand, it can dedicate itself more efficiently to the production of goods and services for which it was created, and on the other, the secondary, instrumental, and accessory activities that do not add greater value but nonetheless cannot cease to be developed for the benefit of the principal ones are not demerited. In general terms, this figure is resorted to, insofar as there is a dissociation of the contracting party from said legal duties, exception made of some legislations, such as, for example, Laws 18,099 and 18,251 of Uruguay where there exists a dimensioned joint liability for the former, before breaches that fit certain assumptions. However, in our country, there being no express rule and in the absence of a contractual provision, the indicated joint liability would not apply and the contractor maintains its exclusive obligation to the worker. That figure, which originates in the private sphere, is embraced in the public sphere, thus the Public Administration, via contracting of services or other analogous mechanisms, has proceeded to transfer, through this mechanism, certain activities to the private or mixed regime, which had been carried out by the Administration itself through its officials. Additionally, as has been said, persons have been contracted under figures foreign to the public employment regime. In this line of thought, it has been indicated that although this mechanism is valid, it should not be a means for breaching labor obligations, demeriting the nature of the service provided. The vote of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), number 669, at 9:40 a.m. on November 9, 2001, indicated: "It is important to emphasize that neither in the private labor sphere, nor in the public sphere, are employers permitted to denature labor or public service contracts to diminish the protection for the worker, guaranteed in the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). In the public sector, there is no legal authorization to use forms of negotiation whose true purpose is to eliminate the rights inherent to a public labor service contract. In this case, the administrative contracting regime, by itself, does not distort the presumption of laborality that has been discussed; since, in the matter at hand, and in this specific case, what matters is not so much the form the employer may have wished to give to the contract, as what legally results, in the end, regarding the nature of the totality of what was expressly agreed upon. The denomination given to the contract cannot be used with the purpose of evading and attempting to disrespect the constitutional and legal labor guarantees developed by our legal system. This assertion, consequently, is valid for both sectors. It must also be indicated that the State and its institutions have the power to use, in their operation, legal institutes other than the 'public service contract', when this is not a mechanism for evading the burdens imposed by respect for the labor rights of public servants" (highlighting is not from the original). One of the first normative experiences in our context regarding this mechanism is found in the Law of Labor Corporations (Ley de Sociedades Anónimas Laborales). In this body of law, the regulation proper to the so-called Labor Corporations is established, and the services that may be transferred for their administration and operation are defined as follows: "Article 7- Labor corporations, established for the purpose of providing minor or auxiliary services, shall be governed by the following rules: a) The following are considered auxiliary support activities or activities not consubstantial to the public service or to the administration or institution, provided they do not constitute its main line of business: 1) Sanitation or cleaning services. 2) Surveillance services. 3) Maintenance or repair services for buildings, gardens, installations, and mechanical, rolling, and office equipment. 4) Nutrition and food services for personnel or users. 5) Computing services. 6) Secretarial and archiving services. 7) Professional services that can be exercised liberally; in particular, judicial collections, notary services, accounting, pharmacy, architecture, veterinary medicine, technical services, agricultural services, engineering, and expert assessments. 8) Transportation and distribution services for supplies or medicines. 9) Printing, publishing, and photography services. 10) Inspection, design, and construction of civil works. 11) Training and education services. 12) Dental, optometry, eyewear, and orthopedic services and workshops. 13) Pharmaceutical, chemical, engineering, and quality control laboratories. 14) Clothing manufacturing services. 15) Laundry services. 16) Recreation services. 17) Public relations services. 18) Warehousing services. 19) Any other service that, in accordance with the administration or the institution in question, qualifies as an auxiliary activity. b) No labor corporation may contract, in auxiliary or substantial activities, the provision of services representing more than twenty percent (20%) of the total annual expenditure budget of the institution. Any contract between a labor corporation and the State or its institutions that does not comply with this provision shall be null, without prejudice to the administrative, civil, and criminal liabilities of the officials involved. c) The Boards of Directors of decentralized, autonomous, and semi-autonomous institutions and of public enterprises; the municipal councils and the Ministers of State, must define, after prior consultation with the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), which activities or services are auxiliary and which are substantial or fundamental to the institutional work. d) Public servants from public bodies or entities who cease working for them may assume the provision of the contracted services as worker partners of a labor corporation". "Article 8. - The Executive Power is hereby authorized, by decree, and the decentralized institutions or administrations, by order of their hierarchical superiors, to lease or give in trust or commodatum the goods, equipment, and material accessories destined for the provision of auxiliary, support activities or those not consubstantial to the public service or the specific activity of the institution, when the development of these activities must be associated with the transfer or use of State assets or those of its institutions, which are indispensable for the exercise of the activity." As is noted from the indicated body of law, there is an enumeration of services susceptible to contracting with third parties, with the auxiliary character gravitating over each of them. Said Law was reformed by the Framework Law for Institutional Transformation and Reform of Labor Corporations (Ley Marco de Transformación Institucional y Reforma de Sociedades Anónimas Laborales), insofar as it provides: "ARTICLE 1.- Transfer of provision of services and auxiliary activities. The bodies of the State, the decentralized, autonomous, and semi-autonomous public institutions, the public enterprises of the State, and the municipalities are hereby empowered to transfer, through acts of concession or administrative contracting in conformity with the law, the provision of services and auxiliary activities in favor of the following social organizations: community development associations, cooperatives, associations, foundations, and labor corporations. This transfer shall not prejudice the obligatory control and regulation of the transferred activity, to protect the public interest and the exercise of powers of authority (potestades de imperio) and the attributions of the Administration, which are non-delegable, imprescriptible, and non-waivable. The hierarchical superiors must define which activities and services are auxiliary and which are fundamental to the institutional work, in accordance with the regulations to be issued for this purpose. In no case may public domain assets be transferred, particularly those referred to in subsection 14) of article 121 of the Political Constitution. Nor may the provision of services and activities in which the State and the institutions exercise powers of authority or of a regulatory nature be contracted, which may not be delegated." In this specific case, it was left to the discretion of the Administrations to determine the activities that could be considered auxiliary, abandoning the exhaustive enumeration of the Law cited previously. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that, in parallel to the application of the aforementioned Law, in recent decades, based on the self-organizational powers of the Administration, contracting mechanisms have been employed by different public administrations as an instrument to ensure the provision of different services, among which are highlighted from professional activities -doctors, accountants, lawyers, and computer scientists- to purely operational ones, such as security or cleaning services. In these cases, we are in the presence of an externalization understood as "a transfer of activity that the Public Administration has either been carrying out directly, or considers it necessary to carry out from a given moment onward, to a specialized organization, through a competitive process formalized in an agreement" (Peláez, J.A, and De la Cuerda, K., “Externalización de la gestión y los servicios del sector público” cited by Cantero Martínez Josefa. La incidencia del fenómeno de la externalización en la Administración General del Estado. ¿Existe algún límite?. Revista Documentación Administrativa. nº 286-287, January-August 2010, pp. 297-334). In all these administrative decisions, there has been, in the respective formal conduct of the administration, an explicit or implicit intention to transfer certain activities not consubstantial to the public service to third parties, in order to focus public management on the substantive activity of the respective entity. This has been based on presumed positive impacts both on public finances (reduction of the state payroll) and on the efficiency of the service provided. Due to the foregoing, its use has become generalized to certain activities and has been considered a valid instrument to assist in public management. This is in concert with the possibilities offered by both the specific regulation on contracting and the possibility possessed by all public entities to choose different means for the fulfillment of public purposes. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that subcontracting has as a legal limit, the impossibility that, by way of contracting services, the Administration delegates to a third party services that are consubstantial to the public function or that imply the exercise of powers of authority. In this line of thought, article 66 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) states that: "Powers of authority and their exercise are non-waivable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible." A norm complementary to this provision, applicable to the concession of management of public services, is article 74 of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa) which provides: "The Administration may indirectly manage, by concession, the services under its competence that, due to their economic content, are susceptible to business exploitation. This figure may not be used when the provision of the service implies the exercise of powers of authority or acts of authority..." Regarding powers of authority, the master Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz indicated: "... the fundamental power of the Administration is its so-called power of authority, which allows it to create obligations or suppress rights of the individual without the latter's consent. In this power, the necessity to achieve the public end at all costs stands out, since its imperative character is explained as a means to overcome the resistance of the individual in cases where he/she must collaborate in achieving said end and does not do so. From this power of authority emanate others that also reveal a superiority of the Administration over the individual, incompatible with the principle of equality." (E, Ortiz Ortiz: Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, Volume I, Editorial Stradtmann, S.A. San José, 1998, p. 39.). In the same line of thought, in the discussion of the General Law of the Public Administration draft, Prof. Ortiz Ortiz indicated: "... By public powers are understood the faculties of the Administration to act as an authority, that is, imposing itself on the individual, imposing obligations on him/her, depriving him/her of rights or denying those rights, or limiting those rights, etc. The term public powers is technically designated in the technology of public law to signify precisely that kind of authoritarian intervention of the Administration in the legal sphere of the individual, unfavorable to the latter eventually... doctrine understands by 'public powers' the so-called 'powers of authority' which can eventually harm individuals..." (Quirós Coronado, R., Ley General de la Administración Pública, Concordada y Anotada con el Debate Legislativo y al Jurisprudencia Constitucional, Editorial ASELEX S.A., Costa Rica, p. 153 and 154). As noted, the exercise of these powers has as an immediate and direct consequence the creation, modification, or extinction of rights through unilateral acts, which are implemented in the exercise of different prerogatives enjoyed by the Administration in protection of the public interest and before which the legal sphere of the individual yields. Due to said effects on the legal situations of persons, it is intrinsic to the power of authority that it is non-delegable. Given the above, unless there is an enabling norm, it is not possible for a third party, public or private, to exercise it to the exclusion of or in complement to the competent Administration. The Administration to which the Law assigned its legitimate exercise must exercise them directly, unless there is an express provision to the contrary. In the same vein, the following has been indicated: "...if we try to make the effort to transfer this concept to the sphere of administrative action to delimit which are precisely the functions of the General State Administration that imply the exercise of public powers and cannot be externalized, in principle, one would have to conclude that we cannot enclose in this category all the functions that it performs because, as we have pointed out, it is not simply about the exercise of any public function, but exclusively of those that imply the exercise 'of public powers' or of 'public power, of authority,' which in our judgment, at least should place us directly in the plane of that type of functions or tasks that exteriorize an activity of the Administration that has a direct transcendence for the legal situation of other subjects of law and for which precisely the notes of objectivity, impartiality, and independence that characterize official performance acquire relevance..." (Cantero Martínez Josefa. La incidencia del fenómeno de la externalización en la Administración General del Estado. ¿Existe algún límite?. Revista Documentación Administrativa. nº 286-287, January-August 2010, pp. 297-334). Additionally, the same author specifically refers to inspection acts in the following manner: "Special mention should be made at this point to inspection functions. An interesting doctrinal debate has been raised about the legal nature of said activities, since the function performed by inspectors is no more than a merely material, technical, or instrumental activity which the Administration normally performs prior to the exercise of its sanctioning power. As such, in principle, it would not imply the taking of definitive and binding decisions. What would be lacking, strictly speaking, is what in the community sphere has been called the decision-making autonomy proper to the exercise of public power prerogatives, that is, the faculty to be able to extract binding legal consequences from the result of the control or inspection task. We agree, however, with Bermejo Vera in considering it as an authentic power, an activity of an imperative nature that involves the exercise of authority, because it is not generated in any legal relationship, nor in pacts, nor in legal transactions, nor in singular facts, but proceeds directly from the legal system. It is 'an administrative action that presents itself as the exercise of a power previously attributed by law and delimited and constructed by it.' It is an instrument for controlling compliance with current legality, the absence of which would imply a renunciation by the State of guaranteeing the application of the Law. Moreover, with the new titles of intervention introduced by Spanish regulations for its adaptation to community regulations on free access to service activities, the reasonable thing would be to considerably strengthen said functions, since in important sectors of the country's economic activity, the prior authorization regime is going to be replaced by subsequent control or inspection, so it is now more important, if possible, that the Administration retakes and reinforces said tasks and that it does so through its officials. Otherwise, it would provoke the sensation of a total absence of control on the part of the Administration, which is scarcely compatible with the satisfaction of the general interest that it constitutionally has entrusted. On the other hand, even if we consider that the inspector lacks 'decision-making autonomy' because he/she carries out a material and technical activity, there is no doubt that said function is indispensable for the subsequent exercise of the sanctioning activity, where the mentioned autonomy of decision of the Administration would manifest itself, undoubtedly. In this sense, the inspection activity could be subsumed, at least, within the indirect exercise of public powers mentioned by the functional reserve of art. 9.2 of the Basic Statute for Public Employees. In fact, inspection personnel must be characterized by their special qualification and by meeting the notes of impartiality and objectivity, which requires their submission to rules of Public Law, to the statutory regime, which is the only one that can guarantee these qualities fundamentally based on the consecration of the note of tenure in the public function. On the other hand, the very nature of the inspection activity imposes on the employees who exercise it duties of professional secrecy and confidentiality, while also conferring on them certain prerogatives: the very character of 'agent of authority,' the possibility of requesting inter-administrative collaboration, of accessing the places to be inspected, of accessing important information and data, which implies, in short, the imposition on the inspected subject of a personal obligation, which is subject to legal reserve. That is to say, in our judgment, the performance of the inspection function should also fall under the scope of the employment reserve, and therefore, at least in principle, not be susceptible to being externalized by a mere administrative decision. This is because, as we have pointed out, the guarantee of impartiality and objectivity that the fulfillment of said tasks requires demands a special status that Administrative Law has already constructed." By virtue of the foregoing, in the case of powers of authority, it will necessarily correspond to the respective Administration to allocate the human, technical, operational, and financial resources necessary for their timely and effective exercise, applying the provisions of article 66 of the General Law of the Public Administration, which provides: "1. Powers of authority and their exercise, and public duties and their fulfillment, shall be non-waivable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible. 2. Only by law may commitments not to exercise a power of authority be established. Said commitment may only be given within a bilateral and onerous act or contract. 3. The exercise of powers in specific cases may be expressly subject to expiration, by virtue of other laws." For the determination of the existence of certain powers assigned to an entity, one must turn to the Law. In this line of thought, it has been indicated that they should preferably be specific, although the use of general powers exists. Thus, it has been pointed out that "Normally, and as we already noted, the attribution of powers by the norm must be done in a specific and concrete manner, specifying with the greatest possible degree of detail the powers or faculties that it consists of. This is a requirement of a political nature, indissoluble from the very essence of the constitutional regime: since the freedom of the individual is the basic pattern of civil coexistence, the administrative powers of intervention in it cannot be but exceptions that, therefore, must be defined with entire rigor. It is not infrequent, however, in our positive law – which is a bitter inheritance of our authoritarian political tradition – that certain norms attribute to the Administration generic powers of action through the vague and imprecise description of the ends to be achieved with them, of the factual assumptions that authorize their use, and of the means or measures they consist of” (J, Santamaría Pastor, Apuntes de Derecho Administrativo, I, Madrid, 1987, p. 585). Another untouchable limit in this matter is the existence of a hard legal core that it is not appropriate to transfer to third parties, given that it implies the very reason for being of the entity itself and is inherent to the exercise of state competences. The doctrine indicates it as follows: "The constitutional reserve of Administration – in its broad sense of reserve of the Executive Power – is formed by the activity of political direction and the activity of police and promotion. These activities, which are public functions of sovereignty, must be obligatorily developed by an Administration as it is regulated by the Constitution, that is, with the features of its institutional guarantee." There is an identification between the administrative reserve and the prohibition of formal privatization—resort to private legal ordering. It is the material object of the reserve that justifies the constitutional singularity of the public Administration. There is no freedom to choose the legal form or regime to carry out these activities that belong to the public Administration reserve. The flight to private law by these Administrations that exercise sovereign public functions is unconstitutional. Public service activity and logistical or supply activity are not typically administrative—they are not within the public Administration reserve—and do not necessarily have to be exercised by Administrations in accordance with their institutional guarantee. The Administration may choose between the administrative law regime and the private law regime. By contrast, the Administration’s free activity in the market must be conducted, obligatorily, under a private law regime in order to safeguard competition. Constitutional bodies, and in general the other branches of the State, may not resort to private law for the fulfillment of their own exclusive functions, but they may do so to carry out certain auxiliary or instrumental functions. As with the administrative reserve, it is the exclusive competences that delineate the sphere in which the use of public law is mandatory for the constitutional body.” (TRONCOSO REIGADA, Antonio, Privatización, Empresa Pública y Constitución, Marcial Pons, Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales S.A., Madrid, 1997, pages 458 and 459). Along the same lines, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) stated, when it indicated: “The Chamber further understands that the concession of public works and services referred to in this bill excludes everything relating to national security, customs control, migration, and everything having to do with the State’s own functions, which are non-delegable and inalienable and may in no way be left in private hands. Thus, for example, even if an airport is granted in concession, so that the public service provided there is carried out by a private entity, matters relating to port security, migration, and customs, among others, remain reserved exclusively to the State, and these functions may be exercised neither directly nor indirectly by private parties” (vote no. 2319-98 of 5:51 p.m. on March 31, 1998).
In accordance with the foregoing considerations, the outsourcing (tercerización) mechanism is valid for the Administration to contract certain secondary activities for the better fulfillment of the public service provided. However, its application is not unrestricted, as it has limits both with respect to the elements of the administrative act leading to its adoption or the respective contract, and with respect to the nature of the service sought to be outsourced. As an instrument at the service of the public service, any contractual figure employed cannot be arbitrary or unmotivated and must conform to the scope afforded to it by the administrative legal order. Thus, the Administration is barred from outsourcing the consubstantial activity of the entity or the exercise of sovereign powers (potestades de imperio), as indicated.
VII.II.II— Considerations on the Administration’s private employment regime: In Costa Rica, the public servant (servidor público) is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations emanate. Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, establishing the following: “Article 191.— A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration” and “Article 192.— With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed on the basis of proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal set forth in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof.” In accordance with the indicated constitutional-level norms, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of its own normative regulation, stability in employment—limiting the regime of free removal (libre remoción) characteristic of private labor regulation—and an administrative career (carrera administrativa), together with the other guarantees existing for persons covered by a subordinate employment regime, such as payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (with the caveat of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber). Correlative to the foregoing rights, the public servant has a series of employment obligations, inherent to the public purposes sought through the servant’s activity and which must always guide the servant’s conduct, so as not to incur personal misconduct generating disciplinary liability. Without intending to be exhaustive, some of the duties inherent to the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (art. 3 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Administración Pública), b) duty to comply with the principles of public service—continuity, efficiency, adaptation to changes in the legal regime, and equality of treatment—(art. 4 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), c) duty to ensure an adequate internal control environment (art. 39 of the Ley General de Control Interno), d) duty to protect the best interests of children (art. 4 and 5 of the Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia), e) duty to comply with the legal order (art. 13 and concordant articles of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, art. 39(a) of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil), f) duty to provide a prompt response and information to the user (art. 5 and 10 of the Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos), g) duty of obedience (art. 108 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), h) duty to act effectively (art. 5 of the Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos), i) duty to maintain decorum and to give due attention to the user (art. 114 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and art. 39(d) and (e) of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil), j) duty to respond in case of having acted with intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) (art. 199 and 211 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (art. 11 of said normative body). Additionally, on a supplementary basis, pursuant to article 9 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and article 51 of the indicated Estatuto, the provisions of the Código de Trabajo and other provisions related to the employment relationship—such as, for example, the Ley de Hostigamiento Sexual en el Empleo y la Docencia, the Ley de Regulación del Fumado, the Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para Personas con Discapacidad, among others—are applicable to said public employment relationship. In this order of ideas, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal order and labor-law principles given the existence of a statutory (estatutaria) and not contractual relationship (article 111 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), the existence of general guiding lines of the relationship that are common cannot be overlooked, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in article 19 of the Código de Trabajo. In addition to said figure in the employment relationship, articles 111.3 and 112.2 and 3 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública provide for the existence of the public employee under the State’s private employment regime (régimen de empleo privado del Estado). In this regard, said norms state the following: “...3. Employees of State enterprises or economic services entrusted with activities governed by ordinary law (derecho común) are not considered public servants.” and “Article 112....2. The service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management (gestión pública) of the Administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as appropriate. 3. However, the provisions of public law, whether statutory or regulatory, that are necessary to guarantee administrative legality and morality shall also apply to the latter, as determined by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) by Decree.” In accordance with the foregoing norms, there is a considerable group of persons who provide services to public entities who cannot be considered public servants, given that they are employees under the State’s private employment regime. In this sense, it has been pointed out that they fall into two broad groups, namely, on the one hand, those who work for public enterprises (ICE, INS, CNFL, RACSA, among others) or who provide their labor to State economic services (Tiendas Libres del IMAS), and those who do not participate in what is known as public management. Regarding the rationale for this figure, Lic. Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz stated the following: “Our idea is to draw a clear boundary between what we consider should be ordinary workers of the State and servants governed by the State’s special Public Law. Of course, there is a minimum, as article 116 [referring to the current article 112] reveals, that we want to be common in one sense; it is obvious that a State worker, no matter how similar the worker’s regime may be to that of an ordinary worker in a private company, always has opportunities that the ordinary worker does not have, so we want to guarantee the morality and legality of the administration in what relates strictly to them, but always preserving their status as ordinary law workers. This is the same as well, for example, regarding employees of autonomous entities, which are public enterprises… this concerns those State enterprises that function as if they were private entities because they sell and do the same things as private parties, for example, the INS itself when it sells policies does the same thing as any insurance company, the bank when it makes a loan does the same thing as an ordinary financial entity, the CNFL, which sells electric energy, sells it under the same conditions under which a private company could sell it; we maintain that those employees of those entities should be considered ordinary workers and not public officials, why, because otherwise there is a series of statutes and regulations that apply to them directly or supplementarily that hinder the operation of those services to the detriment of the public entity… Conversely, if we were to try to extend to these officials the stability regime characteristic of the ordinary officials of the Executive Branch, we would find that a series of tremendous obstacles are created for enterprises that must operate under conditions of competition equal to those of private enterprise… So we wanted to preserve that private, labor or commercial regime of the public enterprise that has a commercial activity (giro mercantil) identical to that of private parties..... We do not see the need for a salaried worker (trabajador de planillas) or an employee of an autonomous institution that is a public enterprise functioning as an ordinary commercial entity to be given the advantages or imposed the duties of a public servant; moreover, that thesis that contemplates special advantages or special burdens, one must also see this negative side that by being suppressed it results in a favor to them, they will not be applied because they will not be considered public servants, except naturally where those laws do not speak of public servants but rather, as is most likely, refer specifically to such and such type of servants, defining which servants are covered, when they refer to salaried workers (planillas) it implies it, and you see that, for example, in pension laws, for example, of the employees of the Ministry of Transport or the guards of the Ministries. I believe that perhaps the misunderstanding that has arisen could be dispelled somewhat when one reads article 116 which says ‘Administrative law shall be applicable to service relationships between the Administration and its public servants’ by which we mean that when dealing with servants who are not public, administrative law—which is this entire Code and its related laws—will not be applied to them, but rather labor law, meaning they are simply ordinary workers. Now, why should an ordinary worker of the State be treated better than an ordinary worker of a private company, when both operate under equal circumstances? Why should one not have a pension if the laws have not expressly covered that person with that protection and others will have it? It seems to us that it is not fair for one worker to have more rights or more burdens than another ordinary worker, both governed by the Código de Trabajo, simply because one is a State worker and the other is a worker of a private entity; so it seems to us that what is appropriate in this is uniformity of the regime; if they are workers and are governed by the Código de Trabajo, they should be protected only by it and by related laws, not by administrative law.” (Quirós Coronado, R., Ley General de la Administración Pública, Concordada y Anotada con el Debate Legislativo y la Jurisprudencia Constitucional, Editorial ASELEX S.A., Costa Rica, pp. 153 and 154 and minutes of the Comisión Permanente de Gobierno y Administración, Act No. 99 Extraordinary Session, of March 23, 1970). In the same vein, legal commentators have indicated the distinction between the public employment regime and the Administration’s private one, in the following manner: “The personnel at the service of these enterprises may be considered part of public employment only from an economic or, perhaps, sociological point of view, but not from a legal point of view. The relationship that binds them to their enterprise is of a strictly private nature, regulated by labor law for all purposes. It is true that this rule has some exceptions, since the public nature of the enterprise entails the application of certain specialties characteristic of public law. For example, in matters of incompatibilities...” (Sánchez Morón, Miguel. Derecho de la Función Pública. Editorial Tecnos). Additionally, in other legal systems, the use of this legal figure is also provided for. In this order of ideas, it is stated: “In Germany, by express provision of the Ley Fundamental of May 23, 1943, the closed civil service model coexists with Labor Law. This is provided for in paragraph four of Article 33 of the Ley Fundamental; by reserving the exercise of public power prerogatives to agents of the Administration bound to public entities by a relationship of service and fidelity, i.e., to career civil servants (funcionarios), it is indirectly admitting that other functions that do not entail the exercise of these prerogatives may be, though not necessarily, provided by labor-law agents… Upon this constitutional reserve, which is limited to establishing a reserve for the civil service regime without setting any limit—since it does not prevent the legislator from establishing an administrative regime for all Administration personnel—was superimposed, however, the Ley federal marco de la función pública of February 27, 1985, whose art. 2.2 transforms the reserve into a positive limit by prescribing that only career civil servants may fill posts that involve the exercise of public powers and the exercise of public authorities or tasks that, for reasons of State security or public life, cannot be entrusted to persons linked to the Administration by an employment relationship. Through this channel, labor contracting has become widespread in the lower levels of the civil service, i.e., in instrumental posts, administrative support, and those involving the performance of physical or manual work, from which career civil servants have been displaced, reserving for the latter functions of certain importance and, of course, the directive function, a solution that has the advantage of preventing the overlapping of career civil servants and labor-law employees in the same work posts.” (Silvia del Saz, Contrato Laboral y Función Pública, Editorial Marcial Pons, Ediciones Jurídicas S.A, Madrid 1995). Our Constitutional Chamber has also referred to said figure, establishing the following: “For its part, from the interrelation of articles 112(2) and 111(3) (the norm to which the former refers and both from the same Law), it is also clear that they are not officials subject to the public employment regime, but rather laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, the employees of State enterprises or economic services entrusted with activities governed by ordinary Law (Derecho común), who, in accordance with transcribed article 112(2), are governed by Labor Law (Derecho laboral) and not by Public Law, which empowers them to bargain collectively. …. Therefore, the regime is administrative, statutory, for ‘public servants,’ that is, for those who provide services to the administration or on its behalf and account, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective investiture act; however, the Ley General de la Administración Pública itself establishes that ‘the service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as appropriate.’ Consequently, and based on this constitutional interpretation and the texts contained in the Ley General de la Administración Pública, in the public sector only those servants who do not participate in public management may enter into collective labor agreements (convenciones colectivas de trabajo), such that entities with an employment regime of a labor-law (non-public) nature, such as, for example, State enterprises, of which national doctrine has said they are ‘those that function as if they were private enterprises, because they sell and do the same things as private parties; for example, the INS itself when it sells policies does the same thing as any insurance company, the bank when it makes loans does the same thing as an ordinary financial entity, the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, which sells electric energy, sells it under the same conditions under which a private company could sell it,’ among others, may indeed bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions that inform Collective Labor Law” (vote 2000-4453 of 2:56 p.m. on May 24, 2000). To the same effect, votes no. 3053-94 of 9:45 a.m. on June 24, 1994, 2000-9690 of 3:01 p.m. on November 1, 2000, as well as resolutions 2000-07730, 2006-6728, 2006-7261, 2006-3001, 2006-2006, 2006-7966, 2006-6729, 2006-17743, and 2006-1743. In a similar vein, the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has ruled in the following manner: “There emerges, then, a clear division of the Administration’s servants into two groups: those governed by Public Law and those governed by Labor Law. Finally, it also follows from the foregoing that, ultimately, the Chamber left it to the ordinary judge to determine, in each specific case, whether the relationship is statutory or not; and, if it is not, it is then governed by Private Labor Law... From the foregoing, it can thus be concluded that a public official (funcionario público) is anyone who, regardless of the nature of the activity performed, has been appointed as such, by means of a formal, valid, and effective act of appointment, to exercise public powers, within the field of competence; whether in inter-organic relations (employee) or inter-subjective relations (official). When dealing with workers whose link to the Public Administration was not produced by virtue of that indispensable formal act, and who are employees of State enterprises or economic services entrusted with activities governed by ordinary Law; or laborers, workers, or employees who do not participate in public management, their relationships shall then be governed by Private Labor Law. However, it is of great importance to make one final observation. The status of public official is not a product of a concession derived from a discretionary act of the Administration; the required appointment, or the act of investiture, is not something left to the Administration’s discretion; rather, its definition, in its legal scope, was left in the hands of the legislator, according to the considerations set forth above. Consequently, only in the specific cases of exception expressly provided for in the indicated articles 111 and 112 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública is it possible to be in the presence of relationships of State servants subject to the general or ordinary private employment regime.” (Vote No. 513-2001 of 9:50 a.m. on August 20, 2001).
The Constitutional Chamber has deemed that this regime even extends to personnel contracted by corporate entities created by said public enterprises (e.g., corporations (sociedades anónimas) created by State Banks or other public entities). In this regard, it stated: “…the Chamber deems that with the creation of these ‘corporations’ a type of administrative deconcentration (desconcentración administrativa) has operated, which has permitted a specialization of the activity, separated from the founding entity; however, the separation is not absolute. Indeed, the allocation of resources for the fulfillment of the purpose entrusted by the founder and the use of the trade name of the autonomous institution offer an image of integration (e.g., BN puesto de Bolsa). Now, unlike pure and simple deconcentration, the creation of a distinct legal entity (corporation) within the scheme of the autonomous entity implies separation of the corporation with respect to budget control and resource management, among other things; which the legislator has achieved by granting full legal personality, characteristic of the ‘corporation’ figure of private law. Now, even if these entities are called ‘corporations,’ they are administratively part of the scheme of the autonomous institution to which they belong. Through these legal figures characteristic of private law and unknown to classical public law, the founding entity seeks to fulfill the purpose assigned to it. The special nature of these ‘corporations’ is also reflected in the possibility of constituting them with a single shareholder, a scheme inadmissible under private law, for which the existence of a corporation presupposes a ‘gathering of several persons subject to a single rule.’ The Procuraduría General de la República is therefore correct in stating that these corporations are an ‘instrument’ that the legislator has made available to these autonomous entities to achieve their purposes, to which recourse has been had, given that the public scheme has not permitted the financial group system implemented by national private banks. Therefore, this instrument called ‘corporation’ is not equivalent to the private law figure in all its splendor; rather, from the point of view of its organization, it is a specialized activity of the founding entity, and for that purpose it has, in its ordinary activity, full legal personality not incompatible with the founding entity, with which, in principle, it does not compete and to which it is attached—by ownership of the shares—. Therefore, these corporations necessarily partake in the nature of the creating entity; that is, they are enterprises of the founding entity and consequently of the State. Within this order of ideas, principles such as transparency in actions, prior and subsequent control over resource management, State ownership of public domain goods (bienes demaniales), application of the contracting regime and of public employment principles, and the principle of accountability and performance measurement are applicable to these corporations... The corporations of the State banks and of the INS, although in their ordinary stock-market activity they may be governed by private law, are not equivalent to corporations formed by private-law subjects, with at least two persons in association. … In effect, the nature of their owner—the autonomous institution—is dragged along by the so-called ‘corporation’ to the point that it is not possible to recognize it as a holder of fundamental rights protectable through this jurisdictional avenue.” (vote 2002-06513 of 2:57 p.m. on July 3, 2002). In accordance with the foregoing, we would be in the presence of an Administration private employment regime in the case of workers of public enterprises, in their various modalities of public-law entity enterprise, private-law subject, or organ-enterprise, and also in the case of those servants who do not participate in public management. With respect to this latter case, vote 4453-2000 of 2:56 p.m. on May 24, 2000, of the Constitutional Chamber, among others, stated the following: “...it falls to the Administration itself, to legal practitioners in general, and ultimately to the Judge, when hearing specific cases, to determine whether a State institution or a group of its servants or officials constitutes the core of the exception that may bargain collectively, or whether, on the contrary, that path is barred to them...” Thus, in this latter case, a margin of discretion is preserved, to the extent that it falls to each administration to determine whether, in each particular case, one is in the presence of the regime under analysis or not, i.e., whether it is deemed that it participates in public management or not. There will be obvious cases thereof depending on the activity carried out by a particular group of servants (e.g., doctors, teachers, police officers, judges, etc.) and there will be borderline cases where the adoption of a position and a decision by the applier of the law will be required for its specific application. As direct legal effects of this differentiated regime, they will not be covered by the stability regime characteristic of the public employment regime, given that they are governed by the Código de Trabajo, and as a consequence of the foregoing, they may indeed resort to conventional mechanisms to agree upon employment conditions, such as collective agreements (convenciones colectivas). By reason of these consequences, the possibility of free removal (libre remoción) of said workers exists, on the understanding that if the termination occurs with employer liability, i.e., payment of labor severance, due process does not apply, but if it occurs as a consequence of the exercise of disciplinary power, said process is indeed imperative. Additionally, there is no legal impediment for said workers to organize through a union and negotiate working conditions with the entity or enterprise or to resort to the labor dispute resolution mechanisms provided for in the Código de Trabajo. The different nature of this regime does not, however, impede the application of administrative law regulations regarding control and transparency in the worker’s conduct, nor does it empower the Administration of the entity or enterprise to carry out arbitrary, unmotivated, or unlawful actions, such as dismissal due to union persecution, discrimination in employment, or even the lack of adequate substantiation of the administrative decision. Again, it must be stated that conduct has limits inherent in the legal order and in the human condition of the workers that are unavoidable, whatever the applicable labor regime may be.
Having made these considerations, the specific analysis of the case at hand in this resolution proceeds.
VII.II.III- Regarding the nature of the plaintiffs' employment regime and the employer figure in the case under analysis: In their complaint, the plaintiffs claim that they performed duties as work-risk inspectors starting on August 17, 2009, and that by reason of said function, they were empowered to inspect workplaces, close businesses, or halt construction for non-payment of the respective policy. Based on the foregoing, they invoke the public nature of said activity and indicate that in application of the theory of the State as the sole employer, the legal nature of the employment relationship with Insurance Servicios S.A. is mixed and its workers are State employees. Based on this, they request that the contracting of insurance services with them be declared null and that their dismissal without liability be annulled for failure to follow due process. They also request that the INS be established as the employer in the relationship, given that they provided services for it and used equipment, identification, and other items belonging to said entity. In this regard, it has been demonstrated in the case file that Mr. Guillermo Constenla Umaña, in his capacity as General Attorney-in-Fact without Limit of Sum of the INS, incorporated the corporation named Insurance Servicios S.A., and that this entity signed a master corporate services agreement with the Instituto Nacional de Seguros to regulate the mutual relationship concerning the provision of reciprocal services. In this vein, as the defendant parties have indicated, this Court considers that the provisions of Article 1 of the Creation Law of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, as amended by the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, must be applied, as it currently provides: "Artículo 1.- Instituto Nacional de Seguros and its activities. The Instituto Nacional de Seguros, hereinafter INS, is the autonomous insurance institution of the State, with its own legal personality and patrimony, authorized to develop insurance and reinsurance activity. In such activities, it shall be subject to the regulation, supervision, and sanctioning regime established for all insurance entities. The INS shall be empowered to perform all technical, commercial, and financial actions required, in accordance with the best business practices, including the possibility of rejecting insurance when technically or commercially justified, as well as to define insurance conditions and risk retention margins, according to its technical criteria and administrative policies. Decisions regarding the functions placed under its competence may only emanate from its Board of Directors and shall be its exclusive responsibility. The INS shall have its legal domicile in the city of San José and may have branches, agencies, or offices in the rest of the country. In the development of insurance activity in the country, which includes the administration of commercial insurance, the administration of the Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo and the Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos Automotores, the INS shall have the full guarantee of the State. The INS is empowered to incorporate or acquire equity interests in corporations (sociedades anónimas), commercial companies, branches, agencies, or any other commercial entity of a similar nature, none of which shall have the guarantee indicated in the preceding paragraph, for the following purposes: a) To carry out the activities entrusted to it by law within the country. Such activities include financial activities, granting of credits, health services provision, and those activities proper to the Cuerpo de Bomberos, the supply of medical benefits, and the sale of goods acquired by the INS by reason of its activities. Additionally, the INS may establish, by itself or through its companies, strategic alliances with public or private entities in the country or abroad, for the sole purpose of fulfilling its competence. Both the INS and its corporations, with the approval of their respective boards of directors, may prudently incur debt in accordance with corresponding financial studies. These operations shall not have the guarantee of the State. Public banks are authorized to participate as shareholders in the corporations that the INS establishes according to the provisions of this article, provided that the INS remains the majority shareholder of said companies". (emphasis added). In accordance with the foregoing provision, it is evident that the Instituto Nacional de Seguros was authorized to incorporate the co-defendant company, as the existing legal framework permits it to create corporations for the fulfillment of its legal purposes. Regarding the private legal nature of the company Insurance Servicios S.A. and therefore its effects on the relationship with its workers, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) ruled as follows: "I.- The plaintiff alleges that starting May thirty-first, two thousand ten, he was hired to provide services as a Corporate Account Executive at INSurance Servicios Sociedad Anónima for an indefinite term; however, once the period established in the Labor Code as a probationary period had elapsed, without having committed any fault, he was dismissed without following any procedure, without being given the corresponding notice, and without just cause; he was only informed by a note signed by the head of the Human Resources area that, due to an administrative decision, they would dispense with his services as of August thirteenth, two thousand ten, with labor liability, for which he filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the dismissal decision on September sixth, two thousand ten, but as of the date of filing this amparo, said motion has not been resolved. II.- From the brief filing this appeal and the accompanying documentation, it is observed that the respondent Insurance Servicios Sociedad Anónima (folio 17) is a private law subject, whose challenged action does not correspond to be heard or evaluated in this constitutional court, given that there are other remedies provided in the legal system that are suitable and timely for hearing the facts alleged in this amparo. In this sense, the discussion regarding the propriety and validity of the mentioned dismissal, as well as the procedure used to make it effective, represents a typical labor conflict that must be settled in the labor jurisdiction, as it is the competent jurisdiction to hear this matter, and in which such conflict can be resolved—with the required evidentiary breadth—and the rights of the protected party can be effectively safeguarded. III.- Regarding the lack of resolution of the motion for reconsideration filed against the mentioned dismissal, it should be noted that even though Article 41 of the Political Constitution establishes the right to obtain a prompt resolution, in this case, the motion whose lack of resolution is claimed was made before the Executive President of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, who in turn is the President of Insurance Servicios Sociedad Anónima—the company for which the protected party worked and which also ordered his dismissal with labor liability (folio 57)—which, in this case, does not constitute a public entity, but one of a private legal nature; therefore, the alleged violation has not occurred. Hence—if the protected party deems it appropriate—he must resort to the respondent party itself or, failing that, to the appropriate jurisdictional avenue, in protection of the rights he believes assist him". (vote 2010-17033 of fourteen hours and forty-four minutes of October thirteenth, two thousand ten). The foregoing was ratified by vote 11-14638 of fourteen hours thirty minutes of November thirtieth, two thousand eleven, which ruled: ""I.- In the present case, from the evidence in the case file and the statements of the appellants themselves, it is inferred that they signed individual labor contracts for an indefinite term with the company Insurance Servicios S.A. Regarding amparo appeals filed against State companies, in judgment N° 16586-2006 of 10:20 hrs. on November 17, 2006, the Chamber stated: 'This Court clarifies its jurisprudential line regarding the dismissal of employees of private companies of the State in this matter as follows: when the amparo appeal is directed against this type of entity, it must first be assessed whether the protected party has or does not have a relationship regulated by common law; in which case, once the execution of the individual labor contract is verified, the termination of the relationship is generally governed by the provisions of the Labor Code and must be submitted to the knowledge of the ordinary judge, who is the one responsible for analyzing the legality of the dismissal. (…)'. In the same vein, as noted, between the company and the entity that originates it, there exists a link clearly described in vote 2002-06513 of fourteen hours and fifty-seven minutes of July third, two thousand two, cited in previous considerandos. For purposes of the employment regime, this Court considers that it must be understood that a sui generis link operates between both, which could be characterized as a business group with common economic interests, beyond the invoked theory of the State as sole employer, which does not have the indiscriminate scope that the representation of the plaintiff intends for this type of public entities that carry out business activities. Regarding the concept of an economic group, it must be considered that this figure has been applied to different legal disciplines, from tax, regulatory, consumer law, etc., to labor law, in strict application of the principle of the primacy of reality. In this vein, the doctrine has characterized that in private labor law there exists the group of economic interest as a novel model where a complex business/employer structure arises that displaces traditional organizational models. In this sense, Fernando Valdés Dal-Re indicates that the traditional operation is characterized by: ".. control of the entire cycle of production of goods and services (vertical integration), the autonomy of each company in its relations with others, and a hierarchical functional management...". He points out that it is replaced by "---another one with structural features of the opposite sign: fragmentation of the productive cycle (horizontal integration), dependence, coordination, and articulation in inter-company relations, and management that privileges functional autonomy. Centralization will give way to decentralization and autonomy, to internal and external interconnection" (Valdés Dal-Ré. Fernando. Productive Decentralization and Disorganization of Labor Law. cited by Bolaños Céspedes Fernando. In Complex Organization of Companies and its Effects on Labor Law. A Costa Rican Vision. Revista Derecho Laboral. Number 1. November 2009). The foregoing considerations are applicable to the case under analysis (with the caveat that it is based on a law that so authorizes and that, as will be stated, the existence of an avoidant intent in its creation was not demonstrated), given that based on a legal authorization, the company-public law entity created a corporation for the exercise of activities it considered auxiliary; a permanent linkage originating in their legal nature and in the services connecting them having been demonstrated in both, such as the use of common equipment, similar identifications, related image, etc. Regarding some of the indicia for determining the existence of a link between two economic subjects, the doctrine indicates that '... various indicia have been pointed out to determine in a specific case whether one is in the presence of an economic conglomerate. Among such indicia are mentioned: sharing administration, domicile, machinery; if the workers perform duties in several of the group companies; if there is a coincidence of directors; if they have complementary lines of activity, etc. Judges analyze the set of indicia to reach a conclusion. ..' (Mangarelli Cristina. Responsibility of the Company that uses subcontractors, intermediaries, or labor suppliers in Uruguay. Revista Derecho Laboral. Number 1. November 2009). With great precision, our Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice has referred to this figure as follows: 'IV.- ON GROUPS OF ECONOMIC INTEREST: It is a well-known fact that the development of economic relations worldwide and an integrationist trend has given rise to the appearance of new and very diverse forms of contracting and has also influenced the emergence of different forms of company organization in the development of their commercial operations. In Labor Law, as in other branches of law, this situation has often required the rethinking of some legal institutions, the emergence of new figures to regulate novel situations; and also, in other cases, the adaptation of existing legal concepts to the advancement and development of mainly social and economic relations. Regarding what is to be understood by an economic conglomerate, Ermida Uriarte points out that "this is a group of companies, formally and apparently independent, which are, however, reciprocally interlinked, to the point of forming a single, complex but compact whole, insofar as it responds to a single interest". (Ermida Uriarte, Oscar. "The concept of the transnational company and some of its repercussions in Labor Law". Taken from Relaciones Laborales y Globalización: Antología de textos. Compiled by Alexander Godínez Vargas. San José, Judicial School, Supreme Court of Justice, first edition, 1999, pp. 174-188). For his part, Plá Rodríguez defined it as the "group of apparently autonomous companies but subject to a single economic direction." (Plá Rodríguez, Américo. "Los Grupos de Empresas". Idem, pp. 148-154). Likewise, labor doctrine has attempted to establish the determining elements of the group of economic interest and, in a general manner, has indicated that the essential characteristics of the group of companies are the plurality of components, which are linked to each other and subject to a single decision-making power, and also the underlying unity of the group, which is given precisely by the common economic interest. Indeed, the group cannot be conceptualized except through the idea of plurality; since there is no group if there is not more than one component. It is, therefore, a matter of independent legal entities that make up such economic conglomerate. These companies are interlinked through relationships of subordination or coordination; but normally, the link is one of subordination. Consequently, what exists is the subjugation of all the group entities, or all but one, to a determined control or a common management. At the same time, these companies are organized into a broader economic structure and, of course, are influenced by a single interest or by a single economic policy. (Ermida Uriarte, Oscar, op.cit. and Plá Rodríguez, Américo, op.cit.)...' To further elaborate on the reasoning presented, it has been demonstrated in the case file that the company Insurance Servicios S.A. forms part of the financial group Instituto Nacional de Seguros, duly authorized by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. It is for all the foregoing that, in the case subject to this resolution, there is abundant evidence of the said link between the INS and the company Insurance Servicios S.A., but it is meritorious to indicate that the foregoing, and the relationship between both, does not blur the employer status of one, in light of the evidence produced. The theory of the economic conglomerate or group of business interest has effects, above all, in the face of a claim for liability for breach of labor obligations—so that any member of the conglomerate is liable for the obligations of any of the parties—but it does not mean that the immediate relationship between the worker and their immediate employer is rendered null. The application of the concept also operates in situations where there is an attempt to evade reality vis-à-vis the worker, trying to feign the non-existence of a link between members of the group with the latter, or to hide connections, always with the purpose of avoiding compliance with legal obligations. This does not occur in the case under analysis. As noted, in the present process, despite the link between the co-defendants being demonstrated, it has been proven in the case file that all plaintiffs were promptly settled and paid all labor items arising from the termination of their employment relationship, making the determination of who the immediate employer is irrelevant. Therefore, in the evident relationship between the INS and the co-defendant, there is no purpose to evade legal obligations, nor has the relationship been created contra legem. The situation would have been different in the face of a claim arising from a dismissal without employer liability—which, as we have indicated, does not occur in the case under study—given that, based on the said doctrine and the objective liability of the State (Art. 190 LGAP), the plaintiff could well address any of the co-defendants in the present process. It is not superfluous to indicate that the defendant entity is not seeking to diminish the link either and, on the contrary, bases it as a consequence of the regulations that permit it. For this Court, it is clear that the INS creates Insurance Servicios S.A. under the protection of the legal system, within the context of the market opening resulting from the Free Trade Agreement with the United States of America, and with the aim of competing under better conditions with new players in the insurance market. The Insurance Market Regulatory Law grants that possibility in order to operate under deregulation, and that is why, despite the existence of that link, it is not possible to proceed from the existence of an unlawful group of economic interest, given that the legality of the relationship is granted by said legislation. In this vein, what jurisprudential antecedents and doctrine reproach as contrary to law is that economic group that exists for the purpose of evading, concealing, or deceiving, which, as has been indicated, does not occur in the present case; a reason for which, and given the absence of breach of labor obligations, it is not possible to disregard the existence of Insurance Servicios S.A. as the employer figure. Thus, in the case under examination, it has been demonstrated that, based on the master agreement signed by the co-defendants, both parties executed a contract for the provision of the service of 17 work-risk inspectors, and the plaintiffs were hired as such by the company Insurance Servicios S.A. By reason of the foregoing, it is noted that, although Insurance Servicios S.A. is born as a figure of a private corporate nature, it is protected by the legal system that permits the Instituto Nacional de Seguros its creation. Given the foregoing, it is evident that the persons who work for it form part of the private employment regime and consequently can be validly dismissed if their labor rights are recognized, as the termination of the labor relationship does not have a disciplinary origin. As has been indicated, Article 111 of the General Public Administration Law classifies the private employment relationship by the Administration, either by the activity or by the line of business of the entity for which one works. In the case under examination, in the legal situation of the plaintiffs we are in the second scenario, given that their employer is a private law subject created by an entity-company. On the other hand, although it is recorded in the case file that at certain times INS facilities and equipment were used, as well as the use of its materials and the coincidence regarding the content of identification cards, this does not imply that the plaintiffs' relationship was with said entity, given that, as has been stated, it forms part of a group of economic interest with Insurance Servicios S.A., and additionally, the contract signed between both parties expressly provided for said shared use, given the evident and uncontroversial link between both legal subjects. It is worth highlighting the contradictions existing between the deponents, Mr. Erick Duarte Fallas and Karen Morelli Alfaro, given that while the former reaffirmed that the exercise of management and hierarchical powers were carried out by persons linked to Insurance Servicios S.A., the latter, in her testimony, sought to link them to the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. In any case, it must be understood that any situation or overlap of instructions, orders, or guidelines that may have been issued by both co-defendants stems from the dynamic proper to an employment relationship within a legitimate group of economic interest and the nature of the services rendered. It is also evident that, for inspection services, within the linkage of the co-defendants, both deemed it necessary to use an institutional image for purposes vis-à-vis third parties, without this meaning that Insurance Servicios S.A. does not occupy the employer figure with respect to the plaintiffs. The differentiated nature of the company from the entity that created it, according to the provisions of the legal framework that empowers the latter—despite their linkage—allows Insurance Servicios S.A. to have a different employment regime, with salary scales, benefits, and occupational profiles different from the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. In any event, it should be noted that for this Chamber, even if the plaintiff intends to apply the principle of primacy of reality, there is ample evidence to the effect that the immediate employer figure with the plaintiffs was the co-defendant Insurance Servicios S.A. Thus, it has been demonstrated that the Personnel Administration Department of the company issued personnel action for the interim appointment of the plaintiffs, and all signed a confidentiality agreement with it. It is also recorded that the Human Resources unit of the company processed vacation and leave requests for the indicated plaintiffs and, in at least two cases, referred to the recognition for the quality of their work. Finally, there is evidence that the Chief of Operations of said corporation was the one who communicated to all the fact that the decision had been made to end their notice period and settle the eleven days pending for that concept. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff is not correct in claiming that their employment relationship is of a nature different from the private employment regime and that it was established with the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. As is evident from the case file, the immediate labor relationship of the plaintiffs is with the company Insurance Servicios S.A., and it is thus that the same possesses a nature and raison d'être instrumental to the purposes of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, without this implying that the latter occupies the employer figure, especially considering that the respective termination was with employer liability and that, for that reason, the application of a prior due process is not required, which is only applicable when the employment relationship is broken as a consequence of a disciplinary measure. The dismissal carried out is legitimate, given that, as workers under the private employment regime of the Administration, the parties are subject to the provisions of Article 85.d) of the Labor Code, which provides: "ARTICULO 85.- The following are causes that terminate the labor contract without liability for the employer and without extinguishing the rights of the latter or their beneficiaries to claim and obtain the payment of benefits and indemnities that may correspond to them by virtue of the provisions of this Code or special provisions: ....d. The employer's own will". Regardless of the discussion regarding whether or not it was legitimate for the Instituto Nacional de Seguros to outsource work-risk inspection to Insurance Servicios S.A., the same is not relevant for the purposes of the claims referred to in this considerando, given that, as has been indicated, whether before one or the other co-defendant, the employment regime of the plaintiffs is of a private nature and, consequently, the dismissal carried out was valid and effective.
Thus, the claims of the lawsuit must be rejected regarding the establishment that the employer in the relationship is the INS and that the dismissal of the plaintiffs without employer liability be declared null.”, **VII.II.I- General considerations on the outsourcing of services in the Public Administration:** The Public Administration employs various means for the fulfillment of public purposes, which are not limited to mere material actions or formal administrative acts, as the technique of administrative contracting is also resorted to, in which the fulfillment of an object is agreed upon with a contractor, as a collaborating subject in achieving the public interest sought. However, unlike a private contract, in administrative contracting there is a series of elements that transcend the mere meeting of the minds signed in a document and that condition its creation, development, and extinction. Thus, the administrative contract is conditioned in its origin, evolution, and termination by the specific regulations governing the matter and the contracting in particular. In this sense, the act of will, free and sovereign, of the contractor is filtered by the administrative legal system, and fundamentally by the regulations of the contracting, be it the bid specifications or conditions document, which is its basis. Furthermore, underlying every administrative contracting procedure will always be a series of principles that have been delimited by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) from vote 0998-98 of 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, and reiterated in subsequent rulings, which are basically summarized as free participation, equal treatment among bidders, publicity, legal certainty, legality and transparency, good faith, balance of interests, mutability of the contract, asset intangibility, and control in the procedures. From the point of view of positive law, the general regulatory framework for the obligations of both the contracting entities and the contracting companies is established in the Law of Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), notwithstanding which, depending on the contracting entity and the matter in question, another sui generis regulatory framework could apply. In any case, administrative contracting is oriented towards the satisfaction of one or more public interests and arises on the occasion of a need of such nature, in response to which, the Administration adopts the decision, for reasons of public interest, to resort to a public or private third party to supply a good or provide a good or service for its satisfaction. Originally conceived as simple acquisition of goods, over time, contracting has been displacing direct management in different areas of the Public Administration, with an expansive force characteristic of the prevailing ideological conception at the time. A doctrinal distinction has been made between the so-called direct management of the public service provided by an Administration, and indirect management. In the former, the service is provided by the Administration itself, or through another public or private legal entity, exclusively dependent on it. In the latter, the services of a private third party are contracted, who assumes all or part of the risk that they entail. In this vein, administrative contracting mechanisms have also come to be used as a means to avoid the growth of the public servant payroll, through the contracting of private parties, whether individual natural persons, through figures not typical of public employment (services contracts), or subjects created under a corporate figure, as is the case of the outsourcing of certain activities. In the private sphere, also applicable to the public sphere, outsourcing is understood as follows: "*'Outsourcing', 'Externalization', 'Delocalization', or 'Exteriorization' is a 'second step' of Decentralization as it implies the transfer of certain functions or activities from an integrated productive process to other economic units (natural or legal persons) that are truly or fictitiously external to the company. This is the result of the firm identifying a position in its business process that could be performed more efficiently by another person or legal entity, allowing it to concentrate on the part of the business it considers most suitable*". (Ermida Uriarte Oscar. OUTSOURCING/OUTSOURCING: A JOURNEY BETWEEN DEFINITIONS AND APPLICATIONS. In Outsourcing. Answers from the workers. www.csa-csi.org). It has been indicated that this mechanism is assumed by the employer, in order to maximize profits and reduce losses, by transferring the element of risk in the outsourced employment relationship to a third party and the fact that the latter will assume the costs inherent to it. Thus, not only the economic risk, but also the legal risk is not assumed by the contracting party, but is shifted to the contracting company, which is responsible before the Worker for fulfilling the labor obligations and covering the respective insurance and compensation. The company uses this mechanism to seek specialization and concentration of its workers in the proper and essential activities (hard core of the enterprise), with bifrontal results in terms of effectiveness; on the one hand, it can dedicate itself more efficiently to the production of the goods and services for which it was created, and on the other, the secondary, instrumental, and accessory activities that do not add major value but nevertheless cannot cease to be developed for the benefit of the main ones, are not diminished. In general terms, this figure is resorted to insofar as there is a disassociation of the contracting party from said legal duties, with the exception of some legislations, such as, for example, Laws 18.099 and 18.251 of Uruguay where there is a dimensioned solidarity from the former, in cases of non-compliance that fit certain scenarios. However, in our country, as there is no express norm and no contractual provision, the indicated solidarity would not apply, and the contractor maintains its exclusive obligation towards the worker. That figure, which arises in the private sphere, is welcomed in the public sphere, with the Public Administration, via contracting of services or other analogous mechanisms, having proceeded to transfer, through this mechanism, certain activities to the private or mixed regime, which had been exercised by the Administration itself through its officials. Additionally, as has been said, individuals have been contracted under figures foreign to the public employment regime. In this vein, it has been indicated that although this mechanism is valid, it should not be a means for non-compliance with labor obligations, diminishing the nature of the service provided. Vote of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), number 669, of 9:40 a.m. on November 9, 2001, indicated: "*It is important to highlight that neither in the private nor in the public labor sphere,* ***employers are permitted to denature labor or public service contracts, to diminish the protection of the worker, guaranteed in the Political Constitution (Constitución Política).*** *In the public sector, there is no legal authorization whatsoever to use forms of negotiation whose true purpose is to eliminate the rights inherent to a public labor service contracting. In this case, the administrative contracting regime, by itself, does not distort the presumption of laborality of which has been spoken; since, in the matter that occupies us, and in this specific case* ***it is not so much the form that the employer may have wanted to give to the contract that matters, as it is what legally results, in the end, regarding the nature of the totality of what was expressly agreed upon.*** ***The denomination given to the contract cannot be used with the purpose of evading and attempting to disrespect the constitutional and legal labor guarantees, developed by our legal system***. *This affirmation, consequently, is valid for both sectors. It must also be indicated that the State and its institutions have the authority to use, in their operation, legal institutes other than the 'public service contract', when this is not a mechanism for evading the burdens imposed by respect for the labor rights of public servants*" (emphasis not in original). One of the first normative experiences in our environment regarding this mechanism is found in the Law of Labor Stock Corporations (Ley de Sociedades Anónimas Laborales). In this regulatory body, the specific regulation of the so-called Labor Stock Corporations is established and the services that can be transferred for their administration and operation are defined as follows: "*Article 7.- Labor stock corporations, established with the purpose of providing minor or support services (servicios menores o auxiliares), shall be governed by the following rules: a) The following are considered support activities (actividades auxiliares), non-consubstantial to the public service or to the administration or institution, provided they do not constitute its main activity: 1) Janitorial or cleaning services. 2) Surveillance services. 3) Maintenance or repair services for buildings, gardens, installations, and mechanical, rolling, and office equipment. 4) Nutrition and feeding services for personnel or users. 5) Computing services. 6) Secretarial and archiving services. 7) Professional services that can be exercised freely; in particular, judicial collections, notary services, accounting, pharmacy, architecture, veterinary medicine, technical services, agricultural services, engineering, and expert appraisals. 8) Transport and distribution services for supplies or medications. 9) Printing, publication, and photography services. 10) Inspection, design, and construction of civil works. 11) Training and education services. 12) Dental, optometry, eyewear, and orthopedic services and workshops. 13) Pharmaceutical, chemical, engineering, and quality control laboratories. 14) Clothing manufacturing services. 15) Laundry services. 16) Recreation services. 17) Public relations services. 18) Warehousing services. 19) Any other service that, according to the administration or institution in question, qualifies as a support activity (actividad auxiliar). b) No labor stock corporation may contract, in support or substantial activities (actividades auxiliares o sustanciales), the provision of services representing more than twenty percent (20%) of the total annual expense budget of the institution. Any contract between a labor stock corporation and the State or its institutions that does not comply with this provision shall be null and void, without prejudice to the administrative, civil, and criminal liabilities of the officials involved. c) The Boards of Directors of decentralized, autonomous, semi-autonomous institutions and public companies; the municipal councils and the Ministers of State, must define, after consulting the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), which activities or services are support services (auxiliares) and which are substantial or fundamental (sustanciales o fundamentales) to the institutional mission. d) Public servants of the public bodies or entities, who cease working for them, may assume the provision of contracted services, as worker partners of a labor stock corporation*". "*Article 8.- The Executive Branch is authorized, by decree, and the decentralized institutions or administrations, by provision of their hierarchical superiors, to rent or give in trust (fideicomiso) or commodatum (comodato) the goods, equipment, and material accessories intended for the provision of support activities (actividades auxiliares), or activities that are not consubstantial to the public service or the institution's own activity, when the development of these activities must be associated with the transfer or use of State assets or those of its institutions, which are indispensable for the exercise of the activity*". As observed from the indicated regulatory body, there is an enumeration of the services subject to third-party contracting, with the character of support services (auxiliar) gravitating upon each of them. Said Law was amended by the Framework Law for Institutional Transformation and Reform of Labor Stock Corporations (Ley Marco de Transformación Institucional y Reforma de Sociedades Anónimas Laborales), as it provides: "*ARTICLE 1.- Transfer of service provision and support activities (actividades auxiliares). The bodies of the State, the decentralized, autonomous, and semi-autonomous public institutions, the public companies of the State, and the municipalities are empowered to transfer, through concession acts or administrative contracting in accordance with the law, the provision of services and support activities (actividades auxiliares) in favor of the following social organizations: community development associations, cooperatives, associations, foundations, and labor stock corporations. This transfer shall not prejudice the obligatory control and regulation of the transferred activity, to protect the public interest and the exercise of governmental authority (potestades de imperio) and the attributions of the Administration, which are non-delegable, imprescriptible, and non-waivable. The hierarchical superiors must define which activities and services are support services (auxiliares) and which are fundamental (fundamentales) to the institutional mission, in accordance with the regulation to be issued for this purpose. In no case may public domain assets be transferred, in particular those referred to in subsection 14) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). Nor may the provision of services and activities in which the State and the institutions exercise governmental authority or powers of a regulatory nature be contracted, which shall not be delegated*". In this specific case, the determination of the activities that could be considered support services (auxiliares) was left to the discretion of the Administration, abandoning the exhaustive enumeration of the Law cited above. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that, parallel to the application of the aforementioned Law, in recent decades, based on the self-organization powers of the Administration, contracting mechanisms have been used by the different public administrations as an instrument to ensure the provision of different services, among which stand out from professional activities—doctors, accountants, lawyers, and computer scientists—to purely operational ones, such as security or cleaning services. In these cases, we are in the presence of an externalization understood as "*a transfer of activity that either has been performed directly by the Public Administration, or it considers necessary to perform from a given moment onwards, to a specialized organization, through a competitive process that is formalized in an agreement*" (Peláez, J.A, and De la Cuerda, K., “Externalización de la gestión y los servicios del sector público” quoted by Cantero Martínez Josefa. La incidencia del fenómeno de la externalización en la Administración General del Estado. ¿Existe algún límite?. Revista Documentación Administrativa. nº 286-287, enero-agosto 2010, pp. 297-334). In all these administrative decisions, there has mediated in the respective formal conduct of the administration, an explicit or implicit intent to transfer certain activities not consubstantial to the public service to third parties, in order to focus public management on the substantive activity of the respective entity. It has been based on presumed positive impacts both on public finances (reduction of the state payroll) and on the efficiency of the service provided. Due to the foregoing, its use has become generalized to certain activities and has been considered a valid instrument to assist in public management. The foregoing in accordance with the possibilities offered both by the specific regulation on contracting and the possibility that all public entities have to choose the different means for the fulfillment of public purposes. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that outsourcing has as a legal limit the impossibility that by way of contracting services, the Administration delegates to a third party services that are consubstantial to the public function or that involve the exercise of governmental authority (potestades de imperio). In this vein, Article 66 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) states that: "*The governmental authority powers (potestades de imperio) and their exercise are non-waivable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible*". A complementary norm to this provision, applicable to the concession for the management of public services, is Article 74 of the Law of Administrative Contracting (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa), which provides: "*The Administration may manage, indirectly and by concession, the services under its competence that, due to their economic content, are susceptible to business exploitation. This figure may not be used when the provision of the service implies the exercise of governmental authority (potestades de imperio) or acts of authority...*". Regarding governmental authority powers (potestades de imperio), Professor Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz indicated "*… the fundamental power of the Administration is its so-called governmental authority power (potestad de imperio), which allows it to create obligations or suppress rights of the individual without their consent. In this power, the need to achieve the public end at all costs stands out, as its imperative nature is explained as a means to overcome the resistance of the individual in cases where they have to collaborate in achieving said end and do not do so. From this governmental authority power (poder de imperio) emanate others that also reveal a superiority of the Administration over the individual, incompatible with the principle of equality.*" (E, Ortiz Ortiz: Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, Editorial Stradtmann, S.A. San José, 1998, p. 39.). In the same vein, in the discussion of the draft General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), Prof. Ortiz Ortiz indicated: "*… By public powers (potestades públicas) are understood the faculties of the Administration to act as authority, that is, imposing itself on the individual, imposing obligations on them, depriving them of rights or denying them those rights, or limiting those rights etc. The term public powers (potestades públicas) is technically designated in the terminology of public law to signify precisely that kind of authoritative intervention by the Administration in the legal sphere of the individual, unfavorable to them eventually… the doctrine understands by “public powers (potestades públicas)” the so-called “governmental authority powers (potestades de imperio)” that may eventually prejudice individuals ..”* (Quirós Coronado, R., Ley General de la Administración Pública, Concordada y Anotada con el Debate Legislativo y al Jurisprudencia Constitucional, Editorial ASELEX S.A., Costa Rica, p. 153 and 154). As observed, the exercise of these powers has as an immediate and direct consequence the creation, modification, or extinction of rights through unilateral acts, which are implemented in the exercise of different prerogatives enjoyed by the Administration in protection of the public interest and before which, the legal sphere of the individual yields. Because of said effects on the legal situations of persons, the non-delegability of governmental authority (potestad de imperio) is intrinsic to it. Given the foregoing, unless there is an enabling norm, it is not possible for a third party, public or private, to exercise it with exclusion of or in complement to the competent Administration. The Administration to which the Law assigned its legitimate exercise must exercise them directly, unless there is an express provision to the contrary.
In the same vein, the following has been stated: "<i>...if we attempt to make an effort to transfer this concept to the field of administrative action to delimit precisely which functions of the General Administration of the State involve the exercise of public powers and cannot be outsourced, in principle, we would have to conclude that we cannot enclose in this category all the functions that it performs because, as we have pointed out, it is not simply about the exercise of any public function, but exclusively those that involve the exercise 'of public powers' or of 'public power, of authority,' which in our judgment, at least should place us directly in the realm of that type of functions or tasks that externalize an activity of the Administration that has a direct transcendence for the legal situation of other subjects of law and for which precisely the notes of objectivity, impartiality, and independence that characterize civil service action gain relevance...</i>" (Cantero Martínez Josefa. The impact of the outsourcing phenomenon on the General Administration of the State. Is there any limit?. Revista Documentación Administrativa. No. 286-287, January-August 2010, pp. 297-334). Additionally, the same author refers specifically to inspection acts in the following manner: "<i>Special mention should be made at this point to inspection functions. An interesting doctrinal debate has arisen over the legal nature of such activities, since the function carried out by inspectors is no more than a merely material, technical, or instrumental activity normally performed by the Administration prior to the exercise of its sanctioning power. As such, in principle it would not involve the making of definitive and binding decisions. What would be strictly lacking is what in the community sphere has been called the decision-making autonomy inherent to the exercise of public power prerogatives, that is, the faculty to be able to derive binding legal consequences from the result of the control or inspection task. We agree, however, with Bermejo Vera in considering it an authentic power, an activity of an imperative nature that entails the exercise of authority, for it is not generated in any legal relationship, nor in pacts, nor in legal business nor in singular facts, but proceeds directly from the legal system. It is 'an administrative action that presents itself as the exercise of a power previously attributed by law and by it delimited and constructed.' It is an instrument for controlling compliance with current legality, the absence of which would imply a renunciation by the State of guaranteeing the application of the Law. Moreover, with the new intervention titles introduced by Spanish regulations for their adaptation to community regulations on free access to service activities, it would be reasonable to considerably strengthen such functions, since in important sectors of the country's economic activity the prior authorization regime is going to be replaced by subsequent control or inspection, so it is now more important, if possible, for the Administration to retake and reinforce such tasks and to do so through its civil servants. Otherwise, it would provoke the sensation of a total lack of control by the Administration, which is hardly compatible with the satisfaction of the general interest constitutionally entrusted to it. On the other hand, even if we consider that the inspector lacks 'decision-making autonomy' because they carry out a material and technical activity, there is no doubt that this function is indispensable for the subsequent exercise of sanctioning activity, where the aforementioned decision-making autonomy of the Administration would manifest itself, without doubt. In this sense, the inspection activity could be subsumed, at least, within the indirect exercise of public powers mentioned in the functional reservation of Article 9.2 of the Basic Statute of the Public Employee. In fact, inspection personnel must be characterized by their special qualification and by meeting the notes of impartiality and objectivity, which requires their submission to Public Law norms, to the statutory regime, which is the only one that can guarantee these qualities fundamentally based on the consecration of the note of lifetime tenure (inamovilidad) in the public function. On the other hand, the very nature of the inspection activity imposes on the employees who exercise it duties of professional secrecy and confidentiality, while conferring upon them certain prerogatives: the very character of 'agent of authority,' the possibility of requesting inter-administrative collaboration, of accessing the places to be inspected, of accessing important information and data, which ultimately entails the imposition on the inspected subject of a personal obligation, therefore it is subject to legal reserve. That is, in our judgment, also the performance of the inspection function should fall under the scope of the civil service reservation and therefore, at least in principle, not be capable of being outsourced by a mere administrative decision. This is because, as we have pointed out, the guarantee of impartiality and objectivity required for the fulfillment of such tasks demands a special status that Administrative Law has already constructed.</i>" By virtue of the foregoing, in the case of coercive powers (potestades de imperio), it will necessarily correspond to the respective Administration to allocate the human, technical, operational, and financial resources necessary for their timely and effective exercise, applying the provisions of Article 66 of the General Law of the Public Administration, which provides: "<i>1. Coercive powers (potestades de imperio) and their exercise, and public duties and their fulfillment, shall be non-waivable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible. 2. Only by law may commitments not to exercise a coercive power (potestad de imperio) be established. Such commitment may only occur within a bilateral and onerous act or contract. 3. The exercise of powers in specific cases may be expressly subject to expiration, by virtue of other laws.</i>" For the determination of the existence of certain powers assigned to an entity, one must turn to the Law. In this order of ideas, it has been indicated that these should preferably be specific, although the use of general powers exists. Thus, it has been pointed out that " <i>Normally, and as we already pointed out, the attribution of powers by the norm must be carried out in a limited and concrete manner, specifying with the greatest possible degree of detail the powers or faculties of which they consist. This is a political requirement, indissoluble from the very essence of the constitutional regime: since the freedom of the individual is the basic pattern of civil coexistence, administrative powers of intervention therein can only be exceptions that, therefore, must be defined with complete rigor. It is not infrequent, however, in our positive law – which is a bitter inheritance from our authoritarian political tradition – for certain norms to attribute to the Administration generic powers of action through the vague and imprecise description of the ends to be achieved with them, of the factual assumptions that authorize their use, and of the means or measures of which they consist</i>”, (J, Santamaría Pastor, Notes on Administrative Law, I, Madrid, 1987, p. 585). Another untouchable limit in this matter is the existence of a hard legal core that is not appropriate to transfer to third parties, given that it implies the reason for being of the entity itself and is inherent to the exercise of state competences. The doctrine indicates it in the following way: "<i>The constitutional reservation of Administration – in its broad sense of reservation of the Executive Power – is formed by the activity of political direction and the activity of police and promotion. These activities, which are sovereign public functions, must be obligatorily developed by an Administration as it is regulated by the Constitution, that is, with the features of its institutional guarantee. There is an identification between the reservation of Administration and the prohibition of formal privatization – recourse to the private legal system. It is the material object of the reservation that justifies the constitutional uniqueness of the public Administration. There is no freedom of choice of form or legal regime to develop these activities that belong to the reservation of public Administration. The flight to private Law by these Administrations that exercise sovereign public functions is unconstitutional. The public service activity and the logistical or supply activity are not typically administrative – they are not within the reservation of public Administration – and do not necessarily have to be exercised by Administrations in accordance with their institutional guarantee. The Administration can opt between the administrative Law regime and the private Law regime. In contrast, the free activity in the market of the Administration must obligatorily be developed under the private Law regime in order to safeguard competition. Constitutional organs, and in general, the other powers of the State, cannot resort to private Law for the fulfillment of their own and exclusive functions, but they can do so to develop some auxiliary or instrumental functions. As with the reservation of Administration, it is the exclusive competences that mark the scope of obligatory use of public Law by the constitutional organ</i>." (TRONCOSO REIGADA, Antonio, Privatization, Public Enterprise and Constitution, Marcial Pons, Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales S.A., Madrid, 1997, pages 458 and 459). In the same order of ideas, the Constitutional Chamber expressed it when it indicated: " <i>The Chamber also understands that the concession of public works and services referred to in this bill, excepts everything relating to national security, customs control, migration, and everything that has to do with the State's own functions, which are non-delegable and non-waivable and in no way can remain in private hands. Thus, for example, even when an airport is given in concession, so that the public service provided there is carried out by a private entity, matters relating to port security, migration, and customs among others, remain reserved exclusively to the State, without those functions being able to be exercised either directly or indirectly by private parties</i>" (vote No. 2319-98 of 17:51 on March 31, 1998). In accordance with the foregoing considerations, the outsourcing mechanism is valid for the Administration to contract certain secondary activities for the better fulfillment of the public service provided. However, its application is not unrestricted, as it has limits both with respect to the elements inherent to the administrative act that leads to its adoption or the respective contract, and regarding the nature of the service intended to be outsourced. As an instrument in the service of the public interest that it must be, any contractual figure used cannot be arbitrary or unmotivated and must adjust to the scopes provided by the administrative legal system. Therefore, the Administration will be prohibited from outsourcing the consubstantial activity of the entity or the exercise of coercive powers (potestades de imperio), as indicated.
**VII.II.II- Considerations on the private employment regime of the Administration:** In Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations emanate. Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, by establishing the following: <i>"Article 191.- A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration"</i> and <i>"Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed on the basis of <b>proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in <u>labor legislation</u></b></i> <b><i>,</i></b><i> or in the case of forced reduction of services, either due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof". </i>In accordance with the indicated constitutional norms, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of their own regulatory framework, stability in employment - limiting the free removal regime typical of private labor regulation - and an administrative career, along with the other guarantees existing for persons protected under a subordination regime, such as the payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (making the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber). Correlative to the previous rights, the public servant has a series of civil service obligations, inherent to the public purposes sought with their activity and that must always guide their management, in order not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary responsibility. Without intending to be exhaustive, some of the duties typical of the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (Art. 3 Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Administration), b) duty of compliance with the principles of public service - continuity, efficiency, adaptation to change in the legal regime, and equal treatment- (Art. 4 General Law of the Public Administration), c) duty to ensure an adequate internal control environment (Art. 39 of the General Law of Internal Control) d) duty to protect the best interests of children (Art. 4 and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code) e) duty to comply with the legal system (Art. 13 and concordant articles of the General Law of the Public Administration, Art. 39.a of the Civil Service Statute), f) duty to provide prompt response and information to the user (Art. 5 and 10 of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excessive Requirements and Administrative Procedures), g) duty of obedience (Art. 108 of the General Law of the Public Administration), h) duty to act effectively (Art. 5 of the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets) i) duty to maintain decorum and provide due attention to the user (Art. 114 of the General Law of the Public Administration and Art. 39. d) and e) of the Civil Service Statute) j) duty to respond in case of having acted with malice or gross negligence (Art. 199 and 211 General Law of the Public Administration) k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (Art. 11 of said normative body). Additionally, on a supplementary basis, based on Article 9 of the General Law of the Public Administration and 51 of the indicated Statute, the provisions of the Labor Code and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship, such as the Law on Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching, Law for the Regulation of Smoking, Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, among others. In this order of ideas, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles in labor matters given the existence of a statutory and non-contractual relationship, (Article 111 of the General Law of the Public Administration), the existence of general guidelines for the relationship that are common cannot be ignored, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in Article 19 of the Labor Code. In addition to said figure in the employment relationship, Article 111.3 and 112.2 and 3 of the General Law of the Public Administration, foresee the existence of the civil servant of the private employment regime of the State. In this sense, said norms indicate the following: <i>"... 3. Employees of State companies or economic services entrusted with management subject to common law are not considered public servants". and " Article 112.... 2. The service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, in accordance with paragraph 3, of Article III, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be. 3. However, the legal or regulatory provisions of public law that are necessary to guarantee administrative legality and morality shall also apply to the latter, as determined by Decree by the Executive Power</i>". In accordance with the foregoing norms, there is a considerable group of persons who provide their services to public entities who cannot be considered public servants, given that they are employees of the private employment regime of the State. In this sense, it has been pointed out that they are included in two large groups, namely, on one hand those who work for public enterprises (ICE, INS, CNFL, RACSA, among others) or who provide their labor to economic services of the State (Duty-Free Shops of IMAS,) and those who do not participate in what is called public management. Regarding the reason for being of this figure, Lic. Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz indicated the following: <i>"Our idea is to make a clear demarcation between what we consider should be common workers of the State and servants governed by the special Public Law of the State. Of course, there is a minimum as Article 116 [refers to current 112] reveals, <b>that we want to be common in one sense, it is obvious that a State worker, no matter how equal their regime is to that of the common worker of a private company, always has opportunities that the common worker does not have, so we want to guarantee the morality and legality of the administration in what relates strictly to them, but always preserving for them the statute of workers of common law.</b> This is the same, for example, also regarding employees of autonomous entities, which are public enterprises… <b>it concerns those State enterprises that function as if they were private entities because they sell and do the same as private parties,</b> for example, the INS itself when selling policies, does the same as any insurance company, the banking system when making a loan, does the same as a common financial entity, the National Power and Light Company, which sells electrical energy sells it under the same conditions in which a private company could sell it, <b>we maintain that those employees of those entities should be considered common workers and not public officials, why, because otherwise there are a series of statutes and regulations that apply to them directly or supplementarily that come to hinder the operation of those services to the detriment of the public entity</b>… If conversely we tried to extend to these officials the stability regime typical of the common officials of the Executive Power, we would find that a series of tremendous obstacles are created for companies that have to function under competitive conditions equal to those of the private company… <b>So we wanted to preserve that private, labor or commercial regime of the public enterprise that has a commercial activity equal to that of private parties..... We do not see the need for a payroll worker or an employee of an autonomous institution that is a public enterprise that functions as a common commercial entity, to be given the advantages or to be imposed the duties of a public servant,</b></i> <i>then, that thesis that contemplates special advantages or special burdens, one must also see this negative side that by being suppressed it results in a favor for them, they will not be applied because they will not be considered public servants, except naturally if those laws do not speak of public servants but, as is most likely, refer specifically to such and such type of servant, defining which are the covered servants, when they are payroll workers it implies it and that you see for example in pension laws, for example, of the employees of the Ministry of Transport or in the guards of the Ministries. I believe that perhaps the misunderstanding that has been created could be dispelled somewhat when reading Article 116 which says 'Administrative law will be applicable to the service relationships between the Administration and its public servants' by which we mean that <u>when it concerns servants who are not public, administrative law will not be applied to them, which is all this Code and its related laws, but rather labor law, that is, they are simply common workers.</u> Now, why should a common worker of the State be treated better than a common worker of a private company, when both function in equal circumstances? Why should they not have a pension if the laws have not expressly covered them with that protection and others will have it? It seems to us that it is not fair for a worker to have more right or more burden than another common worker, both governed by the Labor Code, simply because one is a State worker and the other is a worker of a private entity, so it seems to us that in this what is advisable is the uniformity of the regime, if they are workers and are governed by the Labor Code, they must be protected only by this and by related laws, not by administrative law</i>". (Quirós Coronado, R., General Law of the Public Administration, Concorded and Annotated with the Legislative Debate and Constitutional Jurisprudence, Editorial ASELEX S.A., Costa Rica, pp. 153 and 154 and minutes of (Permanent Commission of Government and Administration, Minute No. 99 Extraordinary Period, of March 23, 1970). In the same order of ideas, the doctrine has indicated the distinction between the public employment regime and the private employment regime of the Administration, in the following manner: <i>"The personnel at the service of these companies can only from an economic or, perhaps, sociological point of view be considered part of public employment, but not from a legal point of view. The relationship that binds them to their company is of a strictly private nature, regulated by labor law for all purposes. It is true that this rule has some exception, since the public nature of the company entails the application of certain specialties typical of public law.</i>" For example, in matters of incompatibilities..." (Sánchez Morón Miguel. Derecho de la Función Pública. Editorial Tecnos). Additionally, in other legislations, the use of this legal figure is also provided for. In this vein, it is stated: "In Germany, by express provision of the Ley Fundamental of May 23, 1943, the closed public function model coexists with Labor Law. This is provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 33 of the Ley Fundamental, by reserving to the agents of the Administración linked to public entities by a relationship of service and fidelity, that is to say to the civil servants, the exercise of the prerogatives of public power, it is indirectly admitting that the other functions that do not entail the exercise of these prerogatives may be, although not necessarily, provided by labor agents… On this constitutional reservation, which is limited to establishing a reservation of the public function regime without setting any limit, since it does not prevent the legislator from establishing an administrative regime for all the personnel of the Administración, came however to superimpose the Ley federal framework of the public function of February 27, 1985, whose Art. 2.°2 transforms the reservation into a positive limit by prescribing that only positions involving the performance of public powers and the exercise of public authorities or tasks that for reasons of State security or public life cannot be entrusted to persons linked to the Administración by an employment relationship may be held by civil servants. By this means, labor contracting has been generalized in the lower echelons of the public function, that is, in instrumental, administrative support, and physical or manual work positions, from which civil servants have been displaced, who have reserved functions of certain transcendence and, of course, the directive function, a solution that has the advantage of preventing the overlapping of civil servants and labor employees in the same jobs." (Silvia del Saz, Contrato Laboral y Función Pública, Editorial Marcial Pons, Ediciones Jurídicas S.A, Madrid 1995). Our Sala Constitucional has also referred to said figure, as it established the following: "For its part, from the interrelation of Articles 112 subsection 2) and 111 subsection 3) (a norm to which the former refers, both of the same Law) it is also clear that those subject to the public employment regime are not civil servants, but rather laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administración, the employees of State enterprises or economic services, entrusted with activities subject to common Law, who in accordance with Article 112 subsection 2) transcribed, are governed by labor Law and not by public Law, which empowers them to negotiate collectively. …. Thus, the regime is administrative, statutory, for the "public servants", that is, for those who provide services to the administration or on behalf of and for account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture; however, the Ley General de la Administración Pública itself establishes that "the service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be." Consequently, and based on this constitutional interpretation and the texts contained in the Ley General de la Administración Pública, in the public sector, only servants who do not participate in public management may enter into collective labor agreements, such that entities with an employment regime of a labor (not public) nature, such as, for example, State enterprises, of which the national doctrine has said that they are "those that function as if they were private enterprises, because they sell and do the same as private individuals; for example, the INS itself when it sells insurance policies does the same as any insurance company, the banking sector when it makes loans does the same as a common financial entity, the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, which sells electrical energy under the same conditions that a private company could sell it," among others, may indeed negotiate collectively in accordance with the provisions that inform Collective Labor Law" (vote 2000-4453 at fourteen hours and fifty-six minutes of May twenty-fourth, two thousand). In the same vein, votes Nos. 3053-94 at 09:45 hours of June 24, 1994, 2000-9690 at 15:01 hours of November 1, 2000, as well as resolutions 2000-07730, 2006-6728-, 2006-7261, 2006-3001, 2006-2006, 2006-7966, 2006-6729, 2006-17743, and 2006-1743. In a similar sense, the Sala Segunda of the Corte Suprema de Justicia has pronounced as follows: "A clear division of the servants of the Administración thus emerges into two groups: those governed by Public Law and those governed by Labor Law. Finally, it also follows from the foregoing that, ultimately, the Sala left in the hands of the ordinary judge the task of establishing, in each specific case, whether the relationship is statutory or not; and, if it is not, then it is governed by Private Labor Law... From the foregoing, it can then be concluded that a civil servant is any person who, regardless of the nature of the activity they perform, has been appointed as such, through a formal, valid, and effective act of appointment, to exercise public powers, within their field of competence; whether in inter-organic (employee) or inter-subjective (civil servant) relationships. When dealing with workers whose link with the Administración Pública has not occurred by virtue of that indispensable formal act, and they are employees of State enterprises or economic services, entrusted with activities subject to common Law; or laborers, workers, or employees who do not participate in public management, their relationships shall then be governed by Private Labor Law. However, it is of transcendence to make a final observation. The quality of civil servant is not a product of a concession derived from a discretionary act of the Administración; the required appointment, or the act of investiture, is not something left to the freedom of the Administración; instead, its definition, in its legal scope, was left in the hands of the legislator, according to the considerations set forth above. Consequently, only in the specific cases of exception, expressly provided for in the indicated numerals 111 and 112, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, can one be in the presence of relationships of servants of the State subject to the general or common regime of private employment." (Vote No. 513-2001 at nine hours and fifty minutes of August twentieth, two thousand one). The Sala Constitucional has considered that said regime even extends to personnel contracted through corporate figures created by said public enterprises (e.g., corporations created by State Banks or other public entities). In this sense, it indicated: "…the Sala considers that with the creation of these 'corporations' a kind of administrative deconcentration has operated, which has allowed a specialization of the activity, separated from the founding entity; however, the separation is not absolute. Indeed, the provision of resources for fulfilling the purpose entrusted by the founder and the use of the commercial name of the autonomous institution offer an image of integration (e.g., BN Puesto de Bolsa). However, unlike pure and simple deconcentration, the creation of a different legal entity (S.A.) within the scheme of the autonomous entity implies separation of the corporation in terms of budget control and resource management, among others; what the legislator has achieved by granting full legal personality, characteristic of the 'corporation' figure of private law. However, even though these entities are called 'corporations,' administratively they are part of the scheme of the autonomous institution to which they belong. Through these legal figures characteristic of private law and unknown to classic public law, the founding entity seeks to fulfill the task assigned to it. The special nature of these 'corporations' is also reflected in the possibility of constituting them with a single shareholder, a scheme inadmissible for private law, for which the existence of a corporation presupposes an 'association of several persons subject to the same rule.' The Procuraduría General de la República is therefore correct in pointing out that these corporations are an 'instrument' that the legislator has made available to these autonomous entities to achieve their tasks, which has been resorted to, given that the public scheme has not allowed the system of financial groups implemented by national private banks. Thus, this instrument called 'corporation' is not equivalent to the figure of private law in all its splendor; rather, from the point of view of its organization, it is a specialized activity of the founding entity, and for this it has, in its ordinary activity, full legal personality not incompatible with the founding entity, with which, in principle, it does not compete and to which it is attached – by the ownership of the shares. For this reason, these corporations necessarily participate in the nature of the creating entity; that is, they are enterprises of the founding entity and consequently of the State. Within this framework, principles such as transparency in actions, prior and subsequent control over resource management, ownership by the State of demanial assets, application of the contracting regime and the principles of public employment, and the principle of accountability and measurement of results are applicable to these corporations... The corporations of the State Banks and the INS, although in their ordinary stock market activity they may be governed by private law, are not equivalent to the corporations formed by private law subjects, with at least two persons in association. … Indeed, the nature of its owner – the autonomous institution – is carried over by the so-called 'corporation,' to the point that it is not possible to recognize it as a holder of fundamental rights protectable in this venue." (vote 2002-06513 at fourteen hours and fifty-seven minutes of July third, two thousand two). In accordance with the foregoing, we would be in the presence of a private employment regime of the Administración, in the case of workers of public enterprises, in their diverse modalities of public-entity enterprise, private-law subject, or organ-enterprise, and additionally, in the case of those servants who do not participate in public management. With respect to this last scenario, vote 4453-2000 at fourteen hours and fifty-six minutes of May twenty-fourth, two thousand, of the Sala Constitucional, among others, indicated the following: "…it corresponds to the Administration itself, to the operators of Law in general, and ultimately to the Judge, when hearing specific cases, to determine if a State institution or a group of its servants or civil servants constitute the core of the exception that can negotiate collectively, or if, on the contrary, that path is forbidden to them…". Thus, in this last case, a margin of discretion is maintained, as it corresponds to each administration to determine whether, in each particular case, one is in the presence or not of the regime under analysis, that is, whether it is deemed that one participates in public management or not. There will be evident cases depending on the activity performed by a specific group of servants (e.g., doctors, teachers, police, judges, etc.), and there will be borderline cases where the adoption of a position and a decision by the law enforcer will be required for its particular application. As direct legal effects of this differentiated regime, they will not be protected by the stability regime characteristic of the public employment regime, given that they are governed by the Código de Trabajo, and as a consequence, they could resort to conventional mechanisms to agree upon employment conditions, such as collective bargaining agreements. Due to these consequences, there is the possibility of free removal of said workers, on the understanding that if the termination occurs with employer liability, that is, payment of labor entitlements, no due process applies, but if it is as a consequence of the exercise of disciplinary power, the same is indeed imperative. Additionally, there is no legal impediment for the indicated workers to group together through a union and agree upon working conditions with the entity or enterprise, or to resort to the mechanisms for resolving labor disputes provided for in the Código de Trabajo. The differentiated nature of this regime does not, however, prevent the application of the regulations characteristic of administrative law regarding control and transparency in the worker's performance, nor does it empower the Administración of the entity or enterprise to carry out arbitrary, unmotivated, or unlawful actions, such as dismissal due to union persecution, discrimination in employment, or even the lack of adequate substantiation of the administrative decision. Again, it must be indicated that conduct presents inherent limits to the legal system and to the human condition of the workers that are unavoidable, regardless of the applicable labor regime. Having made these considerations, the particular analysis of the case subject to this resolution proceeds.
VII.II.III- On the nature of the regime of the plaintiffs and the employer figure in the case under analysis: In their complaint, the plaintiffs invoke that they performed duties as labor risk inspectors starting from August 17, 2009, such that by reason of said function, they were empowered to inspect workplaces, close businesses, or halt constructions for non-payment of the respective insurance policy. Therefore, they invoke the public nature of said activity and point out that in application of the theory of the State as sole employer, the legal nature of the employment relationship in Insurance Servicios S.A. is mixed and its workers are State employees. Based on the foregoing, they request that the contracting of Insurance Servicios with them be declared null and that their dismissal without liability be annulled for not following due process. They also request that it be established that the employer in the relationship is the INS, given that they provided services for it, used equipment, identifications, and other items belonging to said entity. In this regard, it has been proven from the case records that Mr. Guillermo Constenla Umaña, in his capacity as Generalísimo Attorney-in-Fact without Limit of Sum of the INS, constituted the corporation denominated Insurance Servicios S.A., such that the latter signed with the Instituto Nacional de Seguros a framework agreement for the provision of corporate services, in order to regulate the mutual relationship with respect to the provision of reciprocal services. In this vein, as the defendant parties have indicated, this Tribunal considers that the provisions of Article 1 of the Ley de Creación del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, reformed by the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, must be applied, as it currently provides: "Artículo 1.- Instituto Nacional de Seguros and its activities. The Instituto Nacional de Seguros, hereinafter INS, is the autonomous insurance institution of the State, with its own legal personality and assets, authorized to develop the insurance and reinsurance activity. In said activities, the regulation, supervision, and sanctioning regime established for all insurance entities shall be applicable. The INS shall be empowered to carry out all the technical, commercial, and financial actions required, in accordance with the best business practices, including the possibility of rejecting insurance coverage when technically or commercially justified, as well as to define underwriting conditions and risk retention margins, according to its technical criteria and administrative policies. Decisions on the functions placed under its competence may only emanate from its Board of Directors and shall be its exclusive responsibility. The INS shall have its legal domicile in the city of San José and may have branches, agencies, or offices in the rest of the country. In the development of the insurance activity in the country, which includes the administration of commercial insurance, the administration of the Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo, and the Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos Automotores, the INS shall have the full guarantee of the State. The INS is empowered to constitute or acquire capital participations in corporations, commercial companies, branches, agencies or any other commercial entity of a similar nature, none of which shall have the guarantee indicated in the preceding paragraph, for the following purposes: a) To exercise the activities entrusted to it by law within the country. Said activities include those of a financial nature, granting of credits, those of provision of health services and those inherent to the Cuerpo de Bomberos, the supply of medical benefits, and the sale of goods acquired by the INS by reason of its activities. Additionally, the INS may establish, by itself or through its corporations, strategic alliances with public or private entities in the country or abroad, for the sole purpose of fulfilling its competence. Both the INS and its corporations, with the approval of the respective boards of directors, may incur debt prudently in accordance with the corresponding financial studies. These operations shall not have the guarantee of the State. Public banks are authorized to participate as shareholders of the corporations that the INS establishes as indicated in this article, provided that the INS remains as the majority shareholder of said corporations." (emphasis ours). In accordance with the foregoing norm, it is evident that the Instituto Nacional de Seguros was legitimized to constitute the co-defendant corporation, as the existing legal framework allows it to create corporations for the fulfillment of its legal purposes. Regarding the private legal nature of the enterprise Insurance Servicios S.A. and therefore its effects on the relationship with its workers, the Sala Constitucional ruled as follows: "I.- The appellant alleges that as of May thirty-first, two thousand ten, he was hired to provide services as a Corporate Account Executive, at INSurance Servicios Sociedad Anónima for an indefinite term; however, once the period established in the Código de Trabajo as a probationary period had elapsed, without having committed any fault, he was dismissed without following any procedure, without granting the corresponding prior notice and without just cause, he was only informed by means of a note, signed by the head of the Human Resources area, that due to an administrative decision, they would dispense with his services, as of August thirteenth, two thousand ten, with labor liability, for which he filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal decision on September sixth, two thousand ten, but as of the date of filing this amparo, said procedure has not been resolved. II.- From the memorial filing this appeal, and the documentation accompanying it, it is observed that the respondent Insurance Servicios Sociedad Anónima (folio 17), is a private law subject, whose challenged action does not correspond to be known or assessed in this constitutional venue, since there are other remedies provided for in the legal system that are suitable and timely to hear the facts alleged in this amparo. In this sense, the discussion about the propriety and validity of the mentioned dismissal, as well as the procedure used to make it effective, entails a typical labor conflict that must be elucidated in the labor jurisdiction, as it is the competent one to hear this matter, and in which such conflict can be resolved - with the required probative breadth - and the rights of the protected party effectively safeguarded. III.- Regarding the lack of resolution of the motion for reconsideration filed against the aforementioned dismissal, it should be noted that although Article 41 of the Constitución Política establishes the right to obtain prompt resolution, in this case, the procedure whose lack of resolution is claimed was filed before the Executive President of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, who in turn is the President of Insurance Servicios Sociedad Anónima, - the enterprise for which the protected party worked and also ordered his dismissal with labor liability (folio 57)-, which in this case does not constitute a public entity but one of a private legal nature, therefore the alleged violation has not occurred. Thus, - if the protected party deems it appropriate -, he must resort to the respondent itself or, failing that, to the corresponding jurisdictional venue, in protection of the rights he believes assist him." (vote 2010-17033 at fourteen hours and forty-four minutes of October thirteenth, two thousand ten). The foregoing was ratified by vote 11-14638 at fourteen hours thirty minutes of November thirtieth, two thousand eleven, which ruled: "I.- In the present case, from the evidence in the records and the statements of the appellants themselves, it is inferred that they signed individual labor contracts for an indefinite term with the enterprise Insurance Servicios S.A. Regarding the amparo appeals filed against State enterprises, in judgment No. 16586-2006 at 10:20 hrs. of November 17, 2006, the Sala stated: " This Tribunal clarifies in this matter its jurisprudential line regarding the dismissal of employees of private State enterprises in the following sense: when the amparo appeal is directed against this type of entity, it must first be assessed whether or not the protected party has a relationship regulated by common Law; in which case, once the execution of the individual labor contract has been verified, the rupture of the relationship is generally regulated by the provisions of the Código de Trabajo and must be submitted to the knowledge of the ordinary judge, who is the one responsible for analyzing the legality of the dismissal. (…)"”. In the same vein, as noted, between the enterprise and the entity that gives rise to it, there exists a link clearly described in vote 2002-06513 at fourteen hours and fifty-seven minutes of July third, two thousand two, cited in preceding recitals.
For the purposes of the employment regime, this Tribunal considers that it must be understood that a sui generis bond operates between the two, which could be characterized as a business group with common economic interests, beyond the invoked theory of the single employer State, which does not have the indiscriminate scope claimed by the plaintiff’s representation for this type of public entities that conduct business activities. Regarding the concept of an economic group, it must be taken into consideration that this figure has been applied in different legal disciplines, from tax, regulatory, and consumer law, etc., to labor law, in strict application of the principle of the primacy of reality. In this vein, legal doctrine has characterized that in private labor law, the economic interest group exists as an innovative model where a complex business/employer structure is present, displacing traditional organizational models. In this sense, Fernando Valdés Dal-Re indicates that the traditional operation is characterized by: “... the control of the entire cycle of production of goods and services (vertical integration), the autonomy of each company in its relations with others, and a hierarchical functional management...”. He points out that this is being replaced by “---another model with structural features of the opposite sign: fragmentation of the productive cycle (horizontal integration), dependence, coordination, and articulation in inter-company relations, and a management style that privileges functional autonomy. Centralization will give way to decentralization and autonomy, to internal and external interconnection” (Valdés Dal-Ré. Fernando. Descentralización Productiva y Desorganización del Derecho del Trabajo. cited by Bolaños Céspedes Fernando. En Organización Compleja de Empresas y sus Efectos en el Derecho de Trabajo. Una visión Costarricense. Revista Derecho Laboral. Número 1. Noviembre 2009). The foregoing considerations are applicable to the case under analysis (with the caveat that it is founded on a legal norm that authorizes it and that, as will be stated, the existence of an evasive intent in its creation was not demonstrated), insofar as, based on legal authorization, the company-public law entity created a sociedad anónima for the exercise of activities it deemed auxiliary, having demonstrated in both a permanent linkage originating from their legal nature and in the services that bind them, such as the use of common equipment, similar identifications, a related image, etc. Regarding some of the indicators for determining the existence of a linkage between two economic subjects, legal doctrine indicates that “... various indicators have been pointed out to determine, in a specific case, whether one is in the presence of an economic group. Among these indicators are mentioned: sharing administration, domicile, machinery; if the workers perform duties in several of the group’s companies; if there is a coincidence of directors; if their business activities are complementary, etc. Judges analyze the set of indicators to reach a conclusion...” (Mangarelli Cristina. Responsabilidad de la Empresa que utilice subcontratistas, intermediarios o suministradores de mano de obra en Uruguay. Revista Derecho Laboral. Número 1. Noviembre 2009). With great precision, our Sala Segunda of the Corte Suprema de Justicia has referred to this figure, in the following manner: “IV.- OF ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS: It is a notorious fact that the development of economic relations worldwide and an integrationist trend have led to the emergence of new and very diverse forms of contracting and have also influenced the emergence of different forms of organization of companies, in the development of their commercial activity. In Labor Law, as in other branches of Law, this situation has demanded, on many occasions, the rethinking of some legal institutes, the emergence of new figures, in order to regulate novel situations; and, also, in other cases, the adaptation of existing legal concepts to the advancement and development of, primarily, social and economic relations. Regarding what should be understood by an economic group, Ermida Uriarte points out that “it is a group of companies, formally and apparently independent, that are, however, reciprocally intertwined, to the point of forming a single, complex but compact whole, insofar as they respond to a single interest.” (Ermida Uriarte, Oscar. “El concepto de empresa transnacional y algunas de sus repercusiones en el Derecho del Trabajo”. Taken from Relaciones Laborales y Globalización: Antología de textos. Compiled by Alexander Godínez Vargas. San José, Escuela Judicial, Corte Suprema de Justicia, first edition, 1999, pp. 174-188). For his part, Plá Rodríguez defined it as the “group of apparently autonomous companies but subject to a single economic direction.” (Plá Rodríguez, Américo. “Los Grupos de Empresas”. Idem, pp. 148-154). Likewise, labor doctrine has tried to establish the determining elements of the economic interest group and, in general, has indicated that the essential characteristics of the group of companies are the plurality of components, which are linked to each other and subject to a single power of decision, and also, the underlying unity of the group, which is given precisely by the common economic interest. Indeed, the group cannot be conceptualized except through the idea of plurality; since there is no group if there is not more than one component. It is a matter, then, of independent legal entities that make up such an economic group. These companies are intertwined through relations of subordination or coordination; but, normally, the bond is one of subordination. Consequently, what exists is the subjection of all the entities of the group, or all but one, to a determined control or a common direction. At the same time, those companies are organized into a vaster economic structure and, of course, are influenced by a single interest or by a single economic policy. (Ermida Uriarte, Oscar, op.cit. and Plá Rodríguez, Américo, op.cit.)...” To further elaborate on the reasoning made, it has been demonstrated in the case file that the company Insurance Servicios S.A. forms part of the financial group Instituto Nacional de Seguros duly authorized by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. For all the foregoing, in the case object of this resolution, there is abundant proof of the said linkage between the INS and the company Insurance Servicios S.A., but it is of merit to indicate that the foregoing and the relationship between both does not blur the character of employer of one, according to the evidence produced. The theory of the economic group or business interest group has effects, above all, in the face of a claim for liability for breach of labor obligations – so that any member of the group answers for the obligations of any one of its parts – but it does not mean that the immediate relationship between the worker and his immediate employer is rendered nugatory. The application of the concept also operates in situations where one seeks to evade reality in front of the worker, trying to feign the non-existence of a linkage between the group’s members, or to conceal linkages, always with the purpose of avoiding compliance with legal obligations. This does not occur in the case under analysis. As noted, in the present process, despite having demonstrated the linkage between the co-defendants, it has been proven in the case file that all plaintiffs were timely liquidated and paid all labor entitlements arising from the termination of their employment relationship, making the determination of who is the immediate employer irrelevant. Therefore, in the evident relationship between the INS and the co-defendant, there is no purpose of evading legal obligations, nor has the relationship been created contra legem. The situation would have been different in the face of a claim originating from a dismissal without employer liability – which, as we have indicated, does not occur in the case under study – insofar as, based on the said doctrine and the objective liability of the State (Art. 190 LGAP), the plaintiff could well have addressed any of the co-defendants in this present process. It is not superfluous to indicate that the defendant entity neither seeks to detract from the bond, and on the contrary, bases it as a consequence of the regulations that permit it. For this Tribunal, it is clear that the INS creates Insurance Servicios S.A. under the protection of the legal system, within the context of the market opening resulting from the Tratado de Libre Comercio with the United States of America and with the aim of competing under better conditions with the new players in the insurance market. The Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros grants it that possibility to be able to operate in the face of deregulation, and that is why, despite the existence of that linkage, it is not possible to start from the existence of an unlawful economic interest group, given that the legality of the relationship is conferred by the said legislation. In this vein, what jurisprudential precedents and doctrine reproach as contrary to law is that economic group that exists with the purpose of evading, concealing, or deceiving, which, as has been indicated, does not occur in the present case, for which reason, and in the absence of non-compliance with labor obligations, it is not possible to ignore the existence of Insurance Servicios S.A. as an employer entity. Thus, in the case under examination, it has been demonstrated that, based on the framework agreement signed by the co-defendants, both parties executed a contract for the provision of the service of 17 occupational risk inspectors, such that the plaintiffs were hired as such by the company Insurance Servicios S.A. By reason of the foregoing, it is noted that Insurance Servicios S.A., although born as a private corporate figure, is protected by the legal system that allows the Instituto Nacional de Seguros its creation. Given the above, it is evident that the persons who work for it form part of the private employment regime and consequently can be validly dismissed if their labor rights are recognized, since the cessation of the employment relationship does not have a disciplinary origin. As has been indicated, Article 111 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública classifies the private employment relationship by the Administration, be it by the activity or by the business activity of the entity for which one works. In the case under examination, regarding the plaintiffs' legal situation, we find ourselves in the second scenario, given that their employer is a private law subject created by a public entity-company. On the other hand, although it is recorded in the case file that at certain times the use of INS facilities and equipment occurred, as well as the use of its materials and a coincidence regarding the content of the identification cards, this does not imply that the plaintiffs' relationship was with said entity, insofar as, as has been stated, it forms part of an economic interest group with Insurance Servicios S.A., and furthermore, the contract signed between both parties expressly provided for said shared use, given the evident and uncontested linkage between both legal subjects. It is worth highlighting the contradictions existing between the confessants, Mr. Erick Duarte Fallas and Karen Morelli Alfaro, insofar as while the former reaffirmed that the exercise of the powers of direction and hierarchy were carried out by persons who were linked to Insurance Servicios S.A., the latter, in her deposition, sought to link the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. In any case, it must be understood that any situation or overlap of instructions, orders, or guidelines that may have been issued by both co-defendants obeys the dynamic inherent to an employment relationship in a legitimate economic interest group and the nature of the services provided. It is also evident that, given inspection services and the linkage between the co-defendants, both may have deemed necessary the use of an institutional image for purposes vis-à-vis third parties, without this meaning that Insurance Servicios S.A. does not hold the figure of employer for the plaintiffs. The differentiated nature of the company from the entity that created it, according to the provisions of the legal system that empowers the latter – despite their linkage – means that Insurance Servicios S.A. may have a different employment regime, with salary scales, benefits, and occupational profiles different from the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. In any case, it must be indicated that for this Chamber, even if the plaintiff sought to apply the principle of the primacy of reality, there is ample evidence indicating that the immediate employer entity for the plaintiffs was the co-defendant Insurance Servicios S.A. Thus, it has been demonstrated that the company's Personnel Administration Department issued a personnel action for the interim appointment of the plaintiffs, and that all of them signed a confidentiality commitment with it. It is also recorded that the company's Human Resources unit processed vacation and leave requests for the said plaintiffs, and in at least two cases, conveyed recognition to them for the quality of their work. Finally, there is proof that the Operations Manager of said company was the one who communicated to all of them the fact that it had been decided to end their notice period and liquidate the eleven days pending for that concept. By reason of the foregoing, the plaintiff is not correct in invoking that their employment relationship is of another nature different from the private employment regime and that it was constituted with the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. As is evident from the case file, the immediate employment relationship of the plaintiffs is with the company Insurance Servicios S.A., and it has a nature and instrumental reason for being for the purposes of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, without this implying that the latter holds the employer figure, especially taking into consideration that the respective termination was with employer liability and that for this reason, the application of a prior due process is not required, which is only applicable when the employment bond is broken as a consequence of a disciplinary measure. The dismissal carried out is legitimate, insofar as, as workers of the private employment regime of the Administration, the provisions of Article 85.d) of the Código de Trabajo apply to the parties, which provide: “ARTICULO 85.- The following are causes that terminate the employment contract without liability for the worker and without extinguishing the rights of the latter or their legal heirs to claim and obtain payment of the benefits and indemnities that may correspond to them by virtue of what is ordered by the Code or by special provisions: ....d. The employer's own will”. Regardless of the discussion about whether it was legitimate or not for the Instituto Nacional de Seguros to outsource the inspection of occupational risks to Insurance Servicios S.A., the same is not relevant for the purposes of the claims referred to in this considering, insofar as, as has been indicated, whether before one or the other co-defendant, the employment regime of the plaintiffs is private in nature and, consequently, the dismissal carried out was valid and effective. Accordingly, the claims of the lawsuit referring to establishing that the employer in the relationship is the INS and declaring null the dismissal without employer liability of the plaintiffs must be rejected.” **VII.II.I- General considerations on the outsourcing of services in the Public Administration (Administración Pública):** The Public Administration employs various means to fulfill public purposes, which are not exhausted by mere material actions or formal administrative acts, given that it also resorts to the technique of administrative procurement (contratación administrativa), in which the fulfillment of an object is agreed upon with a contractor, as a collaborating subject in achieving the public interest sought. However, unlike a private contract, in administrative procurement there is a series of elements that transcend the mere agreement of wills signed in a document and that condition its creation, development, and termination. Thus, the administrative contract is conditioned in its origin, evolution, and completion by the specific legal framework that governs the subject matter and the specific procurement. In this sense, the act of will, free and sovereign, of the contractor, is filtered by the administrative legal system, and fundamentally by the procurement regulations, whether it is the bid specifications or terms of reference (cartel o pliego de condiciones), which is the basis thereof. Furthermore, in every administrative procurement procedure, there will always be an underlying series of principles that have been defined by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) starting from ruling 0998-98 at 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, and reiterated in subsequent judgments, and which basically summarize as free participation (libre concurrencia), equal treatment among bidders (igualdad de trato entre los oferentes), publicity (publicidad), legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), legality and transparency (legalidad y transparencia), good faith (buena fe), balance of interests (equilibrio de intereses), mutability of the contract (mutabilidad del contrato), patrimonial intangibility (intangibilidad patrimonial), and control of the procedures. From the standpoint of positive law, the general regulatory framework for the obligations of both contracting entities and contractor companies is contained in the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), notwithstanding which, depending on the contracting entity and the subject matter in question, another sui generis regulatory framework could apply. In any case, administrative procurement is oriented towards satisfying one or several public interests and arises by reason of a need of such nature, in response to which the Administration (Administración) adopts the decision, for reasons of public interest, to call upon a public or private third party to supply a good or provide a service for its satisfaction. Originally conceived merely for the acquisition of goods, over time, procurement has been displacing direct management in different areas of the Public Administration, with an expansive force characteristic of the prevailing ideological conception at the time. Doctrinally, a distinction has been made between the so-called direct management of the public service provided by an Administration, and indirect management. In the former, the service is provided by the Administration itself, or through another public or private legal entity, exclusively dependent upon it. In the latter, the services of a private third party are contracted, who assumes all or part of the risk that these entail. In this line of thought, administrative procurement mechanisms have also come to be used as a means to avoid the growth of the public employee payroll, through the contracting of private parties, whether individual natural persons, by means of figures not typical of public employment (service contracts), or entities created under a corporate form, as is the case of the outsourcing (tercerización) of certain activities. In the private sphere, also applicable in effect to the public sphere, outsourcing is understood as follows: "*‘Tercerización,’ ‘Outsourcing’ (‘producing outside’), ‘Externalización,’ ‘Deslocalización’ or ‘Exteriorización’ is a ‘second step’ of Decentralization (Descentralización), as it implies the transfer of certain functions or activities of an integrated productive process to other economic units (natural or legal persons) that are actually or fictionally unrelated to the company. This is the result of the firm identifying a position in its business process that could be performed more efficiently by another person or legal entity, allowing it to concentrate on the part of the business it considers most appropriate*". (Ermida Uriarte Oscar. OUTSOURCING /TERCERIZACIÓN: UN RECORRIDO ENTRE DEFINICIONES Y APLICACIONES. En Outsourcing. Respuestas desde los trabajadores. www.csa-csi.org). It has been indicated that this mechanism is adopted by the employer side in order to maximize profits and reduce losses, by transferring the risk element in the outsourced employment relationship to a third party, and the fact that the latter will assume the costs inherent to it. Thus, not only the economic risk, but also the juridical risk, is not assumed by the contracting party, but is shifted to the contractor company, which is responsible before the Worker for fulfilling labor obligations and covering the respective insurance and indemnities. The company employs this mechanism to seek specialization and concentration of its workers in its own essential activities (hard core of the business (núcleo duro empresarial)), with two-sided results in terms of effectiveness; on one hand, it can dedicate itself more efficiently to the production of the goods and services for which it was created, and on the other, the secondary, instrumental, and accessory activities that do not add greater value, but nevertheless cannot cease to be carried out for the benefit of the principal ones, are not diminished. In general terms, this figure is resorted to insofar as there is a disassociation of the contracting party from said legal duties, with the exception of some legislations, such as, for example, Laws 18.099 and 18.251 of Uruguay, where there is a dimensioned joint liability of the former, in cases of non-compliance that fit certain assumptions. However, in our country, in the absence of an express law and if there is no contractual provision, said joint liability would not apply, and the contractor maintains its exclusive obligation towards the worker. This figure, born in the private sphere, is adopted in the public sphere, with the result that the Public Administration, via service contracts or other analogous mechanisms, has proceeded to transfer, through this mechanism, certain activities to the private or mixed regime, which had previously been exercised by the Administration itself through its public officials. Additionally, as has been said, individuals have been contracted under figures foreign to the public employment regime. In this line of thought, it has been indicated that although this mechanism is valid, it must not be a means for breaching labor obligations, diminishing the nature of the service provided. Ruling number 669 of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), at 9:40 a.m. on November 9, 2001, stated: *"It is important to highlight that neither in the private labor sphere, nor in the public one, **are employers permitted to distort labor or public service contracts, in order to diminish the protection of the worker, guaranteed in the Political Constitution (Constitución Política).** In the public sector, there is no legal authorization to use forms of negotiation whose true purpose is to eliminate the rights inherent to a public labor service contract. In this case, the administrative procurement regime, by itself, does not distort the presumption of labor relationship (laboralidad) that has been being discussed; given that, in the matter at hand, and in this specific case, **it is not so much the form that the employer may have wanted to give to the contract that matters, but rather, what legally results, in the end, regarding the nature of the totality of what was expressly agreed upon.** **The denomination given to the contract cannot be used for the purpose of evading and attempting to disrespect the constitutional and legal labor guarantees, developed by our legal system.** This assertion, consequently, is valid for both sectors. It must also be indicated that the State and its institutions have the power to use, in their operation, legal institutes different from the 'public service contract,' when this is not a mechanism for evading the burdens that respect for the labor rights of public servants imposes*" (highlighting is not from the original). One of the first regulatory experiences in our environment regarding this mechanism is found in the Law of Labor Stock Corporations (Ley de Sociedades Anónimas Laborales). In this normative body, the specific regulation of so-called Labor Stock Corporations (Sociedades Anónimas Laborales) is established, and the services that can be transferred for their administration and operation are defined as follows: "*Article 7°- Labor stock corporations, established for the purpose of providing minor or auxiliary services, shall be governed by the following rules: a) The following are considered auxiliary support activities, or activities not consubstantial to the public service or to the administration or institution, provided they do not constitute its main line of business: 1) Cleaning or janitorial services. 2) Security services. 3) Maintenance or repair services of buildings, gardens, installations, and mechanical, vehicular, and office equipment. 4) Nutrition and food services for staff or users. 5) Computing services. 6) Secretarial and filing services.* 7) Professional services that may be exercised independently; in particular, judicial collections, notarial services, accounting, pharmacy, architecture, veterinary medicine, technical services, agricultural services, engineering services, and expert appraisals (peritajes). 8) Transportation and distribution services for supplies or medications. 9) Printing, publishing, and photography services. 10) Inspection, design, and construction of civil works. 11) Education and training services. 12) Dental, optometry, eyewear, and orthopedic services and workshops. 13) Pharmaceutical, chemical, engineering, and quality-control laboratories. 14) Clothing manufacturing services. 15) Laundry services. 16) Recreation services. 17) Public relations services. 18) Warehousing services. 19) Any other service which, as determined by the relevant administration or institution, qualifies as an auxiliary activity. b) No labor corporation (sociedad anónima laboral) may contract, in auxiliary or substantial activities, the provision of services representing more than twenty percent (20%) of the institution’s total annual expenditure budget. Any contract between a labor corporation and the State or its institutions that does not comply with this provision shall be null and void, without prejudice to the administrative, civil, and criminal liabilities of the officials involved. c) The Boards of Directors of decentralized, autonomous, and semi-autonomous institutions and of public enterprises; municipal councils; and the Ministers of State shall define, after prior consultation with the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), which activities or services are auxiliary and which are substantial or fundamental to the institutional mission. d) Public servants of public bodies or entities who cease working for those entities may assume the provision of the contracted services as worker-partners of a labor corporation." "Article 8.- The Executive Branch, by decree, and decentralized institutions or administrations, by directive of their hierarchical superiors, are hereby authorized to lease, place in trust (fideicomiso), or lend for use (comodato) the goods, equipment, and material accessories intended for the provision of auxiliary or support activities or activities that are not inherent to the public service or the institution's own core activity, when the execution of these activities must be associated with the transfer or use of State or institutional property that is indispensable for the exercise of the activity." As can be observed from the aforementioned regulatory body, there is an enumeration of services susceptible to contracting with third parties, each of which is characterized as auxiliary. Said Law was reformed by the Framework Law for Institutional Transformation and Reform of Labor Corporations (Ley Marco de Transformación Institucional y Reforma de Sociedades Anónimas Laborales), in that it provides: " ARTICLE 1.- Transfer of the provision of services and auxiliary activities. The organs of the State, decentralized, autonomous, and semi-autonomous public institutions, public enterprises of the State, and municipalities are empowered to transfer, through acts of concession or administrative contracting in accordance with the law, the provision of services and auxiliary activities in favor of the following social organizations: community development associations, cooperatives, associations, foundations, and labor corporations. This transfer shall not impair the mandatory control and regulation of the transferred activity in order to protect the public interest and the exercise of sovereign powers (potestades de imperio) and the attributions of the Administration, which are non-delegable, imprescriptible, and inalienable. The hierarchical superiors shall define which activities and services are auxiliary and which are fundamental to the institutional mission, in accordance with the regulation to be issued for that purpose. In no case may public domain property be transferred, particularly that referred to in subparagraph 14) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution. Nor may the provision of services and activities be contracted in which the State and the institutions exercise sovereign powers or powers of a regulatory nature, which may not be delegated." In this specific case, the determination of which activities could be considered auxiliary was left to the discretion of the Administration, abandoning the exhaustive enumeration of the Law cited above. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that, parallel to the application of the aforementioned Law, in recent decades, based on the self-organization powers of the Administration, contracting mechanisms have been employed by various public administrations as an instrument to ensure the provision of different services, ranging from professional activities—physicians, accountants, lawyers, and computer specialists—to purely operational ones, such as security or cleaning services. In these cases, we are in the presence of an outsourcing (externalización) understood as "a transfer of activity that either the Public Administration had been performing directly, or that it deems necessary to perform from a given moment onward, to a specialized organization, through a competitive process formalized in an agreement" (Peláez, J.A, and De la Cuerda, K., “Externalización de la gestión y los servicios del sector público” cited by Cantero Martínez Josefa. La incidencia del fenómeno de la externalización en la Administración General del Estado. ¿Existe algún límite?. Revista Documentación Administrativa. nº 286-287, enero-agosto 2010, pp. 297-334). In all of these administrative decisions, an explicit or implicit intention of the respective formal administrative conduct has been to transfer certain activities not inherent to the public service to third parties, with the aim of focusing public management on the substantive activity of the respective entity. It has been based on presumed positive impacts on both public finances (reduction of the state payroll) and the efficiency of the service provided. For this reason, its use has become generalized for certain activities and it has been deemed a valid instrument to contribute to public management. This is in keeping with the possibilities offered both by the specific regulation on contracting and by the power all public entities possess to choose different means for fulfilling public purposes. Nevertheless, it is important to note that outsourcing has a legal limit: the impossibility of the Administration delegating, through the contracting of services, to a third party, services that are inherent to the public function or that involve the exercise of sovereign powers. In this vein, Article 66 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) states: "Sovereign powers and their exercise are inalienable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible." A complementary norm to this provision, applicable to the concession for the management of public services, is Article 74 of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa), which provides: "The Administration may indirectly manage, by concession, the services within its competence that, due to their economic content, are susceptible to commercial exploitation. This figure may not be used when the provision of the service involves the exercise of sovereign powers or acts of authority..." With respect to sovereign powers, Professor Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz stated: "… the fundamental power of the Administration is its so-called sovereign power (potestad de imperio), which allows it to create obligations or eliminate rights of private individuals without their consent. In this power, the need to achieve the public purpose at all costs is paramount, for its imperative character is explained as a means to overcome the resistance of the private individual in cases where they must collaborate in achieving said purpose and do not do so. From this sovereign power emanate others that also reveal a superiority of the Administration over the private individual, incompatible with the principle of equality." (E. Ortiz Ortiz: Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, Editorial Stradtmann, S.A. San José, 1998, p. 39.). In the same vein, during the discussion of the draft General Law of Public Administration, Prof. Ortiz Ortiz stated: "… By public powers (potestades públicas) are meant the faculties of the Administration to act as an authority, that is, imposing itself on the private individual, imposing obligations on them, depriving them of rights or denying them those rights, or limiting those rights, etc. The term public powers is technically designated in public law terminology precisely to signify that kind of authoritative intervention by the Administration in the legal sphere of the private individual, potentially unfavorable to them... doctrine understands by 'public powers' the so-called 'sovereign powers' (potestades de imperio) that can potentially harm private individuals..” (Quirós Coronado, R., Ley General de la Administración Pública, Concordada y Anotada con el Debate Legislativo y al Jurisprudencia Constitucional, Editorial ASELEX S.A., Costa Rica, p. 153 and 154). As noted, the exercise of these powers has as its immediate and direct consequence the creation, modification, or extinction of rights through unilateral acts, which are implemented in the exercise of various prerogatives enjoyed by the Administration in the protection of the public interest and before which the legal sphere of the private individual yields. Due to these effects on the legal situations of individuals, the non-delegability of sovereign power is intrinsic to it. Given the foregoing, unless there is an enabling norm, it is not possible for a third party, public or private, to exercise it to the exclusion or in complement to the competent Administration. The Administration to which the Law has assigned its legitimate exercise must exercise them directly, unless there is an express provision to the contrary. In the same vein, the following has been stated: "...if we attempt to make the effort to transfer this concept to the sphere of administrative action to delimit precisely which functions of the General Administration of the State involve the exercise of public powers and cannot be externalized, in principle, one would have to conclude that we cannot enclose within this category all the functions it performs because, as we have pointed out, it is not simply a matter of the exercise of any public function, but exclusively of those that involve the exercise 'of public powers' or 'of public power, of authority,' which, in our judgment, should at least place us directly at the level of that type of functions or tasks that externalize an activity of the Administration that has a direct transcendence for the legal situation of other subjects of law and for which, precisely, the notes of objectivity, impartiality, and independence that characterize civil service action become relevant...." (Cantero Martínez Josefa. La incidencia del fenómeno de la externalización en la Administración General del Estado. ¿Existe algún límite?. Revista Documentación Administrativa. nº 286-287, enero-agosto 2010, pp. 297-334). Additionally, the same author specifically refers to inspection acts in the following manner: "Special mention should be made at this point regarding inspection functions. An interesting doctrinal debate has been raised regarding the legal nature of such activities, insofar as the function performed by inspectors is nonetheless a purely material, technical, or instrumental activity that the Administration normally carries out prior to exercising its sanctioning power. As such, in principle it would not involve the making of definitive and binding decisions. Strictly speaking, what would be missing is what, in the community sphere, has been called the decisional autonomy characteristic of the exercise of public power prerogatives, that is, the faculty to be able to extract binding legal consequences from the result of the control or inspection task. We concur, however, with Bermejo Vera in considering it an authentic power, an activity of an imperative nature that entails the exercise of authority, for it is not generated in any legal relationship, nor in agreements, nor in legal business, nor in singular facts, but proceeds directly from the legal system. It is 'an administrative action that presents itself as the exercise of a power previously attributed by law and by it delimited and constructed.' It is an instrument of control of compliance with current legality, the absence of which would imply a renunciation by the State of its duty to guarantee the application of the Law. Moreover, with the new titles of intervention introduced by Spanish legislation for its adaptation to community legislation on free access to service activities, it would be reasonable to considerably strengthen such functions, since in important sectors of the country's economic activity the prior authorization regime is going to be replaced by subsequent control or inspection, which is why it is now more important, if possible, for the Administration to resume and reinforce such tasks and to do so through its officials. Otherwise, it would provoke the feeling of a total absence of control on the part of the Administration, which is hardly compatible with the satisfaction of the general interest that it is constitutionally entrusted with. On the other hand, although we consider that the inspector lacks 'decisional autonomy' because they carry out a material and technical activity, there is no doubt that said function is indispensable for the subsequent exercise of the sanctioning activity, where the aforementioned decisional autonomy of the Administration would be manifested, now without any doubt. In this sense, the inspection activity could be subsumed, at the very least, within the indirect exercise of public powers mentioned by the functional reserve of Art. 9.2 of the Basic Statute of the Public Employee. In fact, inspection personnel must be characterized by their special qualification and by meeting the notes of impartiality and objectivity, which requires their subjection to Public Law norms, to the statutory regime, which is the only one that can guarantee these qualities fundamentally based on the consecration of the note of tenure (inamovilidad) in the civil service. On the other hand, the very nature of the inspection activity imposes on the employees who exercise it duties of confidentiality and professional secrecy, while at the same time conferring upon them certain prerogatives: the very character of 'agent of authority,' the possibility of requesting inter-administrative collaboration, of accessing the places to be inspected, of accessing important information and data, which ultimately implies the imposition on the inspected subject of a provision of a personal nature, which is why it is subject to a legal reservation. That is, in our judgment, the performance of the inspection function should also fall under the scope of the civil service reservation and, therefore, at least in principle, should not be capable of being outsourced by a mere administrative decision. This is because, as we have pointed out, the guarantee of impartiality and objectivity required for the fulfillment of such tasks demands a special status that Administrative Law has already constructed." By virtue of the foregoing, in the case of sovereign powers, the respective Administration must necessarily allocate the human, technical, operational, and financial resources necessary for their timely and effective exercise, applying the provisions of Article 66 of the General Law of Public Administration, which provides: "1. Sovereign powers and their exercise, and public duties and their fulfillment, shall be inalienable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible. 2. Only by law may compromise agreements not to exercise a sovereign power be established. Such a compromise may only be given within a bilateral, onerous act or contract. 3. The exercise of powers in specific cases may be expressly subject to expiration, by virtue of other laws." To determine the existence of specific powers assigned to an entity, one must resort to the Law. In this vein, it has been stated that these should preferably be specific, although the use of powers of a general nature exists. Thus, it has been noted that "Normally, and as we have already pointed out, the attribution of powers by the norm must be carried out in a limited and concrete manner, specifying with the greatest possible degree of detail the powers or faculties of which it consists. This is a requirement of a political character, indissoluble from the very essence of the constitutional regime: since the freedom of the individual is the basic standard of civil coexistence, the administrative powers of intervention therein can only be exceptions that, therefore, must be defined with absolute rigor. It is not infrequent, however, in our positive Law—which is a bitter inheritance from our authoritarian political tradition—for certain norms to attribute to the Administration generic powers of action through the vague and imprecise description of the purposes to be achieved with them, of the factual assumptions that authorize their use, and of the means or measures of which they consist" (J. Santamaría Pastor, Apuntes de Derecho Administrativo, I, Madrid, 1987, p. 585). Another untouchable limit in this matter is the existence of a hard legal core that cannot be transferred to third parties, given that it implies the reason for being of the entity itself and is inherent to the exercise of state competencies. Doctrine expresses it as follows: "The constitutional reservation of Administration—in its broad sense of the reservation of the Executive Branch—is formed by the activity of political direction and the activity of police and promotion. These activities, which are sovereign public functions, must be carried out obligatorily by an Administration as it is regulated by the Constitution, that is, with the features of its institutional guarantee. There is an identification between the reservation of Administration and the prohibition of formal privatization—recourse to the private legal system. It is the material object of the reservation that justifies the constitutional singularity of public Administration. There is no freedom of choice of form or legal regime to develop these activities that belong to the reservation of public Administration. The flight to private Law by these Administrations that exercise sovereign public functions is unconstitutional. The activity of public service and logistical or supply activity are not typically administrative—they are not within the reservation of public Administration—and do not obligatorily have to be exercised by Administrations in accordance with their institutional guarantee. The Administration may choose between the regime of Administrative Law and the regime of private Law. In contrast, the free market activity of the Administration must obligatorily be developed under a regime of private Law for the purpose of safeguarding competition. Constitutional bodies, and in general, the rest of the powers of the State, cannot resort to private Law for the fulfillment of their own and exclusive functions, but they can do so to develop some auxiliary or instrumental functions. Just as in the reservation of Administration, it is the exclusive competencies that determine the scope of the mandatory use of public Law by the constitutional body." (TRONCOSO REIGADA, Antonio, Privatización, Empresa Pública y Constitución, Marcial Pons, Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales S.A., Madrid, 1997, pages 458 and 459). In the same vein, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) expressed this when it stated: "The Chamber further understands that the concession of public works and services referred to in this draft law exempts everything relating to national security, customs control, immigration, and everything having to do with functions proper to the State, which are non-delegable and inalienable and in no way can be left in private hands. Thus, for example, even if an airport is granted in concession so that the public service provided there is carried out by a private entity, matters relating to port security, immigration, and customs, among others, remain reserved exclusively to the State, without those functions being able to be exercised directly or indirectly by private individuals" (vote no. 2319-98 of 17:51 of March 31, 1998). In accordance with the foregoing considerations, the outsourcing mechanism is valid for the Administration to contract certain secondary activities for the better fulfillment of the public service rendered. However, its application is not unrestricted, as it has limits both with respect to the elements of the administrative act leading to its adoption or the respective contract, and to the nature of the service sought to be outsourced. As an instrument in the service of the public purpose, as it must be, any contractual figure employed cannot be arbitrary or unmotivated and must conform to the scope provided by the administrative legal system. Thus, the Administration is barred from outsourcing the inherent core activity of the entity or the exercise of sovereign powers, as indicated above.
VII.II.II- Considerations on the private employment regime of the Administration: In Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations emanate. Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, stating the following: “Article 191.- A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and the public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration” and “Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed on the basis of proven fitness and shall only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in the labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof.” In accordance with the indicated norms of constitutional rank, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of a specific normative regulation, stability in employment – limiting the regime of free removal (libre remoción) typical of private labor regulation – and of an administrative career, together with the other guarantees existing for persons covered by a subordination regime, such as the payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (with the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)). Correlative with the previous rights, the public servant possesses a series of duties inherent to the public service function, inherent to the public ends sought with his activity and which must always guide his management, in order not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary liability. Without attempting to be exhaustive, some of the duties inherent to the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (Art. 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Administration (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Administración Pública)), b) duty of compliance with the principles of the public service – continuity, efficiency, adaptation to change in the legal regime and equality of treatment – (Art. 4 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), c) duty to ensure an adequate internal control environment (Art. 39 of the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno)), d) duty to protect the best interests of children (Arts. 4 and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia)), e) duty to comply with the legal system (Art. 13 and concordant articles of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), Art. 39.a of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil)), f) duty to provide prompt response and information to the user (Arts. 5 and 10 of the Law for the Protection of the Citizen from the Excess of Requirements and Administrative Procedures (Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos)), g) duty of obedience (Art. 108 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), h) duty to act with effectiveness (Art. 5 of the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets (Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos)), i) duty to maintain decorum and provide due attention to the user (Art. 114 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and Art. 39. d) and e) of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil)), j) duty to answer in case of having acted with intent or gross negligence (Arts. 199 and 211 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) (Art. 11 of said normative body). Additionally, on a supplementary basis, based on Article 9 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and Article 51 of the indicated Statute, the provisions of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship, such as the Law on Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching (Ley de Hostigamiento Sexual en el Empleo y la Docencia), the Law Regulating Smoking (Ley de Regulación del Fumado), the Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para Personas con Discapacidad), among others. In this vein, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and labor law principles given the existence of a statutory and not contractual relationship (Article 111 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), the existence of general guiding lines of the relationship that are common cannot be ignored, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in Article 19 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). In addition to said figure in the employment relationship, Articles 111.3 and 112.2 and 3 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) provide for the existence of the private employment regime official of the State. In this sense, said norms indicate the following: "... 3. Employees of companies or economic services of the State entrusted with activities subject to common law are not considered public servants." and " Article 112.... 2. Service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be. 3. However, the legal or regulatory provisions of public law that are necessary to guarantee administrative legality and morality shall also apply to the latter, as determined by Decree by the Executive Branch". In accordance with the previous norms, there is a considerable group of persons who provide their services to public entities who cannot be considered public servants, given that they are employees of the private employment regime of the State. In this sense, it has been noted that they fall into two broad groups, namely, on one hand, those who work for public enterprises (ICE, INS, CNFL, RACSA, among others) or who perform their work for economic services of the State (Duty-Free Shops of IMAS) and those who do not participate in the so-called public management. Regarding the rationale for this figure, Mr. Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz indicated the following: "Our idea is to make a clear delineation between who we consider should be ordinary State workers and servants governed by the special Public Law of the State. Of course, there is a minimum, as Article 116 [referring to current Article 112] reveals, that we want to be common in one sense, it is obvious that a State worker, however similar his regime may be to that of an ordinary worker in a private company, always has opportunities that the ordinary worker does not have, so we want to guarantee the morality and legality of the administration in what strictly relates to them, but always preserving for them the statute of workers under common law. This is the same, for example, also regarding employees of autonomous entities, which are public enterprises… this refers to those State enterprises that function as if they were private entities because they sell and do the same as private individuals, for example, INS itself when it sells policies does the same as any insurance company, the bank when it makes a loan does the same as a common financial entity, the National Power and Light Company (Cía. Nal. de Fuerza y Luz), which sells electrical energy, sells it under the same conditions in which a private company could sell it, we maintain that those employees of those entities should be considered ordinary workers and not public officials, because, otherwise, there are a series of statutes and regulations that are applied to them directly or supplementarily that end up hindering the operation of those services to the detriment of the public entity… If, on the contrary, we tried to extend to these officials the stability regime typical of ordinary officials of the Executive Branch, we would find that a series of tremendous obstacles are created for companies that have to operate under conditions of competition equal to those of the private company… So we wanted to preserve that private, labor or commercial regime of the public enterprise that has a commercial activity equal to that of private parties..... We do not see the need for a payroll worker or the employee of an autonomous institution that is a public enterprise functioning as a common commercial entity, to be given the advantages or be imposed the duties of a public servant, therefore, that thesis that contemplates special advantages or special burdens, one must also see this negative side that, by being removed, it results in a favor for them, they will not be applied because they will not be considered public servants, except naturally if those laws do not speak of public servants but, as is most likely, they refer specifically to such and such type of servant, defining which are the covered servants, when they are on payrolls it implies that and you see that, for example, in pension laws, for example, of the employees of the Ministry of Transport or the custodians of the Ministries. I think perhaps the misunderstanding that has been created could be dispelled somewhat when reading Article 116 which says ‘Administrative law shall be applicable to the service relationships between the Administration and its public servants’ with which we mean that when dealing with servants who are not public, administrative law will not be applied to them, that is, this entire Code and its related laws, but rather labor law, that is to say, they are simply ordinary workers. Now, why should an ordinary State worker be treated better than an ordinary worker in a private company, when both operate in equal circumstances? Why should he not have a pension if the laws have not expressly covered him with that protection and others will have it? To us it does not seem fair that a worker has more right or more burden than another ordinary worker, both governed by the Labor Code, simply because one is a State worker and the other is a worker of a private entity, so it seems to us that in this what is appropriate is the uniformity of the regime, if they are workers and are governed by the Labor Code, they must be protected only by it and by related laws, not by administrative law". (Quirós Coronado, R., General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), Concorded and Annotated with the Legislative Debate and Constitutional Jurisprudence, Editorial ASELEX S.A., Costa Rica, pp. 153 and 154 and minutes of (Permanent Commission of Government and Administration, Minutes No. 99 Extraordinary Period, of March 23, 1970). In the same vein, scholarly opinion has indicated the distinction between the public employment regime and the private one of the Administration, in the following manner: "The personnel at the service of these enterprises can only be considered part of public employment from an economic or, perhaps, sociological point of view, but not from a legal point of view. The relationship that binds them to their enterprise is of a strictly private nature, regulated by labor law for all purposes. It is true that this rule has some exceptions, since the public nature of the enterprise entails the application of certain specialties proper to public law. For example, in matters of incompatibilities..." (Sánchez Morón Miguel. Law of the Public Function (Derecho de la Función Pública). Editorial Tecnos). Additionally, in other legislations, the use of this legal figure is also provided for. In this vein, it is indicated: " In Germany, by express provision of the Fundamental Law (Ley Fundamental) of May 23, 1943, the closed public function model coexists with Labor Law. This is provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 33 of the Fundamental Law (Ley Fundamental), by reserving to the agents of the Administration linked to public entities by a relationship of service and fidelity, that is, to officials, the exercise of the prerogatives of public power, it is indirectly admitting that the other functions that do not entail the exercise of these prerogatives may be, although not necessarily, performed by labor agents… On this constitutional reserve, which is limited to establishing a reserve of the public function regime without setting any limit, as it does not prevent the legislator from establishing an administrative regime for all the personnel of the Administration, however, the federal framework Law of the public function of February 27, 1985, was superimposed, whose Art. 2.°2 transforms the reserve into a positive limit by prescribing that only positions that entail the performance of public powers and the exercise of public authorities or tasks that for reasons of State security or public life cannot be entrusted to persons linked to the Administration by a labor relationship may be held by officials. By this means, labor contracting has become generalized in the lower echelons of the public function, that is, in instrumental positions, administrative support, and those involving the development of physical or manual work, from which officials have been displaced, who have reserved functions of some importance and, of course, the directive function, a solution that has the advantage of preventing the overlapping of officials and labor workers in the same jobs." (Silvia del Saz, Labor Contract and Public Function (Contrato Laboral y Función Pública), Editorial Marcial Pons, Ediciones Jurídicas S.A, Madrid 1995). Our Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has also made reference to said figure, in that it established the following: " For its part, from the interrelation of Articles 112 subsection 2) and 111 subsection 3) (a norm to which the former refers and both of the same Law) it is also clear that they are not officials subject to the public employment regime, but rather laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, the employees of companies or economic services of the State, entrusted with activities subject to common Law, who in accordance with transcribed Article 112 subsection 2), are governed by Labor law and not by Public law, which empowers them to bargain collectively. …. Thus, the regime is administrative, statutory, for "public servants", that is, for those who provide services to the administration or on behalf and on account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture; however, the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) itself establishes that " service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be ". Consequently, and based on this constitutional interpretation and on the texts contained in the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), in the public sector only those servants who do not participate in public management may enter into collective labor agreements, in such a way that entities with an employment regime of a labor nature (not public), such as, for example, State enterprises, of which national scholarly opinion has said that they are " those that function as if they were private companies, because they sell and do the same as private individuals; for example, INS itself when it sells policies does the same as any insurance company, the bank when it makes loans does the same as a common financial entity, the National Power and Light Company (Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz), which sells electrical energy, sells it under the same conditions in which a private company could sell it ", among others, may bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions that inform Collective Labor Law" (vote 2000-4453 of fourteen hours and fifty-six minutes of May twenty-fourth, two thousand). In the same sense, votes Nos. 3053-94 of 09:45 hours of June 24, 1994, 2000-9690 of 15:01 hours of November 1st, 2000, as well as resolutions 2000-07730, 2006-6728-, 2006-7261, 2006-3001, 2006-2006, 2006-7966, 2006-6729, 2006-17743 and 2006-1743. In a similar sense, the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has pronounced itself in the following manner: “ There emerges, then, a clear division of the servants of the Administration into two groups: those governed by Public Law and those governed by Labor Law. Finally, it also follows from the foregoing that, ultimately, the Chamber left in the hands of the ordinary judge the task of establishing, in each specific case, whether or not the relationship is statutory; and, if it is not, then it is governed by Private Labor Law... From the foregoing, it can then be concluded that a public official is anyone who, regardless of the nature of the activity performed, has been appointed as such, through a formal, valid, and effective act of appointment, to exercise public powers, within the field of his competence; whether in inter-organ (employee) or inter-subjective (official) relationships. When dealing with workers, whose bond with the Public Administration has not been produced by virtue of that indispensable formal act, and they are employees of companies or economic services of the State, entrusted with activities subject to common Law; or laborers, workers, or employees, who do not participate in public management, their relationships shall then be governed by Private Labor Law. However, it is of importance to make one last observation. The status of public official is not the product of a concession derived from a discretionary act of the Administration; the required appointment, or the act of investiture, is not something left to the freedom of the Administration; but rather its definition, in its legal scope, was left in the hands of the legislator, according to the considerations previously set forth. Consequently, only in the specific cases of exception, expressly provided for in the indicated numerals 111 and 112 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), is when one can be in the presence of relationships of State servants, subject to the general or common regime of private employment.” (Vote No. 513-2001 of nine hours and fifty minutes of August twentieth, two thousand one). The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has deemed that said regime even extends to personnel contracted through corporate entities created by said public enterprises (e.g., corporations created by State Banks or other public entities). In this sense, it indicated: “…the Chamber deems that with the creation of these "corporations" a kind of administrative deconcentration has operated, which has allowed a specialization of the activity, separated from the founding entity, however, the separation is not absolute. Indeed, the allocation of resources for the fulfillment of the purpose entrusted by the founder and the use of the trade name of the autonomous institution offer an image of integration (e.g., BN Puesto de Bolsa). Now, unlike pure and simple deconcentration, the creation of a distinct legal person (S.A.) within the scheme of the autonomous entity, implies separation of the company regarding budget control and the management of resources, among others; which the legislator has achieved by granting full legal personality, typical of the "corporation" figure of private law. Now, even when these entities are called "corporations", administratively they are part of the scheme of the autonomous institution to which they belong. Through these legal figures proper to private law and unknown to classical public law, the founding entity seeks to fulfill the task assigned to it. The special nature of these "companies" is also reflected in the possibility of constituting them with a single shareholder, an inadmissible scheme for private law, for which the existence of a company presupposes a "gathering of several persons subject to the same rule". The General Attorney of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) is therefore correct in indicating that these corporations are an "instrument" that the legislator has made available to these autonomous entities to achieve their tasks, to which it has been resorted, given that in the public scheme the system of financial groups implemented by national private banks has not been permitted. Thus, this instrument called "corporation" is not equivalent to the figure of private law in all its splendor; rather, from the point of view of its organization, it is a specialized activity of the founding entity, and to this end, it has, in its ordinary activity, full legal personality not incompatible with the founding entity, with which, in principle, it does not compete and to which it is attached –by the ownership of the shares-. Therefore, these companies necessarily partake of the nature of the creating entity; that is, they are enterprises of the founding entity and consequently of the State. Within this line of reasoning, principles such as transparency in actions, prior and subsequent control over the management of resources, ownership by the State of the public domain assets, application of the contracting regime and the principles of public employment, and the principle of accountability and measurement of results are applicable to these companies... The corporations of the State banks and INS, although in their ordinary stock market activity they may be governed by private law, are not equivalent to corporations formed by subjects of private law, with at least two persons in association. … Indeed, the nature of their owner –the autonomous institution– is dragged by the so-called "company" to the point that it is not possible to recognize it as a holder of fundamental rights tutelable through this avenue." (vote 2002-06513 of fourteen hours and fifty-seven minutes of July third, two thousand two). In accordance with the foregoing, we would be in the presence of a private employment regime of the Administration, in the case of workers of public enterprises, in their various modalities of public law enterprise, private law subject, or organ-enterprise, and furthermore, in the case of those servants who do not participate in public management. With respect to this last assumption, vote 4453-2000 of fourteen hours and fifty-six minutes of May twenty-fourth, two thousand, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), among others, indicated the following: "..it corresponds to the Administration itself, to operators of Law in general, and ultimately to the Judge, when hearing specific cases, to determine if a State institution or a group of its servants or officials, form the core of the exception that can bargain collectively, or if, on the contrary, that path is forbidden to them...". It is thus that in this last case a margin of discretion is maintained, insofar as it corresponds to each administration to determine if in each particular case one is in the presence or not of the regime under analysis, that is, whether it is deemed that one participates in public management or not. There will be obvious cases of this depending on the activity carried out by a specific group of servants (e.g., doctors, teachers, police officers, judges, etc.) and there will be borderline cases where it will require the adoption of a position and a decision by the applier of the law for its particular application. As direct legal effects of this differentiated regime, they will not be protected by the stability regime proper to the public employment regime, given that they are governed by the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and as a consequence of the foregoing, they may resort to conventional mechanisms to agree on employment conditions, such as collective bargaining agreements.
By reason of these consequences, the possibility exists of free removal of said workers, on the understanding that if the termination occurs with employer liability, that is, payment of severance entitlements, due process does not apply, but if it is a consequence of the exercise of disciplinary authority, due process is imperative. Additionally, there is no legal impediment for said workers to organize, through a union, and negotiate working conditions with the entity or company, or to resort to the mechanisms for resolving labor disputes provided for in the Labor Code. The differing nature of this regime does not, however, preclude the application of regulations specific to administrative law regarding control and transparency in the worker's management, nor does it empower the Administration of the entity or company to carry out arbitrary, unmotivated, or unlawful actions, such as dismissal for union persecution, discrimination in employment, or even the lack of adequate justification for the administrative decision. Again, it must be noted that conduct has limits inherent to the legal system and to the human condition of workers, which are unavoidable, whatever the applicable labor regime. These considerations having been made, the specific analysis of the case subject to this resolution is in order. **VII.II.III- On the nature of the plaintiffs' regime and the employer figure in the case under analysis:** In their complaint, the plaintiffs invoke that they performed duties as labor risk inspectors beginning August 17, 2009, such that by reason of said function, they were empowered to inspect workplaces, close businesses, or halt construction for non-payment of the respective insurance policy. By reason of the foregoing, they invoke the public nature of said activity and state that in application of the theory of the State as sole employer, the legal nature of the employment relationship with Insurance Servicios S.A. is mixed, and its workers are employees of the State. Based on the foregoing, they request that the hiring contract between Insurance Servicios and them be declared null, and that their dismissal without liability be annulled for failure to follow due process. They also request that it be established that the employer in the relationship is the INS, given that they provided services for it, using equipment, identification, and other items pertaining to said entity. In this regard, it has been demonstrated from the case file that Mr. Guillermo Constenla Umaña, in his capacity as Absolute General Proxy without Limitation of Sum of the INS, incorporated the corporation named Insurance Servicios S.A., and that the latter entered into a framework agreement for the provision of corporate services with the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS), for the purpose of regulating their mutual relationship regarding the provision of reciprocal services. In this vein, as the defendant parties have indicated, this Tribunal considers that the provisions of Article 1 of the Law Creating the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (Ley de Creación del Instituto Nacional de Seguros), as amended by the Insurance Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros), must be applied, insofar as it currently provides: "**Article 1.-** **Instituto Nacional de Seguros and its activities.** The Instituto Nacional de Seguros, hereinafter INS, is the autonomous insurance institution of the State, with its own legal personality and assets, authorized to carry out insurance and reinsurance activities. In said activities, the regulation, supervision, and sanctioning regime established for all insurance entities shall be applicable. The INS shall be empowered to take all required technical, commercial, and financial actions, in accordance with the best business practices, including the possibility of rejecting coverage when technically or commercially justified, as well as to define coverage conditions and risk retention margins, according to its technical criteria and administrative policies. Decisions on the functions placed under its competence may only emanate from its Board of Directors and shall be its exclusive responsibility. The INS shall have its legal domicile in the city of San José and may have branches, agencies, or offices in the rest of the country. In the development of insurance activity in the country, which includes the administration of commercial insurance, the administration of the Workers' Compensation Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo), and the Mandatory Automobile Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos Automotores), the INS shall have the full guarantee of the State. The INS is empowered to establish or acquire capital interests in corporations, commercial companies, branches, agencies, or any other commercial entity of a similar nature, none of which shall have the guarantee indicated in the preceding paragraph, for the following purposes: **a)** To carry out the activities entrusted to it by law within the country. Said activities include those of a financial nature, the granting of credit, the provision of health services and those specific to the Fire Department (Cuerpo de Bomberos), the supply of medical benefits, and the sale of goods acquired by the INS by reason of its activities. Additionally, the INS may establish, by itself or through its companies, strategic alliances with public or private entities in the country or abroad, for the sole purpose of fulfilling its competence. Both the INS and its corporations, with the approval of their respective boards of directors, may incur debt prudently in accordance with the corresponding financial studies. These operations shall not have the guarantee of the State. Public banks are authorized to participate as shareholders of the corporations that the INS establishes in accordance with this article, provided that the INS remains the majority partner of said companies." (emphasis is ours). In accordance with the foregoing provision, it is evident that the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) was authorized to establish the co-defendant company, insofar as the existing legal system allows it to create corporations for the fulfillment of its legal purposes. Regarding the private legal nature of the company Insurance Servicios S.A., and therefore its effects on the relationship with its workers, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) ordered the following: **"I.-** The appellant alleges that as of May thirty-first, two thousand ten, he was hired to provide services as a Corporate Account Executive at Insurance Servicios Sociedad Anónima for an indefinite term; however, once the period established in the Labor Code as a probationary period had elapsed, without having committed any fault, he was dismissed without following any procedure, without granting him the corresponding notice, and without just cause; he was merely informed by means of a note, signed by the head of the Human Resources area, that due to an administrative decision, they would dispense with his services effective August thirteenth, two thousand ten, with employer liability; for which reason he filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal decision on September sixth, two thousand ten, but as of the date of filing this amparo, said motion has not been resolved. **II.-** From the brief filing this appeal, and the accompanying documentation, it is observed that the defendant Insurance Servicios Sociedad Anónima (folio 17), is a subject of private law, whose challenged action is not appropriate to be heard or assessed in this constitutional venue, because there are other remedies provided in the legal system that are suitable and timely for hearing the facts alleged in this amparo. In this sense, the discussion regarding the propriety and validity of the mentioned dismissal, as well as the procedure used to make it effective, constitutes a typical labor dispute that must be resolved in the labor jurisdiction, as it is the competent authority to hear this matter, and in which such dispute can be resolved—with the required breadth of evidence—and the rights of the amparo petitioner can be effectively protected. **III.-** Regarding the lack of resolution of the motion for reconsideration filed against the dismissal in question, it should be noted that although Article 41 of the Political Constitution establishes the right to obtain a prompt resolution, in this case the motion whose lack of resolution is being challenged was made before the Executive President of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, who in turn is the President of Insurance Servicios Sociedad Anónima—the company for which the protected person worked, and who also ordered his dismissal with employer liability (folio 57)—which in this case does not constitute a public entity, but rather one of a private legal nature, and therefore the alleged violation has not occurred. Thus—if the amparo petitioner deems it appropriate—he must resort to the respondent itself or, failing that, to the corresponding jurisdictional route, in protection of the rights he believes assist him." (Ruling 2010-17033 of fourteen hours and forty-four minutes of October thirteenth, two thousand ten). The foregoing was ratified by Ruling 11-14638 of fourteen hours thirty minutes of November thirtieth, two thousand eleven, which ordered: **"I.-** In the present case, from the evidence on file and the statements of the appellants themselves, it is inferred that they signed individual indefinite-term employment contracts with the company Insurance Servicios S.A. Regarding amparo actions filed against state-owned enterprises, in Judgment No. 16586-2006 of 10:20 a.m. on November 17, 2006, the Chamber stated: " Clarifies in this matter this Tribunal its jurisprudential line on the matter of dismissal of employees of private companies of the State in the following sense: when the amparo action is directed against this type of entity, it must first be assessed whether the amparo petitioner has or does not have a relationship regulated by Common Law; in which case, once the execution of the individual employment contract is verified, the rupture of the relationship is generally regulated by the provisions of the Labor Code and must be submitted to the cognizance of the ordinary judge, who is the one responsible for analyzing the legality of the dismissal. (…)". In the same vein, as noted, between the company and the entity that gave it origin, there is a link clearly described in Ruling 2002-06513 of fourteen hours and fifty-seven minutes of July third, two thousand two, cited in previous recitals. For the purposes of the employment regime, this Tribunal considers that it must be understood that a sui generis link operates between both, which could be characterized as a corporate group with common economic interests, beyond the invoked theory of the State as sole employer, which does not have the indiscriminate scope sought by the plaintiffs' representation for this type of public entity engaged in business activities. Regarding the concept of an economic group, it must be taken into consideration that this figure has been applied in different legal disciplines, from tax law, regulatory law, consumer law, etc., to labor law, in strict application of the principle of the primacy of reality. In this vein, legal doctrine has characterized that in private labor law, there exists the economic interest group as a novel model wherein a complex business/employer structure exists, displacing traditional organizational models. In this sense, Fernando Valdés Dal-Re indicates that the traditional operation is characterized by: "... the control of the entire cycle of production of goods and services (vertical integration), the autonomy of each company in its relationships with others, and a hierarchical functional management...". He notes that it is being replaced by "---another with structural features of opposite sign: fragmentation of the productive cycle (horizontal integration), dependency, coordination, and articulation in inter-company relations, and management that privileges functional autonomy. Centralization will give way to decentralization and autonomy, to internal and external interconnection." (Valdés Dal-Ré, Fernando. Descentralización Productiva y Desorganización del Derecho del Trabajo. cited by Bolaños Céspedes, Fernando. In Organización Compleja de Empresas y sus Efectos en el Derecho de Trabajo. Una visión Costarricense. Revista Derecho Laboral. Number 1. November 2009). The foregoing considerations are applicable to the case under analysis (with the caveat that it is based on a provision that authorizes it, and that, as will be stated, the existence of an evasive intent in its creation was not demonstrated), insofar as, based on a legal authorization, the entity—a public law entity—created a corporation to carry out activities it deemed auxiliary, a permanent linkage originating in their legal nature and the services connecting them having been demonstrated in both, such as the use of common equipment, similar identification cards, related image, etc. Regarding some of the indicators for determining the existence of a link between two economic subjects, the doctrine indicates that "... various indicators have been pointed out to determine in a specific case whether one is in the presence of an economic group. Among said indicators mentioned are: sharing management, domicile, machinery; whether workers perform duties in several of the group's companies; whether there is a coincidence of directors; whether they have complementary lines of business, etc. Judges analyze the set of indicators to reach a conclusion..." (Mangarelli, Cristina. Responsabilidad de la Empresa que utilice subcontratistas, intermediarios o suministradores de mano de obra en Uruguay. Revista Derecho Laboral. Number 1. November 2009). With great precision, our Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice has referred to this figure as follows: "IV.- ON ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS: It is a notorious fact that the development of global economic relations and an integrationist trend has led to the emergence of new and very diverse forms of contracting and has also influenced the rise of different forms of business organization in developing their commercial line. In Labor Law, as in other branches of law, this situation has required, on many occasions, a rethinking of some legal institutions, the emergence of new figures, to be able to regulate novel situations; and also, in other cases, the adaptation of existing legal concepts to the advancement and development of relationships, primarily social and economic ones. Regarding what is to be understood by an economic group, Ermida Uriarte notes that "it is a group of companies, formally and apparently independent, which are, however, reciprocally intertwined, to the point of forming a single, complex but compact whole, insofar as it responds to a single interest." (Ermida Uriarte, Oscar. "El concepto de empresa transnacional y algunas de sus repercusiones en el Derecho del Trabajo". Taken from Relaciones Laborales y Globalización: Antología de textos. Compiled by Alexander Godínez Vargas. San José, Escuela Judicial, Corte Suprema de Justicia, first edition, 1999, pp. 174-188). For his part, Plá Rodríguez defined it as the "group of apparently autonomous companies but subject to a single economic direction." (Plá Rodríguez, Américo. "Los Grupos de Empresas". Idem, pp. 148-154). Likewise, labor law doctrine has attempted to establish the determining elements of the economic interest group and has generally indicated that the essential characteristics of a corporate group are the plurality of components, which are linked to each other and subject to a single decision-making power, and also the underlying unity of the group, which is given precisely by the common economic interest. In effect, the group cannot be conceptualized except through the idea of plurality, since there is no group if there is not more than one component. It involves, then, independent legal persons that make up such an economic group. These companies are intertwined through relations of subordination or coordination; but normally, the link is one of subordination. Consequently, what exists is the subjection of all the entities of the group, or of all but one, to a determined control or a common management. At the same time, these companies are organized into a vaster economic structure and, of course, are influenced by a single interest or a single economic policy. (Ermida Uriarte, Oscar, op.cit. and Plá Rodríguez, Américo, op.cit.)..." To further elaborate on the reasoning made, it has been demonstrated on the record that the company Insurance Servicios S.A. forms part of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) financial group, duly authorized by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System (Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero). It is for all the foregoing that in the case subject to this resolution, there is abundant evidence of said link between the INS and the company Insurance Servicios S.A., but it is of merit to state that the foregoing and the relationship between the two does not blur the employer character of one, in light of the evidence produced. The theory of the economic group or business interest group has effects above all when faced with a claim for liability for breach of labor obligations—so that any member of the group answers for the obligations of one of the parties—but it does not mean that the immediate relationship between the worker and their immediate employer is rendered void. The application of the concept also operates in situations where one seeks to evade reality vis-à-vis the worker, trying to feign the non-existence of links between members of the group with the worker, or to hide connections, always for the purpose of avoiding compliance with legal obligations. This does not occur in the case under analysis. As noted, in the present proceeding, despite the link between the co-defendants being demonstrated, it has been proven in the record that all of the plaintiffs were timely settled with and paid all severance entitlements arising from the termination of their employment relationship; therefore, the determination of who the immediate employer is becomes irrelevant. Thus, in the evident relationship between the INS and the co-defendant, there is no purpose of evading legal obligations, nor has the relationship been created contra legem. The situation would have been different in the face of a claim arising from a dismissal without employer liability—which, as we have indicated, does not occur in the case under study—insofar as, based on said doctrine and the strict liability of the State (Art. 190 LGAP), the plaintiff could well address any of the co-defendants in this proceeding. It is not superfluous to point out that neither does the defendant entity seek to diminish the link; on the contrary, it bases it as a consequence of the regulations permitting it. For this Tribunal, it is clear that the INS created Insurance Servicios S.A. under the protection of the legal system, within the context of market opening resulting from the Free Trade Agreement with the United States of America, and for the purpose of competing under better conditions with new players in the insurance market. The Insurance Market Regulatory Law grants it that possibility to operate in the face of deregulation, and it is for this reason that, despite the existence of that link, it is not possible to assume the existence of an unlawful economic interest group, given that the legality of the relationship is granted by said legislation. In this regard, what the jurisprudential background and doctrine reprove as contrary to law is that economic group which exists for the purpose of evading, concealing, or deceiving, which, as has been indicated, does not occur in the present case; for which reason, and in the face of the non-existence of breach of labor obligations, it is not possible to disregard the existence of Insurance Servicios S.A. as the employer figure. Thus, in the case under examination, it has been demonstrated that, based on the framework agreement signed by the co-defendants, both parties executed a contract for the provision of the service of 17 labor risk inspectors, and that the plaintiffs were hired as such by the company Insurance Servicios S.A. By reason of the foregoing, it is noted that Insurance Servicios S.A., although born as a figure of a private corporate nature, is sheltered by the legal system that allows the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) its creation. Given the foregoing, it is evident that the persons working for it form part of the private employment regime, and consequently can be validly dismissed if their employment rights are recognized, as the termination of the employment relationship does not have a disciplinary origin. As has been noted, Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) qualifies the private employment relationship by the Administration according to the activity or the line of business of the entity for which work is performed. In the case under examination, regarding the plaintiffs' legal situation, we are in the second scenario, given that their employer is a private law entity created by a public entity-business. On the other hand, although it is on the record that at certain times the use of the INS's facilities and equipment occurred, as well as the use of its materials and coincidence in the content of the identification cards, this does not imply that the plaintiffs' relationship was with said entity, insofar as, as has been stated, it forms part of an economic interest group with Insurance Servicios S.A., and moreover the contract signed between both parties expressly provided for said shared use, given the evident and uncontested link between both legal entities. The contradictions existing between the deponents, Mr. Erick Duarte Fallas and Ms. Karen Morelli Alfaro, must be highlighted, insofar as while the former reaffirmed that the exercise of management and hierarchy powers were carried out by persons linked to Insurance Servicios S.A., the latter, in her deposition, sought to link them to the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS). In any case, it must be understood that any situation or overlap of instructions, orders, or directives that may have been issued by both co-defendants is due to the dynamics inherent to an employment relationship within a legitimate economic interest group and the nature of the services provided. It is also evident that, in the context of inspection services and the linkage of the co-defendants, both may have deemed necessary the use of a unified institutional image for purposes vis-à-vis third parties, without this meaning that Insurance Servicios S.A. does not hold the figure of employer for the plaintiffs. The differentiated nature of the company from the entity that created it, as established in the legal system empowering the latter—despite their linkage—means that Insurance Servicios S.A. can have a different employment regime, with salary scales, benefits, and occupational profiles different from those of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. In any case, it must be stated that for this Chamber, even if the plaintiffs seek to apply the principle of the primacy of reality, there is ample evidence to the effect that the immediate employer figure for the claimants was the co-defendant Insurance Servicios S.A. Thus, it has been demonstrated that the company's Personnel Administration Department issued personnel actions for the interim appointment of the plaintiffs, and that all of them signed a confidentiality agreement with it. It is also on record that the company's Human Resources unit processed vacation requests and leave permits for the indicated plaintiffs, and in at least two cases, conveyed recognition to them for the quality of their work.
Finally, there is evidence in the record that the Head of Operations of that company was the one who notified everyone of the decision to end their notice period and pay them the eleven days pending for that concept. By reason of the foregoing, the plaintiffs are incorrect when they assert that their employment relationship is of a different nature from the private employment regime and that it was established with the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros). As is evident from the case file, the direct employment relationship of the plaintiffs is with the company Insurance Servicios S.A., such that the latter possesses a nature and purpose that are instrumental to the goals of the National Insurance Institute, without this implying that the Institute occupies the role of employer, especially taking into consideration that the respective termination was with employer liability and without, for that reason, requiring the application of a prior due process, which is only applicable when the employment bond is broken as a consequence of a disciplinary measure. The dismissal carried out is legitimate, insofar as, as workers under the Administration's private employment regime, the provisions of Article 85(d) of the Labor Code apply to the parties, which provide: "<span style='color:#010101'> ARTICLE 85.- The following are causes that terminate the employment contract without liability for the worker and without extinguishing the rights of the latter or their successors to claim and obtain payment of the benefits and indemnifications that may correspond to them by virtue of what is ordered by the Code or by special provisions: ....d. The employer's own will</span>". Regardless of the discussion regarding whether it was legitimate or not for the National Insurance Institute to outsource the inspection of workplace risks to Insurance Servicios S.A., this is not relevant for the purposes of the claims referred to in this recital (considerando), given that, as has been indicated, whether before one or the other co-defendant, the employment regime of the plaintiffs is of a private nature and consequently, the dismissal carried out was valid and effective. <span style='color:#010101'>Thus, the claims of the complaint seeking to establish</span> that the employer in the relationship is the INS and that the dismissal of the plaintiffs without employer liability be declared null <span style='color:#010101'>must be rejected.</span>
“VII.II.I- Consideraciones generales sobre la tercerización de servicios en la Administración Pública: L a Administración Pública emplea diversos medios para el cumplimiento de los fines públicos, que no se agotan en las meras actuaciones materiales o en actos administrativos formales, en tanto que también se recurre a la técnica de la contratación administrativa, en la cual, se pacta el cumplimiento de un objeto con un contratista, como sujeto colaborador del logro del interés público buscado. No obstante, a diferencia de un contrato privado, en la contratación administrativa existe una serie de elementos que trascienden el mero acuerdo de voluntades rubricado en un documento y que condicionan su nacimiento, desarrollo y extinción. Es así como el contrato administrativo está condicionado en su origen, evolución y finalización al ordenamiento propio que rige la materia y la contratación en específico. En este sentido, el acto de voluntad, libre y soberano del contratista, queda filtrado por el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo, y fundamentalmente por la reglamentación de la contratación, sea el cartel o pliego de condiciones, base de la misma. Además siempre estará subyacente en todo procedimiento de contratación administrativa, una serie de principios que han sido delimitados por la Sala Constitucional a partir del voto 0998-98 de las 11:30 horas del 16 de febrero de 1998 y reiterado en los fallos posteriores, y que se resumen básicamente en la libre concurrencia, igualdad de trato entre los oferentes, la publicidad, la seguridad jurídica, la legalidad y transparencia, la buena fe, el equilibrio de intereses, mutabilidad del contrato, intangibilidad patrimonial y control en los procedimientos. Desde el punto de vista del derecho positivo, el marco general regulador de las obligaciones tanto de los entes contratantes como de las empresas contratistas se encuentra contemplado en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, no obstante lo cual, dependiendo del ente contratante y de la materia de que se trate podría aplicarse otro marco normativo sui generis. En todo caso, la contratación administrativa se encuentra orientada a la satisfacción de uno o varios intereses públicos y nace con motivo de una necesidad de tal naturaleza, ante la cual, la Administración adopta la decisión, por razones de interés público de acudir a un tercero público o privado para que suministre un bien o preste un bien o servicio para su satisfacción. Originalmente pensado en simple adquisición de bienes, con el tiempo, la contratación ha venido desplazando la gestión directa en diferentes ámbitos de la Administración Pública, con una fuerza expansiva propia de la concepción ideológica imperante en el momento. Doctrinariamente se ha hecho la distinción entre la denominada gestión directa del servicio público que presta una Administración, de la gestión indirecta. En la primera, el servicio lo presta ésta por sí misma, o mediante otra persona jurídica pública o privada, exclusivamente dependiente de ella. En la segunda, se contratan los servicios de un tercero particular que asume todo o parte del riesgo que los mismos significan. En este orden de ideas, los mecanismos de contratación administrativa también han venido a ser empleados como un medio para evitar el crecimiento de la planilla de los servidores públicos, por medio de la contratación de privados amparada ya sea personas físicas individuales, por medio de figuras no propias del empleo público (contratos de servicios) o de sujetos creados bajo una figura societaria, como es el caso de la tercerización de determinadas actividades. En el ámbito privado, aplicable a los efectos también al ámbito público, se entiende por tercerización lo siguiente: "La “Tercerización”, “Outsourcing” (“producir fuera”), “Externalización”, “Deslocalización” o “Exteriorización” es un “segundo paso” de la Descentralización al implicar el traslado de determinadas funciones o actividades de un proceso productivo integrado a otras unidades económicas (personas físicas o jurídicas) real o ficticiamente ajenas a la empresa. Ello es el resultado de que la firma identifica una posición de su proceso de negocio que podría ser desempeñada más eficientemente por otra persona o entidad jurídica, lo que le permite concentrarse en la parte del negocio que considera más adecuada". (Ermida Uriarte Oscar. OUTSOURCING /TERCERIZACIÓN: UN RECORRIDO ENTRE DEFINICIONES Y APLICACIONES. En Outsourcing. Respuestas desde los trabajadores. www.csa-csi.org). Se ha indicado que este mecanismo es asumido por la parte patronal, a fin de maximizar ganancias y reducir pérdidas, mediante el traslado a un tercero del elemento riesgo en la relación de empleo tercerizada y el hecho de que éste asumirá los costos inherentes a la misma. Así no solo el riesgo económico, sino el jurídico no es asumido por el contratante, sino que es desplazado a la empresa contratista quien es responsable ante el Trabajador de cumplir las obligaciones laborales y cubrir los seguros e indemnizaciones respectivas. La empresa emplea este mecanismo para buscar especialización y concentración de sus trabajadores en las actividades propias y esenciales (núcleo duro empresarial), con resultados bifrontales en cuanto eficacia, por una parte, se puede dedicar de una forma más eficiente a la producción de los bienes y servicios para los cuales fue creada y por otra, no se demerita las actividades secundarias, instrumentales y accesorias que no agregan mayor valor que no obstante, no pueden dejar de ser desarrolladas en beneficio de las principales. En términos generales se recurre a esta figura, en tanto que existe una desvinculación del contratante de dichos deberes legales, salvedad hecha de algunas legislaciones, como por ejemplo, las Leyes 18.099 y 18.251 de Uruguay donde existe una solidaridad dimensionada de la primera, ante incumplimientos que se ajusten a determinados supuestos. No obstante, en nuestro país, al no haber norma expresa y de no existir disposición contractual, no se aplicaría la indicada solidaridad y el contratista mantiene su obligación exclusiva frente al trabajador. Esa figura que nace en el ámbito privado es acogida en el ámbito público, siendo así que la Administración Pública, vía contratación de servicios u otros mecanismos análogos, ha procedido a dar traslado mediante este mecanismo, de determinadas actividades al régimen privado o mixto, que venían siendo ejercidas por la propia Administración mediante sus funcionarios. Adicionalmente, como se ha dicho, se ha contratado a personas, bajo figuras extrañas al régimen de empleo público. En este orden de ideas, se ha indicado que si bien este mecanismo es válido, no debe ser un medio para que se incumplan obligaciones laborales, demeritando la naturaleza del servicio prestado. El voto de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, número nº 669, de las 9:40 horas del 9 de noviembre de 2001, indicó: “Resulta importante destacar que ni en el ámbito laboral privado, ni en el público, le está permitido a los patronos desnaturalizar los contratos laborales o de servicio público, para disminuir la protección al trabajador, garantizada en la Constitución Política. En el sector público no hay ninguna autorización legal, para utilizar formas de negociación cuya verdadera finalidad sea eliminar, los derechos propios de una contratación de servicio público laboral. En este caso el régimen de contratación administrativa, por sí mismo, no desvirtúa la presunción de laboralidad de que se ha venido hablando; toda vez que, en la materia que nos ocupa, y en este caso concreto no interesa tanto la forma que el patrono haya querido darle al contrato, como, lo que jurídicamente resulte, al final, respecto de la naturaleza de la totalidad de lo expresamente pactado. La denominación que se le dé al contrato, no puede ser utilizada con la finalidad de evadir e intentar irrespetar las garantías laborales constitucionales y legales, desarrolladas por nuestro ordenamiento. Esta afirmación, en consecuencia, resulta válida para ambos sectores. También debe indicarse que, el Estado y sus instituciones, tienen facultades para utilizar, en su funcionamiento, institutos jurídicos diversos del 'contrato de servicio público', cuando esto no sea un mecanismo de evasión de las cargas que impone el respeto a los derechos laborales, de los servidores públicos” (resaltado no es del original). Una de las primeras experiencias normativas en nuestro medio sobre este mecanismo se encuentra en la Ley de Sociedades Anónimas Laborales, En este cuerpo normativo, se establece la regulación propia de las denominadas Sociedades Anónimas Laborales y se definen los servicios que pueden trasladarse para su administración y operación de la siguiente manera: " Artículo 7°- Las sociedades anónimas laborales, establecidas con el propósito de prestar servicios menores o auxiliares, se regirán por las siguientes reglas: a) Se consideran actividades auxiliares de apoyo o no consustanciales del servicio público o de la administración o institución, siempre que no constituyan el giro principal de ella, las siguientes: 1) Servicios de aseo o limpieza. 2) Servicios de vigilancia. 3) Servicios de mantenimiento o de reparación de edificaciones, jardines, instalaciones, y equipo mecánico, rodante y de oficina. 4) Servicios de nutrición y alimentación del personal o de usuarios. 5) Servicios de cómputo. 6) Servicios de secretariado y de archivo. 7) Servicios profesionales que pueden ejercerse liberalmente; en particular los cobros judiciales, el notariado, la contabilidad, la farmacia, la arquitectura, la veterinaria, los servicios técnicos, los agrícolas, la ingeniería y los peritajes. 8) Servicios de transporte y de distribución de suministros o medicamentos. 9) Servicios de imprenta, publicaciones y fotografías. 10) Inspección, diseño y contrucción de obras civiles. 11) Servicios de formación y capacitación. 12) Servicios y talleres dentales, de optometría, de anteojos y ortopédicos. 13) Laboratorios farmacéuticos, químicos, de ingeniería y de control de calidad. 14) Servicios de confección de ropa. 15) Servicios de lavandería. 16) Servicios de recreación. 17) Servicios de relaciones públicas. 18) Servicios de bodegaje. 19) Cualquier otro servicio que, de acuerdo con la administración o la institución de que se trate, califique como actividad auxiliar. b) Ninguna sociedad anónima laboral podrá contratar, en actividades auxiliares o sustanciales, la prestación de servicios que representen más del veinte por ciento (20%) del total del presupuesto anual de egresos de la institución. Será nulo cualquier contrato entre una sociedad anónima laboral y el Estado o sus instituciones, que no cumpla con esta disposición, sin perjuicio de las responsabilidades administrativas, civiles y penales de los funcionarios involucrados. c) Las Juntas Directivas de las instituciones descentralizadas, autónomas, semiautónomas y de las empresas públicas; los concejos municipales y los Ministros de Estado, deberán definir, previa consulta con la Contraloría General de la República, cuáles actividades o servicios son auxiliares y cuáles sustanciales o fundamentales del quehacer institucional. d) Los servidores públicos de los órganos o entes públicos, que dejen de laborar para estos, podrán asumir la prestación de los servicios contratados, como socios trabajadores de una sociedad anónima laboral". " Artículo 8.- Autorízase al Poder Ejecutivo, mediante decreto, y a las instituciones o las administraciones descentralizadas, por disposición de sus superiores jerárquicos, para alquilar o dar en fideicomiso o comodato los bienes, equipos y accesorios materiales destinados a la prestación de actividades auxiliares, de apoyo o que no sean consustanciales al servicio público o a la actividad propia de la institución, cuando el desarrollo de estas actividades deba ir asociado al traspaso o al uso de bienes del Estado o de sus instituciones, los cuales sean indispensables para el ejercicio de la actividad". Como se advierte del indicado cuerpo normativo, existe una enumeración de los servicios susceptibles de contratación de terceros, gravitando sobre cada uno de ellos el carácter de auxiliar de los mismos. Dicha Ley fue reformada por la Ley Marco de Transformación Institucional y Reforma de Sociedades Anónimas Laborales, en tanto dispone: " ARTICULO 1.- Transferencia de prestación de servicios y actividades auxiliares. Facúltase a los órganos del Estado, las instituciones públicas descentralizadas, autónomas y semiautónomas, las empresas públicas del Estado y las municipalidades para transferir, mediante actos de concesión o contratación administrativa de conformidad con la ley, la prestación de servicios y actividades auxiliares en favor de las siguientes organizaciones sociales: asociaciones de desarrollo comunal, cooperativas, asociaciones, fundaciones y sociedades anónimas laborales. Esta transferencia no perjudicará el obligado control y la regulación de la actividad transferida, para proteger el interés público y el ejercicio de potestades de imperio y las atribuciones de la Administración, que son indelegables, imprescriptibles e irrenunciables. Los superiores jerárquicos deberán definir cuáles actividades y servicios son auxiliares y cuáles, fundamentales para el quehacer institucional, de conformidad con el reglamento que se dictará para tal efecto. En ningún caso, podrán transferirse los bienes de dominio público, en particular los referidos en el inciso 14) del artículo 121 de la Constitución Política. Tampoco podrá contratarse la prestación de servicios y actividades en los que el Estado y las instituciones ejerzan potestades de imperio o de naturaleza regulatoria, las cuales no podrán ser delegadas". En este caso en concreto, se dejó a discreción de las Administración la determinación de las actividades que podrían ser consideradas auxiliares, abandonándose la enumeración taxativa de la Ley citada anteriormente. No obstante lo anterior, es de advertir, que en paralelo a la aplicaciòn de la supracitada Ley, en las últimas décadas, con base en las potestades de auto organización de la Administración, los mecanismos de contratación han sido empleados por las diferentes administraciones públicas como un instrumento para asegurar la prestación de diferentes servicios, entre los que se destacan desde actividades profesionales, -médicos, contadores, abogados e informáticos- hasta puramente operativas, como servicios de seguridad o de limpieza. En estos casos, estamos en presencia de una externalización entendida como “ una transferencia de actividad que o bien ha venido realizando directamente la Administración Pública, o bien considera necesario realizarla a partir de un momento dado, a una organización especializada, mediante un proceso competitivo que se formaliza en un acuerdo" (Peláez, J.A, y De la Cuerda, K., “Externalización de la gestión y los servicios del sector público” citada por Cantero Martínez Josefa. La incidencia del fenómeno de la externalización en la Administración General del Estado. ¿Existe algún límite?. Revista Documentación Administrativa. nº 286-287, enero-agosto 2010, pp. 297-334). En todas estas decisiones administrativas ha mediado en la respectiva conducta formal de la administración, una intencionalidad explícita o implícita de trasladar determinadas actividades no consustanciales al servicio público a terceros, con el fin de enfocar la gestión pública en la actividad sustantiva del respectivo ente. Se ha partido de presuntos impactos positivos tanto en las finanzas públicas (reducciòn de la planilla estatal) como en la eficiencia del servicio prestado. En razón de lo anterior, su uso se ha generalizado a determinadas actividades y se ha estimado un instrumento válido para coadyuvar en la gestión pública. Lo anterior en consuno con las posibilidades que brinda tanto la regulación específica en materia de contratación como la posibilidad que poseen todos los entes públicos de escoger los diferentes medios para el cumplimiento de los fines públicos. No obstante lo anterior, es de advertir que la tercerización tiene como límite legal, la imposibilidad de que por la vía de la contratación de servicios, la Administración delegue en un tercero, servicios que resulten consustanciales a la función pública o que impliquen el ejercicio de potestades de imperio. En este orden de ideas, el artículo 66 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública señala que: " Las potestades de imperio y su ejercicio son irrenunciables, intransmisibles e imprescriptibles". Una norma complementaria de esta disposición, aplicable a la concesión de gestión de servicios públicos, es el artículo 74 de la Ley de la Contratación Adminstrativa que dispone: "La Administración podría gestionar, indirectamente y por concesión, los servicios de su competencia que por su contenido económico, sean susceptibles de explotación empresarial. Esta figura no podrá ser utilizada cuando la prestación del servicio implique el ejercicio de potestades de imperio o actos de autoridad..." Con respecto a las potestades de imperio, el maestro Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz indicó “… el poder fundamental de la Administración es su llamada potestad de imperio, que le permite crear obligaciones o suprimir derechos del particular sin el consentimiento de éste. En este poder resalta la necesidad de lograr el fin público a toda costa, pues su carácter imperativo se explica como un medio para vencer la residencia del particular en los casos en que tiene que colaborar al logro de dicho fin y no lo hace. De este poder de imperio dimanan otros que también revelan una superioridad de la Administración frente al particular, incompatibles con el principio de igualdad.” (E, Ortiz Ortiz: Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, Editorial Stradtmann, S.A. San José, 1998, p. 39.). En el mismo orden de ideas, en la discusión del proyecto de Ley General de la Administración Pública, el Prof. Ortiz Ortiz indicó: "… Por potestades públicas se entienden las facultades de la Administración para actuar como autoridad, es decir, imponiéndose al particular, imponiéndole obligaciones, privándolo de derechos o denegándole esos derechos, o limitándoles esos derechos etc. El término potestades públicas está técnicamente designado en la tecnología del derecho público para significar justamente esa clase de intervención autoritaria de la Administración en la esfera jurídica del particular, desfavorable a este eventualmente… la doctrina entiende por “potestades públicas” las llamadas “potestades de imperio” que eventualmente pueden perjudicar a particulares ..” (Quirós Coronado, R., Ley General de la Administración Pública, Concordada y Anotada con el Debate Legislativo y al Jurisprudencia Constitucional, Editorial ASELEX S.A., Costa Rica, p. 153 y 154). Como se advierte, el ejercicio de estas potestades, tiene como consecuencia inmediata y directa la creación, modificación o extinción de derechos mediante actos unilaterales, las cuales se implementan en el ejercicio de diferentes prerrogativas de que goza la Administración en tutela del interés público y ante el cual, la esfera jurídica del particular cede. En razón de dichos efectos ante las situaciones jurídicas de las personas, resulta intrínsica a la potestad de imperio, su indegabilidad. Dado lo anterior, excepto que exista norma habilitante, no es posible que un tercero, público o privado la ejerza con exclusión o en complemento de la Administración competente. La Administración a la cual la Ley le asignó su ejercicio legítimo, debe ejercerlas directamente, salvo disposición intentamos hacer el esfuerzo de trasladar este concepto al ámbito de la actuación administrativa para delimitar cuáles son precisamente las funciones de la Administración General del Estado que implican ejercicio de potestades públicas y no se pueden externalizar, en principio, habría que concluir que no podemos encerrar en esta categoría todas las funciones que ésta realiza pues, como hemos apuntado, no se trata sin más del ejercicio de cualquier función pública, sino exclusivamente de aquéllas que implican el ejercicio “de potestades públicas” o de “poder público, de autoridad”, lo que a nuestro juicio, al menos debería situarnos directamente en el plano de aquel tipo de funciones o cometidos que exterioricen una actividad de la Administración que tenga una directa trascendencia para la situación jurídica de otros sujetos de derecho y que por ello precisamente adquieren relevancia las notas de objetividad, imparcialidad e independencia que caracterizan la actuación funcionarial...." (Cantero Martínez Josefa. La incidencia del fenómeno de la externalización en la Administración General del Estado. ¿Existe algún límite?. Revista Documentación Administrativa. nº 286-287, enero-agosto 2010, pp. 297-334). Adicionalmente, la misma autora se refiere en concreto a los actos de inspección de la siguiente manera: "Mención especial debería hacerse en este punto a las funciones de inspección. Sobre la naturaleza jurídica de dichas actividades se ha planteado un interesante debate doctrinal, toda vez que la función que realizan los inspectores no deja de ser una actividad meramente de carácter material, técnico o instrumental que normalmente realiza la Administración con carácter previo al ejercicio de su potestad sancionadora. Como tal, en principio no implicaría la toma de decisiones definitivas y vinculantes. Faltaría, en rigor, lo que en el ámbito comunitario se ha denominado la autonomía decisoria propia del ejercicio de las prerrogativas de poder público, esto es, la facultad para poder extraer consecuencias jurídicas vinculantes del resultado de la tarea de control o inspección. Coincidimos, no obstante, con Bermejo Vera al considerarla como una auténtica potestad, una actividad de naturaleza imperativa que comporta el ejercicio de autoridad, pues no se genera en relación jurídica alguna, ni en pactos, ni en negocios jurídicos ni en hechos singulares, sino que procede directamente del ordenamiento jurídico. Se trata de “una acción administrativa que se presenta como el ejercicio de un poder atribuido previamente por la ley y por ella delimitado y construido”. Es un instrumento de control del cumplimiento de la legalidad vigente cuya ausencia supondría una renuncia del Estado a garantizar la aplicación del Derecho. Es más, con los nuevos títulos de intervención que ha introducido la normativa española para su adaptación a la normativa comunitaria sobre el libre acceso a las actividades de servicios, lo razonable sería potenciar considerablemente dichas funciones, toda vez que en importantes sectores de la actividad económica del país el régimen previo de autorizaciones va a ser sustituido por el posterior control o inspección, por lo que ahora es más importante, si cabe, que la Administración retome y refuerce dichas tareas y que lo haga a través de sus funcionarios. En caso contrario se provocaría la sensación de una ausencia total de control por parte de la Administración poco compatible con la satisfacción del interés general que constitucionalmente tiene encomendada. Por otra parte, aunque consideremos que el inspector carece de “autonomía decisoria” porque lleva a cabo una actividad material y técnica, no cabe duda de que dicha función resulta indispensable para el posterior ejercicio de la actividad sancionadora, donde se manifestaría, ya sin dudas, la mencionada autonomía de decisión de la Administración. En este sentido, la actividad inspectora podría ser subsumida, al menos, dentro del ejercicio indirecto de potestades públicas que menciona la reserva funcional del art. 9.2 del Estatuto Básico del Empleado Público. De hecho, el personal inspector debe caracterizarse por su especial cualificación y por reunir las notas de imparcialidad y objetividad, lo que requiere su sometimiento a normas de Derecho Público, al régimen estatutario, que es el único que puede garantizar estas cualidades a partir fundamentalmente de la consagración de la nota de la inamovilidad en la función pública. Por otra parte, la propia naturaleza de la actividad inspectora impone a los empleados que la ejercen deberes sigilo y secreto profesional, a la vez que les confiere determinadas prerrogativas: el carácter mismo de “agente de autoridad”, la posibilidad de solicitar la colaboración interadministrativa, de acceder a los lugares que van a ser inspeccionados, de acceder a importante información y datos, lo que supone, en definitiva, la imposición para el sujeto inspeccionado de una prestación de carácter personal, por lo que está sujeta a reserva de ley. Es decir, a nuestro juicio, también la realización de la función inspectora debería recaer bajo el ámbito de la reserva funcionarial y por ello, al menos en principio, no ser susceptible de ser externalizada por una mera decisión administrativa. Ello por que, tal como hemos apuntado, la garantía de imparcialidad y objetividad que requiere el cumplimiento de dichas tareas exige un especial estatus que el Derecho Administrativo ya ha construido". En virtud de lo indicado, en el caso de las potestades de imperio, necesariamente corresponderá a la Administración respectiva asignar los recursos humanos, técnicos, operativos y financieros necesarios para su ejercicio oportuno y eficaz, aplicando las disposiciones del artículo 66 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que dispone: "1. Las potestades de imperio y su ejercicio, y los deberes públicos y su cumplimiento, serán irrenunciables, intransmisibles e imprescriptibles. 2. Sólo por ley podrán establecerse compromisos de no ejercer una potestad de imperio. Dicho compromiso sólo podrá darse dentro de un acto o contrato bilateral y oneroso. 3. El ejercicio de las potestades en casos concretos podrá estar expresamente sujeto a caducidad, en virtud de otras leyes." Para la determinación de la existencia de determinadas potestades asignadas a un ente, se debe acudir a la Ley. En este orden de ideas, se ha indicado que las mismas deben ser preferentemente específicas, si bien existe el uso de potestades de carácter general. Así, se ha señalado que " Por lo normal, y como ya señalamos, la atribución de potestades por la norma ha de efectuarse de modo tasado y concreto, especificando con el mayor grado de detalle posible los poderes o facultades en que consiste. Una exigencia esta de carácter político, indisoluble con la esencia misma del régimen constitucional: siendo la libertad del individuo el patrón básico de la convivencia civil, las potestades administrativas de intervención en la misma no pueden ser sino excepciones que, por ello, han de definirse con entero rigor. No es infrecuente, sin embargo, en nuestro Derecho positivo –lo que es una amarga herencia de nuestra tradición política autoritaria- que determinadas normas atribuyan a la Administración potestades genéricas de actuación mediante la descripción vaga e imprecisa de los fines a conseguir con ellas, de los supuestos de hecho que autorizan para su empleo y de los medios o medidas en que consisten”, (J, Santamaría Pastor, Apuntes de Derecho Administrativo, I, Madrid, l987, p. 585). Otro límite intocable en esta materia es la existencia de un núcleo duro legal que no es procedente trasladar a terceros, dado que implica la razón de ser del propio ente y es inherente al ejercicio de las competencias estatales. La doctrina lo indica de la siguiente manera: "La reserva constitucional de Administración –en su sentido amplio de reserva del Poder Ejecutivo- está formada por la actividad de dirección política y la actividad de policía y de fomento. Estas actividades, que son funciones públicas de soberanía, tienen que ser desarrollas obligatoriamente por una Administración tal y como se encuentra regulada por la Constitución, es decir, con los rasgos de su garantía institucional. Hay una identificación entre reserva de Administración y prohibición de privatización formal –recurso al ordenamiento jurídico privado-. Es el objeto material de la reserva lo que justifica la singularidad constitucional de la Administración pública. No existe libertad de elección de forma o régimen jurídico para desarrollar estas actividades que pertenecen a la reserva de Administración pública. La huida al Derecho privado de estas Administraciones que ejercen funciones públicas soberanas es inconstitucional.La actividad de servicio público y la actividad logística o de suministro no son típicamente administrativas –no están dentro de la reserva de Administración pública- y no tienen obligatoriamente que ser ejercidas por Administraciones de conformidad con su garantía institucional. La Administración puede optar entre el régimen del Derecho administrativo y el régimen de Derecho privado. En cambio, la actividad libre en el mercado de la Administración tiene que ser desarrollada obligatoriamente en régimen de Derecho privado con la finalidad de salvaguardar la competencia. Los órganos constitucionales, y en general, el resto de los poderes del Estado, no pueden recurrir al Derecho privado para el cumplimiento de sus funciones propias y exclusivas, pero sí pueden hacerlo para desarrollar algunas funciones auxiliares o instrumentales. Al igual que en la reserva de Administración, son las competencias exclusivas lo que marca el ámbito de utilización obligada del Derecho público por parte del órgano constitucional." (TRONCOSO REIGADA, Antonio, Privatización, Empresa Pública y Constitución, Marcial Pons, Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales S.A., Madrid, 1997, páginas 458 y 459). En el mismo orden de ideas, lo expresó la Sala Constitucional, cuando indicó: " La Sala entiende además que la concesión de las obras y servicios públicos a que se refiere este proyecto de ley, exceptúa todo aquello relativo a la seguridad nacional, control aduanero, migración y todo aquello que tenga que ver con funciones propias del Estado, las que son indelegables e irrenunciables y en modo alguno pueden quedar en manos privadas. Así por ejemplo, aun cuando un aeropuerto sea dado en concesión, para que el servicio público que ahí se preste sea realizado por un ente privado, lo relativo a la seguridad portuaria, migración y aduanas entre otros, queda reservado exclusivamente al Estado, sin que puedan ser ejercidas esas funciones ni directa ni indirectamente por los particulares" (voto n.° 2319-98 de las 17:51 del 31 de marzo de 1998). De conformidad con las anteriores consideraciones, el mecanismo de la tercerización resulta válido para que la Administración contrate determinadas actividades secundarias para el mejor cumplimiento del servicio público prestado. No obstante, la aplicación del mismo, no es irrestricta, en tanto que posee límites tanto con respecto a los elementos propios del acto administrativo que lleva a su adopción o del respectivo contrato, como de la naturaleza del servicio que se pretende tercerizar. Como instrumento al servicio público que debe ser, cualquier figura contractual que se emplee no puede ser arbitraria o inmotivada y debe ajustarse a los alcances que le brinde el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo. Así las cosas le estará vedada a la Adminstración tercerizar la actividad consustancial del ente o el ejercicio de potestades de imperio, según lo indicado.
VII.II.II- Consideraciones sobre el régimen de empleo privado de la Administración: En Costa Rica el servidor público se encuentra sometido a un régimen particular, diferenciado del trabajador privado, y del cual dimanan una serie de derechos y obligaciones específicas. Los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política es la base fundamental para establecer tal distinción, al establecer lo siguiente: “Artículo 191.- Un estatuto de servicio civil regulará las relaciones entre el Estado y los servidores públicos, con el propósito de garantizar la eficiencia de la administración” y “Artículo 192.- Con las excepciones que esta Constitución y el estatuto de servicio civil determinen, los servidores públicos serán nombrados a base de idoneidad comprobada y sólo podrán ser removidos por las causales de despido justificado que exprese la legislación de trabajo , o en el caso de reducción forzosa de servicios, ya sea por falta de fondos o para conseguir una mejor organización de los mismos”. De conformidad con las indicadas normas de rango constitucional se evidencia que el servidor del Estado y sus Instituciones, goza de los derechos de una regulación normativa propia, estabilidad en el empleo - limitando el régimen de libre remoción propio de la regulación laboral privada- y de una carrera administrativa, junto con los demás garantías existentes para las personas amparadas a un régimen de subordinación, como son el pago de un salario, vacaciones, jornadas máximas, huelga, etc. (haciendo la salvedad del derecho a la negociación colectiva, excluida por votos 4453-2000 y 9690-2000 de la Sala Constitucional). Correlativo con las anteriores derechos, el servidor público posee una serie de obligaciones de carácter funcionarial, inherentes a los fines públicos buscados con su actividad y que deben orientar siempre su gestión, a fin de no incurrir en una falta personal generadora de responsabilidad disciplinaria. Sin pretender ser exhaustivos, algunos de los deberes propios del régimen de empleo público, son: a) deber de probidad (art. 3 Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Administración Pública), b) deber de cumplimiento de los principios del servicio público - continuidad, eficiencia, adaptación al cambio en el régimen legal e igualdad de trato- (art. 4 Ley General de la Administración Pública), c) deber de cautelar un adecuado ambiente de control interno (art. 39 de la Ley General de Control Interno) d) deber de proteger el interés superior de los niños y las niñas (art. 4 y 5 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia) e) deber de cumplir el ordenamiento jurídico (art. 13 y concordantes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, art. 39.a del Estatuto de Servicio Civil), f) deber de dar pronta respuesta e información al usuario (art. 5 y 10 de la Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos), g) deber de obediencia (art. 108 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), h) deber de actuar con eficacia (art. 5 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos) i) deber de guardar decoro y de brindar debida atención al usuario (art. 114 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y art. 39. d) y e) del Estatuto de Servicio Civil) j) deber de responder en caso de haber actuado con dolo o culpa grave (art. 199 y 211 Ley General de la Administración Pública) k) deber de acatar la Constitución Política (art. 11 de dicho cuerpo normativo). Adicionalmente, de manera supletoria, con base en el artículo 9 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 51 del indicado Estatuto, le son aplicables a dicha relación de empleo público, las disposiciones propias del Código de Trabajo y demás disposiciones relacionadas con la relación de trabajo, como por empleo la Ley de Hostigamiento Sexual en el Empleo y la Docencia, Ley de Regulación del Fumado, Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para Personas con Discapacidad, entre otras. En este orden de ideas, si bien en materia de empleo público no podemos hablar de una plena integración del ordenamiento jurídico y principios en materia laboral habida cuenta de la existencia de una relación estatutaria y no contractual, (artículo 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), no puede obviarse la existencia de líneas generales de orientación de la relación que son comunes, como por ejemplo, la aplicación del principio de buena fe entre ambas partes, contemplado en el artículo 19 del Código de Trabajo. De manera adicional a dicha figura en la relación de empleo, el artículo 111.3 y 112.2 y 3 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, preveen la existencia del funcionario del régimen de empleo privado del Estado. En este sentido, dichas normas indican lo siguiente: "... 3. No se consideran servidores públicos los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común". y " Artículo 112.... 2. Las relaciones de servicios con obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la Administración, de conformidad con el párrafo 3º, del artículo III, se regirán por el derecho laboral o mercantil, según los casos.3. Sin embargo, se aplicarán también a estos últimos las disposiciones legales o reglamentarias de derecho público que resulten necesarias para garantizar la legalidad y moralidad administrativa, conforme lo determine por Decreto el Poder Ejecutivo". De conformidad con las anteriores normas, existe un grupo considerable de personas que prestan sus servicios a entes públicos que no pueden ser considerados como servidores públicos, dado que son empleados del régimen de empleo privado del Estado, En este sentido, se ha señalo que los mismos se encuentran comprendidos en dos grandes grupos, a saber, por una parte los que laboran para empresas públicas (ICE, INS, CNFL, RACSA, entre otros) o que prestan su labor a servicios económicos del Estado (Tiendas Libres del IMAS,) y aquellos que no participan de la denominada gestión pública. Con respecto a la razón de ser de esta figura el Lic. Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz indicó lo siguiente: “La idea nuestra es hacer un deslinde claro entre lo que consideramos que deben ser trabajadores comunes del Estado y servidores regidos por el Derecho Público especial del Estado. Claro que hay un mínimo como el artículo 116 [se refiere al 112 actual] lo revela, que queremos que sea común en un sentido, es obvio que un trabajador del Estado por muy igual que sea su régimen al del trabajador común de una empresa privada siempre tiene oportunidades que no tiene el trabajador común, entonces queremos garantizar la moralidad y la legalidad de la administración en lo que se relacione estrictamente con ellos, pero siempre conservándoles el estatuto de trabajadores del derecho común. Esto es lo mismo por ejemplo también en cuanto a empleados de entes autónomos, que son empresas públicas… se trata de aquellas empresas del Estado que funcionan como si fueran entidades privadas porque venden y hacen lo mismo que los particulares, por ejemplo el mismo INS cuando vende pólizas, hace lo mismo que una compañía aseguradora cualquiera, la banca cuando hace un préstamo, hace lo mismo que una entidad financiera común, la Cía. Nal. De Fuerza y Luz, que vende energía eléctrica la vende en iguales condiciones en que podría venderla una empresa privada, nosotros sostenemos que esos empleados de esas entidades deben ser considerados trabajadores comunes y no funcionarios públicos, porqué, porque si no hay una serie de estatutos y reglamentaciones que se les aplica directa o supletoriamente que vienen a entorpecer la marcha de esos servicios en perjuicio del ente público… Si a la inversa nosotros tratáramos de extender a estos funcionarios el régimen de estabilidad propio de los funcionarios comunes del Poder Ejecutivo, encontraríamos que se crean una serie de entrabamientos tremendos para empresas que tienen que funcionar en condiciones de competencia iguales a las de la empresa privada… Entonces queríamos preservar ese régimen privado, laboral o mercantil de la empresa pública que tiene un giro mercantil igual al de los particulares..... Nosotros no vemos la necesidad de que a un trabajador de planillas o al empleado de una institución autónoma que es una empresa pública que funciona como una entidad comercial común, se le den las ventajas o se le impongan los deberes de un servidor público, luego, aquella tesis que contemple ventajas especiales o cargas especiales, hay que ver también este lado negativo que al ser suprimido resulta un favor para ellos, no se les aplicará porque no serán considerados como servidores públicos, salvo naturalmente que esas leyes no hablen de servidores públicos sino, como es lo más probable, se refieran concretamente a tal y cual tipo de servidores, definiendo cuáles son los servidores cubiertos, cuando son de planillas lo da a entender y eso ustedes lo ven por ejemplo en las leyes de pensiones, por ejemplo, de los empleados del Ministerio de Transportes o en los celadores de los Ministerios. Yo creo que tal vez el equívoco que se ha creado se podría desvanecer un poco cuando se lee el artículo 116 que dice ‘El derecho administrativo será aplicable a las relaciones de servicio entre la Administración y sus servidores públicos’ con lo cual queremos decir que cuando se trate de servidores que no son públicos, no se les aplicará el derecho administrativo, que es todo este Código y sus leyes conexas sino el derecho laboral, es decir, son simplemente trabajadores comunes. Ahora, ¿por qué a un trabajador común del Estado se le va a tratar mejor que a un trabajador común de una empresa privada, cuando ambos funcionan en iguales circunstancias? ¿por qué no va a tener pensión si es que las leyes no lo han cubierto expresamente con esa protección y otros la van a tener? A nosotros nos parece que no es justo que un trabajador tenga más derecho o más carga que otro trabajador común, regidos ambos por el Código de Trabajo, simplemente porque uno es trabajador del Estado y el otro es trabajador de una entidad privada, entonces nos parece que en esto lo que conviene es la uniformidad del régimen, si es que son trabajadores y se rigen por el Código de Trabajo, deben estar protegidos nada más por este y por leyes conexas, no por el derecho administrativo”. (Quirós Coronado, R., Ley General de la Administración Pública, Concordada y Anotada con el Debate Legislativo y al Jurisprudencia Constitucional, Editorial ASELEX S.A., Costa Rica, p. 153 y 154 y actas de (Comisión Permanente de Gobierno y Administración, Acta N°99 Periodo Extraordinario, del 23 de marzo de 1970). En el mismo orden de ideas, la doctrina ha indicado la distinción entre el régimen de empleo público y el privado de la Administración, de la siguiente manera: "El personal al servicio de estas empresas sólo desde un punto de vista económico o , si acaso, sociológico, puede considerarse parte del empleo público, pero no desde un punto de vista jurídico. La relación que les une a su empresa es de naturaleza estrictamente privada, regulada por el derecho del trabajo a todos los efectos. Es cierto que esta regla tiene alguna excepción, puesto que la naturaleza pública de la empresa conlleva la aplicación de ciertas especialidades propias del derecho público. Por ejemplo en materia de incompatibilidades..." (Sánchez Morón Miguel. Derecho de la Función Pública. Editorial Tecnos). Adicionalmente, en otras legislaciones, también se prevee el uso de esta figura jurídica. En este orden de ideas, se indica: " En Alemania, por Ley Fundamental de 23 de mayo de 1943, conviven el modelo de función pública cerrada con el Derecho Laboral. Así está previsto en el apartado cuarto del artículo 33 de la Ley Fundamental, al reservar a los agentes de la Administración ligados a los entes públicos por una relación de servicio y fidelidad, es decir a los funcionarios, el ejercicio de las prerrogativas de poder público, está admitiendo indirectamente que las demás funciones que no conllevan el ejercicio de estas prerrogativas puedan ser, aunque no necesariamente, prestadas por agentes laborales…Sobre esta reserva constitucional que se limita a establecer una reserva del régimen de función pública sin fijar límite alguno, pues no impide al legislador establecer un régimen administrativo para todo el personal de la Administración, vino sin embargo a superponerse la Ley federal marco de la función pública del 27 de febrero de 1985, cuyo art. 2.°2 transforma la reserva en un límite positivo al prescribir que sólo podrán ser desempeñados por funcionarios los puestos que supongan el desempeño de potestades públicas y el ejercicio de autoridades públicas o tareas que por razones de seguridad del Estado o de la vida pública no puedan ser encomendadas a personas vinculadas a la Administración por una relación laboral. Por esta vía se ha generalizado la contratación laboral en los estrados inferiores de la función pública, es decir, en los puestos instrumentales, de apoyo administrativo y que supongan el desarrollo de trabajos físicos o manuales, de donde han sido desplazados los funcionarios que tienen reservadas las funciones de cierta trascendencia y desde luego la función directiva, solución que tiene la ventaja de impedir el solapamiento de funcionarios y laborales en los mismos puestos de trabajo.” (Silvia del Saz, Contrato Laboral y Función Pública, Editorial Marcial Pons, Ediciones Jurídicas S.A, Madrid 1995). Nuestra Sala Constitucional también ha hecho referencia a dicha figura, en tanto estableció lo siguiente: " Por su parte, de la interrelación de los artículos 112 inciso 2) y 111 inciso 3) (norma a la cual remite la primera y ambos de la misma Ley) queda también claro que no son funcionarios sujetos al régimen de empleo público, sino obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la Administración, los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado, encargados de gestiones sometidas al Derecho común, que de conformidad con el artículo 112 inciso 2) transcrito, se rigen por el Derecho laboral y no por el Derecho público, lo que les faculta para negociar colectivamente. …. Así las cosas, el régimen es administrativo, estatutario, para los "servidores públicos", o sea, para quienes prestan servicios a la administración o a nombre y por cuenta de ésta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura; sin embargo, la propia Ley General de la Administración Pública establece que " las relaciones de servicio con obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración, de conformidad con el párrafo 3 del artículo 111, se regirán por el derecho laboral o mercantil, según los casos ". Consecuentemente, y a partir de esta interpretación constitucional y de los textos contenidos en la Ley General de la Administración Pública , en el sector público solo pueden celebrar convenciones colectivas de trabajo los servidores que no participan en la gestión pública, de tal forma que entes con un régimen de empleo de naturaleza laboral (no pública), como por ejemplo, las empresas del Estado, de las que se ha dicho la doctrina nacional que son " aquellas que funcionan como si fueran empresas privadas, porque venden y hacen lo mismo que los particulares; por ejemplo el mismo INS cuando vende pólizas hace lo mismo que una compañía aseguradora cualquiera, la banca cuando hace préstamos, hace lo mismo que una entidad financiera común, la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, que vende energía eléctrica la vende en iguales condiciones en que podría venderla una compañía privada ", entre otros, sí pueden negociar colectivamente de conformidad con las disposiciones que informan el Derecho Colectivo del Trabajo” (voto 2000-4453 de las catorce horas con cincuenta y seis minutos del veinticuatro de mayo del dos mil). En el mismo sentido, votos Nºs 3053-94 de las 09:45 horas del 24 de junio de 1994, 2000-9690 de las 15:01 horas del 1º de noviembre del 2000, así como resoluciones 2000-07730, 2006-6728-, 2006-7261 , 2006-3001, 2006-2006, 2006-7966, 2006-6729, 2006-17743 y 2006-1743. En similar sentido, se ha pronunciado la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la siguiente manera: “ Surge, entonces, una clara división de los servidores de la Administración, en dos grupos: los regidos por el Derecho Público y los regidos por el Derecho Laboral. Por último, también se desprende de lo expuesto que, en última instancia, la Sala dejó, en manos del juzgador ordinario, la tarea de establecer, en cada caso concreto, si la relación es o no estatutaria; y, de no serlo, se rige entonces por el Derecho Laboral Privado... De lo que, con independencia del carácter de la actividad que realice, haya sido nombrado como tal, mediante un acto formal de nombramiento, válido y eficaz, para ejercer potestades públicas, en el campo de su competencia; ya sea en relaciones inter–orgánicas (empleado) o inter–subjetivas (funcionario). Cuando se trate de trabajadores, cuyo ligamen con la Administración Pública no se haya producido en virtud de ese acto formal indispensable, y se trate de empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado, encargados de gestiones sometidas al Derecho común; o de obreros, trabajadores o empleados, que no participan de la gestión pública, sus relaciones estarán entonces regidas por el Derecho Laboral Privado. Sin embargo, resulta de trascendencia realizar una última apreciación. La calidad de funcionario público no es producto de una concesión derivada de un acto discrecional de la Administración; el requerido nombramiento, o el acto de investidura, no es algo que queda a la libertad de la Administración; sino que su definición, en sus alcances jurídicos, quedó en manos del legislador, según las consideraciones antes es cuando se puede estar en presencia de relaciones de servidores del Estado, sujetos al régimen general o común del empleo privado.” (Voto N. 513-2001 de las nueve horas con cincuenta minutos del veinte de agosto del dos mil uno). La Sala Constitucional ha estimado que inclusive dicho régimen alcanza a aquel personal contratado por figuras societarias creadas por dichas empresas públicas (v.g. sociedades anónimas creadas por Bancos estatales u otros entes públicos). En este sentido indicó: “…la Sala estima que con la creación de estas "sociedades anónimas" ha operado una especie de desconcentración administrativa, que ha permitido una especialización de la actividad, separada del ente fundador, sin embargo, la separación no es absoluta. En efecto, la dotación de recursos para el cumplimiento del fin encomendado por parte del fundador y la utilización del nombre comercial de la institución autónoma ofrecen una imagen de integración (vgr. BN puesto de Bolsa). Ahora bien, a diferencia de la desconcentración pura y simple, la creación de una persona jurídica diversa (S.A.) dentro del esquema del ente autónomo, supone separación de la sociedad en punto al control del presupuesto y al manejo de los recursos, entre otros; lo que ha logrado el legislador con el otorgamiento de personalidad jurídica plena, propia de la figura "sociedad anónima" del derecho privado . Ahora bien, aún cuando se denomine a estos entes "sociedades anónimas" administrativamente son parte del esquema de la institución autónoma a la que pertenecen. A través de estas figuras jurídicas propias del derecho privado y desconocidas para el derecho público clásico, el ente fundador busca cumplir el cometido que se le ha asignado. La especial naturaleza de estas "sociedades" se ve reflejada también en la posibilidad de constituirlas con un único socio, esquema inadmisible para el derecho privado, para el que la existencia de una sociedad supone una " reunión de varias personas sometidas a una misma regla”. Lleva entonces razón la Procuraduría General de la República al indicar que estas sociedades anónimas son un "instrumento" que el legislador ha puesto a disposición de estos entes autónomos, para alcanzar sus cometidos, a lo que se ha recurrido, dado que en el esquema público no se ha permitido el sistema de grupos financieros implementado por los bancos privados nacionales. Así las cosas, este instrumento denominado "sociedad anónima" no es equivalente a la figura del derecho privado en todo su esplendor, antes bien, desde el punto de vista de su organización, es un actividad especializada del ente fundador, y para ello cuenta, en su actividad ordinaria, con personalidad jurídica plena no incompatible con el ente fundador, con el que, por principio, no compite y al que está adscrito –por la titularidad de las acciones-. Por ello, estas sociedades participan necesariamente de la naturaleza del ente creador; es decir, son empresas del ente fundador y en consecuencia del Estado. Dentro de este orden de ideas son aplicables a estas sociedades principios como transparencia en las actuaciones, control previo y posterior sobre el manejo de los recursos, titularidad por parte del Estado de los bienes demaniales, aplicación del régimen de contratación y de los principios de empleo público y el principio de rendición de cuentas y medición de resultados... Las sociedades anónimas de los bancos del Estado y del INS aunque en su actividad ordinaria bursátil pueden regirse por el derecho privado, no son equivalentes a las sociedades anónimas conformadas por sujetos de derecho privado, con al menos dos personas en asocio. … En efecto, la naturaleza de su dueño –la institución autónoma-, es arrastrada por la llamada "sociedad" al punto que no es posible reconocerla como titular de derechos fundamentales tutelables en esta vía." (voto 2002-06513 de las catorce horas con cincuenta y siete minutos del tres de julio del dos mil dos). De conformidad con lo anterior, estaríamos en presencia de un régimen de empleo privado de la Administración, en el caso de los trabajadores de empresas públicas, en sus diversas modalidades de empresa ente derecho público, sujeto de derecho privado u órgano-empresa y además, en el caso de aquellos servidores que no participen de la gestión pública. Con respecto a este último supuesto, el voto 4453-2000 de las catorce horas con cincuenta y seis minutos del veinticuatro de mayo del dos mil, de la Sala Constitucional, entre otros indicó lo siguiente: "..le corresponde a la propia Administración, a los operadores del Derecho en general y en última instancia al Juez, cuando conocen de los casos específicos, determinar si una institución del Estado o un grupo de sus servidores o funcionarios, conforman el núcleo de la excepción que sí puede negociar colectivamente, o si por el contrario, les está vedado ese camino...". Es así como en este último caso se guarda un margen de discrecionalidad, en el tanto que le corresponde a cada administración determinar si en cada caso en particular, se está en presencia o no del régimen de análisis, sea que se estime que se participe de la gestión pública o no. Habrá supuestos evidentes de la misma dependiendo de la actividad que desarrolle un determinado grupo de servidores (v.g. médicos, maestros, policías, jueces, etc) y existirán casos límite en donde requerirá la adopción de una posición y una decisión del aplicador del derecho para su aplicación en particular. Como efectos jurídicos directos de este régimen diferenciado, no estarán amparadas al régimen de estabilidad propio del régimen de empleo público, dado que se rigen por el Código de Trabajo y consecuencia de lo anterior, sí podrían acudir a mecanismos convencionales para pactar las condiciones de empleo, tales como las convenciones colectivas. En razón de estas consecuencias, existe la posibilidad de libre remoción de dichos trabajadores, en el entendido de que si el cese se da con responsabilidad patronal o sea, pago de los extremos laborales, no aplica un debido proceso, mas si es como consecuencia del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria el mismo sí resulta imperativo. Adicionalmente, no existe impedimento legal para que por medio de un sindicato, los indicados trabajadores se agrupen y pacten con el ente o empresa condiciones de trabajo o acudan a los mecanismos de solución de conflictos laborales previstos en el Código de Trabajo. La naturaleza diferencia de este régimen, no impide eso sí, la aplicación de las regulaciones propias del derecho administrativo en cuanto a control y transparencia en la gestión del trabajador ni faculta a la Administración del ente o empresa a realizar actuaciones arbitrarias, inmotivadas o contrarias a derecho, como podría ser el despido por persecución sindical, la discriminación en el empleo o inclusive la falta de adecuada fundamentación de la decisión administrativa. Nuevamente, ha de indicarse que la conducta presenta límites inherentes al ordenamiento jurídico y a la condición humana de los trabajadores que resultan insoslayables, sea cual sea el régimen laboral aplicable. Hechas estas consideraciones procede el análisis particular del caso objeto de la presente resolución.
VII.II.III- Sobre la naturaleza del régimen de los actores y la figura patronal en el caso de análisis: En su demanda, la parte actora invoca que ejercieron labores como inspectores de riesgos del trabajo a partir del día 17 de agosto de 2009, siendo así que en razón de dicha función, ellos estaban facultados para inspeccionar centros de trabajo, clausurar negocios o paralizar construcciones por el no pago de la respectiva póliza. En razón de lo anterior, invocan la naturaleza pública de dicha actividad y señalan que en aplicación de la teoría del Estado como patrono único, la naturaleza jurídica de la relación de empleo en Insurance Servicios S.A. es mixta y sus trabajadores son empleados del Estado. Con base en lo anterior, solicitan se declare nula la contratación de insurance servicios con ellos y se anule su despido sin responsabilidad por no seguirse el debido proceso. También piden se establezca que el patrono en la relación es el INS, dado que prestaron servicios para éste, emplearon equipo, identificaciones y otros propios de dicho ente. Al respecto, de los autos se ha tenido por demostrado que el señor Guillermo Constenla Umaña en su condición de Apoderado Generalísimo sin Límite de Suma del INS constituyó la sociedad anónima denominada Insurance Servicios S.A., siendo así que ésta suscribió con el Instituto Nacional de Seguros un convenio marco de prestación de servicios corporativos, con el fin de regular la relación mutua en lo que respecta a la prestación de servicios recíprocos. En este orden de ideas, tal y como han indicado las partes demandadas, estima este Tribunal que debe aplicarse lo dispuesto en el artículo 1 de la Ley de Creación del Instituto Nacional de Seguros reformada por la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, en tanto que actualmente dispone: "Artículo 1.- Instituto Nacional de Seguros y sus actividades. El Instituto Nacional de Seguros, en adelante INS, es la institución autónoma aseguradora del Estado, con personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propios, autorizada para desarrollar la actividad aseguradora y reaseguradora. En dichas actividades le será aplicable la regulación, la supervisión y el régimen sancionatorio dispuesto para todas las entidades aseguradoras. El INS estará facultado para que realice todas las acciones técnicas, comerciales y financieras requeridas, de conformidad con las mejores prácticas del negocio, incluida la posibilidad de rechazar aseguramientos cuando se justifique técnica o comercialmente, así como para definir condiciones de aseguramiento y márgenes de retención de riesgos, según sus criterios técnicos y políticas administrativas. Las decisiones sobre las funciones puestas bajo su competencia, solo podrán emanar de su Junta Directiva y serán de su exclusiva responsabilidad.El INS tendrá como domicilio legal la ciudad de San José y podrá tener sucursales, agencias o sedes en el resto del país. En el desarrollo de la actividad aseguradora en el país, que incluye la administración de los seguros comerciales, la administración del Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo y del Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos Automotores, el INS contará con plena garantía del Estado. El INS queda facultado para constituir o adquirir participaciones de capital en sociedades anónimas, sociedades comerciales, sucursales, agencias o cualquier otro ente comercial de naturaleza similar, ninguno de los cuales contará con la garantía indicada en el párrafo anterior para los siguientes propósitos: a) Ejercer las actividades que le han sido encomendadas por ley dentro del país. Dichas actividades comprenden las de carácter financiero, otorgamiento de créditos, las de prestación de servicios de salud y las propias del Cuerpo de Bomberos, el suministro de prestaciones médicas y la venta de bienes adquiridos por el INS en razón de sus actividades. Adicionalmente, el INS podrá establecer, por sí o por medio de sus sociedades, alianzas estratégicas con entes públicos o privados en el país o en el extranjero, con la única finalidad de cumplir con su competencia. Tanto el INS como sus sociedades anónimas, con la aprobación de las respectivas juntas directivas, podrán endeudarse en forma prudente de acuerdo con los estudios financieros correspondientes. Estas operaciones no contarán con la garantía del Estado. Se autoriza a los bancos públicos a participar como accionistas de las sociedades anónimas que el INS establezca según lo señalado en este artículo, siempre que el INS se mantenga como socio mayoritario de dichas sociedades". (el destacado es nuestro). De conformidad con la anterior norma se evidencia que el Instituto Nacional de Seguros se encontraba legitimado para constituir la sociedad codemandada, en tanto que el ordenamiento existente le permite la creación de sociedades anónimas para el cumplimiento de sus fines legales. Con respecto de la naturaleza jurídica privada de la empresa Insurance Servicios S.A. y por ende sus efectos en la relación con sus trabajadores la Sala Constitucional dispuso lo siguiente: "I.- El recurrente alega que a partir del treinta y uno de mayo de dos mil diez, se le contrató para prestar servicios como Ejecutivo de Cuentas Corporativas, en INSurance Servicios Sociedad Anónima por tiempo indefinido, sin embargo una vez transcurrido el plazo establecido en el Código de Trabajo como período de prueba, sin haber cometido falta alguna se le despidió sin seguir ningún procedimiento, sin otorgarle el correspondiente preaviso y sin justa causa, únicamente se le indicó por medio de una nota, suscrita por la encargada del área de Recursos Humanos, que por una decisión del índole administrativa, prescindirían de sus servicios, a partir del día trece de agosto de dos mil diez, con responsabilidad laboral, por lo cual presentó un recurso de reconsideración sobre la decisión de despido, el seis de septiembre de dos mil diez, pero a la fecha de interposición de este amparo, dicha gestión no ha sido resuelta. II.- Del memorial de interposición de este recurso, y de la documentación que lo acompañan se observa que, el recurrido Insurance Servicios Sociedad Anónima (folio 17), es un sujeto de derecho privado, cuya actuación impugnada, no corresponde ser conocida ni valorada en esta sede constitucional, por cuanto existen otros remedios previstos en el ordenamiento jurídico, que resultan idóneos y oportunos para conocer los hechos acusados en este amparo. En este sentido, la discusión sobre la procedencia y validez del mencionado despido, así como del procedimiento empleado para hacerlo eficaz, supone un típico conflicto de trabajo que debe dilucidarse en la jurisdicción laboral, por ser la competente para conocer de esta materia, y en la que se podrá resolver -con la amplitud probatoria requerida- tal conflicto y tutelar de manera efectiva los derechos del amparado. III.-En cuanto a la falta de resolución del recurso de reconsideración presentado contra el despido en mención, cabe indicar que si bien el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política establece el derecho de obtener pronta resolución, en este caso la gestión cuya falta de resolución se reclama, fue hecha ante el Presidente Ejecutivo del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, quien a su vez es el Presidente de Insurance Servicios Sociedad Anónima, -empresa para la cual laboró el tutelado, y también dispuso su despido con responsabilidad laboral (folio 57)-, el cual en este caso, no constituye una persona de carácter público, sino de naturaleza jurídica privada, por lo que no se ha producido el quebranto acusado. De esta forma, -si a bien lo tiene el amparado-, deberá acudir ante la propia recurrida o, en su defecto, a la vía jurisdiccional correspondiente, en resguardo de los derechos que estima le asisten". (voto 2010-17033 de las catorce horas y cuarenta y cuatro minutos del trece de octubre del dos mil diez). Lo anterior, fue ratificado mediante voto 11-14638 de las catorce horas treinta minutos del treinta de noviembre de dos mil once, que dispuso: ""I.- En el presente caso, de la prueba que obra en autos y el dicho de los propios recurrentes, se colige que éstos suscribieron contratos individuales de trabajo por tiempo indefinido con la empresa Insurance Servicios S.A. Sobre los amparos interpuestos contra empresas estatales, en sentencia N° 16586-2006 de las 10:20 hrs. de 17 de noviembre de 2006, la Sala dijo: “ Aclara en este asunto este Tribunal su línea jurisprudencial en materia de despido de empleados de empresas privadas del Estado en el siguiente sentido: cuando el recurso de amparo se dirige contra este tipo de entes, debe en primer término valorarse si el amparado tiene o no una relación regulada por el Derecho común ; en cuyo caso, constatada la celebración del contrato individual de trabajo , la ruptura de la relación se regula en lo general por lo dispuesto en el Código de Trabajo y debe someterse a conocimiento del juez ordinario, que es a quien corresponde analizar la legalidad del despido. (…)”. En el mismo orden de ideas, como se advierte, entre la empresa y el ente que le da origen existe un vínculo claramente descrito en el voto 2002-06513 de las catorce horas con cincuenta y siete minutos del tres de julio del dos mil dos citado en considerandos anteriores. Para efectos del régimen de empleo, estima este Tribunal que debe entenderse que entre ambos opera un vínculo sui generis que podría caracterizarse como un grupo empresarial con intereses económicos comunes, más allá de la invocada teoría del Estado patrono único, la cual no tiene el alcance indiscriminado que pretende la representación de la parte actora para este tipo de entes públicos que realizan actividades empresariales. Con relación al concepto de grupo económico, debe tomarse en consideración que esta figura ha sido aplicada a diferentes disciplinas del derecho desde la materia tributaria, regulatoria, del consumidor, etc, hasta el derecho laboral, en estricta aplicación del principio de primacía de la realidad. En este orden de ideas, la doctrina ha caracterizado que en derecho laboral privado existe el grupo de interés económico como un modelo novedoso en donde se da una estructura empresarial/patronal compleja, que desplaza modelos tradicionales de organización. En este sentido Fernando Valdés Dal-Re indica que la operación tradicional se caracteriza por: ".. el control del entero ciclo de producción de bienes y servicios (integración vertical) la autonomía de cada empresa en sus relaciones con otras y una gestión funcional jerárquica...". Señala que el mismo se ve sustituído por "- --otro de rasgos estructurales de signo opuesto: fragmentación del ciclo productivo (integración horizontal), dependencia, coordinación y articulación en las relaciones interempresariales y una gestión que privilegia la autonomía funcional. La centralización cederá el paso a la descentralización y la autonomía, a la interconexión interna y externa" (Valdés Dal-Ré. Fernando. Descentralización Productiva y Desorganización del Derecho del Trabajo. citado por Bolaños Céspedes Fernando. En Organización Compleja de Empresas y sus Efectos en el Derecho de Trabajo. Una visión Costarricense. Revista Derecho Laboral. Número 1. Noviembre 2009). Las anteriores consideraciones le son aplicables al caso de análisis, (con la salvedad de que es fundado en norma que así lo autoriza y que como se dirá no se demostró la existencia de un ánimo evasor en su creación), en tanto que con base en una autorización legal, la empresa- ente de derecho público, creó una sociedad anónima para el ejercicio de actividades que estimaba auxiliares, habiéndose demostrado en ambas una vinculación permanente originada en su naturaleza jurídica y en los servicios que lo vinculan, como es el uso de equipo común, identificaciones similares, imagen relacionada, etc. Con respecto a algunas de los indicios para determinar la existencia de una vinculación entre dos sujetos económicos, la doctrina indica que se "... ha señalado diversos indicios para determinar en el caso concreto si se está en presencia de un conjunto económico. Entre dichos indicios se mencionan: compartir la administración, el domicilio, la maquinaria, si los trabajadores se desempeñan en varias de las empresas del grupo; si hay coincidencia de directores; si tienen giros de actividad que se complementan, etc. Los jueces analizan el conjunto de los indicios para arribar a una conclusión. .." (Mangarelli Cristina. Responsabilidad de la Empresa que utilice subcontratistas, intermediarios o suministradores de mano de obra en Uruguay. Revista Derecho Laboral. Número 1. Noviembre 2009). Con gran precisión, nuestra Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, ha hecho referencia a esta figura, de la siguiente manera: "IV.- DE LOS GRUPOS DE INTERÉS ECONÓMICO: Es un hecho notorio que el desarrollo de las relaciones económicas a nivel mundial y una tendencia integracionista ha dado lugar a la aparición de nuevas y muy diversas formas de contratación y también ha influido en el surgimiento de diferentes formas de organización de las empresas, en el desarrollo de su giro comercial. En el Derecho del Trabajo, al igual que en las otras ramas del Derecho, esta situación ha exigido, en muchas ocasiones, el replanteamiento de algunos institutos jurídicos, el surgimiento de nuevas figuras, para poder regular las situaciones novedosas; y, también, en otros casos, la adaptación de los conceptos jurídicos existentes al avance y desarrollo de las relaciones, principalmente, sociales y económicas. En cuanto a lo que ha de entenderse por conjunto económico, Ermida Uriarte, señala que "se trata de un conjunto de empresas, formal y aparentemente independientes, que están, sin embargo, recíprocamente entrelazadas, al punto de formar un todo único, complejo pero compacto, en cuanto responde a un mismo interés". (Ermida Uriarte, Oscar. "El concepto de empresa transnacional y algunas de sus repercusiones en el Derecho del Trabajo". Tomado de Relaciones Laborales y Globalización: Antología de textos. Compilado por Alexander Godínez Vargas. San José, Escuela Judicial, Corte Suprema de Justicia, primera edición, 1999, pp. 174-188). Por su parte, Plá Rodríguez lo definió como el "conjunto de empresas aparentemente autónomas pero sometidas a una dirección económica única." (Plá Rodríguez, Américo. "Los Grupos de Empresas". Idem, pp. 148-154). Asimismo, la doctrina laboral ha tratado de establecer los elementos determinantes del grupo de interés económico y, de manera general, ha indicado que los caracteres esenciales del grupo de empresas son la pluralidad de componentes, los cuales están vinculados entre sí y sometidos a un poder de decisión único y, también, la unidad subyacente del grupo, que está dada precisamente por el interés económico común. En efecto, no puede conceptualizarse el grupo sino a través de la idea de pluralidad; dado que no hay grupo si no hay más de un componente. Se trata, entonces, de personas jurídicas independientes, que conforman tal conjunto económico. Esas empresas están entrelazadas mediante relaciones de subordinación o de coordinación; pero, normalmente, el vínculo es de subordinación. Por consiguiente, lo que existe es el sometimiento de todas las entidades del grupo, o de todas menos una, a un control determinado o una dirección común. Al mismo tiempo, esas empresas están organizadas en una estructura económica más vasta y, desde luego, están influenciadas por un mismo interés o por una misma política económica. (Ermida Uriarte, Oscar, op.cit. y Plá Rodríguez, Américo, op.cit.)..." A mayor abundamiento sobre los razonamientos hechos, en autos se ha demostrado que la empresa Insurance Servicios S.A. forma parte del grupo financiero Instituto Nacional de Seguros debidamente autorizado por el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. Es por todo lo anterior que en el caso objeto de la presente resolución, existe abundante prueba de la vinculación dicha entre el INS y la empresa Insurance Servicios S.A., mas es de mérito indicar que lo anterior y la relación entre ambas, no desdibuja el carácter de patrono de uno, al tenor de las pruebas evacuadas. La teoría del conjunto económico o grupo de interés empresarial posee efectos ante todo, ante un reclamo de responsabilidad por incumplimiento de las obligaciones laborales, - a fin de que cualquiera del conjunto responda por las obligaciones de alguna de las partes- mas no significa que se haga nugatoria la relación inmediata entre el trabajador y su empleador inmediato. También opera la aplicación del concepto ante situaciones en donde se busca evadir la realidad frente al trabajador, tratándo de aparentar la inexistencia de vinculación entre integrantes del grupo para con éste o para ocultar vinculaciones, siempre con el propósito de evitar el cumplimiento de obligaciones legales. Esto no se da en el caso de análisis. Como se advierte, en el presente proceso, a pesar de demostrarse la vinculación entre las codemandadas, se ha probado en autos que a todos los actores se les liquidó y pago oportunamente todos los extremos laborales que surgen con motivo del cese de su relación de empleo, por lo que resulta irrelevante la determinación de quien es el empleador inmediato. No existe entonces en la evidente relación entre el INS y la codemandada un propósito de evadir obligaciones legales, ni la relación ha sido creada contra legem. Diferente hubiera sido la situación ante un reclamo originado en un despido sin responsabilidad patronal, - lo cual como hemos señalado no se da en el caso de estudio- en tanto que fundado en la doctrina dicha y la responsabilidad objetiva del Estado (art. 190 LGAP), bien podría el actor dirigirse a cualquiera de los codemandados en el presente proceso. No está de más indicar que tampoco el ente accionado busca demeritar vínculo y por el contrario, lo funda como consecuencia de la normativa que lo permite. Para este Tribunal es claro que el INS crea a Insurance Servicios S.A. al amparo del ordenamiento jurídico, dentro del contexto de la apertura del mercado producto del Tratado de Libre Comercio con los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica y con el fin de competir en mejores condiciones con los nuevos actores en el comercio de seguros. La Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros le otorga esa posibilidad para poder operar ante la desregulación y es por ello que a pesar de que existe esa vinculación, no es posible partir de la existencia de un grupo de interés ecónomico antijurídico, dado que la juricidad de la relación la otorga la legislación dicha. En este orden de ideas, lo que los antecedentes jurisprudenciales y la doctrina reprochan como contrario a derecho, es aquel grupo económico que existe con el propósito de evadir, ocultar o engañar , lo que, como se ha indicado, en el presente caso no se da, razón por la cual, y ante la inexistencia de incumplimiento de las obligaciones laborales, no es posible obviar la existencia de Insurance Servicios S.A. como figura patronal. Es así como en el caso en examen se ha demostrado que fundado en el acuerdo marco suscrito por los codemandados, ambas partes rubricaron un contrato para la prestación del servicio de 17 inspectores de riesgos del trabajo, siendo así que los actores fueron contratados como tales por la empresa Insurance Servicios S.A. En razón de lo anterior, se advierte que Insurance Servicios S.A. si bien nace como una figura de carácter societario privado, se encuentra amparada al ordenamiento jurídico que permite al Instituto Nacional de Seguros su creación. Dado lo anterior, es evidente que las personas que laboran para ella forman parte del régimen de empleo privado y por consiguiente pueden ser válidamente despedidas si se reconocen sus derechos laborales, al no tener un origen disciplinario el cese de la relación laboral. Tal y como se ha indicado el artículo 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública califica la relación de empleo privado por la Administración sea por la actividad o por el giro del ente para el cual se labora. En el caso de examen, en la situación jurídica de los actores nos encontramos en el segundo supuesto, dado que su patrono es un sujeto de derecho privado creado por un ente- empresa. Por otra parte, si bien consta en autos que en determinados momentos se dio el uso de instalaciones y equipos del INS, así como el empleo de materiales de éste y la coincidencia en cuanto al contenido de los carnés de identificación, ello no implica que la relación de los actores haya sido con dicho ente, en tanto que como se ha dicho, el mismo forma parte de un grupo de interés económico con Insurance Servicios S.A., siendo así que además el contrato suscrito entre ambas partes previó de manera expresa dicho uso compartido, dada la vinculación evidente y no controvertida entre ambos sujetos jurídicos. Es de destacar las contradicciones existentes entre los confesantes, Señor Erick Duarte Fallas y Karen Morelli Alfaro, en tanto que mientras el primero reafirmaba que el ejercicio de las potestades de dirección y jerarquía fueron hechas por personas que fueron vinculadas a Insurance Servicios S.A. la segunda en su deposición, pretendió vincular al Instituto Nacional de Seguros. En todo caso, debe entenderse que cualquier situación o traslape de instrucciones, órdenes o directrices que hayan sido emitidos por ambos codemandados obedece a la dinámica propia de una relación de empleo en un grupo de interés económico legítimo y la naturaleza de los servicios prestados. También es evidente que ante servicios de inspección, en la vinculación de los codemandados, ambos hayan estimado necesario el uso de una imagen institucional para efectos hacia terceros, sin que ello signifique que Insurance Servicios S.A. no ocupe la figura de empleador para con los actores. La naturaleza diferenciada de la sociedad con el ente que lo creó, según lo establecido en el ordenamiento que faculta a éste - a pesar de su vinculación- hace que Insurance Servicios S.A. pueda tener un régimen de empleo diferente, con escalas salariales, beneficios y perfiles ocupacionales diferentes al Instituto Nacional de Seguros. En todo caso, es de indicar que para esta cámara, aún pretendiendo la parte actora que se aplique el principio de primacía de la realidad, existe senda prueba en el sentido de que la figura patronal inmediata con los demandantes era la codemandada Insurance Servicios S.A. Así, se ha demostrado que el Departamento de Administración de Personal de la empresa emitió acción de personal de nombramiento interino de los actores, siendo así que todos suscribieron un compromiso de confidencialidad con ella. También consta que la unidad de que Recursos Humanos de la empresa tramitó solicitud de vacaciones y permisos de los indicados actores y en al menos dos casos les refirió el reconocimiento por la calidad de su labor. Finalmente consta prueba de que el Jefe de Operaciones de dicha sociedad fue quien comunicó a todos el hecho de que se había decidido poner fin a su período de preaviso y liquidarle los once días pendientes por tal concepto. En razón de lo anterior, no lleva razón la parte actora cuando invoca que su relación de empleo es de otra naturaleza diferente al régimen de empleo privado y que se constituyó con el Instituto Nacional de Seguros. Como se desprende de los autos, la relación laboral inmediata de los demandantes es con la empresa Insurance Servicios S.A., siendo así que la misma posee una naturaleza y razón de ser instrumental para los fines del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, sin que ello implique que éste ocupe la figura patronal, máxime tomando en consideración que el cese respectivo fue con responsabilidad patronal y sin que se requiera por tal motivo la aplicación de un debido proceso previo, el cual sólo es aplicable cuando se rompe el vínculo laboral como consecuencia de una medida disciplinaria. El despido realizado es legítimo, en tanto que, como trabajadores del régimen de empleo privado de la Administración, le aplican a las partes las disposiciones del artículo 85.d) del Código de Trabajo, que disponen: " ARTICULO 85.- Son causas que terminan con el contrato de trabajo sin responsabilidad para el trabajador y sin que extingan los derechos de éste o de sus causahabientes para reclamar y obtener el pago de las prestaciones e indemnizaciones que pudieran corresponderles en virtud de lo ordenado por el Código o por disposiciones especiales: ....d. La propia voluntad del patrono". Indistintamente de la discusión sobre si resultaba legítimo o no que el Instituto Nacional de Seguros tercerizara la inspección de riesgos de trabajo en en Insurance Servicios S.A, la misma no resulta relevante para efectos de las pretensiones a que se refiere el presente considerando, en tanto que como se ha indicado, ya sea ante uno u otro codemandado, el régimen de empleo de los actores reviste naturaleza privada y por consiguiente, el despido efectuado resultó válido y eficaz. Así las cosas deben rechazarse los extremos de la demanda referentes a que se establezca que el patrono en la relación es el INS y que se declare nulo el despido sin responsabilidad patronal de los actores.”
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