Administrative jurisdiction over legislative objection to SUTEL appointmentsCompetencia contencioso-administrativa sobre objeción de nombramientos en SUTEL

**Second: Regarding the alleged political, non-justiciable nature of the challenged act.** As a second preliminary matter, the following must be addressed: in their oral conclusions, the defendants reiterated the alleged formal exception of an act not susceptible to challenge, pursuant to articles 36, 62 and 66, subsection g) of the CPCA, because it is a political act; since it is not an administrative act, it falls outside the scope of this jurisdiction. On this point, it is pertinent to note:

1.- By Law #8660, the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector (Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones) was enacted, and the Superintendency of Telecommunications [SUTEL] was created, as an organ of maximum deconcentration attached to ARESEP; the Law of the latter, #7593, was reformed, and the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) was granted competence to open a public competitive process based on qualifications (concurso público de antecedentes) in order to select candidates, based on proven suitability, to integrate the Council of SUTEL. In exercise of that competence, ARESEP opened the competitive process, which was published on August 17, 2008, in a nationally circulated newspaper; after the respective analysis, the Board of Directors in session 071-2008, held on November 11, 2008, appointed, among others, the plaintiff Castro Mora as members of the Council of SUTEL. Later, in official letter (oficio) 390-RG-2008/29545 of November 13, 2008, it sent to the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa, AL) the files (expedientes) of the appointed persons, given that the AL had 30 days to object to the appointments, on the understanding that if this objection did not occur, they would be deemed ratified; all of the foregoing based on Article 61 in fine of Law #7593, and transitory provision V, paragraph 2 of Law #8660. The AL objected to 2 of the appointed persons; one of them was the plaintiff here.

2.- In the lawsuit, as well as in the oral conclusions, defects are alleged in the call to the extraordinary session held on Friday, December 12, 2008, alteration of procedures, untimeliness of the objection, lack of firmness of the act when it was communicated to ARESEP, violation of the principle of legality and the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, etc. A violation of the right to access and exercise public office is also alleged.

3.- Regarding the foregoing, it is appropriate to state first that this Tribunal finds no substantiated reasons to reverse what it ordered by means of interlocutory resolution #3362-2010 at 10:40 a.m. on September 6, 2010 (folios 106 to 109), which was favorable regarding the right of the plaintiff here to access the jurisdiction, the right to effective judicial protection, or the right to be heard before an independent and impartial Tribunal. Secondly, the Tribunal appreciates that, in this specific case, the crux of the matter lies in determining the regularity of the exercise of the power that the AL reserved to itself to <object to the appointments> of the members of the Council of SUTEL made (and made) by the Board of Directors of ARESEP, as provided in Article 61, paragraph 3 of Law #7593, reformed by Law #8860. This was understood and expressly established by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in its resolution #2008-018550 at 2:30 p.m. on December 17, 2008, when hearing the amparo appeal filed by the plaintiff here, regarding the same facts. It is a matter, indeed, of determining whether the AL complied or not with the procedure established in the law or the regulations of the AL itself for objecting to the appointment of the appellant as a member of the Council of SUTEL.

4.- In accordance with Article 49 of the Political Constitution [CP], this jurisdiction was attributed to the Judicial Branch, as a guarantee of legality control over the administrative function of the State. The guarantee, as we all know, has an auxiliary function, in the sense that it serves something to which it is necessarily attached (Cf. Adolfo Gelsi Bidart. De Derechos, Deberes y Garantías del Hombre Común, B de F Ltda, Montevideo-Buenos Aires, 2006, pages 191 to 204). Stated in the terms of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, regarding other guarantees provided in the Convention:

“25. It is not the purpose of the Court to make a theoretical development on the relationship between rights and guarantees. It is sufficient to point out what should be understood by guarantee in the sense in which the term is used by Article 27.2. Guarantees serve to protect, ensure or enforce the ownership or exercise of a right. As the States Parties have the obligation to recognize and respect the rights and freedoms of the person, they also have the obligation to protect and ensure their exercise through the respective guarantees (art. 1.1), that is to say, through the suitable means so that the rights and freedoms are effective in all circumstances.” (Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987).

In the same superior provision [Article 49 CP], the original constituent legislator established a mandate to the ordinary legislator, in the sense that “the law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests of those administered,” which configures, in the words of Ferrajoli and Bobbio, the sphere of the undecidable, forbidden territory, or inviolable territory, which are negative limits imposed on legislation to guarantee rights of freedom, and positive limits as obligations of what must not fail to be decided or agreed. In harmony with this idea, on April 28, 2006, the CPCA was enacted and it was established that this jurisdiction has the purpose of “protecting the legal situations of every person,” as well as “guaranteeing or restoring the legality of any conduct of the Administration subject to Administrative Law,” which configures both the guarantee in its subjective and objective dimensions of legality (Article 1). Italian doctrine distinguishes between secondary guarantees, consisting of legal protection regarding what are also called primary guarantees, whose fundamental function is to ensure the justiciability of violations of rights; these are reparative guarantees aimed at eliminating or reducing the damage produced or at restraining or punishing those responsible. This new vision has the advantage of clearly establishing what the fundamental function of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction in Costa Rica is, not only as an instrument of control of administrative legality but also as a guarantee for the operation of the Law. It implies abandoning the concept of justice as a service or a branch of public administration, which in reality has been a tendency towards the devaluation of the jurisdiction and the exaltation of other alternative forms of dispute resolution. It equally denotes the application of the violated substantive norms, as a reaffirmation of the principle of strict legality or juridicity, where the jurisdiction develops its proper function of substantial application and, consequently, of affirmation of the law (On these ideas, one may consult: Constitutional Chamber, judgments #1739-92 at 11:45 a.m. on July 1, 1992, considering X; #7006-94 at 9:24 a.m. on December 2, 1994, and #2000-878 at 4:12 p.m. on January 26, considering II; Ferrajoli, Luigi, PRINCIPIA IURIS, Teoría del Derecho y de la democracia, Teoría del derecho, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2011, pages 637 to 644; and LOS FUNDAMENTOS DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES, Editorial Trotta, S. A., Madrid, 2001, pages 28, and 45 to 52; Michele Taruffo, PAGINAS SOBRE JUSTICIA CIVIL, translated by Maximiliano Aramburo Calle, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2009, pages 21 to 29; also, articles 152 to 155 CP).

5.- Regarding this affirmation, it is opportune to recall the relatively recent controversy that occurred between those who advocate for plenary control of the Administration, even reaching a reduction to zero of the margin of discretion (Cf. Tomás R. Fernández, DE LA ARBITRARIEDAD DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN, 4th Corrected Edition, Civitas, Madrid, 2002), and those who advocate for less judicial activism, for a position of more prudence and self-limitation of the Judge's powers (Cf. Luciano Parejo Alfonso, ADMINISTRAR Y JUZGAR: DOS FUNCIONES CONSTITUCIONALES DISTINTAS Y COMPLEMENTARIAS, Técnos, Madrid, 1993, and Sánchez Morón, Miguel, DISCRECIONALIDAD ADMINISTRATIVA Y CONTROL JUDICIAL, Técnos, Madrid, 1994), a debate that, as expressed by Professor Manuel Atienza in a clarifying work titled “Sobre el control de la discrecionalidad administrativa. Comentarios a una polémica” (On the control of administrative discretion. Comments on a controversy) (Cf. his work CUESTIONES JUDICIALES, 1st reprinting, Biblioteca de Ética, Filosofía del Derecho y Política, México, 2004, pages 39 to 71), ended up being resolved according to the demands of the modern democratic and social State, subject to the law and to the Law, that is, subjection of power to reason, and not the reverse, having to protect the rights and interests of persons. Our CPCA is a tributary of this doctrine, insofar as, as a regulatory and directive principle, it does not deal with political acts, as does occur in other legislations, and as the former Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa), #3667 of 1966, did; it only alludes, among the excluded matters or those regarding which there is or must be judicial abstention, to claims "concerning acts of relationship between the Branches of State or arising from international relations, without prejudice to the applicable indemnities, the determination of which shall correspond to the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction" (article 3.b]). This orientation of the new Costa Rican legislation makes the contentious-administrative jurisdiction a guarantee at the service of full control of legality, or, better yet, of juridicity, and of the protection of every person, whether physical or legal, public or private, with exempt or immune strongholds, very limited and qualified.

6.- The reasons, apparently linked to the “strategic linkage” that the ordinary legislator had for reserving a power of control and oversight, such as the one questioned here, are beyond debate. This resides both in the sphere of the capacity for self-regulation and within that broad margin of discretion that it has to intervene in the country's development, with the idea of satisfying general interests. The contemporary legislator has not reduced its role solely to the legislative function, ordinarily provided for (Articles 105 and 121 CP). Its action is also valued considering the effectiveness and timeliness of the parliamentary control function over appointments, paired with another series of important functions, such as legislative, deliberative, financial, oversight, investigative, strictly political functions, among others.

7.- The control performed by the AL in a case like this is one of oversight, review, and verification of the selection and designation work performed by ARESEP's Board of Directors, with the purpose of verifying that it adjusts its acts to the provisions established in secondary or ordinary legislation. That control is determined by the aforementioned laws, which establish the powers and their regulation for the Deputies, who must act collegially. But how is this change of role of the AL explained, with greater intervention in the country's development, beyond the classic normative attribution? With the enactment of the General Telecommunications Law (Ley General de Telecomunicaciones), #8642 of June 4, 2008 (Official Gazette #125 of June 30, 2008), the scope and mechanisms for regulating telecommunications were established, encompassing the use and exploitation as well as the provision of services, with the idea of guaranteeing the inhabitants' right to obtain these services, strengthening the mechanisms of universality and solidarity, user protection, promoting effective competition in the market, the development and use of services, ensuring the efficient and effective assignment, use, exploitation, administration, and control of the radio spectrum, etc. The guiding principles are also established, such as universality, solidarity, user benefit, transparency, publicity, effective competition, non-discrimination, technological neutrality, optimization of scarce resources, information privacy, and environmental sustainability (Cf. Articles 1, 2, and 3). In line with the above, and as part of a national conception or idea, a development model, the aforementioned Law #8660 was enacted, creating the telecommunications sector and the Superintendency of Telecommunications [SUTEL] as the organ responsible for regulating, applying, monitoring, and controlling the legal framework of telecommunications; the creation of that sector and its stewardship is embedded within the State's sectorization framework, which will be or will be guided or oriented in the future through a National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de desarrollo); the entities of the telecommunications sector must consider as guiding principles, those already cited, provided in Law #8642 (Cf. Articles 1, 2, 38). So that SUTEL achieves its purposes, it is granted maximum deconcentration and its own instrumental legal personality, so that it can administer the National Telecommunications Fund (Fondo Nacional de Telecomunicaciones), carry out contractual activity, administer its resources and its budget, as well as to sign contracts and agreements required for the fulfillment of its functions; its independence from all network operators and service providers is also established, and it is subject to the National Development Plan and sectoral policies. Considering the objectives proposed in the law, it is established that the members shall be selected based on proven suitability, through a public competitive process based on qualifications (concurso público de antecedentes) (Cf. Articles 59 and 61 of Law #7593). Well then: as stated, the control function is essentially oriented towards verifying whether the selection and appointment have followed the norms, values, and principles established in the laws governing the matter, and this task is regulated by essentially legal factors, capable of being situated within the broad spectrum of the guarantee of legality, provided in Article 49 cited, in relation to Article 41 ibid.

8.- The fact that the AL may intervene in this matter, objecting or not to the appointments, as part of that oversight function it holds, is also not questioned; that power in itself is beyond debate. Even though all functions have a political tint, strictly speaking in terms of principles, everything comes down to determining, as anticipated, whether the AL exercised the power of control and oversight that it reserved for itself, within the legislative procedure, in strict adherence to the legal system (doctrine of Article 216.1 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP)). It is a regulated power, in the sense that the objection to the appointment was or was not exercised within the thirty-day period. Given the existence of a legal power with these characteristics, the act falls within the administrative conduct subject to ordinary contentious-administrative jurisdictional control, far from the typical political act. To which it must be added that among the claims indicated by the plaintiff are the violation of the individual right and guarantee of free access to public office, and of exercising the position to which she was appointed. At the base of the lawsuit lies the defense of an individual right and guarantee, a fundamental right, derived from the act of appointment agreed upon by the Board of Directors of ARESEP, which would remain without judicial protection if the thesis of the defendants were admitted. Rights are – says the doctrine – the legal armor of the will, a way to make it effective, protecting it from its enemies; if I have rights, I must have the defensive or negative means against the arbitrariness of power (Cf. Zagrebelsky, Gustavo, El derecho dúctil. Ley, derechos, justicia. Editorial Trotta, X edition, Madrid, 2011, page 82). That is, regardless of whether or not the right whose protection is being sought is configured in this case, it is true that upon recognizing the right to choose one's work, to freely access and under conditions of equality public office, one must also have the procedural guarantees for its defense and protection (Cf. Articles 56, 191, and 192 CP, and 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and the aforementioned OC-8/87).

9.- As part of the basis for the defense opposed, reference has been made to a precedent of the constitutional jurisdiction. The facts referred to in the cited Constitutional Chamber precedent (Judgment #2001-11943 at 2:48 p.m. on November 21, 2001) are different from those in this case, and therefore, not applicable, except regarding the condition precedent for the effectiveness of the act (considering VI). Note well that there, the [un]constitutionality of Article 47 of the Law for the Creation of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (Ley de Creación de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos), #7593, was questioned, the text of which states:

"The Board of Directors of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services shall be appointed after opening a personal file and background file for each person who nominates themselves or is nominated to integrate it.

The Government Council (Consejo de Gobierno), once it has appointed the General Regulator and the remaining members, shall send all files to the Legislative Assembly, which shall have a period of thirty days to object to the appointments. If no objection is raised within that period, they shall be deemed ratified.

In case of objection, the Government Council shall substitute the objected director and the new designee shall be subject to the same procedure." Although the content of that norm is analogous to that of article 61, it is also true that they have substantive differences from the standpoint of the organs involved. In this case, the appointment is agreed upon by the Board of Directors of ARESEP and is objected to or not by the AL, whereas in the scenario of the precedent, the appointment is agreed upon directly by the Government Council, and objected to or not by the AL. The constitutional rank and regulation of the organs involved gives a very different aspect to the legislative act; it is a typical act of political control and oversight, as defined in the constitutional precedent, in exercise of a dynamic of checks and balances between subjects that maintain a degree of equalization. Whereas here that power was reserved directly by the AL. The issue boils down to objecting or not to the appointment made by an organ of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, based on the criteria defined in the laws governing the matter, and it falls to this jurisdiction to determine whether that power was exercised within the limits set by the regulatory norm itself. The mere fact that ARESEP - which is the author of the act controlled by the AL - is not a "branch of State (poder del Estado)," nor even an organ of constitutional relevance, would be sufficient to rule out that we are here before a political act.

10.- In short, the Tribunal leans towards denying the alleged lack of jurisdictional competence due to the absence of material object, because the challenge concerns a political act, and instead opts to examine the lawsuit on its merits, as will be seen below. The defendants' argument would lead to the absurdity of declaring today the existence of acts immune to the Law, distinct from those selected and indicated by law, allowing the legislator to reserve certain spheres and equip itself with certain powers outside the rule of Law, which is, of course, contrary to the notion of the democratic and social State of Law that permeates the CPCA.

**Third: Regarding proven facts.** The Tribunal holds the following facts as certain for resolving the case: ----- 1°) that the plaintiff here, Castro Mora, participated in the public competitive process promoted to appoint members of the Council of the Superintendency of Telecommunications [SUTEL] (fact 1 of the lawsuit and its affirmative answer); ----- 2°) that the Board of Directors of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services [ARESEP] appointed the plaintiff here as a member of the Council of SUTEL (fact 1 of the lawsuit and its answer, and folios 2 to 10 of Volume I of the administrative file (legajo administrativo)); ----- 3°) that in official letter (oficio) 390-RG-2008/29545 of November 13, 2008, the General Regulator of ARESEP presented on that same day before the Legislative Assembly [AL] a list of four persons to integrate the Council of SUTEL, with the purpose that it object to or ratify said appointment; among the nominees was the plaintiff here (fact 1 of the lawsuit and its answer, and folios 2 to 10, cited in the preceding fact); ----- 4°) that the thirty-day period the AL had to object to the appointments expired on December 13, 2008 (fact 2 of the lawsuit and folios 765 to 769 of Volume III of the same administrative file); ----- 5°) that on December 3, 2008, the Appointments Committee (Comisión de Nombramientos) of the AL presented an affirmative majority opinion recommending to the Plenary the ratification of the appointment of the entire list sent by ARESEP (fact 3 of the lawsuit and its affirmative answer, and folios 858 to 869 of Volume IV of the same administrative file); ----- 6°) that in plenary session #117, held on Tuesday, December 9, 2008, the Presidency of the Directive Board (Directorio) defined a period of twenty-four hours for the Deputies of the Permanent Special Appointments Committee (Comisión Permanente Especial de Nombramientos) to present the minority report; an appeal was filed against that act, which was rejected (lawsuit, oral closing arguments (alegato de conclusiones orales) of the plaintiff, and folios 924 to 952 of the same Volume and administrative file); ----- 7°) that on Wednesday, December 10, 2008, a motion is submitted to the Deputies for consideration with the purpose of convening for the following Friday, December 12, an extraordinary session to consider the ratification or not of the members proposed by ARESEP to integrate the Council of SUTEL; said motion was approved between four and five o'clock in the afternoon, according to the minutes (acta) of plenary session #118 (facts 4 and 6 of the lawsuit and affirmative answer, and folios 953, 958, 959 and 964 to 994 of the cited Volume IV); ----- 8°) that in extraordinary session #029, held on Friday, December 12, 2008, the AL ratified the appointment as members of the Council of SUTEL of Messrs. Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez Gutiérrez and George Petrie Miley Rojas, while Juan Manuel Quesada Espinoza and the plaintiff here, Castro Mora, were objected to (facts 8 and 9 of the lawsuit and their affirmative answer, and folios 1043 to 1071 of the same administrative file, Volume IV); ----- 9°) that by means of official letter (oficio) SD-70-08-09 of December 12, 2008, the Secretariat of the Directive Board of the AL communicated to the General Regulator of ARESEP the result of the session related in the preceding fact (fact 9 of the lawsuit and its answer, and folio 1073 of the same administrative file and Volume); ----- 10°) that the AL in extraordinary session #33, held on December 19, 2008, did not object to the appointment of Maryleana Méndez Jiménez, for a period of three years, and of Walter Herrera Cantillo, alternate (suplente), for a period of five years (fact 15 of the lawsuit brief and answer, and folio 1109 of Volume IV of the same administrative file), and ----- 11°) that the appointment agreements of the AL, related in the preceding facts 7 and 9, were published in Official Gazette (Gaceta) #26 of February 6, 2009 (fact 10 of the lawsuit brief and its answer).

**Fourth: Brief reference to the object of the process and the allegations raised by both parties.** The object of the claim deduced in the lawsuit, adjusted and reformulated in the preliminary hearing, is to declare the nullity of the act of objection to the appointment of the plaintiff to the Council of SUTEL, adopted by the AL in extraordinary session #029 of December 12, 2008, and the act of finality (firmeza) adopted in the session of the following December 15, for being untimely, according to Article 61 of Law #7395, reformed by Law #8660, as well as the nullity of the prior and related acts, such as those performed on December 9, 10, and 15. As a consequence of the foregoing, it requests a declaration that the ratification of said appointment would have been appropriate, as a form of restitution, compensation, or reparation for the plaintiff, in consideration of her status as a public figure, without the need to order reinstatement due to impossibility of compliance, and instead that damages and losses be recognized. In the alternative, she claims that the act of ratification be converted into an indemnification for damages and losses. The State, in its oral conclusions, in addition to ratifying its written answer, expressed that ARESEP's act does not create a right in favor of the plaintiff, since what it generates is an expectation; that the acts of the AL adopted in sessions on December 9, 10, and 12, 2008, form part of its power of self-regulation, as understood by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment #2005-7961. The co-defendants indicated in their oral conclusions that the act of ratification occurred in a timely manner and in proper form; the AL's manifestation occurred on December 12, 2008; that regarding the nullity invoked, the defects are not of a substantial nature, and the principle of preservation of the act should be applied; that the claim numbered two has an impossible object, since Méndez Jiménez today enjoys an appointment to the position through another [new] competitive process and not through the one challenged, having left the initial period. In the case of Herrera Cantillo, his appointment was as an alternate for five years, it being evident that the plaintiff claims the position of principal (propietario) and not alternate; so that regarding the latter, there is no standing, the same as regarding Méndez Jiménez, but with respect to her, there is also no current interest.

**Fifth: Regarding the passive standing of MENDEZ JIMENEZ and HERRERA CANTILLO.** As a first substantive issue raised, it is appropriate to examine the standing (legitimación) of the co-defendants, because if this is not configured, it would be useless to refer to the other substantial prerequisites (Cf. First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment #775-F-03 at 2:25 p.m. on November 20, 2003).

1.- In accordance with Article 12 CPCA, “it shall be considered” a defendant, among others, “the physical or legal persons who have derived rights and legitimate interests from the administrative conduct subject to the process” (subsection 3°). The obvious question is: what is the conduct subject to this process? Obviously, the act of objection adopted in the AL's extraordinary session #29 of December 12, 2008, regarding the plaintiff's appointment to the Council of SUTEL, made by ARESEP's Board of Directors. According to the law, when that negative act occurs “the Board of Directors shall substitute the objected member of the Council and the new designee shall be subject to the same procedure” (Article 61 already cited). The new proposal fell to MENDEZ JIMENEZ and HERRERA CANTILLO, who were not objected to in extraordinary session #33, held on December 19, 2008. The Tribunal appreciates that even though this act is not challenged directly in the lawsuit, it is challenged through nullity by connection (nulidad por conexidad), as it is clear that if the claim for nullity and reinstatement were appropriate, the removal of this act would be a necessary consequence, as a form of in-kind satisfaction (satisfacción in natura). So, in that sense, the co-defendants' allegation is not well-founded.

2.- But there is another reason that does make this defense allegation admissible, and which is inherent in it, a reason paradoxically highlighted by the plaintiff during the preliminary hearing on August 28, 2013. On that occasion, the claim for reinstatement was reformulated and specified in terms that make the inclusion of MENDEZ JIMENEZ and HERRERA CANTILLO truly futile, useless, and unnecessary.

Even though the plaintiff claims the nullity of the objection act and, as a consequence of this, requests reinstatement to the respective position, it is true that she expressed and clarified that she ultimately does not seek effective reinstatement. That is, the plaintiff does not wish to hold the position at SUTEL; the meaning of her claim is that it be declared that, since the act is null, she was legally and automatically confirmed. Put another way: that since the objection act occurred untimely, that is, outside the established legal deadline, it must be considered literally non-existent and, consequently, it be declared that her appointment became final, consolidated by the passage of time. In this view, the process can proceed without those persons who, like the co-defendants, derive rights from the act that is the subject of the process, because the plaintiff does not wish to hold the position; such that an affirmative judgment would be enforceable, given that, in its place, she opted to convert the right to the position and its exercise into compensation for damages (indemnización por daños y perjuicios). Having put things in this manner, it follows that the right of defense of those persons suffers no diminishment whatsoever, given that ultimately, they would not be affected by a decision whose execution would not reach their legitimate rights and interests. Therefore, the guarantee of effectiveness of rights, proclaimed even in the Charter of the United Nations (Article 55, paragraph 3), signed on June 26, 1945, in the city of San Francisco, United States of America, approved by Costa Rica through Law #142 of August 6, 1945, which entered into force on September 29, 1945, and in our CP (Articles 41, 49, 140.9, and 153), would not be affected, because the plaintiff's claim has another orientation, which is compensation for damages, instead of full reinstatement.

3.- Consequently, even though the co-defendants derive rights from the conduct challenged in this process, due to the meaning and scope that the plaintiff gave to her claim, the established legal situation of those persons would not be affected by an eventual affirmative judgment; therefore, the lack of passive legal standing (legitimación pasiva) raised must be declared, but not the lack of current legal interest (interés actual).

Sixth: On the merits of the case. That the plaintiff questions and disputes the objection act to her appointment, issued by the plenary of the AL, in a session held on December 12, 2008.

1.- The first question to consider is the legal nature of that deadline; whether it is directory (ordenatorio) or peremptory (perentorio). What happens if the act is not issued within the established legal deadline, or if it is issued outside said deadline? What happens if it is not issued at all, or if it is partial? First, the Court observes that the governing rule is explicit in stating that it is a 30-day deadline "to object to appointments" (para objetar los nombramientos). It is equally clear in stating that "if no objection is made within that period, they shall be deemed ratified" (se tendrán por ratificados). It is evident, therefore, that this is a peremptory, preclusive, expiration (caducidad) deadline. The rule recognizes a competence to act and establishes a consequence for its omission. If the AL does not agree to the objection within the conferred deadline, the opportunity to exercise its controlling power expires, and the appointment becomes final; it is deemed ratified due to the passage of the legal deadline for its objection. As the doctrine states regarding expiration: "the claim for whose exercise a term is prefixed is originally born with this time limitation, so that it cannot be asserted once it has elapsed" (Roberto Ruggiero, Instituciones de Derecho Civil, translated from the fourth Italian edition by Ramón Serrano Sureño and José Santacruz Teijeiro, Editorial Reus, S.A, Madrid, Spain, 1929, cited in the judgment of Sala Constitucional #2000-00878 at 16:12 hours on January 26, 2000, Considerando III). The benefit derived from the timely exercise of that competence is the objection and, therefore, the deprivation of finality and conformation of the appointment act. If action is not taken with timeliness and swiftness, the benefit that intervention would have meant is lost and extinguished. This is so because there is a general interest in the organs and institutions acting (in this case, SUTEL, ARESEP), satisfying the rights of the users involved. But there is also a right of the person appointed by the Junta Directiva of ARESEP to have his or her situation defined. All of which justifies the pre-established fatal deadline.

2.- The second question to be defined is whether the AL made use of or not of that controlling function, within the conferred deadline. It has been held as true that on November 13, 2008, ARESEP presented to the AL the list of appointments; so that the 30-day deadline expired on December 13, 2008. The negative act or objection was adopted on Friday, December 12, that is, one day before its expiration. According to the rule governing the matter, the AL "shall have a period of 30 days to object to the appointments" (dispondrá de un plazo de 30 días para objetar los nombramientos). Such that the AL, by its actions, complied with the applicable rule. The immediate communication to ARESEP, according to official letter SD-70-08-09, is inherent to the act of appointment and partial objection, because critically important consequences derive from it, especially negative ones, such as the substitution of the objected person, for the purpose of properly integrating the organ.

3.- Regarding the errors and defects alleged concerning the sending of files (expedientes) to the Comisión de Nombramientos, the reduction of an eight-day deadline to twenty-four hours, the convocation made on December 10 for an extraordinary session on Friday December 12, the finality (firmeza) of the convocation act, which by legislative usage and custom (uso y costumbre legislativa) occurs upon approval of the minutes, which in this case occurred only at the session of Monday, December 15, the following must be noted: By constitutional provision, the AL may not hold sessions without the attendance of two-thirds of the total of its members. If "on the appointed day" it is impossible to begin the session, or if, once open, it cannot continue due to lack of quorum, the members present shall urge the absent members, under the sanctions established by the Regulation (Reglamento), to attend, and the AL shall open or continue sessions when the required number is assembled (Article 117 CP). There is an obligation to designate or schedule the day on which the session will be held, excluding the case of May first, given that by CP there is a session on that day even if there is no convocation. That obligation is based on operational and organizational reasons, basic in a complex organ, composed of fifty-seven Deputies who represent different regions and sectors of Costa Rican society. Matters relating to when, how, where to hold sessions, or deadlines, etc., are reserved to the Legislative Regulation (Reglamento legislativo, RAL).

3.1 Regarding the sending of the case in question to the Comisión de Nombramientos, without this being a matter of that type, it must be said that the RAL attributes that competence to the Presidency. So that it is not an act resulting from the naked will of the Presidency, but the exercise of a regulatory attribution (Article 27.3).

3.2 Regarding the alleged reduction of an eight-day deadline to twenty-four hours for delivering and processing reports, in violation of Articles 81 and 82 RAL, it must be noted that such a thing constitutes the exercise of a power to direct the discussion, provided for in Article 27.4 ibidem, with the idea of making effective the exercise of the power legally conferred upon the plenary to object to the implicated appointments. It is a way of ordering and accelerating the functioning of the AL, an opportunity to render the report, and not the deprivation of the right that minorities have to speak out, for their dissenting viewpoint to be known in the plenary. If the Presidency were deprived of these ordering and directing powers, the right of the majorities to speak out on certain matters within the legally established opportunity could be rendered nugatory.

3.3 The Court also rejects the alleged defect consisting of the alteration of the legislative procedure, by considering and voting on the motion presented to call an extraordinary session, on a day and time provided in the RAL for constitutional matters, and not for cases like the one discussed here. By proceeding in this manner, the AL has done nothing more than exercise its sovereign power of convocation to hold sessions [extraordinary session], constitutionally established, at the time it deemed appropriate, according to parliamentary dynamics and the needs of the matter to be dealt with. Article 32 RAL, relating to the session schedule of the plenary, establishes an organizational rule that seeks to guarantee a fixed space on the legislative agenda for "the matters included in Article 195 of the Constitución Política" in view of their high importance, but it does not exclude other matters from also being dealt with if the needs and workloads so warrant; that is within the margin of operational appreciation that the AL has.

3.4 Finally, and regarding the lack of finality of the act, with the non-application of a legislative usage and custom, it must be noted that in law the approval of minutes does not involve a problem of validity of the act; it is a matter of order, relating to the documentation and record of the will expressed or manifested; it is a discussion analogous to that of the judgment as an act and as a document, where the absence of the latter does not imply the non-existence of the former. So that finality is not part of the essence of the act, and therefore, it would not be an obstacle to undertaking its immediate execution.

Seventh: On free access to public office (libre acceso a los cargos públicos). That in the complaint and in the oral conclusions, reference was made to the freedom to choose work and access public office, via a public competition based on credentials (concurso público de antecedentes). It is suggested that the questioned act violated this right recognized in both the Constitution and the American Convention on Human Rights.

1.- Certainly the selection of the members of the Council of SUTEL is made on the basis of "proven suitability" (idoneidad comprobada), through a public competition based on credentials. This responds to the constitutional provision (Articles 191 and 192 CP), relating to free access to public office under conditions of equality. The competition was opted for as the best instrument to obtain the proposals of the best persons who will make effective the aspirations that the legislator had in this matter. So that in its application, the rules and principles that govern it must be observed. In this case, the procedure states that once the competition is concluded, it is up to the Junta Directiva of ARESEP to appoint the full members and the alternate of said Council, by a majority of at least four votes, for fixed terms; the exercise of the office is full-time and with exclusive dedication, with the option of reelection for only one time. It is also established that, once the selection and appointment act is produced, the files must be sent to the AL, so that it can express whether it objects to it, totally or partially. If the objection is not made within the following 30-day period, the appointment shall be deemed ratified. The foregoing demonstrates that we are in the presence of a reinforced appointment procedure, and that the act of appointing the member or members of the Council of SUTEL is an act of complex formation and content, composed of two wills, each from a different subject. For its consolidation and formation, it also requires obtaining a negative act that will give it finality and effectiveness. But it is not just any act that consolidates the appointment; it is an act of the parliament. What the Sala Constitucional expressed in its judgment #2001-11943 applies here:

"VI . … Note that the procedure provided in the Law for the appointment of the members of the Junta Directiva of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos is simple, insofar as it is the Consejo de Gobierno that makes the designation, and to the Asamblea Legislativa it corresponds -solely- to verify a purely political control in this regard, insofar as it is granted a period of thirty days to make any objection to said designation; otherwise, it shall be deemed ratified. The Asamblea Legislativa performs a merely controlling (or oversight) function (labor contralora (o fiscalizadora)) in relation to this type of appointment, a function that in any case, should not be considered administrative or legislative, under any concept, and which acts solely as a condition for the legal effectiveness of this type of designation. The doctrine on this matter has understood that approval represents a declaration based on assessments of the merit, opportunity, utility, and legality of the act submitted to its knowledge; from which it is verified that the subject that approves does not cooperate in the formation of the act submitted for approval, but only declares that the act submitted to its examination is useful and opportune, in order to thereby consider the condition, upon which the law makes the effectiveness of the act dependent, as fulfilled. That is, that the legislative action on this matter acts as a condition for the legal effectiveness of this type of appointment, insofar as the appointment is not complete and does not produce natural effects until this approval occurs, which is understood to be granted if, after the period established in the law has passed, the deputies have not made any objection." 2.- So that if that negative act, of objection and rejection, is not issued in a timely manner, the appointment shall be deemed ratified. If it is issued, the appointment is rendered ineffective (sin efecto), and the objected person must be replaced, and the new appointee will be subject to the same procedure. While this second phase of the procedure is developing before the AL, the act subject to control is ineffective, incomplete, and incapable of producing effects in the realm of facts, of reality, and the appointed person remains expectant regarding what happens within the parliament. The alleged violation of free access to public office does not appear to have been violated in this case. Of course, that right gives the right to access without discrimination and under equal conditions, in a transparent, objective, and impartial procedure, but it does not ensure the appointment, nor guarantee selection by the Junta Directiva of ARESEP. That is, there is no right to appointment derived from free access to public office.

Eighth: Conclusions and exceptions (excepciones). That in harmony with what has been set forth, the Court rejects the violations and breaches alleged in these proceedings as grounds for invalidity of the challenged act. Firstly, these are matters of order, resulting from the exercise of directing powers, proper to the Presidency, made explicit in the idea of making effective the exercise of a legally conferred power, without it being observed that in that proceeding there are injuries to substantive rules or principles established in favor of the minorities; in fact, matters of this nature are not invoked here. Secondly, the objection to the appointment of the plaintiff herein was issued within the deadline established in Article 61 of Law #7593, amended by Law #8660, in a legally convened session, according to constitutionally recognized powers and duties, its communication being the natural and immediate consequence thereafter, for the purposes of its full execution, and for those purposes the alleged finality is not a sine qua non requirement. Consequently, the exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) raised by the State must be accepted, which has the effect of and results in the dismissal of the complaint in all its aspects, given that the plaintiff's appointment did not become consolidated, having been objected to by the AL within the legal deadline. Regarding the co-defendants MENDEZ JIMENEZ and HERRERA CANTILLO, a lack of passive legal standing must be declared, in view of the reformulation of the claim that makes their procedural insertion futile. Of course, the subsidiary claim meets the same fate; its pertinence is subordinate to the nullity and ratification sought as the main matter, but since that does not prosper, the former falls by its own weight." It is, in effect, a matter of determining whether the LA complied or not with the procedure established in the law or the regulations of that same LA for objecting to the appointment of the appellant as a member of the Council of SUTEL.

**4.-** In accordance with Article 49 of the Political Constitution [PC], this jurisdiction was attributed to the Judicial Branch, as a *guarantee of legality control over the administrative function of the State*. The guarantee, as we all know, has an auxiliary function, in the sense that it serves something to which it is necessarily attached (Cfr. Adolfo Gelsi Bidart. *De Derechos, Deberes y Garantías del Hombre Común*, B de F Ltda, Montevideo-Buenos Aires, 2006, pages 191 to 204). Stated in the terms of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, regarding other guarantees established in the Convention:

“25. It is not the purpose of the Court to make a theoretical development on the relationship between rights and guarantees. It is sufficient to point out what should be understood by guarantee in the sense in which the term is used by Article 27.2. *Guarantees serve to protect, ensure, or enforce the ownership or exercise of a right*. Just as the States Parties have the obligation to recognize and respect the rights and freedoms of the person, *they also have the obligation to protect and ensure their exercise through the respective guarantees* (art. 1.1), *that is to say, through the suitable means so that rights and freedoms are effective in every circumstance*.” (Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987).

In the same superior provision, the original constituent legislator established a mandate to the ordinary legislator, in the sense that “*the law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests of the administered*”, which configures, in the words of Ferrajoli and Bobbio, the sphere of the undecidable, restricted reserve, or inviolable territory, which are negative limits imposed on legislation in guarantee of freedom rights, and positive limits as obligations of what must not fail to be decided or agreed upon. In harmony with this idea, on April 28, 2006, the CPCA was enacted and it established that this jurisdiction has the purpose of “*protecting the legal situations of every person*”, as well as “*guaranteeing or restoring the legality of any conduct of the Administration subject to Administrative Law*”, with which the guarantee is configured in both its subjective and objective dimensions of legality (Article 1). In Italian doctrine, a distinction is made between *secondary guarantees*, consisting of legal protection with respect to the also-called *primary guarantees* whose fundamental function is to ensure the justiciability of violations of rights; these are reparatory guarantees aimed at eliminating or reducing the damage produced or at restraining or punishing those responsible. This new vision has the advantage of clearly establishing what the fundamental function of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction is in Costa Rica, not only as an instrument of administrative legality control but as a guarantee of the operation of the Law. It implies the abandonment of the concept of justice as a *service* or a branch of public administration, which in reality has been a tendency toward the devaluation of the jurisdiction and the exaltation of other alternative forms of conflict resolution. It equally denotes the application of the violated substantive norms, as a reaffirmation of the principle of strict legality or juridicity where the jurisdiction develops its own function of substantial application and, therefore, of affirmation of the *law* (On these ideas, one may consult: Constitutional Chamber, judgments #1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, 1992, considering X; #7006-94 of 9:24 a.m. on December 2, 1994, and #2000-878 of 4:12 p.m. on January 26, considering II; from Ferrajoli, Luigi, *PRINCIPIA IURIS*, *Teoría del Derecho y de la democracia*, *Teoría del derecho*, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2011, pages 637 to 644; and *LOS FUNDAMENTOS DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES*, Editorial Trotta, S. A., Madrid, 2001, pages 28, and 45 to 52; Michele Taruffo, *PAGINAS SOBRE JUSTICIA CIVIL*, translation by Maximiliano Aramburo Calle, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2009, pages 21 to 29; furthermore, articles 152 to 155 PC).

**5.-** Regarding this affirmation, it is timely to recall the relatively recent controversy that arose between those who advocate for a plenary control of the Administration, going so far as to reduce the margin of discretion to zero (Cfr. Tomás R. Fernández, *DE LA ARBITRARIEDAD DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN*, 4th Corrected Edition, Civitas, Madrid, 2002), and those who advocate for less *judicial activism*, for a position of more prudence and self-limitation of the Judge's powers (Cfr. Luciano Parejo Alfonso, *ADMINISTRAR Y JUZGAR: DOS FUNCIONES CONSTITUCIONALES DISTINTAS Y COMPLEMENTARIAS*, Técnos, Madrid, 1993, and Sánchez Morón, Miguel, *DISCRECIONALIDAD ADMINISTRATIVA Y CONTROL JUDICIAL*, Técnos, Madrid, 1994), a debate that, as expressed by Professor Manuel Atienza in an enlightening work titled “*Sobre el control de la discrecionalidad administrativa. Comentarios a una polémica*” (Cfr. his work *CUESTIONES JUDICIALES*, 1st reprint, Biblioteca de Ética, Filosofía del Derecho y Política, México, 2004, pages 39 to 71), ended up being resolved in accordance with the demands of the modern democratic and social State, subject to the law and the Law, that is, the subjection of power to reason, and not the reverse, with the obligation to protect the rights and interests of individuals. Our CPCA is tributary to this doctrine, in that, as a regulatory and directive principle, it does not deal with political acts, as is the case in other legislations, and as the former Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, #3667 of 1966, did; it only alludes, within the excluded matters or those regarding which there is or must be *judicial abstention*, to claims “*concerning acts of relation between the Powers of the State or on the occasion of international relations, without prejudice to the applicable indemnifications, the determination of which shall correspond to the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction*” (Article 3.b]). This orientation of the new Costa Rican legislation makes the contentious-administrative jurisdiction a guarantee at the service of full legality control, or, better yet, of juridicity, and of the protection of every person, whether physical or legal, public or private, with very limited and qualified exempt or immune reserves.

**6.-** The reasons, apparently linked to the “*strategic linkage*” that the ordinary legislator had to reserve a power of control and oversight, such as the one questioned here, are outside the debate. This resides as much in the sphere of self-regulation capacity as within that broad margin of discretion that the legislator has to intervene in the country's development, with the idea of satisfying general interests. The contemporary legislator has not reduced its role to the legislative function only, ordinarily provided for (articles 105 and 121 PC). Its action is also assessed considering the effectiveness and timeliness of the *parliamentary control function* over appointments, similar to another series of important functions, such as legislative, deliberative, financial, oversight, investigative, political in the strict sense, among others.

**7.-** The *control* exercised by the LA in a case like this is one of oversight, review, and verification of the selection and designation work carried out by the Board of Directors of ARESEP, with the purpose of verifying that it adjusts its acts to the provisions established in secondary or ordinary legislation. That control is determined by the aforementioned laws, where the powers and their regulation for the Deputies are established, which must be done in a collegial manner. But how is this change of role of the LA explained, with greater intervention in the country's development, beyond the classic normative attribution? With the enactment of the General Telecommunications Law, #8642 of June 4, 2008 (Gazette #125 of June 30, 2008), the scope and mechanisms for regulating telecommunications were established, encompassing the use, exploitation, and provision of services, with the idea of guaranteeing the right of the inhabitants to obtain these services, strengthening the mechanisms of universality and solidarity, user protection, promotion of effective competition in the market, the development and use of services, ensuring the efficient and effective allocation, use, exploitation, administration, and control of the radio-electric spectrum, etc. The guiding principles are also established, such as universality, solidarity, user benefit, transparency, publicity, effective competition, non-discrimination, technological neutrality, optimization of scarce resources, information privacy, and environmental sustainability (Cfr. articles 1, 2, and 3). In line with the above and as part of a country conception or idea, a development model, the aforementioned Law #8660 was enacted, creating the *telecommunications sector* and the Superintendence of Telecommunications [SUTEL] as the body responsible for regulating, applying, monitoring, and controlling the legal framework of telecommunications; the creation of that sector and its stewardship is embedded within the framework of the State's sectorization, which will be or shall be guided or oriented in the future through a National Development Plan; the entities of the telecommunications sector must consider as guiding principles those already cited, provided for in Law #8642 (Cfr. articles 1, 2, 38). For SUTEL to achieve its ends, it is given maximum deconcentration and its own instrumental legal personality, so that it may administer the National Telecommunications Fund, carry out contractual activity, manage its resources and budget, as well as enter into contracts and agreements required for the fulfillment of its functions; its independence from all network operators and service providers is also established, and it is subject to the National Development Plan and sectoral policies. In attention to the objectives proposed in the law, it is established that *the members shall be selected based on proven suitability, through a public competition of credentials* (Cfr. articles 59 and 61 of Law #7593). Well then: as stated, the *control function* is essentially oriented to verifying whether, in the selection and appointment, the norms, values, and principles established in the laws governing the matter have been followed, and that work is regulated by essentially legal factors, locatable within the broad spectrum of the legality guarantee, provided for in the cited numeral 49, in relation to 41 ibid.

**8.-** Nor is the fact that the LA can intervene in this matter, objecting or not to the appointments, as part of that oversight function it possesses, questioned; that power itself is outside the debate. Even though all functions have a political tint, in strict principle, everything is reduced to determining, as anticipated, if the LA *exercised* the power of control and oversight that it reserved for itself, within the legislative procedure, in strict adherence to the legal system (doctrine of article 216.1 LGAP). It is a regulated power, in the sense that the objection to the appointment was or was not exercised within the thirty-day period. When a legal power with those characteristics exists, the act is located within the administrative conducts subject to ordinary contentious-administrative jurisdictional control, far from the typical political act. To which it must be added that among the claims indicated by the plaintiff are the violation of the individual right and guarantee of free access to public office, and of exercising the office to which she was appointed. At the base of the claim exists the defense of an individual right and guarantee, of a fundamental right, derived from the act of appointment agreed upon by the Board of Directors of ARESEP, which would remain without judicial protection if the defendants' thesis were admitted. Rights are – says the doctrine – the legal armor of the will, a way to make it effective, protecting it from its enemies; if I have rights, I must have the *defensive* or negative *means* against the arbitrariness of power (Cfr. Zagrebelsky, Gustavo, *El derecho dúctil. Ley, derechos, justicia*. Editorial Trotta, X edition, Madrid, 2011, page 82). That is, regardless of whether the right whose protection is sought is or is not configured in the case, it is true that by recognizing the right to choose work, to freely access and under conditions of equality public office, the procedural guarantees for its defense and protection must also be had (Cfr. articles 56, 191, and 192 PC, and 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and the aforementioned OC-8/87).

**9.-** As part of the foundation of the opposing defense, reference has been made to a precedent from the constitutional jurisdiction. The facts referred to in the cited constitutional Chamber precedent (Judgment #2001-11943 of 2:48 p.m. on November 21, 2001) are different from those in this case, being therefore not applicable, except regarding the condition of effectiveness of the act (considering VI). Note well that there, the constitutionality of article 47 of the Law Creating the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, #7593, was questioned, the text of which provides:

> "The Board of Directors of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services shall be appointed after opening a personal and background file for each person who applies or is nominated to join it. > > The Government Council, once it has appointed the General Regulator and the remaining members, shall send all the files to the Legislative Assembly, which shall have a period of thirty days to object to the appointments. If no objection is raised within that period, they shall be deemed ratified. > > In the event of an objection, the Government Council shall substitute the objected director and the newly designated person shall be subject to the same procedure." While the content of that norm is analogous to that of numeral 61, it is also true that they bear substantive differences, from the point of view of the intervening bodies. In this case, the appointment is agreed upon by the Board of Directors of ARESEP and objected to or not by the LA, whereas in the situation of the precedent, the appointment is agreed upon directly by the Government Council, and objected to or not by the LA.

The constitutional rank and regulation of the organs involved gives a very different character to the legislative act; it is a typical act of political control and oversight, as defined in constitutional precedent, in the exercise of a dynamic of checks and balances, among subjects that maintain a degree of equalization. Whereas here that power was reserved directly to the AL. The question reduces to objecting or not to the appointment made by an organ of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, in accordance with the criteria defined in the laws governing the matter, it being for this jurisdiction to determine whether that power was exercised within the limits set by the regulating norm itself. The mere fact that the ARESEP—which is the subject authoring the act that the AL controls—is not a "power of the State," nor even an organ of constitutional relevance, would be sufficient to rule out that we are here dealing with a political act.

10.- Ultimately, the Tribunal inclines toward denying the alleged lack of jurisdictional competence due to absence of material object, on the grounds that the challenge concerns a political act, and instead opts to examine the claim on the merits, as will be seen in the following lines. The defendants' argument would lead to the absurdity of declaring today the existence of acts immune to the Law, other than those selected and indicated by law, allowing the legislator to reserve certain spheres and confer upon itself certain powers, outside the rule of Law, which is of course contrary to the notion of a democratic and social State under the rule of Law that permeates the CPCA.

Third: Regarding proven facts. That the Tribunal holds the following facts as certain for resolving the case: —– 1°) that the plaintiff here, Castro Mora, participated in the public competition promoted to appoint members of the Council of the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones [SUTEL] (fact 1° of the claim and its affirmative answer); —– 2°) that the Junta Directiva of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos [ARESEP], appointed the plaintiff here as a member of the Council of SUTEL (fact 1° of the claim and its answer, and folios 2 to 10 of Volume I of the administrative file); —– 3°) that in official letter 390-RG-2008/29545 of November 13, 2008, the General Regulator of ARESEP, presented that same day before the Asamblea Legislativa [AL], a list of four persons to integrate the Council of SUTEL, for the purpose of objecting to or ratifying said appointment; among the nominees was the plaintiff here (fact 1° of the claim and its answer, and folios 2 to 10, cited in the preceding fact); —– 4°) that the thirty-day period that the AL had to object to the appointments expired on December 13, 2008 (fact 2° of the claim and folios 765 to 769 of Volume III of the same file); —– 5°) that on December 3, 2008, the Comisión de Nombramientos of the AL, presented an affirmative majority opinion recommending to the Plenary the ratification of the appointment of the entire list sent by ARESEP (fact 3° of the claim and its affirmative answer, and folios 858 to 869 of Volume IV of the same file); —– 6°) that in plenary session #117, held on Tuesday, December 9, 2008, the Presidency of the Directorio defined a period of twenty-four hours for the Deputies of the Comisión Permanente Especial de Nombramientos to present the minority report; an appeal was lodged against that act, which was rejected (claim, oral closing arguments of the plaintiff, and folios 924 to 952 of the same Volume and file); —– 7°) that on Wednesday, December 10, 2008, a motion was submitted to the Deputies' knowledge with the aim of calling for the following Friday, December 12, an extraordinary session to hear the ratification or not of the members proposed by ARESEP to integrate the Council of SUTEL; said motion was approved between four and five in the afternoon, according to the minutes of plenary session #118 (facts 4° and 6° of the claim and affirmative answer, and folios 953, 958, 959 and 964 to 994 of Volume IV cited); —– 8°) that in extraordinary session #029, held on Friday, December 12, 2008, the AL ratified the appointment as members of the Council of SUTEL, of Mr. Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez Gutiérrez and Mr. George Petrie Miley Rojas, while Mr. Juan Manuel Quesada Espinoza and the plaintiff here, Castro Mora, were objected to (facts 8° and 9° of the claim and its affirmative answer, and folios 1043 to 1071 of the same file, Volume IV); —– 9°) that through official letter SD-70-08-09 of December 12, 2008, the Secretaría of the Directorio of the AL, communicated to the General Regulator of ARESEP, the result of the session related in the preceding fact (fact 9° of the claim and its answer, and folio 1073 of the same file and Volume); —– 10°) that the AL in extraordinary session #33, held on December 19, 2008, did not object to the appointment of Maryleana Méndez Jiménez, for a term of three years, and of Walter Herrera Cantillo, alternate, for a term of five years (fact 15° of the claim brief and answer and folio 1109 of Volume IV of the same file), and —– 11°) that the appointment agreements of the AL, related in the preceding facts 7° and 9°, were published in La Gaceta # 26 of February 6, 2009 (fact 10° of the claim brief and its answer).

Fourth: Brief reference to the object of the process and to the arguments raised by both parties. That the object of the claim set forth in the lawsuit, adjusted and reformulated in the preliminary hearing, is for a declaration of nullity of the act of objection to the plaintiff's appointment, in the Council of SUTEL, adopted by the AL in extraordinary session #029 of December 12, 2008, and the act of finality adopted in the session of the following December 15, as untimely, according to article 61 of Law #7395, amended by Law #8660, as well as the nullity of the prior and connected acts, such as those carried out on December 9, 10, and 15. As a consequence of the foregoing, it requests a declaration that the ratification of said appointment should have proceeded, as a form of restitution, indemnification, or reparation for the plaintiff, in consideration of her condition as a public figure, without needing to order reinstatement due to impossibility of performance, and instead requiring recognition of damages (daños y perjuicios). In the alternative, she claims that the act of ratification be converted into an indemnification for damages (daños y perjuicios). The State in its oral closing arguments, in addition to ratifying its written answer, expressed that the act of ARESEP does not constitute a right in favor of the plaintiff, as it generates only an expectation; that the acts of the AL adopted in sessions of December 9, 10, and 12, 2008, form part of the self-regulation power that it holds, as the Sala Constitucional understood in judgment #2005-7961. The co-defendants pointed out in their oral closing arguments that the act of ratification occurred in time and form; the AL's manifestation occurred on December 12, 2008; that regarding the nullity invoked, the defects are not of a substantial nature, and the principle of conservation of the act should be applied; that the claim numbered two is of impossible object, because Méndez Jiménez today holds an appointment to the position through another [new] competition and not through the one challenged, having left the initial term. In the case of Herrera Cantillo, his appointment was as an alternate for five years, it being evident that the plaintiff claims the position of full member and not alternate; thus, with respect to him, there is no standing, the same as for Méndez Jiménez, but as regards her, there is also no current interest.

Fifth: On the passive standing of MÉNDEZ JIMÉNEZ and HERRERA CANTILLO. That, as the first substantive issue raised, it is advisable to examine the standing of the co-defendants, for if this is not established, it would be useless to refer to the other substantial prerequisites (Cf. Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment #775-F-03 of 2:25 p.m. of November 20, 2003).

1.- According to article 12 CPCA, “shall be considered” a defendant, among others, “natural or legal persons that have derived rights or legitimate interests from the administrative conduct that is the object of the process” (subsection 3°). The obvious question is: what is the conduct that is the object of this process? Obviously, the act of objection adopted in the extraordinary session of the AL, #29 of December 12, 2008, regarding the appointment of the plaintiff, to the Council of SUTEL, made by the Junta Directiva of ARESEP. According to the law, when that negative act occurs, “the Junta Directiva will substitute the objected Council member and the newly designated person shall be subject to the same procedure” (article 61 already cited). The new proposal fell to MÉNDEZ JIMÉNEZ and HERRERA CANTILLO, who were not objected to in extraordinary session #33, held on December 19, 2008. The Tribunal observes that although this act is not challenged directly in the claim, it is done so via nullity by connection (nulidad por conexidad), since it is clear that if the claim for nullity and reinstatement were to proceed, the removal of this act would be a necessary consequence, as a form of in-kind satisfaction. Thus, in that sense, the co-defendants are not correct in their argument.

2.- But there is another reason that does make that defense argument admissible and which is inherent in it, which was paradoxically highlighted by the plaintiff during the preliminary hearing on August 28, 2013. In that opportunity, the claim for reinstatement was reformulated and specified, in terms that make the inclusion of MÉNDEZ JIMÉNEZ and HERRERA CANTILLO truly pointless, useless, and unnecessary. Even though the plaintiff claims the nullity of the act of objection and, as a consequence, requests restitution to the respective position, it is true that she expressed and clarified that she ultimately does not seek effective reinstatement. That is, the plaintiff does not wish to exercise the position at SUTEL; the sense of her submission is that it be declared that, the act being null, she was legally and automatically ratified. Put another way: that when the act of objection occurred untimely, that is, outside the established legal period, it must be considered literally nonexistent and, consequently, it should be declared that her appointment attained finality, consolidated by the passage of time. In that light, the process may continue without those persons who, like the co-defendants, derive rights from the act that is the object of the process, because the plaintiff does not wish to exercise the position; so much so that an estimatory judgment would be enforceable, given that, in place thereof she opted to convert the right to the position and its exercise into an indemnification for damages (daños y perjuicios). Matters being put that way, it follows that the right of defense of those persons suffers no diminution whatsoever, given that ultimately, they would not be affected by a decision whose enforcement would not reach their legitimate rights and interests. Therefore, the guarantee of effectiveness of rights, proclaimed even in the Charter of the United Nations (article 55, paragraph 3), signed on June 26, 1945, in the city of San Francisco, United States of America, approved by Costa Rica through Law #142 of August 6, 1945, which entered into force on September 29, 1945, and in our CP (articles 41, 49, 140.9 and 153), would not be affected, since the plaintiff's claim has another orientation, that being compensation for damages (daños y perjuicios), instead of full reinstatement.

3.- Consequently, even though the co-defendants derive rights from the conduct challenged in this process, given the meaning and scope that the plaintiff gave to her claim, the established legal situation of those persons would not be affected by a possible estimatory judgment, and therefore the lack of passive standing raised must be declared, but not the lack of current interest.

Sixth: On the merits of the case. That, the plaintiff questions and disputes the act of objection to her appointment, rendered by the full AL, in a session held on December 12, 2008.

1.- The first question that should be asked is the legal nature of that period; whether it is directory or peremptory. What happens if the act is not produced within the established legal period, or if it is produced outside of that period? What happens if it is not produced at all, or if it is partial? In the first place, the Tribunal observes that the regulatory norm is explicit in the sense that it is a period of 30 days “to object to the appointments.” As it is equally clear on the point that “if within that lapse no objection occurs, they shall be deemed ratified.” It is evident, then, that we are in the presence of a peremptory, preclusive, caducity period. The norm recognizes a competence to do and establishes a consequence for its omission.

If the Legislative Assembly (AL) does not agree to the objection within the granted period, the opportunity to exercise its oversight power lapses, and the act becomes final; it is deemed ratified due to the legal period for its objection having elapsed. As the doctrine states regarding lapse: "<i>the claim for whose exercise a term is prefixed is originally born with this time limitation, so that it cannot be asserted once it has elapsed</i>" (Roberto Ruggiero, <i>Instituciones de Derecho Civil</i>, translated from the fourth Italian edition by Ramón Serrano Sureño and José Santacruz Teijeiro, Editorial Reus, S.A, Madrid, Spain, 1929, cited in Constitutional Chamber judgment #2000-00878 of 16:12 hours on January 26, 2000, Considerando III). The benefit derived from the timely exercise of that competence is the objection, and therefore, the deprivation of finality and conformation of the appointment act. If action is not taken with timeliness and celerity, the benefit that intervention would have meant is lost and extinguished. This is so because there is a general interest in the bodies and institutions acting (in this case, SUTEL, ARESEP), satisfying the rights of the users involved. But there is also a right of the person appointed by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of ARESEP to have their situation defined. All of which justifies the pre-established peremptory period.

**2.**- The second issue to define is whether the AL made use or not of that oversight function, within the granted period. It has been taken as true that on November 13, 2008, ARESEP submitted the list of appointments to the AL; such that the 30-day period expired on December 13, 2008. The negative act or objection was adopted on Friday, December 12, that is, one day before its expiration. In accordance with the norm regulating the matter, the AL "shall have a period of 30 days to object to the appointments." So that the AL, with its action, complied with the applicable norm. The immediate communication to ARESEP, according to official letter SD-70-08-09, is inherent to the act of appointment and partial objection, since critically important consequences derive from it, especially negative ones, such as the substitution of the objected person, in order to duly integrate the body.

**3.-** Regarding the errors and defects alleged concerning the sending of the case files to the Appointments Committee (Comisión de Nombramientos), the reduction of an eight-day period to twenty-four hours, the call issued on December 10, for an extraordinary session on Friday, December 12, the finality of the call act, which by legislative usage and custom occurs with the approval of the minutes, which in this case occurred until the session of Monday, December 15, it is worth noting the following: By constitutional provision, the AL cannot convene without the attendance of two-thirds of its total members. If "on the designated day" it is impossible to begin the session, or if begun, it cannot continue due to lack of quorum, the members present shall summon the absentees, under the sanctions established by the Regulations, so that they attend, and the AL shall open or continue the sessions when the required number is met (Article 117 CP). There is an obligation to designate or schedule the day on which the session will be held, excluding the case of May first, given that by CP there is a session on that day even without a call. This obligation is based on operational and order reasons, basic in a complex body, composed of fifty-seven Deputies representing different regions and sectors of Costa Rican society. Matters concerning when, how, where to convene or deadlines, etc., are matters reserved to the Legislative Regulations (RAL).

**3.1** Regarding the sending of the case in question to the Appointments Committee (Comisión de Nombramientos), without this being a matter of that type, it must be said that the RAL attributes that competence to the Presidency (Presidencia). So that it is not an act resulting from the bare will of the Presidency (Presidencia), but rather the exercise of a regulatory attribution (Article 27.3).

**3.2** Regarding the alleged reduction of an eight-day period to twenty-four hours to deliver and process reports, in violation of Articles 81 and 82 RAL, it must be noted that such a thing constitutes the exercise of a power to direct the discussion, provided for in Article 27.4 ibidem, with the idea of making effective the exercise of the power legally conferred on the plenary to object to the implicated appointments. It is a way of ordering and accelerating the functioning of the AL, an opportunity to render the report, and not the deprivation of the right that minorities have to express their opinion, to have their dissenting point of view known in the plenary. If the Presidency (Presidencia) were deprived of those ordering and directive powers, the right of the majorities to express their opinion on certain matters within the legally established opportunity could be rendered nugatory.

**3.3** The Court also dismisses the alleged defect consisting of the alteration of the legislative procedure, when the motion presented to call an extraordinary session was heard and voted on, on a day and time provided for in the RAL for constitutional matters, and not for cases like the one discussed here. By proceeding in that manner, the AL has done nothing more than exercise its sovereign power to call a session [extraordinary session], constitutionally established, at the opportunity it deemed convenient, according to parliamentary dynamics and the needs of the matter to be addressed. Article 32 RAL, relating to the <i>plenary session schedule (horario de sesiones del plenario)</i>, establishes a rule of order that seeks to guarantee a fixed space on the legislative agenda for “<i>the matters comprised in Article 195 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política)</i>” in view of their high importance, but it does not exclude that other matters may also be addressed if the needs and workloads warrant it; this is within the margin of operational discretion that the AL has.

**3.4** Finally, and with regard to the lack of finality of the act, with disapplication of a legislative usage and custom, it must be noted that in law the approval of minutes does not involve a problem of validity of the act; it is a matter of order, relating to the documentation and record of the will expressed or manifested; it is an analogous discussion to that of a judgment as an act and as a document, where the absence of the latter does not imply the non-existence of the former. So that finality is not essential to the act, and therefore, would not be an obstacle to undertaking its immediate execution.

**Seventh**: **On free access to public positions**. That, in the lawsuit and in the oral conclusions, reference was made to the freedom to choose work and access public positions, via public competitive examination of credentials. It is suggested that the challenged act violated this right recognized both in the Constitution (Constitución) and in the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos).

**1.-** Certainly, the selection of the members of the SUTEL Council is made on the basis of &lt;<i>proven suitability</i>&gt;, through a public competitive examination of credentials. This responds to the constitutional provision (Articles 191 and 192 CP), relating to free access to public positions under conditions of equality. The competitive examination was chosen as the best instrument to obtain the offers of the best persons who will make effective the aspirations that the legislator had in this matter. So that in its application, the norms and principles that govern it must be observed. In this case, the procedure indicates that once the competitive examination is completed, it is for the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of ARESEP to appoint the full members and the alternate of said Council, by a majority of at least four votes, for fixed periods; the exercise of the position is full-time and with exclusive dedication, with the option of reelection only once. It is also established that, once the act of selection and appointment is produced, the case files must be sent to the AL, so that it may indicate whether it objects, totally or partially. If the objection is not produced within the following 30 days, the appointment shall be deemed ratified. The foregoing demonstrates that we are in the presence of a reinforced appointment procedure, and that the act of appointment of the member or members of the SUTEL Council is an act of complex formation and content, integrated by two wills, each from a different subject. For its consolidation and formation, it also requires obtaining a negative act that will give it finality and effectiveness. But it is not any act that consolidates the appointment; it is an act of parliament. What the Constitutional Chamber expressed in its judgment #2001-11943 governs here:

“<b><i>VI</i></b> <i>. … Note that the procedure provided for in the Law (Ley) for the appointment of the members of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos) is simple, insofar as it is the Government Council that makes the designation, and the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) is responsible -only- for verifying an eminently political control in this regard, as it is conferred a period of thirty days to make any objection to said designation, otherwise, the same shall be deemed ratified. The Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) carries out a purely oversight (or supervisory) function in relation to this type of appointments, a function that in any case, should not be considered either administrative or legislative, under any concept, and that acts solely as a conditioning factor of the legal effectiveness of this type of designations. The doctrine in this matter has understood that approval represents a declaration based on assessments of the merit, timeliness, usefulness, and legality of the act submitted to its knowledge; from which it is verified that the approving subject does not cooperate in the formation of the act submitted for approval, it only declares that the act submitted to its examination is useful and timely, in order to thus consider fulfilled the condition on which the law makes the effectiveness of the act depend. That is, the legislative action in this matter acts as a conditioning factor of the legal effectiveness of this type of appointments, insofar as it is not complete nor produces natural effects until this approval occurs, which is understood to have been given if, after the period established in the law has passed, the deputies have not made any objection.</i>” **2.-** So that if that negative act of objection and rejection is not produced in a timely manner, the appointment <i>shall be deemed</i> ratified. If it is produced, the appointment is rendered without effect, the objected person must be substituted, and the new designee shall be subject to the same procedure. While this second phase of the procedure is developing before the AL, the act subject to control is ineffective, incomplete, and incapable of producing effects in the realm of facts, of reality, and the <i>appointed</i> person remains expectant of what occurs within the parliament. The alleged infringement of free access to public positions does not appear violated in this case. Certainly, what this right grants is access without discrimination and under conditions of equality, in a transparent, objective, and impartial procedure, but it does not ensure the appointment, nor guarantee the selection by the Board of Directors of ARESEP. That is, there is no right to appointment derived from free access to public positions.

**Eighth**: **Conclusions and exceptions**. That in harmony with what has been stated, the Court dismisses the breaches and violations alleged in these proceedings, as grounds for the invalidity of the challenged act. In the first place, these are matters of order, product of the exercise of directive powers, inherent to the Presidency (Presidencia), made explicit with the idea of making effective the exercise of a legally conferred power, without perceiving in that proceeding injuries to substantive norms or principles, established in favor of minorities; in fact, no matters of this type are invoked here. Secondly, the objection to the appointment of the plaintiff herein was produced within the period established in Article 61 of the Law (Ley) #7593, amended by Law (Ley) #8660, in a legally convened session, according to constitutionally recognized powers and duties, its communication being the natural and immediate subsequent consequence, for the purposes of its full execution, without the alleged finality being a <i>sine qua non</i> requirement for those purposes. Consequently, the exception of lack of right raised by the State must be accepted, which has as its effect and produces as a result the dismissal of the lawsuit in all its aspects, given that the appointment of the plaintiff did not become consolidated, having been objected to by the AL within the legal period. As for the co-defendants MENDEZ JIMENEZ and HERRERA CANTILLO, a lack of passive legal standing (legitimación pasiva) must be declared, in view of the reformulation of the claim that renders their procedural insertion pointless. Of course, the <i>subsidiary</i> claim runs the same fate; its pertinence is subordinate to the nullity and ratification sought as the main matter, but when the latter does not prosper, the former collapses under its own weight." Editorial Trotta, 10th edition, Madrid, 2011, page 82. 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style='line-height:150%'><span lang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:\r\nES-PE'>“</span><b><u><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;\r\nfont-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Second</span></u></b><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";\r\ncolor:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>: <b>On the alleged non-justiciable political nature of the challenged act. </b>That, as a second preliminary matter, the following must be addressed: in their oral conclusions, the defendants reiterated the alleged formal exception of an act not susceptible to challenge, according to articles 36, 62, and 66, subsection g) of the CPCA, because it is a political act; as it is not an administrative act, it is outside the scope of this jurisdiction. Regarding which it is fitting to note:</span><span\r\nlang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-size:\r\n14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-size:13.5pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";\r\ncolor:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><b><u><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;\r\nmso-ansi-language:EN'>1.-</span></u></b><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;\r\nline-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'> By Law #8660, the <i>Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector (Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones)</i> was enacted, and the Superintendency of Telecommunications [SUTEL] was created, as a body of maximum deconcentration attached to ARESEP; the Law of the latter, #7593, was reformed, and the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) was granted competence to open a public competition of credentials (concurso público de antecedentes) in order to select candidates, by proven suitability, to form the Council of SUTEL. In the exercise of that competence, ARESEP opened the competition, which was published on August 17, 2008, in a newspaper of national circulation; after the respective analysis, the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva), in session 071-2008, held on November 11, 2008, appointed as members of the Council of SUTEL, among others, the plaintiff Castro Mora. Later, in official communication (oficio) 390-RG-2008/29545 of November 13, 2008, it sent to the LA the files of the appointed persons, given that the latter has 30 days to object to the appointments, on the understanding that if that objection is not made, they are considered ratified; all the foregoing based on article 61 <i>in fine</i> of Law #7593, and Transitory V, paragraph 2 of Law #8660. The LA objected to 2 of the appointed persons; one of them was the plaintiff here. </span><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-size:\r\n14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-size:13.5pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";\r\ncolor:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><b><u><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;\r\nmso-ansi-language:EN'>2.-</span></u></b><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;\r\nline-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'> In the lawsuit, as well as in the oral conclusions, defects are pointed out in the call to the extraordinary session held on Friday, December 12, 2008, alteration of procedures, untimeliness of the objection, lack of finality of the act when it was communicated to ARESEP, violation of the principle of legality and of the singular non-derogability of the regulation (inderogabilidad singular del reglamento), etc. Violation of the right to access and hold public office is also alleged. </span><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-size:\r\n14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-size:13.5pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";\r\ncolor:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><b><u><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;\r\nmso-ansi-language:EN'>3.-</span></u></b><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;\r\nline-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'> With respect to the foregoing, it is fitting to state, in the first instance, that this Court finds no well-founded reasons to reverse what it ordered through interlocutory resolution #3362-2010 of 10:40 a.m. on September 6, 2010 (folios 106 to 109), in a sense favorable to the right of the plaintiff here to access the jurisdiction, the right to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) or the right to be heard before an independent and impartial Court. In the second place, the Court considers that, in the specific case, the crux of the matter lies in determining the regularity of the exercise of the power that the LA reserved for itself to <i>object to the appointments</i> of the members of the Council of SUTEL made (and made) by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of ARESEP, as provided for in article 61, paragraph 3 of Law #7593, reformed by Law #8860. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) so understood and expressly established in its resolution #2008-018550 of 2:30 p.m. on December 17, 2008, when hearing the amparo appeal filed by the plaintiff here, on the occasion of the same facts. It is, in effect, a matter of determining whether the LA complied or not with the procedure provided for in the law or the regulations of the LA itself to object to the appointment of the appellant as a member of the Council of SUTEL.</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-size:\r\n14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-size:13.5pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";\r\ncolor:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><b><u><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;\r\nmso-ansi-language:EN'>4.-</span></u></b><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;\r\nline-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'> In accordance with article 49 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) [CP], this jurisdiction was attributed to the Judicial Branch, as a <i><u>guarantee</u></i> <i>of the control of legality of the administrative function of the State.</i> The guarantee, as we all know, has an auxiliary function, in the sense that it serves something to which it is necessarily attached (Cf. Adolfo Gelsi Bidart. <i>De Derechos, Deberes y Garantías del Hombre Común</i>, B de F Ltda, Montevideo-Buenos Aires, 2006, pages 191 to 204). Stated in the terms of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, with regard to other guarantees provided for in the Convention: </span><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-family:\r\n\"Courier New\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>“25. It is not the purpose of the Court to make a theoretical development on the relationship between rights and guarantees. It is enough to point out what should be understood by guarantee in the sense in which the term is used by article 27.2. <i>Guarantees serve to protect, ensure, or enforce the ownership or exercise of a right</i>. As the States Parties have the obligation to recognize and respect the rights and freedoms of the person, <i>they also have the obligation to protect and ensure their exercise through the respective guarantees</i> (art. 1.1), <i>that is to say, of the suitable means so that the rights and freedoms are effective in all circumstances</i>.” (Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987). </span><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-size:\r\n14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In the same superior provision, the original constituent legislator established a mandate to the ordinary legislator, in the sense that “<i>the law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests (intereses legítimos) of the administered</i>”, which configures, in the words of Ferrajoli and Bobbio, the sphere of the undecidable, forbidden territory (coto vedado) or inviolable territory, which are negative limits imposed on legislation in guarantee of freedom rights, and positive limits as obligations of what must not fail to be decided or agreed upon. In harmony with this idea, on April 28, 2006, the CPCA was enacted and it was established that this jurisdiction has the purpose of “<i>protecting the legal situations of every person</i>”, as well as “<i>guaranteeing or reestablishing the legality of any conduct of the Administration subject to Administrative Law</i>”, with which the guarantee is configured both in its subjective and objective dimension of legality (article 1). </span><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";\r\nmso-ansi-language:EN'>In Italian doctrine, a distinction is made between <i><span\r\nstyle='color:#010101'>secondary guarantees,</span></i></span><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='font-size:13.5pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";color:#010101;\r\nmso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:\r\n150%;font-family:\"Courier New\";mso-ansi-language:EN'>consisting of the legal protection with respect to the also-called <i>primary</i> <i>guarantees</i><span\r\nstyle='color:#010101'> whose fundamental function is to ensure the justiciability of violations of rights; these are reparatory guarantees aimed at eliminating or reducing the damage produced or at restraining or punishing those responsible. This new vision has the advantage of clearly establishing what the fundamental function of the administrative litigation jurisdiction in Costa Rica is, not only as an instrument for control of administrative legality but as a guarantee of the operation of the Law. It implies the abandonment of the concept of justice as a <i>service</i> or a branch of the public administration, which has actually been a trend towards the devaluation of the jurisdiction and the exaltation of other alternative forms of conflict resolution.</span></span></p>\r\n\r\n</div>\r\n\r\n</body>\r\n\r\n</html>\r\n" } It equally denotes the application of the violated substantive norms, as a reaffirmation of the principle of strict legality or juridicity, where the jurisdiction performs its proper function of substantial application and, therefore, of affirmation of the *law* (On these ideas, see: Constitutional Chamber, rulings #1739-92 at 11:45 a.m. on July 1, 1992, considering X; #7006-94 at 9:24 a.m. on December 2, 1994, and #2000-878 at 4:12 p.m. on January 26, considering II; from Ferrajoli, Luigi, *PRINCIPIA IURIS*, *Theory of Law and Democracy*, *Theory of Law*, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2011, pages 637 to 644; and *THE FOUNDATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS*, Editorial Trotta, S. A., Madrid, 2001, pages 28, and 45 to 52; Michele Taruffo, *PAGES ON CIVIL JUSTICE*, translation by Maximiliano Aramburo Calle, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2009, pages 21 to 29; also, articles 152 to 155 CP).

**5.-** Regarding this statement, it is timely to recall the relatively recent controversy that arose between those who advocate for a plenary control of the Administration, even to the point of reducing the margin of discretion to zero (Cf. Tomás R. Fernández, *ON THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE ADMINISTRATION*, 4th Corrected Edition, Civitas, Madrid, 2002), and those who advocate for less *judicial activism*, for a position of greater prudence and self-limitation of the Judge's powers (Cf. Luciano Parejo Alfonso, *ADMINISTERING AND JUDGING: TWO DISTINCT AND COMPLEMENTARY CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS*, Técnos, Madrid, 1993, and Sánchez Morón, Miguel, *ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND JUDICIAL CONTROL*, Técnos, Madrid, 1994), a debate that, as Professor Manuel Atienza expressed in an illuminating work titled “*On the Control of Administrative Discretion. Comments on a Controversy*” (Cf. his work *JUDICIAL ISSUES*, 1st reprint, Library of Ethics, Philosophy of Law and Politics, Mexico, 2004, pages 39 to 71), was ultimately resolved in accordance with the demands of the modern democratic and social State, subject to the law and to Law, that is, subjection of power to reason, and not the reverse, with the duty to protect the rights and interests of individuals. Our CPCA is a product of this doctrine, insofar as, as a regulative and directive principle, it does not deal with political acts, as occurs in other legislations, and as the former Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, #3667 of 1966, did; it only alludes, among the excluded matters or those regarding which there is or must be *judicial abstention*, to claims “*concerning acts relating to the relations between the Powers of the State or arising from international relations, without prejudice to any applicable compensation, the determination of which shall correspond to the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction*” (article 3.b]). This orientation of the new Costa Rican legislation makes the contentious-administrative jurisdiction a guarantee at the service of full control of legality, or, better yet, of juridicity, and of the protection of every person, whether natural or legal, public or private, with very limited and qualified exempt or immune pockets.

**6.-** The reasons are beyond debate, apparently linked to the “*strategic linkage*” that the ordinary legislator had to reserve a power of control and oversight, such as the one questioned here, which resides both in the realm of self-regulation capacity, and within that broad margin of discretion that the legislator has to intervene in the country's development, with the idea of satisfying general interests. The contemporary legislator has not reduced its role solely to the ordinarily provided legislative function (articles 105 and 121 CP). Its action is valued also considering the effectiveness and timeliness of the *parliamentary control function* of appointments, alongside another series of important functions, such as legislative, deliberative, financial, oversight, investigative, political in the strict sense, among others.

**7.-** The *control* exercised by the LA in a case like this is one of oversight, review, and verification of the selection and designation work carried out by the Board of Directors of ARESEP, with the purpose of verifying that it adjusts its acts to the provisions established in secondary or ordinary legislation. That control is determined by the aforementioned laws, where the powers and their regulation for the Deputies are established, which must be done collegially. But how is this change in the role of the LA explained, with greater intervention in the country's development, beyond the classic normative attribution? With the enactment of the General Telecommunications Law, #8642 of June 4, 2008 (Gazette #125 of June 30, 2008), the scope and mechanisms for regulating telecommunications were established, encompassing the use, exploitation, and provision of services, with the idea of guaranteeing the right of inhabitants to obtain these services, strengthening the mechanisms of universality and solidarity, user protection, promotion of effective competition in the market, the development and use of services, ensuring the efficient and effective allocation, use, exploitation, administration, and control of the radioelectric spectrum, etc. The guiding principles are also established, such as universality, solidarity, user benefit, transparency, publicity, effective competition, non-discrimination, technological neutrality, optimization of scarce resources, information privacy, and environmental sustainability (Cf. articles 1, 2, and 3). In line with the above and as part of a national conception or idea, a development model, the aforementioned Law #8660 was enacted, creating the *telecommunications sector* and the Superintendency of Telecommunications [SUTEL] as the body in charge of regulating, applying, monitoring, and controlling the legal framework of telecommunications; the creation of that sector and its stewardship is embedded within the framework of the State's sectorization, which is or will be guided or oriented in the future through a National Development Plan; the entities of the telecommunications sector must consider as guiding principles those already cited, provided in Law #8642 (Cf. articles 1, 2, 38). So that SUTEL achieves its ends, it is given maximum deconcentration and its own instrumental legal personality, so that it administers the National Telecommunications Fund, carries out contractual activity, administers its resources and its budget, as well as to sign contracts and agreements required for the fulfillment of its functions; its independence from all network operators and service providers is also established, and it is subject to the National Development Plan and sectoral policies. In accordance with the objectives proposed in the law, it is established that *the members shall be selected based on proven suitability, through a public competition of credentials* (Cf. articles 59 and 61 of Law #7593). Well then: as stated, the *control function* is essentially oriented towards verifying whether in the selection and appointment, the norms, values, and principles established in the laws governing the matter have been followed, and that task is regulated by essentially legal factors, which fall within the broad spectrum of the guarantee of legality, provided in the cited article 49, in relation to article 41 ibid.

**8.-** Neither is the fact questioned that the LA can intervene in this matter, objecting or not to the appointments, as part of that oversight function it holds; that power in itself is beyond debate. Even though all functions have a political tint, strictly speaking in terms of principles, everything reduces to determining, as anticipated, whether the LA *exercised* the power of control and oversight it reserved for itself, within the legislative procedure, in strict adherence to the legal system (doctrine of article 216.1 LGAP). It is a regulated power, in the sense that the objection to the appointment was exercised or not exercised within the thirty-day period. When a legal power with these characteristics exists, the act falls within the administrative conducts subject to ordinary contentious-administrative jurisdictional control, far from the typical political act. To which it must be added that among the claims indicated by the plaintiff are the violation of the individual right and guarantee of free access to public positions, and to exercise the position to which she was appointed. At the base of the lawsuit is the defense of an individual right and guarantee, a fundamental right, derived from the act of appointment agreed upon by the Board of Directors of ARESEP, which would remain without judicial protection if the thesis of the defendants were admitted. Rights are – says the doctrine – the legal armor of the will, a way to make it effective, protecting it from its enemies; if I have rights, I must have the *defensive* or negative *means* against the arbitrariness of power (Cf. Zagrebelsky, Gustavo, *The Ductile Law. Law, rights, justice*. Editorial Trotta, 10th edition, Madrid, 2011, page 82). That is, regardless of whether or not the right whose protection is sought is configured in this case, the truth is that upon recognizing the right to choose work, to access freely and under conditions of equality to public positions, one must also have the procedural guarantees for its defense and protection (Cf. articles 56, 191, and 192 CP, and 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and the aforementioned AO-8/87).

**9.-** As part of the basis for the defense opposed, reference has been made to a precedent of the constitutional jurisdiction. The facts referred to in the cited precedent of the Constitutional Chamber (Ruling #2001-11943 at 2:48 p.m. on November 21, 2001), are different from those in this case, and therefore, are not applicable, except regarding the condition of effectiveness of the act (considering VI). Note well that what was questioned there was the *[un]* constitutionality of article 47 of the Law Creating the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, #7593, the text of which provides:

> *"The Board of Directors of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services shall be appointed after opening a personal and credentials file for each person who applies or is nominated to join it.* > > *The Governing Council, once it has appointed the General Regulator and the remaining members, shall send all the files to the Legislative Assembly, which shall have a period of thirty days to object to the appointments. If no objection is made within that period, they shall be deemed ratified.* > > *In case of objection, the Governing Council shall replace the objected director and the newly designated person shall be subject to the same procedure."* Although the content of this norm is analogous to that of article 61, it is also true that they hold substantive differences, from the point of view of the organs that intervene. In this case, the appointment is agreed upon by the Board of Directors of ARESEP and objected to or not by the LA, while in the scenario of the precedent, the appointment is agreed upon directly by the Governing Council, and objected to or not by the LA. The constitutional rank and regulation of the organs involved gives a very different character to the legislative act; it is a typical act of political control and oversight, as defined in the constitutional precedent, in the exercise of a dynamic of checks and balances, between subjects that maintain a degree of equalization. Whereas here, that power was reserved directly by the LA. The question is reduced to objecting or not to the appointment made by an organ of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, based on the criteria defined in the laws that govern the matter, and it falls to this jurisdiction to determine whether that power was exercised within the limits set by the regulating norm itself.

The mere fact that ARESEP — which is the authoring subject of the act that controls the AL — is not a “power of the State,” nor even a constitutionally relevant body, would be sufficient to rule out that we are here dealing with a political act.

**10.-** Ultimately, the Tribunal inclines toward denying the alleged lack of jurisdictional competence for absence of material subject matter, on the grounds that the challenge concerns a political act, and instead chooses to examine the claim on the merits, as will be seen in the following lines. The defendants’ argument would lead to the absurdity of declaring today the existence of acts immune to the Law, distinct from those selected and indicated by statute, allowing the legislator to reserve certain spheres and endow itself with certain powers, outside the rule of Law, which is of course contrary to the notion of the democratic and social State of Law that permeates the CPCA.

**Third**: **Regarding proven facts.** That the Tribunal holds the following facts to be true for resolving the case: **----- 1°)** that the plaintiff here, Castro Mora, participated in the public competition promoted to appoint members of the Council of the Superintendency of Telecommunications [SUTEL] (fact 1 of the claim and its affirmative defense); **----- 2°)** that the Board of Directors of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services [ARESEP], appointed the plaintiff here as a member of the Council of SUTEL (fact 1 of the claim and its defense, and folios 2 a 10 of Volume I of the administrative record); **----- 3°)** that in official communication 390-RG-2008/29545 of November 13, 2008, the General Regulator of ARESEP, submitted that same day before the Legislative Assembly [AL], a list of four persons to form the Council of SUTEL, with the aim that it object to or ratify said appointment; among the nominees was the plaintiff here (fact 1 of the claim and its defense, and folios 2 a 10, cited in the preceding fact); **----- 4°)** that the thirty-day period that the AL had to object to the appointments expired on December 13, 2008 (fact 2 of the claim and folios 765 a 769 of Volume III of the same record); **----- 5°)** that on December 3, 2008, the Appointments Committee of the AL, presented an affirmative majority opinion recommending to the Plenary the ratification of the appointment of the entire list sent by ARESEP (fact 3 of the claim and its affirmative defense, and folios 858 a 869 of Volume IV of the same record); **----- 6°)** that in plenary session #117, held on Tuesday, December 9, 2008, the Presidency of the Directorio defined a period of twenty-four hours so that the Deputies of the Special Permanent Appointments Committee could present the minority report; an appeal was filed against that act, which was rejected (claim, oral closing arguments of the plaintiff, and folios 924 a 952 of the same Volume and record); **----- 7°)** that on Wednesday, December 10, 2008, a motion was submitted to the knowledge of the Deputies for the purpose of convening an extraordinary session for the following Friday, December 12, to hear the ratification or not of the members proposed by ARESEP to form the Council of SUTEL; said motion was approved between four and five o'clock in the afternoon, according to the minutes of plenary session #118 (facts 4 and 6 of the claim and affirmative defense, and folios 953, 958, 959, and 964 a 994 of the cited Volume IV); **----- 8°)** that in extraordinary session #029, held on Friday, December 12, 2008, the AL ratified the appointment as members of the Council of SUTEL, of Messrs. Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez Gutiérrez and George Petrie Miley Rojas, while Juan Manuel Quesada Espinoza and the plaintiff here, Castro Mora, were objected to (facts 8 and 9 of the claim and its affirmative defense, and folios 1043 a 1071 of the same record, Volume IV); **----- 9°)** that through official communication SD-70-08-09 of December 12, 2008, the Secretariat of the Directorio of the AL, communicated to the General Regulator of ARESEP, the result of the session related in the preceding fact (fact 9 of the claim and its defense, and folio 1073 of the same record and Volume); **----- 10°)** that the AL in extraordinary session #33, held on December 19, 2008, did not object to the appointment of Maryleana Méndez Jiménez, for a term of three years, and of Walter Herrera Cantillo, alternate, for a term of five years (fact 15 of the written claim and defense and folio 1109 of Volume IV of the same record), and **----- 11°)** that the appointment resolutions of the AL, related in the previous facts 7 and 9, were published in La Gaceta # 26 of February 6, 2009 (fact 10 of the written claim and its defense).

**Fourth**: **Brief reference to the object of the proceeding and to the arguments raised by both parties.** That the object of the claim deduced in the suit, adjusted and reformulated in the preliminary hearing, is for the declaration of nullity of the act of objection to the appointment of the plaintiff, to the Council of SUTEL, adopted by the AL in extraordinary session #029 of December 12, 2008, and the act of finality adopted in the session of the following December 15, as untimely, according to Article 61 of Law #7395, reformed by Law #8660, as well as the nullity of the prior and related acts, such as those performed on December 9, 10, and 15. As a consequence of the foregoing, she requests a declaration that the ratification of said appointment was appropriate, as a form of restitution, indemnification or reparation for the plaintiff, in view of her status as a public figure, without needing to order reinstatement due to impossibility of performance, instead requiring recognition of damages (daños y perjuicios). *Subsidiarily*, she claims that the act of ratification be converted into compensation for damages. The State, in its oral conclusions, besides ratifying its written defense, stated that the act of ARESEP does not create a right in favor of the plaintiff, rather it generates an expectation; that the acts of the AL adopted in the sessions of December 9, 10, and 12, 2008, form part of its power of self-regulation, just as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) understood it in judgment #2005-7961. The co-defendants pointed out in their oral conclusions that the act of ratification was produced in a timely manner and proper form; the AL's statement was made on December 12, 2008; that the invoked nullity, the defects are not of a substantial nature, and the principle of preservation of the act must be applied; that the claim numbered two, is of impossible object, since Méndez Jiménez today enjoys an appointment to the position through another [new] competition and not through the one challenged, having left the initial term. In the case of Herrera Cantillo, his appointment was as an alternate for five years, it being evident that the plaintiff claims the position of full member and not of alternate; such that with respect to this, there is no standing (legitimación), the same as with Méndez Jiménez, but regarding the latter, nor is there any current interest.

**Fifth**: **Regarding the lack of standing (legitimación pasiva) of MENDEZ JIMENEZ and HERRERA CANTILLO.** That, as the first substantive issue raised, it is appropriate to examine the standing of the co-defendants, since if this does not exist, it would be useless to refer to the other substantive requirements (Cf. First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment #775-F-03 of 2:25 p.m. on November 20, 2003).

**1.-** According to Article 12 CPCA, “it shall be considered” a defendant, among others, “*natural or legal persons who have derived rights and legitimate interests from the administrative conduct that is the object of the proceeding*” (subsection 3). The obvious question is: what is the conduct that is the object of this proceeding? Obviously, the act of objection adopted in the extraordinary session of the AL, #29 of December 12, 2008, regarding the appointment of the plaintiff, to the Council of SUTEL, carried out by the Board of Directors of ARESEP. According to the law, when that negative act occurs, “*the Board of Directors shall replace the objected Council member and the new designee shall be subject to the same procedure*” (Article 61 already cited). The new proposal fell upon MENDEZ JIMENEZ and HERRERA CANTILLO, who were not objected to in extraordinary session #33, held on December 19, 2008. The Tribunal appreciates that even though this act is not directly challenged in the claim, it is challenged via nullity by connection (conexidad), since it is clear that if the claim for nullity and reinstatement were admissible, the removal of this act would be a necessary consequence, as a form of satisfaction in natura. So in that sense, the co-defendants are not correct in their argument.

**2.-** But there is another reason that does make admissible said defense argument, and which is inherent in it, a reason that was paradoxically highlighted by the plaintiff during the preliminary hearing of August 28, 2013. On this occasion, the claim for reinstatement was reformulated and specified in terms that truly make the inclusion of MENDEZ JIMENEZ and HERRERA CANTILLO vain, useless, unnecessary. Even though the plaintiff seeks the nullity of the act of objection and, as a consequence of it, requests restitution to the respective position, what is true is that she expressed and clarified that definitively she does not seek *effective* reinstatement. That is, the plaintiff does not wish to hold the position at SUTEL; the sense of her petition is that it be declared that, the act being null, she remained legally and automatically *ratified*. Put another way: that since the act of objection occurred untimely, that is, outside the legally established time limit, it must be considered literally *non-existent* and, consequently, it be declared that her appointment attained finality (firmeza), was consolidated by the passage of time. In that idea, the proceeding can continue despite those persons who, like the co-defendants, derive rights from the act subject to the proceeding, since the plaintiff does not wish to hold the position; such that an upholding judgment would be enforceable, given that, instead, she opted to convert the right to the position and its exercise, into compensation for damages. Put in that way, the right of defense of those persons suffers no diminution whatsoever, given that definitively, they would not be affected by a decision whose execution would not reach their legitimate rights and interests. Therefore, the guarantee of *effectiveness* of rights, proclaimed even in the Charter of the United Nations (Article 55, subsection 3), signed on June 26, 1945, in the city of San Francisco, United States of America, approved by Costa Rica through Law #142 of August 6, 1945, which entered into force on September 29, 1945, and in our CP (Articles 41, 49, 140.9 and 153), would not be affected, because the plaintiff's claim has another orientation, which is compensation for damages, instead of full reinstatement.

**3.-** Consequently, even though the co-defendants derive rights from the conduct challenged in this proceeding, by the meaning and scope that the plaintiff gave to her claim, the established legal situation of the former would not be affected by an eventual upholding judgment, therefore the asserted lack of standing (legitimación pasiva) must be declared, but not the lack of current interest.

**Sixth**: **Regarding the merits of the case**. That, the plaintiff questions and disputes the act of objection to her appointment, issued by the plenary of the AL, in the session held on December 12, 2008.

**1.-** The first question that must be posed is the legal nature of that time limit; whether it is procedural or peremptory. What happens if the act is not produced within the legally established time limit, or if it is produced outside said time limit? What happens if it is not produced at all, or if it is partial? In the first place, the Tribunal appreciates that the governing norm is express in the sense that it is a 30-day period “*to object to the appointments*.” As it is equally clear regarding the point that “*if within that period no objection is produced, they shall be considered ratified*.” It is therefore evident that we are in the presence of a peremptory, preclusive, expiration (caducidad) time limit. The norm recognizes a competence *to act* and establishes a consequence in its omission. If the AL does not agree to the objection within the granted time limit, the opportunity to exercise its control power expires, and the appointment becomes final; it is considered ratified by the legal time limit for its objection having elapsed. As the doctrine expresses regarding expiration: “*the claim for whose exercise a term is fixed, originates with this limitation of time, so that it cannot be asserted when it has elapsed*” (Roberto Ruggiero, *Instituciones de Derecho Civil*, translated from the fourth Italian edition by Ramón Serrano Sureño and José Santacruz Teijeiro, Editorial Reus, S.A, Madrid, Spain, 1929, cited in the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) #2000-00878 of 4:12 p.m. on January 26, 2000, Considerando III). The benefit derived from the timely exercise of that competence is the objection and, therefore, the deprivation of finality and conformation of the act of appointment. If one does not act with timeliness and celerity, the benefit that intervention would have meant is lost and extinguished. This is so because there is a general interest in the organs and institutions acting (in this case, SUTEL, ARESEP), satisfying the rights of the users involved. But there is also a right of the person appointed by the Board of Directors of ARESEP for their situation to be defined. All of which justifies the pre-established fatal time limit.

**2.**- The second question to define is whether the AL made use or not of that control function, within the granted time limit. It has been held as true that on November 13, 2008, ARESEP submitted to the AL, the list of appointments; such that the 30-day period expired on December 13, 2008. The negative act or objection, was adopted on Friday, December 12, that is, one day before its expiration. According to the norm that regulates the matter, the AL “shall have a period of 30 days to object to the appointments.” Such that the AL with its action, complied with the applicable norm. The immediate communication to ARESEP, according to official letter SD-70-08-09, is inherent to the act of appointment and partial objection, since very important consequences derive from it, especially negative ones, such as the replacement of the objected person, in pursuit of properly forming the body.

**3.-** Regarding the errors and defects alleged relative to the sending of the case files to the Appointments Committee, the reduction of an eight-day period to twenty-four hours, the call issued on December 10, for an extraordinary session on Friday, December 12, the finality of the act of call, which by legislative use and custom is attained with the approval of the minutes, which in this case occurred only at the session of Monday, December 15, the following should be noted: By constitutional provision, the AL shall not be able to meet without the attendance of two-thirds of the total of its members. If “on the specified day” it is impossible to initiate the session, or if once opened, they cannot continue for lack of quorum, the members present shall urge the absentees, under the sanctions established by the Regulations, to attend, and the AL shall open or continue the sessions when the required number is met (Article 117 CP). There is an obligation to specify or schedule the day on which the session will take place, excluding the case of the first of May, given that by CP on that day there is a session even without a call. That obligation is based on operational and order reasons, basic in a complex organ, composed of fifty-seven Deputies representing distinct regions and sectors of Costa Rican society.

That which concerns when, how, where to meet, or time limits, etc., is a matter reserved to the Legislative Regulations (Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, RAL).

**3.1** As for the referral of the case in question to the Appointments Committee (Comisión de Nombramientos), without this being a matter of that type, it must be said that the RAL assigns that competence to the Presidency (Presidencia). Thus, it is not an act born of the bare will of the Presidency, but rather the exercise of a regulatory power (article 27.3).

**3.2** As for the alleged reduction of an eight-day period to twenty-four hours for delivering and processing reports, in violation of articles 81 and 82 RAL, it must be noted that such a thing constitutes the exercise of a power to direct the discussion, provided for in article 27.4 ibid., with the idea of making effective the exercise of the power legally conferred upon the plenary to object to the implicated appointments. It is a way of ordering and accelerating the functioning of the Legislative Assembly (AL), an opportunity to render the report, and not the deprivation of the right that the minorities have to be heard, to have their dissenting viewpoint known in the plenary. If the Presidency were to be deprived of those ordering and directive powers, the right of the majorities to be heard on certain matters within the legally established opportunity could be rendered nugatory.

**3.3** The Court also dismisses the alleged defect consisting of the alteration of the legislative procedure, when the motion presented to convene an extraordinary session was heard and voted upon, on a day and time provided in the RAL for constitutional matters, and not for cases such as the one discussed here. By proceeding in that manner, the AL has done nothing more than exercise its sovereign power to convene a session [extraordinary session], constitutionally established, at the opportunity it deemed convenient, according to parliamentary dynamics and the needs of the matter to be addressed. Article 32 RAL, relating to the *plenary session schedule*, establishes a rule of order that seeks to guarantee a fixed space on the legislative agenda for “*the matters included in article 195 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política)*” in view of their high importance, but it does not exclude that other matters may also be addressed if the needs and workloads so warrant; this falls within the margin of operational appreciation that the AL has.

**3.4** Finally, and regarding the lack of finality (firmeza) of the act, with the disapplication of a legislative use and custom, it must be noted that in law, the approval of minutes does not entail a problem of the act's validity; it is a matter of order, relating to the documentation and record of the will expressed or manifested; it is a discussion analogous to that of the judgment as an act and as a document, where the absence of the latter does not imply the non-existence of the former. Thus, finality does not pertain to the essence of the act, and therefore, would not be an obstacle to undertaking its immediate execution.

**Seventh**: **On free access to public office**. That, in the complaint and in the oral conclusions, reference was made to the freedom to choose one's work and to access public office, via a public competitive examination of credentials (concurso público de antecedentes). It is suggested that the challenged act violated this right recognized both in the Constitution and in the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos).

**1.-** Certainly, the selection of the members of the SUTEL Board (Consejo de SUTEL) is made on the basis of <*proven suitability*>, by means of a public competitive examination of credentials. This responds to the constitutional provision (articles 191 and 192 CP), relating to free access to public office under conditions of equality. The competitive examination was chosen as the best instrument to obtain the offers from the best persons who will make effective the aspirations that the legislator had in this matter. Thus, in its application, the norms and principles that govern it must be observed. In this case, the procedure indicates that once the competitive examination is concluded, it is incumbent upon the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of ARESEP to appoint the full members and the alternate of said Board, by a majority of at least four votes, for fixed periods; the exercise of the office is full-time and with exclusive dedication, with the option of re-election for only one time. It is also established that, once the act of selection and appointment is produced, the case files (expedientes) must be sent to the AL, so that it may express whether it objects, totally or partially. If the objection is not made within the following 30-day period, the appointment shall be deemed ratified. The foregoing demonstrates that we are in the presence of a reinforced appointment procedure, and that the act of appointing the member or members of the SUTEL Board is an act of complex formation and content, composed of two wills, each from a different subject. For its consolidation and formation, it also requires drawing on a negative act that will give it finality and efficacy. But it is not just any act that consolidates the appointment; it is an act of parliament. Here, what the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) expressed in its judgment #2001-11943 applies:

“**VI** *. … Note that the procedure provided in the Law (Ley) for the appointment of the members of the Board of Directors of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos) is simple, in that it is the Government Council (Consejo de Gobierno) which makes the designation, and it corresponds to the Legislative Assembly —only— to verify an eminently political control in this regard, in that it is granted a thirty-day period to make any objection to said designation, failing which, the same shall be deemed ratified. The Legislative Assembly carries out a merely controlling (or oversight) function in relation to this type of appointments, a function that in any case, should not be considered administrative or legislative, under any concept, and which acts solely as a conditioning factor of the legal efficacy of this type of designations. The doctrine in this matter has understood that approval represents a declaration based on assessments of the merit, opportunity, utility, and legality of the act submitted to its cognizance; whence it is verified that the approving subject does not cooperate in the formation of the act submitted to approval, but only declares that the act submitted to its examination is useful and opportune, in order thereby to deem as realized the condition upon which the law makes the efficacy of the act depend. That is, the legislative action in this matter acts as a conditioning factor of the legal efficacy of this type of appointments, in that the same is not complete nor does it produce natural effects until this approval supervenes, which is understood to be given if, after the time limit set in the law has passed, the deputies have not made any objection.*” **2.-** Thus, if that negative act, of objection and rejection, is not produced in a timely manner, the appointment *shall be deemed* ratified. If it is produced, the appointment is rendered without effect, the person objected to must be substituted, and the newly designated person will be subject to the same procedure. While this second phase of the procedure is developed before the AL, the act subject to control is ineffective, incomplete, and incapable of producing effects in the realm of facts, of reality, and the *appointed* person remains expectant as to what occurs within the parliament. The alleged infringement of free access to public office does not appear to have been violated in this case. Of course, this right entitles one to access without discrimination and under equal conditions, in a transparent, objective, and impartial procedure, but it does not ensure appointment, nor does it guarantee selection by the Board of Directors of ARESEP. That is, there is no right to appointment derived from free access to public office.

**Eighth**: **Conclusions and defenses**. That in harmony with what has been set forth, the Court dismisses the breaches and violations alleged in these proceedings, as grounds for invalidity of the challenged act. In the first place, these are matters of order, products of the exercise of directive powers, belonging to the Presidency, made explicit with the idea of making effective the exercise of a legally conferred power, without it being observed in that proceeding that there are injuries to substantive norms or principles established in favor of the minorities; in fact, no matters of this type are invoked here. In the second place, the objection to the appointment of the plaintiff herein was produced within the time limit established in article 61 of Law #7593, reformed by Law #8660, in a legally convened session, according to constitutionally recognized powers and duties, its communication being the natural and immediate subsequent consequence, for the purposes of its proper execution, without the alleged finality being a *sine qua non* requirement for those purposes. Consequently, the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) raised by the State must be accepted, which has as its effect and produces as a result the dismissal of the complaint in all its aspects, given that the appointment of the plaintiff did not become consolidated, having been objected to by the AL within the legal time limit. As for the co-defendants MENDEZ JIMENEZ and HERRERA CANTILLO, a lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) must be declared, in view of the reformulation of the claim that renders their procedural inclusion inane. Of course, the *subsidiary* claim meets the same fate; its pertinence is subordinated to the nullity and ratification sought as the main matter, but since the latter does not prosper, the former falls under its own weight.”

“Segundo: Sobre la alegada naturaleza política no judiciable del acto impugnado. Que, como segunda cuestión previa, debe abordarse la siguiente: en sus conclusiones orales los demandados reiteraron la aducida excepción formal de acto no susceptible de impugnación, según los artículos 36, 62 y 66, inciso g) CPCA, por tratarse de un acto político; como no es un acto administrativo, está fuera del alcance de esta jurisdicción. Sobre lo cual conviene señalar:

1.- Por Ley #8660, se promulgó la Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, y se creó la Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones [SUTEL], como órgano de desconcentración máxima adscrito a la ARESEP; se reformó la Ley de ésta, #7593, y se le atribuyó competencia a la Junta Directiva para abrir concurso público de antecedentes con el fin de seleccionar los candidatos, por idoneidad comprobada, para integrar el Consejo de SUTEL. En ejercicio de esa competencia la ARESEP abrió el concurso, el cual se publicó el 17 de agosto de 2008, en un diario de circulación nacional; después del análisis respectivo, la Junta Directiva en sesión 071-2008, celebrada el 11 de noviembre de 2008, nombró como miembros del Consejo de SUTEL, entre otros, a la actora Castro Mora. Más tarde, en oficio 390-RG-2008/29545 de 13 de noviembre de 2008, remitió a la AL los expedientes de las personas nombradas, dado que ésta dispone de 30 días para objetar los nombramientos, en el entendido de que si esa objeción no se produce, se tienen por ratificados; todo lo anterior con fundamento en el artículo 61 in fine de la Ley #7593, y transitorio V, párrafo 2° de la Ley #8660. La AL objetó a 2 de las personas nombradas; una de ellas fue la aquí actora.

2.- En la demanda, lo mismo que en las conclusiones orales, se señalan vicios en la convocatoria a la sesión extraordinaria celebrada el viernes 12 de diciembre de 2008, alteración de procedimientos, extemporaneidad de la objeción, falta de firmeza del acto cuando se comunicó a ARESEP, violación al principio de legalidad y al de inderogabilidad singular del reglamento, etc. También se aduce violación del derecho de acceder y ejercer cargos públicos.

3.- Respecto de lo anterior, conviene dejar sentado en primer término que este Tribunal no encuentra razones fundadas para revertir lo que dispuso mediante resolución interlocutoria #3362-2010 de 10.40 horas de 6 de septiembre de 2010 (folios 106 a 109), en sentido favorable al derecho de la aquí actora de acceder a la jurisdicción, derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva o derecho a ser oído ante un Tribunal independiente e imparcial. En segundo lugar, el Tribunal aprecia que, en el caso concreto, el quid del asunto está en determinar la regularidad del ejercicio de la potestad que se reservó la AL para <objetar los nombramientos> de los miembros del Consejo de SUTEL que realiza (y realizó) la Junta Directiva de ARESEP, según lo dispone el artículo 61, párrafo 3° de la Ley #7593, reformado por la Ley #8860. Así lo entendió y dejó expresamente establecido la Sala Constitucional en su resolución #2008-018550 de 14.30 horas de 17 de diciembre de 2008, al conocer del recurso de amparo que interpuso la aquí actora, con motivo de los mismos hechos. Se trata, en efecto, de determinar si la AL cumplió o no el procedimiento previsto en la ley o el reglamento de la misma AL para objetar el nombramiento de la recurrente como miembro del Consejo de SUTEL.

4.- De conformidad con el artículo 49 de la Constitución Política [CP] esta jurisdicción se atribuyó al Poder Judicial, como garantía del control de legalidad de la función administrativa del Estado. La garantía, todos lo sabemos, tiene una función asistencial, en el sentido que sirve a algo a lo que está adscrita necesariamente (Cfr. Adolfo Gelsi Bidart. De Derechos, Deberes y Garantías del Hombre Común, B de F Ltda, Montevideo-Buenos Aires, 2006, páginas 191 a 204). Dicho en términos de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, a propósito de otras garantías previstas en la Convención:

“25. No es el propósito de la Corte hacer un desarrollo teórico sobre la relación entre derechos y garantías. Basta señalar qué debe entenderse por garantía en el sentido en que el término está utilizado por el artículo 27.2. Las garantías sirven para proteger, asegurar o hacer valer la titularidad o el ejercicio de un derecho. Como los Estados Partes tienen la obligación de reconocer y respetar los derechos y libertades de la persona, también tienen la de proteger y asegurar su ejercicio a través de las respectivas garantías (art. 1.1), vale decir, de los medios idóneos para que los derechos y libertades sean efectivos en toda circunstancia.” (Opinión Consultiva OC-8/87 de 30 de enero de 1987).

En la misma disposición superior, el legislador constituyente originario estableció un mandato al legislador ordinario, en el sentido que “la ley protegerá, al menos, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos de los administrados”, lo cual configura, en palabras de Ferrajoli y Bobbio, la esfera de lo indecidible, coto vedado o territorio inviolable, que son límites negativos impuestos a la legislación en garantía de los derechos de libertad, y límites positivos en cuanto obligaciones de lo que no debe dejar de decidirse o acordarse. En armonía con esta idea, el 28 de abril de 2006, se promulgó el CPCA y se estableció que esta jurisdicción tiene por objeto “tutelar las situaciones jurídicas de toda persona”, lo mismo que “garantizar o restablecer la legalidad de cualquier conducta de la Administración sujeta al Derecho Administrativo”, con lo cual se configura tanto la garantía en su dimensión subjetiva como objetiva de legalidad (artículo 1°). En la doctrina italiana se distingue entre garantías secundarias, consistente en la protección jurídica respecto de las también llamadas garantías primarias cuya función fundamental es asegurar la justiciabilidad de las violaciones de los derechos; se trata de garantías reparatorias dirigidas a eliminar o reducir el daño producido o a cohibir o a castigar a los responsables. Esta nueva visión tiene la ventaja de establecer claramente cuál es la función fundamental de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa en Costa Rica, no solo como instrumento de control de la legalidad administrativa sino como garantía de actuación del Derecho. Implica el abandono del concepto de la justicia como un servicio o una rama de la administración pública que en realidad ha sido una tendencia hacia la devaluación de la jurisdicción y exaltación de otras formas alternativas de solución de conflictos. Denota igualmente la aplicación de las normas sustantivas violadas, como reafirmación del principio de estricta legalidad o juridicidad en donde la jurisdicción desarrolla la función que le es propia de aplicación substancial y, por ende, de afirmación de la ley (Sobre estas ideas pueden consultarse: Sala Constitucional, sentencias #1739-92 de 11.45 horas de 1 de julio de 19992, considerando X; #7006-94 de 9.24 horas de 2 de diciembre de 1994, y #2000-878 de 16.12 horas de 26 de enero, considerando II; de Ferrajoli, Luigi, PRINCIPIA IURIS, Teoría del Derecho y de la democracia , Teoría del derecho, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2011, páginas 637 a 644; y LOS FUNDAMENTOS DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES, Editorial Trotta, S. A., Madrid, 2001, páginas 28, y 45 a 52; Michele Taruffo, PAGINAS SOBRE JUSTICIA CIVIL, traducción de Maximiliano Aramburo Calle, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2009, páginas 21 a 29; además, artículos 152 a 155 CP).

5.- A propósito de esta afirmación, es oportuno recordar la polémica relativamente reciente que se dio entre quienes apuestan por un control plenario de la Administración, llegándose incluso a la reducción a cero del margen de discrecionalidad (Cfr. Tomás R. Fernández, DE LA ARBITRARIEDAD DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN, 4° Edición corregida, Civitas, Madrid, 2002), y quienes propugnan por un menor activismo judicial, por una posición de más prudencia y de autolimitación de los poderes del Juez (Cfr. Luciano Parejo Alfonso, ADMINISTRAR Y JUZGAR: DOS FUNCIONES CONSTITUCIONALES DISTINTAS Y COMPLEMENTARIAS, Técnos, Madrid, 1993, y Sánchez Morón, Miguel, DISCRECIONALIDAD ADMINISTRATIVA Y CONTROL JUDICIAL, Técnos, Madrid, 1994) debate que, como lo expresó el profesor Manuel Atienza en un trabajo esclarecedor titulado “Sobre el control de la discrecionalidad administrativa. Comentarios a una polémica” (Cfr. su obra CUESTIONES JUDICIALES, 1° reimpresión, Biblioteca de Ética, Filosofía del Derecho y Política, México, 2004, páginas 39 a 71), terminó por resolverse conforme a las exigencias del moderno Estado democrático y social, sometido a la ley y al Derecho, es decir, sometimiento del poder, a la razón, y no a la inversa, debiendo protegerse los derechos e intereses de las personas. Nuestro CPCA es tributario de esta doctrina, en cuanto, como principio regulativo y directivo, no se ocupa de los actos políticos, como sí ocurre en otras legislaciones, y sí lo hacía la anterior Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, #3667 de 1966; tan solo alude, dentro de las cuestiones excluidas o respecto de las cuales hay o debe haber abstención judicial, las pretensiones “concernientes a los actos de relación entre los Poderes del Estado o con motivo de las relaciones internacionales, sin perjuicio de las indemnizaciones procedentes, cuya determinación corresponderá a la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa” (artículo 3.b]). Esta orientación de la nueva legislación costarricense, hace de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa una garantía al servicio del control pleno de legalidad, o, mejor aún, de juridicidad, y de la protección de toda persona, sea física o jurídica, pública o privada, con reductos exentos o inmunes, muy limitados y calificados.

6.- Están fuera de debate las razones, al parecer vinculadas con la “vinculación estratégica” que tuvo el legislador ordinario para reservarse una potestad de control y fiscalización, como la que aquí se cuestiona, lo cual se residencia tanto en el ámbito de la capacidad de autoregulación, como dentro de ese amplio margen de discrecionalidad que éste tiene para intervenir en el desarrollo del país, en la idea de satisfacer los intereses generales. El legislador contemporáneo no ha reducido su papel a la función legislativa solamente, ordinariamente prevista (artículos 105 y 121 CP). Su acción se valora considerando también la eficacia y oportunidad de la función de control parlamentario de nombramientos, pareja a otra serie de importantes funciones, tales como la legislativa, deliberativa, financiera, fiscalizadora, investigadora, política en estricto sentido, entre otras.

7.- El control que realiza la AL en un caso como este, es de fiscalización, revisión y comprobación sobre la labor de selección y designación realizada por Junta Directiva de ARESEP, con la finalidad de verificar que ajusta sus actos a las disposiciones establecidas en la legislación secundaria u ordinaria. Ese control está determinado por las precitadas leyes, donde se establecen las facultades y su regulación para los Diputados (as), debiendo hacerlo en forma colegiada. Pero ¿cómo se explica ese cambio de rol de la AL, con una mayor intervención en el desarrollo del país, allende de la clásica atribución normativa? Con la promulgación de la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, #8642 de 4 de junio de 2008 (Gaceta #125 de 30 de junio de 2008), se estableció el ámbito y los mecanismos de regulación de las telecomunicaciones que comprende tanto el uso y la explotación como la prestación de los servicios, en la idea de garantizar el derecho de los habitantes de obtener estos servicios, de fortalecer los mecanismos de universalidad y solidaridad, de protección al usuario, promoción de la competencia efectiva en el mercado, el desarrollo y uso de los servicios, de asegurar la eficiente y efectiva asignación, uso, explotación, administración y control del espectro radioeléctrico, etc. También se establecen los principios rectores, tales como la universalidad, solidaridad, beneficio al usuario, transparencia, publicidad, competencia efectiva, no discriminación, neutralidad tecnológica, optimización de los recursos escasos, privacidad de la información y sostenibilidad ambiental (Cfr. artículos 1, 2 y 3). En línea con lo anterior y como parte de una concepción o idea país, de un modelo de desarrollo, se promulgó la precitada Ley #8660 que crea el sector telecomunicaciones y la Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones [SUTEL] como órgano encargado de regular, aplicar, vigilar y controlar el ordenamiento jurídico de las telecomunicaciones; la creación de ese sector y su rectoría, se incardina dentro del marco de sectorización del Estado que estará o será guiado u orientado en el futuro a través de un Plan Nacional de desarrollo; las entidades del sector telecomunicaciones han de considerar como principios rectores, los ya citados, previstos en la Ley de #8642 (Cfr. artículos 1, 2, 38). Para que SUTEL alcance sus fines, se le da máxima desconcentración y personalidad jurídica instrumental propia, para que administre el Fondo Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, realice la actividad contractual, administre sus recursos y su presupuesto, así como para suscribir contratos y convenios que requiera para el cumplimiento de sus funciones; se establece además su independencia de todo operador de redes y proveedor de servicios, y se le sujeta al Plan nacional de desarrollo y a las políticas sectoriales. En atención a los objetivos propuestas en la ley, se establece que los miembros serán seleccionados por idoneidad comprobada, mediante concurso público de antecedentes (Cfr. artículos 59 y 61 de la Ley #7593). Pues bien: como se dijo la función de control está orientada esencialmente a verificar si en la selección y el nombramiento se han seguido las normas, valores y principios establecidos en las leyes que gobiernan la materia, y esa labor está regulada por factores esencialmente jurídicos, residenciables dentro del amplio espectro de la garantía de legalidad, prevista en el numeral 49 citado, en relación con el 41 ibídem.

8.- Tampoco se cuestiona el hecho de que la AL pueda intervenir en esta materia, objetando o no los nombramientos, como parte de esa función contralora que tiene; esa potestad en sí está fuera de debate. Aún cuando todas las funciones tienen un tinte político, en rigor de principios, todo se reduce a determinar, como se anticipó, si la AL ejerció la potestad de control y fiscalización que se auto reservó, dentro del procedimiento legislativo, en estricto apego al ordenamiento jurídico (doctrina del artículo 216.1 LGAP). Es una potestad reglada, en el sentido que se ejerció o no se ejerció la objeción del nombramiento dentro del plazo de treinta días. Al existir una potestad legal con esas características, el acto se residencia dentro de las conductas administrativas sujetas al control jurisdiccional ordinario contencioso administrativo, lejos del típico acto político. A lo que habría que añadir que entre los reclamos que señala la parte actora están la violación al derecho y garantía individual de libre acceso a los cargos públicos, y a ejercer el cargo en que fue nombrada. Existe en la base de la demanda, la defensa de un derecho y garantía individual, de un derecho fundamental, derivado del acto de nombramiento acordado por la Junta Directiva de ARESEP, el cual quedaría sin protección judicial, si se admitiera la tesis de los demandados. Los derechos son –dice la doctrina- la armadura jurídica de la voluntad, un modo de hacerla eficaz, protegiéndola de sus enemigos; si tengo derechos debo tener los medios defensivos o negativos frente a las arbitrariedades del poder (Cfr. Zagrebelsky, Gustavo, El derecho dúctil. Ley, derechos, justicia. Editorial Trotta, X edición, Madrid, 2011, página 82). Es decir, al margen de, si se configura o no en el caso, el derecho cuya protección se impetra, es lo cierto que al reconocerse el derecho de elección del trabajo, de acceder libremente y en condiciones de igualdad a los cargos públicos, también se ha de tener las garantías procesales para su defensa y protección (Cfr. artículos 56, 191 y 192 CP, y 23 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, y la precitada OC-8/87).

9.- Como parte del fundamento de la defensa opuesta, se ha hecho referencia a un precedente de la jurisdicción constitucional. Los hechos a que se refiere el precedente de Sala Constitucional que se cita (Sentencia #2001-11943 de 14.48 horas de 21 de noviembre de 2001), son distintos a los de este caso, siendo por tanto, no aplicable, salvo en lo relativo al condicionante de eficacia del acto (considerando VI). Nótese bien que ahí se cuestionaba la [in] constitucionalidad del artículo 47 de la Ley de Creación de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, #7593, cuyo texto dispone:

"La Junta Directiva de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Pú blicos ser á nombrada despu é s de abrirle expediente personal y de antecedentes a cada persona que se postule o sea postulada para integrarla.

El Consejo de Gobierno, una vez que haya nombrado al Regulador General y a los restantes miembros, enviará todos los expedientes a la Asamblea Legislativa, la cual dispondrá de un plazo de treinta d ías para objetar los nombramientos. Si en ese lapso no se produjere objeció n, se tendr án por ratificados.

En caso de objeción, el Consejo de Gobierno sustituir á al director objetado y el nuevo designado será objeto del mismo procedimiento." Si bien el contenido de esa norma es an á logo al del numeral 61, tambié n es verdad que guardan diferencias substantivas, desde el punto de vista de los ó rganos que intervienen. En este caso el nombramiento lo acuerda la Junta Directiva de ARESEP y lo objeta o no la AL, mientras que en el supuesto del precedente, el nombramiento lo acuerda directamente el Consejo de Gobierno, y lo objeta o no la AL. El rango y regulació n constitucional de los ó rganos implicados, le da un cariz muy distinto al acto legislativo; se trata de un acto tí pico de control y fiscalizació n pol ítica, tal cual se define en el precedente constitucional, en ejercicio de una diná mica de pesos y contrapesos, entre sujetos que guardan un grado de igualació n. Mientras que aquí esa potestad se la reservó directamente la AL. La cuestió n se reduce a objetar o no el nombramiento que realiza un ó rgano de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Pú blicos, en funció n de los criterios definidos en las leyes que gobiernan la materia, correspondiendo a esta jurisdicció n determinar si esa potestad se ejerció dentro de los l ímites que fija la propia norma reguladora. El solo hecho de que la ARESEP -que es el sujeto autor del acto que controla la AL-, no es un gpoder del Estadoh, ni siquiera un ó rgano de relevancia constitucional, serí a suficiente para descartar que estemos aquí ante un acto pol ítico.

10.- En definitiva el Tribunal se inclina por denegar la alegada falta de competencia jurisdiccional por ausencia de objeto material, por versar la impugnación sobre un acto político, y en su lugar opta por examinar la demanda por el fondo, conforme se verá en líneas siguientes. El argumento de los demandados conduciría al absurdo de declarar hoy día la existencia de actos inmunes al Derecho, distintos a los seleccionados y señalados por la ley, permitiendo al legislador reservarse ciertos ámbitos y dotarse de ciertas potestades, fuera del imperio del Derecho, lo que desde luego es contrario a la noción del Estado democrático y social de Derecho que permea al CPCA.

Tercero: Sobre hechos probados. Que el Tribunal tiene por ciertos los siguientes hechos para resolver el caso: ----- 1°) que la aquí actora Castro Mora, participó en el concurso público promovido para nombrar miembros del Consejo de la Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones [SUTEL] (hecho 1° de la demanda y su contestación afirmativa); ----- 2°) que la Junta Directiva de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos [ARESEP], nombró a la aquí actora como miembro de Consejo de SUTEL (hecho 1° de la demanda y su contestación, y folios 2 a 10 del Tomo I del legajo administrativo); ----- 3°) que en oficio 390-RG-2008/29545 de 13 de noviembre de 2008, el Regulador General de ARESEP, presentó ese mismo día ante la Asamblea Legislativa [AL], una nómina de cuatro personas para integrar el Consejo de SUTEL, con la finalidad de que objetara o ratificara dicho nombramiento; entre los nominados estaba la aquí actora (hecho 1° de la demanda y su contestación, y folios 2 a 10, citados en el hecho que antecede); ----- 4°) que el plazo de treinta días que tenía la AL para objetar los nombramientos, vencía el 13 de diciembre de 2008 (hecho 2° de la demanda y folios 765 a 769 del Tomo III del mismo legajo); ----- 5°) que el 3 de diciembre de 2008, la Comisión de Nombramientos de la AL, presentó dictamen afirmativo de mayoría recomendando al Plenario la ratificación del nombramiento de la totalidad de la nómina enviada por ARESEP (hecho 3° de la demanda y su contestación afirmativa, y folios 858 a 869 del Tomo IV del mismo legajo); ----- 6°) que en sesión plenaria #117, celebrada el martes 9 de diciembre de 2008, la Presidencia del Directorio definió un plazo de veinticuatro horas para que los Diputados de la Comisión Permanente Especial de Nombramientos pudieran presentar el informe de minoría; contra ese acto se interpuso apelación, la cual fue rechazada (demanda, alegato de conclusiones orales de la parte actora, y folios 924 a 952 del mismo Tomo y legajo); ----- 7°) que el miércoles 10 de diciembre de 2008, se somete a conocimiento de los Diputados una moción con la finalidad de convocar para el viernes 12 de diciembre siguiente, a sesión extraordinaria para conocer la ratificación o no de los miembros propuestos por ARESEP para integrar el Consejo de SUTEL; dicha moción fue aprobada entre las dieciséis y las diecisiete horas del día, según acta de sesión plenaria #118 (hechos 4° y 6° de la demanda y contestación afirmativa, y folios 953, 958, 959 y 964 a 994 del Tomo IV citado); ----- 8°) que en sesión extraordinaria #029, celebrada el viernes 12 de diciembre de 2008, la AL ratificó el nombramiento como miembros del Consejo de SUTEL, a los señores Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez Gutiérrez y George Petrie Miley Rojas, mientras que Juan Manuel Quesada Espinoza y la aquí actora Castro Mora, fueron objetados (hechos 8° y 9° de la demanda y su contestación afirmativa, y folios 1043 a 1071 del mismo legajo, Tomo IV); ----- 9°) que mediante oficio SD-70-08-09 de 12 de diciembre de 2008, la Secretaría del Directorio de la AL, comunicó al Regulador General de ARESEP, el resultado de la sesión relacionada en el hecho que antecede (hecho 9° de la demanda y su contestación, y folio 1073 del mismo legajo y Tomo); ----- 10°) que la AL en sesión extraordinaria #33, celebrada el 19 de diciembre de 2008, no objetó el nombramiento de Maryleana Méndez Jiménez, por un plazo de tres años, y de Walter Herrera Cantillo, suplente, por un plazo de cinco años (hecho 15° del escrito de demanda y contestación y folio 1109 del Tomo IV del mismo legajo), y ----- 11°) que los acuerdos de nombramiento de la AL, relacionados en los anteriores hechos 7° y 9°, fueron publicados en la Gaceta # 26 de 6 de febrero de 2009 (hecho 10° del escrito de demanda y su contestación).

Cuarto: Breve referencia al objeto del proceso y a los alegatos planteados por ambas partes. Que el objeto de la pretensión deducida en la demanda, ajustada y reformulada en la audiencia preliminar, es para que se declare la nulidad del acto de objeción al nombramiento de la actora, en el Consejo de SUTEL, adoptado por la AL en sesión extraordinaria #029 de 12 de diciembre de 2008, y el acto de firmeza adoptado en sesión de 15 de diciembre siguiente, por extemporáneo, según el artículo 61 de la Ley #7395, reformado por Ley #8660, así como la nulidad de los actos previos y conexos, como los realizados el 9, 10 y 15 de diciembre. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, pide declarar que procedía la ratificación de dicho nombramiento, como forma de restitución, indemnización o reparación de la actora, en atención a su condición de figura pública, sin necesidad de disponer la reinstalación por imposibilidad de cumplimiento, debiendo en su lugar reconocerse los daños y perjuicios. Subsidiariamente reclama que se convierta el acto de ratificación en una indemnización de daños y perjuicios. El Estado en sus conclusiones orales, además de ratificar su contestación escrita, expresó que el acto de ARESEP no configura derecho a favor de la actora, pues lo que genera es una expectativa; que los actos de la AL adoptados en sesiones del 9, 10 y 12 de diciembre de 2008, forman parte de la facultad de autoregulación que tiene, tal cual lo entendió Sala Constitucional en sentencia #2005-7961. Los co-demandados señalaron en sus conclusiones orales que el acto de ratificación se produjo en tiempo y forma; la manifestación de la AL se dio el 12 de diciembre de 2008; que la nulidad invocada, los vicios no son de carácter substancial, debiendo aplicarse el principio de conservación del acto; que la pretensión numerada dos, es de objeto imposible, pues Méndez Jiménez hoy goza de nombramiento en el cargo por otro [nuevo] concurso y no por el impugnado, habiendo dejado el periodo inicial. En el caso de Herrera Cantillo, su nombramiento fue como suplente por cinco años, siendo evidente que la actora reclama el cargo de propietario y no de suplente; de modo que respecto de este, no hay legitimación, lo mismo que de Méndez Jiménez, pero en cuanto a ésta, tampoco hay interés actual.

Quinto: Sobre la legitimación pasiva de MENDEZ JIMENEZ y HERRERA CANTILLO. Que, como primera cuestión de fondo planteada, conviene examinar la legitimación de los codemandados, pues si esta no se configura, no tendría utilidad referirse a los demás presupuestos substanciales (Cfr. Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia #775-F-03 de 14.25 horas de 20 de noviembre del 2003).

1.- De acuerdo con el artículo 12 CPCA, “se considerará” parte demandada, entre otros, a “las personas físicas o jurídicas que hayan derivado derechos e intereses legítimos de la conducta administrativa objeto de proceso” (inciso 3°). La pregunta evidente es ¿cuál es la conducta objeto de este proceso? Obviamente el acto de objeción adoptado en sesión extraordinaria de la AL, #29 de 12 de diciembre de 2008, respecto del nombramiento de la actora, en el Consejo de SUTEL, realizado por Junta Directiva de ARESEP. Según la ley, cuando se produce ese acto negativo “la Junta Directiva sustituirá al miembro del Consejo objetado y el nuevo designado será objeto del mismo procedimiento” (artículo 61 ya citado). La nueva proposición recayó en MENDEZ JIMENEZ y HERRERA CANTILLO quienes no fueron objetados en sesión extraordinaria #33, celebrada el 19 de diciembre de 2008. El Tribunal aprecia que aún cuando este acto no se impugna directamente en la demanda, sí se hace vía nulidad por conexidad, pues es claro que si la pretensión de nulidad y reinstalación, fuere procedente, la remoción de éste, sería una consecuencia necesaria, como forma de satisfacción in natura. De modo que en ese sentido no llevan razón los co-demandados en su alegato.

2.- Pero existe otra razón que sí hace admisible dicho alegato de defensa y que está ínsita en este, la cual paradógicamente fue puesta de relieve por la parte actora durante la audiencia preliminar del 28 de agosto de 2013. En esta oportunidad se reformuló y precisó la pretensión de reinstalación, en términos tales que hacen verdaderamente inane, inútil, innecesaria la integración de MENDEZ JIMENEZ y HERRERA CANTILLO. Aún cuando la parte actora reclama la nulidad del acto de objeción y como consecuencia de esta, pide la restitución en el puesto respectivo, es lo que cierto que expresó y aclaró que en definitiva no pretende la reinstalación efectiva. Es decir, la actora no desea ejercer el puesto en SUTEL; el sentido de su planteamiento es que se declare que, al ser nulo el acto, ella quedó legal y automáticamente ratificada. Dicho en otro giro: que al producirse el acto de objeción en forma extemporánea, esto es, fuera del plazo legal establecido, ha de tenerse por literalmente inexistente y, en consecuencia, se declare que su nombramiento alcanzó firmeza, se consolidó por el transcurso del tiempo. En esa idea, el proceso puede seguirse con prescindencia de aquellas personas que, como los co-demandados, derivan derechos del acto objeto del proceso, pues la parte actora no desea ejercer el puesto; de suerte que una sentencia estimatoria, sería ejecutable, dado que, en su lugar optó por convertir el derecho al puesto y su ejercicio, en una indemnización por daños y perjuicios. Puestas las cosas de esa manera, se tiene que el derecho de defensa de esas personas, no sufre merma alguna, dado que en definitiva, no se verían afectadas por una decisión cuya ejecución no alcanzaría sus legítimos derechos e intereses. Por ende, no se vería afectada la garantía de efectividad de los derechos, proclamada incluso en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas (artículo 55, inciso 3]), suscrita el 26 de junio de 1945, en la ciudad de San Francisco, Estados Unidos de América, aprobada por Costa Rica mediante Ley #142 de 06 de agosto de 1945 que entró en vigencia el 29 de septiembre de 1945, y en nuestra CP (artículos 41, 49, 140.9 y 153), pues la pretensión de la actora tiene otra orientación, como es el resarcimiento de daños y perjuicios, en lugar de la reinstalación cabal.

3.- En consecuencia, aún cuando los co-demandados deriven derechos de la conducta impugnada en este proceso, por el sentido y alcances que la parte actora le dio a su pretensión, la situación jurídica establecida de aquellos, no se vería afectada con una eventual sentencia estimatoria, debiendo por tanto declararse la falta de legitimación pasiva planteada, no así la falta de interés actual.

Sexto: Sobre el fondo del caso . Que, la parte actora cuestiona y disputa el acto de objeción a su nombramiento, vertido por el pleno de la AL, en sesión celebrada el 12 de diciembre de 2008.

1.- La primera cuestión que cabe plantearse es la naturaleza jurídica de ese plazo; si es ordenatorio o perentorio. ¿Qué sucede si el acto no se produce dentro del plazo legal establecido, o bien si se produce fuera de dicho plazo? ¿Qué ocurre si del todo no se produce, o si es parcial? En primer término el Tribunal aprecia que la norma reguladora, es expresa en el sentido que es un plazo de 30 días “para objetar los nombramientos”. Como es igualmente clara en punto a que “si en ese lapso no se produjere objeción, se tendrán por ratificados”. Es evidente pues que se está en presencia de un plazo perentorio, preclusivo, de caducidad. La norma reconoce una competencia de hacer y establece una consecuencia en su omisión. Si la AL no acuerda la objeción dentro del plazo conferido, caduca la oportunidad para ejercer su potestad contralora, y aquel queda firme; se tiene por ratificado por haber transcurrido el plazo legal para su objeción. Como lo expresa la doctrina a propósito de la caducidad: "la pretensión a cuyo ejercicio se prefija un término, nace originariamente con esta limitación de tiempo, de modo que no puede ser hecha valer cuando haya transcurrido" (Roberto Ruggiero, Instituciones de Derecho Civil, traducido de la cuarta edición italiana por Ramón Serrano Sureño y José Santacruz Teijeiro, Editorial Reus, S.A, Madrid, España, 1929, citado en la sentencia de Sala Constitucional #2000-00878 de 16.12 horas de 26 de enero de 2000, considerando III). El beneficio que se deriva del oportuno ejercicio de esa competencia, es la objeción y por tanto, la privación de firmeza y conformación del acto de nombramiento. Si no se actúa con oportunidad y celeridad, se pierde y extingue el beneficio que habría significado intervenir. Esto es así porque existe un interés general en que los órganos y las instituciones actúen (en este caso, SUTEL, ARESEP), satisfaciendo los derechos de los usuarios implicados. Pero también existe un derecho de la persona nombrada por la Junta Directiva de ARESEP a que se defina su situación. Todo lo cual justifica el plazo fatal preestablecido.

2.- La segunda cuestión a definir es si la AL hizo uso o no de esa función contralora, dentro del plazo conferido. Se ha tenido por cierto que el 13 de noviembre de 2008, ARESEP presentó a la AL, la nómina de nombramientos; de modo que el plazo de 30 días vencía el 13 de diciembre de 2008. El acto negativo o de objeción, se adoptó el viernes 12 de diciembre, es decir, un día antes de su vencimiento. De acuerdo con la norma que regula la materia, la AL “dispondrá de un plazo de 30 días para objetar los nombramientos”. De suerte que la AL con su accionar, se ajustó a la norma aplicable. La comunicación inmediata a ARESEP, según oficio SD-70-08-09, es connatural al acto de nombramiento y objeción parcial, pues de él se derivan consecuencias importantísimas, especialmente negativas, como es la substitución de la persona objetada, en aras de integrar debidamente al órgano.

3.- En cuanto a los errores y vicios que se denuncian relativos al envío de los expedientes a la Comisión de Nombramientos, a la reducción de un plazo de ocho días a veinticuatro horas, a la convocatoria realizada el 10 de diciembre, para sesión extraordinaria del viernes 12 de diciembre, a la firmeza del acto de convocatoria, la cual por uso y costumbre legislativa se da con la aprobación del acta, lo que en el caso se dio hasta la sesión del lunes 15 de diciembre, cabe señalar lo siguiente: Por disposición constitucional, la AL no podrá sesionar sin la concurrencia de dos tercios del total de sus miembros. Si “en el día señalado” fuere imposible iniciar la sesión, o si abiertas, no pudieren continuarse por falta de quórum, los miembros presentes conminarán a los ausentes, bajo las sanciones que establece el Reglamento, para que concurran, y la AL abrirá o continuará las sesiones cuando se reúna el número requerido (artículo 117 CP). Existe una obligación de señalar o calendarizar el día en que se efectuará la sesión, excluido el supuesto del primero de mayo, dado que por CP ese día hay sesión aún cuando no haya convocatoria. Esa obligación se funda en razones operativas y de orden, básicas en un órgano complejo, compuesto por cincuenta y siete Diputados (as) que representan a distintas regiones y sectores de la sociedad costarricense. Lo que tiene que ver con cuándo, cómo, dónde sesionar o plazos, etc., es materia reservada al Reglamento legislativo (RAL).

3.1 En cuanto al envío del caso en cuestión, a la Comisión de Nombramientos, sin ser esto materia de ese género, hay que decir que el RAL le atribuye esa competencia a la Presidencia. De modo que no es un acto fruto de la voluntad desnuda de la Presidencia, sino ejercicio de una atribución reglamentaria (artículo 27.3).

3.2 En cuanto a la aducida reducción de un plazo de ocho días, a veinticuatro horas, para entregar y tramitar informes, con infracción de los numerales 81 y 82 RAL, hay que señalar que tal cosa constituye el ejercicio de un poder de dirección de la discusión, previsto en el artículo 27.4 ibídem, en la idea de hacer efectivo el ejercicio de la potestad legalmente conferida al pleno para objetar los nombramientos implicados. Es una forma de ordenar y acelerar el funcionamiento de la AL, una oportunidad para rendir el informe, y no la privación del derecho que tienen las minorías a pronunciarse, a que se conozca en el pleno su punto de vista disidente. De privarse a la Presidencia de esos poderes ordenatorios y directivos, podría hacerse nugatorio el derecho de las mayorías a pronunciarse en la oportunidad legalmente establecida, sobre determinados asuntos.

3.3 El Tribunal también descarta el vicio aducido consistente en la alteración del procedimiento legislativo, al conocerse y votarse la moción presentada para convocar a sesión extraordinaria, en un día y hora previsto en el RAL para asuntos constitucionales, y no para casos como el que aquí se discute. Al proceder de esa manera la AL no ha hecho más que ejercer su poder soberano de convocatoria a sesionar [sesión extraordinaria], constitucionalmente establecido, en la oportunidad que estimó conveniente, según la dinámica parlamentaria y las necesidades del asunto a tratar. El artículo 32 RAL, relativo al horario de sesiones del plenario, lo que establece es una regla de orden que procura garantizarles un espacio fijo en la agenda legislativa a “los asuntos comprendidos en el artículo 195 de la Constitución Política” en atención a su elevada importancia, pero no excluye que también se traten otros asuntos si las necesidades y cargas de trabajo lo ameritan; eso está dentro del margen de apreciación operativa que tiene la AL.

3.4 Finalmente y por lo que se refiere a la falta de firmeza del acto, con desaplicación de un uso y costumbre legislativo, hay que señalar que en derecho la aprobación de un acta no envuelve un problema de validez del acto; es una cuestión de orden, relativa a la documentación y registro de la voluntad expresada o manifestada; es una discusión análoga a la de la sentencia como acto y como documento, donde la ausencia de este, no implica la inexistencia de aquella. De modo que la firmeza no hace a la esencia del acto, y por tanto, no sería obstáculo para emprender su ejecución inmediata.

Séptimo: Sobre el libre acceso a los cargos públicos. Que, en la demanda y en las conclusiones orales, se hizo referencia a la libertad de elegir el trabajo y acceder a los cargos públicos, vía concurso público de antecedentes. Se sugiere que el acto cuestionado, violó este derecho reconocido tanto en la Constitución como en la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.

1.- Ciertamente la selección de los miembros del Consejo de SUTEL se hace a base de <idoneidad comprobada>, mediante concurso público de antecedentes. Esto responde a la previsión constitucional (artículos 191 y 192 CP), relativa al libre acceso a los cargos públicos en condiciones de igualdad. Se apostó por el concurso como el mejor instrumento para obtener las ofertas de las mejores personas que habrán de hacer efectivas las aspiraciones que tuvo el legislador en esta materia. De modo que en su aplicación deben observarse las normas y principios que lo gobiernan. En este caso el procedimiento señala que una vez finalizado el concurso, corresponde a la Junta Directiva de ARESEP nombrar los miembros titulares y el suplente de dicho Consejo, por mayoría de al menos cuatro votos, por períodos fijos; el ejercicio del cargo es a tiempo completo y con dedicación exclusiva, con opción de reelección por una sola vez. También se establece que, producido el acto de selección y nombramiento, debe enviarse los expedientes a la AL, para que esta manifieste si lo objeta, total o parcialmente. Si la objeción no se produce dentro del plazo de 30 días siguientes, se tendrá por ratificado el nombramiento. Lo anterior demuestra que estamos en presencia de un procedimiento reforzado de nombramiento, y que el acto de nombramiento del o los miembros del Consejo de SUTEL, es un acto de formación y contenido complejo, integrado por dos voluntades, cada una de distinto sujeto. Para su consolidación y formación, requiere recabar además un acto negativo que le dará firmeza y eficacia. Pero no es cualquier acto el que consolida el nombramiento; es un acto del parlamento. Aquí rige lo que expresó Sala Constitucional en su sentencia #2001-11943:

“VI . … Nótese que el procedimiento previsto en la Ley para el nombramiento de los miembros de la Junta Directiva de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos es sencillo, en tanto es el Consejo de Gobierno quien hace la designación, y a la Asamblea Legislativa le corresponde -únicamente- verificar un control eminentemente político al respecto, en tanto se le confiere un plazo de treinta días para realizar cualquier objeción a dicha designación, caso contrario, se tendrá el mismo se tendrá por ratificado. La Asamblea Legislativa efectúa una labor meramente contralora (o fiscalizadora) en relación con los este tipo de nombramientos, función que en todo caso, no debe ser considerada ni administrativa ni legislativa, bajo ningún concepto, y que actúa únicamente a modo de condicionante de eficacia jurídica de este tipo de designaciones. La doctrina en esta materia ha entendido que la aprobación representa una declaración fundada en valoraciones sobre el mérito, oportunidad, utilidad y legalidad del acto sometido a su conocimiento; de donde se constata que el sujeto que aprueba no coopera a la formación del acto sometido a la aprobación, únicamente declara que el acto sometido a su examen es útil y oportuno, para tener así por realizada la condición de la cual la ley hace depender la eficacia del acto. Es decir, que la actuación legislativa en esta materia actúa como condicionante de eficacia jurídica de este tipo de nombramientos, en tanto el mismo no queda completo ni produce efectos naturales hasta tanto no sobreviene esta aprobación, la cual se entiende que se da, si pasado el plazo fijado en la ley, los diputados no han realizado objeción alguna.”.

2.- De modo que si ese acto negativo, de objeción y rechazo, no se produce oportunamente, se tendrá por ratificado el nombramiento. Si se produce, el nombramiento queda sin efecto, debiendo substituirse a la persona objetada y el nuevo designado será objeto del mismo procedimiento. Mientras se desarrolla esta segunda fase del procedimiento ante la AL, el acto objeto de control, es ineficaz, incompleto e incapaz de producir efectos en el terreno de los hechos, de la realidad, y la persona nombrada se mantiene expectante a lo que ocurra en el seno del parlamento. La aducida infracción al libre acceso a los cargos públicos, no aparece violada en este caso. Desde luego que ésta lo que da derecho es a acceder sin discriminación y en igualdad de condiciones, en un procedimiento transparente, objetivo e imparcial, pero no asegura el nombramiento, ni garantiza la selección por Junta Directiva de ARESEP. Es decir, no hay un derecho al nombramiento derivado del libre acceso a los cargos públicos.

Octavo: Conclusiones y excepciones . Que en armonía con lo que viene expuesto, el Tribunal descarta los quebrantos y violaciones aducidos en estos autos, como causales de invalidez del acto impugnado. En primer término se trata de cuestiones de orden, producto del ejercicio de poderes de dirección, propios de la Presidencia, explicitados en la idea de hacer efectivo el ejercicio de una potestad legalmente conferida, sin que en ese proceder, se adviertan lesiones a normas o principios substantivos, establecidos en favor de las minorías; de hecho aquí no se invocan cuestiones de este género. En segundo lugar la objeción al nombramiento de la aquí actora, se produjo dentro del plazo establecido en el artículo 61 de la Ley #7593, reformado por Ley #8660, en una sesión legalmente convocada, según poderes y deberes constitucionalmente reconocidos, siendo su comunicación, la consecuencia natural e inmediata siguiente, a efectos de su cabal ejecución, sin que a esos efectos sea requisito sine qua non la aducida firmeza. En consecuencia, debe aceptarse la excepción de falta de derecho opuesta por el Estado, lo que tiene como efecto y produce por resultado la desestimación de la demanda en todos sus extremos, dado que el nombramiento de la actora, no llegó a consolidarse, al haberse objetado por la AL dentro del plazo legal. En cuanto a los co-demandados MENDEZ JIMENEZ y HERRERA CANTILLO, debe declararse una falta de legitimación pasiva, en atención a la reformulación de la pretensión que convierte en inane su inserción procesal. Desde luego que la pretensión subsidiaria corre igual suerte; su pertinencia está subordinada a la nulidad y ratificación pretendidas como cosa principal, pero al no prosperar ésta, aquella cae por propio peso.”