Nullity of competition due to unconstitutional regulation and reinstatement of interim workersNulidad de concurso por inconstitucionalidad del reglamento y reinstalación de interinas

**IV.- NULLITY OF THE CONTEST (CONCURSO).** Of the claims that have not been analyzed, the first is the request for the nullity of the contest (concurso). Article 11 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP) contains the principle of legality, which states: *“1. The Public Administration shall act subject to the legal system and may only perform those acts or provide those services authorized by said system, according to the hierarchical scale of its sources. 2. An act expressly regulated by a written norm shall be considered authorized, at least as to its motive or content, even if in an imprecise manner.”* For its part, Article 13 states: *“1. The Administration shall be subject, in general, to all written and unwritten norms of the administrative system, and to the private law supplementary thereto, without being able to repeal them or disapply them for specific cases. 2. The preceding rule shall also apply in relation to regulations (reglamentos), whether they originate from the same authority, or from another competent higher or lower authority”* (emphasis added). In turn, Article 128 mentions that an administrative act (acto administrativo) is valid if it is substantially in accordance with the legal system, including as to the motive of the official who issues it. Thus, from the reading of all these articles, it is clearly inferred that any action by the Public Administration must be duly based on the legal system, that is, on current legal norms. In this case, the contest (concurso) that was published, as a result of which the plaintiffs' contract was not renewed, was based on the Regulation (Reglamento) that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) annulled for unconstitutionality. A natural consequence of this is the loss of validity, and therefore, it becomes null because it is not in accordance with the legal system. It must be taken into account that said declaration of unconstitutionality had declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the annulled norms, so that an action such as the contest (concurso), covered by executive decree (decreto ejecutivo) No. 24782-MEP, was left without basis even though the norm was in force at the time of publishing it. In this same sense, it must be taken into account that among the objective elements of the administrative act (acto administrativo) are the purpose (fin), the content (contenido), and the motive (motivo) (Articles 131, 132, and 133 of the LGAP). As for the content (contenido) of the act, Article 132 establishes that it must be lawful, possible, clear, precise, encompass all factual and legal situations arising from the motive (motivo), proportionate to the legal purpose (fin), and correspond to the motive (motivo). For its part, Article 133 indicates that the motive (motivo) must be legitimate, which brings as a logical consequence that the contest (concurso), by not meeting the requirements of a motive (motivo) and a content (contenido) adhering to the current norm, is null and must be declared so.

**V.- ON REINSTATEMENT (REINSTALACIÓN) AND BACK PAY (SALARIOS CAÍDOS).** Now, as a consequence of the annulment of the contest (concurso), it is necessary to resolve on the reinstatement (reinstalación) and back pay (salarios caídos). This Chamber has reiterated in its case law, also in line with constitutional pronouncements, that Title XV of the Political Constitution had as its objective the creation of a special regime to regulate relations between the State and public officials (funcionarios públicos), whom Article 192 endowed with stability, in order to guarantee the efficiency of the administration through the appointment of suitable officials. The norm states: *“With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed based on proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed by labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof.”* From this follows the selection of the serving persons by their capacity and merit, as a guarantee of proper functioning, as well as the existence of the stability that accompanies that condition. This eliminates the possibility of removing them arbitrarily or unjustifiably. Now, there is a difference between officials in a permanent position (funcionarios en propiedad), that is, those who were selected based on their suitability, and those who are in a condition of interim workers (interinos). National doctrine has said that this figure*“…arises when there is no servant to automatically occupy the vacant position or provide the service, upon the absence of the regular servant. Given the origin of the interim worker (interino), the same is necessarily a temporary servant and subject to a term, upon expiration of which he automatically ceases in his position or becomes regular”* (Eduardo Ortiz, Ortiz, Tesis de Derecho Administrativo II, First Edition, Editorial Stradtmann, San José, Costa Rica, 2000, pages 121 and 122). Thus, the person who is in a position on an interim (interina) basis is aware that their job stability is momentary, since they have not undergone the respective contest (concurso) that accredits them as the suitable person to occupy the position. For this reason, Article 5, subsection e of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) excludes this type of workers from its regulation. Now, even though they do not enjoy the stability that an official in a permanent position (propiedad) has, it has been said that they have an improper job stability that nonetheless protects them from being removed capriciously, without basis in an objective cause for it. In this regard, this Chamber has said: *“In this way, a series of guarantees have been delineated in favor of the interim servant (servidor interino) to limit the abuses that can arise from the precarious nature of their appointment. In that sense, it has been established that when the interim worker's (interino) relationship has exceeded one year, all the rights that would correspond to the servant appointed in a permanent position (servidor nombrado en propiedad) arise in their favor, except that of stability. In this regard, in the cited resolution number 5025-93 (of the Constitutional Chamber), it was stated: ‘It should be added, that in any case of interim service (interinazgo), whether in a vacant post or not, after one year from the start of the labor relationship, even though the right to the post is not acquired, the same rights as the permanent owners (propietarios) must be recognized, in accordance with the regulations that the Labor Code makes for indefinite-term contracts.’ (In the same sense, the judgments of this Chamber may also be consulted, numbers 207, at 4:00 p.m. on July 21, 1994; 234, at 3:20 p.m. on July 26, 1995; 8, at 10:10 a.m. on January 14; 283, at 10:20 a.m. on November 25; both from 1998; 154, at 10:00 a.m. on June 9, 1999; 35, at 2:50 p.m. on January 12; 587, at 9:40 a.m. on September 28, both from 2001; 46, at 10:20 a.m. on February 8; 78, at 11:20 a.m. on February 27, 100, at 2:30 p.m. on March 13; and, 339, at 10:00 a.m. on July 5, these last ones from 2002. (…) Consequently, the removal of the interim servant (servidor interino) is appropriate if any of the legal causes for removal are present, following the fulfillment of due process, such as the appointment of a servant in a permanent position (servidor en propiedad), or, by the return of the permanent holder, in the case of substitutions.”* (Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote No. 291-11 at 10:15 a.m. on April 1, 2011). In this manner, in this specific case, once the nullity of the contest (concurso) has been declared, the cause for separation of the female employees becomes unsubstantiated since there was no objective cause for not extending their appointment. For this reason, it is necessary to order the reinstatement (reinstalación) of the female workers in the positions from which they were unjustifiably removed, and as a consequence of this, the payment of back pay (salarios caídos) must also be granted to them. Now, because so much time has passed (more than eight years) since the moment they were removed from the position, this must be dimensioned because the current situation of the posts where they should be reinstated is unknown, taking into account that their return to such posts would equally be in a condition of interim service (interinazgo) and in no way would signify lifetime tenure (inamovilidad) comparable to that of officials in a permanent position (funcionarios en propiedad). Therefore, the reinstatement (reinstalación) would not be appropriate in the event that a person appointed in a permanent position (propiedad) already existed in such posts, so that the payment of back pay (salarios caídos) would be from February 1, 2005, until the date on which the official occupying the position in a permanent position (propiedad) was appointed. This is by virtue of the fact that officials in a permanent position (propiedad) could not be removed from their posts, as they are suitable servants to occupy the posts and have undergone a valid contest (concurso) to be there. Given that the reinstatement (reinstalación) and the payment of back pay (salarios caídos) are granted to restore to its previous state a situation that has been harmed as a consequence of an illegitimate action by the Administration, if the female workers had continued working for the same employer, in this case the MEP or the UCR, they would not have suffered the harm of being deprived of work due to the separation from their posts at the Escuela Laboratorio. In such a case, the payment of back pay (salarios caídos) would be from February 1, 2005, until the date on which they had returned to work for the same employer, in order to avoid a double payment and, consequently, an illicit enrichment on their part. In the event that the female workers are at this moment appointed in a permanent position (propiedad) with the State or the University in some other post, the reinstatement (reinstalación) would not be appropriate as it would be generating again the instability that is intended to be combated through the reinstatement (reinstalación), since the return to the posts in the Escuela Laboratorio, in any case, would be in a condition of interim service (interinazgo).” **IV.- NULLITY OF THE COMPETITION.** Among the claims that have not yet been analyzed, the first is the request for nullity of the competition. Article 11 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP) contains the principle of legality, which states: *“1. The Public Administration shall act subject to the legal system and may only perform those acts or provide those services authorized by said system, according to the hierarchical scale of its sources. 2. An act expressly regulated by written law shall be considered authorized, at least as to its motive or content, even if in an imprecise form.”* For its part, Article 13 states: *“1. The Administration shall be subject, in general, to all written and unwritten norms of the administrative system, and to the supplementary private law thereof, without being able to derogate them or disapply them for specific cases. 2. The preceding rule shall also apply in relation to regulations, whether they come from the same authority, or from another higher or lower competent authority”* (emphasis added). In turn, Article 128 mentions that an administrative act is valid if it is substantially consistent with the legal system, even with regard to the motive of the public official issuing it. Thus, a reading of all these articles shows clearly that any action by the Public Administration must be duly grounded in the legal system, that is, in current legal norms. In this case, the competition that was published, by reason of which the plaintiffs' contracts were not renewed, was grounded in the Regulation that the Sala Constitucional annulled as unconstitutional. A natural consequence of this is the loss of validity, and therefore, it becomes null for not being in conformity with the legal system. It must be taken into account that said declaration of unconstitutionality had declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the annulled norms, so that an action such as the competition, based on Decreto Ejecutivo nº 24782-MEP, was left without foundation even though the norm was in force at the time it was published. In this same vein, it must be kept in mind that among the objective elements of the administrative act are the purpose, the content, and the motive (Articles 131, 132, and 133 of the LGAP). Regarding the content of the act, Article 132 establishes that it must be lawful, possible, clear, precise, encompassing all factual and legal situations arising from the motive, proportionate to the legal purpose, and corresponding to the motive. For its part, Article 133 indicates that the motive must be legitimate, the logical consequence of which is that the competition, by not meeting the requirements of a motive and content consistent with the current norm, is null and must be declared so.

**V.- ON REINSTATEMENT AND BACK PAY (SALARIOS CAÍDOS).** Now, as a consequence of the annulment of the competition, it is appropriate to rule on reinstatement and back pay (salarios caídos). This Chamber has reiterated in its case law, also in harmony with constitutional pronouncements, that Title XV of the Constitución Política had as its objective the creation of a special regime to regulate relations between the State and public officials, whom Article 192 endowed with stability, with the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration through the appointment of suitable officials. The norm states: *“With the exceptions that this Constitución and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed based on proven suitability and may only be dismissed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof.”* From this, the selection of officials based on their ability and merit follows, as a guarantee of proper functioning, as well as the existence of the stability that accompanies that condition. This eliminates the possibility of removing them arbitrarily or unjustifiably. Now, there is a difference between permanent officials, that is, those who were selected based on their suitability, and those who are in a condition of interim appointment. National legal doctrine has said that this figure “...*arises when there is no servant who automatically occupies the vacant post or provides the service, upon the regular servant’s absence. Given the origin of the interim servant, they are necessarily temporary and subject to a term, upon the expiration of which they automatically cease in their position or become regular*” (Eduardo Ortiz, Ortiz, Tesis de Derecho Administrativo II, Primera Edición, Editorial Stradtmann, San José, Costa Rica, 2000, páginas 121 y 122). Thus, a person holding a position on an interim basis is aware that their employment stability is temporary, since they have not passed through the respective competition that accredits them as the suitable person to occupy the position. For this reason, Article 5, subsection e) of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) excludes this type of worker from its regulation. Now, even though they do not enjoy the stability that a permanent official has, it has been said that they have a type of improper employment stability that equally protects them from being dismissed arbitrarily, without a basis in an objective cause. In this regard, this Chamber has stated: *“In this way, a series of guarantees in favor of the interim servant have been outlined to limit the abuses that may arise from the precarious nature of their appointment. In that sense, it has been established that when the interim relationship has lasted more than one year, all the rights that would correspond to a permanently appointed servant arise in their favor, except that of stability. In this regard, in the cited resolution number 5025-93 (from the Sala Constitucional), it was indicated: ‘It should be added that in any case of interim appointment, whether in a vacant position or not, after one year from the start of the employment relationship, even though a right to the position is not acquired, they must be recognized the same rights as permanent employees, in accordance with the regulations regarding indefinite-term contracts set forth in the Labor Code.’ (In the same sense, consult also the judgments of this Chamber, numbers 207, of 4:00 p.m. on July 21, 1994; 234, of 3:20 p.m. on July 26, 1995; 8, of 10:10 a.m. on January 14; 283, of 10:20 a.m. on November 25; both from 1998; 154, of 10:00 a.m. on June 9, 1999; 35, of 2:50 p.m. on January 12; 587, of 9:40 a.m. on September 28, both from 2001; 46, of 10:20 a.m. on February 8; 78, of 11:20 a.m. on February 27, 100, of 2:30 p.m. on March 13; and, 339, of 10:00 a.m. on July 5, these last ones from 2002. (...) Consequently, the removal of the interim servant is appropriate if it is based on any of the legal grounds for removal, prior fulfillment of due process, such as the appointment of a permanent servant, or, the return of the permanent holder, in the case of substitute appointments.”* (Segunda Chamber of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, vote nº 291-11 of 10:15 a.m. on April 1, 2011). In this way, in the specific case, once the nullity of the competition is declared, the cause for the female officials’ separation becomes without effect, as no objective cause existed for not extending their appointment. Therefore, it is necessary to order the reinstatement of the female workers in the positions from which they were unjustifiably removed and, as a consequence of this, the payment of back pay (salarios caídos) must also be granted. Now, because so much time has passed (more than eight years) since the moment they were removed from their positions, this must be measured, given that the current situation of the posts where they should be reinstated is unknown, taking into account that their return to such posts would equally be in an interim capacity and would in no way signify lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad) comparable to that of permanent officials. Therefore, reinstatement would not be appropriate in the event that a permanently appointed person already existed in such posts, so the payment of back pay (salarios caídos) would be from February 1, 2005, until the date on which the official occupying the permanent post was appointed. This by virtue of the fact that permanent officials cannot be removed from their posts, as they are suitable servants to occupy the positions and have passed through a valid competition to be there. Given that reinstatement and the payment of back pay (salarios caídos) is granted to restore to its previous state a situation that has been harmed as a consequence of an illegitimate action by the Administration, in the event that the female workers had continued working for the same employer, in this case the MEP or the UCR, they would not have suffered the injury of being deprived of work due to their separation from their posts at the Escuela Laboratorio. In such a scenario, the payment of back pay (salarios caídos) would be from February 1, 2005, until the date on which they had returned to work for the same employer, in order to avoid double payment and, consequently, illicit enrichment on their part. In the event that the female workers are currently permanently appointed with the State or the University in some other post, reinstatement would not be appropriate insofar as it would generate anew the instability that reinstatement is intended to combat, since the return to the posts at the Escuela Laboratorio, in any case, would be in an interim capacity.

“IV.- NULIDAD DEL CONCURSO. De las pretensiones que no se han analizado, se tiene en primer lugar la solicitud de nulidad del concurso. El artículo 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP) contiene el principio de legalidad, el cual indica: “1. La Administración Pública actuará sometida al ordenamiento jurídico y sólo podrá realizar aquellos actos o prestar aquellos servicios que autorice dicho ordenamiento, según la escala jerárquica de sus fuentes. 2. Se considerará autorizado el acto regulado expresamente por norma escrita, al menos en cuanto a motivo o contenido, aunque sea en forma imprecisa”. Por su parte, el artículo 13 señala: “1. La Administración estará sujeta, en general, a todas las normas escritas y no escritas del ordenamiento administrativo, y al derecho privado supletorio del mismo, sin poder derogarlos ni desaplicarlos para casos concretos. 2. La regla anterior se aplicará también en relación con los reglamentos, sea que éstos provengan de la misma autoridad, sea que provengan de otra superior o inferior competente” (énfasis suplido). A su vez, el artículo 128 menciona que es válido el acto administrativo que sea sustancialmente conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico, incluso en cuanto al móvil del funcionario que lo dicta. Así, de la lectura de todos estos artículos se colige diáfanamente que cualquier actuación de la Administración Pública debe estar debidamente fundamentada en el ordenamiento, sea, en normas jurídicas vigentes. En este caso, el concurso que se publicó, en razón del cual no se renovó el contrato de las actoras, estaba fundamentado en el Reglamento que la Sala Constitucional anuló por inconstitucional. Una consecuencia natural de esto es la pérdida de validez y por lo tanto, deviene nulo por no resultar conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico. Debe tomarse en cuenta que la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad dicha, tuvo efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de las normas anuladas, de manera que una actuación como la del concurso, amparada en el decreto ejecutivo nº 24782-MEP, quedó sin fundamento aún cuando la norma estuviera vigente al momento de publicarlo. En este mismo sentido, debe tenerse en cuenta que dentro de los elementos objetivos del acto administrativo, se cuenta con el fin, el contenido y el motivo (artículos 131, 132 y 133 de la LGAP). En cuanto al contenido del acto, el artículo 132 establece que debe ser lícito, posible, claro, preciso, abarcar todas las situaciones de hecho y derecho surgidas del motivo, proporcionado al fin legal y correspondiente al motivo. Por su parte, el artículo 133 indica que el motivo debe ser legítimo, lo que trae como consecuencia lógica que el concurso, al no cumplir con los requisitos de un motivo y un contenido apegados a la norma vigente, sea nulo y así se debe declarar.

V.- SOBRE LA REINSTALACIÓN Y LOS SALARIOS CAÍDOS. Ahora bien, como consecuencia de la anulación del concurso, corresponde resolver sobre la reinstalación y los salarios caídos. Esta Sala ha reiterado en su jurisprudencia, en sintonía también con los pronunciamientos constitucionales, que el título XV de la Constitución Política, tuvo como objetivo la creación de un régimen especial que regulara las relaciones entre el Estado y los funcionarios públicos, a quienes en el artículo 192 dotó de estabilidad, con el fin de garantizar la eficiencia de la administración a través del nombramiento de funcionarios idóneos. Señala la norma: “Con las excepciones que esta Constitución y el estatuto de servicio civil determinen, los servidores públicos serán nombrados a base de idoneidad comprobada y sólo podrán ser removidos por las causales de despido justificado que exprese la legislación de trabajo, o en el caso de reducción forzosa de servicios, ya sea por falta de fondos o para conseguir una mejor organización de los mismos”. De ella se desprende la selección de las personas funcionarias por su capacidad y mérito, como garantía del buen funcionamiento, así como la existencia de la estabilidad que acompaña esa condición. Con ello se elimina la posibilidad de removerlas arbitraria o injustificadamente. Ahora bien, existe una diferencia entre los funcionarios en propiedad, es decir, que fueron seleccionados con base en su idoneidad, y aquellos que se encuentran en una condición de interinos. La doctrina nacional ha dicho que esta figura “…surge cuando no hay servidor que automáticamente ocupe el cargo vacante ni preste el servicio, al ocurrir la ausencia del servidor regular. Dado el origen del interino, el mismo es servidor necesariamente temporal y sujeto a plazo, expirado el cual cesa automáticamente en su cargo o se convierte en regular” (Eduardo Ortiz, Ortiz, Tesis de Derecho Administrativo II, Primera Edición, Editorial Stradtmann, San José, Costa Rica, 2000, páginas 121 y 122). Así, la persona que se encuentra en un puesto de manera interina, tiene conocimiento de que su estabilidad laboral es momentánea, pues no ha pasado por el respectivo concurso que la acredite como la persona idónea para ocupar el cargo. Por esto, el artículo 5 inciso e del Estatuto de Servicio Civil excluye a este tipo de trabajadores de su regulación. Ahora bien, aún cuando no goza de la estabilidad que tiene un funcionario en propiedad, se ha dicho que cuenta con una estabilidad laboral impropia que igualmente le protege de ser removido de manera antojadiza, sin fundamento en una causa objetiva para ello. Al respecto, ha dicho esta Sala: “De esa manera, se han ido delineando una serie de garantías a favor del servidor interino para limitar los abusos que pueden surgir a raíz de la naturaleza precaria de su nombramiento. En ese sentido, se ha establecido que cuando la relación del interino haya superado el año, surgen a su favor todos los derechos que le corresponderían al servidor nombrado en propiedad, salvo el de la estabilidad. Al respecto, en la citada resolución número 5025-93 (de la Sala Constitucional), se indicó: “Cabe añadir, que en todo caso de interinazgo, sea en plaza vacante o no, pasado un año desde el inicio de la relación laboral aún cuando no se adquiere derecho a la plaza deben reconocérsele los mismos derechos de los propietarios, de conformidad con las regulaciones que del contrato a tiempo indefinido hace el Código de Trabajo”. (En el mismo sentido, también pueden consultarse las sentencias de esta Sala, números 207, de las 16:00 horas del 21 de julio de 1994; 234, de las 15:20 horas del 26 de julio de 1995; 8, de las 10:10 horas del 14 de enero; 283, de las 10:20 horas del 25 de noviembre; ambas de 1998; 154, de las 10:00 horas del 9 de junio de 1999; 35, de las 14:50 horas del 12 de enero; 587, de las 9:40 horas del 28 de setiembre, ambas de 2001; 46, de las 10:20 horas del 8 de febrero; 78, de las 11:20 horas del 27 de febrero, 100, de las 14:30 horas del 13 de marzo; y, 339, de las 10:00 horas del 5 de julio, estas últimas de 2002. (…) En consecuencia, la remoción del servidor interino resulta procedente si media alguna de las causales legales de remoción, previo cumplimiento del debido proceso, tales como el nombramiento de un servidor en propiedad, o bien, por el regreso del titular, tratándose de suplencias”. (Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto nº 291-11 de las 10:15 horas del 1º de abril de 2011). De esta manera, en el caso concreto, una vez declarada la nulidad del concurso, la causa de separación de las funcionarias deviene insubsistente al no haber mediado una causa objetiva para no prorrogar su nombramiento. Por ello, es necesario ordenar la reinstalación de las trabajadoras en los puestos de los cuales fueron removidas injustificadamente y como consecuencia de esto, debe concedérseles también el pago de salarios caídos. Ahora bien, por haber pasado tanto tiempo (más de ocho años) desde el momento en el que fueron removidas del cargo, esto debe ser dimensionado por cuanto se desconoce la situación actual de las plazas donde deberían ser reinstaladas, tomando en cuenta que su regreso a tales puestos sería igualmente en condición de interinazgo y de ninguna manera significaría inamovilidad equiparada a la de los funcionarios en propiedad. Por ende, la reinstalación no procedería en caso de que ya existiera una persona nombrada en propiedad en tales plazas, de forma que el pago de salarios caídos sería desde el 1º de febrero de 2005 y hasta la fecha en la que se nombró al funcionario que ocupe el puesto en propiedad. Esto en virtud de que no podría removerse a funcionarios en propiedad de sus puestos, por ser servidores idóneos para ocupar las plazas y haber pasado por un concurso válido para estar allí. Dado que la reinstalación y el pago de salarios caídos se da para restaurar a su estado anterior una situación que ha sido lesionada como consecuencia de una actuación ilegítima de la Administración, en caso de que las trabajadoras hubieran seguido trabajando para el mismo patrono, en este caso el MEP o la UCR, no habrían sufrido el perjuicio de verse privadas de trabajo por la separación de sus puestos en la Escuela Laboratorio. En tal supuesto, el pago de salarios caídos sería del 1º de febrero de 2005 hasta la fecha en la que hubieran vuelto a trabajar para el mismo patrono, con el fin de evitar un doble pago y por consiguiente, un enriquecimiento ilícito de su parte. En caso de que las trabajadoras se encuentren en estos momentos nombradas en propiedad con el Estado o la Universidad en algún otro puesto, la reinstalación no sería procedente en el tanto estaría generando nuevamente la inestabilidad que se intenta combatir a través de la reinstalación, ya que el regreso a los puestos en la Escuela Laboratorio, en cualquier caso, sería en condición de interinazgo.”