Disciplinary prescription for public servant handling public assetsPrescripción disciplinaria de servidor que maneja bienes públicos

**V.- REGARDING THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ITS CALCULATION:** The IDA disagrees with the application of section 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). From its perspective, the correct rule should have been canon 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República). The version of section 71 that was in force at the time of the facts stated: “*The disciplinary liability of a Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) servant shall prescribe within a two-year period (plazo de prescripción), counted from the verified knowledge of the fault by the competent body to initiate the respective disciplinary proceeding (procedimiento sancionatorio). For these purposes, article 603 of the Labor Code and any other legal provisions opposing it are hereby amended with respect to public officials or servants. / Verification of knowledge of the fault may be carried out by any means of proof, with the value it holds, in accordance with the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and, secondarily, in accordance with common law. / When the author of the fault is the head of the entity, the period shall begin to run from the date on which his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body ends. / Failure by the competent official to timely initiate the disciplinary proceeding or allowing the offender's liability to prescribe without justified cause shall be deemed a serious fault*.” Regarding that specific rule, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) held the view that said section could not have an unrestricted scope, but rather that its field of action was reduced to cases where the person serving the State managed and disposed of public funds. Let us see what was said by that body in its judgment No. 6750-1997 of 11:12 a.m. on October 17, 1997: “*In general, and as this Chamber has already held in various pronouncements (1696-92 of three thirty p.m. on August twenty-third, nineteen ninety-two, and 1472-94 of five fifty-four p.m. on March twenty-first, nineteen ninety-four), the Constituent Assembly intended to establish a differentiated employment regime for State servants, operating under characteristics of suitability, efficiency, and also—for what is relevant in this action—partaking of the condition of stability.- The foregoing means that the public employee holds the right to remain in their position as long as they meet the legally required conditions and do not incur any of the expressly regulated grounds for dismissal.- Added to the foregoing is a clear legislative intention, manifested in the articles of the General Law of Public Administration, to hold the public official responsible for their actions and, in general, for their conduct as an integral part of the Public Administration.- This places the State as an employer in a very different position from that of private subjects, given that it cannot, as they can, dismiss its employees for mere convenience, such that a greater scope for the exercise of disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria) becomes adequate and fair to compensate for that inequality, especially if we consider the aims that the public service must pursue.- Linked to the foregoing—and already in relation to the issue of the 'quantum' of the statute of limitations period—it must be taken into account that, in the Chamber's judgment, the challenged rule seeks to provide the State with effective tools for the control and sanction of public officials who perform one of the most sensitive functions, namely the handling of public funds.- / Indeed, this Court considers that although Article 8 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller defines the 'Public Treasury' as '...the organization formed by public entities and bodies, including non-state ones, that are owners or responsible, by any title, for the administration of public assets' and that the latter is '...the entirety constituted by public funds and the liabilities chargeable to the Public Treasury,' such concepts must be understood and applied in relation to what constitutes the main objective of the Law, that is, the establishment of the Comptroller's sphere of competence. / - However, when dealing with matters generally unrelated to said body—as is the case of the challenged article 71—the truth is that the interpretation of the concept of a public treasury servant must be restricted to one who is in charge of handling public funds.- For the Chamber, this interpretation is necessary, because only in this way is the difference in the statute of limitations periods for the application of disciplinary sanctions justified and explicable.- **Stated differently, the two-year period established in the challenged article is constitutionally adequate only if it is understood that it is intended to enable the State to have greater control over its officials who are directly related to the handling and disposition of public funds**, due to the undeniable relevance of the matter and the great need to ensure the soundest and cleanest possible handling of public funds*” (bold added). As can be observed, the cited provision maintained a subjective criterion that was limited to the analysis of the worker’s special elements, to conclude whether or not they were a public treasury official. In the case at bar (sub júdice), the plaintiff worked as Head of the Beneficiaries Section (Jefa de la Sección de Beneficiarios) at the IDA, an administrative office that was in charge of the selection process for families applying for land, and she was accused of violating sections 62 of the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) and 4, 7, 8, 18, 22, 23, and 24 of the Autonomous Regulation for the Selection of Beneficiaries (Reglamento Autónomo para la Selección de Beneficiarios). Thus, it is clear that the servant, by the nature of her position, indeed participated in the disposition and handling of goods of a public nature, so much so that her duties were directly linked to the allocation of parcels that were acquired and delivered to farming families with resources from the State treasury; for which reason section 603 of the Labor Code could not be applied to her, but rather the version of canon 71 mentioned above. Now, according to the record, the Executive Presidency (Presidencia Ejecutiva) (the official competent to exercise disciplinary power in the institution) learned of Internal Audit Report ARI-004-2001 on October 26, 2001 (folios 164 to 193); however, it had to order a preliminary investigation on May 14, 2003, because those involved in those irregularities were not specified. On September 20, 2006, it was informed of the need to institute a disciplinary proceeding against the plaintiff (folio 108 of the administrative file). Subsequently, on October 9, 2006, it gave the order to the Labor Relations Unit (Unidad de Relaciones Laborales) to begin processing the matter. Finally, the opening act of 2:00 p.m. on November 17, 2006, issued by that body, was formally notified to the plaintiff on November 28 following (thirteenth fact of the complaint, not contradicted by the IDA's representation). This Chamber has repeatedly held that in public institutions where the opening of a proceeding prior to the imposition of a dismissal sanction is essential, the statute of limitations period does not begin to run until the moment when the body responsible for agreeing on the final decision is in a position to do so, that is, when the result of the investigation is communicated to it. Thus, we have that between **September 20, 2006**, the IDA was fully able to initiate the disciplinary proceeding, and it was on **November 28** of the same year that it opened that case, a point by which the fatal two-year period had not been completed.” Let us examine what that body stated in its judgment no. 6750-1997 of 11:12 a.m. on October 17, 1997: “In general, and as this Chamber has already held in various pronouncements (1696-92 of three thirty p.m. on August twenty-third, nineteen ninety-two and 1472-94 of five fifty-four p.m. on March twenty-first, nineteen ninety-four), there was the will of the Constituent to institute a differentiated employment regime for State servants, operating under characteristics of suitability, efficiency, and additionally—for what matters in this action—that it participate in the condition of stability. The foregoing means that the public employee holds the right to remain in their position as long as they comply with the legally required conditions and do not incur any of the expressly regulated grounds for dismissal. Added to the foregoing is a clear legislative intention, manifested in the articles of the General Public Administration Law, to hold the public official liable for their actions and, in general, for their conduct as an integral part of the Public Administration. This places the State, as employer, in a position very different from that of private subjects, given that it cannot, as they can, dispense with its employees out of mere convenience, such that a broader scope for the exercise of disciplinary power becomes appropriate and fair to compensate for that inequality, principally if we take into account the ends that public service must pursue. Linked to the foregoing—and now in relation to the issue of the 'quantum' of the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción)—it must be taken into account that, in the Chamber's opinion, the challenged norm seeks to equip the State with effective weapons for the control and sanction of public officials who perform one of the most sensitive functions, namely the management of public funds. / Indeed, this Court considers that although Article 8 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General defines 'Public Treasury' (Hacienda Pública) as '...the organization formed by public entities and organs, including non-state ones, that own or are responsible, by any title, for the administration of public assets' and that the latter is '...the universality constituted by public funds and by the liabilities chargeable to the Public Treasury,' such concepts must be understood and applied in relation to what constitutes the principal objective of the Law, that is, the establishment of the sphere of competence of the Comptroller General. / However, when it involves matters generally outside said organ—as is the case of the questioned Article 71—the truth is that the interpretation of the concept of servant of the public treasury must be restricted to one who is charged with the management of public funds. For the Chamber, this interpretation is necessary, since only in this way is the difference in the statutes of limitations (plazos de prescripción) for the application of disciplinary sanctions justified and explicable. In other words, the two-year period established in the questioned article is constitutionally adequate only if it is understood that it seeks to enable the State greater control over its officials who are directly related to the management and disposal of public funds, this due to the undeniable relevance of the subject and the great need to ensure the soundest and cleanest possible management of public funds” (emphasis supplied). As can be observed, the cited provision maintained a subjective criterion that was circumscribed to the analysis of the special elements of the worker, to conclude whether or not they were an official of the public treasury. In the sub judice, the plaintiff served as Head of the Beneficiaries Section at the IDA, an administrative office responsible for the selection process of families applying for land, and she was accused of violating numerals 62 of the Land and Colonization Law and 4, 7, 8, 18, 22, 23, and 24 of the Autonomous Regulation for the Selection of Beneficiaries. Thus, it is clear that the servant, by the nature of her position, indeed participated in the disposal and management of assets of a public nature, so much so that her duties were directly linked to the assignment of parcels that were acquired and delivered to rural families with resources from the State treasury; which is why precept 603 of the Labor Code could not be applied to her, but rather the version of canon 71 previously mentioned. Now, according to the record, the Executive Presidency (the competent official to exercise disciplinary power in the institution) learned of the Internal Audit Report ARI-004-2001 on October 26, 2001 (folios 164 to 193); however, it had to order a preliminary investigation on May 14, 2003, because those involved in those irregularities were not specified. On September 20, 2006, it was informed of the need to institute a disciplinary proceeding against the plaintiff (folio 108 of the administrative file). Thereafter, on October 9, 2006, it gave the order to the Labor Relations Unit to commence the processing of the matter. Finally, the act initiating the proceeding at 2:00 p.m. on November 17, 2006, issued by that organ, was formally notified to the plaintiff on the following November 28 (fact thirteen of the complaint, uncontested by the IDA’s representatives). This Chamber has repeatedly held that in public institutions where the opening of a proceeding prior to the imposition of a dismissal sanction is mandatory, the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) does not begin to run until the moment when the organ responsible for agreeing on the final decision is in a position to do so, that is, when it is notified of the result of the investigation. Thus, we have that between September 20, 2006, the IDA was fully in a position to initiate the disciplinary proceeding, and November 28 of the same year is when it opens that proceeding, at which moment the fatal two-year period had not yet elapsed.”

“V.- RESPECTO AL PLAZO DE PRESCRIPCIÓN APLICABLE Y SU CÓMPUTO: El IDA se muestra disconforme con que se aplicara el ordinal 603 del Código de Trabajo. Desde su perspectiva, la norma correcta debió ser el canon 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. La versión del ordinal 71 que se encontraba vigente para la data de los hechos rezaba: “La responsabilidad disciplinaria del servidor de la Hacienda Pública prescribirá en el plazo de dos años, contados a partir del conocimiento comprobado de la falta por parte del órgano competente, para iniciar el respectivo procedimiento sancionatorio. Para estos efectos, quedan reformados, respecto de los funcionarios o de los servidores públicos, el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo y cualesquiera otras disposiciones jurídicas que se le opongan. / La comprobación del conocimiento de la falta podrá efectuarse por cualquier medio de prueba, con el valor que esta tenga, de acuerdo con la Ley General de la Administración Pública y, supletoriamente, de acuerdo con el derecho común. / Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo. / Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente, para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar prescribir la responsabilidad del infractor, sin causa justificada”. Sobre esa norma en concreto, la Sala Constitucional sostuvo el criterio que dicho ordinal no podía tener un alcance irrestricto, sino que su ámbito de acción se reducía a los supuestos en que la persona servidora del Estado manejase y dispusiere de fondos públicos. Veamos lo dicho por ese órgano en su sentencia n.° 6750-1997 de las 11:12 horas del 17 de octubre de 1997: “En general, y como ya lo ha sostenido esta Sala en diversos pronunciamientos (1696-92 de las quince horas treinta minutos del veintitrés de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y dos y 1472-94 de las diecisiete horas cincuenta y cuatro minutos del veintiuno de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro), existió la voluntad del Constituyente para instituir un régimen de empleo diferenciado para los servidores del Estado, que operase bajo características de idoneidad, eficiencia y además -para lo que interesa en esta acción- que participara de la condición de estabilidad.- Lo anterior significa que el empleado público ostenta el derecho de permanecer en su puesto mientras cumpla con las condiciones legalmente exigidas y no incurra en ninguna de las causales de despido expresamente reguladas.- Se agrega a lo anterior, una clara intención legislativa, manifestada en el articulado de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, de hacer responsable al funcionario público por su actuaciones y en general por su conducta como parte integrante de la Administración Pública.- Esto coloca al Estado en tanto que patrono, en una posición muy distinta de la de los sujetos privados, dado que no puede como éstos, prescindir de sus empleados por la simple conveniencia, de manera que un mayor ámbito de ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria se convierte en adecuada y justa para compensar esa desigualdad, principalmente si tomamos en cuenta los fines que debe perseguir el servicio público.- Unido a lo anterior -y ya en relación con el tema del "quantum" del plazo de prescripción- debe tenerse en cuenta que, a juicio de la Sala, la norma impugnada pretende dotar al Estado de armas efectivas para el control y sanción de los funcionarios públicos que cumplen una de las funciones más sensibles como lo es el manejo de dineros públicos.- / En efecto, considera esta Sede que si bien el artículo 8 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría, define la "Hacienda Pública" como "...la organización formada por los entes y órganos públicos, incluyendo los no estatales, propietarios o encargados, por cualquier título, de la administración del patrimonio público" y que éste último es "...la universidad constituida por los fondos públicos y por los pasivos a cargo de la Hacienda Pública", tales conceptos deben entenderse y aplicarse con relación a lo que constituye el objetivo principal de la Ley, vale decir, el establecimiento de la esfera de competencia de la Contraloría. / - Sin embargo, cuando se trata de temas ajenos en general a dicho órgano -tal y como es el caso del artículo 71 cuestionado- lo cierto es que la interpretación del concepto de servidor de la hacienda pública debe restringirse a aquel que tiene a su cargo el manejo de fondos públicos.- Para la Sala esta interpretación es necesaria, pues solo de esa forma resulta justificada y explicable la diferencia de los plazos de prescripción para la aplicación de sanciones disciplinarias.- Dicho de otra forma, el plazo de dos años establecido en el artículo cuestionado resulta constitucionalmente adecuado solo si se entiende que con él se pretende posibilitar al Estado un control mayor sobre sus funcionarios que están directamente relacionados con el manejo y disposición de los fondos públicos, ello por indudable relevancia del tema y la gran necesidad de asegurar el manejo más sano y limpio posible de los fondos públicos” (la negrita es suplida). Como se puede observar, la citada disposición mantenía un criterio subjetivo que se circunscribía al análisis de los elementos especiales del trabajador, para concluir si se trataba o no, de un funcionario de la hacienda pública. En el sub júdice, la actora se desempeñaba como Jefa de la Sección de Beneficiarios en el IDA, despacho administrativo que se encargaba del proceso de selección de familias solicitantes de tierras y, se le endilgó la violación de los numerales 62 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización y 4, 7, 8, 18, 22, 23 y 24 del Reglamento Autónomo para la Selección de Beneficiarios. De este modo, es diáfano que la servidora por la naturaleza de su cargo, en efecto intervenía en la disposición y manejo de bienes de naturaleza pública, tan es así, que sus labores se vinculaban directamente en la asignación de las parcelas que eran adquiridas y entregadas a familias campesinas con recursos del erario del Estado; razón por la cual no podía serle aplicado el precepto 603 del Código de Trabajo, sino la versión del canon 71 antes mencionado. Ahora bien, según consta la Presidencia Ejecutiva (funcionario competente para ejercitar la potestad disciplinaria en la institución) conoció del Informe de Auditoría Interna ARI-004-2001 el 26 de octubre de 2001 (folios 164 a 193), sin embargo, tuvo que ordenar una investigación preliminar el 14 de mayo de 2003, pues no estaban especificados los involucrados en esas irregularidades. El 20 de setiembre de 2006 se le informó de la necesidad de instaurar un procedimiento disciplinario a la accionante (folio 108 del expediente administrativo). Después, el 9 de octubre de 2006 dio la orden a la Unidad de Relaciones Laborales para que diera inicio a la tramitación del asunto. Finalmente, el acto de apertura de las 14:00 horas del 17 de noviembre de 2006 emitido por ese órgano, se le notificó formalmente a la accionante el 28 de noviembre siguiente (hecho treceavo de la demanda no contradicho por la representación del IDA). De manera reiterada esta Sala ha resuelto que en instituciones públicas donde es de rigor la apertura de un procedimiento previo a la imposición de la sanción de despido, el plazo de prescripción no inicia sino a partir del momento cuando el órgano responsable de acordar la decisión final se encuentra en posibilidad de hacerlo, es decir, cuando se le comunica el resultado de la investigación. Así, tenemos que entre el 20 de setiembre de 2006 el IDA estaba en plena posibilidad de iniciar el procedimiento disciplinario y, es el 28 de noviembre del mismo año en que da la apertura de esa causa, momento para el que el plazo fatal de dos años no se había completado.”