Consumer association standing to defend diffuse and collective interestsLegitimación de asociación de consumidores para defender intereses difusos y colectivos

“IV. To resolve the challenge against ANCL’s lack of active standing (legitimación activa) —alleged by the defendant banks and upheld in the judgment under appeal— it is important to refer to the reasoning used by the judges to support their decision, who stated the following: ‘Regarding the merits of the matter, for the purposes of analyzing the claim, this Court, after hearing the parties’ arguments and the testimonial evidence at trial, observes that the issue to be resolved is the potential strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), this condition falling upon the defendant banks, attributing to them conduct that is linked to the fluctuations of the basic passive rate (tasa básica pasiva), which reflected an upward trend in the period of interest to the plaintiff Association; that is, from the second half of 2007 to the date of filing of the claim. But in the manner in which the plaintiff defined the claim, from the preliminary hearing, the Court observes that the petition of the claim refers to an abstract and indeterminate content, exposing the dilemma that we are faced with the non-existence of a specific case that allows the Court to faithfully comply with Article 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, so that it is possible to analyze the existence of the damage, to verify that it is effective, assessable, and individualizable (efectivo, evaluable e individualizable) in relation to a person or group. The Trial Court is fully aware that Article 122, subsection m), of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo allows for a condemnation in the abstract (condenatoria en abstracto) of damages (daños y perjuicios), but not even in that scenario is it admissible to think that this —ethereal— condition refers not only to the condemnation but also to subjects in the abstract, that is, unidentified subjects, since the rule always requires, at least, the proof of administrative conduct or an administrative legal relationship, which must necessarily be understood as that which arises from the interrelation between the Administration and the administered party, so that it is enforceable by the person affected. The possibility of admitting standing by collective interest (legitimación por interés colectivo) is not rejected a priori, but even in that hypothesis, the need for individualization of the damage persists, as a necessary requirement for filing the action, since admitting the contrary would mean allowing claims with abstract pretensions, the issuance of an eventual abstract judgment being unthinkable, which thus evades the reference to a concrete and specific administrative legal relationship, as the generator of the damage, conduct against which the consumer could well have claimed by raising a claim individually or collectively, but in both cases proving, at least, the existence of that relationship and the affected party’s interest in asserting their rights. In the present case, it has not been possible to locate an express manifestation that suggests the plaintiff Association fulfilled the mandate cited in the mentioned rules, since we have reviewed the hypotheses and the claim does not meet any one or any of them, that is, one, that each member (asociado) affected by the credit conditions claimed in the said claim, has delegated the representation of their individual case to the said Association, by means of a power of attorney in accordance with the law; or, two, that regardless of the existence of a power of attorney to exercise representation and in the case of a collective interest, the plaintiff Association has sued in effective representation of its members, having proven in advance the identification of each of them and the context of their particular cases, individualizing which members were the subjects of credit under the conditions precisely claimed in the claim. To corroborate what has been said, it is enough to observe, precisely, the claim in its factual, evidentiary, and petitionary elements, where we are left with the impression that the plaintiff Association is rather attempting a kind of popular action (acción popular), which is not admitted, at least not under the terms of Article 10, subsection 1), sub-subsection d) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.’ (Audiovisual record of the reading of the oral judgment, from 10:18:57 a.m. to 10:23:39 a.m.). In addition to what was transcribed, the Court read —practically in its entirety— considerando V of the judgment of that same Section, no. 175-2011 of 2:00 p.m. on August 31, 2011, referring to the lack of standing of the ANCL in a lawsuit against Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago, incorporating those arguments into the oral resolution of this proceeding. There they refer to the difference between standing “ad procesum” (legitimación “ad procesum”) and “ad causam” (legitimación “ad causam”), the first being understood as procedural capacity (procedural prerequisite) and the second as standing properly speaking, whether active or passive (material prerequisite or prerequisite of the claim), regarding which they add extensive citations of jurisprudence and doctrine. They add, in precept 54 of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, Ley no. 7472 of December 20, 1994, the legislator provided for direct standing (legitimación directa) and indirect standing (legitimación indirecta). In the first case, it includes consumers who associate to litigate in the administrative or judicial venue, not individually, but through the corporation; or else, when some persons who are members of a group are affected by the practice of a merchant, for which the latter would defend them. Hence, if the members lack standing to institute a proceeding, the association would also lack it. The indirect one would be, according to the judges, equivalent to the figure of intervention (coadyuvancia), through which the group entity appears in court when one of its members could benefit from the outcome of the proceeding, insofar as the effects of the judgment could extend to some other or new proceeding. They fail to deduce, they note, a kind of expanded standing (legitimación ampliada), open or similar, in favor of consumer associations by their mere condition, even when their members or the corporate name do not evidence any direct relationship with the procedural object. The plaintiff, they indicate, seeks to extract a kind of popular action, which is not shared by the Court; since, in their opinion, the purpose of the rule is to allow groups of consumers, especially with small impacts or little economic value, to present a joint claim to gain group strength, a situation that does not arise in the present case. They mention the scenarios contemplated in canon 10 of the CPCA and the differences between collective interests (intereses colectivos) and diffuse interests (difusos). The former, they state, refer to limited groups, at times united by a legal bond, for the pursuit of their own purposes; which allows persons with small claims to litigate as a group, sharing all the costs of the proceeding and giving more strength to their personal claims, but considered collectively. As for diffuse interests, they explain, they affect the individual as a member of society, where there is no particular legal bond and, therefore, it is permitted that anyone manages to assert general and preventive protection. The precept 54 of Ley no. 7472, they continue, regulates two scenarios: the direct standing of the person who effectively forms part of the procedural relationship and the Consumer Association that defends the legitimate interests of its members. However, the plaintiff Association seems to extract that its condition empowers it to bring any type of proceeding for the benefit of consumers, regardless of whether they are members or not, who could be affected by a specific commercial practice. Such a mechanism, they assert, would allow a procedural fraud (burla procesal), since any person who is in a similar situation, in the event of obtaining a favorable resolution, could resort to joining the group, for the sole purpose of saving themselves the proceeding, when the legal system already provides a mechanism for such a circumstance (articles 185 to 188 of the CPCA), hence the lack of standing of the ANCL must be declared (all the foregoing is extracted from the audiovisual record of the oral judgment, from 10:24:52 a.m. to 10:49:28 a.m.). Finally, regarding the testimonial evidence received at the oral trial, the Court considered: ‘Their testimonies prove inert, for the purposes of issuing this judgment, since they do not allow for proving procedural aspects, such as that related to standing; it becoming evident that the accounts of the witnesses for the plaintiff Association made reference to cases that were not subject to assessment, in the context of the claim, according to the presentation of the facts, the evidence, and the claims (pretensiones) that were lodged in the litis. We do not ignore the value and importance of the material or emotional situations of each of the persons offered by said Association, just as they were heard by the Court, as we clearly understand that each circumstance is the result of a subjective appreciation that deserves the respect of all those who interacted in the oral trial; but we also cannot ignore what we already said, on the understanding that these statements reflect four specific situations, which do not form part of the set of facts presented by the plaintiff Association, given that in the claim there is no reference whatsoever to particular cases, as we have previously stated.’ (Audiovisual record of the oral judgment, from 10:50:15 a.m. to 10:51:48 a.m.).

V.As was explained, the appellant challenges the judgment inasmuch as, she alleges, her represented party has invoked the defense of diffuse interests, collective interests, and what she calls homogeneous individual interests (individuales homogéneos), due to the imbalance generated in the consumer relationship between the banking entities and the users, by referencing the current interest rates to the TBP. In such a way that, she considers, without providing pertinent information and warnings about the risks, abusive clauses (cláusulas abusivas) were incorporated into the credit contracts, which materialized in a disproportionate increase in the installments that the debtors had to pay. Her standing for the defense of these interests, she alleges, is found in the precepts 27 and 46 of the Constitución Política, 1023 of the Código Civil, 54 of Ley no. 7472, as well as articles 9, 10, 48 and 130, subsection 2), of the CPCA, which she considers violated by the judgment under appeal. In light of the foregoing, it is advisable to make —beforehand— a brief reference to the concepts of diffuse and collective interests; from there, to determine their application in consumer matters and, with that, elucidate the point under discussion here.

VI.In the broad spectrum of interests, where at one extreme are general interests and at the other are individual interests, diffuse interests are placed at an intermediate point and, to the extent that they are specified, are located the collective interests and, later, the corporate interests. In this way, diffuse interests, even though capable of being relevant to a subject, transcend towards a supra-individual dimension, extending to a more or less extensive and amorphous set of persons, not formally organized, who can be linked to a protected legal right, as a point of objective reference (natural environment, health, cultural heritage, Public Treasury, etc.) or united based on a determined subjective condition (for example, a physical characteristic, ethnic origin, or a social need). In this regard, this Chamber has understood it as an interest “extended, disseminated, dilated; it propagates or dilutes among the members of the group whether it is or is not organized and compact” (judgment no. 675-F-2007 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21, 2007). These interests —being such— belong to a community; however, when they can be concretized in an identifiable group, they are called collective in the strict sense or categorical; thus, this decision-making body has distinguished them as follows: “The distinction that must be made on this aspect is that, unlike what occurs with the diffuse interest, in the collective interest this group is determinable” (judgment no. 896-F-S1-2012 of 3:00 p.m. on July 26, 2012). It is worth noting that, when the link occurs through a prior relationship derived from belonging to a legally organized group, it would then be a corporate interest (such is the case, for example, of professional colleges). On the other hand, this Chamber has highlighted the procedural aspect of diffuse interests, as a parameter linked to the right of action in certain circumstances: “it is therefore a matter, in the thesis of this Chamber, of an interest of undefined ownership that legitimizes the subject to take action, which transforms, by virtue of its incorporation into the catalog of rights of the human person, into a kind of ‘reactional right’, designed so that its holder opposes the violation originating from illegitimate acts or omissions, caused to a whole” (resolution no. 805-F-S1-2010 of 1:55 p.m. on July 5, 2010). Likewise, it is necessary to take into account that these interests “since they are diffuse or collective, do not cease to be part of the broader category of legitimate interests” (judgment no. 896-F-S1-2012 of 3:00 p.m. on July 26, 2012).

VII.Now then, regarding the issue of interest here, it is important to note that the protection of the rights and interests of consumers obtained express recognition at the highest normative level, through the reform operated by Ley no. 7606 of May 29, 1996, to precept 46 of the Constitución Política, by virtue of which it was provided: “Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they constitute for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters.” This constitutional canon is the product of a normative development that, in this country, finds antecedents in rules dating back to the Código General del Estado de Costa Rica (Código de Carrillo) of July 30, 1841, which obligated the seller: “to [sic] clearly explain that to which he obligates himself: every obscure or [sic] ambiguous covenant shall be interpreted against the seller” (Article 1020 of the First Part); in addition, it sanctioned frauds in commerce that had been committed through falsified merchandise, deceit, or alteration of weights and measures (articles 309, 310, and 644 of the Second Part). In the 20th century, in the face of the depression of the 1930s and the Second World War, the laws of Abastos, no. 51 of July 16, 1932; of Subsistencias e Inquilinato, no. 6 of September 21, 1939; of Creación de la Oficina de Defensa Económica, no. 206 of August 20, 1944; and of Defensa Económica, no. 57 of March 26, 1945, were enacted, aimed at regulating monopolistic practices, hoarding, price fixing, quality, inspections, and it was admitted that “anyone may report the punishable infractions of this law” (precept 37 of Ley no. 57 of 1945). In the Código Penal of 1941, Ley no. 368 of August 21, 1941, it was sanctioned to “depreciate the quality of the services, products or merchandise of a competitor” and “unfair propaganda” (canon 259), as well as to defraud another “in the substance, quality or quantity the things that are delivered by virtue of a contract” (Article 282, subsection 1). The Ley General de Salud, no. 5395 of October 30, 1973, and the Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, no. 5412 of November 8 of that same year, established rights and duties to prevent risks to the health of those who consume medicines, foods, packaged products or are users of health or educational centers, among others. Shortly thereafter, was issued the Ley de Protección al Consumidor, no. 5665 of February 28, 1975, although focused on price setting and supply, it also established “obligations of those who engage in commerce,” which included displaying in a visible place the price of products and installment sales plans, where it was necessary to indicate the interest rate, basis, and term; to issue an invoice; to maintain weights and measures in perfect condition; and it prohibited “deceptive practices in the offer of goods and services” (Article 17). In that Law, the sanctioning approach continued to be mainly criminal in nature, through public action that enabled anyone to file the respective complaint (precept 25). With the enactment of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, Ley no. 6815 of September 27, 1982, it was entrusted with the function of: “Taking legal actions to safeguard the interests of consumers” through a “Procuraduría de Defensa del Consumidor” (articles 3, subsection i) and 7, subsection f). Said function later became part of the “Defensoría General de los Derechos Humanos,” according to Articles 21 and 22 of Ley no. 7142 of March 8, 1990, which were tacitly repealed by canon 32 of the Ley de la Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República, Ley no. 7319 of November 17, 1992, which assumed such powers, until the enactment of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, Ley no. 7472 of December 20, 1994, which repealed Ley no. 5665 of 1975 and currently governs the matter. In the current regulations, monopolistic practices were prohibited and, among other things, a catalog of consumer rights was recognized (precept 32), in addition to correlative obligations of merchants and suppliers (canon 34).

VIII.It is necessary to highlight that this legal development is not limited to recognizing subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) in favor of the consumer, understood as those powers of a particular individual to act validly (position of freedom) or to demand from another or others —including coercively— a concrete and specific conduct, for the satisfaction of their own and current, legally protectable ends and interests (as would be, for example, enforcing the guarantee of a product within 30 days following its purchase, pursuant to Article 43 of Ley no. 7472). That is, in addition to the subjective rights attributed to the parties of a specific consumer relationship, that legal system has recognized diffuse and collective interests, as fundamental and inalienable rights for the generality of consumers. Thus, precept 32, subsections b), d), and e) ibidem, contemplates: “the protection of their legitimate economic and social interests”; “education and dissemination on the proper consumption of goods or services, that ensure freedom of choice and equality in contracting,” and “administrative and judicial protection against deceptive advertising, abusive practices and clauses, as well as unfair or freedom-restricting commercial methods.” In that vein, the Sala Constitucional has highlighted the need to understand the consumer not only as one of the subjects of a particular commercial relationship, since it is also necessary to encompass their protection from a more general perspective: “the Ley de Protección al Consumidor does not impose limitations or affectations on the assets of merchants in the terms of Article 45 of the Constitution. What that normative body does is not to affect the private assets of each merchant, but to regulate a specific activity, which is commercial, having the characteristic of transcending the specific sphere of the individual and involving the general consuming public. Without a doubt, the fact that third parties may be affected by commercial activity (hoarding, unreasonable profit percentages, existence of private monopolies, etc.) makes it feasible for the ordinary legislator to provide, based on Article 28 of the Political Charter, special obligations for merchants, in relation to the goods they offer to the public, and this is not unconstitutional as it is a consequence of the duties and legal relationships that the legal system can and must regulate. […] The principles of public social order justify the broad development promoted around the protection of consumer rights” (judgment no. 4286-95 of 3:12 p.m. on August 3, 1995). Therefore, it is not surprising that this decision-making body includes this matter as one of the examples where this type of interest is evidenced: “In synthesis, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of persons not formally organized, but united based on a determined social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a determined personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. […]” (resolution no. 2002-00481 of 2:42 p.m. on January 23, 2002). Under that same perspective, this First Chamber has considered that the concept of “consumer” is not limited to a contractual party, but rather encompasses an entire undetermined collective, made up of the potential purchasers of a product: “In accordance with the constitutional parameter, consumer must be understood in an expansive approach regarding the scope of application of those persons who require special protection in this matter. It is not subordinated to a ‘consumer contract,’ because that would mean applying it in a restricted and limited manner to the person who buys, or who contracts. The position of modern law, according to this Decision-Making Body, is that it be conceived as a client, understood as one who participates in commercial activities in the position of a potential acquirer —and not an effective buyer— of goods and services from the owner of the offer. Depending on the stage of the process, one can distinguish between contracting party and client. The first, is called a legal consumer (consumidor jurídico). He acquires a good or service through a typical legal relationship, such as, for example, a purchase. The second is the material consumer (consumidor material), who does not contract for the good or service, but can potentially acquire or use it. The latter is the focus of legal protection in the area of consumer safety” (judgment no. 295-F-2007 of 10:45 a.m. on April 26, 2007).

IX.In the judgment under appeal, the Court considers that the ACNL lacks standing because it considers that “we are faced with the non-existence of a specific case that allows the Court to faithfully comply with Article 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, so that it is possible to analyze the existence of the damage, to verify that it is effective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group. […]. The possibility of admitting standing by collective interest is not denied a priori, but even in that hypothesis, the need for individualization of the damage persists, as a necessary requirement for filing the action” (see transcription supra). By virtue of the foregoing, it concludes: “[…] if the members do not present standing to institute any proceeding, the association, as representative of the legitimate rights or interests of these, would also lack it” (audiovisual record of the oral judgment, from 10:39:51 a.m. to 10:40:06 a.m.). This Chamber does not share the criterion of the judges. It is worth recalling that, on previous occasions, this decision-making body has accepted the existence of non-individualizable damages (daños no individualizables), which can be caused to communities: “it is not a matter of damage generated directly in the person of the plaintiff, but to the whole; which, by injuring a diffuse interest, possesses autonomy, and therefore may or may not concur with individually caused damages” (resolution no. 805-F-S1-2010 of 1:55 p.m. on July 5, 2010; in a similar sense see no. 547-F-S1-2012 of 8:55 a.m. on May 10, 2012). That is, contrary to what was indicated by the Court, the fact that an injury to a subjective right of a private individual may not be proven does not —necessarily— rule out an affectation of diffuse or collective interests. In that sense, referring to environmental damages, this Chamber has indicated that: “the first and principal victim is society as a whole, or else an undetermined generality of subjects; without prejudice to the fact that simultaneously, some of the individuals in the group may also be affected in a particular manner. […]. […] There is defined a new and particular mode of damage, which enjoys certain specifications, and accordingly, the rules for its reparation cannot be equated with those that grant protection to subjective rights, simply because this type of damage may also violate other types of prerogatives, such as rights of collective or general incidence” (judgment no. 675-F-2007 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21, 2007). In the present case, we are faced with a correlative action, that is, a double procedural action, directed —on one hand— in favor of the subjective interests and rights of the members (asociados) of the ANCL; but which —from another angle— is also directed towards the defense of diffuse and collective interests. Each one of these actions has different causes and implications, without them being necessarily opposing or mutually exclusive. Thus, the plaintiff seeks that the BPDC and the BNCR be ordered to pay the material and moral damage and the losses (daño material y moral y los perjuicios) caused to each one of its members, who entered into credit contracts with those entities under the modality of interest rates referenced to the TBP. However —and this is the relevant point— its claim does not limit itself to that, the Association also demands that those banks be ordered to inform clearly and truthfully about the economic risks that, in its opinion, credits under those conditions entail. For this Chamber, taking into account what was stated in the preceding considerandos, this is a claim based on a diffuse interest, in favor of all those interested —current or potential— in acquiring a bank loan (Article 32, subsections c) and d), of Ley no. 7472). In addition to the foregoing, this claim is intimately linked to the thesis that the ANCL has put forward in this proceeding, in that such a method of calculating interest constitutes an abusive clause, incorporated into adhesion contracts that impacts at least some 270,017 credit operations, which represented 55% of the total, in the banks that were the object of that study (folio 296 of the judicial expediente). Thus, in the opinion of this Chamber, there is an action that advocates —in addition— for a collective interest, of the entire group of debtors —undetermined but determinable— who signed credit contracts linked to the TBP (article 32, subsections b) and e), ibidem). Having the foregoing clear, it now becomes necessary to analyze whether a consumer association has standing to take action in favor of such diffuse and collective interests.

X.According to what has been set forth, the country has witnessed an evolution towards the recognition and protection of the legitimate rights and interests of the consumer, which culminates with the reform of constitutional precept 46 and finds development in Ley no. 7472. It is worth highlighting the first canon of said legal body, whose concept “effectively” provides the legal interpreter with guidance for the exegesis of the norm, so that these rights and interests find true protection, both in the administrative and judicial venue. Along these lines, the Sala Constitucional, since resolution no.

4286-95 of 15 hours 12 minutes of August 3, 1995, held: “The State must have rules that allow the fulfillment of consumer protection work, since it is of little or no use to establish a principle of the Social State of law, if the adequate mechanisms for its development and application are not also established. […]”. In addition to the above, that decision-making body added: “[…] The state role in this matter must start from the enshrinement of an effective legal system of consumer protection, which expressly recognizes their fundamental rights, establishes substantial solutions for the basic questions emerging from consumer relations, and finally enshrines the concrete implementation mechanisms that allow those rights to be effectively enforced” (judgment no. 2001-01391 of 14 hours 52 minutes of February 14, 2001). In the same vein, the First Chamber has indicated: “In view of the emergence of an unbalanced situation in consumer relations between businesspersons and consumers or users, traditional legal instruments were not sufficient to protect them. In order to avoid, or at least mitigate these differences, the legislator has created various legal defense systems, in the interest of finding a fair balance between the reciprocal interests of consumers and producers” (resolution no. 655-F-2007 of 15 hours 5 minutes of September 19, 2007). Such an approach must guide the analysis of Law no. 7472 and, as relevant here, the standing for the protection of diffuse and collective interests of consumers, as these form part of the broad category of legitimate interests. That is the sense in which article 32, subsection f), of the referenced regulatory body must be understood, insofar as it imposes, as one of their fundamental and inalienable rights, the “effective access mechanisms for the administrative and judicial protection of their legitimate rights and interests, which lead to adequately preventing, sanctioning, and promptly repairing the injury to these, as appropriate.” The foregoing must be guaranteed by the State, as part of its essential functions, as ordered by precept 33, subsection d), ibid: “In the terms established in this Law, the essential functions of the State are the following: // d) Guarantee access to effective and agile administrative and judicial protection mechanisms, to defend the legitimate rights and interests of consumers.” Likewise, rule 46 of that same regulatory body enshrines: “To enforce their rights, the consumer may resort to the administrative or the judicial route, […]”; from which it is important to highlight that the rule uses the concept of “rights,” in general terms and in a broad sense, without restricting it solely to subjective ones. Pursuant to the transcribed provisions, it follows that the duty to prevent and, eventually, repair, is not limited to the individualizable damages that a merchant or supplier may have caused to a determined subject (or subjects); but rather includes any injury to the legitimate interests of consumers, which could be diffuse or collective. That is, as has been seen, the national legal system recognizes, regarding consumers, not only the subjective rights that may arise from a particular consumer relationship, but also their diffuse and collective interests; which is why access to the mechanisms for their effective protection is guaranteed, whether in the administrative or judicial sphere. On this point, note article 56 of that Law, insofar as it stipulates: “The action before the National Consumer Commission can only be initiated by virtue of a complaint from any consumer or person, without it necessarily being the party aggrieved by the fact being reported. […].” That Commission is a body of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce, tasked with “hearing and sanctioning administrative infractions, breaches of the obligations established in Chapter V, and, in particular, protecting consumer rights, […]” (article 53, subsection a), of the Law under discussion). Thus, precept 56 ibidem grants broad authority for anyone to set that administrative body in motion, in pursuit of the effective defense of consumers, which, while referring to administrative procedures, demonstrates “an opening regarding standing—any consumer—and predominantly objective, since what matters are the reported facts, and not who has suffered the injury” (as this Chamber recognized in judgment no. 870-F-2007 of 10 hours 50 minutes of December 4, 2007). Even more, it would be contradictory if—by virtue of said norm—a consumer organization could file a complaint in the administrative venue, but be denied standing to challenge in the judicial venue what is resolved therein, when what was agreed by the Commission was contrary to its interests. On the other hand, provision 54 of the regulatory body under discussion states: “Consumer organizations have standing to initiate as a party or intervene, as coadjuvants, in proceedings before the National Consumer Commission and before courts of justice, in defense of the legitimate rights and interests of their members. […].” This canon confers standing on this type of group to intervene as a party, both in administrative and judicial venues, not only in defense of the subjective rights of their members, but also of their legitimate interests, which includes—as explained—diffuse and collective ones, being—as such—supraindividual and without subjection of one to another. Said precept could not be interpreted in a way that restricts that recognition, as these are rights that the legal system conceives as fundamental and inalienable, as derived from article 46 of the Political Constitution in relation to article 32 of Law no. 7472, to which reference has already been made. Thus, what has already been indicated for environmental cases would apply here, namely: “the simple lack of a direct relationship or of harm, in principle, cannot lead to a loss of standing for someone who possesses a right recognized at the constitutional level” (judgment no. 675-F-2007 of 10 hours of September 21, 2007, of this Chamber). Therefore, in addition to the standing a consumer organization may hold to advocate for the subjective rights or interests of its members (corporate interest), such groupings, like the ANCL, are also vested with standing for the defense of their diffuse and collective interests. Canon 46 of the Magna Carta, in conjunction with the harmonious analysis of Law no. 7472, imposes such a conclusion, guaranteeing access to the administrative or judicial route, with the aim of achieving effective protection of these rights and interests (provisions 1, 32, subsections b), e), and f), 33, subsection d), 46, 54 and 56 of the cited Law).

XI.Hence, this Decision-Making Body does not agree with the criterion of the Court, insofar as it considers that “the need for individualization of damage persists, as a necessary requirement for exercising the action.” On the contrary, the constitutional and legal precepts indicated, and their jurisprudential development, allow concluding that the ANCL has standing to file the present process in the judicial venue, given the injury that, it argues, has been caused to the diffuse and collective interests of consumers of financial products and services, due to: the alleged lack of information about the possible risks implied by bank loans linked to the TBP and the alleged abusive nature of contractual clauses stipulating that calculation method. Even more, it would not be possible to determine if individualizable damages to particular persons have been caused, until it is first evidenced whether there is a violation of those diffuse and collective interests that the ANCL has claimed; as it is necessary—firstly—to demonstrate if referencing loan interest rates to the TBP really constitutes a risk that, as such, must be reported and, additionally, if the incorporation of these interest calculation methodologies in bank loans could be qualified as abusive clauses in adhesion contracts.

XII.By virtue of the foregoing analysis, it is necessary to uphold the procedural grievance invoked. Pursuant to the provisions of article 105.1 of the CPCA, it is appropriate to annul the appealed judgment and remand the file to the office of origin, so that the judgment that is legally appropriate may be rendered.

51 of July 16, 1932; on Subsistence and Tenancy, No. 6 of September 21, 1939; on the Creation of the Office of Economic Defense, No. 206 of August 20, 1944, and on Economic Defense, No. 57 of March 26, 1945, aimed at regulating monopolistic practices, hoarding, price fixing, quality, inspections, and it was admitted that *"anyone may report the punishable infractions of this law"* (precept 37 of Law No. 57 of 1945). In the Penal Code of 1941, Law No. 368 of August 21, 1941, *"depreciating the quality of the services, products, or goods of a competitor"* and *"unfair advertising"* were sanctioned (canon 259), as well as defrauding another *"in the substance, quality, or quantity of the things delivered by virtue of a contract"* (article 282, subsection 1). The General Health Law, No. 5395 of October 30, 1973, and the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health, No. 5412 of November 8 of that same year, established rights and duties to prevent health risks for those who consume medicines, food, packaged products, or are users of health or educational centers, among others. Shortly after, the Consumer Protection Law was issued, No. 5665 of February 28, 1975, and although it focused on price fixing and supply, it also established *"obligations of those engaged in commerce"*, which contemplated displaying the price of products and installment sales plans in a visible place, where the interest rate, basis, and term had to be indicated; issuing an invoice; maintaining weights and measures in perfect condition; and it prohibited *"deceptive practices in the offering of goods and services"* (article 17). In that Law, the sanctioning approach continued to be predominantly criminal in nature, through public action that enabled anyone to file the respective complaint (precept 25). Upon the enactment of the Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, Law No. 6815 of September 27, 1982, it was entrusted with the power to: *"Take legal actions to protect the interests of consumers"* through a *"Consumer Defense Attorney's Office"* (numerals 3, subsection i) and 7, subsection f). Said function later became part of the *"General Ombudsman for Human Rights"*, according to articles 21 and 22 of Law No. 7142 of March 8, 1990, which were tacitly repealed by canon 32 of the Law of the Ombudsman of the Inhabitants of the Republic, Law No. 7319 of November 17, 1992, which assumed such powers, until the enactment of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer, Law No. 7472 of December 20, 1994, which repealed Law No. 5665 of 1975 and currently governs the matter. In the current regulations, monopolistic practices were prohibited and, among other things, a list of consumer rights was recognized (precept 32), in addition to correlative obligations of merchants and suppliers (canon 34).

**VIII.** It is necessary to emphasize that this legal development is not limited to recognizing subjective rights in favor of the consumer, understood as those powers of a particular individual to act validly (position of freedom) or to demand from another or others –including coercively– a concrete and specific conduct, for the satisfaction of their own, current, and legally protectable ends and interests (as would be, for example, enforcing a product warranty within 30 days following its purchase, pursuant to article 43 of Law No. 7472). That is, in addition to the subjective rights attributed to the parties of a specific consumer relationship, that legal system has recognized diffuse and collective interests, as fundamental and inalienable rights for the generality of consumers. Thus, precept 32, subsections b), d), and e) ibidem, contemplates: *"the protection of their legitimate economic and social interests"*; *"education and dissemination on the adequate consumption of goods or services, which ensure freedom of choice and equality in contracting"*; and *"administrative and judicial protection against misleading advertising, abusive practices and clauses, as well as unfair commercial methods or those that restrict free choice"*. In that vein, the Constitutional Chamber has highlighted the necessity of understanding the consumer not only as one of the subjects of a particular commercial relationship, since it is also necessary to encompass their protection from a more general perspective: *"the Consumer Protection Law does not impose limitations or affectations on the patrimony of merchants in the terms of constitutional article 45. What that regulatory body does is not affect the private patrimony of each merchant, but rather regulate a specific activity, which is commercial, having the characteristic of transcending the concrete sphere of the individual and involving the general consuming public. Undoubtedly, the fact that third parties may be affected by commercial activity (hoarding, unreasonable profit margins, existence of private monopolies, etc.) makes it feasible for the ordinary legislator to provide, based on article 28 of the Political Charter, special obligations for merchants, in relation to the goods they offer to the public, and this is not unconstitutional as it is a consequence of the duties and legal relationships that the legal system can and must regulate. [...] The principles of social public order justify the broad development that is promoted around the protection of consumer rights"* (judgment No. 4286-95 of 15 hours 12 minutes of August 3, 1995). Therefore, it is not surprising that this deciding body includes this matter as one of the examples where this type of interests is evident: *"In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a specific social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a specific personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. [...]"* (resolution No. 2002-00481 of 14 hours 42 minutes of January 23, 2002). Under that same optic, this First Chamber has considered that the concept of "consumer" is not limited to a contractual party, but rather encompasses an entire indeterminate collective, made up of the potential purchasers of a product: *"In accordance with the constitutional parameter, consumer must be understood in an expansive approach regarding the scope of application of persons who require special protection in this matter. It is not subordinated to a 'consumer contract,' because that would mean applying it in a restricted and limited way to that person who buys, or who contracts. The position of modern law, according to this Deciding Body, is that it be conceived as a client, understood as one who participates in commercial activities in the position of a potential purchaser –and not an effective buyer– of goods and services with the holder of the offer. Depending on the stage of the process, a distinction can be made between contracting party and client. The former is called a legal consumer. They acquire a good or service through a typical legal relationship, such as a purchase. The latter is the material consumer, who does not contract for the good or service, but may potentially acquire or use it. The latter is the center of legal protection in the field of consumer safety"* (judgment No. 295-F-2007 of 10 hours 45 minutes of April 26, 2007).

**IX.** In the contested judgment, the Court considers that the ACNL lacks standing because it believes that *"we find ourselves before the non-existence of a concrete case that allows the Court to faithfully comply with article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration, so that it is possible to analyze the existence of the damage, to verify that it is effective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group. [...] It is not denied in advance the possibility of admitting standing by collective interest, but even in that hypothesis, the necessity of the individualization of the damage persists, as a necessary requirement for the exercise of the action"* (see transcription supra). By virtue of the foregoing, it concludes: *"[...] if the members do not have standing to institute any proceeding, the association, as the representative of their legitimate rights or interests, would not have it either"* (audiovisual record of the oral judgment, from 10:39:51 to 10:40:06 hours). This Chamber does not share the criterion of the judges. It is worth recalling that, on previous occasions, this deciding body has accepted the existence of non-individualizable damages, which can be caused to collectivities: *"it is not a matter of damage generated directly upon the person of the plaintiff, but to the whole; which, for harming a diffuse interest, possesses autonomy, so it may or may not concur with damages caused individually"* (resolution No. 805-F-S1-2010 of 13 hours 55 minutes of July 5, 2010; in a similar sense, see No. 547-F-S1-2012 of 8 hours 55 minutes of May 10, 2012). That is, contrary to what the Court indicated, the fact that an injury to a subjective right of an individual is not proven, does not necessarily rule out an affectation to diffuse or collective interests. In that sense, referring to environmental damages, this Chamber has indicated that: *"the first and principal injured party is society as a whole, or rather an indeterminate generality of subjects; without prejudice to the fact that some of the individuals within the group may also be simultaneously affected in a particular manner. [...] A new and particular mode of damage is defined, which enjoys some specifications, and accordingly, the rules for its reparation cannot be equated to those that grant protection to subjective rights, simply because this type of damage can also infringe upon another type of prerogatives, such as rights of collective or general incidence"* (judgment No. 675-F-2007 of 10 hours of September 21, 2007). In the present case, we are faced with a correlative action, that is, a dual procedural action, directed –on one hand– in favor of the subjective interests and rights of the members of the ANCL; but which –from another angle– is also aimed toward the defense of diffuse and collective interests. Each of these actions has different causes and implications, without them being necessarily opposed or mutually exclusive. Thus, the plaintiff seeks that BPDC and BNCR be ordered to pay material and moral damage and the losses caused to each of their members, who signed credit contracts with those entities under the modality of interest rates referenced to the TBP. However –and this is the relevant point– its lawsuit is not limited to that; the Association also demands that those banks be ordered to inform clearly and truthfully about the economic risks that, in its view, credits under those conditions entail. For this Chamber, taking into account what was set forth in the preceding recitals (considerandos), this constitutes a claim based on a diffuse interest, in favor of all those interested –current or potential– in acquiring a bank loan (article 32, subsections c) and d), of Law No. 7472). Added to the foregoing, that claim is intimately linked to the thesis that the ANCL has advanced in this proceeding, in that such a method of calculating interest constitutes an abusive clause, incorporated into adhesion contracts that impacts, at least, some 270,017 credit operations, which represented 55% of the total, in the banks subject to that study (folio 296 of the judicial file). Thus, in the criterion of this Chamber, we have an action that advocates –in addition– for a collective interest, of the entire group of debtors –indeterminate but determinable– who signed credit contracts linked to the TBP (numeral 32, subsections b) and e), ibidem). Having clarified the foregoing, it is now necessary to analyze whether a consumer association has standing to bring an action in favor of such diffuse and collective interests.

**X.** According to what has been set forth, the country has witnessed an evolution toward the recognition and protection of the legitimate rights and interests of the consumer, which culminates with the reform of constitutional precept 46 and finds development in Law No. 7472. It is worth highlighting the first canon of said legal body, whose concept *"effectively"* provides the legal interpreter with a guideline for the exegesis of the norm, so that these rights and interests find true protection, both in administrative and judicial venues. Along these lines, the Constitutional Chamber, since resolution No. 4286-95 of 15 hours 12 minutes of August 3, 1995, considered: *"The State must have norms that allow the fulfillment of the work of consumer protection, since it is of little or no use to establish a principle of the Social State of law, if the adequate mechanisms for its development and application are not also established. [...]"*. In addition to the foregoing, that deciding body added: *"[...] The state role in this matter must stem from the consecration of an effective legal system for consumer protection, which expressly recognizes their fundamental rights, establishes the substantial solutions for the basic issues emerging from consumer relations, and finally consecrates the concrete mechanisms of implementation that allow those rights to be effectively enforced"* (judgment No. 2001-01391 of 14 hours 52 minutes of February 14, 2001). In the same sense, the First Chamber has indicated: *"In view of the emergence of an imbalanced situation in consumer relations between entrepreneurs and consumers or users, the traditional legal instruments were not sufficient to protect them. In order to avoid, or at least mitigate those differences, the legislator has created various systems of legal defense, in the interest of finding a fair equilibrium between the reciprocal interests of consumers and producers"* (resolution No. 655-F-2007 of 15 hours 5 minutes of September 19, 2007). Such an approach must guide the analysis of Law No. 7472 and, in what is of interest here, the standing for the protection of the diffuse and collective interests of consumers, insofar as these form part of the broad category of legitimate interests. That is the sense in which numeral 32, subsection f), of the referenced regulatory body must be understood, as it imposes, as one of their fundamental and inalienable rights, *"effective access mechanisms for the administrative and judicial protection of their legitimate rights and interests, that lead to the adequate prevention, sanctioning, and prompt reparation of the injury to these, as appropriate"*. The foregoing must be guaranteed by the State, as part of its essential functions, as ordered by precept 33, subsection d), ibidem: *"In the terms established in this Law, the following are essential functions of the State: // d) Guarantee access to effective and agile mechanisms of administrative and judicial protection, to defend the legitimate rights and interests of consumers"*. Similarly, rule 46 of that same regulatory body consecrates: *"To enforce their rights, the consumer may resort to the administrative or judicial route, [...]"*; from which it is important to highlight that the norm uses the concept of *"rights"*, in general terms and in a broad sense, without restricting it solely to subjective ones. In light of the transcribed provisions, it follows that the duty to prevent and, eventually, repair, is not limited to the individualizable damages that a merchant or supplier may have caused to a specific subject (or subjects); but includes any injury to the legitimate interests of consumers, which could be diffuse or collective. That is, as has been seen, the national legal system recognizes, regarding consumers, not only the subjective rights that may arise from a particular consumer relationship, but also their diffuse and collective interests; which is why access to the mechanisms for their effective protection is guaranteed, whether in the administrative or judicial sphere. On this point, observe numeral 56 of that Law, as it stipulates: *"The action before the National Consumer Commission can only be initiated by virtue of a complaint from any consumer or person, without it necessarily having to be the aggrieved party by the fact reported. [...]"*. That Commission is an organ of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce, with the task of *"hearing and sanctioning administrative infractions, breaches of the obligations established in Chapter V, and, in particular, protecting the rights of consumers, [...]"* (article 53, subsection a), of the Law under comment). Thus, precept 56 ibidem grants broad authority for anyone to set that administrative organ in operation, in pursuit of the effective defense of consumers, which, although it refers to administrative procedures, shows *"an opening regarding standing –any consumer– and predominantly objective, since what is important are the facts reported, and not who has suffered the injury"* (as recognized by this Chamber in judgment No. 870-F-2007 of 10 hours 50 minutes of December 4, 2007). Moreover, it would be contradictory if –by virtue of said norm– a consumer organization could file a complaint in an administrative venue, but was denied standing to challenge in a judicial venue what is resolved there, when what was agreed upon by the Commission was contrary to its interests. On the other hand, provision 54 of the regulatory body under comment provides: *"Consumer organizations have standing to initiate as a party or intervene, in the capacity of coadjuvants, in proceedings before the National Consumer Commission and before the courts of justice, in defense of the legitimate rights and interests of their members. [...]"*. This canon confers standing on such types of groups to intervene as a party, both in administrative and judicial venues, not only in defense of the subjective rights of their members, but also of their legitimate interests, which includes –as was explained– those that are diffuse and collective, being –as such– supraindividual and without subjection of some to others. Said precept could not be interpreted in a way that restricts that recognition, as they are rights that the legal system conceives as fundamental and inalienable; as derived from numeral 46 of the Political Constitution in relation to article 32 of Law No. 7472, to which reference has already been made. Such that what has already been indicated for environmental cases would apply here, namely: *"the simple lack of a direct relationship or of prejudice, as a matter of principle, cannot lead to a loss of standing for one who possesses a right recognized at the constitutional level"* (judgment No. 675-F-2007 of 10 hours of September 21, 2007, from this Chamber). Thus things, added to the standing that an organization may hold to advocate for the subjective rights or interests of its members (corporate interest); consumer groups, such as the ANCL, also have standing for the defense of their diffuse and collective interests. Canon 46 of the Magna Carta, in conjunction with the harmonious analysis of Law No. 7472, imposes such a conclusion, guaranteeing access to the administrative or judicial route, in order to achieve the effective protection of these rights and interests (provisions 1, 32, subsections b), e), and f), 33, subsection d), 46, 54, and 56 of the cited Law).

**XI.** Hence, this Deciding Body does not concur with the criterion of the Court, which considered that *"the necessity of the individualization of the damage persists, as a necessary requirement for the exercise of the action"*. On the contrary, the constitutional and legal precepts indicated, and their jurisprudential development, allow the conclusion that the ANCL has standing to file the present proceeding in a judicial venue, given the injury that, it argues, has been caused to the diffuse and collective interests of consumers of financial products and services, due to: the alleged lack of information about the potential risks entailed by bank loans linked to the TBP and the alleged abusive nature of the contractual clauses that stipulate that calculation method. Furthermore, it would not be possible to determine whether individualizable damages have been caused to particular persons, until it is evidenced, in the first place, whether the violation of those diffuse and collective interests that the ANCL has claimed exists; as it is necessary –first– to demonstrate whether referencing loan interest rates to the TBP truly constitutes a risk that, as such, must be disclosed, and also, whether the incorporation of those interest calculation methodologies into bank loans could be qualified as abusive clauses in adhesion contracts.

**XII.** By virtue of what was previously analyzed, it is imperative to uphold the procedural grievance invoked.

In compliance with the provisions of numeral 105.1 of the CPCA, it is appropriate to annul the appealed judgment and remand the case file (expediente) to the court of origin, so that the legally appropriate judgment may be issued.”</span></p> </div> </body> </html> On the other hand, this Chamber has highlighted the procedural aspect of diffuse interests, as a parameter linked to the right of action in certain circumstances: *“it is therefore, in the opinion of this Chamber, an interest of undefined ownership that legitimizes the subject to bring an action, which is transformed, by virtue of its incorporation into the catalog of the rights of the human person, into a kind of ‘reactional right’ (derecho reaccional), intended so that its holder may oppose the violation originating from illegitimate acts or omissions caused to a generality”* (Resolution No. 805-F-S1-2010 of 1:55 p.m. on July 5, 2010). Likewise, it is necessary to take into account that these interests *“because they are diffuse or collective, do not cease to be part of the broader category of legitimate interests”* (Judgment No. 896-F-S1-2012 of 3:00 p.m. on July 26, 2012).

**VII.** Now, regarding the matter at hand here, it is important to note that the protection of consumer rights and interests obtained express recognition at the highest normative level, through a reform implemented by Ley 7606 of May 29, 1996, to Article 46 of the Constitución Política, by virtue of which it was provided: *“Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they form for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters.”* Said constitutional canon is the product of a normative development that, in this country, finds antecedents in regulations dating back to the Código General del Estado de Costa Rica (Código de Carrillo) of July 30, 1841, which obligated the seller: *“to clearly explain that to which he obligates himself: every obscure or ambiguous pact is interpreted against the seller”* (Article 1020 of the First Part); furthermore, it sanctioned fraud in commerce committed through falsified merchandise, deceit, or alteration of weights and measures (Articles 309, 310, and 644 of the Second Part). In the 20th century, in the face of the depression of the 1930s and the Second World War, the following laws were enacted: Ley de Abastos, No. 51 of July 16, 1932; Ley de Subsistencias e Inquilinato, No. 6 of September 21, 1939; Ley de Creación de la Oficina de Defensa Económica, No. 206 of August 20, 1944; and Ley de Defensa Económica, No. 57 of March 26, 1945, aimed at regulating monopolistic practices, hoarding, price fixing, quality, inspections, and it was admitted that *“anyone may report the punishable infractions of this law”* (Article 37 of Ley 57 of 1945). In the Código Penal of 1941, Ley No. 368 of August 21, 1941, it was sanctioned to *“depreciate the quality of the services, products, or merchandise of a competitor”* and *“unfair advertising”* (Article 259), as well as defrauding another *“in the substance, quality, or quantity of the things delivered to them by virtue of a contract”* (Article 282, subsection 1). The Ley General de Salud, No. 5395 of October 30, 1973, and the Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, No. 5412 of November 8 of that same year, established rights and duties to prevent risks to the health of those who consume medicines, food, packaged products, or are users of health or educational centers, among others. Shortly thereafter, the Ley de Protección al Consumidor, No. 5665 of February 28, 1975, was issued; although it focused on price fixing and supply, it also established *“obligations of those who engage in commerce,”* which included displaying the price of products and installment sales plans in a visible place, where the interest rate, basis, and term had to be indicated; issuing an invoice; maintaining weights and measures in perfect condition; and it prohibited *“deceptive practices in the offering of goods and services”* (Article 17). In that Law, the sanctioning approach remained mostly criminal in nature, through public action that enabled anyone to file the corresponding complaint (Article 25). Upon the enactment of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, Ley No. 6815 of September 27, 1982, it was entrusted with the attribution of: *“Taking legal actions to safeguard the interests of consumers”* through a *“Procuraduría de Defensa del Consumidor”* (Articles 3, subsection i) and 7, subsection f)). That function later became part of the *“Defensoría General de los Derechos Humanos,”* according to Articles 21 and 22 of Ley No. 7142 of March 8, 1990, which were tacitly repealed by Article 32 of the Ley de la Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República, Ley No. 7319 of November 17, 1992, which assumed such competencies, until the enactment of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, Ley No. 7472 of December 20, 1994, which repealed Ley No. 5665 of 1975 and currently governs the matter. In the current legislation, monopolistic practices were prohibited and, among other things, a list of consumer rights was recognized (Article 32), in addition to correlative obligations of merchants and suppliers (Article 34).

**VIII.** It is necessary to emphasize that this legal development is not limited to recognizing subjective rights in favor of the consumer, understood as those powers of a particular individual to act validly (a position of freedom) or to demand from another(s) –including coercively– a concrete and specific conduct, for the satisfaction of their own current, legally protectable ends and interests (as would be, for example, enforcing the warranty of a product within 30 days following its purchase, pursuant to Article 43 of Ley 7472). That is, in addition to the subjective rights attributed to the parties of a specific consumer relationship, that legal system has recognized diffuse and collective interests, as fundamental and inalienable rights for the generality of consumers. Thus, Article 32, subsections b), d), and e) ibidem, contemplates: *“the protection of their legitimate economic and social interests”;* *“education and dissemination about the adequate consumption of goods or services, which ensure freedom of choice and equality in contracting”;* and *“administrative and judicial protection against misleading advertising, abusive practices and clauses, as well as unfair commercial methods or those that restrict free choice.”* In that order of ideas, the Sala Constitucional has emphasized the need to understand the consumer not only as one of the subjects of a particular commercial relationship, since it is also necessary to encompass their protection from a more general perspective: *“the Consumer Protection Law does not impose limitations or affectations on the assets of merchants in the terms of Article 45 of the Constitution. What that normative body does is not affect the private assets of each merchant, but rather regulate a specific activity, which is commercial, which has the characteristic of transcending the concrete sphere of the individual and involving the consuming public at large. Undoubtedly, the fact that third parties may be affected by commercial activity (hoarding, unreasonable profit margins, existence of private monopolies, etc.) makes it feasible for the ordinary legislator, based on Article 28 of the Carta Política, to impose special obligations on merchants in relation to the goods they offer to the public, and this is not unconstitutional as it is a consequence of the duties and legal relationships that the legal order can and must regulate. [...] The principles of social public order justify the broad development promoted around the protection of consumer rights”* (Judgment No. 4286-95 of 3:12 p.m. on August 3, 1995). Therefore, it is not surprising that this deciding body includes this matter as one of the examples where this type of interest is evidenced: *“In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a certain social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. [...]”* (Resolution No. 2002-00481 of 2:42 p.m. on January 23, 2002). Under that same perspective, this Sala Primera has considered that the concept of “consumer” is not limited to a contractual party, but rather encompasses an entire indeterminate collective, made up of the potential purchasers of a product: *“In accordance with the constitutional parameter, consumer must be understood in an expansive approach regarding the scope of application of persons requiring special protection in this matter. It is not contingent upon a ‘consumer contract,’ because that would mean applying it in a restricted and limited manner to that person who purchases or contracts. The position of modern law, according to this Deciding Body, is that they be conceived of as a client, understood as one who participates in commercial activities in the position of a potential acquirer –and not an effective purchaser– of goods and services with the offeror. Depending on the stage of the process, a distinction can be made between contracting party and client. The former is called a legal consumer. They acquire a good or service through a typical legal relationship, such as, for example, a purchase. The latter is the material consumer, who does not contract for the good or service, but may potentially acquire or use it. The latter is the center of legal protection in the field of consumer safety”* (Judgment No. 295-F-2007 of 10:45 a.m. on April 26, 2007).

**IX.** In the appealed judgment, the Tribunal considers that the ACNL lacks standing because it considers that *“we are faced with the non-existence of a concrete case that allows the Tribunal to faithfully comply with Article 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, so that it is possible to analyze the existence of the damage, to verify that it is effective, assessable, and individualizable (individualizable) in relation to a person or group. [...] It is not denied in advance the possibility of admitting standing by collective interest, but even in that hypothesis the need for the individualization (individualización) of the damage persists, as a necessary requirement for the exercise of the action”* (see transcription *supra*). By virtue of the foregoing, it concludes: *“[...] if the associates do not have standing to institute any proceeding, the association, as the representative of their rights or legitimate interests, would not have it either”* (audiovisual record of the oral judgment, from 10:39:51 a.m. to 10:40:06 a.m.). This Chamber does not share the criterion of the judges. It is worth remembering that, on previous occasions, this deciding body has accepted the existence of non-individualizable (individualizable) damages, which may be caused to collectivities: *“it is not a damage generated directly in the person of the plaintiff, but to the generality; which, because it injures a diffuse interest, possesses autonomy, so it may or may not concur with individually caused damages”* (Resolution No. 805-F-S1-2010 of 1:55 p.m. on July 5, 2010; in a similar sense, see No. 547-F-S1-2012 of 8:55 a.m. on May 10, 2012). That is, contrary to what was indicated by the Tribunal, the fact that an injury to a subjective right of an individual is not proven does not –necessarily– rule out an affectation to diffuse or collective interests. In that sense, referring to environmental damages, this Chamber has indicated that: *“the first and main injured party is society as a whole, or else an indeterminate generality of subjects; without prejudice to the fact that, simultaneously, some of the individuals in the group may also be affected in a particular manner. [...] A new and particular mode of damage is defined, which enjoys some specifications, and accordingly, the rules for its reparation cannot be equated to those that grant protection to subjective rights, simply because this type of damage may also violate other types of prerogatives, such as rights of collective or general incidence”* (Judgment No. 675-F-2007 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21, 2007). In the present case, we are faced with a correlative action, that is, a double procedural action, directed –on one hand– in favor of the interests and subjective rights of the associates of the ANCL; but which –from another angle– is also directed towards the defense of diffuse and collective interests. Each of these actions has different causes and implications, without them being necessarily opposed or mutually exclusive. Thus, the plaintiff seeks to condemn the BPDC and the BNCR to pay for the material and moral damage and the losses caused to each of its associates, who entered into credit contracts with those entities under the modality of interests referenced to the TBP. However –and this is what is relevant– its claim is not limited to that; the Association also demands that those banks be ordered to inform clearly and truthfully about the economic risks that, in its view, credits under those conditions entail. For this Chamber, taking into account what has been set forth in the preceding considerandos, this is a claim sustained on a diffuse interest, in favor of all those interested –current or potential– in acquiring a bank loan (Article 32, subsections c) and d), of Ley 7472). In addition to the foregoing, that claim is intimately linked to the thesis that the ANCL has put forward in this process, namely that such a modality of interest calculation constitutes an abusive clause (cláusula abusiva), incorporated into adhesion contracts that impacts at least some 270,017 credit operations, which represented 55% of the total, in the banks subject to that study (folio 296 of the judicial file). This Chamber thus considers that there is an action that advocates –additionally– for a collective interest, of the entire group of debtors –indeterminate but determinable– who signed credit contracts linked to the TBP (Article 32, subsections b) and e), ibidem). With the foregoing clear, it now becomes necessary to analyze whether a consumer association has standing to bring an action on behalf of such diffuse and collective interests.

**X.** According to what has been set forth, the country has witnessed an evolution towards the recognition and protection of the legitimate rights and interests of the consumer, which culminates with the reform of Article 46 of the Constitution and finds development in Ley 7472. It is worth highlighting the first canon of said legal body, whose concept *“effectively”* provides the legal interpreter with a guideline for the exegesis of the norm, so that these rights and interests find true protection, both in administrative and judicial venues. Along those lines, the Sala Constitucional, since Resolution No. 4286-95 of 3:12 p.m. on August 3, 1995, considered: *“The State must have norms that allow the fulfillment of the task of consumer protection, since it is of little or no use to establish a principle of the Social State of law if the adequate mechanisms for its development and application are not also established. [...]”*. In addition to the foregoing, that deciding body added: *“[...] The state role in this matter must start from the consecration of an effective legal system of consumer protection, which expressly recognizes their fundamental rights, establishes the substantial solutions for the basic questions emerging from consumer relations, and finally consecrates the concrete implementation mechanisms that allow those rights to be effectively enforced”* (Judgment No. 2001-01391 of 2:52 p.m. on February 14, 2001). In the same sense, the Sala Primera has indicated: *“In view of the emergence of an unbalanced situation in consumer relations between businesses and consumers or users, traditional legal instruments were not sufficient to protect them. In order to avoid, or at least attenuate those differences, the legislator has created diverse legal defense systems, in an effort to find a fair balance between the reciprocal interests of consumers and producers”* (Resolution No. 655-F-2007 of 3:05 p.m. on September 19, 2007). Such an approach must guide the analysis of Ley 7472 and, as relevant here, the standing for the protection of the diffuse and collective interests of consumers, as these form part of the broad category of legitimate interests. That is the sense in which Article 32, subsection f) of the referred normative body must be understood, in that it imposes, as one of their fundamental and inalienable rights, *“effective mechanisms of access for the administrative and judicial protection of their legitimate rights and interests, which lead to adequately preventing, sanctioning, and promptly repairing the injury to these, as appropriate.”* The foregoing must be guaranteed by the State, as part of its essential functions, as ordered by Article 33, subsection d), ibidem: *“In the terms established in this Law, the essential functions of the State are the following: // d) Guarantee access to effective and agile mechanisms of administrative and judicial protection, to defend the legitimate rights and interests of consumers.”* Similarly, Article 46 of that same regulatory body consecrates: *“To enforce their rights, the consumer may resort to the administrative or judicial route, [...]”*; from which it is important to highlight that the norm uses the concept of *“rights,”* in general terms and in a broad sense, without restricting it solely to subjective rights. In accordance with the transcribed provisions, it follows that the duty to prevent and, eventually, repair, is not limited to the individualizable (individualizable) damages that a merchant or supplier may have caused to a determined subject (or subjects); but rather includes any injury to the legitimate interests of consumers, which could be diffuse or collective. That is, as has been seen, the national legal system recognizes, regarding consumers, not only the subjective rights that may arise from a particular consumer relationship, but –also– their diffuse and collective interests; for which reason access to the mechanisms for their effective protection is guaranteed, whether in the administrative or judicial sphere. On this point, note Article 56 of that Law, in that it stipulates: *“The action before the Comisión Nacional del Consumidor may only be initiated by virtue of a complaint from any consumer or person, without it being necessary that they be the aggrieved party by the fact being reported. [...]”*. That Commission is a body of the Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio, tasked with *“hearing and sanctioning administrative infractions, breaches of the obligations established in Chapter V, and, in particular, protecting the rights of consumers, [...]”* (Article 53, subsection a), of the Law under discussion). Thus, Article 56 ibidem grants a broad power for anyone to set that administrative body in motion, in pursuit of the effective defense of consumers, which, although it refers to administrative procedures, evidences *“an opening regarding standing –any consumer– and predominantly objective, since what is important are the reported facts, and not who has suffered the injury”* (as this Chamber recognized in Judgment No. 870-F-2007 of 10:50 a.m. on December 4, 2007). Furthermore, it would be contradictory if –by virtue of said norm– a consumer organization could file a complaint in the administrative venue, but were denied standing to challenge in the judicial venue what is resolved there, when what was agreed upon by the Commission was contrary to its interests. Moreover, Article 54 of the normative body under discussion provides: *“Consumer organizations have standing to initiate as a party or intervene, in the capacity of coadjuvants, in proceedings before the Comisión Nacional del Consumidor and before the courts of justice, in defense of the legitimate rights and interests of their associates. [...]”*. This canon confers standing on such types of groups to intervene as a party, in both the administrative and judicial venues, not only in defense of the subjective rights of their associates, but also their legitimate interests, which includes –as explained– the diffuse and collective ones, being –as such– supraindividual (supraindividuales) and without subjection of some to others. Said precept could not be interpreted in a way that restricts that recognition, as they are rights that the legal system conceives of as fundamental and inalienable; as derived from Article 46 of the Constitución Política in relation to Article 32 of Ley 7472, to which reference has already been made. Thus, what has already been indicated for cases in environmental matters would apply here, namely: *“the simple lack of a direct relationship or of harm, in principle, cannot lead to a loss of standing for one who possesses a right recognized at the constitutional level”* (Judgment No. 675-F-2007 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21, 2007, of this Chamber). This being the case, in addition to the standing that an organization may hold to advocate for the subjective rights or interests of its associates (corporate interest); consumer groups, such as the ANCL, also have standing for the defense of their diffuse and collective interests. Article 46 of the Carta Magna, in conjunction with the harmonious analysis of Ley 7472, imposes such a conclusion, guaranteeing access to the administrative or judicial route, in order to achieve the effective protection of these rights and interests (Articles 1, 32, subsections b), e), and f), 33, subsection d), 46, 54, and 56 of the cited Law).

**XI.** Hence, this Deciding Body does not agree with the Tribunal's criterion, in that it considers that *“the need for the individualization (individualización) of the damage persists, as a necessary requirement for the exercise of the action.”* On the contrary, the constitutional and legal precepts indicated, and their jurisprudential development, allow the conclusion that the ANCL has standing to file the present proceeding in the judicial venue, given the injury that, it argues, has been caused to the diffuse and collective interests of consumers of financial products and services, due to: the alleged lack of information about the eventual risks that bank credits linked to the TBP entail and the alleged abusive nature of the contractual clauses stipulating that calculation modality. Moreover, it would not be possible to determine whether individualizable (individualizable) damages have been caused to particular persons, until it is shown, first, whether there exists the violation of those diffuse and collective interests that the ANCL has claimed; in that it is necessary –firstly– to demonstrate whether referencing the interest on credits to the TBP truly constitutes a risk that, as such, must be informed and, additionally, whether the incorporation of those interest calculation methodologies in bank credits could be qualified as abusive clauses in adhesion contracts.

**XII.** By virtue of the foregoing analysis, it is necessary to uphold the procedural grievance invoked. In accordance with the provisions of Article 105.1 of the CPCA, it is appropriate to annul the appealed judgment and remand the case file to the court of origin, so that the judgment that may be appropriate in law is issued.

“IV. Para el resolver el cargo en contra de la falta de legitimación activa de la ANCL –alegada por los bancos demandados y acogida en la sentencia que se impugna– importa hacer referencia a los razonamientos utilizados por los juzgadores para sustentar su decisión, quienes señalaron lo siguiente: “En cuanto al fondo del asunto, para efectos del análisis de la demanda, este Tribunal luego de escuchar en juicio las intervenciones de las partes y la prueba testimonial, observa que la cuestión a resolver es la eventual responsabilidad objetiva, recayendo esta condición en los bancos demandados, atribuyéndole una conducta que está vinculada a los vaivenes de la tasa básica pasiva, la cual reflejó una tendencia hacia el alza en el período que le interesa a la Asociación actora; es decir, a partir del segundo semestre del año 2007 y a la fecha de presentación de la demanda. Pero en la forma en que la parte actora definió la pretensión, desde la audiencia preliminar, observa el Tribunal que la petitoria de la demanda refiere a un contenido abstracto e indeterminado, dejando concreto que permita al Tribunal dar fiel cumplimiento al artículo 196 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, de manera que sea posible analizar la existencia del daño, para comprobar que sea efectivo, evaluable e individualizable con relación a una persona o grupo. El Tribunal de Juicio tiene plena conciencia de que el artículo 122, inciso m), del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo admite la condenatoria en abstracto de los daños y perjuicios, pero ni aún en ese supuesto resulta admisible pensar que esa condición –etérea– se refiere no sólo a la condenatoria sino también a sujetos en abstracto, es decir, no identificados, puesto que la norma exige siempre, al menos, la acreditación de una conducta administrativa o relación jurídica administrativa, que debe entenderse necesariamente como aquella que nace de la interrelación entre la Administración y el administrado, de manera que resulte oponible por quien resultó afectado. De antemano no se niega la posibilidad de admitir la legitimación por interés colectivo pero aún en esa hipótesis persiste la necesidad de la individualización del daño, como requisito necesario para el ejercicio de la acción, ya que admitir lo contrario implicaría dar cabida a demandas con pretensiones abstractas, siendo impensable el dictado de una eventual sentencia abstracta, que evade de esa forma la referencia de una relación jurídico administrativa, concreta y específica, como generadora del daño, conducta frente a la cual bien pudo reclamar el consumidor planteando una pretensión en forma individual o en forma colectiva, pero en ambos casos acreditado, al menos, la existencia de esa relación y el interés del afectado para hacer valer sus derechos. En el presente caso no ha sido posible ubicar una manifestación expresa, que dé a entender que la Asociación actora cumplió el mandato citado en las normas mencionadas, pues hemos revisado las hipótesis y la demanda no cumple alguna o cualesquiera de ellas, es decir, uno, que cada asociado afectado por las condiciones del crédito que reclama la citada demanda, haya delegado la representación de su caso individual en la Asociación dicha, por medio de poder conforme a derecho; o bien, dos, que independientemente de la existencia de un poder para ejercer la representación y tratándose de un interés colectivo la Asociación actora haya demandado en representación efectiva de sus miembros, habiendo acreditado de manera anticipada la identificación de cada uno de ellos y el contexto de sus casos en particular, individualizando cuáles son los asociados que fueron sujetos del crédito en las condiciones que precisamente se reclama en la demanda. Para corroborar lo dicho basta observar, precisamente, la demanda en su elenco fáctico, probatorio y petitorio, donde nos queda la impresión de que la Asociación actora más bien está intentando una especie de acción popular, la que no es admitida, al menos, en los términos del artículo 10, inciso 1), subinciso d) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo”. (Registro audiovisual de la lectura de sentencia oral, de las 10:18:57 a las 10:23:39 horas). Adicional a lo transcrito, el Tribunal realizó la lectura –prácticamente en su totalidad– del considerando V de la sentencia de esa misma Sección, no. 175-2011 de las 14 horas del 31 de agosto de 2011, referido a la falta de legitimación de la ANCL en una demanda contra el Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago, incorporando dichos argumentos a la resolución oral de este proceso. Allí refieren a la diferencia entre legitimación “ad procesum” y “ad causam”, entendida la primera como capacidad procesal (presupuesto del proceso) y la segunda como legitimación propiamente dicha, sea tanto activa o pasiva (presupuesto material o de la pretensión), respecto de lo cual adiciona extensas citas de jurisprudencia y doctrina. Agregan, en el precepto 54 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, Ley no. 7472 del 20 de diciembre de 1994, el legislador previó una legitimación directa y una indirecta. En el primer caso, incluye a los consumidores que se asocian para litigar en la vía administrativa o judicial, no de manera individual, sino por intermedio de la corporación; o bien, cuando algunas personas integrantes de una agrupación son afectadas por la práctica de un comerciante, por lo que ésta los defendería. De ahí que, si los miembros no cuentan con legitimación para instaurar un proceso, la asociación tampoco la tendría. La indirecta sería, según los juzgadores, equivalente a la figura de la coadyuvancia, mediante la cual la entidad grupal concurre a estrados cuando alguno de sus integrantes podría verse beneficiado de las resultas del proceso, en tanto los efectos del fallo se podrían extender a algún otro o nuevo proceso. No logran deducir, señalan, una especie de legitimación ampliada, abierta o semejante, a favor de las asociaciones de consumidores por su mera condición, aún cuando sus integrantes o la razón social no evidencien ninguna relación directa con el objeto procesal. La parte actora, indican, pretende extraer una especie de acción popular, lo que no es compartido por el Tribunal; pues, en su criterio, el fin de la norma es permitir que los grupos de consumidores, especialmente con afectaciones pequeñas o de poco valor económico, pudieran presentar una pretensión conjunta para tomar fuerza de grupo, lo que no se configura en el presente caso. Mencionan los supuestos contemplados en el canon 10 del CPCA y las diferencias entre intereses colectivos y difusos. Los primeros, manifiestan, hacen referencia a grupos limitados, a veces unidos por un vínculo jurídico, para la persecución de fines propios; lo que permite que personas con pequeñas pretensiones puedan litigar como grupo, repartiéndose todos los costos del proceso y otorgándole más fuerza a sus pretensiones personales, pero consideradas en forma colectiva. Por su parte, en los difusos, explican, afectan al individuo como miembro de la sociedad, en donde no hay un particular vínculo jurídico y, por ello, se permite que cualquiera gestione para hacer valer la tutela general y preventiva. El precepto 54 de la Ley no. 7472, continúan, regula dos supuestos, la legitimación directa de la persona que efectivamente integra la relación procesal y la Asociación de Consumidores que defiende los intereses legítimos de sus asociados. Sin embargo, la Asociación demandante parece extraer que su condición le faculta plantear cualquier tipo de proceso en beneficio de los consumidores, al margen de si se trata de afiliados o no, quienes pudieran verse afectados por una práctica de comercio concreta. Tal mecanismo, aseguran, permitiría una burla procesal, pues cualquier persona que se encuentre en unas situación semejante, en caso de obtener una resolución favorable, podría recurrir a unirse a la agrupación, con el único fin de economizarse el proceso, cuando ya el ordenamiento jurídico prevé un mecanismo para tal circunstancia (numerales 185 a 188 del CPCA), de ahí que se debe declarar la falta de legitimación de la ANCL (todo lo anterior se extrae del registro audiovisual de la sentencia oral, de las 10:24:52 a las 10:49:28 horas). Por último, en cuanto la prueba testimonial recibida en el juicio oral, el Tribunal consideró: “Sus testimonios resultan inertes, a los efectos del dictado de la presente sentencia, ya que no permiten acreditar aspectos procesales, como el relacionado con la legitimación; quedando en evidencia que los relatos de los testigos de la Asociación actora hacían referencia a casos que no estaban sometidos a valoración, en el contexto de la demanda, según el planteamiento de los hechos, de las pruebas y de las pretensiones que fueron trabados en la litis. No desconocemos el valor y la importancia de las situaciones materiales o emocionales de cada una de las personas ofrecidas por dicha Asociación, tal y como fueron escuchadas por el Tribunal, pues entendemos con claridad que cada circunstancia es el resultado de una apreciación subjetiva que merece el respeto de todos los que interactuamos en juicio oral; pero tampoco podemos desconocer lo que ya dijimos, en el entendido que estas declaraciones reflejan cuatro situaciones específicas, que no conforman parte del elenco de hechos que presentó la Asociación actora, dado que en la demanda no existe referencia alguna a casos en particular, según hemos referido anteriormente”. (Registro audiovisual de la sentencia oral, de las 10:50:15 a las 10:51:48 horas).

V.Tal y como se explicó, el casacionista combate la sentencia por cuanto, alega, su representada ha invocado la defensa de intereses difusos, colectivos y los que denomina individuales homogéneos, por el desequilibrio generado en la relación de consumo entre las entidades bancarias y los usuarios, al referenciar los intereses corrientes a la TBP. De tal forma que, estima, sin mediar información pertinente y advertencias sobre los riesgos, se incorporaron cláusulas abusivas en los contratos de crédito, las cuales se materializaron en un aumento desproporcionado de las cuotas que debían cancelar los deudores. Su legitimación para la defensa de estos intereses, alega, la encuentra en los preceptos 27 y 46 de la Constitución Política, 1023 del Código Civil, 54 de la Ley no. 7472, así como los cardinales 9,10, 48 y 130, inciso 2), del CPCA, los cuales considera infringidos por la sentencia impugnada. En virtud de lo anterior, conviene realizar –de previo– una breve referencia a los conceptos de intereses difusos y colectivos; a partir de ahí, determinar su aplicación en materia del consumidor y, con ello, dilucidar el punto que aquí se discute.

VI.En el amplio espectro de los intereses, donde en un extremo se tienen los generales y en el otro los individuales, los difusos se colocan en un punto intermedio y, en la medida en que se especifican, se ubican los colectivos y, luego, los corporativos. De esta forma, los intereses difusos, aún pudiendo ser relevantes para un sujeto, trascienden hacia una dimensión supra-individual, extendiéndose a un conjunto más o menos extenso y amorfo de personas, no organizadas formalmente, que pueden ser vinculadas a un bien jurídico tutelado, como punto de referencia objetivo (ambiente natural, salud, patrimonio cultural, Hacienda Pública, etc.) o unidas a partir de una determinada condición subjetiva (por ejemplo una característica física, origen étnico o una necesidad social). Al respecto, esta Sala lo ha entendido como un interés “extendido, difundido, dilatado; se propaga o diluye entre los miembros del conjunto sea que este se encuentre o no organizado y compacto” (sentencia no. 675-F-2007 de las 10 horas del 21 de setiembre de 2007). Estos intereses –por ser tales– pertenecen a una colectividad; sin embargo, cuando se pueden concretizar en un grupo identificable, se les denomina colectivos en sentido estricto o de categoría; así, este órgano decisor los ha distinguido de la siguiente manera: “La distinción que debe realizarse sobre este aspecto es que, a diferencia de lo que ocurre en el interés difuso, en el colectivo este grupo es determinable” (sentencia no. 896-F-S1-2012 de las 15 horas del 26 de julio de 2012). Valga acotar que, cuando el ligamen se da por una relación previa derivada de la pertenencia a un grupo jurídicamente organizado, se trataría entonces de un interés corporativo (tal es el caso, por ejemplo, de los colegios profesionales). Por otra parte, esta Sala ha destacado la arista procesal de los intereses difusos, como parámetro vinculado al derecho de acción en determinadas circunstancias: “se trata por ello, en tesis de esta Cámara, de un interés de titularidad indefinida que legitima al sujeto para accionar, el cual se transforma, en virtud de su incorporación al elenco de los derechos de la persona humana, en una especie de ‘derecho reaccional’, dispuesto a fin de que su titular se oponga a la violación originada en actos u omisiones ilegítimas, causados a una globalidad” (resolución no. 805-F-S1-2010 de las 13 horas 55 minutos del 5 de julio de 2010). Asimismo, es necesario tomar en cuenta que estos intereses “por ser difusos o colectivos, no dejan de integrar la categoría más amplia de los legítimos” (sentencia no. 896-F-S1-2012 de las 15 horas del 26 de julio de 2012).

VII.Ahora bien, en cuanto al tema que aquí interesa, importa advertir que la protección de los derechos e intereses de los consumidores obtuvo reconocimiento expreso en la más alta jerarquía normativa, mediante reforma operada por Ley no. 7606 del 29 de mayo de 1996 al precepto 46 de la Constitución Política, en virtud de la cual se dispuso: “Los consumidores y usuarios tienen derecho a la protección de su salud, ambiente, seguridad e intereses económicos; a recibir información adecuada y veraz; a la libertad de elección, y a un trato equitativo. El Estado apoyará los organismos que ellos constituyan para la defensa de sus derechos. La ley regulará esas materias”. Dicho canon constitucional es producto de un desarrollo normativo que, en este país, encuentra antecedentes en normas que datan desde el Código General del Estado de Costa Rica (Código de Carrillo) del 30 de julio de 1841, el cual obligaba al vendedor: “á [sic] explicar claramente aquello á [sic] que se obliga: todo pacto oscuro ó [sic] ambiguo, se interpreta contra el vendedor” (artículo 1020 de la Parte Primera); además, sancionaba los fraudes en el comercio que se hubieran cometido mediante mercadería falsificada, engaño o alteración de pesas y medidas (numerales 309, 310 y 644 de la Parte Segunda). En el siglo XX, ante la depresión de los años 30 y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, se promulgaron las leyes de Abastos, no. 51 del 16 de julio de 1932; de Subsistencias e Inquilinato, no. 6 del 21 de setiembre de 1939; de Creación de la Oficina de Defensa Económica, no. 206 del 20 de agosto de 1944 y de Defensa Económica, no. 57 del 26 de marzo de 1945, tendentes a regular prácticas monopolísticas, acaparamiento, fijación de precios, calidad, inspecciones y se admitía que “cualquiera puede denunciar las infracciones punibles de esta ley” (precepto 37 de la Ley no. 57 de 1945). En el Código Penal de 1941, Ley no. 368 del 21 de agosto de 1941, se sancionaba “depreciar la calidad de los servicios, productos o mercancías de un competidor” y la “propaganda desleal” (canon 259), así como defraudar a otro “en la sustancia, calidad o cantidad las cosas que le entregue en virtud de contrato” (artículo 282, inciso 1). La Ley General de Salud, no. 5395 del 30 de octubre de 1973 y la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, no. 5412 del 8 de noviembre de ese mismo año, establecieron derechos y deberes para prevenir riesgos a la salud de quienes consumen medicinas, alimentos, productos envasados o son usuarios de centros de salud o educativos, entre otros. Poco después, se emitió la Ley de Protección al Consumidor, no. 5665 del 28 de febrero de 1975, si bien se centraba en fijación de precios y abastecimiento, también establecía “obligaciones de quienes ejercen el comercio” , lo cual contemplaba exponer en lugar visible el precio de los productos y los planes de venta a plazos, donde se debía indicar la tasa de interés, base y plazo; extender factura; mantener en perfectas condiciones la pesas y medidas y prohibía las “prácticas engañosas en la oferta de bienes y servicios” (artículo 17). En esa Ley, el enfoque sancionatorio seguía siendo mayoritariamente de carácter penal, mediante acción pública que posibilitaba a cualquiera interponer la respectiva denuncia (precepto 25). Al promulgarse la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, Ley no. 6815 del 27 de setiembre de 1982, se le encomendó la atribución de: “Tomar las acciones legales en resguardo de los intereses de los consumidores” mediante una “Procuraduría de Defensa del Consumidor” (numerales 3, inciso i) y 7, inciso f). Dicha función pasó luego a formar parte de la “Defensoría General de los Derechos Humanos”, según los artículos 21 y 22 de la Ley no. 7142 del 8 de marzo de 1990, los cuales fueron derogados tácitamente por el canon 32 de la Ley de la Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República, Ley no. 7319 del 17 de noviembre de 1992, que asumió tales competencias, hasta la promulgación de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, Ley no. 7472 del 20 de diciembre de 1994, que derogó la Ley no. 5665 de 1975 y actualmente rige la materia. En la normativa vigente, se prohibieron prácticas monopolísticas y, entre otras cosas, se reconoció un elenco de derechos del consumidor (precepto 32), además de correlativas obligaciones de los comerciantes y proveedores (canon 34).

VIII.Es necesario destacar que ese desarrollo jurídico no se limita a reconocer derechos subjetivos a favor del consumidor, entendidos como aquellos poderes de un individuo particular para obrar válidamente (posición de libertad) o de exigir a otro(s) –inclusive coactivamente– una conducta concreta y específica, para la satisfacción de fines e intereses propios y actuales, jurídicamente tutelables (tal como lo sería, por ejemplo, hacer valer la garantía de un producto dentro de los 30 días siguientes a su compra, conforme el artículo 43 de la Ley no. 7472). Sea, aunado a los derechos subjetivos que se le atribuyen a las partes de una determinada relación de consumo, ese ordenamiento ha reconocido intereses difusos y colectivos, como derechos fundamentales e irrenunciables para la generalidad de los consumidores. Así, el precepto 32, incisos b), d) y e) ibídem, contempla: “la protección de sus legítimos intereses económicos y sociales” ; “la educación y la divulgación sobre el consumo adecuado de bienes o servicios, que aseguren la libertad de escogencia y la igualdad en la contratación” y “la protección administrativa y judicial contra la publicidad engañosa, las prácticas y las cláusulas abusivas, así como los métodos comerciales desleales o que restrinjan la libre elección”. En ese orden de ideas, la Sala Constitucional ha resaltado la necesidad de comprender al consumidor no sólo como uno de los sujetos de una relación comercial particular, toda vez que también es necesario abarcar su protección desde una perspectiva más general: “la Ley de Protección al Consumidor no impone limitaciones o afectaciones al patrimonio de los comerciantes en los términos del artículo 45 constitucional. Lo que ese cuerpo normativo hace, no es afectar el patrimonio privado de cada comerciante, sino regular una actividad específica que es la comercial, que tiene la característica de trascender el ámbito concreto del particular e involucrar al gran público consumidor. Sin duda, el hecho de que los terceros puedan resultar afectados por la actividad comercial (acaparamiento, porcentajes de utilidad irrazonables, existencia de monopolios de carácter privado, etc.) hace factible que el legislador ordinario disponga, con fundamento en el artículo 28 de la Carta Política obligaciones especiales a los comerciantes, en relación con los bienes que ofrecen al público y ello no resulta inconstitucional en tanto es consecuencia de los deberes y relaciones jurídicas que el ordenamiento jurídico puede y debe regular. […] Los principios de orden público social justifican el amplio desarrollo que se promueve en torno a la protección de los derechos de los consumidores” (sentencia no. 4286-95 de las 15 horas 12 minutos del 3 de agosto de 1995). Por ello, no es de extrañar que ese órgano decisor incluya esta materia como uno de los ejemplos donde se evidencia este tipo de intereses: “En síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. […]” (resolución no. 2002-00481 de las 14 horas 42 minutos del 23 de enero de 2002). Bajo esa misma óptica, esta Sala Primera ha considerado que el concepto de “consumidor” no se limita a una parte contractual, sino que comprende a todo un colectivo indeterminado, conformado por los potenciales adquirentes de un producto: “En concordancia con el parámetro constitucional, consumidor, debe entenderse en un planteamiento expansivo respecto al ámbito de aplicación de las personas que requieran de una especial protección en esta materia. No se supedita a un “contrato de consumo”, porque significaría aplicarla de forma restringida y limitada a aquella persona que compra, o que contrata. La posición del derecho moderno, según este Órgano decidor, es que se le conciba como cliente, entendido a quien participa en las actividades comerciales en la posición de potencial adquiriente -y no comprador efectivo-, de bienes y servicios con el titular de la oferta. Dependiendo de la etapa del proceso, se puede distinguir entre contratante y cliente. El primero, se denomina consumidor jurídico. Adquiere un bien o servicio mediante una relación jurídica típica, como por ejemplo, la compra. El segundo es el consumidor material, quien no contrata el bien o servicio, puede potencialmente adquirirlo o utilizarlo. Este último es el centro de protección jurídica en el ámbito de la seguridad de los consumidores” (sentencia no. 295-F-2007 de las 10 horas 45 minutos del 26 de abril de 2007).

IX.En la sentencia impugnada, el Tribunal estima que la ACNL carece de legitimación por cuanto considera que “nos encontramos ante la inexistencia de un caso en concreto que permita al Tribunal dar fiel cumplimiento al artículo 196 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, de manera que sea posible analizar la existencia del daño, para comprobar que sea efectivo, evaluable e individualizable con relación a una persona o grupo. […]. De antemano no se niega la posibilidad de admitir la legitimación por interés colectivo pero aún en esa hipótesis persiste la necesidad de la individualización del daño, como requisito necesario para el ejercicio de la acción” (ver transcripción supra). En virtud de lo anterior, concluye: “[…] si los asociados no presentan legitimación para instaurar algún proceso, la asociación, en cuanto representante de los derechos o intereses legítimos de estos, tampoco lo tendría” (registro audiovisual de la sentencia oral, de las 10:39:51 a las 10:40:06 horas). Esta Sala no comparte el criterio de los juzgadores. Conviene recordar que, en anteriores oportunidades, este órgano decisor ha aceptado la existencia de daños no individualizables, que pueden ser causados a colectividades: “no se trata de un daño generado directamente en la persona de la actora, sino a la globalidad; que por lesionar un interés difuso, posee autonomía, por lo que puede o no concurrir con daños causados individualmente” (resolución no. 805-F-S1-2010 de las 13 horas 55 minutos del 5 de julio de 2010; en similar sentido véase la no. 547-F-S1-2012 de las 8 horas 55 minutos del 10 de mayo de 2012). Es decir, contrario a lo indicado por el Tribunal, el hecho de que no se llegue a demostrar una lesión a un derecho subjetivo de un particular, no descarta –necesariamente– una afectación a intereses difusos o colectivos. En ese sentido, refiriéndose a los daños ambientales, esta Cámara ha indicado que: “el primer y principal damnificado es la sociedad en su conjunto, o bien una generalidad indeterminada de sujetos; sin perjuicio de que simultáneamente también puedan resultar afectados en forma particular, algunos de los individuos del grupo. […]. […] Se define un nuevo y particular modo de daño, el cual goza de algunas especificaciones, y conforme a ello, las reglas para su reparación no podrán equipararse a las que otorgan protección a los derechos subjetivos, simplemente porque este tipo de daño puede conculcar además otro tipo de prerrogativas, como los derechos de incidencia colectiva o general” (sentencia no. 675-F-2007 de las 10 horas del 21 de setiembre de 2007). En el presente caso, se está ante una acción correlativa, es decir, una doble acción procesal, dirigida –por un lado– a favor de los intereses y derechos subjetivos de los asociados a la ANCL; pero que –desde otro ángulo– también se encuentra encaminada hacia la defensa de intereses difusos y colectivos. Cada una de estas acciones tiene causas e implicaciones diferentes, sin que sean necesariamente contrapuestas o excluyentes. Así, la demandante pretende se condene al BPDC y al BNCR al pago del daño material y moral y los perjuicios causados a cada uno de sus asociados, que suscribieron con esas entidades contratos crediticios bajo la modalidad de intereses referenciados a la TBP. Sin embargo –he aquí lo relevante– su demanda no se limita a ello, la Asociación también exige se ordene a esos bancos informar de manera clara y veraz sobre los riesgos económicos que, en su criterio, entrañan los créditos en esas condiciones. Para esta Sala, tomándose en cuenta lo de un reclamo sustentado en un interés difuso, a favor de todos aquellos interesados –actuales o potenciales– en adquirir un crédito bancario (artículo 32, incisos c) y d), de la Ley no. 7472). Aunado a lo anterior, esa pretensión se encuentra íntimamente ligada con la tesis que la ANCL ha esgrimido en este proceso, en cuanto que tal modalidad de cálculo de intereses constituye una cláusula abusiva, incorporada en contratos de adhesión que impacta, al menos, unas 270.017 operaciones de crédito, las cuales representaban un 55% del total, en los bancos objeto de ese estudio (folio 296 del expediente judicial). Se tiene así, en criterio de esta Cámara, una acción que aboga –además– por un interés colectivo, de todo el grupo de deudores –indeterminado pero determinable– que suscribieron contratos de créditos vinculados a la TBP (numeral 32, incisos b) y e), ibídem). Teniéndose claro lo anterior, resulta ahora necesario analizar si una asociación de consumidores se encuentra legitimada para accionar en favor de tales intereses difusos y colectivos.

X.Según lo que se ha expuesto, el país ha presenciado una evolución hacia el reconocimiento y protección de los derechos e intereses legítimos del consumidor, que culmina con la reforma del precepto 46 constitucional y encuentra desarrollo en la Ley no. 7472. Conviene destacar el canon primero de dicho cuerpo legal, cuyo concepto “efectivamente” le brinda al intérprete jurídico una pauta para la exégesis de la norma, con el fin de que estos derechos e intereses encuentren verdadero resguardo, tanto en sede administrativa como judicial. En esa línea, la Sala Constitucional, desde la resolución no. 4286-95 de las 15 horas 12 minutos del 3 de agosto de 1995, estimó: “El Estado debe contar con normas que permitan el cumplimiento de la labo r de protección al consumidor, ya que, de poco o nada sirve establecer un principio del Estado Social de derecho, sino se establecen, además, los mecanismos adecuados para su desarrollo y aplicación. […]”. Aunado a lo anterior, ese órgano decisor agregó: “[…] El rol estatal en esta materia debe partir de la consagración de un sistema legal efectivo de protección del consumidor, que reconozca para las cuestiones básicas emergentes de las relaciones de consumo, y finalmente consagre los mecanismos concretos de implementación que permitan hacer valer efectivamente aquellos derechos” (sentencia no. 2001-01391 de las 14 horas 52 minutos del 14 de febrero de 2001). En el mismo sentido, la Sala Primera ha indicado: “En vista del surgimiento de una situación desequilibrada en las relaciones de consumo entre empresarios y consumidores o usuarios, los instrumentos jurídicos tradicionales no resultaban suficientes para tutelarlos. Con el fin de evitar, o al menos atenuar esas diferencias, el legislador ha creado diversos sistemas jurídicos de defensa, en aras de encontrar un justo equilibrio entre los intereses recíprocos de consumidores y productores” (resolución no. 655-F-2007 de las 15 horas 5 minutos del 19 de septiembre de 2007). Tal enfoque debe guiar el análisis de la Ley no. 7472 y, en lo que aquí interesa, la legitimación para la tutela de los intereses difusos y colectivos de los consumidores, en tanto estos integran la amplia categoría de los legítimos. Ese es el sentido en que debe ser entendido el numeral 32, inciso f), del referido cuerpo normativo, en cuanto impone, como uno de sus derechos fundamentales e irrenunciables, los “mecanismos efectivos de acceso para la tutela administrativa y judicial de sus derechos e intereses legítimos, que conduzcan a prevenir adecuadamente, sancionar y reparar con prontitud la lesión de estos, según corresponda”. Lo anterior debe ser garantizado por el Estado, como parte de sus funciones esenciales, según lo ordena el precepto 33, inciso d), ibídem: “En los términos establecidos en la presente Ley, son funciones esenciales del Estado las siguientes: // d) Garantizar el acceso a mecanismos efectivos y ágiles de tutela administrativa y judicial, para defender los derechos y los intereses legítimos de los consumidores”. De igual forma, la regla 46 de ese mismo cuerpo regulatorio, consagra: “Para hacer valer sus derechos, el consumidor puede acudir a la vía administrativa o a la judicial, […]”; de donde interesa destacar que la norma utiliza el concepto de “derechos”, en términos generales y en sentido amplio, sin restringirlo únicamente a los subjetivos. Al tenor de las disposiciones transcritas, se tiene que el deber de prevenir y, eventualmente, reparar, no se limita a los daños individualizables que un comerciante o proveedor pudo haber causado a un sujeto (o sujetos) determinado(s); sino que incluye toda lesión a los intereses legítimos de los consumidores, lo cuales podrían ser difusos o colectivos. Es decir, según se ha visto, el ordenamiento jurídico patrio reconoce, respecto de los consumidores, no sólo los derechos subjetivos que puedan surgir de una relación particular de consumo, sino –también– sus intereses difusos y colectivos; motivo por el cual se garantiza el acceso a los mecanismos para su efectiva tutela, ya sea en el ámbito administrativo o judicial. Sobre el particular, obsérvese el numeral 56 de esa Ley, en cuanto estipula: “La acción ante la Comisión Nacional del Consumidor sólo puede iniciarse en virtud de una denuncia de cualquier consumidor o persona, sin que sea necesariamente el agraviado por el hecho que denuncia. […]”. Esa Comisión es un órgano del Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio, con la tarea de “conocer y sancionar las infracciones administrativas, los incumplimientos de las obligaciones establecidas en el Capítulo V y, en particular, tutelar los derechos de los consumidores, […]” (artículo 53, inciso a), de la Ley en comentario). Así, el precepto 56 ibídem, otorga una amplia facultad para que cualquiera ponga en operación ese órgano administrativo, en procura de la defensa efectiva de los consumidores, que si bien se encuentra referida a procedimientos administrativos, evidencia “una apertura en cuanto a la legitimación –cualquier consumidor– y predominantemente objetiva, ya que lo importante son los hechos denunciados, y no quién ha sufrido la lesión” (según lo reconoció esta Cámara en la sentencia no. 870-F-2007 de las 10 horas 50 minutos del 4 de diciembre de 2007). Mas aún, sería contradictorio que –en virtud de dicha norma– una organización de consumidores pudiera interponer una denuncia en sede administrativa, pero se le negara la legitimación para impugnar en sede judicial lo que allí se resuelva, cuando lo acordado por la Comisión fuera contrario a sus intereses. Por otra parte, la disposición 54 del cuerpo normativo en comentario dispone: “Las organizaciones de consumidores están legitimadas para iniciar como parte o intervenir, en calidad de coadyuvantes, en los procedimientos ante la Comisión Nacional del Consumidor y ante los tribunales de justicia, en defensa de los derechos y los intereses legítimos de sus asociados. […]”. Este canon confiere legitimación a tal tipo de agrupaciones para intervenir en calidad de parte, tanto en sede administrativa como judicial, no sólo en defensa de los derechos subjetivos de sus asociados, sino también de sus intereses legítimos, lo cual incluye –según se explicó– los difusos y colectivos, siendo –como tales– supraindividuales y sin sujeción de unos a otros. Dicho precepto no podría ser interpretado de forma que restrinja ese reconocimiento, en tanto se trata de derechos que el ordenamiento jurídico concibe como fundamentales e irrenunciables; según se deriva del numeral 46 de la Constitución Política en relación con el artículo 32 de la Ley no. 7472, a los que ya se hizo referencia. De tal suerte que aplicaría aquí lo que ya se ha indicado para casos en materia de ambiente, sea: “la simple falta de relación directa o de perjuicio, en tesis de principio, no puede conducir a una pérdida de la legitimación para quien posee un derecho reconocido a nivel constitucional” (sentencia no. 675-F-2007 de las 10 horas del 21 de setiembre de 2007, de esta Sala). Así las cosas, aunado a la legitimación que pueda ostentar una organización para abogar por los derechos subjetivos o los intereses de sus asociados (interés corporativo); las agrupaciones de consumidores, como la ANCL, se encuentran también legitimadas para la defensa de sus intereses difusos y colectivos. El canon 46 de la Carta Magna, en consuno con el análisis armónico de la Ley no. 7472, impone tal conclusión, garantizando el acceso a la vía administrativa o judicial, con el fin de lograr la tutela efectiva de estos derechos e intereses (disposiciones 1, 32, incisos b), e), y f), 33, inciso d), 46, 54 y 56 de la citada Ley).

XI.De ahí que, este Órgano Decisor no concuerda con el criterio del Tribunal, en cuanto estima que “persiste la necesidad de la individualización del daño, como requisito necesario para el ejercicio de la acción”. Por el contrario, los preceptos constitucionales y legales señalados, y su desarrollo jurisprudencial, permiten concluir que la ANCL se encuentra legitimada para para interponer el presente proceso en sede judicial, ante la lesión que, arguye, se ha causado a los intereses difusos y colectivos de los consumidores de productos y servicios financieros, por causa de: la supuesta falta de información acerca de los eventuales riesgos que implican los créditos bancarios vinculados a la TBP y la alegada naturaleza abusiva de las cláusulas contractuales que estipulen esa modalidad de cálculo. Más aún, no sería posible determinar si se han ocasionado daños individualizables a las personas particulares, hasta tanto no se evidencie, en primer lugar, si existe la vulneración a esos intereses difusos y colectivos que la ANCL ha reclamado; en tanto es preciso –primeramente– demostrar si referenciar los intereses de los créditos a la TBP constituye realmente un riesgo que, como tal, debe ser informado y, además, si la incorporación de esas metodologías de cálculo de intereses en los créditos bancarios podrían ser calificadas como cláusulas abusivas en contratos de adhesión.

XII.En virtud de lo anteriormente analizado, se impone acoger el agravio procesal invocado. En atención a lo dispuesto en el numeral 105.1 del CPCA, procede anular la sentencia impugnada y reenviar el corresponda.”