Unification of criteria on insignificance in simple theftUnificación de criterio sobre insignificancia en el hurto simple

“II.- The claim is admissible and the application of substantive law regarding the offense of simple theft (hurto simple) must be unified. The appealed Sentencing Appeals Tribunal acquitted the defendant Quirós Quirós, considering that the attempted theft of a pack of Derby brand cigarettes costing one thousand three hundred colones—which he put in his pants pocket—did not affect the protected legal interest, since the cost of the item is negligible, and he was detained without the crime being consummated. The decision assumes that material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) can only be configured with a significant harm or endangerment of the protected legal interest. It adds that the legislator, historically, paid special attention to the value of objects stolen without force against things or violence against persons, citing the substantive norms that were in force from the Código General de Carrillo to the original version of the current Penal Code, where a minimum cost of the item was required for it to be considered a crime.

It points out that in this particular case, the accused person tried to remove a pack of cigarettes worth one thousand three hundred colones, upon which he was apprehended, without any patrimonial loss being generated for the offended institution, which also did not accept alternative measures for the accused, which would have had a better result than imposing a penalty for an insignificant act. Finally, the appealed Tribunal justifies that the insignificance of the harm or endangerment, in this matter, is related to the offended party, since it involves a transnational corporation of great economic power, its assets are affected, but not in a significant way. (see folios 59 to 64). On the other hand, the resolutions of the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal cited by the appellant as contradictory to the challenged one, consider that material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) does exist, since it was a decision of the legislator to eliminate the minimum thresholds for the value of things stolen without force or violence in order to classify them as crimes.

Likewise, they indicate that it is not up to the judge to disapply a norm that is part of the legal system based solely on the criterion of minimal harm to the legal interest, because this implies that harm did exist—in consummated crimes of simple theft—or danger—in attempted simple thefts—to the interest, and therefore, the conduct must be punished. This Chamber, in exercise of the power granted in Article 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has been able to corroborate that the presence of contradictory precedents is due to an erroneous interpretation of the law, specifically referring to the analysis of the existence of the elements that constitute the crime of attempted simple theft, provided for in Articles 24 and 208 of the Penal Code, declaring that this interpretive defect is present in the resolution being appealed. Specifically regarding the content of the material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) of said illicit act, the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal in the challenged resolution assumes that this element does not exist, due to the insignificance of the harm or endangerment of the legal interest of property.

In this sense, it must be said that authoritative doctrine on the subject does not refer to “insignificance” in the analysis of material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material), but rather to the absence of harm to the protected legal interest. Thus, Doctor Francisco Castillo can be cited, who, echoing authors such as Roxin and Jescheck, states: “For a crime to exist, it must be materially unlawful. And for the action to materialize as a harm to legal interests that is socially harmful and that cannot be sufficiently combated with extra-penal means… According to Jescheck, an action is unlawful in a material sense when it harms the legal interest protected by the penal norm. To establish whether an action is materially unlawful, it is necessary to examine the conduct carried out by the perpetrator in concrete, the conduct that the legislator sanctioned with punishment, and to establish whether it harms the protected legal interest.

In this sense, the concept of harm should not be taken naturalistically (as damage from the action to a specific object of protection) but as a contradiction to the ideal value that is protected by the norm (legal interest). The harm to the community lies in the harm to the legal interest, which justifies considering the act as socially damaging behavior.” (CASTILLO GONZALEZ, Francisco, El Bien Jurídico Penalmente Protegido, San José, Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2008, pp. 128-129). This definition must be interpreted in accordance with our domestic legislation. Thus, Article 28 of the Political Constitution, where the constituent defined what should be understood as the principle of harm (principio de lesividad), states: “No one may be disturbed or pursued for the manifestation of their opinions or for any act that does not infringe the law. Private actions that do not harm public morals or order, or that do not harm a third party, are outside the action of the law…”.

It must be understood that a person can only be “disturbed or pursued” when it is determined that they have infringed the law, which corresponds to the examination of the typicality of the conduct. However, the constitutional norm further indicates, according to its interpretation, that after determining this element of the crime, it must also be assessed whether the actions, despite being described within a penal norm, as part of the examination of the elements of the crime, produced harm to a third party (principle of harm, principio de lesividad), all of which has been placed within the analysis of material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material). If it is verified that the conduct carried out by the accused was typical, but not unlawful because there was no harm to the protected legal interest, insofar as it is verified that there was no harm to the assets of this third party called victim in the criminal process, the appropriate course is to acquit, since the minimum elements to consider the crime configured are not complete, and, in the absence of material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material), the legal operator cannot continue with the examination of culpability.

Notwithstanding the foregoing and the ease with which this small outline can be made, the content of material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) is not a point that can be resolved so simply, as it can be confused with another of the phases that must be analyzed within the examination of the crime, a defect incurred by the challenged resolution. To this end, a review of the legal system must be carried out, prior to defining whether the “insignificance” indicated by the appealed Tribunal is or is not an element to be taken into account within the examination of the conduct displayed by the accused. In accordance with this, it is essential to make the following reflections. The first is precisely the legislative change carried out through Law 8720 called “Ley de Protección a Víctimas, Testigos y demás intervinientes en el Proceso Penal”. Before this law, Article 208 of the Penal Code established: “Anyone who illegitimately seizes a movable thing, totally or partially belonging to another, provided it is not the contravention provided for in subsection 1 of Article 384, shall be punished with imprisonment from one month to three years.

(Thus reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 6726 of March 10, 1982).” According to this transcription, every dispossession carried out without force against things or violence against persons was a crime, if the value of the stolen item did not correspond to the contravention of minor theft (hurto menor). Thus, the way in which the legislator had chosen to differentiate between a crime and a contravention was through the value of the stolen item, indicating in subsection

• 1)of Article 387 of the Penal Code: “Five to thirty days’ fine shall be imposed: Minor theft
• 1)On anyone who illegitimately seizes a movable thing, totally or partially belonging to another, when the value of the stolen item does not exceed half of the base salary…”. Despite this, for reasons of criminal policy, and as all laws originate, to control a problem afflicting the population, since minor thefts were increasing, the legislator opted to adapt the norm contained in Article 208 of the Penal Code, and eliminate the difference between seizures without force or violence based on the value of the thing, and equate all conducts aimed at illegitimately taking a good totally or partially belonging to another, under said conditions, establishing it as a crime. From this change made through Law 8720 called “Ley de Protección a Víctimas, Testigos y demás intervinientes en el Proceso Penal”, it must be understood that the legislator considers a conduct whose harm is negligible to be as harmful as one that produces very large harmful results against the victim’s property. This implies that it is not appropriate to examine the economic condition of the offended party, or whether or not it is a company of great purchasing power to define the “insignificance” of the harm to the legal interest of property and, thereby, decriminalize the conduct despite having been declared a crime by the legislator. To determine the non-existence of harm to the legal interest, it would be necessary for the accused not to have taken the property disposition to the detriment of the offended party, because in these cases, according to the reform implemented by the legislator, every attack against property in the manner described by Article 208 of the Penal Code constitutes a harm to the protected legal interest, however small, and, consequently, material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) is configured. Therefore, it can be concluded that in these cases, in accordance with the norm contained in the cited Article 208, merely verifying an endangerment of the interest—in the case of attempts—or a harm to it—a decrease in assets in the consummated crime—is sufficient for material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) to be configured and for the examination of culpability to proceed. Secondly, this position of the legislator is consistent with the content of Article 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which contemplates the possibility for the Public Prosecutor’s Office to dispense with criminal prosecution when “a) It involves an insignificant act, minimal culpability of the author or participant, or with a minor contribution thereof, unless there is violence against persons or force against things, the public interest is affected, or the act was committed by a public official in the exercise of their duties or on occasion of them”. This norm authorizes that, in cases of trivial offenses (bagatela), the prosecuting entity may request the issuance of a dismissal judgment by application of this criterion of opportunity, as an exception permitted by the legislator to not continue with the criminal action, despite it being a crime (reasons of criminal policy). Said legal provision is consistent with the modification made by Law 8720 in Article 208 of the Penal Code, insofar as, if the value of the thing is insignificant, it is up to the Public Prosecutor’s Office to dispense with legal prosecution, but not because it is not a crime, as the appealed Tribunal states, but because, being a crime, the cost of justice is much greater than the damage produced, and only under the reasons of criminal policy developed by the prosecuting entity. Taking this into account, in accordance with the cited norms, it could not be thought that there is no material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) due to the “insignificance” of what was stolen, when in reality there was harm to the protected legal interest of property, and, consequently, material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material), and the fact that this harm was very small because the crime was attempted, thanks to the quick action of the employees working for the offended company, is a situation that cannot favor the accused, eliminating that material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material), but rather it continues to be a typical, unlawful action requiring an examination of culpability. Finally, and as a third point, it cannot be considered that in the application of Article 208 in conjunction with Article 24, both of the Penal Code, it can be thought that insignificance is a reason to eliminate material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material), and for the accused to be acquitted as erroneously indicated by the interpretation of the appealed Appeals Tribunal. As stated above, the legislator opted to criminally sanction the conduct of stealing property belonging to another, regardless of its economic value, being consistent with what is indicated by subsection b) of Article 71 of the Penal Code, insofar as one of the elements that must be examined in the imposition of a penalty and that determines its proportionality according to the facts proven, is the magnitude or importance of the harm or endangerment of the protected legal interest. In this case, after jointly analyzing Articles 208 and 24 of the Penal Code, as well as subsection b) of Article 71 of this same legal body, it can be inferred with absolute certainty that, at least regarding simple theft, the legislator provided that the “insignificance” of the harm to the legal interest of property does not eliminate material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material), because harm or endangerment did occur; but that insignificance falls on the analysis that the judge must make regarding the elements for imposing a penalty, so that the sanction is proportional to the acts committed. It is for all the foregoing reasons that this Chamber, in exercise of the power of Article 468 subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, proceeds to declare that resolution 848-2013, issued by the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at 10:00 hours on April 26, 2013, erroneously interprets Article 208, in conjunction with Article 24, both of the Penal Code, and therefore it is resolved to unify the criterion that until today has been contradictory among different resolutions of the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal, establishing that the insignificance regarding the economic cost of the stolen good—when it concerns the case of the consummated crime of simple theft—or endangered—in the case of the attempted simple theft—does not eliminate the unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) of the conduct, because there was a harm or endangerment of the interest, even if it is considered insignificant, following the order of the legislator, who eliminated in 2009 the value of the good for the existence of the crime. As a consequence of the foregoing, the challenged resolution is annulled, and, considering the fact that in this particular case the defense of the accused only challenged the decision of the trial judge for considering that there was no material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) (see folios 44 to 51), and the party did not appeal on any other issue, upon annulling resolution 2013-848 issued by the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, the defendant’s conviction remains intact, which must be served in the respective places, according to prison regulations, after deduction of the pre-trial detention served, if any. Having made this determination, a ruling on the second admitted ground of cassation is omitted.” 6726 of March 10, 1982)”</i>.&nbsp; According to this transcription, all dispossession (despojo) carried out without force against things or violence against persons was a crime, if the value of what was stolen did not correspond to the contravention of petty theft (hurto menor).&nbsp; So, the way in which the legislator had chosen to differentiate between a crime (delito) and a contravention (contravención) was through the amount of what was stolen, stating in subsection
• 1)of Article 387 of the Penal Code (Código Penal):&nbsp; “<i>A fine of five to thirty days shall be imposed: <b>Petty theft (Hurto menor)</b>
• 1)Upon anyone who illegitimately takes possession of a movable thing, wholly or partially belonging to another, when the value of the stolen item does not exceed half of the base salary…”.</i>&nbsp; Despite this, for reasons of criminal policy, and as all laws originate, to control a problem that afflicted the population, since petty thefts (hurtos menores) were on the rise, the legislator chose to adapt the rule contained in Article 208 of the Penal Code, and eliminate the difference between thefts without force or violence, based on the value of the thing, and to equate all conducts aimed at illegitimately removing a good wholly or partially belonging to another, under said conditions, establishing it as a crime (delito).&nbsp; As of this change made through Law 8720 (ley 8720) called “Law for the Protection of Victims, Witnesses and Other Participants in the Criminal Process” (“Ley de Protección a Víctimas, Testigos y demás intervinientes en el Proceso Penal”), it must be understood that the legislator considers conduct whose harm is minuscule to be as damaging as that which produces very great harmful results against the victim's property.&nbsp; This implies that it is not appropriate to examine the economic condition of the offended party, or whether or not it is a company with great purchasing power, to define the “insignificance” of the injury to the protected legal interest (bien jurídico) of property and, thereby, decriminalize the conduct despite having been declared a crime by the legislator.&nbsp; To determine the non-existence of an injury to the protected legal interest, it would be necessary for the accused not to have taken the patrimonial disposition to the detriment of the offended party, since in these cases, according to the reform implemented by the legislator, any attack against property in the manner described by Article 208 of the Penal Code results in an affectation of the protected legal interest, no matter how small, and, consequently, material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) is established.&nbsp; Therefore, it can be concluded that in these cases, in accordance with the rule contained in the cited numeral 208, the mere verification of a placing at risk of the interest –in the case of attempts- or an injury to it –patrimonial diminution in the consummated crime- is sufficient to establish material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) and to proceed with the examination of culpability.&nbsp; Secondly, this position of the legislator goes hand in hand with the content of Article 22 of the Criminal Procedural Code (Código Procesal Penal), which contemplates the possibility for the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) to dispense with criminal prosecution when “<i>a) It involves an insignificant act, minimal culpability of the perpetrator or participant, or with an exiguous contribution from them, unless there is violence against persons or force against things, the public interest is affected, or the act was committed by a public official in the exercise of their duties or on the occasion of them</i>”.&nbsp;&nbsp; This rule authorizes that, when dealing with de minimis cases (casos de bagatela), the prosecuting entity may request the issuance of a dismissal judgment (sobreseimiento) by application of this discretionary criterion (criterio de oportunidad), as an exception permitted by the legislator to not continue with the criminal action, despite it being a crime (reasons of criminal policy).&nbsp; Said legal provision is consistent with the modification made by Law 8720 to Article 208 of the Penal Code, in that, if the value of the thing is insignificant, it is in the hands of the Public Prosecutor's Office to dispense with legal prosecution, but not because it is not a crime, as the appealed Court (Tribunal recurrido) claims, but because, being a crime, the cost of justice is much greater than the damage produced, and only under the reasons of criminal policy developed by the prosecuting entity.&nbsp; Taking this into account, according to the cited norms, it could not be thought that material unlawfulness does not exist because of the “insignificance” of what was stolen, when in reality there was an injury to the protected legal interest of property, and, consequently, material unlawfulness, and that this injury was very minimal because the crime was attempted, thanks to the rapid action of the employees who work for the offended company, is a situation that cannot favor the accused, eliminating that material unlawfulness, but rather it continues to be a typical conduct (acción típica), unlawful (antijurídica), and requiring a necessary examination of culpability.&nbsp; Finally, and as a third point, it cannot be considered that in the application of Article 208 in conjunction with Article 24, both of the Penal Code, it can be thought that insignificance is a reason to eliminate material unlawfulness, and to acquit the accused as erroneously indicated by the interpretation of the Court of Appeals (Tribunal de apelación) being appealed.&nbsp; As stated earlier, the legislator chose to penalize the conduct of stealing another's property, regardless of its economic value,&nbsp; being consistent with what is indicated in subsection b) of Article 71 of the Penal Code, insofar as one of the elements that must be examined in the imposition of a sentence and that determines its proportionality according to the facts deemed proven, is the magnitude or importance of the injury or placing at risk of the protected legal interest. In this case, after jointly analyzing numerals 208 and 24 of the Penal Code, as well as subsection b) of Article 71 of this same legal body, it can be inferred with absolute certainty that, at least regarding simple theft (hurto simple), the legislator foresaw that the “insignificance” of the injury to the protected legal interest of property does not eliminate material unlawfulness, since there was indeed an injury or placing at risk; but that insignificance falls upon the analysis that the judge must make about the elements for imposing a sentence, so that the sanction is proportional to the acts committed.&nbsp; It is for all the foregoing that this Chamber (Sala), in exercise of the power of Article 468 subsection a) of the Criminal Procedural Code, proceeds to declare that resolution 848-2013, issued by the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José), at 10:00 a.m. on April 26, 2013, erroneously interprets Article 208, in conjunction with numeral 24, both of the Penal Code, and therefore, it is resolved to <b>unify the criterion</b> (unificar el criterio) that to this day has been contradictory among different resolutions of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court, establishing that insignificance regarding the economic cost of the stolen good –in the case of the consummated crime of simple theft (hurto simple)- or placed at risk –in the case of the attempt of simple theft (tentativa de hurto simple)- does not eliminate the unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) of the conduct, for there was an injury or placing at risk of the interest, even if it is considered insignificant, following the order of the legislator, who eliminated in 2009 the amount of the good for the existence of the crime.&nbsp; As a consequence of the foregoing, <b>the appealed resolution is set aside</b>, and, considering the fact that in this particular case the defense of the accused only challenged the trial judge's decision on the grounds that they considered material unlawfulness did not exist (see folios 44 to 51), and the party did not appeal on any other issue, upon annulling resolution 2013-848 issued by the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, the condemnatory sentence of the accused remains intact, which shall be served in the respective places, according to prison regulations, after deduction of the pre-trial detention served, if any.&nbsp; Having made this determination, a ruling regarding the second admitted cassation ground is omitted.</span></p> 6726 of March 10, 1982)". According to this transcription, any dispossession carried out without force against things or violence against persons was a crime, if the value of what was taken did not correspond to the contravention of petty theft (hurto menor). Thus, the way in which the legislator had chosen to differentiate between a crime and a contravention was through the amount of what was taken, as indicated in subsection
• 1)of Article 387 of the Criminal Code: "A fine of five to thirty days shall be imposed: Petty theft (hurto menor)
• 1)On whoever illegitimately takes possession of a movable thing, wholly or partially belonging to another, when the value of what was stolen does not exceed half of the base salary…". Despite this, for reasons of criminal policy, and as all laws originate, to gain control over a problem afflicting the population, since petty thefts (hurtos menores) were on the rise, the legislator opted to adapt the rule contained in Article 208 of the Criminal Code and eliminate the difference between takings without force or violence based on the value of the thing, and to equate all conduct aimed at illegitimately taking a good wholly or partially belonging to another under such conditions, establishing it as a crime. Starting from this change made through Law 8720, called "Law for the Protection of Victims, Witnesses, and Other Participants in the Criminal Process" (Ley de Protección a Víctimas, Testigos y demás intervinientes en el Proceso Penal), it must be understood that the legislator considers conduct whose harm is minimal to be just as injurious as that which produces very significant harmful results against the victim's property. This implies that it is not appropriate to examine the economic condition of the offended party, or whether or not they are a company with significant purchasing power, to define the "insignificance" of the injury to the legal right of property and, thereby, decriminalize the conduct even though it has been declared a crime by the legislator. To determine the nonexistence of an injury to the legal right, it would be necessary for the accused not to have taken the property disposition to the detriment of the offended party, since in these cases, according to the reform implemented by the legislator, any attack against property in the manner described by Article 208 of the Criminal Code constitutes an impact on the protected legal right, however small it may be, and, consequently, material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) is configured. Therefore, it can be concluded that in these cases, in accordance with the rule contained in the cited Article 208, the mere verification of a placing at risk of the right – in the case of attempts – or an injury to it – a decrease in assets in the completed crime – is sufficient for material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) to be configured and for the examination of culpability to proceed. Secondly, this position of the legislator goes hand in hand with the content of Article 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which contemplates the possibility for the Public Prosecutor's Office to dispense with criminal prosecution when "a) It involves an insignificant act, minimal culpability of the perpetrator or participant, or an exiguous contribution by them, unless there is violence against persons or force against things, the public interest is affected, or the act was committed by a public official in the exercise of their duties or on occasion of them". This rule authorizes that, in cases of trivial matters, the prosecuting entity may request the issuance of a dismissal judgment by application of this opportunity criterion, as an exception permitted by the legislator not to continue with the criminal action, even though it involves a crime (reasons of criminal policy). This legal provision is consistent with the amendment made by Law 8720 to Article 208 of the Criminal Code, insofar as, if the value of the thing is insignificant, it falls to the Public Prosecutor's Office to dispense with legal prosecution, not because it is not a crime, as the appealed Court states, but because, being a crime, the cost of justice is much higher than the damage produced, and only under the reasons of criminal policy developed by the prosecuting entity. Taking this into account, and in accordance with the cited rules, it could not be thought that material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) does not exist due to the "insignificance" of what was taken, when in reality there was an injury to the protected legal right of property, and, consequently, material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material); and that this injury was very minor because the crime was attempted, thanks to the rapid action of the employees working for the offended company, is a situation that cannot favor the accused by eliminating that material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material), but rather it remains a typical, unlawful action requiring a necessary examination of culpability. Finally, and as a third point, it cannot be considered that in the application of Article 208 in conjunction with Article 24, both of the Criminal Code, it might be thought that insignificance is a reason to eliminate material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) and to acquit the defendant, as erroneously stated by the interpretation of the appeals Court being challenged. As stated above, the legislator opted to penalize the conduct of taking another's property, regardless of its economic value, being consistent with what is indicated by subsection b) of Article 71 of the Criminal Code, insofar as one of the elements that must be examined in the imposition of a sentence, and which determines its proportionality in accordance with the fact held as proven, is the magnitude or importance of the injury or placing at risk of the protected legal right. In this case, after jointly analyzing Articles 208 and 24 of the Criminal Code, as well as subsection b) of Article 71 of this same legal body, it can be inferred with absolute certainty that, at least regarding simple larceny, the legislator provided that the "insignificance" of the injury to the legal right of property does not eliminate material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material), since there was indeed an injury or placing at risk; but that insignificance falls within the analysis that the judge must make regarding the elements of imposing the sentence, so that the sanction is proportional to the acts committed. It is for all the foregoing reasons that this Chamber, in exercise of the power under Article 468, subsection a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, proceeds to declare that ruling 848-2013, issued by the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at 10:00 a.m. on April 26, 2013, erroneously interprets Article 208, in conjunction with Article 24, both of the Criminal Code, and therefore resolves to unify the criterion that up to today has been contradictory among different rulings of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court, establishing that insignificance regarding the economic cost of the taken property – when dealing with the case of the completed crime of simple larceny – or the placing at risk – in the case of attempted simple larceny – does not eliminate the unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) of the conduct, since there was an injury or placing at risk of the right, even if it is considered insignificant, following the order of the legislator, who eliminated in 2009 the amount of the property for the existence of the crime. As a consequence of the foregoing, the challenged ruling is annulled, and, considering the fact that in this particular case the defense of the accused only challenged the trial judge's decision for considering that material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad material) did not exist (see folios 44 to 51), and no party having appealed regarding any other issue, upon annulling ruling 2013-848 issued by the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, the conviction of the accused remains intact, which sentence must be served in the respective facilities, according to prison regulations, after deduction of the pretrial detention suffered, if any. Having taken this determination, a pronouncement regarding the second admitted cassation ground is omitted.

“II.- El reclamo es procedente y debe unificarse la aplicación del derecho de fondo respecto a la figura del hurto simple. El Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia recurrido absolvió al imputado Quirós Quirós, tomando en consideración que la tentativa de hurto de una cajetilla de cigarros marca Derby con un costo de mil trescientos colones -la que introdujo en la bolsa de su pantalón- no afectaba el bien jurídico tutelado, pues el costo del bien es ínfimo, y fue detenido sin que se consumara el delito. Asume la resolución, que la antijuridicidad material sólo puede configurarse con una afectación o puesta en peligro significativa del bien jurídico tutelado. Agrega que el legislador, históricamente, puso especial atención a la cuantía de los objetos sustraídos sin fuerza en las cosas o violencia sobre las personas, citando las normas de fondo que estuvieron vigentes desde el Código General de Carrillo, hasta la versión original del Código Penal vigente, donde se requería un costo mínimo del bien para que se considerara delito.

Señala que en el caso particular, la persona imputada trató de sustraer una cajetilla de cigarros por un valor de mil trescientos colones, ante lo cual fue aprehendido, sin que se generara ninguna pérdida patrimonial para la institución ofendida, la cual tampoco aceptó medidas alternas para el encartado, lo que tendría un mejor resultado que el imponer una pena por un hecho insignificante. Finalmente, justifica el Tribunal recurrido que la insignificancia de la lesión o puesta en peligro, en el presente asunto, tiene relación con el ofendido, pues al tratarse de una empresa transnacional de gran poderío económico, ve afectado su patrimonio, pero no en forma significativa. (ver folios 59 a 64). Por otro lado, las resoluciones del Tribunal de Apelación de sentencia citadas por la recurrente como contradictorias con la impugnada, consideran que sí existe antijuridicidad material, al ser una decisión del legislador eliminar los topes mínimos del valor de las cosas sustraídas sin fuerza, ni violencia, para catalogarlas como delito.

Asimismo, señalan que no corresponde al juez desaplicar una norma que es parte del ordenamiento jurídico sólo bajo el criterio de una mínima lesión al bien jurídico, pues esto implica que sí existió lesión –en los delitos consumados de hurto simple- o peligro -en las tentativas de hurto simple- para el bien, y por ello, debe sancionarse la conducta. Esta Sala, en ejercicio de la potestad concedida en el artículo 468 del Código Procesal Penal, ha podido corroborar que, la presencia de precedentes contradictorios, se debe a una errónea interpretación del derecho, específicamente referido al análisis sobre la existencia de los elementos que componen el delito de tentativa de hurto simple, previsto por los artículos 24 y 208 del Código Penal, declarándose que dicho defecto de interpretación está presente en la resolución que se recurre. Específicamente sobre el contenido de la antijuridicidad material de dicho ilícito, el Tribunal de Apelación de sentencia en la resolución impugnada, asume que no existe ese elemento, por la insignificancia de la lesión o puesta en peligro del bien jurídico propiedad.

En este sentido, debe decirse que doctrina autorizada en el tema, no hace referencia a la “insignificancia” en el análisis de la antijuridicidad material, sino a la ausencia de afectación al bien jurídico tutelado. Así, puede citarse al Doctor Francisco Castillo, quien haciendo eco de autores como Roxin y Jescheck, señala: “Para que exista delito deber ser materialmente antijurídica. Y para que la acción se plasma en una lesión a bienes jurídicos, que sea socialmente nociva y que no se pueda combatir suficientemente con medios extra-penales… Para Jescheck una acción es antijurídica en sentido material cuando lesiona el bien jurídico tutelado por la norma penal. Para establecer si una acción es antijurídica materialmente es necesario examinar la conducta realizada por el autor en concreto, la conducta que el legislador sancionó con pena y establecer si ella lesiona el bien jurídico tutelado.

En este sentido, el concepto de lesión no debe tomarse naturalísticamente (como daño de la acción a un determinado objeto de protección) sino como contradicción al valor ideal que es protegido por la norma (bien jurídico). En la lesión al bien jurídico radica el daño a la comunidad, que justifica considerar el hecho como un comportamiento socialmente dañoso.” (CASTILLO GONZALEZ, Francisco, El Bien Jurídico Penalmente Protegido, San José, Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2008, pp. 128-129). Esta definición debe interpretarse de acuerdo con nuestra normativa interna. Así, el artículo 28 de la Constitución Política, donde el constituyente definió qué debe entenderse como principio de lesividad, señala: “Nadie puede ser inquietado ni perseguido por la manifestación de sus opiniones ni por acto alguno que no infrinja la ley. Las acciones privadas que no dañen la moral o el orden públicos, o que no perjudiquen a tercero, están fuera de la acción de la ley…”.

Debe entenderse que una persona sólo puede ser “inquietada o perseguida” cuando se determine que ha infringido la ley, lo que obedece al examen de tipicidad de la conducta. Sin embargo, más adelante señala la norma constitucional, según su interpretación, que luego de determinarse ese elemento del delito, de seguido debe también valorarse si las acciones, pese a estar descritas dentro de una norma penal, como parte del examen de los elementos del delito, produjo un daño a un tercero (principio de lesividad), todo lo cual se ha ubicado en el análisis de la antijuridicidad material. De constatarse que la conducta realizada por el imputado fue típica, pero no antijurídica porque no hubo daño al bien jurídico tutelado, en el tanto se verifica que no existió afectación a los bienes de este tercero llamado víctima en el proceso penal, lo que procede es absolver, ya que no se completan los elementos mínimos para tener por configurado el delito, y, ante la inexistencia de antijuridicidad material, el operador del derecho no puede continuar con el examen de culpabilidad.

No obstante lo anterior y la facilidad con la que logra hacerse este pequeño esbozo, el contenido de la antijuridicidad material no es un punto que pueda resolverse con tal sencillez, pues puede ser confundido con otra de las fases que deben analizarse dentro del examen del delito, defecto en el que incurre la resolución impugnada. Para este efecto, debe hacerse una revisión del ordenamiento jurídico, previo a definir si la “insignificancia” que señala el Tribunal recurrido es o no un elemento a tomar en cuenta dentro del examen de la conducta desplegada por el imputado. De acuerdo con esto, resulta indispensable hacer las siguientes reflexiones. La primera, es precisamente el cambio legislativo que se llevó a cabo a través de la ley 8720 denominada “Ley de Protección a Víctimas, Testigos y demás intervinientes en el Proceso Penal”. Antes de esta ley, el artículo 208 del Código Penal establecía: “Será reprimido con prisión de un mes a tres años, el que se apoderare ilegítimamente de una cosa mueble, total o parcialmente ajena, siempre que no se trate de la contravención prevista en el inciso 1º del artículo 384.

(Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la ley No. 6726 de 10 de marzo de 1982)”. De acuerdo con esta transcripción, era delito todo despojo que se llevara a cabo sin fuerza sobre las cosas o violencia en las personas, si el valor de lo sustraído no correspondía a la contravención de hurto menor. Entonces, la forma en la cual el legislador había optado por diferenciar entre un delito y una contravención, fue a través de la cuantía de lo sustraído, señalando en el inciso 1) del artículo 387 del Código Penal: “Se impondrá de cinco a treinta días multa: Hurto menor 1) A quien se apoderare ilegítimamente de una cosa mueble, total o parcialmente ajena, cuando el valor de lo hurtado no exceda de la mitad del salario base…”. Pese a ello, por razones de política criminal, y según se originan todas las leyes, para lograr controlar un problema que aquejaba a la población, ya que los hurtos menores iban en aumento, el legislador optó por adecuar la norma contenida en el artículo 208 del Código Penal, y eliminar la diferencia entre las sustracciones sin fuerza, ni violencia, en razón del valor de la cosa, y equiparar todas las conductas dirigidas a sustraer de forma ilegítima un bien total o parcialmente ajeno, en dichas condiciones, estableciéndolo como delito.

A partir de este cambio realizado a través de la ley 8720 denominada “Ley de Protección a Víctimas, Testigos y demás intervinientes en el Proceso Penal”, debe entenderse que el legislador considera tan lesiva una conducta cuyo perjuicio es ínfimo, como aquélla que produce resultados lesivos muy grandes contra la propiedad de la víctima. Esto implica que no es procedente examinar la condición económica del ofendido, o si ésta es o no una empresa de gran poder adquisitivo para definir la “insignificancia” de la lesión al bien jurídico propiedad y, con ello, despenalizar la conducta pese a haber sido declarada como delito por el legislador. Para lograr determinar la inexistencia de una lesión al bien jurídico, sería necesario que el acusado no tomara la disposición patrimonial en perjuicio del ofendido, pues en estos casos, según la reforma implantada por el legislador, todo ataque contra los bienes de la manera descrita por el artículo 208 del Código Penal, resulta una afectación al bien jurídico tutelado, por más pequeña que sea, y, en consecuencia, se configura la antijuridicidad material.

Entonces, puede concluirse que en estos casos, de acuerdo con la norma contenida en el numeral 208 de cita, basta con la constatación de una puesta en riesgo del bien –en el caso de las tentativas- o una lesión a éste –disminución patrimonial en el delito consumado- para que se configure la antijuridicidad material y se pueda continuar con el examen de la culpabilidad. En segundo lugar, esta posición del legislador va de la mano con el contenido del artículo 22 del Código Procesal Penal, donde se contempla la posibilidad de que el Ministerio Público prescinda de la persecución penal cuando “a) Se trate de un hecho insignificante, de mínima culpabilidad del autor o el partícipe o con exigua contribución de este, salvo que exista violencia sobre las personas o fuerza sobre las cosas, se afecte el interés público o el hecho haya sido cometido por un funcionario público en el ejercicio del cargo o con ocasión de él”.

Esta norma autoriza que, cuando se trata de casos de bagatela, el ente fiscal pueda solicitar el dictado de una sentencia de sobreseimiento por aplicación de este criterio de oportunidad, como excepción permitida por el legislador para no continuar con la acción penal, pese a que se trate de un delito (razones de política criminal). Dicha disposición legal es acorde con la modificación hecha por la ley 8720 en el artículo 208 del Código Penal, en el tanto, si el valor de la cosa es insignificante, queda en manos del Ministerio Público prescindir de la persecución legal, pero no porque no sea un delito, como lo afirma el Tribunal recurrido, sino porque siendo un delito, el costo de la justicia es mucho mayor que el daño producido, y sólo bajo las razones de política criminal que desarrolla el ente fiscal. Tomando en cuenta esto, de acuerdo con las normas citadas, no podría pensarse que no existe antijuridicidad material por la “insignificancia” de lo sustraído, cuando en realidad sí hubo lesión al bien jurídico tutelado propiedad, y, en consecuencia antijuridicidad material, y que ésta haya sido muy poca porque el delito fue tentado, gracias a la rápida acción de los empleados que laboran para la empresa ofendida, es una situación que no puede favorecer al encartado, eliminando esa antijuridicidad material, sino que sigue siendo una acción típica, antijurídica y de necesario examen de culpabilidad.

Finalmente, y como tercer punto, no puede considerarse que en la aplicación del artículo 208 en consonancia con el 24, ambos del Código Penal, pueda pensarse que la insignificancia es razón para eliminar la antijuridicidad material, y se absuelva al imputado como lo señala de forma errónea la interpretación del Tribunal de apelación que se recurre. Como se dijo líneas atrás, el legislador optó por sancionar penalmente la conducta de sustraer bienes ajenos, independientemente de su valor económico, siendo consistente con lo señalado por el inciso b) del artículo 71 del Código Penal, en el tanto uno de los elementos que deben examinarse en la imposición de pena y que determina su proporcionalidad de acuerdo con el hecho tenido por probado, es la magnitud o importancia de lesión o puesta en peligro del bien jurídico tutelado. En este caso, luego de analizar de forma conjunta los numerales 208 y 24 del Código Penal, así como el inciso b) del artículo 71 de este mismo cuerpo legal, se puede inferir con absoluta seguridad que, al menos en cuanto al hurto simple, el legislador previó que la “insignificancia” de la lesión al bien jurídico propiedad no elimina la antijuridicidad material, pues sí hubo lesión o puesta en peligro; pero esa insignificancia recae en el análisis que debe hacer el juez sobre los elementos de imposición de pena, con el fin de que la sanción sea proporcional a los hechos cometidos.

Es por todo lo anterior que, esta Sala, en ejercicio de la potestad del artículo 468 inciso a) del Código Procesal Penal, procede a declarar que la resolución 848-2013, emitida por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, al ser las 10:00 horas del 26 de abril de 2013, interpreta erróneamente el artículo 208, en concordancia con el numeral 24, ambos del Código Penal, y por ello se resuelve unificar el criterio que hasta el día de hoy ha sido contradictorio entre distintas resoluciones del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, estableciendo que la insignificancia en cuanto al costo económico del bien sustraído –cuando se trata del supuesto del delito consumado de hurto simple- o puesto en peligro –en el caso de la tentativa de hurto simple- no elimina la antijuridicidad de la conducta, pues existió una lesión o puesta en peligro del bien, aunque ésta sea considerada insignificante, siguiendo la orden del legislador, quien eliminó en el año 2009 la cuantía del bien para la existencia del delito.

Como consecuencia de lo anterior, se deja sin efecto la resolución impugnada, y, atendiendo al hecho de que en este caso particular la defensa del imputado sólo impugnó la decisión del juez de juicio por considerar que no existía antijuridicidad material (ver folios 44 a 51), no habiendo recurrido la parte por algún otro tema, al anularse la resolución 2013-848 emitida por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, se mantiene incólume la sentencia condenatoria del imputado, la cual deberá descontar en los lugares respectivos, según los reglamentos carcelarios, previo descuento de la preventiva sufrida, si la hubiere. Al haberse tomado esta determinación, se omite pronunciamiento respecto al segundo motivo admitido de casación.”