No compensation for termination of notary irregularly contracted by INSImprocedencia de indemnización por cese de notaria contratada irregularmente por el INS

VI.- Based on the transcriptions made, for this Chamber, it is necessary to first decipher whether, in reality, the relationship that INS maintained with the plaintiff constitutes an irregular contracting (contratación irregular). The foregoing is fundamental in light of the appellant's grievance. Note that it was through official communication no. PE-91-987, of October 29, 1991, that the Executive President and the General Manager of INS requested the Head of the Credit Department of that entity to include Licenciada Vincenzi Guilá on the list of external notaries who would provide their services to the institution (folio 150 of the judicial file). The existence of a competitive selection process (procedimiento de concurso) to make that choice is not evident. For these purposes, it must be made clear that even though the LCA was not in force, the contracting had to be carried out in accordance with the Constitution and the administrative legal system in force at that time. Therefore, it is stated from the outset that the alleged provisions of the Civil Code would only serve to complement the administrative legal system in case of any gap; however, as will be seen, the existing public law provisions were sufficient to understand the process that INS had to carry out to contract the services of the notary. In this regard, it is true that Law 7494 did not yet exist, but the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic, no. 1279 and its amendments were in force, currently repealed by the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, no. 8131. Thus, to the extent applicable, the rules established therein had to be respected (included through the 1976 amendment via Law 5901), regarding the acquisition of goods and services, especially concerning the requirement of a public bidding (licitación) procedure as derived from articles 92 and 93. Those contracting rules responded to what was stated in article 182 of the Magna Carta, which literally establishes the following: “Contracts for the execution of public works entered into by the State Powers, the Municipalities and the autonomous institutions, purchases made with funds from those entities, and the sales or leases of property belonging to them, shall be made through public bidding, in accordance with the law regarding the respective amount.” Now, these provisions, including that of the Fundamental Charter, should not be viewed only for the acquisition of goods, but also for the provision of services to the Administration, since in both cases, they constitute the basis and the pillar for proper public spending, through duly established contractual procedures that guarantee the free participation, equality, transparency, and efficiency of the proceeding. This means that both legal bodies required the selection of the contractor through a competitive process (concurso) established for that purpose. As things stand, since Licda. Vicenzi Guilá was appointed as an external notary solely by means of official communication no. PE-91-987, of October 29, 1991, it is clear that the existing relationship was based on an irregular contracting, given that it was carried out without complying with due process (by default, a public bidding or request for proposals (licitación o concurso de antecedentes)). In this way, the appellant's argument on this point is unfounded, first, because the legal provisions applicable to the specific case were indeed indicated in the judgment (Law no. 1279 and article 182 of the Political Constitution); second, because from the analysis of those precepts, it is clear that, for the year 1991, the selection of notaries by means of a contracting procedure was indeed required, a procedure which was omitted by the Administration. Consequently, the arguments referring to being in the presence of a valid contract must be dismissed, as well as the argument that the provisions of the Civil Code should have been applied, since Law no. 1279 (including its amendment by Law 5901) and the Constitution were clear on the requirement of the public bidding process for such purposes. For the same reason, it is also not true that Law 7494 was applied retroactively to classify the contracting as irregular; that allegation must also be rejected.

VII.- Now, recall that through agreement no. III of session 8823, held on February 19, 2007, the Board of Directors of INS agreed to order the definitive and immediate closure of the granting of mortgage loans, for which it communicated the denial of those mortgage loans whose granting was not finalized, according to what was determined in technical report of Management no. G-00369-2007, issued on February 19, 2007 (folios 176 to 181 of the main file). At that point, the LCA was already in force, published on June 8, 1995, including the partial amendment of that regulatory text introduced by Law no. 8511 of May 16, 2006 (in force as of January 4, 2007). In this regard, Article 21 ibidem states: “Verification of procedures./ It is the contractor's responsibility to verify the correctness of the administrative contracting procedure, and contractual execution. By virtue of this obligation, to substantiate claims for compensation, they may not allege ignorance of the applicable legal system nor of the consequences of the administrative conduct. / The Regulations of this Law shall define the circumstances and the manner in which the irregular contractor may be indemnified. Likewise, the official who has promoted an irregular contracting shall be sanctioned according to the provisions of Article 96 bis of this Law.” In ruling of this Chamber no. 001112-S1-F-2009 at 3:15 p.m. on October 30, 2009, regarding the topic under analysis, citing various criteria of the Comptroller General of the Republic, it was indicated that in cases of irregular contracting: “for example, one carried out without complying with due process (by default, a public bidding), if we assumed that the Administration is obligated to recognize payment, and not an indemnity for the benefit it may have obtained, the general administrative contracting regime could be disregarded without any consequence or sanction for anyone. Therefore, the recognition made by the Administration in such cases is only indemnifying, motivated by principles of equity and preventing unjust enrichment; it is not, therefore, the payment of a contract validly awarded to the individual (…). In conclusion, the basis for indemnifying individuals for the execution of irregular contracting is founded on legal principles of equity and that of preventing unjust enrichment, applicable in the case at hand, by integration of the administrative legal system, as provided in Article 7 in relation to Article 16.1. of the General Law of Public Administration…” (official communication 13023 DAGJ-297-99 of November 12, 1999, also, no. 4414 -DCGA-457-97- of April 15, 1997, and nos. 14803/96 and 4414/97, all from the CGR according to the cited ruling). The legislator proceeded to codify the reiterated pronouncements issued by the controlling body, regarding irregular contracting, through the partial amendment introduced by the aforementioned Law no. 8511 of May 16, 2006 (in force as of January 4, 2007), to Article 21 of the LCA, to which a final paragraph was added, indicating the following: “The Regulations of this Law shall define the circumstances and the manner in which the irregular contractor may be indemnified. Likewise, the official who has promoted an irregular contracting shall be sanctioned according to the provisions of Article 96 bis of this Law.” Consequently, the Regulations to the cited Law, which came into force on the same date, in Article 210, second and third paragraphs, determined the following: “The contract shall be considered irregular, when in its processing serious and evident defects, of easy verification, are incurred, such as omission of the corresponding procedure or illegitimate recourse to some exemption. In those cases, no payment may be recognized to the interested party, except in qualified cases, where it proceeds according to general principles of Law, regarding supplies, works, services, and other objects, executed with evident benefit to the Administration. In that case, the expected profit shall not be recognized, and if its value is unknown, a reduction of 10% of the total amount shall be applied for that concept. The same solution shall apply to those contracts executed without the respective countersignature or internal approval, when such is required. / The non-formalization of the contract shall not be an impediment to applying this provision to the extent pertinent.” According to the doctrine issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic, embodied in those norms, which this Chamber shares, it is reiterated that, in the Costa Rican legal system, it is possible to recognize the existence of an indemnity in irregular contracting, based on the principles of equity and preventing unjust enrichment. However, in the specific case, there is the particularity that the claimed indemnity is not appropriate for three clearly defined reasons. First, due to the simple fact that the Institute had already paid for the services provided by the notary, or rather, was up to date with payments, as the plaintiff herself demonstrates by presenting the receipts she issued for the services, for which reason one cannot speak of an undue advantage or enrichment on the part of the Administration that would have generated enrichment on its part or a debt in favor of the plaintiff. Second, because one cannot speak of the existence and the possibility of providing services after that 2007 agreement of the INS Board of Directors, since from that moment on, the definitive and immediate closure of mortgage loan granting occurred, due to the low yields generated compared to other investment instruments. For this reason, deeds or work related to these transactions could not continue to be assigned; they were completely suppressed by INS. This means that from 2007 the plaintiff did not receive deeds, so it also cannot be established that she is owed payments for services rendered; consequently, the contracting had no motive or cause to exist. An aspect the plaintiff herself became aware of, and consequently deemed herself notified, when she went to the Institution to ask why she had not been assigned other work. In any case, thirdly, what the plaintiff claims are the damages for not executing more deeds, but here it must be highlighted that Article 210 of the Regulations to the Law on Administrative Contracting expressly establishes that in cases of irregular contracts such as the present one, “the expected profit shall not be recognized.” To rule otherwise would be to grant validity and effectiveness to a contracting that is already defective in itself, which would generate unjust enrichment for the plaintiff. As things stand, the Tribunal is correct when it states that: “…the plaintiff, as an apparent contractor, provided the service in good faith, for the benefit of the Administration receiving the good or service, and for that provision, she received the corresponding payment of professional fees during the time the irregular contractual relationship was maintained. Note that the plaintiff provides as evidence the different receipts proving payment for the different deeds prepared from the moment of designation until the year 2006 and does not claim in this proceeding that she is owed fees for the notarial services provided during that period (between October 1991 and December 2006)… Now, although it was stated that in such cases an indemnity may be recognized in favor of the apparent contractor, based on a principle of equity or equivalence in the burdens received and a principle of preventing unjust enrichment; the truth is that these judges consider that, in this case, it is inappropriate. The foregoing because the cause that led INS to stop sending more deeds to the plaintiff was the decision to close the granting of the credits that institution awarded. Indeed, the relationship with the plaintiff could not be maintained because the condition that gave rise to it no longer existed: if the granting of credits is closed, there will be no deeds to be executed. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that the indemnity is granted under the principle of good faith and equity, which is why, if the plaintiff did not receive files to prepare deeds from the year 2007 onward (because the granting of credits was closed), any indemnity in that sense would constitute unjust enrichment in her favor… any claim regarding the payment of lost profits (lucro cesante) must also be rejected, because, it is insisted, we are facing an irregular contracting, in which there is no valid or effective agreement that serves as a generating cause…” (folio 237). In summary, from the factual framework analyzed, as well as from the legal arguments mentioned, one cannot speak of the existence of a valid contract since we are in the presence of an irregular contract, but in this specific case, it is also not necessary to apply the principles of equity, since a situation of unjust enrichment on the part of INS does not exist that would recognize the plaintiff the right to obtain an indemnity for the service she provided. It is true that the Administration benefited from the services provided by the notary, but these were paid for as they were provided. Moreover, the contractual termination (resolución contractual) procedure alleged under the terms established by the LCA would only be appropriate in the case of a duly constituted contracting. It is reiterated, the indemnity proceeds in irregular contracting, not by virtue of a contractual termination, since there is no valid contract, but from the application of principles of equity and justice that must be evaluated in each specific case. For the reasons stated, the arguments regarding contractual breach by INS, violations of due process, the requirement of a contractual termination procedure, and the payment of an indemnity for irregular contracting are not admissible. Consequently, the violation of articles 11, 34, and 182 of the Political Constitution; 131, 132, 133, 136, and 158 of the General Law of Public Administration; 21 of the Law on Administrative Contracting and 210 of the Regulations to the Law on Administrative Contracting does not occur either, for which reason the objections must be dismissed.

Likewise, the official who has promoted an irregular procurement shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of article 96 bis of this Law." Consequently, the Regulation to the aforementioned Law, which came into effect on the same date, in article 210, second and third paragraphs, determined the following: "The contract shall be deemed irregular when, in its processing, serious and evident defects are incurred, of easy verification, such as the omission of the corresponding procedure or an illegitimate recourse to some exception. In those cases, no payment whatsoever may be recognized to the interested party, except in qualified cases, where it proceeds in accordance with general principles of Law, regarding supplies, works, services, and other objects, executed with evident benefit to the Administration. In that case, the expected profit shall not be recognized, and if this is unknown, a deduction of 10% of the total amount shall be applied for that concept. The same solution shall be given to those contracts that are executed without the countersignature or internal approval, when this is required. / The failure to formalize the contract shall not be an impediment to applying this provision to the extent pertinent." In accordance with the doctrine issued by the General Comptroller of the Republic, embodied in those norms, which this Chamber shares, it is reiterated that in the Costa Rican legal system, it is possible to recognize the existence of compensation (indemnización) in irregular procurement, based on the principles of equity and the prohibition of unjust enrichment. However, in the specific case, the particularity arises that the compensation claimed is not appropriate for three clearly defined reasons. First, due to the simple fact that the Institute had already paid for the services rendered by the notary, or rather, it was up to date with payments, as the plaintiff herself demonstrates by submitting the receipts she issued for the services; therefore, one cannot speak of a benefit or enrichment on the part of the Administration that generated enrichment on its side or a debt in favor of the plaintiff. Second, because one cannot speak of the existence or the possibility of providing services after that agreement of the Board of Directors of the INS in 2007, since from that moment on, the definitive and immediate closure of the granting of mortgage loans occurred, due to the low yields they generated compared to other investment instruments. For this reason, deeds or work related to these businesses could not continue to be assigned; they were completely eliminated by the INS. This means that since 2007 the plaintiff did not receive deeds, so it also cannot be established that payments are owed for services rendered; consequently, the procurement had no reason or cause to exist. An aspect of which the plaintiff herself learned, and consequently considered herself notified, when she went to the Institution to ask why no other work had been assigned to her. In any case, third, what the plaintiff claims are damages for not preparing more deeds, but it must be highlighted here that article 210 of the Regulation to the Law on Administrative Procurement expressly establishes that in cases of irregular contracts such as the present one, "the expected profit shall not be recognized". To hold otherwise would be to grant validity and effectiveness to a procurement that is already inherently defective, which would generate an unjust enrichment of the plaintiff. Thus, the lower court is correct when it establishes that: "…the plaintiff, as an apparent contractor, provided the service in good faith, such that the Administration received the good or service, and for that provision, she received the corresponding payment of professional fees during the time the irregular contractual relationship was maintained. Notably, the plaintiff submits as evidence the different receipts that certify the payment of the different deeds granted from the time of the designation until the year 2006, and she does not claim in this proceeding that fees are owed for the notarial services rendered during that period (encompassed between October 1991 and December 2006)… Now, although it was stated that in these cases compensation can be recognized in favor of the apparent contractor, based on a principle of equity or equivalence in the burdens received and a principle against unjust enrichment; the truth is that these judges consider that in this case, it is inappropriate. The foregoing because the cause that led the INS to stop sending deeds to the plaintiff was the decision to close the granting of loans that the institution offered. Indeed, the relationship with the plaintiff could not be maintained because the condition that gave rise to it no longer existed: if the granting of loans is closed, there will be no deeds that must be granted. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that compensation is granted under the principle of good faith and equity, which is why if the plaintiff did not receive case files to prepare deeds from the year 2007 onward (because the granting of loans was closed), any compensation in that regard would constitute an unjust enrichment in her favor… any claim regarding the payment of lost profit must also be rejected, since, it is insisted, we are facing an irregular procurement, in which there is no valid or effective agreement that serves as its generating cause…" (folio 237). In sum, from the factual framework analyzed, as well as from the legal arguments alluded to, one cannot speak of the existence of a valid contract, as it involves an irregular contract, but in this specific case, it is also not necessary to apply the principles of equity, since no instance of unjust enrichment by the INS is presented, which would recognize the plaintiff's right to obtain compensation for the service she provided. It is true that the Administration was benefited by the services rendered by the notary, but these were paid as they were rendered. Moreover, the contractual resolution procedure alleged under the terms established by the LCA would only be appropriate in the case of a duly constituted procurement. It is insisted, compensation proceeds in irregular procurements, not by virtue of a contractual resolution, since there is no valid contract, but rather from the application of principles of equity and justice that must be evaluated in each specific case. For the reasons stated, the arguments regarding contractual breach by the INS, violations of due process, the requirement of a contractual resolution procedure, or the payment of compensation for irregular procurement are not acceptable. Consequently, neither is there a violation of articles 11, 34, and 182 of the Political Constitution; 131, 132, 133, 136, and 158 of the General Law of the Public Administration; 21 of the Law on Administrative Procurement, and 210 of the Regulation to the Law on Administrative Procurement; therefore, the objections must be dismissed.

8511 of May 16, 2006, previously indicated (effective as of January 4, 2007), amended Article 21 of the LCA, to which it added a final paragraph that states the following: <i>“The Regulations to this Law shall define the circumstances and the manner in which the irregular contractor is to be indemnified. Likewise, the official who has promoted an irregular procurement shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of article 96 bis of this Law.”</i> Consequently, the Regulations to <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la citada Ley\" w:st=\"on\">the cited Law</st1:PersonName>, which entered into force on the same date, in its Article 210, second and third paragraphs, established the following: “<i>The contract shall be deemed irregular when, in its processing, grave and evident defects are incurred, of easy verification, such as the omission of the corresponding procedure or having illegitimately resorted to an exception. In such cases, no payment whatsoever may be recognized to the interested party, except in qualified cases, where it proceeds in accordance with general principles of Law, regarding supplies, works, services, and other objects, executed with evident benefit to <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Administración. En\" w:st=\"on\">the Administration. In</st1:PersonName> that event, the anticipated profit shall not be recognized, and if it is unknown, a deduction of 10% of the total amount shall be applied under that concept. The same solution shall be given to those contracts executed without the required counter-signature or internal approval, when that is required. / The failure to formalize the contract shall not be an impediment to applying this provision insofar as it is pertinent.”</i> In accordance with the doctrine issued by <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Contraloría General\" w:st=\"on\">the Comptroller General</st1:PersonName> of the Republic, set forth in those norms, which this Chamber shares, it is reiterated that in the Costa Rican legal system, it is possible to recognize the existence of indemnification in irregular procurement, based on the principles of equity and that of no unjust enrichment. However, in the specific case, the particularity arises that the claimed indemnification is not appropriate for three clearly delimited reasons. <u>First</u>, due to the simple fact that the Institute had already paid for the services rendered by the notary, or rather, it was up to date with the payments, as the plaintiff herself demonstrates by presenting the receipts she issued for the services, and therefore one cannot speak of an advantage or an enrichment on the part of the Administration that would generate an enrichment on her part or a debt in favor of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la actora. Segundo\" w:st=\"on\">the plaintiff. <u>Second</u></st1:PersonName>, because one also cannot speak of the existence of and the possibility of providing services after that agreement of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Junta Directiva\" w:st=\"on\">the Board of Directors</st1:PersonName> of INS in the year 2007, given that from that moment onward, the definitive and immediate closure of the granting of mortgage loans occurred, this due to the low yields they generated in comparison with other investment instruments. For this reason, deeds or work related to these businesses could no longer be assigned; they were entirely eliminated by INS. That is to say, from 2007 the plaintiff did not receive deeds, and therefore it cannot be established that payments are owed for services rendered; consequently, the procurement had no motive or cause for existing. An aspect of which the plaintiff herself learned, and consequently was considered notified, when she went to the Institution to ask why no other work had been assigned to her. In any event, in the <u>third</u> place, what the plaintiff claims are damages for not executing more deeds, but here it must be emphasized that Article 210 of the Regulations to the Administrative Procurement Law expressly establishes that in cases of irregular contracts such as this one, “<i>the anticipated profit shall not be recognized</i>”. To hold otherwise would be to grant validity and effectiveness to a procurement that is already defective, which would generate an unjust enrichment for <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la demandante. Así\" w:st=\"on\">the plaintiff. Thus</st1:PersonName>, the lower court is correct when it states that: “…<i>the plaintiff, as apparent contracting party, provided the service in good faith, for the benefit of the Administration receiving the good or the service, and for that provision she received the corresponding payment of professional fees during the time the irregular contractual relationship was maintained. It should be noted that the plaintiff provides as evidence the different receipts that prove the payment of the different deeds granted from the moment of designation until the year 2006, and she does not claim in this proceeding that she is owed fees for the notarial services provided during that period (encompassed between October 1991 and December 2006)… Now then, although it was said that in these cases an indemnification can be recognized in favor of the apparent contractor, based on a principle of equity or equivalence in the received burdens and a principle of no unjust enrichment; the truth is that these judges estimate that in this specific case, it is inappropriate. The foregoing because the cause that led INS to stop sending more deeds to the plaintiff was the decision to close the granting of the loans that that institution provided. In effect, the relationship with the plaintiff could not be maintained since the condition that brought it into being no longer existed: if the granting of loans is closed, there will be no deeds that must be granted. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that indemnification is granted under the principle of good faith and equity, the reason for which, if the plaintiff did not receive files to prepare deeds starting from the year 2007 (because the granting of loans was closed), any indemnification in that sense would constitute an unjust enrichment in her favor… any claim regarding the payment of lost profits (lucro cesante) must also be rejected, since, it is insisted, we are facing an irregular procurement, in which there is no valid and effective agreement that serves as its generating cause…</i>” (<span class=GramE>folio</span> 237). In summary, from the analyzed factual situation, as well as from the aforementioned legal arguments, one cannot speak of the existence of a valid contract, since an irregular contract is present, but in this specific case, it is also not necessary to apply the principles of equity, since a case of unjust enrichment on the part of INS is not present, which would recognize for the plaintiff the right to obtain indemnification for the service she provided. It is true that the Administration benefited from the services provided by the notary, but these were paid for as they were provided. Moreover, the contract resolution procedure alleged under the terms established by the LCA would be appropriate only in the event of a duly constituted procurement. It is insisted, indemnification proceeds in irregular procurements, not by virtue of a contract resolution, since there is no valid contract, but rather from the application of principles of equity and justice that must be assessed in each specific case. For the reasons stated, the arguments regarding contractual non-compliance by INS, violations of due process (debido proceso), the requirement of a contract resolution procedure, nor the payment of indemnification for irregular procurement, are not acceptable. Consequently, there is also no injury to Articles 11, 34, and 182 of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Constitución Política\" w:st=\"on\">the Political Constitution</st1:PersonName>; 131, 132, 133, 136, and 158 of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley General\" w:st=\"on\">the General Law</st1:PersonName> of <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Administración Pública\" w:st=\"on\">the Public Administration</st1:PersonName>; 21 of the Administrative Procurement Law and 210 of the Regulations to the Administrative Procurement Law, for which the objections must be dismissed.”</span><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'><o:p></o:p></span></p> </div> </body> </html>

“VI.- Según las transcripciones realizadas, para esta Cámara, es preciso descifrar en primer término, si en realidad, la relación que el INS mantenía con la actora responde a una contratación irregular. Lo anterior resulta fundamental de cara al agravio de la recurrente. Nótese que fue a través del oficio no. PE-91-987, del 29 de octubre de 1991, que el Presidente Ejecutivo y el Gerente del INS solicitaron al Jefe del Departamento de Crédito de ese ente, que se incluyera a la licenciada Vincenzi Guilá en la lista de notarios externos que prestarían sus servicios a la institución (folio 150 del expediente judicial). No se desprende la existencia de un procedimiento de concurso para realizar esa elección. A estos efectos, debe dejarse claro que aunque no estuviera vigente la LCA, la contratación debía realizarse según la Constitución y el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo vigente en esa época. Por lo cual, de antemano se indica que las normas del Código Civil alegadas, únicamente servirían para complementar el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo pero en caso de alguna laguna, empero, como se verá, las normas de derecho público existentes, eran suficientes para entender el proceso que tuvo que realizar el INS para contratar los servicios de la notaria. En este tanto, es cierto que no existía aún la Ley 7494, pero sí estaba vigente la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República, no. 1279 y sus reformas, actualmente derogada por la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, no. 8131. Así, en lo que fuera procedente, debían respetarse las reglas ahí establecidas (incluidas mediante reforma del año 1976 a través de la Ley 5901), en torno a la adquisición de bienes y servicios, especialmente en lo que se refiere a la exigencia del procedimiento de licitación según se desprende de los cardinales 92 y 93. Esas reglas de contratación respondían a lo señalado en el cardinal 182 de la Carta Magna que literalmente establece lo siguiente: “Los contratos para la ejecución de obras públicas que celebren los Poderes del Estado, las Municipalidades y las instituciones autónomas, las compras que se hagan con fondos de esas entidades y las ventas o arrendamientos de bienes pertenecientes a las mismas, se harán mediante licitación, de acuerdo con la ley en cuanto al monto respectivo”. Ahora bien, estas normas, incluso la de la Carta Fundamental, no deben ser vistas solo para la adquisición de bienes, sino también para la prestación de servicios a la Administración, ya que en ambos supuestos, constituyen la base y el pilar para el debido gasto público, mediante procedimientos contractuales debidamente establecidos que garanticen la libre participación, igualdad, transparencia y eficiencia del procedimiento. Ello dice, que en los dos cuerpos jurídicos se exigía la selección del contratista mediante un concurso establecido al efecto. Así las cosas, al ser nombrada la Licda. Vicenzi Guilá como notaria externa, únicamente por medio del oficio no. PE-91-987, de 29 de octubre de 1991, es claro que la relación existente estaba basada en una contratación irregular, puesto que se realizó sin cumplir con el procedimiento debido (por regla la licitación o concurso de antecedentes). De este modo, no lleva razón la casacionista sobre este punto, primero, porque la normativa aplicable al caso concreto sí se indicó en la sentencia (Ley no. 1279 y numeral 182 de la Constitución Política); segundo, porque del análisis de esos preceptos se desprende que para el año 1991, sí se exigía la selección de notarios por medio de un procedimiento de contratación, el cual fue omitido por la Administración. De esta forma, los planteamientos referentes a que se está en presencia de un contrato válido deben ser desestimados, al igual que el argumento de que se debió aplicar la normativa del Código Civil, ya que la Ley no. 1279 (incluida su reforma mediante Ley 5901) y la Constitución, eran claros sobre la exigencia del proceso de licitación para tales efectos. Por igual razón, tampoco es cierto que para calificar de irregular la contratación, se aplicó retroactivamente la Ley 7494, ese alegato también debe ser rechazado.

VII.- Ahora bien, recuérdese que mediante acuerdo no. III de la sesión 8823, celebrada el 19 de febrero de 2007, la Junta Directiva del INS acordó ordenar el cierre definitivo e inmediato de la concesión de créditos hipotecarios, para lo cual comunicó la denegatoria de los créditos hipotecarios cuya concesión no estuviera en firme, esto según lo dictaminado en el informe técnico de la Gerencia no. G-00369-2007, emitido el 19 de febrero del 2007 (folios 176 a 181 del expediente principal). A esas alturas ya estaba vigente la LCA, publicada el 8 de junio de 1995, incluso la reforma parcial de ese texto normativo introducida por la Ley no. 8511 del 16 de mayo de 2006 (vigente a partir del 4 de enero de 2007). En este tanto, dice el artículo 21 ibídem: “Verificación de procedimientos./ Es responsabilidad del contratista verificar la corrección del procedimiento de contratación administrativa, y la ejecución contractual. En virtud de esta obligación, para fundamentar gestiones resarcitorias, no podrá alegar desconocimiento del ordenamiento aplicable ni de las consecuencias de la conducta administrativa. / El Reglamento de esta Ley definirá los supuestos y la forma en que proceda indemnizar al contratista irregular. Asimismo, el funcionario que haya promovido una contratación irregular será sancionado conforme a lo previsto en el artículo 96 bis de esta Ley”. En la resolución de esta Cámara no. 001112-S1-F-2009 de las 15 horas 15 minutos del 30 de octubre de 2009, a propósito del tema en análisis, citando varios criterios de la Contraloría General de la República, se indicó que ante casos de contrataciones irregulares: “por ejemplo la que se realiza sin cumplir con el procedimiento debido (por regla la licitación), asumiéramos que la Administración está obligada a reconocer el pago, y no una indemnización por el provecho que pueda haber obtenido, el régimen de contratación administrativa general podría ser inobservado sin consecuencia ni sanción alguna para nadie. Por ello, el reconocimiento que haga la Administración en tales casos es sólo indemnizatorio, motivado en principios de equidad y de no enriquecerse incausadamente; no se trata así, del pago de un contrato válidamente atribuido al particular(…). En conclusión, el fundamento para indemnizar a particulares por la ejecución de contrataciones irregulares está fundado en principios jurídicos de equidad y el de no enriquecimiento sin causa, aplicables en la especie, por integración del ordenamiento jurídico administrativo, según lo previsto en el numeral 7º en relación con el 16.1. de la Ley General de la Administración Pública…” (oficio 13023 DAGJ-297-99 de 12 de noviembre de 1999, también, el no. 4414 -DCGA-457-97- de 15 de abril de 1997, y los no. 14803/96 y 4414/97, todos de la CGR según el fallo citado). El legislador, procedió a positivizar los pronunciamientos reiterados emitidos por el órgano contralor, respecto a la contratación irregular, mediante la reforma parcial introducida por la Ley no. 8511 de 16 de mayo de 2006 anteriormente indicada (vigente a partir del 4 de enero de 2007), al canon 21 de la LCA, al cual le adicionó un párrafo, el final, que indica lo siguiente: “El Reglamento de esta Ley definirá los supuestos y la forma en que proceda indemnizar al contratista irregular. Asimismo, el funcionario que haya promovido una contratación irregular será sancionado conforme a lo previsto en el artículo 96 bis de esta Ley.” Consecuentemente, el Reglamento a la citada Ley, el cual entró a regir en la misma fecha, en el numeral 210, párrafos segundo y tercero, determinó lo siguiente: “El contrato se tendrá como irregular, cuando en su trámite se incurra en vicios graves y evidentes, de fácil constatación, tales como, omisión del procedimiento correspondiente o se haya recurrido de manera ilegítima a alguna excepción. En esos casos, no podrá serle reconocido pago alguno al interesado, salvo en casos calificados, en que proceda con arreglo a principios generales de Derecho, respecto a suministros, obras, servicios y otros objetos, ejecutados con evidente provecho para la Administración. En ese supuesto, no se reconocerá el lucro previsto y de ser éste desconocido se aplicará por ese concepto la rebaja de un 10% del monto total. Igual solución se dará a aquellos contratos que se ejecuten sin contar con el refrendo o aprobación interna, cuando ello sea exigido. / La no formalización del contrato no será impedimento para aplicar esta disposición en lo que resulte pertinente”. Acorde a la doctrina emitida por la Contraloría General de la República, plasmada en esas normas, la cual comparte esta Sala, se reitera, en el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense, es posible reconocer la existencia de la indemnización en la contratación irregular, con base en los principios de equidad y el de no enriquecimiento sin causa. Sin embargo, en el caso concreto se presenta la particularidad de que no es procedente la indemnización reclamada por tres razones claramente delimitadas. Primero, por el simple hecho de que el Instituto ya había cancelado los servicios prestados por la notaria, o mejor dicho, estaba al día con los pagos, como la propia actora lo demuestra al presentar los recibos que extendió por los servicios, por lo cual no se puede hablar de un aprovechamiento o enriquecimiento por parte de la Administración que generaran un enriquecimiento de su parte o una deuda a favor de la actora. Segundo, porque tampoco se puede hablar de la existencia y de la posibilidad de prestar los servicios después de ese acuerdo de la Junta Directiva del INS del año 2007, por cuanto a partir de ese momento, se dio el cierre definitivo e inmediato de la concesión de créditos hipotecarios, esto debido a los bajos rendimientos que generaban en comparación con otros instrumentos de inversión. Por este motivo, es que no podían seguir asignándose escrituras ni trabajos relacionados con estos negocios, del todo fueron suprimidos por el INS. Ello dice, que desde el 2007 la actora no recibió escrituras, por lo cual tampoco se puede establecer que se le deben pagos por los servicios prestados, en consecuencia la contratación no tenía motivos ni causa para existir. Aspecto del que la propia actora se enteró, y en consecuencia se dio por comunicada, cuando acudió a la Institución a preguntar por qué razones no se le habían asignado otros trabajos. En todo caso, en tercer lugar, lo que la accionante reclama son los perjuicios por no realizar más escrituras, pero aquí debe resaltarse que el canon 210 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa establece expresamente que en casos de contratos irregulares como el presente “no se reconocerá el lucro previsto”. Caso contrario, sería otorgarle validez y eficacia a una contratación que ya de por sí es defectuosa, lo cual generaría un enriquecimiento sin causa de la demandante. Así las cosas, lleva razón el Tribunal cuando establece que: “…la actora, como aparente contratante brindó el servicio de buena fe, a efectos de que la Administración receptora del bien o el servicio, y por esa prestación recibió el correspondiente pago de honorarios profesionales durante el tiempo que se mantuvo la relación contractual irregular. Nótese que la accionante aporta como prueba los diferentes recibos que acreditan el pago de las diferentes escrituras otorgadas desde el momento de la designación hasta el año 2006 y no reclama en esta vía que se le adeuden honorarios por los servicios notariales prestados durante ese período (comprendido entre octubre de 1991 y diciembre del 2006)… Ahora bien, si bien se dijo que en estos supuestos se puede reconocer una indemnización en favor del aparente contratista, basada en un principio de equidad o equivalencia en las cargas recibidas y un principio de no enriquecimiento sin causa; lo cierto es que estos juzgadores estiman que en la especie, ésta es improcedente. Lo anterior por cuanto la causa que originó que el INS no enviara más escrituras a la accionante fue la decisión de cerrar la concesión de los créditos que esa institución otorgaba. En efecto, no podía mantenerse la relación con la demandante por cuanto ya no existía la condición que hizo nacer aquella: si se cierra el otorgamiento de créditos, no habrán escrituras que deban ser otorgadas. Por demás, debe tenerse presente que la indemnización se otorga bajo el principio de buena fe y equidad, razón por la cual si la actora no recibió expedientes para confeccionar escrituras a partir del año 2007 (porque se cerró el otorgamiento de créditos) cualquier indemnización en ese sentido constituiría un enriquecimiento sin causa en su favor… deberá rechazarse, también, cualquier reclamo referente al pago de lucro cesante, por cuanto, se insiste, estamos frente a una contratación irregular, en la cual no existe un convenio válido ni eficaz que le sirva de causa generadora…” (folio 237). En suma, del cuadro fáctico analizado, así como de las argumentaciones jurídicas aludidas, no se puede hablar de la existencia de un contrato válido ya que se está en presencia de un contrato irregular, pero en este caso concreto, tampoco es necesario aplicar los principios de equidad, ya que no se presenta un supuesto de enriquecimiento sin causa por parte del INS, el cual le reconozca a la demandante, el derecho a obtener una indemnización por el servicio que brindó. Es cierto que la Administración se vio beneficiada con los servicios prestados por la notaria, pero estos fueron cancelados conforme se fueron brindando. Por lo demás, el procedimiento de resolución contractual alegado en los términos que establece la LCA, sería procedente solo en el supuesto de una contratación debidamente constituida. Se insiste, la indemnización procede en contrataciones irregulares, no en virtud de una resolución contractual, puesto que no hay contrato válido, sino de la aplicación de principios de equidad y justicia que deben ser valorados en cada caso concreto. Por las razones expuestas, es que no son de recibo los argumentos en torno al incumplimiento contractual por parte del INS, las violaciones al debido proceso, la exigencia de un trámite de resolución contractual, ni el pago de una indemnización por contratación irregular. En consecuencia tampoco se da la lesión de los cardinales 11, 34 y 182 de la Constitución Política; 131, 132, 133, 136 y 158 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 21 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y 210 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, por lo que los reparos deben ser desestimados.”