Dismissal of PROMECE Director for advance payment of invoices in public tenderDespido de Director de PROMECE por pago adelantado de facturas en licitación

“III.- LEGAL ASPECTS INVOLVED: Having set forth the matter thus, it is now appropriate to determine the propriety of the claims, based on the factual framework and the relationship of the proven and unproven facts. However, it is advisable beforehand to make some general observations that will allow clarification of the points in dispute. ON THE NULLITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACT: Pursuant to article 158 of the General Law on Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, hereinafter LGAP), the lack or defect of any requirement of the administrative act, expressly or implicitly required by the legal system, shall constitute a defect thereof. Stating thereafter that an administrative act substantially inconsistent with the legal system shall be invalid, specifying that insubstantial infractions shall not invalidate the act. Accordingly, two types of infractions can occur in an administrative act: substantial and insubstantial, the former being those that determine the invalidity of the act, which manifests itself, depending on the seriousness of the violation committed, as relative or absolute nullity, and the insubstantial ones that do not produce the invalidity of the act, but do produce disciplinary liability of the public servant. The validity of the administrative act is verified by the perfect fulfillment and presence of the elements that constitute it, both formal and substantial. These elements to which we refer, national doctrine, as well as the LGAP, distinguishes between formal and substantial; among the formal elements are the subject, procedure, and form, and among the substantial or material elements, the grounds, content, and purpose. The first formal element of the administrative act is the subject. It corresponds to the author of the act. It is the public official, administrative body, or entity that issues an administrative act, which must in turn meet a series of requirements, such as investiture, competence (competencia), and status as the holder. Investiture is the appointment or election to a public office or employment. In this sense, article 111 of the LGAP provides that a public servant is the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf of and for the account of the latter, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. Which in turn confers upon them the power to act on behalf of and for the account of the State and to direct the effect of their conduct toward the latter. This can occur by election or appointment. It becomes effective upon taking possession of the office. Eduardo Ortiz defines competence (competencia) 'as the exact measure of the quantity of means legally authorized in favor of the State, within a specific case to pursue a determined purpose.' Competence (competencia) means the quantity of powers and duties arranged in favor of a determined administrative entity. Competence (competencia) is the complex of faculties and powers attributed to a determined administrative body in relation to the others, for the foundation of competence (competencia) lies in the plurality of bodies that make up the Public Administration and the distribution of the different functions among them (in this sense see articles 59 and 129 LGAP). It has been stated that competence (competencia) consists of the set of faculties granted to the Public Administration, or the exact measure of the quantity of means legally authorized in favor of the Public Administration, within a specific case to pursue a determined purpose. Competence (competencia) belongs to the administrative entity, which is exercised by partial centers of action called administrative bodies. The origin of competence (competencia) is always legal, understanding by legal any juridical norm issued within the order of the State. Thus, competence (competencia) can be granted by law or by regulation. It should be noted that competence (competencia) is not only a measure of powers but also of duties, because by virtue of it, it is not only possible to enter into legal relations and affect the world of law through the performance of legal acts, but it may also be necessary, in fulfillment of bonds imposed by law for the better satisfaction of the public interest. All public competence (competencia) always implies the necessity of its exercise for the benefit of the community, and the principle can be formulated that the public official has not only the power but also the duty to exercise their competence (competencia), since the interest to be satisfied by that exercise is alien and not their own. On the distribution and change of competence (competencia): Competence (competencia) is attributed generally to the administrative entity, who by virtue of the power of organization creates and distributes the competence (competencia) internally, creating the administrative bodies that will partially and temporarily put the competence (competencia) into execution, performing the legal and material acts sufficient for the satisfaction of the public interest. Competence (competencia), as indicated, is attributed to a holder, who is consequently the only one competent to exercise it. However, to achieve a decongestion of functions and procedures, or to achieve administrative action in a more expeditious and efficient manner, on certain occasions, the transfer of competence (competencia) occurs from one body to another. This transfer of competence (competencia) should not be confused with administrative decentralization as a technique of transferring competence (competencia) from the legal person of the State to another public legal person. The fundamental note that characterizes the phenomenon of decentralization is that the transfer occurs between distinct legal persons. In the case of inter-body transfer of competence (competencia), it is an internal phenomenon, characterized by the distribution of competence (competencia) carried out by the head (jerarca) among the various bodies that make up the respective entity. Article 70 LGAP. Among the techniques of distribution and transfer of competence (competencia), we find deconcentration (desconcentración). On some occasions, the legislator has considered it convenient to create bodies (within the respective entity) to carry out technical and specialized functions, all with the object of optimizing the efficiency of the administrative function. It is here where deconcentration (desconcentración) is resorted to as a technique for distributing competence (competencia) in the internal sphere of the same public entity (but not the transfer of competence (competencia) from one subject to another, a phenomenon typical of decentralization), by virtue of which the legislator removes a competence (competencia) belonging to a superior, to attribute it exclusively to an inferior, for the purpose of the latter exercising it as its own and under its responsibility. Thus, there are three elements that configure it. On the one hand, the necessary existence of a legal norm that attributes the competence (competencia) (formerly of the superior) to the inferior for its exclusive exercise. On the other hand, the creation of the deconcentrated body (órgano desconcentrado) that will exercise the competence (competencia). This is derived from numeral 83 subsection 1) of the LGAP, which clearly indicates that every body other than the head (jerarca) shall be fully subordinate to the latter and to the immediate hierarchical superior, except for deconcentration (desconcentración) operated by law or by regulation. Now then, our legal system distinguishes between minimum and maximum deconcentration (desconcentración). According to the aforementioned numeral 83, minimum deconcentration occurs when the superior cannot recall competences (competencias) from the inferior, review or substitute the conduct of the inferior, ex officio or at the request of a party. For its part, deconcentration (desconcentración) will be maximum when, in addition to the foregoing, the inferior is removed from the orders, instructions, or circulars of the superior. It is also indicated that norms creating minimum deconcentration (desconcentración) shall be restrictively applied against the competence (competencia) of the deconcentrated body (órgano desconcentrado) and those creating maximum deconcentration (desconcentración) shall be extensively applied in its favor. Finally, it should be noted that, in some cases, the legislator endows the deconcentrated body (órgano desconcentrado) with what has jurisprudentially been called 'instrumental legal personhood (personería jurídica instrumental),' limited, as a general rule, only to budgetary aspects, in such a way that this 'personhood (personería)' does not convert the body into a legal person distinct from the entity to which it belongs (typical of decentralization), but does attribute to it the capacity to manage certain funds, independently of the central budget of the entity to which it belongs. Finally, the status as holder (titularidad) refers to the fact that the public official must not only be competent, but must also be the holder (titular) of the competence (competencia). Holder (titular) has been understood as one who exercises a position, profession, or trade, by their own right or permanent appointment, with the fullness of requirements and stability, as opposed to the person called to occupy it provisionally. The second formal element of the administrative act is the procedure. The Public Administration has the faculty to issue administrative acts unilaterally, which can even annul or revoke subjective rights of individuals. This power of self-protection has been limited by the legal system. That limit is constituted by the obligation of the Public Administration to follow a procedure to issue the administrative act. The administrative procedure is a concatenated series of procedural acts tending toward an end. The administrative procedure has a fundamental object, the investigation of the real truth of the grounds that will serve as the basis for the final administrative act. The procedure concerns the mode of production of an act (articles 214, 216, 224, 225, 308 and 320 LGAP). The administrative procedure constitutes the means or instrument that allows the Administration to verify that the assumptions conditioning the issuance of an administrative act have occurred; for such purposes, it has been conceptualized as the ordering of a series of actions, the concatenation of different procedures, whose legal effects are linked together for the production of an administrative decision, which reveals, in itself, its nature as acts of mere procedure, in principle not contestable by themselves, but rather through the final administrative act, the product of that procedure. From this perspective, procedural defects will be relevant provided they determine the invalidity of the adopted administrative act, which consequently requires an examination of the legality of the act, which implies, if applicable, examining the administrative action and thus determining the validity or not of the administrative decision. Included here are the elements of due process (debido proceso), which must be observed and respected in every sanctioning administrative procedure. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has defined them as follows: 'a) to notify the affected party of the charges, which implies communicating in an individualized, concrete, and timely manner the facts imputed; b) to allow them unrestricted access to the administrative file, c) to grant them a reasonable period for the preparation of their defense, d) to grant them a hearing and allow them to provide all evidence they deem appropriate to support their defense; e) to state the grounds for the resolutions that conclude the procedure; f) to recognize their right to appeal against the sanctioning resolution' (Judgment number 5469-95 of eighteen hours three minutes of the fourth of October of nineteen ninety-five). The third formal element of the administrative act is the form, which is the manner in which the administrative act is externalized or manifested. In accordance with article 134 of the LGAP, the administrative act must be expressed in writing, unless its nature or the circumstances demand a different form (see 136 LGAP and 146 Political Constitution). Regarding the material or substantial elements of the administrative act, we have that the grounds (motivo) (article 133 LGAP) is the legal premise, the conditioning fact that gives genesis to the administrative act. In such a way, the grounds (motivo) of the administrative act constitute the assumption or the conditioning fact for the issuance of an administrative act; in other terms, it constitutes the reason for being of the administrative act, what obliges or permits its issuance. It can consist of a legal act or fact provided for by the legal norm. Article 166 LGAP provides: 'There shall be absolute nullity of the act when one or more of its constitutive elements are totally lacking, in fact or in law.' Meanwhile, the content of the act constitutes the legal effect or the operative part of the act, what it commands, orders, or disposes. It is the change it introduces into the legal world. It is the part of the act that disposes a sanction, an authorization, a permit, or a concession (article 132 LGAP). The last of the substantial or material elements is the Purpose (Fin). The Public Administration has a sole mission, the satisfaction of the public interest. That satisfaction of the public interest is achieved in various ways, one of them being through the issuance of administrative acts. In principle, it is understood that every administrative act, as a concrete exercise of a generic competence (competencia), tends toward the satisfaction of the common interest. Therefore, it is affirmed that the purpose (fin) of the administrative act will consequently be the satisfaction of the public interest, which constitutes the general purpose (fin) of every administrative act, and in turn, the specific purpose (fin) will be the satisfaction of the public interest that is entrusted to that competence (competencia) (article 131 LGAP).

\n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- ON THE SANCTIONING POWER OF THE ADMINISTRATION: The Sanctioning Power (Potestad Sancionatoria) of the Administration is that which opens the punitive action of the Administration. It is an inherent attribution of the Administration that translates into the legal possibility of imposing sanctions on individuals and even on officials who infringe its provisions in the exercise of their functions, transgressing its mandates or disregarding its prohibitions. The legal nature of said power is administrative and should not be confused with that exercised by a judge in the development of a judicial process, since in that context the sanction is of a criminal jurisdictional nature. The penalty that is externalized in the field of administrative law does not have a criminal character. It is imposed as an instrument of self-protection to preserve the institutional legal order through the distribution of competences (competencias) and the indication of penalties of the same character. They are sanctions that assume a corrective or disciplinary nature, depending on the scope of application. Hence, one speaks of disciplinary sanctioning power (potestad sancionatoria disciplinaria) and correctional sanctioning power (potestad sancionatoria correccional), depending on whether the recipients are public servants or individuals. The Sanctioning Power (Potestad Sancionatoria) of the Administration unfolds within the scope of the most dissimilar facts, acts, and complex activities of individuals and the Administration itself. It is aimed at repressing those behaviors that transgress administrative normativity and is subject, moreover, to the constitutional and legal limitations established in the Political Constitution and in the general provisions that regulate it. Basis of the hierarchical power and the disciplinary regime: With the purpose of achieving a joint and coordinated action despite the diversity of bodies that may form an Administrative Entity, it is necessary to reserve the power of decision and command in a few bodies, the others being simple management bodies or preparatory bodies for the decision-making bodies. The manner in which the various bodies that depend on the same hierarchy are linked and coordinated among themselves can be expressed graphically when those bodies are grouped, placing themselves in relation to each other in a situation of dependency such that among all of them there exists a bond which, starting from the body situated in the highest grade of that order, links them successively down to the body of the lowest category, through various grades in which certain faculties exist to which reference will later be made. The legal relationship that links the various bodies constitutes what is called 'Hierarchical Relationship (Relación de Jerarquía).' This hierarchical relationship is what permits and explains how the unity of the Administrative Power is maintained despite the diversity of bodies that form it. The conservation of that unity is guaranteed by the concentration of the power of decision and command. The concentration of the power of command and decision consists in the fact that in the organization of a public entity there exists a reduced number of bodies with competence (competencia) to issue resolutions, impose determinations, or perform legal acts that create legal situations. The other bodies simply perform the material acts necessary to assist the decision-making ones. The power of command of this regime is found in the faculty of the superior authorities to give orders and instructions to the inferior bodies, indicating the guidelines they must follow for the exercise of the attributions and functions entrusted to them. This power of command is generally exercised by means of orders, instructions, and circulars issued by authorities regarding the employees who are subordinate to them. It is based on the necessity that the set of bodies and officials that make up the Public Administration act in a coordinated manner in the fulfillment of their own duties as if they were a unit. That coordination is achieved by centralizing administrative direction in a single body, called Head (Jerarca), and making the other bodies and officials dependent on it. The way in which said bodies and officials are linked to one another gives rise to Hierarchy (Jerarquía). Hierarchy (Jerarquía) is the legal relationship that links the administrative bodies and officials together, through powers of subordination, for the purpose of coordinating and giving unity to the action of all of them. That hierarchical relationship consists of a relationship of dependency that implies certain powers of the superior bodies over the inferior ones. These powers inherent to the hierarchical relationship are: a) Power of appointment: It is a faculty of the superior authorities to make the designations of the holders (titulares) of the bodies that are subordinate to them, by means of appointments. b) Power of command: It consists, as stated, of the faculty of the superior authorities to give orders and instructions to the inferior bodies, indicating the guidelines they must follow for the exercise of the activity that corresponds to them. Orders are imperative decisions for specific cases; service instructions constitute a way of supplying detailed and practical indications; circulars are always a set of provisions of a general nature, unlike the other two which sometimes have an individual nature. c) Power of supervision: It is a faculty that manifests itself through acts of a purely material nature, which consist of demanding accountability, conducting investigations or inquiries about the processing of matters, and in general, all those acts that tend to give knowledge to the superior authorities of the regularity with which the inferiors are performing their functions. d) Disciplinary Power: The failure to fulfill the duties imposed by public service gives rise to the liability of the author, liability that can be civil, criminal, or administrative. Any fault committed by the official or employee in the performance of their duties makes them administratively responsible, without prejudice to the possibility that it may also originate civil or criminal liability. e) Power of Review: In this domain, the faculties derived from the hierarchical relationship consist of the power to grant prior approval to the acts that the inferiors perform, to suspend them, annul them, or reform them. f) Power for the resolution of conflicts of competence (competencia). The disciplinary power of the Head (Jerarca) is tacit and of principle and does not require an express norm establishing it, as expressed in article 104 LGAP, that is, the Head (Jerarca), by their simple condition as such, has the faculty to discipline the faults committed by their subordinates without the need for a norm in that sense. Closely related to the topic, and due to its relevance in the matter at hand, it is appropriate to address the point regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria) in public employment. On that specific aspect, this Tribunal has stated: 'VI.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF THE DISCIPLINARY POWER (POTESTAD DISCIPLINARIA). The statute of limitations (prescripción) is an institution by means of which the passage of time produces the effect of consolidating de facto situations, permitting the extinction of rights or the acquisition of things belonging to others, which obeys the maxim that \"Time leads to the consolidation of certain rights or to the loss of the same.\" As the legal scholar Rafael Caballero Sánchez correctly points out in his work \"Prescripción y Caducidad en el Ordenamiento Administrativo\" (\"Statute of Limitations and Expiration in the Administrative System\"), the institution is of ancient date in other branches, since its application in Administrative Law is more recent. Its application in Public Law has reached maturity, offering a finished model, formed by its own norms, rules, and principles. Thus, as matters are set forth, in the public employment regime, there are various, duly differentiated, statute of limitations (prescripción) periods for the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria), applicable to public officials, which derive from the normative bodies. In the first place, there is article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which applies as a general norm, unless there is a special provision to the contrary. Said norm provides that the statute of limitations (prescripción) operates in one month. On the other hand, article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) establishes a period of 5 years, when it involves transgressions of the Control and Oversight system (ordenamiento de Control y Fiscalización). In the same sense, canon 43 of the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno) and 44 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública) establish the 5-year period when it involves transgressions of the control and oversight system (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización). Based on the foregoing, it can be affirmed, in general terms, that there are two statute of limitations (prescripción) periods applicable to public officials regarding the exercise of the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria), without prejudice to other special systems that have their own periods, as is the case of the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía) No. 7410. It is important to keep in mind the provisions of the mentioned numerals that regulate the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the sanctioning power in the field of control and oversight. Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) was reformed by Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, and it is the one that refers to the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in the Law and in the superior control and oversight system (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización), in the following terms: \"Article 71.—Statute of limitations (Prescripción) of disciplinary liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight system (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización), shall be subject to the statute of limitations (prescribirá) according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular fact is notorious, the liability shall be subject to the statute of limitations (prescribirá) in five years, counted from the occurrence of the fact. b) In cases where the irregular fact is not notorious – understood as that fact which requires an inquiry or an audit study to inform of its possible irregularity – the liability shall be subject to the statute of limitations (prescribirá) in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the head (jerarca) or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. The statute of limitations (prescripción) shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible person of the act that orders the initiation of the administrative procedure. When the author of the fault is the head (jerarca), the period shall begin to run from the date on which their service relationship with the entity, company, or respective body ends. It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the liability of the offender to be barred by the statute of limitations (prescriba), without justified cause.\" (Thus reformed by subsection a) of article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, Internal Control Law (Ley de Control Interno)). For its part, the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno), No. 8292, in numeral 43 indicates the following: \"Article 43.—Statute of limitations (Prescripción) of administrative liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law shall be subject to the statute of limitations (prescribirá) according to article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, of September 7, 1994. It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the liability of the offender to be barred by the statute of limitations (prescribir), without justified cause.\" /Finally, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), No. 8422, states: \"Article 44.—Statute of limitations (Prescripción) of administrative liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the system relating to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), shall be subject to the statute of limitations (prescribirá), according to article 43 of the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno) and article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, of September 7, 1994.\" From the mentioned numerals, an objective material criterion emerges that allows determining when the mentioned statute of limitations (prescripción) applies to a fault against the Public Treasury. In that sense, if there is a transgression of the control and oversight system (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización) or one relating to the Public Treasury, the 5-year statute of limitations (prescripción) period of the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria) applies. This criterion allows differentiating the applicable statute of limitations (prescripción) in cases of a labor nature, which is one month, in accordance with what article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) provides. With the reform undergone by article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), by varying the assessment criterion to determine the applicable statute of limitations (prescripción) period, a shift occurred from a subjective regime to an objective one. Previously, it was necessary to carry out the exercise to determine, for purposes of applying the statute of limitations (prescripción) period, whether the person was a servant of the Public Treasury (aspecto subjetivo). As mentioned supra, the criterion that currently prevails is an objective material one, which is determined by the transgression of the control and oversight system (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización), which is composed, among others, of the mentioned laws, as well as the Law on Financial Administration and Public Budgets (Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos), No. 8131 and its Regulation, the Law on Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) No. 7494 and its Regulation. Thus, it is clear that the interpretation of the cited regulations allows applying the statute of limitations (prescripción) period to any public official who, regardless of whether or not they occupy a position in the Public Treasury, incurs a breach of the control and oversight system (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización); if this occurs, the 5-year period applies to them.' (Judgment number 101-2011 (sic) of fifteen hours thirty minutes of the twenty-fourth of October of two thousand twelve, Section V).

\n\r\n\r\n\nV.- ON THE MERITS: As referenced in the corresponding section, the plaintiff seeks the nullity of official communication (oficio) 633-09 of June 27, 2009, which ordered the establishment of a directing body (órgano director) against him, and resolutions numbers 701-09 of eight hours on September 23, 2009, and 742-09 of ten hours forty-five minutes on September 28, 2009.

Acts issued by the Minister of Public Education, seeking to have his dismissal as Director of PROMECE declared null, ordering the State and the co-defendant officials in their personal capacity to be jointly and severally liable for the payment of damages and losses caused. To this end, he contends that the appointment of the governing body of the proceeding by the Minister of Education is contrary to law, since its designation and processing corresponded to the Human Resources Directorate of the MEP, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 18, subsection j), 50, subsection m) of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Education and 16, subsections a and b of the Internal Labor Regulations and 57 and 61 LGAP. The aforementioned Article 18, subsection j, establishes: "The specific powers of the Minister are: (...) j) To decide in the final administrative instance on the imposition of sanctions under the disciplinary regime for teaching and administrative staff" and Article 50, subsection m) which states: "The duties and powers of the Director of the Personnel Department are: m) To hear and resolve in the first administrative instance: (...) 2º.- Complaints and charges filed against public servants, for offenses committed or breach of duties in the exercise of their functions;" In the same vein, Article 140 of the Fundamental Charter must be taken into account, in its subsections 1 and 2, which establishes the rule that appointment and removal correspond to the head of the institution and that it is their obligation to coordinate the means of providing public service. However, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 2 of Law number 7315 of October 23, 1992, PROMECE officials are excluded from the Civil Service Regime, which means that Article 6 of the aforementioned Organic Law of the Ministry of Labor is not applicable since, by providing that: "This Organic Law, its related laws and their respective regulations, govern the relations between the Ministry and its servants, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and its regulations," it excludes from its provisions personnel not covered by the Civil Service regime, an aspect that was even already resolved by the Constitutional Chamber, which heard an identical argument to the one raised here by the plaintiff himself, when filing an amparo appeal against his dismissal. The Constitutional Court held, in the relevant part: "IV.- REGARDING THE CONFORMATION OF THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE PROCEEDING: As a first point, the appellant alleges that the Minister of Public Education does not have the disciplinary power to institute an ordinary proceeding, since the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Education is clear in indicating that the person in charge of hearing and resolving complaints for breach of duties in the first instance is the Director of the Personnel Department and not the Minister. In this specific case, it is proven that Article 6 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Education, in conjunction with Article 2 of Law No. 7315 of October 23, 1992, called 'Approval of the Loan Contracts between the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank and the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica', created the Coordinating Unit of the Program for the Improvement of the Quality of General Basic Education, as a body attached to the Ministry of Public Education, under the direction of the Ministry of Public Education, and it was indicated that the personnel would be excluded from the Civil Service Regime, that is, PROMECE officials are not covered by Article 6 of the aforementioned Law, consequently, the Personnel or Human Resources Department lacks jurisdiction to institute an administrative proceeding against the petitioner. By virtue of the foregoing, the amparo must be dismissed regarding this point." (Vote 3586-2010). Therefore, this specific objection must be dismissed. He further indicates that the resolution ordering his dismissal was based on false facts. Two important clarifications must be made regarding this particular grievance. One of a procedural nature, directly related to the burden of proof of the one who asserts in the process. Indeed, in accordance with the doctrine of Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is up to the party to prove, through suitable evidence, their assertions. This Chamber has already stated on other occasions that even though the judgment is the responsibility of the jurisdictional authority, the process belongs to the parties, and it is they who define how to present the case, establish which evidence they wish to offer, and what arguments they will put forward. Although the jurisdictional authority has, under the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, broad powers to expand, add to, or clarify the claim, the grounds, and the evidence, these cannot go to the extreme of totally replacing the parties, such that the jurisdictional authority ex officio replaces the participants in the process. At that level, it is not possible. The main function of the jurisdictional authority is to direct the process, not to replace the parties. It is they who define how the evidence should be chosen and the approach they intend to give it. In this regard, the plaintiff did not demonstrate, nor did he provide any evidence in favor of his thesis, regarding the alleged false facts on which the resolution ordering his dismissal is based; he did not even bother to indicate which facts he labels as such. The second necessary clarification lies in the fact that the facts on which the Administration based its decision to dismiss the plaintiff are basically coincident with the proven facts of this judgment, so that rather than speaking of a falsehood regarding the facts, what exists is a discrepancy of criteria regarding the effects and consequences derived from such facts. He further contends that his defense formally raised a ground for disqualification against the Minister of Public Education, before the issuance of the final act of the administrative sanctioning procedure, and that despite this, he issued the resolution challenged in this process. Upon conducting the respective analysis of this argument, we find that on folio 700 of the judicial file, Volume I, there is a brief mention in the conclusions of the plaintiff's defense in the administrative proceeding, in which it was indicated: "But the most serious thing is that in your capacity as head of program 570 - referring to the minister - who had already signed approving the corresponding payment, you order an administrative proceeding against another official for an alleged advance payment (sic) that you approved; that is being judge and party." and later, in the appeal phase, folio 863 of the judicial file, Volume I, it was noted: "Nevertheless, this representation stated in its conclusions that, in accordance with the law, you should have abstained from issuing the final act, given the existence of an evident ground for disqualification. You did not do so. You did not even consider it. This is a defect that contaminates your action." This being the case, it must be concluded that a formal recusal was not filed against the Minister of Public Education, by virtue of which he had to abstain from issuing the final act, until the filed recusal had been resolved beforehand, so from that particular aspect, the alleged ground for nullity does not exist. Another aspect to consider would be whether the referred official could infer, from such a generic and unclear argument, a ground for disqualification or excuse that would prevent him from issuing the final act in the administrative proceeding. Certainly, what was set forth in the conclusions of Mr. Barrantes Rivera's legal representation, analyzed and weighed under a criterion of reasonableness and average understanding, does not allow for the inference of an accused ground for recusal; at most, a grievance regarding the double administrative instance, insofar as such a condition and duty are accepted within the structure and organization of the Public Administration. If that is the objection, it is therefore appropriate to cite again what was said by the Constitutional Chamber, in Vote 3586-2010 regarding the alleged violation of the double administrative instance, in the plaintiff's specific case: "VI.- REGARDING THE DOUBLE INSTANCE: The appellant alleges that the Minister of Public Education, against internal regulations, processed the administrative proceeding, and even worse, heard the appeal for revocation and the hierarchical appeal filed against the resolution ordering his dismissal, a situation that does not allow him to resort to a second instance. In the present matter – as indicated in Considerando IV of this judgment – the Minister is capable of initiating and processing the ordinary administrative proceedings instituted against PROMECE officials, since they are excluded from the Civil Service Regime, a situation which makes it understood that the proceeding that has the possibility of a second instance is the one processed by the Director of the Personnel or Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Public Education, a situation that does not arise in the specific case. Thus, this Chamber observes that the respondent authority has not incurred in any act violating the fundamental rights of the appellant, so this alleged point must be declared without merit." It suffices to analyze whether, regardless of whether the Minister of Public Education was formally recused, because he was part of the process for processing and advance payment of the invoices, he had grounds for disqualification or excuse, such that he should have recused himself from hearing the matter. Article 230 of the LGAP provides that the grounds for abstention shall be the same grounds for impediment and recusal established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and, additionally, those resulting from Article 102 of the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic. The grounds for abstention shall apply to the governing body of the proceeding, to the appellate body, and to the other authorities or officials who intervene assisting or advising them in the proceeding. It is worth highlighting that Article 31 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch expressly refers, regarding impediments, recusals, and excuses, to what is expressly provided in the Civil Procedure Code, given that the aforementioned Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic is currently repealed. The impediments are expressly regulated in Article 49 of the Civil Procedure Code, of which, in principle, the only applicable ground in the situation at hand would be having a direct interest. The State representation denies that a direct interest exists in the Minister's case, as he does not obtain any advantage, benefit, utility, or gain. It is clear that this position starts from considering that interest always implies a surplus or an increase, be it in his legal sphere or in his assets. However, there is also interest if that advantage manifests itself in avoiding a harm or a detriment, of a personal or patrimonial nature, through the imposition of a sanction or the loss of a benefit or position; hence, to analyze the eventual direct interest, one must not only consider whether an advantage is obtained, but also whether a detriment is avoided. From this perspective, it is observed that in the issuance of the administrative act ordering the plaintiff's dismissal from his position as Director of PROMECE, the Minister of Public Education did so by virtue of his position in the exercise of the disciplinary power he holds, without the condition of having participated in some way in the procedures and advance payment of the invoices constituting a ground for impediment or recusal regarding disciplining the officials hierarchically dependent on his Office, without prejudice to his personal and eventual responsibility for those same acts. It is worth adding that the principle that there is no nullity for nullity's sake governs in this matter, so that even if some ground for the superior's separation could exist, it has not been demonstrated that this situation diverted the purposes, tasks, and contents of the act. This prevents accepting the party's argument.

VI.- ON THE MERITS (continuation): The fundamental basis upon which the plaintiff's defense revolves regarding the imputed acts centers on affirming that in the Tender 2006LN-000075-57000, he had no personal participation, nor did PROMECE as a body. To this end, in summarized terms, he gives an account of the development of the tender, from its conception and definition of the required goods and services, the purchase decision, the budget program that is financed by an item from the Minister's Office, the preparation of the tender specifications, the definition of the administrative unit of the MEP that will oversee the process and the fulfillment of the contracting objectives, which falls to the MEP Procurement Department, the preparation of the orders, without any participation by him or PROMECE he warns, the award by a committee, the preparation and signing of the contracts by the minister and their referral to the Legal Division of the MEP for their "endorsement" and the subsequent purchase order and start by the Procurement Department. With all this, he says, it is proven that he had no participation whatsoever in the process. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the accuracy of such an affirmation. In the present process, it has been proven that in the justification document for the acquisition of workshops for a pedagogical transformation within the framework of the educational innovation project, it was stated that "Through the Educational Innovation Project, led by the Minister of Education and with the technical support of the Program for the Improvement of the Quality of Pre-school Education and the III Cycle (PROMECE), the Ministry of Public Education has engaged in promoting initiatives that provide new educational opportunities through the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in such a way that their constructive and democratic use in the teaching-learning process fosters in the actors of the educational process the successful integration between the pedagogical and the technological as a methodological alternative to transform educational practice." (proven fact three). Consequently, the Ministry of Public Education promoted Public Tender No. 2006LN-000075-5700 for the acquisition of the following goods or services: Line 1: Pedagogical Integration Workshops in the use of Geometer's Sketchpad software (quantity 10). Line 2: Pedagogical Integration Workshops in the use of Create Together software (quantity 10). Line 3: Pedagogical Integration Workshops in the use of Microworlds software (quantity 10). Line 4: Pedagogical transformation training workshops for the strengthening of a culture of change for directors and lead teachers (quantity 12). Line 5: Workshops on basic tools for integrating learning processes (quantity 10). Line 6: Workshops for the consolidation of educational practice innovation and the construction of collaborative networks (quantity 13). In all of them, it was expressly indicated that the managing unit was Innovación Educativa Promece (proven fact four). In this way, in the respective public tender specifications No. 2006LN-000075-5700 for the contracting of training activities for the Educational Innovation Program, it was recorded that the execution time for the required products and services would be determined by the completion of the last module, which must be no later than three months from the start order and in accordance with a schedule that must be approved by the MEP. Regarding the workshops, it was established that the delivery time is estimated at three months from the start order, in accordance with an implementation schedule that must be reconciled with the educational centers and that must be approved by the MEP-PROMECE (proven fact six). Likewise, in the respective public tender specifications No. 2006LN-000075-5700 for the contracting of training activities for the Educational Innovation Program, it was stated that the Ministry of Public Education, with the support of PROMECE, is willing to purchase the required services, committing to: "a) Make the corresponding payments upon delivery of the products established in an implementation schedule previously approved by the parties./ b) Provide the Innovation and Learning Rooms necessary for the development of these training processes. /c) In the event that the training is not in the metropolitan area, provide the necessary transportation costs and per diems for the participants." (proven fact seven). Subsequently, in the document called "Comprehensive Analysis No. 0091-2006 of Administrative Contracting" from the Institutional Procurement Department of the MEP, related to Public Tender No. 2006LN-000075-5700 for the contracting of training activities for the Educational Innovation Program, in which the award is recommended, it was specified: "2.3 TECHNICAL ASPECTS/ Once the competing offer was analyzed and according to the technical report issued by the IT specialist of the Program for the Improvement of the Quality of Pre-school and General Basic Education (PROMECE) Luis C. Rodríguez Carballo, forwarded via official communication PROMECE 0981-2006, signed by (sic) Carlos A. Barrantes Rivera, Director of PROMECE, it was determined:/ That the offers adequately meet the technical aspects requested in the tender specifications." (proven fact ten). Subsequently, the Institutional Procurement Department of the Ministry of Education issued Purchase Orders numbers 4500061831, 4500061824, 4500061821, and 4500061827, dated December 12, 2006, regarding Public Tender 2006LN-000075-57000 Training Activities Educational Innovation Program, specifying that the Managing Unit is PROMECE (proven fact fourteen). It was also proven that the official Luis Carlos Rodríguez Carballo drafted and submitted for signature to the Director of PROMECE, Mr. Carlos Alberto Barrantes Rivera, the notes with the approval for the corresponding payment to the companies awarded in Public Tender 2006LN-000075-57000 Training Activities Educational Innovation Program (proven fact twenty-five). Therefore, through official communications number PROMECE-2199-06, PROMECE-2201-06, PROMECE-2202-06, and PROMECE-2204-06, all dated December 14, 2006, from the Director of PROMECE, Mr. Carlos Barrantes Rivera, addressed to the Advisor of the Office of the Administrative Vice Minister of the MEP, he forwards with his approval invoices number 1473 for an amount of $53,879.50 in the name of the company BPO Técnica (Técnica Administrativa) S.A., number 22638 for an amount of $26,500.00 in the name of the company Bytes of Learning Incorporated, number 220 for an amount of ¢8,610,599.98 in the name of the Fundación Costa Rica para el Desarrollo Sostenible, number 17938 for an amount of $30,000.00 in the name of the Fundación Tecnológica de Costa Rica, for their respective payment (proven facts twenty-six, twenty-seven, twenty-eight, and twenty-nine). Therefore, contrary to what the plaintiff asserts, both he, in his capacity as Director, and PROMECE, as a specialized technical body, did participate in the process of definition, design, competition, award, and payment of Public Tender No. 2006LN-000075-5700 for the contracting of training activities for the Educational Innovation Program, without the provisions of official communication DM-0697-06-06 of June 7, 2006, detracting from, diminishing, or in any way exempting the participation and responsibility of the plaintiff in any way, given that from the relation of the cited facts, it is noted that despite what was recorded there, the plaintiff and PROMECE continued to participate and that the attributed fault is subsequent to what was provided, and does not exempt the plaintiff from the responsibility, duties, and commitments specifically assumed in the Tender in question, so often cited. In this regard, the party omits that the tender specifications themselves establish him as the responsible Technical Unit, regardless of who the budget executor was, which determines that the plaintiff's level of responsibility is unquestionable. The plaintiff points out that the final act issued by the Minister of Public Education ordering his dismissal as Director of PROMECE violates due process, as it does not contain a relation of proven facts, nor an assessment of the evidence, in addition to being incongruent, due to a lack of correlation between what was accused, what was proven, and what was sanctioned. From a merely formal aspect, upon reviewing the respective resolution containing the final act - number 701-09 of eight o'clock on September twenty-third, two thousand nine - (proven fact 42), it is noted that the final report rendered by the Governing Body of the administrative proceeding is transcribed in its entirety, in which the facts considered proven are recorded (folios 774 to 778 of the judicial file, Volume I), in addition to a numbered Considerando IV called "ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE", in which the evidentiary material is analyzed (folio 779 to 790 of the judicial file, Volume I), which the challenged resolution makes its own, so the formulated objection is improper. On a previous occasion, this Court has indicated that in disciplinary matters, the principles of typicity and relative imputation govern, so that the level of rigor does not reach the level of demand of criminal law, as the party intends. It is further alleged that resolution number 701-09 of eight o'clock on September twenty-third, two thousand nine (proven fact 42), is incongruent, due to a lack of correlation between what was accused, what was proven, and what was sanctioned. Let us make an important clarification of a terminological nature. It is said that incongruence (in the jurisdictional field) occurs when there is no relationship between what was requested by the parties and the operative part of the judgment; that is, when there is no connection or coincidence between what was resolved in the operative part of the ruling and the claims and exceptions raised by the parties, both in the claim or counterclaim, as well as in the oral hearings that take place in accordance with contentious-administrative procedural legislation. Specifically, it occurs when the judges rule on matters not requested (ultra petita), or in excess of what was requested (extra petita), likewise, when they omit to resolve each of the established claims and exceptions (minima or infra petita). In other words, there is no incongruence between the considerations of the judgment and what was resolved in the operative part. From the above, it can be inferred that the requirements and, where applicable, the exceptions invoked by the parties form the inexorable framework within which the judge must resolve; these constitute the limit of their action. All of this, of course, excepting the ex officio pronouncements that the procedural law of the matter attributes to the judge, and which as such, could not be classified as incongruent. In those terms, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated that: "(…) to determine the existence of this defect, the operative part of the judgment must first be compared with the claims adduced in the claim and their response, and at the other opportunities - indicated hearings - contemplated by law, in order to determine if there really is an evident mismatch between these two extremes. Secondly, the ex officio power of the judge must be considered. Subsection 1) of canon 119 of the CPCA establishes that it shall resolve all claims and all extremes permitted by the Code. The latter, the Chamber understands, are those pronouncements that '…must be made, as appropriate, among others,' when declaring the claim procedent, totally or partially, in accordance with what is established in precept 122, as well as those contained in the following numerals, which make clear the broad sentencing powers of the Court, in protection of the rights or interests of the justiciable, restoring or recognizing their legal situation." (Resolution number 258-F-S1-2010 of 2:00 p.m. on February 18, 2010). Now then, if we transfer what has been said, mutatis mutandi, to the administrative field and more specifically regarding the validity of the administrative act that orders an administrative sanction, there must undoubtedly be a correspondence between the facts imputed and intimated to the alleged offender, their verification and confirmation in the administrative proceeding, and their correspondence in the final act, in such a way that there is a relationship of identity between what was accused and the sanction imposed. It is worth noting that regarding the imputation of charges made to the plaintiff, the already referred vote 3586-2010 of the Constitutional Chamber stated: "V.- ON THE LACK OF IMPUTATION OF CHARGES: As the first grievance of the amparo, the appellant states that he was not given a clear, precise, and detailed imputation of charges to exercise his defense. He considers that this omission in the order initiating the administrative proceeding prevented him from providing his defense. The right to intimation and imputation of charges operates, above all, in the case of ex officio initiated administrative proceedings and, particularly, disciplinary ones. Thus, the transfer of charges or the imputation formulated against the administered party or official acquires special relevance for this purpose. It is the responsibility of the governing body of the proceeding to notify the interested parties in the administrative proceeding of a timely, express, clear, precise, and detailed relation of the facts or conducts that are imputed to them and their legal consequences, that is, there must be a specification of the nature and purposes of the administrative proceeding, so that the interested party can provide for their defense. In the case under analysis, resolution OD-001-2009 of two o'clock in the afternoon on July 29, 2009, issued by the Governing Body of the Administrative Proceeding (see folios 59-67 of the administrative file), enumerates one by one the facts attributed to the appellant in his capacity as Director of the Program for the Improvement of the Quality of Basic Education (PROMECE), indicating each of them amply. In the specific case, the alleged participation of the appellant (...) was detailed in the following facts 'ELEVENTH: That on December 14, 2006, before the courses were taught, Mr. (...) , Director of PROMECE, sent the invoices to Licda. Hazle (sic) Córdoba Soto, Advisor to the Office of the Administrative Vice Minister, so that they could be sent to the Procurement Department for their respective payment, through the following official communications, which appear on folios 152 to 155 of the evidence file … TWELFTH: That this official communication signed by Mr. (...) initiated the payment process to the companies, before the service was actually provided. All the official communications forwarding the invoices state, in the relevant part: 'We have received the invoice (...) which I forward with our approval, so that it can be sent to the MEP Procurement Department for its respective payment'. In the opinion of this Constitutional Court, the plaintiff is not correct in his arguments, since from a careful reading of the resolution it is clear that there is, effectively, a clear, precise, and detailed relation of the illegitimate activities, detailing dates and documentary evidence of his actions and omissions. On the other hand, the initial resolution indicates that if the described facts were proven, they would presumably constitute the infractions established in Articles 4, 35, and 51 of the Regulations to the Law of Administrative Contracting, Executive Decree 33411-H, and Article 3 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, number 8422. Likewise, it was indicated that these are very serious infractions that could be sanctioned in the following manner: written reprimand, suspension from work without pay for up to three months, and/or dismissal without employer liability by the State.

In the referenced resolution, the date of August 24, 2004, was set for the holding of the oral and private hearing, informing the parties of the guarantees provided in their favor, such as the possibility of being advised and accompanied by an attorney, to propose and present all evidence deemed convenient during the oral hearing, to present written arguments, to read and examine the entire administrative case file, and the possibility of filing a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) before the directing body and an appeal before the Hierarchical Superior of the Directing Body of the Ordinary Administrative Procedure. Consequently, regarding this aspect of the appeal, no violation of the protected party's right of defense is found, as the summons fulfilled the requirements imposed by Constitutional Law." (underlining and highlighting not from the original). Thus, the imputed facts and their legal consequences were clearly delimited, specified, and warned to the plaintiff, in accordance with what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber itself. Essentially, the discussion is limited to the aforementioned principle of relative imputation specific to criminal matters, which in this case is satisfied insofar as it allows the exercise of the right of defense, the level of rigor of Criminal Law not being necessary. Subsequently, in the final act, precisely those facts were considered proven, and more specifically that based on the action of Mr. Carlos Barrantes Rivera, Director of PROMECE, who gave his approval for the payment of invoices corresponding to training courses that had not been given, advance payment was made for all the courses contracted through public tender (licitación pública) 2006LN-000075-57000, for which his dismissal without employer liability was ordered, such that there is congruence between what was accused, proven, and sanctioned. The plaintiff also indicates that the directing body omitted to refer to the participation of the minister in the processing and payment of the invoices, even though he brought this to their attention and evidence was provided in that regard. The plaintiff is indeed correct on this point, in stating that the directing body omitted to rule on the participation of the minister, and we even add, of any other involved official, which would entail a potential nullity of the actions taken and resolved, if such analysis would modify, mitigate, or eliminate the participation and responsibility of the plaintiff; but the truth is that the statement of facts from the internal audit, the composition of the directing body, and therefore its object and purpose, and the resolution that ordered his dismissal, analyzed the individual conduct of the plaintiff in relation to the facts investigated and his responsibility, which could well be individualized, which does not prevent jointly or in parallel forming other investigations to analyze the participation of other possible involved parties. The plaintiff asserts that the members of the directing body of the administrative procedure based their report on an improper assessment of the testimonial and documentary evidence, analyzed in a subjective and biased manner. However, such a reproach is nothing more than a simple, unfounded assertion lacking proof in that sense, given that the plaintiff neglected to indicate what that improper assessment of the evidence he accuses consists of, which testimonies and documents were improperly assessed, and how that error notably influences the issuance of the final act. This Chamber cannot, based on such a vague indication, conduct a general analysis as if it were issuing the act anew, in substitution of the Administration. It should be taken into consideration that the administrative contentious jurisdiction conducts a legality review based on the grounds adduced by the parties, which justify their claims, without this implying, as stated above, that the judge ex officio replaces the participants in the proceeding. The plaintiff did not demonstrate, nor did he provide any evidence in favor of his thesis, regarding the alleged improper assessment of the testimonial and documentary evidence, or that the analysis was done in a subjective and biased manner. The claimant now argues that the directing body left unresolved the nullity incident raised regarding the imputation and summons that contained the notification of charges. Strictly speaking, the directing body of the administrative procedure is a mere instructor, whose purpose is to process each and every one of the stages that make up the procedure, and once completed, to send the case file to the deciding body to issue the final administrative act; therefore, as stated supra, procedural defects will be relevant only if they determine the invalidity of the adopted administrative act. As an instructor, the directing body is not responsible for ruling on the merits; however, this Chamber is aware that administrative practice in our country has established that at the end of the procedure, the directing body renders a final report or recommendation, which, it is worth noting, is not binding on the hierarchical superior, the holder of the competence who must resolve and issue the final act. Hence, the directing body was not legally obligated to resolve the "incident of nullity" regarding the imputation and summons of charges formulated against Mr. Barrantes Rivera. It was up to the minister, in the final resolution, to rule on the nullity raised, an aspect that was omitted, but which upon hearing the motion for reconsideration against resolution 701-09 of eight o'clock on September twenty-sixth, two thousand nine, was expressly resolved and rejected. An argument or grievance that definitively precluded with the issuance of Ruling (Voto) 3586-2010 of thirteen hours and two minutes on February nineteenth, two thousand ten from the Constitutional Chamber, cited herein, which analyzed and equally rejected such a claim.- VII.- OF THE OTHER OBJECTIONS FORMULATED: Mr. Barrantes Rivera points out that the resolution issued by the Minister of Public Education ordering his dismissal without employer liability does not indicate whether the services contracted and paid for in the questioned invoices were received satisfactorily or not. On this point, as on many others, the plaintiff does not explain or justify the reason for this indication. We can infer that it constitutes a ground for discharge from his responsibility insofar as, had the contracted services been received, there would have been no harm and therefore nothing to impute. If so, and solely for argumentative purposes, given that the plaintiff did not bother to elaborate on his indication, it must be said that the conduct reproached is having given approval to authorize advance payment for contracted services that had not yet been provided, not that they were never provided at all. It should be remembered that from the statement of proven facts, between the purchase request or order, the submission of the invoices, and the official letters granting approval to authorize their payment, only a few days elapsed; therefore, considering the object of the contracts, it was materially impossible for them to have been satisfied at that time. The plaintiff now indicates that neither the directing body nor the final act issued by the Minister of Public Education indicated whether, in signing the questioned official letters, he acted with willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the performance of his duties, as required by Article 199, subsection 1) of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), which makes the resolution illegally issued. It is worth clarifying that the cited article is located in the Second Chapter of the Seventh Title of the General Law of Public Administration, which regulates the civil liability of the public servant before third parties, imposing a subjective liability regime on the public official by requiring willful misconduct or gross negligence in the performance of their duties or on the occasion thereof for such liability to arise, and it does not have nor bear any relation to the administrative liability of the official, whose conduct, depending on its severity—from simple fault to the most serious, such as willful misconduct—can generate a sanction that is adjustable and proportional to the offense committed. He further points out that the directing body came to consider it true that he incurred in an improper act, without reasoning or foundations encompassing an analysis of each and every one of the arguments and evidence they received as the directing body. He affirms that the foregoing stems, among other considerations, from not having considered as proven the official letter number DM-0697-06-06 of June 7, 2006, from the Minister of Public Education, in which it is ordered that from that moment on, the technical decisions and supervision of the project would be in the hands of the Department of Academic Education of the Division of Curricular Development. He maintains that this fact and that evidence were considered not proven, despite the case file showing that this official letter was provided. To verify this assertion, it is consequently necessary to transcribe from resolution 701-09 of eight o'clock on September twenty-third, two thousand nine, which agreed to dismiss the plaintiff without employer liability, the unproven fact: "A. That from the documentary evidence presented by the defense of the alleged responsible party, specifically official letter number DM-0697-06-06, dated June 7, 2006, insofar as it states that from that moment 'the technical decisions and supervision of the Project will be in the hands of the Department of Academic Education of the Division of Curricular Development'; it is possible to infer that PROMECE had been effectively relieved of the responsibilities attributed by the tender specifications corresponding to Public Tender number 2006-LN-000075-57000. See official letter on folio 173 of the administrative case file." (folio 777 of the judicial case file, Volume I). Therefore, contrary to what the claimant affirms, it is not true that the referenced official letter was considered as an unproven fact regarding its material existence; rather, it was not demonstrated, or better said, it is not extracted from it, that PROMECE had been relieved of the tasks, duties, and responsibilities derived from public tender number 2006-LN-000075-57000, as the plaintiff seeks to assert. A series of objections are also leveled against the Audit Report, Statement of Facts 40-09, many of which there has already been an opportunity to rule on, dismissing them, as occurs with the competence, both of the Minister of Education and the directing body of the procedure, the nature of the plaintiff's employment relationship, and the eventual participation of other officials in the related facts. The plaintiff undertakes to demonstrate a series of contradictions regarding the report and the testimony rendered by Mr. Julio Cesar Rodríguez Céspedes, an official of the MEP Audit Office, who asserted that the purchase orders contained in the SIGAF were signed by the plaintiff and testified that his signature appears on the justification document for the administrative contracting processes, which is not true, when in reality the only one recorded is that of the minister; he also affirmed that a hierarchical relationship existed between the plaintiff, PROMECE, and the Institutional Procurement Office of the MEP, without indicating the basis for his affirmation. He points out that the Audit Report did not include documentation and information requested by that body, according to official letter A.I-024-08 of February 22, 2009, in which he formulates his defense and provides evidence. He indicates that, without any justification, that evidence and information is not referenced in the report, neither to reject nor to accept it. A fundamental clarification is therefore required here regarding the nature of the statements of facts formulated by an audit and their nature as a preliminary investigation. In the first place, it is not necessary, prior to the initiation of an administrative procedure, as a substantial procedural requirement, to hold a hearing on the results of a preliminary investigation involving the alleged implicated parties, because the conclusions derived from an audit report, as the Constitutional Chamber has resolved, are limited to highlighting possible situations that may give rise to administrative liability and to individualizing and identifying the allegedly responsible officials. Note that the Administration, once it receives the statement of facts from the Internal Audit Office, at this initial stage, does not consider or assess substantive aspects, much less assess evidence for the purpose of determining a priori the liability of the supposedly involved officials. With the receipt of the statement of facts, at this stage, a value judgment is not made, but rather one of probabilities; it is a summary assessment, in the sense that the merits of what is reported are not estimated, but rather the probability of the occurrence of the events, given the existence of elements justifying the opening of an administrative procedure. From this point of view, once the statement of facts has been rendered, the opening of an administrative procedure must be ordered, in order to determine, through the guarantees offered by the ordinary procedure, the real truth of the facts imputed, and it will be at that stage that the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, will be known, processed, and evacuated, and the involved officials will have the opportunity to exercise broadly and without any restriction their right of defense, inherent to Due Process. In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber has clearly distinguished between the preliminary investigation and the administrative procedure proper, as follows: "This Constitutional Court has repeatedly provided that it is valid for the Public Administration to carry out a preliminary investigation in administrative procedures and has indicated that a correct understanding of the character and foundations of due process admits that, prior to the opening of an administrative procedure, it is sometimes essential to carry out a series of preliminary inquiries. Thus, the Administration—prior to the opening of the administrative case file—could require the realization of a prior investigation, through which it can not only individualize the possible perpetrator of the offense being investigated, but also determine the need to continue with the formalities of the procedure if there is merit for it." (Ruling 04420-2003 of 9:21 hours on May 23, 2003). It further held: "IV.- On the merits. Administrative process and preliminary procedures. Neither the Council nor the appellant is clear on the difference that exists between the preliminary investigations to the administrative process and the process itself. If the Administration, in complex cases, does not distinguish against whom the procedure should be directed, it can and must open a prior investigation in order to identify the possible or alleged responsible parties, and then open the respective process against them. At this prior investigation stage, it is not necessary to notify the interested parties, because no liability is being established. The possibility of a prior investigation process has been admitted by this Chamber in reiterated jurisprudence for many years. In ruling No. 676-97 (preceded, among others, by rulings No. 7259-94, No. 598-95, and No. 5796-96), the Chamber stated: 'A correct understanding of the character and foundations of due process requires admitting—as the Chamber has also done—that, prior to the opening or continuation of a formal proceeding, it may sometimes be useful or necessary to carry out a series of preliminary inquiries.' / In the case of the administrative process, this preliminary investigation aims to individualize the possible persons responsible for the irregularities and to recommend whether a process should be opened against them, of what type, and for what purpose. The cited ruling continues to add: / 'The stated administrative power to carry out investigations prior to the opening of the formal procedure cannot at any time contravene the set of rights and guarantees covered by the institutions of defense and due process. Stated summarily: the prior inquiry is correct and pertinent insofar as it is necessary to gather the elements of judgment needed to rule out or confirm the need for the formal procedure, or to allow its correct substantiation (for example, when it is necessary to identify those who will appear as respondents in the process). In any other case, it is entirely inexcusable to subsume within the investigation stage an act or acts proper to the formal proceeding, which would entail an indubitable violation of the right of defense or the guarantees of due process. The prototypical case occurs when, without the intervention of the interested parties, certain evidence is evacuated during the investigation to later assert it during the procedure, it being the case that—by the nature of the evidence (for example, testimonial)—the participation of those parties could have contributed to yielding a different result or assessment. Such evidence, undoubtedly, is useless for the purposes of supporting the final act, and must be repeated in due course with the participation of the affected party, so that it can become effective. On the contrary, and only for purposes of clarifying the point, no objection is seen in that, during the preliminary stage, documents are compiled or reports are prepared, in order to identify the parties to the future process or to prepare the arguments against them, then submitting the result of that work to the administrative procedure as part of the evidence, which the interested parties may then examine and assess.' (Ruling number 10824-2003)." Therefore, any reproach made against the Audit Report regarding the limitation or lack of analysis of evidence proves unaddressable, as it is in the administrative procedure where the defense and the evidence in support of it must be offered and provided. Regarding the testimony rendered at the oral and private hearing of the administrative procedure by Mr. Rodríguez Céspedes, it highlights that his assertions as a matter of opinion or errors of fact or contradiction with reality in no way modify the factual framework investigated, nor does its suppression in any way modify, alter, or exempt the participation of Mr. Barrantes Rivera in the investigated facts. In any case, the plaintiff also did not explain or substantiate how that testimony, in those specific aspects, affects or harms the conclusions set forth in the challenged administrative act. Likewise, it is noted that the objections and indications made by the plaintiff regarding the actions of Mr. Alberto Orozco Canossa, in his capacity as Head of Human Resources of the MEP, for having declined competence in his case, are expressly resolved when hearing those same objections, but regarding the alleged lack of competence of the minister in the composition of the directing body and the issuance of the plaintiff's dismissal act. Finally, it is alleged, in the conclusions stage of the oral and public trial, that the imposed sanction becomes illegal for having been imposed when the employer's disciplinary power was already time-barred. To this end, it is argued that the imputed facts relate to a tender from June 2006, regarding an invoice from December 13 of that same year, whose official letter he signed on the 13th (sic) of that same month and year, and that the Minister of Education, in his own handwriting, signed authorizing the payment of the invoice in December 2006. It is not until June 2009 that the minister orders the formation of a directing body against him, that is, two and a half years later. As we had occasion to comment, citing what was resolved by this same Court, regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the Public Administration's disciplinary power, we have two systems or regimes. The general one, in which Article 603 of the Labor Code applies, unless there is a special provision to the contrary, which provides that the statute of limitations operates in one month. On the other hand, Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic establishes a period of 5 years when dealing with violations of the control and oversight legal framework. Directly related, Article 43 of the General Law of Internal Control and Article 44 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service establish the 5-year period when dealing with violations of the control and oversight legal framework. With which it is affirmed that there are two limitation periods applicable to public officials regarding the exercise of disciplinary power, without prejudice to other special laws that have their own periods, as is the case of the General Police Law No. 7410. Specifically, the norms that regulate the statute of limitations of the sanctioning power in the field of control and oversight provide: Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, reformed by Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002: "Article 71.—Statute of limitations for disciplinary liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight legal framework shall prescribe according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular fact is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the fact. b) In cases where the irregular fact is not notorious—understood as that fact which requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is made known to the hierarchical superior or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible party of the act agreeing to the initiation of the administrative procedure. When the perpetrator of the offense is the hierarchical superior, the period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the entity, company, or respective body. It shall be considered a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning proceeding, the failure to initiate it in a timely manner or allowing the offender's liability to prescribe, without justified cause." (As reformed by subsection a) of Article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, Law of Internal Control). For its part, the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292, in Article 43 indicates the following: "Article 43.—Statute of limitations for administrative liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law shall prescribe according to Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994. It shall be considered a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning proceeding, the failure to initiate it in a timely manner or allowing the offender's liability to prescribe, without justified cause." / Finally, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, No. 8422, states: "Article 44.—Statute of limitations for administrative liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the legal framework relating to the Public Treasury, shall prescribe according to Article 43 of the General Law of Internal Control and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994." From the mentioned provisions, an objective material criterion emerges that allows determining when the mentioned statute of limitations applies to an offense against the Public Treasury. In that sense, if there is a violation of the control and oversight legal framework or that relating to the Public Treasury, the 5-year limitation period for the disciplinary power applies. This criterion allows differentiating the applicable statute of limitations in cases of a labor nature of one month, in accordance with the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code. With the reform that Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic underwent, by changing the assessment criterion to determine the applicable limitation period, a shift occurs from a subjective regime to an objective one. Previously, it was necessary to carry out an exercise to determine, for the purposes of applying the limitation period, whether one was a servant of the Public Treasury (subjective aspect). As mentioned supra, the criterion currently governing is objective material, which is determined by the violation of the control and oversight legal framework, composed among others by the aforementioned laws, as well as the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets, No. 8131 and its Regulation, and the Law of Administrative Contracting, No. 7494 and its Regulation. Thus, it is clear that the interpretation of the cited regulations allows for applying the limitation period to any public official who, regardless of whether or not they hold a position in the Public Treasury, incurs a breach of the control and oversight legal framework; if this occurs, the 5-year period applies. By virtue of which, in the case at hand, the alleged statute of limitations has not occurred, given that the offense committed implies a violation of the control and oversight legal framework or that relating to the Public Treasury, whose limitation period is five years, as stated.

VIII.- OF THE CLAIMS OF THE LAWSUIT: It is requested that the judgment order: "1. That official letter 633-09, dated June 27, 2009, issued by the MINISTRY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, in the person of its Minister LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, ordering the establishment of a directing body against me, be declared illegal, violative of the legal system, violative of due process, and null." This claim, apart from challenging a mere procedural step, appealable only together with the final act, was based on the plaintiff's position that the minister lacked competence to order the formation of a directing body against him; however, as we had the opportunity to clarify, such an objection proves unfounded, by virtue of the nature of the plaintiff's public employment relationship, given that his position as Director of PROMECE is excluded from the Civil Service regime, such that the competent official to order the establishment of a directing body and the exercise of disciplinary power rests with the Minister of the MEP, for which reason the claim is rejected. It is also requested: "2. That resolutions of the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, issued by the Minister of the branch, LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, numbers 701-09, of 8 hours on September 23, 2009, and resolution 742-09 of 10 hours 45 minutes on September 28, 2009, be declared illegal, violative of the legal system, violative of due process, and null./" In the corresponding section, each and every one of the arguments and objections raised by the plaintiff were analyzed and weighed, and they were rejected, as he lacked reason in his substantiation; by virtue of which, there is no alternative but to equally reject this claim. It is requested: "3. That the dismissal carried out by the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, in the person of its Minister LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, against me, which occurred through the resolutions mentioned in the preceding claim, be declared null." The preceding claim having been rejected, consequently and by connectedness, the rejection of this claim is appropriate. Likewise, it is claimed: "4. That the Costa Rican State be ordered to pay the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) that may have been caused to me by its illegal action, damages and losses to be determined in execution of the judgment." The main claim having been rejected, and the nullity of the plaintiff's dismissal act not having been established, the claimed damages and losses have not been produced, which compels their rejection. It is demanded: "5. That the public officials sued herein, LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, GABRIELA VALVERDE MURILLO, JEANETTE CALERO ARAYA, DAVER ROJAS CHAVES, ALBERTO OROZCO CANOSSA, JULIO CESAR RODRÍGUEZ CÉSPED, all of the stated qualifications, be declared jointly and severally liable with the State for the damages and losses caused to me by their illegal actions.

Damages and Losses which will be liquidated in the execution of judgment." Likewise, having rejected the principal claim and consequently the requested indemnification, the petition to declare the co-defendant officials as jointly and severally liable must be rejected. Having dismissed the lawsuit in its entirety, the following claims are not applicable and are likewise rejected: "6. That the MINISTERIO DE EDUCACIÓN PÚBLICA be ordered to pay all costs of this proceeding," and "7. That the defendants LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, GABRIELA VALVERDE MURILLO, JEANETTE CALERO ARAYA, DAVER ROJAS CHAVES, ALBERTO OROZCO CANOSSA, JULIO CESAR RODRÍGUEZ CÉSPEDES, jointly and severally with the Ministerio de Educación, be ordered to pay all costs of this proceeding." Since the present lawsuit has been dismissed in all its aspects, having failed to demonstrate that the administrative conduct was inconsistent with the legal system, nor having succeeded in proving the other subsidiary claims, given the total absence of evidence in that regard, nothing remains but to declare the lawsuit without merit in all its aspects, both in its principal claims and accessory and/or subsidiary claims.

IX.- REGARDING THE OPPOSED DEFENSES (EXCEPCIONES): As was timely indicated, the ESTADO, through its representation, the individual co-defendants through their special judicial representative (apoderado especial judicial), and the CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA, in its capacity as passive coadjuvant, through its representation, all opposed the defense of Lack of Right (Falta de Derecho), and the individual co-defendants also opposed the defenses of Lack of Standing (Falta de Legitimación) in both forms, which they termed Lack of Standing ad causam and Res Judicata (Cosa Juzgada) regarding the discussion on the violation of due process at the stage of summons and imputation (folios: 1427 to 1581, 1586 to 1623, and 1633 to 1730, respectively). Regarding this, it is resolved: We will first address the Defense of Lack of Right (Falta de Derecho), which will be resolved jointly for all defendants. The substantive right is verified when the requested claims are granted, a situation that does not occur in the case of the plaintiff, for the reasons already set forth in the preceding recitals, since the plaintiff is not assisted by the substantive right they invoke in their lawsuit, having failed to prove the nullity (nulidad) of the administrative act that ordered their dismissal without employer liability. By virtue of this, the opposed defense is granted, and the filed lawsuit is declared without merit in all its aspects. Regarding the defense of Lack of Standing (Falta de Legitimación), both Active and Passive: The individual co-defendants opposed the defense of lack of standing ad causam, both active and passive. As a preamble, recall that standing ad causam refers to the aptitude of a subject to be considered a party to a proceeding, suitability that is intimately related to the claim brought in the action. In the present proceeding, the plaintiff seeks the nullity (nulidad) of official communication 633-09 of June 27, 2009, which ordered the establishment of a directing body against him, and resolutions number 701-09 of eight o'clock on September 23, 2009, and 742-09 of ten forty-five o'clock on September 28, 2009. Acts issued by the minister of Educación Pública, seeking to declare his dismissal as Director of PROMECE null and void, ordering the Estado and the co-defendant officials in their personal capacity, jointly and severally, to pay the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused, considering that in their capacity as public officials, by virtue of their participation, they caused said damages and losses. In accordance with this, and based on such claims, both the plaintiff and the co-defendants have standing to sue and be sued, as one brings a claim for compensation against the others, by virtue of their participation and responsibility in the issuance of the challenged act; therefore, the defense of lack of standing ad causam, both active and passive, raised by the individual co-defendants is rejected. Regarding the defense of Res Judicata (Cosa Juzgada) concerning the discussion on the violation of due process at the stage of summons and imputation. Indeed, as we had occasion to review, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in ruling 3586-2010, heard, resolved, and dismissed the plaintiff's argument regarding the imputation of charges made by the directing body of the administrative procedure, which served as one more element to likewise dismiss that objection in this venue, which in any case constitutes a further reason to grant the defense of lack of right, making it unnecessary to rule on the alleged res judicata." b) <b>Power of command (Poder de mando):</b> It consists, as stated, of the authority of superior officials to issue orders and instructions to lower bodies, indicating the guidelines they must follow in the exercise of their corresponding activity. Orders are imperative decisions for specific cases; service instructions constitute a means of providing detailed, practical indications; circulars are always a set of provisions of a general nature, unlike the other two, which sometimes have an individual character. c) <b>Power of oversight (Poder de vigilancia):</b> This is a power manifested through acts of a purely material nature, consisting of demanding accountability, conducting investigations or inquiries into the handling of matters, and generally, in all those acts aimed at making superior authorities aware of the regularity with which subordinates are performing their duties. d) <b>Disciplinary power (Poder Disciplinario):</b> The failure to fulfill the duties imposed by public service gives rise to the author's liability (responsabilidad), which may be civil, criminal, or administrative. Any fault committed by an official or employee in the performance of their duties makes them administratively liable, without prejudice to the possibility of also incurring civil or criminal liability. e) <b>Power of review (Poder de Revisión):</b> In this domain, the powers derived from the hierarchical relationship consist of being able to grant prior approval to the acts performed by subordinates, suspend them, annul them, or reform them. f) <b>Power for the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts (Poder para la resolución de conflictos de competencia).</b> The disciplinary power of the hierarchical superior (Jerarca) is tacit and a matter of principle, requiring no express rule to establish it, as expressed in Article 104 of the LGAP; that is, the hierarchical superior (Jerarca), simply by virtue of that status, has the power to discipline the faults committed by subordinates without needing a rule to that effect. Closely related to this topic, and because of its relevance to the matter at hand, it is appropriate to address the issue of the <b>prescription (prescripción) of the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria) </b>in public employment. On this specific aspect, this Tribunal has stated: " <b>VI.- ON THE PRESCRIPTION OF THE DISCIPLINARY POWER. </b>Prescription (prescripción) is an institution through which the passage of time produces the effect of consolidating factual situations, allowing for the extinction of rights or the acquisition of others' property, which follows the maxim that <i>“Time leads to the consolidation of certain rights or the loss of the same”</i>. As correctly pointed out by the jurist Rafael Caballero Sánchez in his work "Prescripción y Caducidad en el Ordenamiento Administrativo," this institution has ancient origins in other branches, as its application in Administrative Law is more recent. Its application in Public Law has reached maturity, offering a complete model, shaped by its own norms, rules, and principles. Thus stated, in the public employment regime, there are distinct, properly differentiated prescription (prescripción) periods for the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria), applicable to public officials, deriving from normative bodies. First, there is Article 603 of the Labor Code, which applies as a rule of a general nature, barring a special provision to the contrary. Said norm provides that the prescription (prescripción) operates in one month. On the other hand, Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic establishes a 5-year period when dealing with transgressions of the Control and Oversight regulatory framework. In the same vein, canon 43 of the General Law on Internal Control and 44 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service establish a 5-year period when dealing with transgressions of the control and oversight regulatory framework. Based on the foregoing, it can be stated, in general terms, that there are two prescription (prescripción) periods applicable to public officials regarding the exercise of the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria), without prejudice to other special regulations having their own periods, such as the case of the General Police Law No. 7410. It is important to keep in mind the provisions of the mentioned numerals that regulate the prescription (prescripción) of the sanctioning power in the field of control and oversight. Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic was amended by Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, and it is the one referring to the prescription (prescripción) of the administrative liability (responsabilidad) of the public official for infractions provided for in the Law and in the higher-level control and oversight regulatory framework, in the following terms: <i>“Article 71.—Prescription of disciplinary liability. The administrative liability (responsabilidad) of the public official for infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher-level control and oversight regulatory framework shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability (responsabilidad) shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as one requiring an investigation or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—liability (responsabilidad) shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report of the respective investigation or audit is made known to the hierarchical superior (jerarca) or the official competent to initiate the respective proceeding. The prescription (prescripción) shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding. When the perpetrator of the fault is the hierarchical superior (jerarca), the period shall begin to run from the date on which their service relationship with the entity, company, or respective body ends. It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning proceeding, not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the infractor's liability (responsabilidad) to prescribe, without justified cause.” (As amended by subsection a) of Article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, Law on Internal Control). </i>For its part, the General Law on Internal Control, No. 8292, in numeral 43, indicates the following: <i>“Article 43.—Prescription of administrative liability. The administrative liability (responsabilidad) of the public official for infractions provided for in this Law shall prescribe according to Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994. It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning proceeding, not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the infractor's liability (responsabilidad) to prescribe, without justified cause.” /</i>Finally, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, No. 8422, states: <i>“Article 44.—Prescription of administrative liability. The administrative liability (responsabilidad) of the public official for infractions provided for in this Law, and in the regulatory framework related to the Public Treasury, shall prescribe according to Article 43 of the General Law on Internal Control and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994.” </i>From the mentioned numerals, an objective material criterion emerges that allows for determining when the aforementioned prescription (prescripción) applies to a fault against the Public Treasury. In that sense, if there is a transgression of the control and oversight regulatory framework or that relating to the Public Treasury, the 5-year prescription (prescripción) period for the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria) applies. This criterion allows differentiating the applicable prescription (prescripción) in cases of a labor nature, which is one month, in accordance with the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code. With the amendment undergone by Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, by changing the assessment criterion to determine the applicable prescription (prescripción) period, a shift occurs from a subjective regime to an objective one. Previously, it was necessary to carry out an exercise to determine, for the purpose of applying the prescription (prescripción) period, whether someone was a servant of the Public Treasury (subjective aspect). As mentioned supra, the criterion currently in force is objective material, which is determined by the transgression of the control and oversight regulatory framework, which is composed, among others, of the mentioned laws, as well as the Law on Financial Administration and Public Budgets, No. 8131 and its Regulations, and the Law on Administrative Procurement No. 7494 and its Regulations. Thus, it is clear that the interpretation of the cited norms allows applying the prescription (prescripción) period to any public official who, regardless of whether or not they hold a position within the Public Treasury, incurs a breach of the control and oversight regulatory framework; if this occurs, the 5-year period applies to them." (Judgment number **101-2011** (sic) of fifteen hours thirty minutes on October twenty-fourth, two thousand twelve, Section V).

**V.- ON THE MERITS:** As referenced in the corresponding section, the plaintiff seeks the nullity of official communication (oficio) 633-09 of June 27, 2009, which ordered the establishment of a directing body (órgano director) against him, and resolutions numbers 701-09 of eight hours on September 23, 2009, and 742-09 of ten hours forty-five minutes on September 28, 2009. These acts were issued by the Minister of Public Education, and the plaintiff seeks to have his dismissal as Director of PROMECE declared null, ordering the State and the co-defendant officials in their personal capacity, jointly and severally, to pay the damages caused. To this end, he argues that the appointment of the directing body (órgano director) of the proceeding by the Minister of Education is contrary to law because its designation and processing corresponded to the Human Resources Directorate of the MEP, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 18, subsection j), 50, subsection m) of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Education and 16 subsections a and b of the Internal Work Regulations and 57 and 61 of the LGAP. The aforementioned Article 18, subsection j, establishes: "These are specific powers of the Minister: (...) j) To decide in the final administrative instance on the imposition of sanctions of the disciplinary regime on teaching and administrative staff" and Article 50, subsection m) which states: " " These are duties and powers of the Director of the Personnel Department: m) To hear and resolve in the first administrative instance: (...) 2º.- The complaints and charges filed against servants, for faults committed or breach of duties in the exercise of their functions;" In the same vein, it is necessary to consider Article 140 of the Constitution, in its subsections 1 and 2, which establishes the rule that appointment and removal correspond to the hierarchical superior (jerarca) and it is their obligation to coordinate the means of public service provision. However, it must be borne in mind that in accordance with Article 2 of Law Number 7315 of October 23, 1992, PROMECE officials are excluded from the Civil Service Regime, which means that Article 6 of the mentioned Organic Law of the Ministry of Labor is not applicable because, by providing that: "This Organic Law, its related laws, and their respective regulations govern the relations between the Ministry and its servants, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and its regulations." excludes from its provisions personnel not covered by the Civil Service regime, an aspect that was even already resolved by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), which heard an identical allegation to the one put forward here by the plaintiff himself when filing an amparo action against his dismissal. The Constitutional Court held, in what is relevant: "**IV.- REGARDING THE COMPOSITION OF THE DIRECTING BODY OF THE PROCEEDING:** As a first point, the appellant alleges that the Minister of Public Education does not have the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria) to institute an ordinary proceeding, since the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Education is clear in indicating that the person in charge of hearing and resolving complaints for breach of duties in the first instance is the Director of the Personnel Department and not the Minister. In the specific case, it is proven that Article 6 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Education, in conjunction with Article 2 of Law No. 7315 of October 23, 1992, called 'Approval of the Loan Contracts between the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank and the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica,' created the Coordinating Unit of the Program for the Improvement of the Quality of General Basic Education, as a body attached to the Ministry of Public Education, under the direction of the Ministry of Public Education, and it was indicated that the personnel would be excluded from the Civil Service Regime; that is, PROMECE officials are not covered by Article 6 of the aforementioned Law, consequently, the Personnel Department or Human Resources lacks competence to institute an administrative proceeding against the protected party. By virtue of the foregoing, the amparo action must be dismissed on this point." (**Voto 3586-2010**). Therefore, that specific reproach must be dismissed. He also indicates that the resolution ordering his dismissal was based on false facts. Two important clarifications must be made regarding this particular grievance. One of a procedural nature, directly related to the burden of proof of the one who asserts in the process. Indeed, according to the doctrine of Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is up to the party to prove their claims through suitable evidence. On other occasions, this Chamber has already indicated that even though the judgment is the responsibility of the jurisdictional authority, the process belongs to the parties, and they are the ones who define how to present the case, establish what evidence they wish to offer, and what arguments they will present. Although the jurisdictional authority has, based on the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, broad powers to expand, supplement, or clarify the claim, the grounds, and the evidence, these cannot go to the extreme of totally substituting the parties, such that the jurisdictional authority officially replaces the participants in the process. It is not possible to that level. The main function of the jurisdictional authority is to direct the process, not to substitute the parties. They are the ones who define how the evidence should be chosen and the approach they intend to give it. In that sense, the plaintiff did not demonstrate, nor did he provide any evidence in favor of his thesis, regarding the alleged false facts on which the resolution ordering his dismissal is based; he did not even bother to point out which facts he labels as such. The second necessary clarification lies in the fact that the facts on which the Administration based its decision to dismiss the plaintiff are basically coincident with the proven facts of this judgment, so rather than speaking of a falsehood regarding the facts, what exists is a discrepancy of criteria regarding the effects and consequences derived from such facts. It is also argued that his defense formally raised a cause for disqualification (inhibición) against the Minister of Public Education before the final act of the administrative sanctioning proceeding was issued, and that despite this, he issued the resolution challenged in this process. Upon conducting the respective analysis of this argument, we find that on folio 700 of the judicial file, Volume I, there is a brief mention in the conclusions of the plaintiff's defense in the administrative proceeding, in which it was indicated: <i>"But what is most serious is that in your capacity as Head of program 570 </i>-referring to the minister-<i> you had already signed approving the corresponding payment order an administrative proceeding against another official for a supposed payment </i>(sic) <i>advance that you approved, that is being judge and party."</i> and subsequently on appeal, folio 863 of the judicial file, Volume I, it was stated: <i>"However, this representation in its conclusions pointed out that, according to the law, you should have abstained from issuing the final act, as there was an evident ground for disqualification (inhibición). You did not. You did not even consider it. This is a vice that contaminates your action.".</i> This being the case, it must be concluded that no formal recusation (recusación) was filed against the Minister of Public Education, by virtue of which he should have abstained from issuing the final act until the filed recusation (recusación) had been previously resolved; therefore, from that specific aspect, the alleged ground for nullity does not exist. Another aspect to consider would be whether the alluded official could infer, from such a generic and unclear argument, a ground for disqualification (inhibición) or excuse preventing him from issuing the final act in the administrative proceeding. Certainly, what was stated in the conclusions of the legal representation of Mr. Barrantes Rivera, analyzed and weighed under a criterion of reasonableness and average understanding, does not allow for inferring a strong ground for recusation (recusación); at most, a breach of the double administrative instance, insofar as such condition and duty within the structure and organization of the Public Administration is accepted. If that is the reproach, it is consequently appropriate to cite again what was said by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in **Voto 3586-2010** regarding the alleged violation of the double administrative instance in the specific case of the plaintiff: "**VI.- REGARDING THE DOUBLE INSTANCE:** The appellant alleges that the Minister of Public Education, contrary to internal regulations, processed the administrative proceeding, and even worse, heard the appeal for reversal (revocatoria) and the hierarchical appeal (apelación) filed against the resolution ordering his dismissal, a situation that prevents him from accessing a second instance. In the present matter—as indicated in Considering IV of this judgment—the Minister is capable of initiating and processing ordinary administrative proceedings instituted against PROMECE officials, since they are excluded from the Civil Service Regime, a situation which implies that the proceeding with the possibility of a second instance is that processed by the Director of the Personnel Department or Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Education, a situation that does not occur in this specific case. Thus, this Chamber observes that the appealed authority has not incurred in any act violating the fundamental rights of the appellant, and therefore this alleged point must be declared without merit." It is sufficient to analyze whether, independently of whether or not the Minister of Public Education was formally recused (recusado), because he had been part of the process of processing and making advance payment of the invoices, he had a ground for disqualification (inhibición) or excuse, such that he should have recused himself from hearing the matter. Article 230 of the LGAP provides that the grounds for abstention (abstención) shall be the same grounds for impediment (impedimento) and recusation (recusación) established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and, additionally, those arising from Article 102 of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic. The grounds for abstention (abstención) shall apply to the directing body (órgano director) of the proceeding, to the appeal body, and to the other authorities or officials who intervene assisting or advising them in the proceeding. It is worth noting that Article 31 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch expressly refers, regarding impediments (impedimentos), recusations (recusaciones), and excuses, to what is expressly provided for in the Civil Procedure Code, given that the mentioned Law of Financial Administration of the Republic is currently repealed. Impediments (impedimentos) are expressly regulated in Article 49 of the Civil Procedure Code, of which, in principle, the only applicable ground in the situation at hand would be having a direct interest. The State's representation denies that a direct interest exists in the case of the Minister, as he obtains no advantage, benefit, utility, or gain. It is clear that this position stems from considering that interest always implies an increase or an accretion, whether in his legal sphere or in his patrimony. However, there is also interest if that advantage manifests itself in avoiding an evil or prejudice, of a personal or patrimonial nature, through the imposition of a sanction or the loss of a benefit or position; hence, to analyze the eventual direct interest, one must consider not only whether an advantage is obtained, but also whether a prejudice is avoided. From this perspective, it is observed that in issuing the administrative act ordering the plaintiff's dismissal from his position as Director of PROMECE, the Minister of Public Education did so by virtue of his position in the exercise of the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria) he holds, without the condition of having participated in some way in the processing and advance payment of the invoices signifying a ground for impediment (impedimento) or recusation (recusación) regarding disciplining officials hierarchically dependent on his Office, without prejudice to his personal and potential liability (responsabilidad) for those same acts. It is not superfluous to add that the principle that there is no nullity for nullity's sake governs in this matter, such that even if some ground for the hierarchical superior's (jerarca) recusal could exist, it has not been demonstrated that this situation diverted the purposes, objectives, and contents of the act. This prevents accepting the party's argument.

**VI.- ON THE MERITS** (continuation): The fundamental basis on which the plaintiff's defense revolves regarding the imputed acts focuses on asserting that in Tender 2006LN-000075-57000, neither he personally nor PROMECE as a body had any participation. To this end, in summary terms, he gives an account of the development of the tender, from its conception and definition of the required goods and services, the purchase decision, the budgetary program financed through an item from the Minister's Office, the preparation of the tender specifications (cartel), the definition of the MEP administrative unit that will supervise the process and compliance with the objectives of the procurement, which falls to the MEP Procurement Department, the preparation of the orders without any participation from him or PROMECE, he notes, the award by a committee, the preparation and signing of the contracts by the Minister and their referral to the MEP Legal Division for its "approval (refrendo)" and the subsequent purchase order and initiation by the Procurement Department. Through all this, he says, it is proven that he had no participation whatsoever in the process. It is therefore appropriate to examine the accuracy of such a statement. In the present process, it has been proven that in the justification document for the acquisition of workshops for a pedagogical transformation within the framework of the educational innovation project, it was stated that <i>"Through the Educational Innovation Project, led by the Minister of Education and with the technical support of the Program for the Improvement of the Quality of Preschool Education and Third Cycle (PROMECE), the Ministry of Public Education has been engaged in promoting initiatives that provide new educational opportunities through the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in such a way that the constructive and democratic use of these in the teaching-learning process fosters, in the actors of the educational process, the successful integration of the pedagogical and the technological as a methodological alternative to transform educational practice."</i> (proven fact number three). Therefore, the Ministry of Public Education promoted Public Tender Number 2006LN-000075-5700 for the acquisition of the following goods or services: Line 1: Pedagogical Integration Workshops in the use of the software Geometric Sketchpad (quantity 10). Line 2: Pedagogical Integration Workshops in the use of the software Create Together (quantity 10). Line 3: Pedagogical Integration Workshops in the use of the software Microworlds (quantity 10). Line 4: Formative pedagogical transformation workshops for the strengthening of a culture of change for principals and lead teachers (quantity 12). Line 5: Workshops on basic tools for integrating learning processes (quantity 10). Line 6: Workshops for the consolidation of the innovation of educational practice and construction of collaborative networks (quantity 13). In all of them, it was expressly indicated that the managing unit was **Innovación Educativa Promece** (proven fact number four). Thus, in the respective public tender specifications (cartel) Number 2006LN-000075-5700 for the procurement of training activities for the Educational Innovation Program, it was recorded that the execution time for the required products and services will be determined by the completion of the last module, which must be no later than three months from the start order and in accordance with a schedule that must be approved by the MEP.

Regarding the workshops, it was established that the delivery time is estimated at three months, from the start order, in accordance with an implementation schedule that must be reconciled with the educational centers and that must be approved by the MEP-PROMECE (proven fact six). Likewise, in the respective public tender specifications (cartel) for Public Tender No. 2006LN-000075-5700 for the contracting of training activities for the Educational Innovation Program, it was stated that the Ministry of Public Education, with the support of PROMECE, is willing to purchase the required services, committing to: "a) Make the corresponding payments against delivery of the products established in an implementation schedule previously approved by the parties./ b) Provide the Innovation and Learning Rooms necessary for the development of these training processes. /c) In the event that the training is not in the metropolitan area, provide the necessary transportation and per diem costs for the participants." (proven fact seven). Subsequently, in the document called "Comprehensive Analysis No. 0091-2006 of Administrative Contracting" from the Institutional Procurement Office (Proveeduría Institucional) of the MEP, related to Public Tender No. 2006LN-000075-5700 for the contracting of training activities for the Educational Innovation Program, in which the award is recommended, it was specified: "2.3 TECHNICAL ASPECTS/ Once the competing offer was analyzed and according to the technical report issued by the Information Technology specialist of the Program for the Improvement of the Quality of Preschool and General Basic Education (PROMECE) Luis C. Rodríguez Carballo, sent via official letter PROMECE 0981-2006, signed by (sic) Carlos A. Barrantes Rivera, Director of PROMECE, it was determined:/ That the offers adequately meet the technical aspects, requested in the tender specifications (cartel)." (proven fact ten). Subsequently, the Institutional Procurement Office of the Ministry of Education issued Purchase Orders numbers 4500061831, 4500061824, 4500061821, and 4500061827, dated December 12, 2006, regarding Public Tender 2006LN-000075-57000 Training Activities Educational Innovation Program, specifying that the Managing Unit is PROMECE (proven fact fourteen). It was also proven that the official Luis Carlos Rodríguez Carballo drafted and presented for signature, to the Director of PROMECE, Mr. Carlos Alberto Barrantes Rivera, the notes with approval (visto bueno) for the corresponding payment to the companies awarded in Public Tender 2006LN-000075-57000 Training Activities Educational Innovation Program (proven fact twenty-five), and therefore, through official letters number PROMECE-2199-06, PROMECE-2201-06, PROMECE-2202-06, and PROMECE-2204-06, all dated December 14, 2006, from the Director of PROMECE, Mr. Carlos Barrantes Rivera, addressed to the Advisor to the Office of the Administrative Vice Minister of the MEP, he forwards with his approval (visto bueno) invoices number 1473 for an amount of $53,879.50 in the name of the Company BPO Técnica (Técnica Administrativa) S.A., number 22638 for an amount of $26,500.00 in the name of the Company Bytes of Learning Incorporated, number 220 for an amount of ¢8,610,599.98 in the name of the Costa Rica Foundation for Sustainable Development, number 17938 for an amount of $30,000.00 in the name of the Technological Foundation of Costa Rica, for their respective payment (proven facts twenty-six, twenty-seven, twenty-eight, and twenty-nine). Thus, contrary to what was affirmed by the plaintiff, both he in his capacity as Director and PROMECE, as a specialized technical body, did participate in the process of definition, design, tender, award, and payment of Public Tender No. 2006LN-000075-5700 for the contracting of training activities for the Educational Innovation Program, without the provisions of official letter DM-0697-06-06 of June 7, 2006, in any way discrediting, diminishing, or in any manner exempting the participation and responsibility of the plaintiff, given that from the account of the cited facts, it is noted that despite what was recorded therein, the plaintiff and PROMECE continued to have participation and that the attributed fault occurred after said provisions, and they do not exempt the plaintiff from the responsibility, duties, and commitments assumed specifically in the Tender in question, so often cited. In this regard, the party omits that the tender specifications (cartel) itself establishes it as the responsible Technical Unit, regardless of who the budget executor was, which determines that the level of responsibility of the plaintiff is unquestionable. The plaintiff points out that the final act issued by the Minister of Public Education that ordered his dismissal as Director of PROMECE violates due process, as it does not contain a list of proven facts, nor the assessment of evidence, in addition to being incongruent, due to a lack of correlation between what was accused, what was proven, and what was sanctioned. From a purely formal aspect, upon reviewing the respective resolution containing the final act - number 701-09 of eight o'clock on September twenty-third, two thousand nine - (proven fact 42), it is noted that the final report rendered by the Directing Body (Órgano Director) of the administrative procedure is transcribed in its entirety, in which the facts that are held as proven are recorded (folios 774 to 778 of the judicial file, Volume I), in addition to a Recital (Considerando) numbered IV called "ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE," in which the evidentiary material is analyzed (folio 779 to 790 of the judicial file, Volume I), which the contested resolution makes its own, so the reproach formulated is unfounded. On a previous occasion, this Court has indicated that in disciplinary matters, the principles of typicity and relative imputation govern, such that the level of rigor does not reach the level of demand of criminal law, as the party intends. It is also reproached that resolution number 701-09 of eight o'clock on September twenty-third, two thousand nine (proven fact 42) is incongruent, due to a lack of correlation between what was accused, what was proven, and what was sanctioned. Let us make an important precision of a terminological nature. It is said that incongruence (in the jurisdictional sphere) occurs when there is no relationship between what was requested by the parties and the operative part of the judgment; that is, when there is no connection or coincidence between what was resolved in the operative part of the ruling and the claims and exceptions raised by the parties, both in the complaint or counterclaim, as well as in the oral hearings held in accordance with the contentious-administrative procedural legislation. Specifically, it occurs when the judges rule on issues not requested (ultra petita), or in excess of what was requested (extra petita), likewise, when they fail to resolve each of the established claims and exceptions (minima or infra petita). In other words, there is no incongruence between the considerations of the judgment and what was resolved in the operative part. From the foregoing, it follows that the requirements and, where applicable, the exceptions invoked by the parties form the inexorable framework within which the judge must rule; these constitute his limit of action. All of this, of course, saving the ex officio pronouncements that the procedural law of the matter attributes to the judge, and which, as such, could not be classified as incongruent. In those terms, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated that: "(...) to determine the existence of this defect, one must compare, in the first place, the operative part of the judgment with the claims alleged in the complaint and its answer, and in the other opportunities - indicated hearings - that the law contemplates, in order to determine if there is in fact an evident mismatch between these two extremes. Secondly, the ex officio power of the judge must be considered. Subsection 1) of canon 119 of the CPCA establishes that it shall resolve all claims and all extremes permitted by the Code. This last point, the Chamber understands, refers to those pronouncements that '...must be made, as appropriate, among others,' when declaring the claim admissible, totally or partially, as established in precept 122, as well as those contained in the following numerals, which make clear the broad sentencing powers of the Court, in protection of the rights or interests of the justiciable, restoring or recognizing their legal situation." (Resolution number 258-F-S1-2010 of 14:00 hours on February 18, 2010). Now, if we translate what has been said, mutatis mutandi, to the administrative sphere and more specifically regarding the validity of the administrative act that orders an administrative sanction, there must undoubtedly be a correspondence between the facts imputed and intimated to the alleged offender, their verification and proof in the administrative procedure, and their correspondence in the final act, in such a way that there is a relationship of identity between what was accused and the sanction imposed. It should be noted that regarding the imputation of charges made to the plaintiff, the previously cited ruling 3586-2010 of the Constitutional Chamber stated: " V.- ON THE LACK OF IMPUTATION OF CHARGES: As the first grievance of the amparo, the appellant states that he was not given a clear, precise, and detailed imputation of charges to exercise his defense. He considers that this omission in the order to open the administrative procedure prevented him from providing his defense. The right to the intimation and imputation of charges operates, above all, in the case of administrative proceedings initiated ex officio and, particularly, disciplinary ones. Therefore, the transfer of charges or the imputation formulated against the administered party or official acquires special relevance for this purpose. It is the responsibility of the directing body of the procedure to notify the interested parties in the administrative procedure of a timely, express, clear, precise, and detailed account of the facts or conducts imputed to them and their legal consequences, that is, there must be a specification of the nature and purposes of the administrative procedure, so that the interested party can provide for their defense. In the case under analysis, resolution OD-001-2009 of fourteen hundred hours on July 29, 2009, issued by the Directing Body of the Administrative Procedure (see folios 59-67 of the administrative file), enumerates one by one the facts attributed to the protected party in his capacity as Director of the Program for the Improvement of the Quality of Basic Education (PROMECE), indicating each one of them in a broad manner. In the specific case, the presumed participation of the protected party (...) was detailed, in the following facts 'ELEVENTH: That on December 14, 2006, before the courses were delivered, Mr. (...) , Director of PROMECE, sent the invoices to Licda. Hazle (sic) Córdoba Soto, Advisor to the Office of the Administrative Vice Minister, so they could be sent to the Procurement Office for their respective payment, through the following official letters, which appear on folios 152 to 155 of the evidence file … TWELFTH: That this official letter signed by Mr. (...) initiated the payment process to the companies, before the service was actually provided. In all the official letters forwarding the invoices, it is indicated, in what concerns us: "We have received the invoice (…) which I forward with our approval (visto bueno), so that it be sent to the MEP Procurement Office, for its respective payment"' . In this Constitutional Court's opinion, the plaintiff is not correct in his arguments, since from a careful reading of the resolution it is evident that, effectively, there is a clear, precise, and detailed account of the illegitimate activities, detailing dates and documentary evidence of his actions and omissions. On the other hand, the initial resolution indicates that if the described facts were proven, they would presumably constitute the infractions established in articles 4, 35, 51 of the Regulation to the Law on Administrative Contracting (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa), Executive Decree 33411-H and article 3 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley Contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), number 8422. Likewise, it was indicated that these are very serious infractions that could be sanctioned as follows: written reprimand, suspension from work without pay for up to three months, and/or dismissal without employer liability by the State. In the aforementioned resolution, August 24, 2004, was set for the oral and private hearing, informing the parties about the guarantees provided in their favor, such as the possibility of being advised and accompanied by a lawyer, proposing and presenting all evidence deemed convenient during the oral hearing, presenting written arguments, reading and examining the entire administrative file, and the possibility of filing an appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) before the directing body and appeal before the Hierarchical Superior of the Directing Body of the Ordinary Administrative Procedure. Consequently, on this point of the appeal, no infringement of the right of defense of the protected party is found, since the intimation met the requirements imposed by the Law of the Constitution." (underlining and highlighting are not in the original). Thus, the imputed facts and their legal consequences were clearly delimited, specified, and warned to the plaintiff, in accordance with what was stated by the Constitutional Court itself. At heart, the discussion is limited to the already mentioned principle of relative imputation typical of criminal matters, which in this case is satisfied insofar as it allows the exercise of the right of defense, the level of rigor of Criminal Law not being necessary. Subsequently, in the final act, precisely those facts were held as proven, and more specifically that based on the action of Mr. Carlos Barrantes Rivera, Director of PROMECE, who gave his approval (visto bueno) for the payment of invoices corresponding to training that had not been delivered, advance payment was made for all the courses contracted through public tender 2006LN-000075-57000, whereupon his dismissal without employer liability was ordered, with which there is congruence between what was accused, proven, and sanctioned. It is also indicated, by the plaintiff, that the directing body omitted to refer to the participation of the minister in the processing and payment of the invoices, despite the fact that he pointed it out to them and evidence was provided in this regard. The plaintiff is indeed correct on this point, in stating that the directing body omitted to rule on the participation of the minister and we even add, of any other official involved, which would imply a potential nullity of what was done and resolved, if such analysis would modify, mitigate, or eliminate the participation and responsibility of the plaintiff, but the truth is that the account of facts from the internal audit, the composition of the directing body, therefore its object and purpose, and the resolution that ordered his dismissal, analyzed the individual conduct of the plaintiff in relation to the investigated facts and his responsibility, which could well be individualizable, which does not prevent jointly or parallelly forming other investigations to analyze the participation of other possible involved parties. The plaintiff affirms that the members of the directing body of the administrative procedure based their report on an improper assessment of the testimonial and documentary evidence, analyzed in a subjective and biased manner. However, such reproach is nothing more than a simple unfounded assertion lacking proof in that sense, given that the plaintiff neglected to point out what that improper assessment of the evidence he accuses consists of, which testimonies and documents were improperly assessed, and how that error notoriously influences the issuance of the final act. This Chamber could not, based on such a vague assertion, conduct a general analysis as if it were issuing the act again, in substitution of the Administration. It must be taken into consideration that the contentious-administrative jurisdiction conducts a legality review based on the grounds alleged by the parties, which justify their claims, without this implying, as stated above, that the judge ex officio replaces the participants in the process. The plaintiff did not demonstrate, nor provide any evidence in favor of his thesis, regarding the alleged improper assessment of the testimonial and documentary evidence, or that the analysis was done in a subjective and biased manner. The claimant now argues that the directing body left unresolved the nullity incident raised, regarding the imputation and intimation that the transfer of charges contained. Strictly speaking, the directing body of the administrative procedure is a mere instructor, whose purpose is to process each and every one of the stages that make up the procedure and once completed, send the file to the deciding body to issue the final administrative act, therefore, as stated supra, the procedural defects will be relevant, provided they determine the invalidity of the adopted administrative act. As an instructor, it is not for the directing body to rule on the merits; however, it does not escape this Chamber that the administrative praxis in our country has imposed that at the end of the procedure, the directing body renders a final report or recommendation, which, it should be noted, is not binding on the hierarchical superior, the holder of the competence, who must decide and issue the final act. Hence, the directing body was not legally obligated to resolve the "nullity incident" regarding the imputation and intimation of charges formulated against Mr. Barrantes Rivera. It fell to the minister in the final resolution to rule on the nullity raised, an aspect that was omitted, but which, upon hearing the appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) against resolution 701-09 of eight o'clock on September twenty-sixth, two thousand nine, was expressly resolved, being rejected. An argument or grievance that definitively precluded with the issuance of Ruling 3586-2010 of thirteen hours and two minutes on February nineteenth, two thousand ten, of the Constitutional Chamber, cited herein, which analyzed and equally rejected such a claim.- **VII.- OF THE OTHER REPROACHES FORMULATED:** Mr. Barrantes Rivera points out that the resolution issued by the Minister of Public Education, ordering his dismissal without employer liability, does not indicate whether the services contracted and paid for in the questioned invoices were received satisfactorily or not. On this point, as in many others, the plaintiff does not explain or justify the reason for that assertion. We can infer that it constitutes a reason for discharge from his responsibility insofar as, having received the contracted services, there was no harm and therefore there is nothing to blame. If so, and solely for argumentative purposes, given that the plaintiff did not bother to elaborate on his assertion, it must be said that the conduct that is reproached is having given the approval (visto bueno) to authorize the advance payment for the contracted services, without them having been provided, not that they were never provided. Remember that from the account of proven facts, between the request or purchase order, the submission of the invoices, and the official letters that granted the approval (visto bueno) to authorize their payment, only a few days passed, so considering the object of the contracts, it was materially impossible for them to have been satisfied at that time. The plaintiff now points out that neither the directing body nor the final act issued by the Minister of Public Education indicated whether, when signing the questioned official letters, he acted with intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the performance of his duties, as required by article 199 subsection 1) LGAP, which makes the resolution issued illegally. It is worth clarifying that the cited article is located in the Second Chapter of the Seventh Title of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which regulates the civil liability of the public servant before third parties, which imposes a subjective liability regime for public officials, requiring intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the performance of their duties or on the occasion thereof for that liability to arise, and it does not have or bear any relationship with the administrative liability of the official, whose conduct, depending on its severity - from simple negligence to the most serious such as intent (dolo) - may generate a sanction gradable and proportional to the fault committed. He also points out that the directing body came to hold it as certain that he incurred in an improper act, without reasoning or grounds covering an analysis of each and every one of the arguments and evidence they received as the directing body. He affirms that this stems, among other considerations, from not holding as proven official letter number DM-0697-06-06 of June 7, 2006, from the Minister of Public Education, in which it is ordered that, from that moment, the technical decisions and the supervision of the project will be in the hands of the Department of Academic Education of the Division of Curricular Development. He maintains that this fact and this evidence were held as not proven, despite the fact that the file shows that this official letter was provided. To verify that correctness, it is consequently necessary to transcribe from resolution 701-09 of eight o'clock on September twenty-third, two thousand nine, which agreed to dismiss the plaintiff without employer liability, the non-proven fact: "A. That from the documentary evidence presented by the defense of the alleged responsible party, specifically official letter number DM-0697-06-06, dated June 7, 2006, insofar as it states that from said moment 'the technical decisions and the supervision of the Project will be in the hands of the Department of Academic Education of the Division of Curricular Development'; it is possible to infer that PROMECE was effectively released from the responsibilities attributed by the tender specifications (cartel) corresponding to Public Tender No. 2006-LN-000075-57000. See official letter at folios 173 of the administrative file." (folio 777 of the judicial file, Volume I). Thus, contrary to what was affirmed by the claimant, it is not true that the official letter in question was held as a non-proven fact, regarding its material existence, but rather that it was not demonstrated, or rather, it is not extracted from it, that PROMECE was released from the tasks, duties, and responsibilities derived from public tender number 2006-LN-000075-57000, as the plaintiff tries to assert. A series of reproaches are also alleged against the Audit Report, Account of Facts 40-09, many of which there has already been an opportunity to rule on, discarding them, as happens with the competence, both of the Minister of Education and of the directing body of the procedure, the nature of the plaintiff's employment relationship, and the eventual participation of other officials in the related facts. The plaintiff endeavors to highlight a series of contradictions regarding the report and the testimony given by Mr. Julio Cesar Rodríguez Céspedes, an official of the MEP Audit Office, who asserted that the purchase orders contained in the SIGAF were signed by the plaintiff and testified that his signature appears on the justification document for the administrative contracting processes, which is not true, when in reality the only one recorded is that of the minister, just as he affirmed that between the plaintiff, PROMECE, and the Institutional Procurement Office of the MEP, there existed a relationship of hierarchy, not indicating on what he based his affirmation. He points out that the Audit Report did not include documentation and information requested by that body, according to official letter A.I-024-08 of February 22, 2009, in which he formulates his defense and provides evidence. He indicates that without any justification, that evidence and information is not referred to in the report, neither to reject it nor to accept it. A fundamental clarification is therefore required here regarding the nature of the accounts of facts formulated by an audit and their character as a preliminary investigation. In the first place, it is not necessary, prior to the initiation of an administrative procedure, as a substantial procedural requirement, to give a hearing on the results of a preliminary investigation to the alleged implicated parties, since the conclusions derived from an audit report, as the Constitutional Chamber has well resolved, are limited to evidencing possible situations that may give rise to administrative liability and to individualizing and identifying the allegedly responsible officials. Note that the Administration, once it receives the account of facts from the Internal Audit Office, at this initial stage, does not consider or assess aspects of the merits, much less assess evidence for the purpose of determining a priori the responsibility of the supposedly involved officials. With the receipt of the account of facts, at this stage, a value judgment is not made, but a judgment of probabilities; it is a summary assessment, in the sense that the merits of what is reported are not estimated, but rather the probability of the occurrence of the facts, given the existence of elements that justify the opening of an administrative procedure. From this point of view, once the account of facts is rendered, the opening of an administrative procedure must be ordered, in order to determine, through the guarantees offered by the ordinary procedure, the real truth of the imputed facts, and it will be at that stage that the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, will be heard, processed, and evacuated, and the involved officials will have the opportunity to exercise their right of defense, inherent to Due Process, in a broad manner and without any restriction.

In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber has clearly distinguished between the preliminary investigation and the administrative procedure proper, as follows: “This Constitutional Court has repeatedly held that it is valid for the Public Administration to conduct a preliminary investigation in administrative proceedings and has indicated that a correct understanding of the nature and foundations of due process admits that, prior to the opening of an administrative procedure, it is sometimes essential to carry out a series of preliminary inquiries. Thus, the Administration—prior to the opening of the administrative case file—could require the completion of a prior investigation, through which it may not only identify the possible person responsible for the fault being investigated, but also determine the need to continue with the formalities of the procedure if there is merit to do so.” (Voto 04420-2003 of 9:21 a.m. on 23-5-2003). It further held: "IV.- On the merits. Administrative process and prior proceedings. Neither the Council nor the appellant clearly understands the difference that exists between investigations prior to the administrative process and the process itself. If the Administration, in complex cases, does not distinguish against whom the procedure should be directed, it can and should open a prior investigation in order to identify the possible or presumed responsible parties, and then open the respective process against them. In this prior investigative stage, it is not necessary to notify the interested parties, because no responsibility is being established. The possibility of the prior investigative process has been admitted by this Chamber in repeated jurisprudence for many years. In ruling No. 676-97 (preceded, among others, by rulings No. 7259-94, No. 598-95, and No. 5796-96), this Chamber stated: ‘A correct understanding of the nature and foundations of due process requires admitting—as this Chamber has also done—that, prior to the opening or continuation of a formal proceeding, it may sometimes be useful or necessary to carry out a series of preliminary inquiries.’ / In the case of the administrative process, this preliminary investigation aims to identify the possible persons responsible for the irregularities and to recommend whether a process should be opened against them, of what type, and for what purpose. The cited ruling continues: / ‘The aforementioned administrative power to conduct investigations prior to the opening of the formal procedure may not, at any time, contravene the set of rights and guarantees that are protected by the institutions of defense and due process. In short: the preliminary inquiry is correct and pertinent insofar as it is necessary to gather the elements of judgment needed to rule out or confirm the need for the formal procedure, or to allow for its proper substantiation (for example, when those who will appear as respondents in the process must be identified). In any other circumstance, it is entirely inexcusable to subsume within the investigative stage an act or acts proper to the formal proceeding, which would entail an unquestionable violation of the right of defense or the guarantees of due process. The prototypical case occurs when, without the intervention of the interested parties, certain evidence is gathered during the investigation to later be used during the procedure, it being the case that—due to the nature of the evidence (for example, testimonial)—the participation of those parties could have helped to yield a different result or assessment. Such evidence, undoubtedly, is useless for the purposes of supporting the final act, and must be repeated in due course with the participation of the affected party in order to become effective. Conversely, and only for purposes of clarifying the point, there is no objection to the collection of documents or the preparation of reports during the preliminary stage, in order to identify the parties to the future process or to prepare the arguments against them, subsequently submitting the result of that work to the administrative procedure as part of the evidence, which the interested parties may then examine and assess.’” (Voto number 10824-2003). Therefore, any reproach formulated against the Audit Report regarding the limitation or lack of analysis of evidence is unactionable, it being in the administrative procedure where the defense and the evidence in support thereof must be offered and provided. Regarding the testimony given during the oral and private hearing of the administrative procedure by Mr. Rodríguez Céspedes, it is noteworthy that his assertions by way of opinion, or factual errors, or contradictions with reality, in no way modify the factual picture investigated, nor does their suppression in any way modify, alter, or excuse the participation of Mr. Barrantes Rivera in the investigated facts. In any event, the plaintiff also failed to explain or substantiate how that testimony, in those specific aspects, affects or prejudices the conclusions set forth in the challenged administrative act. Similarly, it is noted that the objections and remarks made by the plaintiff regarding the actions of Mr. Alberto Orozco Canossa, in his capacity as Head of Human Resources of the MEP, for having declined jurisdiction in his case, are expressly resolved when addressing those same objections, but regarding the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Minister in the formation of the directing body and the issuance of the plaintiff’s dismissal act. Finally, in the closing arguments stage of the oral and public trial, it is alleged that the imposed sanction became illegal for having been imposed when the employer’s disciplinary power was already time-barred. To this end, it is argued that the imputed facts concern a public tender (licitación) from June 2006, regarding an invoice dated December 13 of that same year, and whose official letter he signed on the 13 (sic) of that same month and year, and that the Minister of Education, in his own handwriting, signed authorization for payment of the invoice in December 2006. That it was not until June 2009 that the Minister ordered the formation of a directing body against him, that is, two and a half years later. As this Court had occasion to comment, citing what was resolved by this same Court, in matters of the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power of the Public Administration, we have two systems or regimes. The general one, in which article 603 of the Labor Code applies, unless there is a special provision to the contrary, which provides that the statute of limitations operates in one month. On the other hand, article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic establishes a 5-year term when dealing with transgressions against the Control and Oversight legal framework. Directly related, article 43 of the General Law of Internal Control and article 44 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service establish the 5-year term when dealing with transgressions against the control and oversight legal framework. Thereby affirming that there are two limitation periods applicable to public officials regarding the exercise of disciplinary power, without prejudice to other special legal frameworks that have their own terms, as is the case with the General Police Law No. 7410. Specifically, the rules regulating the statute of limitations of the sanctioning power in the field of control and oversight provide: article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, as amended by Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002: "Article 71.—Statute of limitations for disciplinary liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight legal framework shall be time-barred in accordance with the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall be time-barred in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as that act that requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—liability shall be time-barred in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the agency head (jerarca) or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure. When the perpetrator of the fault is the agency head, the term shall begin to run from the date on which their service relationship with the entity, company, or respective body ends. It shall be considered a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure, the failure to initiate it in a timely manner or allowing the liability of the offender to become time-barred, without justified cause." (As amended by subsection a) of article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, Law of Internal Control). For its part, the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292, in article 43 states the following: "Article 43.—Statute of limitations for administrative liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law shall be time-barred according to article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994. It shall be considered a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure, the failure to initiate it in a timely manner or allowing the liability of the offender to become time-barred, without justified cause." / Finally, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, No. 8422, states: "Article 44.—Statute of limitations for administrative liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the legal framework relating to the Public Treasury, shall be time-barred, according to article 43 of the General Law of Internal Control and article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994." From the aforementioned articles, an objective material criterion emerges that allows determining when the mentioned statute of limitations applies to a fault against the Public Treasury. In that sense, if there is a transgression of the control and oversight legal framework or that relating to the Public Treasury, the 5-year statute of limitations for disciplinary power applies. This criterion makes it possible to differentiate the applicable statute of limitations in cases of a labor nature of one month, in accordance with the provisions of article 603 of the Labor Code. With the amendment to article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, by changing the assessment criterion to determine the applicable limitation period, it moved from a subjective regime to an objective one. Previously, it was necessary to carry out an exercise to determine, for purposes of applying the limitation period, whether someone was a servant of the Public Treasury (subjective aspect). As mentioned supra, the currently governing criterion is objective material, which is determined by the transgression of the control and oversight legal framework, which is composed of, among others, the aforementioned laws, as well as the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets, No. 8131 and its Regulation, and the Law of Administrative Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) No. 7494 and its Regulation. Thus, it is clear that the interpretation of the cited regulations allows applying the limitation period to any public official who, regardless of whether or not they hold a Public Treasury position, incurs a violation of the control and oversight legal framework; if this occurs, the 5-year term applies. By virtue of which, in the case at hand, the alleged statute of limitations has not occurred, given that the committed infraction implies a transgression of the control and oversight legal framework or that relating to the Public Treasury, whose limitation period is five years, as stated.

**VIII.- OF THE CLAIMS OF THE COMPLAINT:** It is requested that the judgment order: "1. That Official Letter 633-09, dated June 27, 2009, issued by the MINISTRY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, in the person of its Minister LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, ordering the establishment of a directing body against me, be declared illegal, violative of the legal system, violative of due process, and null." This claim, aside from challenging a purely procedural act (acto de mero trámite), appealable only together with the final act, was based on the plaintiff's position that the Minister lacked jurisdiction to order the formation of a directing body against him; however, as this Court had the opportunity to clarify, such an objection is improper, by virtue of the nature of the plaintiff's public employment relationship, given that his position as Director of PROMECE is excluded from the Civil Service regime, so the official competent to order the establishment of a directing body and the exercise of disciplinary power falls upon the Minister of the MEP; therefore, the claim is denied. It is also requested: "2. That Resolutions numbers 701-09, of 8 a.m. on September 23, 2009, and Resolution 742-09 of 10:45 a.m. on September 28, 2009, issued by the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, through the relevant Minister, LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, be declared illegal, violative of the legal system, violative of due process, and null." In the corresponding section, each and every one of the arguments and objections raised by the plaintiff were analyzed and weighed, and they were all rejected, as they lacked merit in their reasoning; by virtue of which, there is no alternative but to equally deny this claim. The following is requested: "3. That the dismissal, carried out by the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, in the person of its Minister LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, against me, which occurred through the resolutions mentioned in the preceding claim, be declared null." Having denied the preceding claim, by consequence and connection, the denial of this claim proceeds. Furthermore, the following is claimed: "4. That the Costa Rican State be ordered to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) that may have been caused to me by its illegal actions, damages to be liquidated in the enforcement of judgment stage." The principal claim having been denied, and the nullity of the plaintiff's dismissal act not having been established, the alleged damages have not been produced, which necessitates their denial. The complaint demands: "5. That the public officials sued herein, LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, GABRIELA VALVERDE MURILLO, JEANETTE CALERO ARAYA, DAVER ROJAS CHAVES, ALBERTO OROZCO CANOSSA, JULIO CESAR RODRÍGUEZ CÉSPEDES, all of the stated qualities, be declared jointly and severally liable with the State for the damages caused to me by their illegal actions. Damages to be liquidated in the enforcement of judgment stage." In the same vein, the principal claim and consequently the requested compensation having been denied, the request to declare the co-defendant officials jointly and severally liable must be denied. The complaint having been dismissed in its entirety, the following claims are not appropriate, and they are likewise denied: "6. That the MINISTRY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION be ordered to pay the costs of both instances of this process." and "7. That the defendants LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, GABRIELA VALVERDE MURILLO, JEANETTE CALERO ARAYA, DAVER ROJAS CHAVES, ALBERTO OROZCO CANOSSA, JULIO CESAR RODRÍGUEZ CÉSPEDES be jointly and severally ordered with the Ministry of Education to pay the costs of both instances of this process." As the present complaint has been dismissed in all its aspects, the non-conformity of the administrative conduct with the legal system not having been proven, nor having been able to demonstrate the other subsidiary claims, given the total absence of evidence in that regard, there is no alternative but to declare the complaint without merit in all its aspects, in its principal as well as accessory and/or subsidiary claims.

**IX.- ON THE EXCEPTIONS RAISED:** As timely indicated, the **STATE**, through its representation, the co-defendant individuals through their special judicial attorney-in-fact, and the **OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC**, in its capacity as passive intervener (coadyuvante pasivo), through its representation, all raised the exception of **Lack of Right** and the co-defendant individuals also raised the exceptions of Lack of Standing in both modalities, which they called Lack of Standing *ad causam* and Res Judicata regarding the discussion on violation of due process at the stage of intimation and accusation (folios: 1427 to 1581, 1586 to 1623, and 1633 to 1730, respectively). **In this regard, it is decided:** We will first address the **Exception of Lack of Right**, which will be resolved jointly for all defendants. The substantive right is verified when the requested claims are granted, a situation that does not occur in the plaintiff's case, for the reasons already set forth in the preceding considerandos, since the plaintiff is not entitled to the substantive right invoked in their complaint, not having proven the nullity of the administrative act that ordered their dismissal without employer liability. By virtue of which, the raised exception is upheld, and the filed complaint is declared without merit in all its aspects. Regarding the **exception of Lack of Standing, both Active and Passive**: The co-defendant individuals raised the exception of lack of standing *ad causam*, both active and passive. By way of preamble, it is recalled that standing *ad causam* refers to a subject's capacity to be considered a party to a process, suitability that is intimately related to the claim being brought in the action. In the present process, the plaintiff claims the nullity of Official Letter 633-09 of June 27, 2009, which ordered the establishment of a directing body against him, and Resolutions numbers 701-09 of eight o'clock in the morning on September 23, 2009, and 742-09 of ten forty-five in the morning on September 28, 2009. Acts issued by the Minister of Public Education, seeking the declaration of nullity of their dismissal as Director of PROMECE, ordering the State and the co-defendant officials in their personal capacity to jointly and severally pay the damages caused, considering that in their capacity as public officials, by virtue of their participation, they caused such damages. Accordingly, and based on such claims, both the plaintiff and the co-defendants have standing to sue and be sued, since one is bringing a claim for compensation against the others, by virtue of their participation and responsibility in issuing the challenged act; therefore, the exception of lack of standing *ad causam*, both active and passive, raised by the co-defendant individuals, is denied.

Regarding the exception of <b>Res Judicata (Cosa Juzgada)</b> with respect to the discussion on the violation of due process at the notification and imputation stage. Indeed, as it was possible to review, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in ruling 3586-2010, heard, resolved, and dismissed the plaintiff's claim regarding the imputation of charges made by the directing body of the administrative procedure, which served as one more element to likewise dismiss that objection in this venue, which in any case constitutes an additional reason to uphold the exception of lack of right, making it unnecessary to rule on the alleged res judicata (cosa juzgada).

It is here that recourse is made to deconcentration as a technique for distributing competence within the internal sphere of a single public entity (but not the transfer of competence from one subject to another, a phenomenon characteristic of decentralization), by virtue of which the legislator withdraws an exclusive competence from a superior, in order to attribute it exclusively to an inferior, with the purpose that the latter exercises it as its own and under its own responsibility. Thus, three elements configure it. On the one hand, the necessary existence of a legal norm that attributes the competence (formerly of the superior) to the inferior for its exclusive exercise. On the other hand, the creation of the deconcentrated body that will exercise the competence. This is inferred from numeral 83, subsection 1) of the LGAP, which clearly indicates that any body other than the head of the entity (jerarca) shall be fully subordinated to the latter and to the immediate hierarchical superior, except for deconcentration carried out by law or by regulation. However, our legal system distinguishes between minimal and maximum deconcentration. As indicated by the aforementioned numeral 83, minimal deconcentration occurs when the superior cannot arrogate (avocar) the competences of the inferior, or review or substitute the conduct of the inferior, either ex officio or at the request of a party. For its part, deconcentration will be maximum when, in addition to the foregoing, the inferior is removed from the orders, instructions, or circulars of the superior. It is also indicated that the norms creating minimal deconcentration shall be applied restrictively against the competence of the deconcentrated body, and those creating maximum deconcentration shall be applied extensively in its favor. Finally, it is worth noting that, in some cases, the legislator endows the deconcentrated body with what has jurisprudentially been termed “instrumental legal personhood” (personería jurídica instrumental), limited, as a general rule, solely to budgetary aspects, such that this “legal personhood” does not convert the body into a legal entity distinct from the entity to which it belongs (which is characteristic of decentralization), but does attribute to it the capacity to manage certain funds, independently of the central budget of the entity to which it belongs. Finally, tenure (titularidad) refers to the fact that the public official must not only be competent, but must also be the holder (titular) of the competence. A holder has been understood as one who exercises a position, profession, or trade, by their own right or definitive appointment, with the fullness of requirements and stability, unlike one called to occupy it provisionally.

The second formal element of the administrative act is the procedure (procedimiento). The Public Administration has the power to issue administrative acts unilaterally, which can even annul or revoke the subjective rights of individuals. This power of self-protection (autotutela) has been limited by the legal system. That limit is constituted by the obligation of the Public Administration to follow a procedure to issue the administrative act. The administrative procedure is a concatenated series of procedural acts aimed at an end. The administrative procedure has a fundamental objective, the ascertainment of the real truth of the motive (motivo) that will serve as the basis for the final administrative act. The procedure concerns the mode of production of an act (articles 214, 216, 224, 225, 308, and 320 of the LGAP). The administrative procedure constitutes the means or instrument that allows the Administration to verify that the assumptions conditioning the issuance of an administrative act have occurred; to these effects, it has been conceptualized as the ordering of a series of actions, the concatenation of different formalities, whose legal effects are linked together to produce an administrative decision, which reveals, in itself, its nature as mere procedural acts, in principle unchallengeable on their own, but only through the final administrative act, the product of that procedure. From this perspective, defects in the processing of the procedure will be relevant, provided they determine the invalidity of the adopted administrative act, which consequently requires an examination of the legality of the act, which implies, if applicable, examining the administrative action and thus determining the validity or not of the administrative decision. Herein are integrated the elements of due process (debido proceso), which must be observed and respected in every sanctioning administrative procedure. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has defined them as follows: “a) to notify the affected party of the charges (traslado de cargos), which implies communicating the imputed facts in an individualized, concrete, and timely manner; b) to allow unrestricted access to the administrative file (expediente administrativo); c) to grant a reasonable period for the preparation of their defense; d) to grant the hearing and allow them to provide all evidence they deem appropriate to support their defense; e) to provide grounds for the resolutions that conclude the procedure; f) to recognize their right to appeal against the sanctioning resolution” (Judgment number 5469-95 of eighteen hours three minutes of the fourth of October of nineteen ninety-five).

The third formal element of the administrative act is the form (forma), which is the manner in which the administrative act is externalized or manifested. In accordance with article 134 of the LGAP, the administrative act must be expressed in writing, unless its nature or the circumstances require a different form (see 136 LGAP and 146 Political Constitution).

Regarding the material or substantial elements of the administrative act, we have that the motive (motivo) (article 133 of the LGAP) is the legal premise, the conditioning fact that gives rise to the administrative act. In such a way that, the motive of the administrative act constitutes the assumption or the conditioning fact for the issuance of an administrative act, in other words, it constitutes the reason for being of the administrative act, what obliges or permits its issuance. It may consist of a legal act or fact provided for by the legal norm. Article 166 of the LGAP provides: “There shall be absolute nullity of the act when one or more of its constitutive elements is totally lacking, in fact or in law.” Meanwhile, the content (contenido) of the act constitutes the legal effect or the operative part of the act, what it commands, orders, or disposes. It is the change it introduces into the legal world. It is the part of the act that orders a sanction, an authorization, a permit, or a concession (article 132 LGAP). The last of the substantial or material elements is the Purpose (Fin). The Public Administration has a single mission, the satisfaction of the public interest. That satisfaction of the public interest is achieved in various ways, one of them being through the issuance of administrative acts. In principle, it is understood that every administrative act, as a concrete exercise of a generic competence, aims at the satisfaction of the common interest. Therefore, it is affirmed that the purpose of the administrative act will consequently be the satisfaction of the public interest, which constitutes the general purpose of every administrative act, and in turn, the specific purpose will be the satisfaction of the public interest that is entrusted to that competence (article 131 LGAP).

**IV.- OF THE SANCTIONING POWER (POTESTAD SANCIONATORIA) OF THE ADMINISTRATION:** The Sanctioning Power of the Administration is that which opens the punitive action of the Administration. It is an attribution proper to the Administration that translates into the legal possibility of imposing sanctions on individuals and even on officials who infringe its provisions in the exercise of their functions, transgressing its mandates or ignoring its prohibitions. The legal nature of said power is administrative and should not be confused with that exercised by the judge in the development of a judicial process, for there the sanction is of a jurisdictional criminal nature. The penalty that is externalized in the field of administrative law does not have a criminal character. It is imposed as an instrument of self-protection (autoprotección) to preserve the institutional legal order with the distribution of competences and the indication of penalties of an equal nature. These are sanctions that assume a corrective or disciplinary character, depending on the scope of application. Hence, one speaks of a disciplinary sanctioning power (potestad sancionatoria disciplinaria) and a corrective sanctioning power (potestad sancionatoria correccional), according to whether the recipients are public servants or private individuals. The sanctioning power of the Administration unfolds within the scope of the most dissimilar facts, acts, and complex activities of individuals and of the Administration itself. It is aimed at repressing those conducts that transgress administrative normativity and is subject, moreover, to the constitutional and legal limitations established in the Political Constitution and in the general provisions that regulate it.

**Basis of the hierarchical power (potestad jerárquica) and the disciplinary regime:** With the purpose of achieving a joint and coordinated action despite the diversity of bodies that may form an Administrative Entity, it is necessary to reserve the power of decision and command in a few bodies, with the rest being simple management bodies or preparatory ones for the decision-making bodies. The way in which the various bodies that depend on the same hierarchy are linked and coordinated among themselves can be expressed graphically when those bodies are grouped, placing themselves with respect to one another in a situation of dependence such that among all of them there exists a bond that, starting from the body situated at the highest degree of that order, links them down to the body of the lowest category, through various degrees in which certain faculties exist, to which reference will be made later. The legal relationship that links the various bodies constitutes what is termed the "Hierarchy Relationship" (Relación de Jerarquía). This hierarchical relationship is what allows and explains how the unity of the Administrative Power is maintained despite the diversity of bodies that form it. The preservation of that unity is guaranteed by the concentration of the power of decision and command. The concentration of the power of command and decision consists in that in the organization of a public entity there exists a reduced number of bodies with competence to issue resolutions, impose determinations, or carry out legal acts that create legal situations. The other bodies simply carry out the material acts necessary to assist the decision-making ones. The power of command in this regime lies in the faculty of superior authorities to give orders and instructions to inferior bodies, indicating to them the guidelines they must follow for the exercise of the attributions and functions entrusted to them. This power of command is generally exercised by means of orders, instructions, and circulars issued by authorities with respect to the employees who are subordinated to them. It is based on the need for the set of bodies and officials that make up the Public Administration to act in a coordinated manner in fulfilling their own duties as if they were a single unit. This coordination is achieved by centralizing the administrative direction in a single body, called the head of the entity (Jerarca), and making the other bodies and officials depend on it. The way in which said bodies and officials are linked together gives rise to Hierarchy. Hierarchy is the legal relationship that links together administrative bodies and officials, through powers of subordination, for the purpose of coordinating and giving unity to the action of all of them. That relationship of hierarchy consists of a relationship of dependence that implies certain powers of superior bodies over inferior ones. These powers characteristic of the hierarchical relationship are:

• a)**Power of appointment (Poder de nombramiento):** It is a faculty of superior authorities to make the designations of the holders of the bodies that are subordinated to them, by means of appointments.
• b)**Power of command (Poder de mando):** It consists, as stated, of the faculty of superior authorities to give orders and instructions to inferior bodies, indicating to them the guidelines they must follow for the exercise of the activity that corresponds to them. Orders are imperative decisions for specific cases; service instructions constitute a means to provide detailed indications of a practical nature; circulars are a set of provisions that are always of a general nature, unlike the other two which sometimes have an individual nature.
• c)**Power of oversight (Poder de vigilancia):** It is a faculty that is manifested through acts of a purely material nature, which consist of demanding the rendering of accounts, carrying out investigations or inquiries into the processing of matters, and in general, all those acts aimed at informing the superior authorities of the regularity with which inferiors are performing their functions.
• d)**Disciplinary Power (Poder Disciplinario):** The failure to fulfill the duties imposed by public office gives rise to the liability of the author, a liability that may be civil, criminal, or administrative. Any fault committed by the official or employee in the performance of their duties makes them administratively liable, without prejudice to the fact that it may also give rise to civil or criminal liability.
• e)**Power of Review (Poder de Revisión):** In this domain, the faculties derived from the hierarchical relationship consist of being able to grant prior approval to the acts that inferiors perform, to suspend them, annul them, or reform them.
• f)**Power to resolve conflicts of competence (Poder para la resolución de conflictos de competencia).** The disciplinary power of the head of the entity (Jerarca) is tacit and a matter of principle, and does not require an express norm to establish it, as expressed in article 104 of the LGAP; that is, the head of the entity, by their simple condition as such, has the faculty to discipline faults committed by their subordinates without the need for a norm to that effect.

Closely related to the subject, and because it is relevant to the matter at hand, it is appropriate to address the point regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power in public employment. On that specific aspect, this Tribunal has stated:

"**VI.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF THE DISCIPLINARY POWER.** The statute of limitations is an institution by means of which the passage of time produces the effect of consolidating de facto situations, allowing the extinction of rights or the acquisition of others' property, which obeys the maxim that 'Time leads to the consolidation of certain rights or the loss of the same.' As the scholar Rafael Caballero Sánchez well points out in his work 'Statute of Limitations and Expiration in the Administrative System' (Prescripción y Caducidad en el Ordenamiento Administrativo), the Institute is of ancient origin in other branches, since its application in Administrative Law is more recent. Its application in Public Law has reached maturity, offering a finished model, shaped by its own norms, rules, and principles. Thus set forth, in the public employment regime, there exist different statute of limitations periods for the disciplinary power, duly differentiated, applicable to public officials, derived from normative bodies. In the first place, there is article 603 of the Labor Code, which applies as a general rule, unless there is a special provision to the contrary. Said norm provides that the statute of limitations operates in one month. On the other hand, article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic establishes a period of 5 years when it concerns transgressions of the Control and Oversight system. In the same vein, canon 43 of the General Law of Internal Control and 44 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office establish the period of 5 years when it concerns transgressions of the control and oversight system. Based on the foregoing, it can be affirmed, in general terms, that there are two statute of limitations periods applicable to public officials regarding the exercise of the disciplinary power, without prejudice to other special systems that have their own periods, as is the case of the General Police Law No. 7410.

It is important to bear in mind what is provided by the mentioned numerals, which regulate the statute of limitations of the sanctioning power in the field of control and oversight. Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic was reformed by Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, and is the one that refers to the statute of limitations of the administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in the Law and in the superior control and oversight system, in the following terms: 'Article 71.—Statute of limitations of disciplinary liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight system shall prescribe according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious – understood as that act which requires an inquiry or an audit study to report on its possible irregularity – the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is made known to the head of the entity or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure. When the author of the fault is the head of the entity, the period shall begin to run from the date on which they terminate their service relationship with the entity, the company, or the respective body. Failure by the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure in a timely manner, or allowing the liability of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause, shall be deemed a serious fault.' (As reformed by subsection a) of article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, Internal Control Law). For its part, the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292, in numeral 43 indicates the following: 'Article 43.—Statute of limitations of administrative liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law shall prescribe according to article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994. Failure by the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure in a timely manner, or allowing the liability of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause, shall be deemed a serious fault.' Finally, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, No. 8422, states: 'Article 44.—Statute of limitations of administrative liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the system relating to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), shall prescribe according to article 43 of the General Law of Internal Control and article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994.' From the mentioned numerals, an objective material criterion emerges that allows determining when the mentioned statute of limitations applies to a fault against the Public Treasury. In that sense, if there is a transgression of the control and oversight system or that relating to the Public Treasury, the 5-year statute of limitations period for the disciplinary power applies. This criterion allows differentiating the statute of limitations applicable in cases of a labor nature of one month, in accordance with what is provided by article 603 of the Labor Code. With the reform that article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic underwent, by varying the assessment criterion to determine the applicable statute of limitations period, a shift occurred from a subjective regime to an objective one. Previously, it was necessary to carry out the exercise of determining, for the purposes of applying the statute of limitations period, if one was a servant of the Public Treasury (subjective aspect). As mentioned supra, the criterion that currently governs is an objective material one, which is determined by the transgression of the control and oversight system, which is composed of, among others, the mentioned laws, as well as the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets, No. 8131 and its Regulations, the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its Regulations. Thus, it is clear that the understanding of the cited regulations allows applying the statute of limitations period to any public official who, regardless of whether or not they hold a position in the Public Treasury, incurs a breach of the control and oversight system; if this occurs, the 5-year period applies to them." (Judgment number 101-2011 [sic] of fifteen hours thirty minutes of the twenty-fourth of October of two thousand twelve, Section V).

**V.- ON THE MERITS:** As referenced in the corresponding section, the plaintiff seeks the nullity of official letter 633-09 of June 27, 2009, which ordered the establishment of a directing body (órgano director) against him, and resolutions number 701-09 of eight hours of September 23, 2009, and 742-09 of ten hours forty-five minutes of September 28, 2009. Acts issued by the Minister of Public Education, seeking for his dismissal as Director of PROMECE to be declared null, condemning the State and the co-defendant officials in their personal capacity jointly and severally to pay the damages caused. To this end, he argues that the appointment of the directing body of the procedure by the Minister of Education is contrary to law, because its designation and processing corresponded to the Human Resources Directorate of the MEP, pursuant to the provisions of articles 18 subsection j), 50 subsection m) of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Education, and 16 subsections a and b of the Internal Work Regulations, and 57 and 61 of the LGAP. The mentioned article 18 subsection j, establishes: "The specific attributions of the Minister are: (...) j) To decide in the final administrative instance on the imposition of sanctions of the disciplinary regime on teaching and administrative staff," and article 50 subsection m) which states: "The duties and attributions of the Director of the Personnel Department are: m) To hear and resolve in the first administrative instance: (...) 2nd.- The denunciations and charges formulated against servants for faults committed or breach of duties in the exercise of their functions;" In the same vein, article 140 of the Fundamental Charter must be considered, in its subsections 1 and 2, which establishes the rule that appointment and removal correspond to the head of the entity (jerarca) and that it is their obligation to coordinate the means of public service provision. However, it must be borne in mind that in accordance with article 2 of Law number 7315 of October 23, 1992, PROMECE officials are excluded from the Civil Service Regime, which means that article 6 of the mentioned Organic Law of the Ministry of Labor is not applicable, since it provides that: "This Organic Law, its related laws, and their respective regulations, govern the relations between the Ministry and its servants, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and its regulations," which excludes from its provisions personnel not covered by the Civil Service regime, an aspect that has already been resolved by the Constitutional Chamber, which heard an identical allegation to the one raised here by the plaintiff himself, when he filed an amparo appeal against his dismissal. The Constitutional Court held, in what is relevant: "**IV.- REGARDING THE CONFORMATION OF THE DIRECTING BODY OF THE PROCEDURE:** As a first point, the appellant alleges that the Minister of Public Education does not have the disciplinary power to institute an ordinary procedure, since the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Education is clear in indicating that the person in charge of hearing and resolving in the first instance denunciations for breach of duties is the Director of the Personnel Department and not the Minister. In the specific case, it is proven that article 6 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Education, in conjunction with article 2 of Law No. 7315 of October 23, 1992, called 'Approval of the Loan Contracts between the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank and the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica,' created the Coordinating Unit of the Program for the Improvement of the Quality of General Basic Education, as a body attached to the Ministry of Public Education, under the direction of the Ministry of Public Education, and it was indicated that the personnel would be excluded from the Civil Service Regime; that is, PROMECE officials are not covered by article 6 of the aforementioned Law; consequently, the Personnel Department or Human Resources lacks competence to institute an administrative procedure against the protected party. By virtue of the foregoing, the amparo must be dismissed regarding this point." (**Voto 3586-2010**). Therefore, that specific reproach must be dismissed. He also indicates that the resolution in which his dismissal was agreed was based on false facts. Two important clarifications must be made regarding this particular grievance. One of a procedural nature, directly related to the burden of proof of the party making an assertion in the process. Indeed, in accordance with the doctrine of article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is up to the party to prove, through suitable evidence, their statements.

This Chamber has already indicated on other occasions that even though the judgment is the responsibility of the jurisdictional authority, the process belongs to the parties, and it is they who define how to present the case, establish what evidence they wish to offer, and what arguments they will present. Although the jurisdictional authority has, under the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, broad powers to expand, supplement, or clarify the claim, the grounds, and the evidence, these cannot go to the extreme of entirely substituting the parties, such that the jurisdictional authority officially replaces the participants in the process. At that level, it is not possible. The main function of the jurisdictional authority is to direct the process, not to substitute the parties. It is they who define how the evidence should be chosen and the approach they intend to give it. In this regard, the plaintiff did not demonstrate, nor did he provide any evidence in favor of his thesis, regarding the alleged false facts on which the resolution ordering his dismissal is based; he did not even bother to indicate which facts he labels as such. The second necessary clarification lies in that the facts on which the Administration based its decision to dismiss the plaintiff basically coincide with the proven facts of this judgment, so rather than speaking of falsehood regarding the facts, what exists is a discrepancy of criteria regarding the effects and consequences derived from such facts.

It is also alleged that his defense formally raised a ground for disqualification (causal de inhibición) against the Minister of Public Education, before the issuance of the final act of the administrative disciplinary procedure, and that despite this, he issued the resolution challenged in this process. Having carried out the respective analysis of this argument, we find that on folio 700 of the judicial expediente, Volume I, there is a brief mention in the conclusions of the plaintiff's defense in the administrative procedure, which stated: <i>"But the most serious thing is that in his capacity as head of program 570 </i>—referring to the minister—<i> who had already signed approving the corresponding payment, you order an administrative procedure against another official for a supposed payment </i>(sic) <i>made in advance that he approved; that is being judge and party."</i> and later, already on appeal, folio 863 of the judicial expediente, Volume I, it was stated: <i>"However, this representation in its conclusions pointed out that, according to the law, you should have abstained from issuing the final act, due to an evident ground for disqualification. You did not do so. You did not even consider it. This is a defect that contaminates your action."</i>. This being the case, it must be concluded that no formal recusal (recusación) was filed against the Minister of Public Education, by virtue of which he was required to abstain from issuing the final act until the filed recusal had been previously resolved, and therefore, from that particular aspect, the alleged ground for nullity does not exist. Another aspect to consider would be whether the aforementioned official could infer, from such a generic and unclear argument, a ground for disqualification or excuse that would prevent him from issuing the final act in the administrative procedure. Certainly, what was stated in the conclusions of Mr. Barrantes Rivera's legal representation, analyzed and weighed under a criterion of reasonableness and average understanding, does not allow a clear ground for recusal to be inferred; at most, a violation of the administrative double instance, insofar as such a condition and duty within the structure and organization of the Public Administration is accepted. If that is the reproach, it is consequently appropriate to cite again what was said by the Constitutional Chamber, in Voto <b>3586-2010</b> regarding the alleged violation of the administrative double instance, in the specific case of the plaintiff: "</span><b><span lang=EN style='font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%; font-family:"Bookman Old Style";mso-ansi-language:EN'>VI.- REGARDING THE DOUBLE INSTANCE: </span></b><span lang=EN style='font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%; font-family:"Bookman Old Style";mso-ansi-language:EN'>The appellant alleges that the Minister of Public Education, contrary to internal regulations, processed the administrative procedure, and worse still, heard the appeal for reversal and the hierarchical appeal filed against the resolution ordering his dismissal, a situation that does not allow him to resort to a second instance. In the present matter—as indicated in Considerando IV of this judgment—the Minister is capable of initiating and processing the ordinary administrative procedures brought against PROMECE officials, since they are excluded from the Civil Service Regime, a situation that implies that the procedure that has the possibility of a second instance is the one processed by the Director of the Personnel or Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Public Education, a situation that does not arise in the specific case. Thus, this Chamber observes that the appealed authority has not incurred in any act violating the fundamental rights of the appellant, and therefore this alleged ground must be declared without merit." </span><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Bookman Old Style"; mso-ansi-language:EN'>It is sufficient to analyze whether, regardless of whether the Minister of Public Education was formally recused, for having been part of the process of processing and advance payment of the invoices, he had a ground for disqualification or excuse, such that he should have recused himself from hearing the matter. Article 230 of the LGAP provides that the grounds for abstention shall be the same grounds for impediment and recusal established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and, in addition, those resulting from Article 102 of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic. The grounds for abstention shall apply to the directing body of the procedure, to the appellate body, and to the other authorities or officials who intervene assisting or advising them in the procedure. It is worth highlighting that Article 31 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch expressly refers, regarding impediments, recusals, and excuses, to what is expressly provided in the Civil Procedure Code, given that the aforementioned Law of Financial Administration of the Republic is currently repealed. Impediments are expressly regulated in Article 49 of the Civil Procedure Code, of which, in principle, the only applicable ground in the situation at hand would be that of having a direct interest. The State's representation denies that in the case of the Minister there is a direct interest, as he obtains no advantage, benefit, utility, or gain whatsoever. It is clear that this position starts from considering that interest always implies a plus or an increase, whether in his legal sphere or in his assets. However, there is also an interest if that benefit manifests itself in avoiding an evil or prejudice, of a personal or patrimonial nature, through the imposition of a sanction or the loss of a benefit or position; hence, to analyze the potential direct interest, one must consider not only if an advantage is obtained, but also if a prejudice is avoided. From this perspective, it is observed that in issuing the administrative act ordering the plaintiff's dismissal from his position as Director of PROMECE, the Minister of Public Education did so by virtue of the position in the exercise of the disciplinary power he holds, without the fact of having participated in some way in the procedures and advance payment of the invoices signifying a ground for impediment or recusal regarding disciplining officials hierarchically dependent on his Office, without prejudice to his personal and eventual responsibility for those same acts. It is not superfluous to add that the principle that there is no nullity for nullity's sake governs in this matter, so that even if there could have been some ground for the hierarch's recusal, it has not been demonstrated that this situation diverted the purposes, tasks, and content of the act. This prevents accepting the party's argument. </span> <b><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Bookman Old Style"; mso-ansi-language:EN'>VI.- ON THE MERITS</span></b><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Bookman Old Style";mso-ansi-language:EN'> (continuation): The fundamental basis on which the plaintiff's defense regarding the imputed facts revolves centers on affirming that in Public Tender (Licitación) 2006LN-000075-57000, he had no personal participation, nor did PROMECE as a body. To this end, in summary terms, he recounts the development of the tender, from its conception and definition of the required goods and services, the purchase decision, the budget program financed by a line item from the Minister's Office, the preparation of the tender document (cartel), the definition of the MEP administrative unit that will supervise the process and the fulfillment of the contracting objectives, which falls on the MEP Procurement Office (Proveeduría), the preparation of the orders, without any participation by him or PROMECE, he notes, the award by a committee, the preparation and signing of the contracts by the Minister and their referral to the MEP Legal Division for its <i>"endorsement (refrendo)" </i>and the subsequent purchase order and start-up by the Procurement Office. With all this, he says, it is proven that he had no participation whatsoever in the process. It is therefore appropriate to examine the accuracy of such assertion. In this process, it has been accredited that in the justification document for the acquisition of workshops for a pedagogical transformation within the framework of the educational innovation project, it was stated that </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Bookman Old Style"; mso-ansi-language:EN'>"Through the Educational Innovation Project, led by the Minister of Education and with the technical support of the Program for the Improvement of the Quality of Preschool and Third Cycle Education (PROMECE), the Ministry of Public Education has been dedicated to promoting initiatives that provide new educational opportunities through the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in such a way that the constructive and democratic use of these in the teaching-learning process fosters in the actors of the educational process the successful integration between pedagogy and technology as a methodological alternative to transform educational practice."</span></i><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Bookman Old Style"; mso-ansi-language:EN'> (proven fact three). Therefore, the Ministry of Public Education promoted Public Tender number 2006LN-000075-5700 for the acquisition of the following goods or services: Line 1: Pedagogical Integration Workshops on the use of the Geometra Skechpad software (quantity 10). Line 2: Pedagogical Integration Workshops on the use of the Create Together software (quantity 10). Line 3: Pedagogical Integration Workshops on the use of the Micromundos software (quantity 10). Line 4: Formative pedagogical transformation workshops for the consolidation of a culture of change for principals and leading teachers (quantity 12). Line 5: Basic tool workshops for integrating learning processes (quantity 10). Line 6: Workshops for the consolidation of educational practice innovation and the construction of collaborative networks (quantity 13). Given that in all of them, it was expressly indicated that the managing unit was <b>Educational Innovation Promece</b></span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-family: "Bookman Old Style";mso-ansi-language:EN'>(proven fact four). In this way, in the respective Public Tender document number 2006LN-000075-5700 for the contracting of training activities for the Educational Innovation Program, it was recorded that the execution time for the required products and services will be determined by the completion of the last module, which must be no later than three months from the start-up order and in accordance with a schedule that must be approved by the MEP. Regarding the workshops, it was established that the delivery time is estimated at three months from the start-up order, in accordance with an implementation schedule that must be reconciled with the educational centers and that MEP-PROMECE must approve (proven fact six). Likewise, in the respective Public Tender document number 2006LN-000075-5700 for the contracting of training activities for the Educational Innovation Program, it was stated that the Ministry of Public Education, with the support of PROMECE, is willing to purchase the required services, committing to: </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Bookman Old Style"; mso-ansi-language:EN'>"a) Make the corresponding payments upon delivery of the products established in an implementation schedule previously approved by the parties./ b) Provide the necessary Innovation and Learning Rooms for the development of these training processes. /c) In the event that the training is not in the metropolitan area, contribute the necessary transportation costs and per diem for the participants." </span></i><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Bookman Old Style"; mso-ansi-language:EN'>(proven fact seven). Subsequently, in the document called "Comprehensive Analysis No. 0091-2006 of Administrative Contracting" from the MEP Institutional Procurement Office, related to Public Tender number 2006LN-000075-5700 for the contracting of training activities for the Educational Innovation Program, in which the award is recommended, it was specified: </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%; font-family:"Bookman Old Style";mso-ansi-language:EN'>"2.3 TECHNICAL ASPECTS/ Once the competing offer was analyzed and according to the technical report issued by the IT specialist of the Program for the Improvement of the Quality of Preschool and General Basic Education (PROMECE) Luis C. Rodríguez Carballo, forwarded via official letter PROMECE 0981-2006, signed by (sic) Carlos A. Barrantes Rivera, Director of PROMECE, it was determined:/ That the offers adequately meet the technical aspects requested in the tender document."</span><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Bookman Old Style";mso-ansi-language:EN'> (proven fact ten). Subsequently, the Institutional Procurement Office of the Ministry of Education issued Purchase Orders numbers 4500061831, 4500061824, 4500061821, and 4500061827, dated December 12, 2006, regarding Public Tender 2006LN-000075-57000 Training Activities Educational Innovation Program, specifying that the Managing Unit is PROMECE (proven fact fourteen). It was also accredited that the official Luis Carlos Rodríguez Carballo drafted and submitted for signature, to the Director of PROMECE, Mr. Carlos Alberto Barrantes Rivera, the notes with the approval (visto bueno) for the corresponding payment to the companies awarded in Public Tender 2006LN-000075-57000 Training Activities Educational Innovation Program (proven fact twenty-five). Therefore, through official letters number PROMECE-2199-06, PROMECE-2201-06, PROMECE-2202-06, and PROMECE-2204-06, all dated December 14, 2006, from the Director of PROMECE, Mr. Carlos Barrantes Rivera, addressed to the Advisor of the Office of the Administrative Vice-Minister of the MEP, he forwards with his approval invoices number 1473 for an amount of $53,879.50 in the name of the Company BPO Técnica (Técnica Administrativa) S.A., number 22638 for an amount of $26,500.00 in the name of the Company Bytes of Learning Incorporated, number 220 for an amount of ¢8,610,599.98 in the name of the Fundación Costa Rica para el Desarrollo Sostenible, number 17938 for an amount of $30,000.00 in the name of the Fundación Tecnológica de Costa Rica, for their respective payment (proven facts twenty-six, twenty-seven, twenty-eight, and twenty-nine). Then, contrary to what the plaintiff affirmed, both he, in his capacity as Director, and PROMECE, as a specialized technical body, did participate in the process of definition, design, competition, award, and payment of Public Tender number 2006LN-000075-5700 for the contracting of training activities for the Educational Innovation Program, without the provisions of official letter DM-0697-06-06 of June 7, 2006, in any way diminishing, reducing, or somehow exempting the participation and responsibility of the plaintiff. Given that, from the relation of the cited facts, it is noted that despite what was recorded there, the plaintiff and PROMECE continued to participate, and the attributed fault occurred after that provision, and does not exempt the plaintiff from the responsibility, duties, and commitments specifically assumed in the Tender at hand, so many times cited. In this regard, the party omits that the tender document itself establishes him as the responsible Technical Unit, regardless of who the budget executor was, which determines that the level of responsibility of the plaintiff is unquestionable.

The plaintiff points out that the final act issued by the Minister of Public Education ordering his dismissal as Director of PROMECE violates due process by not containing a list of proven facts nor a weighing of evidence, in addition to being incongruent, due to a lack of correlation between what was accused, what was proven, and what was sanctioned. From a purely formal aspect, upon reviewing the respective resolution containing the final act—number 701-09 at eight o'clock on September twenty-third, two thousand nine—(proven fact 42), it is noted that the final report rendered by the Directing Body of the administrative procedure is transcribed in its entirety, in which the facts deemed proven are recorded (folios 774 to 778 of the judicial expediente, Volume I), in addition to a Considerando numbered IV called "WEIGHING OF EVIDENCE," in which the evidentiary material is analyzed (folio 779 to 790 of the judicial expediente, Volume I), which the challenged resolution adopts as its own, and therefore the formulated reproach is unfounded. On a previous occasion, this Court has indicated that in disciplinary matters, the principles of specificity (tipicidad) and relative imputation govern, such that the level of rigor does not reach the level of demand of criminal law, as the party intends. It is further criticized that resolution number 701-09 at eight o'clock on September twenty-third, two thousand nine (proven fact 42), is incongruent due to a lack of correlation between what was accused, what was proven, and what was sanctioned. Let us make an important clarification of a terminological nature. It is said that incongruence (in the jurisdictional sphere) occurs when there is no relationship between what the parties requested and the operative part of the judgment; that is, when there is no connection or coincidence between what was resolved in the operative part of the ruling and the claims and defenses raised by the parties, both in the complaint or counterclaim, and in the oral hearings held in accordance with the contentious-administrative procedural legislation. Specifically, it occurs when the judges rule on issues not requested (ultra petita), or in excess of what was requested (extra petita), likewise, when they fail to resolve each of the claims and defenses raised (minimum or infra petita). In other terms, there is no incongruence between the considerations of the judgment and what was resolved in the operative part. From the foregoing, it follows that the requirements and, where appropriate, the defenses invoked by the parties form the inexorable framework within which the judge must resolve; these constitute the limit of his action. All this, of course, saving the official pronouncements that the procedural law on the matter attributes to the judge, and which as such, could not be classified as incongruent. In these terms, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated that: “(…) </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:10.0pt; line-height:150%;font-family:"Bookman Old Style";mso-ansi-language:EN'>to determine the existence of this defect, the operative part of the judgment must be compared, first, with the claims adduced in the complaint and its answer, and in the other opportunities—indicated hearings—provided for by law, in order to determine if there really is an evident mismatch between these two extremes. Secondly, the judge's official powers must be considered. Subsection 1) of canon 119 of the CPCA establishes that it shall resolve on all claims and all extremes permitted by the Code. The latter, this Chamber understands, are those pronouncements that "…must make, as appropriate, among others," when it declares the claim admissible, totally or partially, in accordance with precept 122, as well as those contained in the following numerals, which make clear the broad sentencing powers of the Court, in protection of the rights or interests of the justiciable party, restoring or recognizing their legal situation.</span></i><span lang=EN style='font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Bookman Old Style"; mso-ansi-language:EN'>” </span><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Bookman Old Style"; mso-ansi-language:EN'>(Resolution number 258-F-S1-2010 at 14:00 hours on February 18, 2010). Now, if we transpose what has been said, mutatis mutandi, to the administrative sphere and more specifically regarding the validity of the administrative act that imposes an administrative sanction, there must undoubtedly be a correspondence between the facts imputed and given notice of to the alleged offender, their verification and proof in the administrative procedure, and their correspondence in the final act, such that there exists a relationship of identity between what was accused and the sanction imposed. It is worth noting that regarding the statement of charges made against the plaintiff, the already referenced voto 3586-2010 of the Constitutional Chamber stated: “</span><span lang=EN style='font-size: 10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Bookman Old Style";mso-ansi-language:EN'> <b>V.- ON THE LACK OF STATEMENT OF CHARGES: </b>As the first grievance of the amparo, the appellant states that he was not given a clear, precise, and detailed statement of charges to exercise his defense. He considers that this omission in the order initiating the administrative procedure prevented him from providing his defense. The right to notification and statement of charges operates, above all, in the case of administrative procedures initiated ex officio and, particularly, disciplinary ones. Thus, the notification of charges or the imputation made against the administered party or official acquires special relevance for this purpose. It corresponds to the directing body of the procedure to notify the interested parties in the administrative procedure of a timely, express, clear, precise, and detailed relation of the facts or conduct imputed to them and their legal consequences, that is, there must be a specification of the nature and purposes of the administrative procedure, so that the interested party can provide for their defense. <b><u>In the case under analysis, resolution OD-001-2009 at fourteen hundred hours on July 29, 2009, issued by the Directing Body of the Administrative Procedure (see folios 59-67 of the administrative expediente), lists one by one the facts attributed to the petitioner in his capacity as Director of the Program for the Improvement of the Quality of Basic Education (PROMECE), indicating each of them broadly.</u></b> In the specific case, the alleged participation of the petitioner (...) was detailed in the following facts: <i>“ELEVENTH: That on December 14, 2006, before the courses were given, Mr. (...) , Director of PROMECE, sent the invoices to Licda. Hazle </i></span><span lang=EN style='font-family: "Bookman Old Style";mso-ansi-language:EN'>(sic)</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:10.0pt; line-height:150%;font-family:"Bookman Old Style";mso-ansi-language:EN'>Córdoba Soto, Advisor to the Office of the Administrative Vice-Minister, so that they could be sent to the Procurement Office for their respective payment, through the following official letters, which appear on folios 152 to 155 of the evidence file …TWELFTH: That this official letter signed by Mr. (...) initiated the payment process to the companies, before the service was actually provided. In all the official letters forwarding the invoices, it is indicated, as relevant: “We have received the invoice (…) which I forward with our approval, for it to be sent to the MEP Procurement Office, for its respective payment”</span></i><span lang=EN style='font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Bookman Old Style"; mso-ansi-language:EN'> . In the opinion of this Constitutional Court, the plaintiff is not correct in his arguments, since from a careful reading of the resolution, it can be deduced that, effectively, there is a clear, precise, and detailed list of illegitimate activities, detailing dates and documentary evidence of his actions and omissions. Furthermore, the initial resolution indicates that if the described facts were proven, they would presumably constitute the infractions established in Articles 4, 35, and 51 of the Regulation to the Law on Administrative Contracting, Decreto Ejecutivo 33411-H, and Article 3 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, number 8422. Likewise, it was indicated that these are very serious infractions that could be sanctioned as follows: written reprimand, suspension from work without pay for up to three months, and/or dismissal without employer liability by the State. In the referenced resolution, August 24, 2004, was set for the holding of the oral and private hearing, informing the parties about the guarantees established in their favor, such as the possibility of being advised and accompanied by a lawyer, proposing and presenting all evidence deemed convenient during the oral hearing, presenting written arguments, reading and examining the entire administrative expediente, and the possibility of filing an appeal for reversal before the directing body and a hierarchical appeal before the Hierarchical Superior of the Directing Body of the Ordinary Administrative Procedure. Consequently, regarding this part of the appeal, no infringement of the petitioner's right to defense is found, as the notification complied with the requirements imposed by Constitutional Law.</span><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Bookman Old Style";mso-ansi-language:EN'>" (underline and highlight not in the original). Thus, the imputed facts and their legal consequences were clearly delimited, specified, and warned to the plaintiff, according to what was stated by the Constitutional Court itself. In essence, the discussion is limited to the already mentioned principle of relative imputation typical of criminal law, which in this case is satisfied insofar as it allows the exercise of the right to defense, the level of rigor of Criminal Law not being necessary. Subsequently, in the final act, precisely those facts were deemed proven, and more specifically that, from the management of Mr. Carlos Barrantes Rivera, Director of PROMECE, who gave his approval for the payment of the invoices corresponding to training sessions that had not been given, advance payment was made for all the courses contracted through Public Tender 2006LN-000075-57000, before which his dismissal without employer liability was ordered, meaning there is congruence between what was accused, proven, and sanctioned. It is also indicated by the plaintiff that the directing body omitted to refer to the Minister's participation in the processing and payment of the invoices, despite being made aware and evidence being provided in this regard.

The plaintiff is indeed correct on this point, in stating that the directing body omitted to rule on the participation of the minister, and we would even add, of any other official involved, which would entail a potential nullity of what was acted upon and resolved, if such analysis would modify, mitigate, or eliminate the participation and responsibility of the plaintiff. However, the truth is that the internal audit's relation of facts, the composition of the directing body, and therefore its object and purpose, and the resolution that ordered his dismissal, analyzed the individual conduct of the plaintiff in relation to the investigated facts and his responsibility, which could very well be individualized, which does not prevent the joint or parallel formation of other investigations to analyze the participation of other possible involved parties.

The plaintiff asserts that the members of the directing body of the administrative procedure based their report on an improper assessment of the testimonial and documentary evidence, analyzed in a subjective and biased manner. However, such reproach is nothing more than a simple unfounded assertion lacking proof in that regard, given that the plaintiff neglected to indicate what that alleged improper assessment of evidence consists of, which testimonies and documents were improperly assessed, and how that error notably influences the issuance of the final act. This Chamber cannot, based on such a vague indication, conduct a general analysis as if it were issuing the act anew, substituting for the Administration. It must be taken into consideration that the administrative contentious jurisdiction conducts a legality review based on the grounds adduced by the parties, which justify their claims, without this implying, as stated above, that the judge ex officio replaces the intervenors in the process. The plaintiff did not demonstrate, nor did he provide any evidence in favor of his thesis, regarding the alleged improper assessment of the testimonial and documentary evidence, or that the analysis was conducted in a subjective and biased manner.

The plaintiff now argues that the directing body left unresolved the motion for nullity raised regarding the imputation and notification, which contained the transfer of charges. Strictly speaking, the directing body of the administrative procedure is a mere instructor, whose purpose is to process each and every one of the stages that make up the procedure, and once completed, to forward the file to the deciding body to issue the final administrative act. Therefore, as stated above, procedural defects during the handling of the procedure will be relevant only if they determine the invalidity of the administrative act adopted. As an instructor, the directing body is not responsible for ruling on the merits. Nevertheless, this Chamber is not unaware that administrative praxis in our country has established that at the conclusion of the procedure, the directing body renders a final report or recommendation, which, it is worth noting, is not binding on the hierarch, the holder of the competence, who must resolve and issue the final act. Hence, the directing body was not legally obligated to resolve the "motion for nullity" regarding the imputation and notification of charges made against Mr. Barrantes Rivera. It was the minister's responsibility to rule on the raised nullity in the final resolution, an aspect that was omitted, but which, upon hearing the appeal for revocation against Resolution 701-09 at eight o'clock on September 26, 2009, was expressly resolved, being rejected. This argument or grievance was definitively precluded by the issuance of the Constitutional Chamber's Voto 3586-2010 at thirteen hours and two minutes of February 19, two thousand ten, cited herein, which analyzed and equally rejected such a claim.

**VII.- OF THE OTHER OBJECTIONS RAISED:** Mr. Barrantes Rivera points out that the resolution issued by the Minister of Public Education ordering his dismissal without employer liability does not indicate whether the services contracted and paid for in the questioned invoices were received satisfactorily or not. On this point, as in many others, the plaintiff does not explain or justify the reason for this observation. We can infer that it constitutes a ground for exculpation of his responsibility, insofar as the contracted services having been received, there was no harm and therefore nothing to attribute. If this were the case, and solely for argumentative purposes, given that the plaintiff did not bother to elaborate on his observation, it must be stated that the reproached conduct is having given the approval to authorize the advance payment for contracted services, without them having been provided, not that they were not provided at all. It should be recalled that from the relation of proven facts, between the request or purchase order, the presentation of the invoices, and the official communications that granted approval to authorize their payment, only a few days elapsed. Therefore, considering the object of the contracts, it was materially impossible for them to have been satisfied at that time.

The plaintiff now indicates that neither the directing body nor the final act issued by the Minister of Public Education stated whether, in signing the questioned official communications, he acted with intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the performance of his duties, as required by Article 199, subsection 1) of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), which renders the resolution illegally issued. It is worth clarifying that the cited article is located in Chapter Two of Title Seven of the General Law of Public Administration, which regulates the civil liability of the public servant before third parties, which imposes a regime of subjective liability of the public official, by requiring intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the performance of his duties or on occasion thereof for such liability to arise. This has no relation whatsoever to the administrative liability of the official, whose conduct, depending on its severity—from simple negligence (culpa) to the most serious, which is intent (dolo)—can generate a sanction that is gradable and proportional to the fault committed.

He further states that the directing body came to hold as true that he incurred in an improper act, without reasoning or grounds encompassing an analysis of each and every one of the arguments and evidence they received as the directing body. He affirms that the foregoing derives, among other considerations, from not having deemed proven the official communication number DM-0697-06-06 of June 7, 2006, from the Minister of Public Education, in which it is ordered that from that moment on, the technical decisions and supervision of the project will be in the hands of the Department of Academic Education of the Curriculum Development Division. He sustains that this fact and this evidence were deemed not proven, despite the fact that the administrative file shows that this communication was provided. To verify this assertion, it is consequently necessary to transcribe from Resolution 701-09 at eight o'clock on September 23, 2009, which agreed to dismiss the plaintiff without employer liability, the fact not proven: *"A. That from the documentary evidence presented by the defense of the presumed responsible party, specifically the official communication number DM-0697-06-06, dated June 7, 2006, insofar as it states that from that moment 'the technical decisions and supervision of the Project will be in the hands of the Department of Academic Education of the Curriculum Development Division'; it is possible to infer that PROMECE was effectively relieved of the responsibilities attributed by the corresponding bid specifications for Public Tender number 2006-LN-000075-57000. See official communication on folios 173 of the administrative file."* (folio 777 of the judicial file, Volume I). Therefore, contrary to what the plaintiff asserts, it is not true that the referenced communication was deemed an unproven fact regarding its material existence; rather, it was not demonstrated, or rather, it cannot be extracted from it, that PROMECE was relieved of the tasks, duties, and responsibilities derived from Public Tender number 2006-LN-000075-57000, as the plaintiff intends to assert.

A series of objections are also directed against the Audit Report, Relation of Facts 40-09, many of which have already been addressed and dismissed, as occurs regarding the competence of both the Minister of Education and the directing body of the procedure, the nature of the plaintiff's employment relationship, and the eventual participation of other officials in the related facts. The plaintiff endeavors to demonstrate a series of contradictions between the report and the testimony given by Mr. Julio Cesar Rodríguez Céspedes, an official of the MEP's Internal Audit, who asserted that the purchase orders contained in the SIGAF were signed by the plaintiff, and testified that his signature appears on the justification document for the administrative procurement processes, which is not true, when in reality the only one recorded is that of the minister. He also affirmed that there existed a hierarchical relationship between the plaintiff, PROMECE, and the MEP's Institutional Procurement Department, without indicating the basis for his assertion. He points out that the Audit Report did not include documentation and information requested by that body, according to official communication A.I-024-08 of February 22, 2009, in which he formulates his defense and provides evidence. He indicates that without any justification, no reference is made to this evidence and information in the report, neither to reject nor to accept it.

A fundamental clarification is consequently required here regarding the nature of the relations of facts formulated by an internal audit and its character as a preliminary investigation. In the first place, it is not necessary, prior to the initiation of an administrative procedure, as a substantial procedural requirement, to grant a hearing on the results of a preliminary investigation to the presumed implicated parties, because the conclusions derived from an audit report, as the Constitutional Chamber has well resolved, are limited to highlighting possible situations that may give rise to administrative liability and to individualizing and identifying the presumably responsible officials. It should be noted that the Administration, once it receives the relation of facts from the Internal Audit, at this initial stage, does not consider or assess substantive aspects, much less assesses evidence for the purpose of determining, a priori, the liability of the supposedly involved officials. Upon receipt of the relation of facts, at this stage, a value judgment is not made, but rather a judgment of probabilities; it is a summary assessment, in the sense that the substance of what is reported is not evaluated, but rather the probability of the occurrence of the facts, given the existence of elements that justify the opening of an administrative procedure. From this point of view, once the relation of facts is rendered, the opening of an administrative procedure must be ordered, in order to determine, through the guarantees offered by the ordinary procedure, the real truth of the facts being imputed. It will be at that stage that the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, will be known, processed, and examined, and the involved officials will have the opportunity to exercise, broadly and without any restriction, their right to defense, inherent to Due Process. In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber has clearly distinguished between the preliminary investigation and the administrative procedure itself, as follows: "This Constitutional Tribunal has repeatedly ruled that it is valid for the Public Administration to conduct a preliminary investigation in administrative procedures, and has indicated that a correct understanding of the nature and foundations of due process admits that, prior to the opening of an administrative procedure, it is sometimes indispensable to carry out a series of preliminary inquiries. Thus, the Administration—prior to the opening of the administrative file—could require a prior investigation, through which it is possible not only to individualize the possible person responsible for the fault under investigation, but also to determine the need to continue with the formalities of the procedure if merit is found to do so." (Voto 04420-2003 at 9:21 hours on 23-5-2003). It further held: "IV.- On the merits. Administrative process and prior procedures. Neither the Council nor the appellant is clear on the difference that exists between the investigations prior to the administrative process and the process itself. If the Administration, in complex cases, cannot distinguish against whom the procedure should be directed, it may and must open a prior investigation in order to identify the *possible* or *presumed* responsible parties, and then open the respective process against them. In this prior investigative stage, it is not necessary to notify the interested parties, because no liability is being established. The possibility of the prior investigative process has been admitted by this Chamber in reiterated jurisprudence for many years. In ruling No. 676-97 (preceded, among others, by rulings No. 7259-94, No. 598-95, and No. 5796-96), the Chamber stated: 'A correct understanding of the nature and foundations of due process requires admitting—as the Chamber has also done—that, prior to the opening or continuation of a formal proceeding, it may sometimes be useful or necessary to carry out a series of preliminary inquiries.' / In the case of the administrative process, this preliminary investigation aims to individualize the possible responsible parties for the irregularities and to recommend whether a process should be opened against them, of what type, and for what purpose. The cited ruling continues: / 'The stated administrative power to carry out investigations prior to the opening of the formal procedure cannot, at any time, contravene the set of rights and guarantees covered by the principles of defense and due process. In summary: the prior inquiry is correct and pertinent insofar as it is necessary to gather the elements of judgment needed to discard or confirm the need for the formal procedure, or to allow its proper substantiation (for example, when the parties to be named as defendants in the process must be identified). In any other scenario, it is entirely inexcusable to subsume within the investigative stage an act or acts proper to the formal proceeding, which would entail an undoubted breach of the right to defense or the guarantees of due process. The prototypical case occurs when, without the intervention of the interested parties, certain evidence is examined during the investigation and later used during the procedure, being the case that—due to the nature of the evidence (for example, testimonial)—the participation of those parties could have contributed to yielding a different result or assessment. Said evidence, undoubtedly, is useless for the purposes of substantiating the final act, and must be repeated in due course with the participation of the affected party, in order for it to become effective. Conversely, and solely for the purpose of clarifying the point, no objection is seen in the fact that, during the preliminary stage, documents are collected or reports are prepared, in order to identify the parties of the future process or to prepare the arguments against them, subsequently subjecting the result of that work to the administrative procedure as part of the evidence, which the interested parties may then examine and assess.'" (Voto number **10824-2003**). Therefore, any reproach formulated against the Audit Report regarding the limitation or lack of evidence analysis is untenable, as it is in the administrative procedure where the defense and the evidence supporting it must be offered and provided.

Regarding the testimony given at the oral and private hearing of the administrative procedure by Mr. Rodríguez Céspedes, it is notable that his assertions, by way of opinion or errors of fact or contradiction with reality, in no way modify the factual picture investigated, nor does their suppression in any way modify, alter, or exempt the participation of Mr. Barrantes Rivera in the investigated facts. In any event, the plaintiff also did not explain or substantiate how this testimony, in these specific aspects, affects or prejudices the conclusions set forth in the contested administrative act. Similarly, it is noted that the objections and observations made by the plaintiff regarding the actions of Mr. Alberto Orozco Canossa, in his capacity as Head of Human Resources of the MEP, for having declined competence in his case, are expressly resolved when addressing those same objections, but regarding the alleged lack of competence of the minister in the composition of the directing body and the issuance of the act of dismissal of the plaintiff.

Finally, in the closing arguments stage of the oral and public trial, it is alleged that the imposed sanction is illegal because it was imposed when the employer's disciplinary power was already time-barred. To this end, it is argued that the imputed facts relate to a public tender from June 2006, an invoice from December 13 of the same year, and whose official communication he signed on the 13th (sic) of that same month and year, and that the Minister of Education, in his own handwriting, signed authorizing payment of the invoice in December 2006. It is not until June 2009 that the minister ordered the establishment of a directing body against him, that is, two and a half years later. As we had occasion to discuss, citing what was resolved by this same Tribunal, in matters of the statute of limitations for the disciplinary power of the Public Administration, we have two systems or regimes. The general one, where Article 603 of the Labor Code applies, unless a special provision states otherwise, which stipulates that the statute of limitations operates in one month. On the other hand, Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic establishes a 5-year term when dealing with transgressions of the Control and Oversight legal framework. Directly related, Article 43 of the General Law of Internal Control and Article 44 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service establish the 5-year term when dealing with transgressions of the control and oversight legal framework. Thus, it is affirmed that there are two statutory limitation periods applicable to public officials regarding the exercise of disciplinary power, without prejudice to other special legal frameworks that have their own terms, as is the case with the General Police Law No. 7410.

Specifically, the norms regulating the statute of limitations for sanctioning power in the field of control and oversight provide: Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, reformed by Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002: *"Article 71.—Statute of limitations for disciplinary responsibility. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight legal framework shall be time-barred according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular fact is notorious, liability shall be time-barred in five years, counted from the occurrence of the fact. b) In cases where the irregular fact is not notorious—understood as that fact which requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—liability shall be time-barred in five years, counted from the date on which the report of the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the hierarch or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible party of the act that orders the initiation of the administrative procedure. When the perpetrator of the fault is the hierarch, the term shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, enterprise, or body. It shall be considered a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the responsibility of the infractor to become time-barred, without justified cause." (Thus reformed by subsection a) of Article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, the General Law of Internal Control).* For its part, the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292, states in Article 43 the following: *"Article 43.—Statute of limitations for administrative liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law shall be time-barred according to Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994. It shall be considered a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the liability of the infractor to become time-barred, without justified cause." /* Finally, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, No. 8422, states: *"Article 44.—Statute of limitations for administrative liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the legal framework relating to the Public Treasury, shall be time-barred according to Article 43 of the General Law of Internal Control and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994."* From the mentioned articles, an objective material criterion emerges that allows determining when the mentioned statute of limitations applies to a fault against the Public Treasury. In this sense, if there is a transgression of the control and oversight legal framework or one relating to the Public Treasury, the 5-year term for the statute of limitations of the disciplinary power applies. This criterion allows differentiating the applicable statute of limitations in cases of a labor nature, which is one month, according to the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code. With the reform suffered by Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, by changing the assessment criterion to determine the applicable statute of limitations period, a shift occurred from a subjective regime to an objective one. Previously, it was necessary to carry out an exercise to determine, for the purposes of applying the statute of limitations period, whether one was a servant of the Public Treasury (subjective aspect). As mentioned above, the currently prevailing criterion is objective material, determined by the transgression of the control and oversight legal framework, composed, among others, of the mentioned laws, as well as the Law on Financial Administration and Public Budgets, No. 8131 and its Regulations, and the Law on Administrative Procurement, No. 7494 and its Regulations. Thus, it is clear that the interpretation of the cited regulations allows applying the statute of limitations period to any public official who, regardless of whether or not they hold a position in the Public Treasury, incurs a breach of the control and oversight legal framework. If this occurs, the 5-year term applies. By virtue of which, in the case at hand, the alleged statute of limitations has not occurred, given that the committed infraction implies a transgression of the control and oversight legal framework or one relating to the Public Treasury, whose statute of limitations period is five years, as stated.

**VIII.- OF THE CLAIMS OF THE LAWSUIT:** It is requested that the judgment order: "1. That official communication 633-09, dated June 27, 2009, issued by the MINISTRY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, through its Minister LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, ordering the establishment of a directing body against me, be declared illegal, violative of the legal system, violative of due process, and null." This claim, besides challenging a mere procedural act, appealable only together with the final act, was based on the plaintiff's position that the minister lacked competence to order the establishment of a directing body against him. However, as we had the opportunity to clarify, such objection is improper, due to the nature of the plaintiff's public employment relationship, given that his position as Director of PROMECE is excluded from the Civil Service regime, so the competent official to order the establishment of a directing body and the exercise of disciplinary power rests with the MEP's minister, for which reason the claim is rejected. It is also requested: "2. That Resolutions of the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, issued by the Minister of the branch, LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, numbers 701-09, at 8 o'clock on September 23, 2009, and Resolution 742-09 at 10 hours 45 minutes on September 28, 2009, be declared illegal, violative of the legal system, violative of due process, and null." In the corresponding section, each and every argument and objection raised by the plaintiff was analyzed and weighed, which were rejected, as he was not correct in his reasoning, by virtue of which, there is no alternative but to equally reject this claim. It is requested: "3. That the dismissal carried out by the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, through its Minister LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, against me, which occurred through the resolutions mentioned in the previous claim, be declared null." The previous claim having been rejected, by consequence and connection, the rejection of this claim proceeds. Likewise, it is claimed: "4. That the Costa Rican State be ordered to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) that may have been caused to me by its illegal actions, damages to be liquidated during the judgment execution phase." The main claim having been rejected, and the nullity of the plaintiff's dismissal act not having been established, the alleged damages have not occurred, which compels its rejection. It is demanded: "5. That the public officials sued here, LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, GABRIELA VALVERDE MURILLO, JEANETTE CALERO ARAYA, DAVER ROJAS CHAVES, ALBERTO OROZCO CANOSSA, JULIO CESAR RODRÍGUEZ CÉSPEDES, all of stated qualities, be declared jointly and severally liable (responsables solidarios) with the State for the damages caused to me by their illegal actions. Damages to be liquidated during the judgment execution phase." Equally, the main claim and consequently the requested compensation having been rejected, the petition to declare the co-defendant officials as jointly and severally liable must be rejected. The lawsuit having been dismissed in its entirety, the subsequent claims are not applicable, which are likewise rejected: "6. That the MINISTRY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION be ordered to pay both costs of this process." and "7.

That the defendants LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, GABRIELA VALVERDE MURILLO, JEANETTE CALERO ARAYA, DAVER ROJAS CHAVES, ALBERTO OROZCO CANOSSA, JULIO CESAR RODRÍGUEZ CÉSPEDES, jointly and severally with the Ministry of Education, be ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding." As this claim has been dismissed in its entirety, the nonconformity of the administrative conduct with the legal system not having been proven, nor having the other subsidiary claims been demonstrated, given the total absence of evidence in that regard, there is no alternative but to dismiss the claim in its entirety, both in its principal claims and in its accessory and/or subsidiary claims.

**IX.- REGARDING THE DEFENSES RAISED:** As timely indicated, the **STATE**, through its representation, the individual co-defendants through their special judicial representative, and the **CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA**, in its capacity as passive coadjuvant, through its representation, all raised the defense of **Lack of Right** and the individual co-defendants additionally raised the defenses of Lack of Standing in both forms, which they termed Lack of standing ad causam and Res Judicata regarding the discussion on the violation of due process at the notification and charging stage (folios: 1427 to 1581, 1586 to 1623, and 1633 to 1730, respectively). **In this regard, it is resolved:** We will address first the **Defense of Lack of Right**, which will be resolved jointly for all defendants. The substantive right is verified when the requested claims are upheld, a situation that does not occur in the plaintiff's case, for the reasons already set forth in the preceding recitals, since the plaintiff is not entitled to the substantive right invoked in their complaint, having failed to prove the nullity of the administrative act that ordered their dismissal without employer liability. By virtue of which, the defense raised is upheld, and the claim filed is dismissed in its entirety. Regarding the **defense of Lack of Standing, both Active and Passive**: The individual co-defendants raised the defense of lack of standing ad causam, both active and passive. By way of preamble, it should be recalled that standing ad causam refers to the capacity of a subject to be considered a party to a proceeding, a suitability that is intimately related to the claim brought in the action. In the present proceeding, the plaintiff seeks the nullity of official letter 633-09 of June 27, 2009, which ordered the establishment of an investigating body against them, and resolutions numbers 701-09 of eight o'clock on September 23, 2009, and 742-09 of ten forty-five o'clock on September 28, 2009. Acts issued by the Minister of Public Education, seeking to have their dismissal as Director of PROMECE declared void, ordering the State and the co-defendant officials in their personal capacity, jointly and severally, to pay the damages caused, considering that in their capacity as public officials, by virtue of their participation, they caused said damages. Accordingly, and based on such claims, both the plaintiff and the co-defendants have standing to sue and be sued, given that one is bringing an indemnification claim against the others, by virtue of their participation and responsibility in issuing the challenged act; therefore, the defense of lack of standing ad causam, both active and passive, raised by the individual co-defendants is rejected. Regarding the defense of **Res Judicata** concerning the discussion on the violation of due process at the notification and charging stage. Indeed, as we had occasion to outline, the Constitutional Chamber, in vote 3586-2010, heard, resolved, and dismissed the plaintiff's argument regarding the charging of offenses made by the investigating body of the administrative procedure, which served as a further element to likewise dismiss that objection in this venue, which in any case constitutes an additional reason to uphold the defense of lack of right; therefore, it is unnecessary to rule on the alleged res judicata.”

“III.- ASPECTOS JURÍDICOS INVOLUCRADOS: Planteado así el asunto, corresponde ahora determinar la procedencia de las pretensiones, a partir del cuadro fáctico y la relación de los hechos probados como no probados. Sin embargo, conviene de previo, realizar algunas acotaciones generales, que permitan esclarecer los puntos debatidos. SOBRE LA NULIDAD DEL ACTO ADMINISTRATIVO: Conforme con el artículo 158 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (en adelante LGAP) la falta o defecto de algún requisito del acto administrativo, expresa o implícitamente exigido por el ordenamiento jurídico constituirá un vicio de éste. Manifestando a continuación, que será inválido el acto administrativo sustancialmente disconforme con el ordenamiento jurídico, precisando que las infracciones insustanciales no invalidarán el acto. De acuerdo con ello, en un acto administrativo se pueden presentar dos tipos de infracciones: sustanciales e insustanciales, siendo las primeras de ellas las que determinan la invalidez del acto, que se manifiesta, dependiendo de la gravedad de la violación cometida, en nulidad relativa o absoluta y, las insustanciales que no producen la invalidez del acto, pero si responsabilidad disciplinaria del servidor agente. La validez del acto administrativo se verifica con el cumplimiento y presencia en forma perfecta de los elementos que lo constituyen, tanto formales como sustanciales. Estos elementos a que hacemos referencia, la doctrina nacional, como la LGAP, los distingue entre formales y sustanciales, entre los elementos formales se encuentran el sujeto, procedimiento y la forma, y en los sustanciales o materiales, el motivo, contenido y fin. El primer elemento formal del acto administrativo es el sujeto. Corresponde al autor del acto. Es el funcionario público, órgano o ente administrativo que dicta un acto administrativo, el cual debe a su vez contar con una serie de requisitos, tales como investidura, competencia y titularidad. La investidura es el nombramiento o la elección para un cargo o empleo público. En tal sentido, el artículo 111 de la LGAP, dispone que es servidor público la persona que presta servicios a la Administración o a nombre y por cuenta de ésta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura con entera independencia del carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva. Lo que a su vez, le confiere la potestad para actuar a nombre y por cuenta del Estado y dirigir a éste el efecto de su conducta. Esta puede darse por elección o nombramiento. Se hace efectiva con la toma de posesión del cargo. Eduardo Ortiz define a la competencia "como la medida exacta de la cantidad de medios legalmente autorizados en favor del Estado, dentro de un caso concreto para perseguir un fin determinado". La competencia significa la cantidad de poderes y deberes dispuestos en favor de un determinado ente administrativo. La competencia es el complejo de facultades y poderes atribuido a un determinado órgano administrativo con relación a los demás, pues el fundamento de la competencia radica en la pluralidad de órganos que integran la Administración Pública y la distribución de las distintas funciones entre ellas (en tal sentido ver los artículos 59 y 129 LGAP). Se ha manifestado que la competencia consiste en el conjunto de facultades otorgadas a la Administración Pública, o la medida exacta de la cantidad de medios legalmente autorizados en favor de la Administración Pública, dentro de un caso concreto para perseguir un fin determinado. La competencia pertenece al ente administrativo, la cual es ejercida por centros parciales de acción denominados órganos administrativos. El origen de la competencia siempre es legal, entendiendo por legal toda norma jurídica emitida dentro del orden del Estado. Entonces la competencia puede ser otorgada por ley o por reglamento. Es de advertir que la competencia no es sólo una medida de poderes, sino también de deberes, porque no sólo es posible en virtud de ella entrar en relaciones jurídicas y afectar el mundo del derecho, mediante la realización de actos jurídicos, sino que también puede ser necesario, en cumplimiento de vínculos impuestos por la ley para la mejor satisfacción del interés público. Toda competencia pública implica siempre la necesidad de su ejercicio en beneficio de la colectividad y puede formularse el principio de que el funcionario público tiene no sólo la potestad, sino también el deber de ejercer su competencia, por ser extraño y no propio el interés a satisfacer con ese ejercicio. De la distribución y cambio de competencia: La competencia es atribuida en forma general al ente administrativo, quien en virtud del poder de organización crea y distribuye la competencia internamente, creando los órganos administrativos que en forma parcial y transitoria pondrán en ejecución la competencia, realizando los actos jurídicos y materiales suficientes para la satisfacción del interés público. La competencia, como se indicó, es atribuida a un titular, único en consecuencia competente para ejercerla. Sin embargo, para lograr un desahogo de funciones y trámites, o para lograr en forma más expedita y eficiente la actuación administrativa, en ciertas ocasiones, se da la transferencia de competencias de un órgano a otro. Esta transferencia de competencias no debe confundirse con la descentralización administrativa como técnica de traslado de competencias de la persona jurídica del Estado a otra persona jurídica pública. La nota fundamental que caracteriza al fenómeno de la descentralización es que el traslado se da entre personas jurídicas distintas. En el caso de la transferencia de competencias inter-órganos, se trata de un fenómeno interno, caracterizado por la distribución de competencias que realiza el jerarca entre los diversos órganos que componen el ente respectivo. Artículo 70 LGAP. Entre las técnicas de distribución y transferencia de competencias, encontramos la desconcentración. En algunas ocasiones, el legislador ha considerado conveniente la creación de órganos (dentro del respectivo ente), para que lleven funciones técnicas y especializadas, todo con el objeto de optimizar la eficiencia de la función administrativa. Es aquí donde se recurre a la desconcentración como una técnica de distribución de competencia en el ámbito interno de un mismo ente público (mas no la traslación de competencia de un sujeto a otro, fenómeno propio de la descentralización), en virtud de la cual el legislador sustrae una competencia propia de un superior, para atribuirla en forma exclusiva a un inferior, con la finalidad de que éste último la ejerza como propia y bajo su responsabilidad. Así, son tres elementos que la configuran. Por una parte, la necesaria existencia de una norma legal que atribuya la competencia (otrora del superior) al inferior para su ejercicio en forma exclusiva. Por otra parte, la creación del órgano desconcentrado que ejercerá la competencia. Así se desprende del numeral 83 inciso 1) de la LGAP, que indica claramente que todo órgano distinto del jerarca estará plenamente subordinado a éste y al superior jerárquico inmediato, salvo desconcentración operada por ley o por reglamento. Ahora bien, nuestro ordenamiento jurídico distingue entre desconcentración mínima y máxima. Según lo señala el numeral 83 ya citado, la mínima se presenta cuando el superior no pueda avocar competencias del inferior, revisar o sustituir la conducta del inferior, de oficio o a instancia de parte. Por su parte, la desconcentración será máxima cuando, además de lo anterior, el inferior esté sustraído de las órdenes, instrucciones o circulares del superior. Se indica también que las normas que crean la desconcentración mínima serán de aplicación restrictiva en contra de la competencia del órgano desconcentrado y las que crean la desconcentración máxima serán de aplicación extensiva en su favor. Finalmente, cabe señalar que, en algunos casos, el legislador dota al órgano desconcentrado de la que jurisprudencialmente se ha denominado "personería jurídica instrumental" , limitada, por regla general, a aspectos presupuestarios, solamente, de tal manera que esta "personería" no convierte al órgano en una persona jurídica distinta del ente al que pertenece (propio de la descentralización), pero si le atribuye la capacidad de gestionar determinados fondos, en forma independiente del presupuesto central del ente al que pertenece. Finalmente la titularidad, se refiere a que el funcionario público no sólo debe ser competente, sino además debe ser el titular de la competencia. Por titular se ha entendido aquel que ejerce un cargo, profesión u oficio, por derecho propio o nombramiento definitivo, con la plenitud de requisitos y estabilidad, a diferencia del llamado a ocuparlo provisionalmente. El segundo elemento formal del acto administrativo es el procedimiento. La Administración Pública cuenta con la facultad de emitir actos administrativos en forma unilateral, que incluso pueden llegar a anular o revocar derechos subjetivos de los particulares. Este poder de autotutela ha sido limitado por el ordenamiento jurídico. Ese límite lo constituye la obligación de la Administración Pública de seguir un procedimiento para emitir el acto administrativo. El procedimiento administrativo es una serie concatenada de actos procedimentales tendentes a un fin. El procedimiento administrativo tiene un objeto fundamental, la averiguación de la verdad real del motivo que va a servir de base al acto administrativo final. El procedimiento se trata del modo de producción de un acto (artículos 214, 216, 224, 225, 308 y 320 LGAP). El procedimiento administrativo constituye el medio o instrumento que permite a la Administración, verificar que los supuestos que condicionan la emisión de un acto administrativo se han producido, a tales efectos, se ha conceptualizado como la ordenación de una serie de actuaciones, a la concatenación de diferentes trámites, cuyos efectos jurídicos están vinculados entre sí para la producción de una decisión administrativa, lo que revela, por sí mismo, su naturaleza como actos de mero trámite, en principio inimpugnables por sí solos, sino a través del acto administrativo final, producto de ese procedimiento. Desde esta óptica, los defectos de tramitación del procedimiento, serán relevantes, siempre que determinen la invalidez del acto administrativo adoptado, lo que requiere en consecuencia, un examen de legalidad del acto, lo que implica, si es del caso, examinar la actuación administrativa y determinar de esta forma, la validez o no de la decisión administrativa. Se integran acá los elementos del debido proceso, que deberán ser observados y respetados en todo procedimiento administrativo sancionador. La Sala Constitucional los ha definido de la siguiente manera: "a) hacer traslado de cargos al afectado, lo cual implica comunicar en forma individualizada, concreta y oportuna los hechos que se imputan; b) permitirle el acceso irrestricto al expediente administrativo, c) concederle un plazo razonable para la preparación de su defensa, d) concederle la audiencia y permitirle aportar toda prueba que considere oportuna para respaldar su defensa; e) fundamentar las resoluciones que pongan fin al procedimiento; f) reconocer su derecho a recurrir contra la resolución sancionatoria” (Sentencia número 5469-95 de las dieciocho horas tres minutos del cuatro de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco). El tercer elemento formal del acto administrativo es la forma, que es la manera como se exterioriza o manifiesta el acto administrativo. De conformidad con el artículo 134 de la LGAP, el acto administrativo deberá expresarse por escrito, salvo que su naturaleza o las circunstancias exijan forma diversa (ver 136 LGAP y 146 Constitución Política). Respecto de los elementos materiales o sustanciales del acto administrativo, tenemos que el motivo (artículo 133 LGAP) es el presupuesto jurídico, el hecho condicionante que da génesis al acto administrativo. De tal manera que, el motivo del acto administrativo constituye el supuesto o el hecho condicionante de la emisión de un acto administrativo, en otros términos, constituye la razón de ser del acto administrativo, lo que obliga o permite su emisión. Puede consistir en un acto o un hecho jurídico previsto por la norma jurídica. Dispone el artículo 166 LGAP: “Habrá nulidad absoluta del acto cuando falten totalmente uno o varios de sus elementos constitutivos, real o jurídicamente” En tanto que el contenido del acto, constituye el efecto jurídico o la parte dispositiva del acto, lo que manda, ordena o dispone. Es el cambio que introduce en el mundo jurídico. Es la parte del acto que dispone una sanción, una autorización, un permiso o una concesión (artículo 132 LGAP). El último de los elementos sustanciales o materiales es el Fin. La Administración Pública tiene un cometido único, la satisfacción del interés público. Esa satisfacción del interés público se logra de diversas maneras, siendo una de ellas a través de la emisión de actos administrativos. En principio se entiende que todo acto administrativo, como ejercicio concreto de una competencia genérica, tiende a la satisfacción del interés común. Por ello se afirma, que el fin del acto administrativo en consecuencia será la satisfacción del interés público, que constituye el fin general de todo acto administrativo y a su vez, el fin específico será la satisfacción del interés público que está a cargo de esa competencia (artículo 131 LGAP).

IV.- DE LA POTESTAD SANCIONATORIA DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN: La Potestad Sancionatoria de la Administración es la que abre la acción punitiva de la Administración. Es una atribución propia de la Administración que se traduce en la posibilidad jurídica de la imposición de sanciones a los particulares y aún a los funcionarios que infringen sus disposiciones en el ejercicio de sus funciones, transgrediendo sus mandatos o desconociendo sus prohibiciones. La naturaleza jurídica de dicha potestad es administrativa y no debe confundirse con la que ejerce el juez en el desarrollo de un proceso judicial, pues allí la sanción es de naturaleza penal jurisdiccional. La pena que se exterioriza en el campo del derecho administrativo no tiene carácter penal. Se impone como instrumento de autoprotección para preservar el orden jurídico institucional con la distribución de competencias y el señalamiento de penas de igual carácter. Son sanciones que asumen carácter correctivo o disciplinario, según el ámbito de aplicación. De allí que se hable de potestad sancionatoria disciplinaria y potestad sancionatoria correccional, según los destinatarios sean servidores públicos o particulares. La potestad sancionatoria de la Administración se desenvuelve dentro del ámbito de los más disímiles hechos, actos y actividades complejas de los particulares y de la misma Administración. Está dirigida a reprimir aquellas conductas transgresoras de la normatividad administrativa y está sujeta, por lo demás, a las limitaciones constitucionales y legales que se establecen en la Constitución Política y en las disposiciones generales que la regulan. Fundamento de la potestad jerárquica y el régimen disciplinario: Con el propósito de lograr una acción conjunta y coordinada a pesar de la diversidad de órganos que pueden conformar un Ente Administrativo, es necesario reservar el poder de decisión y de mando en unos pocos órganos, siendo los demás simples órganos de gestión o preparatorios de los órganos decisorios. La manera como se vinculan y coordinan entre sí, los diversos órganos que dependen de una misma jerarquía se puede de otros en una situación de dependencia tal, que entre todos ellos existe un vínculo que, partiendo del órgano situado en el más alto grado de ese orden, los vaya ligando hasta el órgano de ínfima categoría, a través de diversos grados en los que existen ciertas facultades a que luego se hará referencia. La relación jurídica que liga a los diversos órganos, constituye lo que se denomina "Relación de Jerarquía¨. Esta relación jerárquica es la que permite y explica cómo se mantiene la unidad del Poder Administrativo a pesar de la diversidad de órganos que la forman. La conservación de esa unidad está garantizada por la concentración del poder de decisión y de mando. La concentración del poder de mando y decisión consiste en que en la organización de un ente público existe un reducido número de órganos con competencia para dictar resoluciones, imponer determinaciones o realizar actos jurídicos creadores de situaciones de derecho. Los demás órganos simplemente realizan los actos materiales necesarios para auxiliar a los decisorios. El poder de mando de este régimen, se encuentra en la facultad de las autoridades superiores de dar órdenes e instrucciones a los órganos inferiores señalándoles los lineamientos que deben seguir para el ejercicio de las atribuciones y funciones que le están encomendadas. Este poder de mando se ejercita generalmente por medio de órdenes, instrucciones y circulares expedidas por autoridades respecto de los empleados que les están subordinados. Se fundamenta en la necesidad que el conjunto de órganos y funcionarios que integran la Administración Pública, actúen coordinadamente en el cumplimiento de sus cometidos propios como si fuera una unidad. Esa coordinación se logra centralizando la dirección administrativa en un órgano único, denominado Jerarca, y haciendo depender de él, los demás órganos y funcionarios. La forma cómo se vinculan entre sí dichos órganos y funcionarios da origen a la Jerarquía. La Jerarquía es la relación jurídica que vincula entre sí los órganos de administración y los funcionarios, mediante poderes de subordinación, con el fin de coordinar y dar unidad a la acción de todos ellos. Esa relación de jerarquía consiste en una relación de dependencia que implica ciertos poderes de los órganos superiores sobre los inferiores. Estos poderes propios de la relación jerárquica son: a) Poder de nombramiento: Es una facultad de las autoridades superiores hacer las designaciones de los titulares de los órganos que le están subordinados, por medio de nombramientos. b) Poder de mando: Consiste, como se manifestó, en la facultad de las autoridades superiores de dar ordenes e instrucciones a los órganos inferiores, señalándoles los lineamientos que deben seguir para el ejercicio de la actividad que les corresponde. Las ordenes son decisiones imperativas para casos concretos, las instrucciones de servicio, constituyen una vía para suministrar indicaciones de detalle y de carácter práctico, las circulares son un conjunto de disposiciones de carácter general siempre, a diferencia de las otras dos que a veces revisten un carácter individual. c) Poder de vigilancia: Es una facultad que se manifiesta por medio de actos de carácter puramente material, que consisten en exigir rendición de cuentas, en practicar investigaciones o informaciones sobre la tramitación de los asuntos, y en general en todos aquellos actos que tiendan a dar conocimiento a las autoridades superiores de la regularidad con que están desempeñando sus funciones los inferiores. d) Poder Disciplinario: La falta de cumplimiento de los deberes que impone la función pública, da nacimiento a la responsabilidad del autor, responsabilidad que puede ser civil, penal o administrativa. Cualquier falta cometida por el funcionario o empleado en el desempeño de sus funciones lo hace responsable administrativamente, sin perjuicio de que pueda originar además una responsabilidad de orden civil o penal. e) Poder de Revisión: En este dominio las facultades derivadas de la relación jerárquica consisten en poder otorgar aprobación previa a los actos que los inferiores realizan, suspenderlos, anularlos, reformarlos. f) Poder para la resolución de conflictos de competencia. El poder disciplinario del Jerarca es tácito y de principio y no requiere norma el Jerarca por su simple condición de tal, cuenta con la facultad de disciplinar las faltas cometidas por sus subalternos sin necesidad de norma en tal sentido. Estrechamente relacionado con el tema, y por ser de relevancia en el asunto que nos ocupa, conviene tratar el punto respecto de la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria en el empleo público. Sobre ese aspecto concreto este Tribunal ha manifestado: "VI.- SOBRE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN DE LA POTESTAD DISCIPLINARIA. La prescripción es un instituto por medio del cual, el transcurso del tiempo produce el efecto de consolidar las situaciones de hecho, permitiendo la extinción de los derechos o la adquisición de las cosas ajenas, que obedece a la máxima de que "El tiempo lleva a la consolidación de cierto derechos o a la pérdida de los mismos". Como bien lo apunta el tratadista Rafael Caballero Sánchez en su obra "Prescripción y Caducidad en el Ordenamiento Administrativo", el Instituto es de antigua data en otras ramas, ya que su aplicación en el Derecho Administrativo es más reciente. Su aplicación en el Derecho Público ha alcanzado su madurez, ofreciendo un modelo acabado, conformado por sus propias normas, reglas y principios. Así planteadas las cosas, en el régimen de empleo público, existen distintos plazos de prescripción, de la potestad disciplinaria, debidamente diferenciados, aplicables a los funcionarios públicos, que derivan de los cuerpos normativos. En primer término, se encuentra el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, que aplica como norma de carácter general, salvo disposición especial contraria. Dicha norma dispone que la prescripción opera en un mes. Por otro lado, el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, establece un plazo de 5 años, cuando se trata de transgresiones al ordenamiento de Control y Fiscalización. En el mismo sentido, el canon 43 de la Ley General de Control Interno y 44 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, establecen el plazo de los 5 años cuando se trata de transgresiones al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización. Con base en lo anterior, se puede afirmar, en términos generales, que existen dos plazos de prescripción, aplicables a los funcionarios públicos, en cuanto al ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria, sin perjuicio de otros ordenamientos especiales que tienen sus propios plazos, como lo es el caso de la Ley General de Policía n.º 7410. Resulta importante, tener presente lo dispuesto por los numerales mencionados, que regulan la prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria en el campo del control y la fiscalización. El artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República fue reformado mediante la Ley Nº 8292 del 31 de julio de 2002, y es el que hace referencia a la prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por la infracciones previstas en la Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, en los siguientes términos: "Artículo 71.—Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: a) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho. b) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea notorio –entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad- la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo. La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo. Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo. Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar que la responsabilidad del infractor prescriba, sin causa justificada." (Así reformado por el inciso a) del artículo 45 de la Ley N° 8292 de 31 de julio del 2002, Ley de Control Interno). Por su parte, la Ley General de Control Interno, n.º 8292, en el numeral 43 indica lo siguiente: "Artículo 43.—Prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley, prescribirá según el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Nº 7428, de 7 de setiembre de 1994. Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar prescribir la responsabilidad del infractor, sin causa justificada." /Finalmente, la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, n.º 8422, señala: "Artículo 44.—Prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley, y en el ordenamiento relativo a la Hacienda Pública, prescribirá, según el artículo 43 de la Ley General de Control Interno y el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Nº 7428, de 7 de setiembre de 1994." De los numerales mencionados, se desprende un criterio material objetivo que permite determinar cuándo aplica la prescripción mencionada a una falta en contra de la Hacienda Pública. En ese sentido, si existe una transgresión al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización o relativo a la Hacienda Pública, aplica el plazo de los 5 años de prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria. Este criterio permite diferenciar la prescripción aplicable en casos de naturaleza laboral de un mes, de acuerdo con lo que dispone el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo. Con la reforma que sufrió el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, al variar el criterio de valoración, para determinar el plazo de prescripción aplicable, se pasa de un régimen subjetivo a uno objetivo. Anteriormente era necesario llevar a cabo el ejercicio para determinar, a efectos de aplicar el plazo de prescripción, si era un servidor de la Hacienda Pública (aspecto subjetivo). Como se mencionó supra, el criterio que rige en la actualidad es material objetivo, que se determina con la transgresión al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización, que lo componen entre otras las leyes mencionadas, así como la Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos, n.º 8131 y su Reglamento, la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.º 7494 y su Reglamento. Así pues, es claro que la inteligencia de la normativa citada, permite aplicar el plazo de prescripción, a cualquier funcionario público que, independientemente que ocupe o no un cargo de la Hacienda Pública, incurre en un quebrantamiento al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización, si esto se produce, le aplica el plazo de los 5 años." (Sentencia número 101-2011 (sic) de las quince horas treinta minutos del veinticuatro de octubre de dos mil doce, Sección V).

V.- SOBRE EL FONDO: Tal y como se hizo referencia en el apartado correspondiente, el actor pretende la nulidad del oficio 633-09 del 27 de junio de 2009, que ordenó la instauración de un órgano director en su contra y las resoluciones números 701-09 de las ocho horas del 23 de setiembre de año 2009 y 742-09 de las diez horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del 28 de setiembre de 2009. Actos dictados por el señor Ministro de Educación Pública, pretendiendo se declare nulo su despido como Director de PROMECE, condenando al Estado y a los funcionarios codemandados en su carácter personal en forma solidaria al pago de los daños y perjuicios causados. Para ello acusa que el nombramiento del órgano director del procedimiento por parte del Ministro de Educación, es contrario a derecho por cuanto le correspondía a la Dirección de Recursos Humanos del MEP, su designación y tramitación, conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 18 inciso j), 50 inciso m) de la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Educación Pública y 16 incisos a y b del Reglamento Interior de Trabajo y 57 y 61 LGAP. El mencionado artículo 18 inciso j, establece: "Son atribuciones específicas del Ministro: (...) j) Decidir en última instancia administrativa sobre la imposición de sanciones del régimen disciplinario al personal docente y administrativo" y el artículo 50 inciso m) que manifiesta: " Son deberes y atribuciones del Director del Departamento de Personal: m) Conocer y resolver en primera instancia administrativa: (...) 2º.- La denuncias y los cargos formulados contra los servidores, por faltas cometidas o incumplimiento de deberes en el ejercicio de sus funciones;" En el mismo sentido, es de tener en cuenta el artículo 140 de la Carta Fundamental, en sus incisos 1 y 2, que establece la regla de que el nombramiento y remoción corresponde al jerarca y es su obligación coordinar los medios de prestación del servicio público. Sin embargo, debe tenerse presente que de conformidad con el artículo 2 de la Ley número 7315 del 23 de octubre de 1992, los funcionarios de PROMECE, están excluidos del Régimen de Servicio Civil, lo que hace que el artículo 6 de la mencionada Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Trabajo no resulte aplicable por cuanto al disponer que: "La presente Ley Orgánica, sus leyes conexas y sus respectivos reglamentos, regulan las relaciones entre el Ministerio y sus servidores, con arreglo a las disposiciones del Estatuto Civil y de su reglamento." excluye de sus disposiciones al personal no cubierto por el régimen de Servicio Civil, aspecto que incluso ya fue resuelto por la Sala Constitucional, que conoció de un alegato idéntico al aquí esgrimido por el propio actor, al interponer un recurso de amparo en contra de su despido. Sostuvo el Tribunal Constitucional, en lo que interesa: "IV.- EN CUANTO A LA CONFORMACIÓN DEL ÓRGANO DIRECTOR DEL PROCEDIMIENTO: Como primer punto el recurrente alega que el Ministro de Educación Pública no tiene la potestad disciplinaria para instaurar un procedimiento ordinario, ya que la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Educación Pública es clara al indicar que el encargado de conocer y resolver en primera instancia las denuncias por incumplimiento de deberes es el Director del Departamento de Personal y no el Ministro. En el caso concreto se acredita que el artículo 6 de la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Educación Pública, en concordancia con el artículo 2 de la Ley N°7315 del 23 de octubre de 1992, denominada “Aprobación de los Contratos de Préstamo entre el Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo y el Gobierno de la República de Costa Rica”, se creó la Unidad Coordinadora del Programa de Mejoramiento de la Calidad de la Educación General Básica, como órgano adscrito al Ministerio de Educación Pública, bajo la dirección del Ministerio de Educación Pública, y se indicó que el personal sería excluido del Régimen de Servicio Civil, es decir, los funcionarios de PROMECE no son cobijados por el artículo 6 de la Ley supra, en consecuencia, el Departamento de Personal o de Recursos Humanos carece de competencia para instaurar un procedimiento administrativo en contra del amparado. En virtud de lo expuesto, se debe desestimar el amparo en cuanto a este extremo."(Voto 3586-2010). Por lo que debe desestimarse ese reproche en concreto. Indica además que la resolución en que se acordó su despido, se fundó en hechos falsos. Se deben realizar dos precisiones importantes respecto de ese agravio en particular. Una de índole procesal, relacionada directamente con la carga probatoria de aquel que afirma en el proceso. Efectivamente, de acuerdo con la doctrina del artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil, corresponde a la parte probar, mediante prueba idónea, sus afirmaciones. Ya en otras ocasiones esta Cámara ha señalado que aún cuando la sentencia está a cargo de la autoridad jurisdiccional, el proceso es de las partes, siendo éstas quienes definen cómo presentar el caso, establecen cuál prueba desean ofrecer y qué alegatos van a Contencioso Administrativo unas amplias facultades tanto para ampliar, adicionar o aclarar la pretensión, los fundamentos y la prueba, estas no pueden llegar al extremo de sustituir en su totalidad a las partes, de suerte que la autoridad jurisdiccional de manera oficiosa reemplace a los intervinientes del proceso. A ese nivel no resulta posible. La función principal de la autoridad jurisdiccional es dirigir el proceso, no sustituir a las partes. Son estas quienes definen cómo debe escogerse la prueba y el enfoque que pretenden darle. En tal sentido, el actor no demostró, ni aportó prueba alguna en favor de su tesis, respecto de los supuestos hechos falsos en que se funda la resolución que acordó su despido, ni siquiera se ocupó de señalar cuáles hechos son los que tilda de tales. La segunda precisión necesaria radica en que los hechos en que se fundamentó la Administración para despedir al actor, básicamente son coincidentes con los hechos probados de esta sentencia, por lo que más que hablar de una falsedad sobre los hechos, lo que existe es una discrepancia de criterios respecto de los efectos y consecuencias que de tales hechos se derivan. Se acusa además, que su defensa planteó formal causal de inhibición en contra del señor ministro de Educación Pública, antes del dictado del acto final del procedimiento administrativo sancionador, y que no obstante ello, dictó la resolución que se impugna en este proceso. Realizado el respectivo análisis de este argumento encontramos que a folio 700 del expediente judicial, Tomo I, se encuentra una breve mención en las conclusiones de la defensa del actor en el procedimiento administrativo, en que se indicó: "Pero lo más grave es que en su condición de Jefe del programa 570 -se refiere al ministro- que ha había firmado aprobando el pago correspondiente ordene un procedimiento administrativo en contra de otro funcionario por un supuesto pagó (sic) anticipado que el aprobó eso es ser juez y parte." y posteriormente ya en vía recursiva, folio 863 del expediente judicial, Tomo I, se señaló: "No obstante, esta representación en sus conclusiones señaló que, conforme a la ley, debió usted abstenerse de dictar el acto final, por existir un evidente motivo de inhibición. No lo hizo. Ni siquiera lo consideró. Esto es un vicio que contamina su actuación.". Siendo así, se debe concluir que no se presentó una formal recusación en contra del señor ministro de Educación Pública, en virtud de la cual, debía de abstenerse de dictar el acto final, hasta tanto se haya resuelto previamente la recusación interpuesta, por lo que desde ese aspecto en particular no existe el motivo de nulidad alegado. Otro aspecto, a considerar sería si el funcionario aludido, podría inferir a partir de un tan genérico y poco claro argumento, un motivo de inhibición o excusa que le impida dictar el acto final en el procedimiento administrativo. Ciertamente, lo Rivera, analizadas y ponderadas bajo un criterio de razonabilidad y entendimiento medio, no permiten colegir un acusado motivo de recusación, a lo sumo, un quebrando a la doble instancia administrativa, en tanto se acepte tal condición y deber dentro de la estructura y organización de la Administración Pública. Si ese es el reproche, conviene en consecuencia citar de nuevo lo dicho por la Sala Constitucional, en el Voto 3586-2010 sobre la alegada violación de la doble instancia administrativa, en el caso concreto del actor: "VI.- EN CUANTO A LA DOBLE INSTANCIA: El recurrente alega que el Ministro de Educación Pública en contra de la normativa interna tramitó el procedimiento administrativo, y peor aún, conoció el recurso de revocatoria y apelación presentado en contra de la resolución que ordenó su despido, situación que no le permite acudir a una segunda instancia. En el presente asunto –tal y como se indicó en el Considerando IV de la presente sentencia- el Ministro está en capacidad de iniciar y tramitar los procedimientos ordinarios administrativos instaurados en contra de los funcionarios del PROMECE, ya que estos se encuentran excluidos del Régimen del Servicio Civil, situación que hace entender que el procedimiento que tiene la posibilidad de segunda instancia es aquel tramitado por el Director del Departamento de Personal o de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Educación Pública, situación que no se presenta en el caso concreto. Así, observa esta Sala que la autoridad recurrida no ha incurrido en ningún acto vulnerante a los derechos fundamentales del recurrente, por lo que debe declararse sin lugar el presente extremo alegado." Basta por analizar, si independientemente de haber sido o no recusado formalmente el señor ministro de Educación Pública, por haber sido parte del proceso de trámite y pago adelantado de las facturas, tenía motivo de inhibición o excusa, de modo tal, que debió haberse separado del conocimiento del asunto. El artículo 230 de la LGAP, dispone que serán motivos de abstención los mismos de impedimento y recusación que se establecen en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y, además, los que resultan del artículo 102 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República. Los motivos de abstención se aplicarán al órgano director del procedimiento, al de la alzada y a las demás autoridades o funcionarios que intervengan auxiliándolos o asesorándolos en el procedimiento. Valga resaltar que el artículo 31 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, remite expresamente en cuanto a impedimentos, recusaciones y excusas a lo dispuesto expresamente en el Código Procesal Civil, siendo que la mencionada Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República, actualmente se encuentre derogada. Los impedimentos se encuentran regulados expresamente en el artículo 49 del Código Procesal Civil, de los cuales, en principio el único motivo aplicable en la situación que nos ocupa, sería el de tener un interés directo. La representación estatal niega que en el caso del señor ministro se dé un interés directo, en tanto no obtiene provecho, beneficio, utilidad o ganancia alguna. Es claro que esa posición parte de considerar que el interés implica siempre un plus o un aumento, sea en su esfera jurídica, sea en su patrimonio. No obstante, también hay interés, si ese provecho se manifiesta en evitar un mal o un perjuicio, de carácter personal o patrimonial, mediante la imposición de una sanción o la pérdida de un beneficio o cargo, de allí que para analizar el eventual interés directo, no solo hay que considerar si se obtiene un provecho, si no también si se evita un perjuicio. Desde esa óptica, se observa que en el dictado del acto administrativo que ordenó el despido del actor de su cargo como Director de PROMECE, el señor ministro de Educación Pública, lo hizo en virtud del cargo en el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria que ostenta, sin que la condición de haber participado de alguna manera en los trámites y pago por adelantado de las facturas, le signifique un motivo de impedimento o recusación, respecto de disciplinar a los funcionarios jerárquicamente dependientes de su Despacho, sin perjuicio de su personal y eventual responsabilidad por esos mismos hechos. No está demás agregar, que en la materia rige el principio que no hay nulidad por la nulidad misma, de suerte que aún cuando pudiera existir algún motivo de separación del jerarca, no se ha demostrado que esta situación desviara los fines, cometidos y contenidos del acto. Lo que impide aceptar el argumento de la parte.

VI.- SOBRE EL FONDO (continuación): La base fundamental sobre la que gira la defensa del actor respecto de los hechos imputados, se centra en afirmar que en la Licitación 2006LN-000075-57000, no tuvo ninguna participación personal ni PROMECE, como órgano. Para ello, en términos resumidos, da cuenta del desarrollo de la licitación, desde su concepción y definición de los bienes y servicios requeridos, la decisión de compra, el programa presupuestario que se financia a cargo de una partida del Despacho del ministro, la confección del cartel, la definición de la unidad administrativa del MEP, que fiscalizará el proceso y el cumplimiento de los objetivos de la contratación, que recae en la Proveeduría del MEP, la confección de los pedidos, sin ninguna participación suya ni PROMECE advierte, la adjudicación a cargo de un comité, la confección y firma de los contratos por parte del ministro y su remisión a la División Jurídica del MEP para su "refrendo" y la posterior orden de compra e inicio a cargo de la Proveeduría. Con todo ello dice, se comprueba que no tuvo participación alguna en el proceso. Por lo que conviene examinar la exactitud de tal afirmación. En el presente proceso se ha acreditado que en el documento de justificación para la adquisición de talleres para una transformación pedagógica en el marco del proyecto de innovación educativa, se manifestó que "A través del Proyecto de Innovación Educativa, liderado por el Ministro de Educación y con el apoyo técnico del Programa de Mejoramiento de la Calidad de la Educación Preescolar y III Ciclo (PROMECE), el Ministerio de Educación Pública se ha abocado a propiciar iniciativas que brinden nuevas oportunidades educativas mediante el uso de las Tecnologías de Información y Comunicación (TIC) de forma tal que el uso constructivo y democrático de éstas en el proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje fomente en los actores del proceso educativo la integración exitosa entre lo pedagógico y lo tecnológico como una alternativa metodológica para transformar la práctica educativa." (hecho probado tres). Por lo que el Ministerio de Educación Pública promovió la Licitación Pública número 2006LN-000075-5700 para la adquisición de los siguientes bienes o servicios: Línea 1: Talleres de Integración Pedagógica en el uso del software Geometra Skechpad (cantidad 10). Línea 2: Talleres de Integración Pedagógica en el uso del software Create Together (cantidad 10). Línea 3: Talleres de Integración Pedagógica en el uso del software Micromundos (cantidad 10). Línea 4: Talleres formativos de transformación pedagógica para el afianzamiento de una cultura de cambio para directores y docentes líderes (cantidad 12). Línea 5: Talleres de herramientas básicas para integrar los procesos de aprendizaje (cantidad 10). Línea 6: Talleres para la consolidación de la innovación de la práctica educativa y construcción de redes colaborativas (cantidad 13). Siendo que en todas ellas, expresamente se indicó que la unidad gestora era Innovación Educativa Promece (hecho probado cuatro). De esa manera, en el respectivo cartel de licitación Pública número 2006LN-000075-5700 para la contratación de actividades de capacitación para el Programa Innovación Educativa, se consignó que el tiempo de ejecución de los productos y servicios requeridos estará determinado por la finalización del último módulo que deberá ser a más tardar tres meses contados a partir de la orden de inicio y de conformidad con un cronograma que deberá ser aprobado por el MEP. Respecto de los talleres se estableció que el tiempo de entrega se estima en tres meses, a partir de la orden de inicio, de conformidad con un cronograma de implementación que deberá conciliarse con los centros educativos y que deberá aprobar el MEP-PROMECE (hecho probado seis). Asimismo en el respectivo cartel de licitación Pública número 2006LN-000075-5700 para la contratación de actividades de capacitación para el Programa Innovación Educativa, se manifestó que el Ministerio de Educación Pública con el apoyo de PROMECE está anuente a comprar los servicios requeridos, comprometiéndose a: "a) Realizar los pagos correspondientes contra entrega de los productos que se establezcan en un cronograma de implementación previamente aprobado por las partes./ b) Facilitar las Salas de Innovación y Aprendizaje necesarias para el desarrollo de estos procesos de capacitación. /c) En caso que la capacitación no sea en el área metropolitana aportar los costos de transporte y viáticos necesarios para los participantes." (hecho probado siete). Posteriormente en el documento denominado "Análisis Integral No. 0091-2006 de Contratación Administrativas" de la Proveeduría Institucional del MEP, relacionado con la Licitación Pública número 2006LN-000075-5700 para la contratación de actividades de capacitación para el Programa Innovación Educativa, en la cual se recomienda la adjudicación, se especificó: "2.3 ASPECTOS TÉCNICOS/ Una vez analizada la oferta concursante y según el informe técnico emitido por el especialista en Informática del Programa de Mejoramiento de la Calidad de la Educación Preescolar y General Básica (PROMECE) Luis C. Rodríguez Carballo, remitido mediante oficio PROMECE 0981-2006, suscrito por el (sic) Carlos A. Barrantes Rivera, Director de PROMECE, se determinó:/ Que las ofertas cumplen adecuadamente los aspectos técnicos, solicitados en el cartel." (hecho probado diez). Seguidamente la Proveeduría Institucional del Ministerio de Educación, emitió los Pedidos de Compra números 4500061831, 4500061824, 4500061821 y 4500061827, con fecha 12 de diciembre de 2006, respecto de la Licitación Pública 2006LN-000075-57000 Actividades de Capacitación Programa Innovación Educativa, especificando que la Unidad Gestora es PROMECE (hecho probado catorce). Se acreditó además que el funcionario Luis Carlos Rodríguez Carballo, redactó y presentó para su firma, ante el Director de PROMECE, señor Carlos Alberto Barrantes Rivera, las notas con el visto bueno para el pago correspondiente a las empresas adjudicadas en la Licitación Pública 2006LN-000075-57000 Actividades de Capacitación Programa Innovación Educativa (hecho probado veinticinco), por lo que mediante oficios número PROMECE-2199-06, PROMECE-2201-06, PROMECE-2202-06 y PROMECE-2204-06, todos del 14 de diciembre de 2006, del Director de PROMECE, señor Carlos Barrantes Rivera, dirigidos a la Asesora del Despacho del Viceministro Administrativo del MEP, le traslada con su visto bueno las facturas número 1473 por un monto de $53.879.50 a nombre de la Empresa BPO Técnica (Técnica Administrativa) S.A, número 22638 por un monto de $26.500,00 a nombre de Empresa Bytes of Learning Incorporated, número 220 por un monto de ¢8.610.599,98 a nombre de la Fundación Costa Rica para el Desarrollo Sostenible, número 17938 por un monto de $30.000,00 a nombre de la Fundación Tecnológica de Costa Rica, para su respectivo pago (hechos probados veintiséis, veintisiete, veintiocho y veintinueve). Entonces contrario a lo afirmado por el actor, tanto él en su condición de Director como PROMECE, como órgano técnico especializado, sí tuvo participación en el proceso de definición, diseño, concurso, adjudicación y pago de la licitación Pública número 2006LN-000075-5700 para la contratación de actividades de capacitación para el Programa Innovación Educativa, sin que en nada desmerite, disminuya o de alguna manera exima la participación y responsabilidad del actor, lo dispuesto en el oficio DM-0697-06-06 del 7 de junio de 2006, dado que de la relación de los hechos citados, se advierte que a pesar de lo allí consignado, el actor y PROMECE siguieron teniendo participación y que la falta endilgada es posterior a lo dispuesto, y no eximen al actor de la responsabilidad, deberes y compromisos asumidos específicamente en la Licitación que nos ocupa, ya tantas veces citada. Al respecto la parte omite que el mismo cartel lo establece como la Unidad Técnica responsable, al margen e quien fuera el ejecutor presupuestario, lo que determina que el nivel de responsabilidad del actor, resulta incuestionable. Señala el actor que el acto final dictado por el ministro de Educación Pública que ordenó su despido como Director de PROMECE, es violatorio del debido proceso, al no contener una relación de hechos probados, ni la valoración de la prueba, además de ser incongruente, por falta de correlación entre lo acusado, lo probado y lo sancionado. Desde un aspecto meramente formal, revisada la respectiva resolución que contiene el acto final -número 701-09 de las ocho horas del veintitrés de setiembre de dos mil nueve- (hecho probado 42), se advierte que se transcribe en su totalidad el informe final rendido por el Órgano Director del procedimiento administrativo, en el cual se consignan los hechos que se tienen por probados (folios 774 a 778 del expediente judicial, Tomo I), además de un Considerando numerado IV denominado "VALORACIÓN DE LA PRUEBA", en que se analiza el material probatorio (folio 779 a 790 del expediente judicial, Tomo I), que la resolución que se impugna hace suyos, por lo que el reproche formulado resulta improcedente. Ya en ocasión anterior, este Tribunal ha señalado que en materia disciplinaria rigen los principios de tipicidad e imputación relativa, de suerte que el nivel de rigurosidad no llega al nivel de exigencia del derecho penal, como lo pretende la parte. Se achaca además que la resolución número 701-09 de las ocho horas del veintitrés de setiembre de dos mil nueve (hecho probado 42), resulta incongruente, por falta de correlación entre lo acusado, lo probado y lo sancionado. Realicemos una precisión importante de carácter terminológica. Se dice que la incongruencia (en el ámbito jurisdiccional) se presenta cuando no existe relación entre lo pedido por las partes y el dispositivo de la sentencia; es decir, cuando no hay conexidad o coincidencia entre lo resuelto en la parte dispositiva del fallo y las pretensiones y excepciones opuestas por las partes, tanto en la demanda o contrademanda, así como en las audiencias orales que se efectúen de conformidad con la legislación procesal contencioso administrativa. En concreto, se produce al pronunciarse los juzgadores sobre cuestiones no peticionadas (ultra petita), o en exceso sobre lo pedido (extra petita), asimismo, cuando omiten resolver, cada una de las pretensiones y excepciones establecidas (mínima o infra petita). Dicho en otros términos, no hay incongruencia entre las consideraciones de la sentencia y lo resuelto en la parte dispositiva. De lo anterior se colige que los requerimientos y en su caso, las excepciones invocadas por las partes, forman el marco inexorable dentro del cual el juez debe resolver, estos se constituyen en su límite de actuación. Todo ello, claro está, salvando los pronunciamientos oficiosos que la ley procesal de la materia atribuye al juzgador, y que como tal, no podrían calificarse como incongruentes. En esos términos, La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, ha indicado que: “(…) para determinar la existencia de este vicio, ha de confrontarse, en primer término, la parte resolutiva de la sentencia con las pretensiones aducidas en la demanda y su contestación, y en las demás oportunidades -audiencias indicadas- que la ley contempla, a fin de determinar si en realidad existe entre estos dos extremos, evidente desajuste. En segundo lugar, debe considerarse la potestad oficiosa del juzgador. El inciso 1) del canon 119 del CPCA, establece que resolverá sobre todas las pretensiones y todos los extremos permitidos por el Código. Esto último, entiende la Sala, son aquellos pronunciamientos que “…deberá hacer, según corresponda, entre otros,” cuando declare procedente la pretensión, total o parcialmente, conforme lo establecido en el precepto 122, así como los contenidos en los numerales siguientes, que dejan en claro los amplios poderes sentenciadores del Tribunal, en protección de los derechos o intereses del justiciable, restableciendo o reconociendo su situación jurídica.” (Resolución número 258-F-S1-2010 de las 14 horas del 18 de febrero de 2010). Ahora bien, si trasladamos lo dicho, mutatis mutandi, al ámbito administrativo y más concretamente en cuanto a la validez del acto administrativo que dispone una sanción administrativa, indudablemente debe haber una correspondencia entre los hechos imputados e intimados al supuesto infractor, su verificación y comprobación en el procedimiento administrativo y su correspondencia en el acto final, de manera tal que exista una relación de identidad entre lo acusado y la sanción impuesta. Valga señalar que respecto a la imputación de cargos realizada al actor, el ya referido voto 3586-2010 de la Sala Constitucional, manifestó: " V.- SOBRE LA FALTA DE IMPUTACIÓN DE CARGOS: Como primer agravio del amparo, el recurrente refiere que no se le dio una imputación de cargos clara, precisa y circunstanciada para ejercer su defensa. Considera que esa omisión en el auto de apertura del procedimiento administrativo, le impidió proveer su defensa. El derecho a la intimación e imputación de cargos opera, sobre todo, tratándose de procedimientos administrativos incoados de oficio y, particularmente, disciplinarios. De modo que, adquiere especial relevancia para ese fin el traslado de cargos o la imputación que se le formula al administrado o funcionario. Le corresponde al órgano director del procedimiento, notificarle a las partes interesadas en el procedimiento administrativo una relación oportuna, expresa, clara, precisa y circunstanciada de los hechos o conductas que se le imputan y de sus consecuencias jurídicas, esto es, debe existir una especificación del carácter y fines del procedimiento administrativo, para que el interesado pueda proveer a su defensa. En el caso que se analiza, la resolución OD-001-2009 de las catorce horas del 29 de julio del 2009, dictada por el Órgano Director del Procedimiento Administrativo (ver folios 59-67 del amparado en su condición de Director del Programa de Mejoramiento de la Calidad de la Educación Básica (PROMECE), indicándole en forma amplia cada uno de ellos. En el caso concreto, se detalló la presunta participación del amparado (...), en los siguientes hechos “DECIMO PRIMERO: Que el 14 de diciembre del 2006, antes de ser impartidos lo curso, el señor (...) , Director de PROMECE, remitió las facturas a la Licda. Hazle (sic) Córdoba Soto, Asesora del Despacho del Viceministro Administrativo para que fueran enviadas a la Proveeduría para su respectivo pago, a través de los siguientes oficios, que constan a folios 152 al 155 del legajo de prueba …DUODECIMO: Que este oficio suscrito por el señor (...) dio inicio al trámite de pago a las empresas, ante s de ser efectivamente prestado el servicio. En todos los oficios de remisión de las facturas se indica, en lo que nos interesa: “Hemos recibido la factura (…) la cual le traslado con nuestro visto bueno, para que se envíe a la Proveeduría del MEP, para su respectivo pago” . En criterio de este Tribunal Constitucional no lleva razón el actor en sus alegatos, pues de la atenta lectura de la resolución se desprende que, efectivamente, existe una relación clara, precisa y circunstanciada de las actividades ilegítimas, detallándose fechas y prueba documental de sus actuaciones y omisiones. De otra parte, la resolución inicial indica que de acreditarse los hechos descritos, se configurarían, presuntamente, las infracciones establecidas en los artículos 4, 35, 51 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo 33411-H y el artículo 3 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, número 8422. Asimismo, se indicó que se trata de infracciones muy graves que podrían ser sancionadas de la siguiente forma: amonestación escrita, suspensión del trabajo sin goce de salario hasta por tres meses y/o despido sin responsabilidad patronal por parte del Estado. En la referida resolución se señaló el día 24 de agosto del 2004 para la realización de la audiencia oral y privada, informando a las partes sobre las garantías dispuestas a su favor, tales como, la posibilidad de hacerse asesorar y acompañar por un abogado, proponer y presentar toda la prueba que se estimara conveniente durante la realización de la audiencia oral, presentar alegatos por escrito, leer y examinar todo el expediente administrativo y la posibilidad de interponer el recurso de revocatoria ante el órgano director y apelación ante el Superior Jerárquico del Órgano Director del Procedimiento Ordinario Administrativo. En consecuencia, sobre este extremo del recurso, no se encuentra infracción alguna al derecho de defensa del amparado, pues la intimación cumplió los recaudos impuestos por el Derecho de la Constitución." (subrayado y resaltado no es del original). De tal forma, que los hechos imputados y sus consecuencias jurídicas fueron claramente delimitados, especificados y advertidos al actor, de acuerdo con lo manifestado por el propio Tribunal Constitucional. En el fondo, la discusión se limita al ya señalado principio de imputación relativa propio de la materia penal, que en la especie se satisface en tanto permite el ejercicio del derecho de defensa, no siendo necesario el nivel de rigurosidad del Derecho Penal. Posteriormente en el acto final, precisamente se tuvo por comprobados dichos hechos, y más concretamente que a partir de la gestión del señor Carlos Barrantes Rivera, Director de PROMECE, que dio su visto bueno para la cancelación de las facturas correspondientes a capacitaciones que no habían sido impartidas, se dio pago adelantado a todos los cursos contratados mediante la licitación pública 2006LN-000075-57000, ante lo cual dispuso su despido sin responsabilidad patronal, con lo que existe congruencia entre lo acusado, demostrado y sancionado. Se indica además, por parte del actor, que el órgano director omitió referirse a la participación del ministro en el trámite y pago de las facturas, pese a que les hizo ver y se aportó prueba al respecto. Efectivamente lleva razón en este punto el actor, al referir que el órgano director omitió pronunciarse sobre la participación del ministro e incluso agregamos, de cualquier otro funcionario involucrado, lo cual aparejaría una eventual nulidad de lo actuado y resuelto, si tal análisis modificara, atenuara o eliminara la participación y responsabilidad del actor, pero lo cierto es, que la relación de hechos de la auditoría interna, la conformación del órgano director, por ende su objeto y fin y la resolución que ordenó su despido, analizó la conducta individual del actor en relación con los hechos investigados y su responsabilidad, la que bien podría ser individualizara, lo que no obsta para conformar en forma conjunta o paralela otras investigaciones para analizar la participación de otros posibles involucrados. Afirma el actor, que los miembros del órgano director del procedimiento administrativo, fundaron su informe en una indebida valoración de la prueba testimonial y documental, analizada en forma subjetiva y sesgada. Empero, tal reproche no es más que una simple aseveración sin fundamento y carente de prueba en tal sentido, dado que el actor se despreocupó de señalar en qué consiste esa indebida valoración de la prueba que acusa, qué testimonios y documentos fueron los indebidamente valorados y cómo ese yerro influye de manera notoria en el dictado del acto final. No podría esta Cámara a partir de un señalamiento tan vago, realizar un análisis general como si se tratara de dictar nuevamente el acto, en sustitución de la Administración. Téngase en consideración que la jurisdicción contenciosa administrativa realiza un examen de legalidad sobre la base de los fundamentos aducidos por las partes, que justifican sus pretensiones, sin que ello implique, como se manifestó líneas arriba, que el juez de manera oficiosa reemplace a los intervinientes del proceso. El actor no demostró, ni aportó prueba alguna en favor de su tesis, respecto de la alegada indebida valoración de la prueba testimonial y documental, o que el análisis se hiciera de forma subjetiva y sesgada. Aduce ahora el accionante, que el órgano director dejó sin resolver el incidente de nulidad planteado, respecto de la imputación e intimación, que contenía el traslado de cargos. En sentido estricto, el órgano director del procedimiento administrativo, es un mero instructor, que tiene por objeto tramitar todas y cada una de las etapas que conforman el procedimiento y una vez completado, remitir el expediente al órgano decisor para emitir el acto administrativo final, por lo que, como se manifestó supra, los defectos de tramitación del procedimiento, serán relevantes, siempre que determinen la invalidez del acto administrativo adoptado. Como instructor que es, el órgano director no le corresponde pronunciarse sobre el fondo, no obstante, no escapa a esta Cámara que la praxis administrativa en nuestro país ha impuesto que al cabo del procedimiento, el órgano director rinda un informe o recomendación final, que valga señalar, no es vinculante para el jerarca, titular de la competencia, que debe resolver y dictar el acto final. De ahí que no estaba obligado jurídicamente el órgano director a resolver el "incidente de nulidad" respecto de la imputación e intimación de cargos formulados al señor Barrantes Rivera. Le correspondía al ministro en la resolución final pronunciarse sobre la nulidad planteada, aspecto que fue omitido, pero que al conocer el recurso de revocatoria en contra de la resolución 701-09 de las ocho horas del veintiséis de setiembre de 2009, expresamente fue resuelto, siendo rechazado. Argumento o agravio que precluyó definitivamente con el dictado del Voto 3586-2010 de las trece horas y dos minutos del diecinueve de febrero del dos mil diez de la Sala Constitucional, aquí citado, que analizó y rechazó por igual tal planteamiento.- VII.- DE LOS OTROS REPAROS FORMULADOS: Apunta el señor Barrantes Rivera, que en la resolución que dicta el ministro de Educación Pública, que ordena su despido sin responsabilidad patronal, no se indica si se recibió o no a satisfacción los servicios contratados y pagados en las facturas cuestionadas. En este punto, como en muchos otros, el actor no explica o justifica la razón de ese señalamiento. Podemos inferir que constituye un motivo de descargo de su responsabilidad en tanto al haberse recibido los servicios contratados no hubo perjuicio y por ende no hay nada que achacar. De ser así, y únicamente para efectos argumentativos, dado que el actor no se preocupó por ahondar en su señalamiento, se debe decir que la conducta que se reprocha es haber dado el visto bueno para autorizar el pago por adelantado de los servicios contratados, sin que se hubieran brindado, no que no se hubieran prestado del todo. Recuérdese que de la relación de hechos probados, entre la solicitud o pedido de compra, la presentación de las facturas y los oficios que otorgaron el visto bueno para autorizar su pago, mediaron escasos días, por lo que considerando el objeto de las contrataciones, resultaba materialmente imposible que se hubieran satisfecho a ese momento. Señala ahora el demandante que ni el órgano director ni en el acto final emitido por el ministro de Educación Pública, indicaron si al firmar los oficios cuestionados haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave en el desempeño de su cargo, como lo exige el artículo 199 inciso 1) LGAP, lo que hace que la resolución se haya dictado ilegalmente. Valga aclarar que el citado artículo se encuentra ubicado en el Capítulo Segundo del Título Sétimo de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que regula la responsabilidad civil del servidor ante terceros, que impone un régimen de responsabilidad subjetiva del funcionario público, al requerir el dolo o culpa grave en el desempeño de sus deberes o con ocasión del mismo para que aquella surja, y no guarda ni tiene relación alguna con la responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario, cuya conducta, dependiendo de su gravedad -desde la simple culpa a las más gravosa como es el dolo- puede generar una sanción graduable y proporcional a la falta cometida. Señala además, que el órgano director llegó a tener por cierto que él incurrió en un acto indebido, sin razonamientos ni fundamentos que abarquen un análisis de todos y cada uno de los argumentos y pruebas que recibieron como órgano director. Afirma que lo anterior, se de entre otras consideraciones, al no tener por probado el oficio número DM-0697-06-06 del 7 de junio de 2006 del ministro de Educación Pública, en el cual se dispone a partir de ese momento, las decisiones técnicas y la supervisión del proyecto estará en manos del Departamento de Educación Académica de la División de Desarrollo Curricular. Sostiene que ese hecho y esa prueba, se tuvo como no probado, pese a que en el expediente consta que se aportó ese oficio. Para verificar ese acierto es preciso en consecuencia transcribir de la resolución 701-09 de las ocho horas del veintitrés de setiembre de 2009, que acordó despedir al actor sin responsabilidad patronal, el hecho no probado: "A. Que de la prueba documental presentada por la defensa del presunto responsable, concretamente el oficio número DM-0697-06-06, de fecha 7 de junio del 2006, en cuanto refiere que a partir de dicho momento 'las decisiones técnicas y la supervisión del Proyecto estará en manos del Departamento de Educación Académica de la División de Desarrollo Curricular'; resulte posible inferir que PROMECE haya quedado efectivamente relevado de las responsabilidades atribuidas por el cartel correspondiente a la Licitación Pública número 2006-LN-000075-57000. Ver oficio a folios 173 del expediente administrativo." (folio 777 del expediente judicial, Tomo I). Entonces contrario a lo afirmado por el accionante, no es cierto que se tuviera como hecho no probado el oficio de referencia, en cuanto a su existencia material, sino que no se demostró o mejor dicho no se extrae de él, que PROMECE haya sido relevado de las tareas, deberes y responsabilidades derivadas de la licitación pública número 2006-LN-000075-57000, como pretende hacer valer la parte actora. Se endilgan también, una serie de reparos en contra del Informe de Auditoria, Relación de Hechos 40-09, de los cuales muchos de ellos ya se ha tenido oportunidad de pronunciarse, descartándolos, como sucede con la competencia, tanto del ministro de Educación como del órgano director del procedimiento, la naturaleza de la relación de empleo del actor y la eventual participación de otros funcionarios en los hechos relacionados. El actor se ocupa de evidenciar una serie de contradicciones respecto del informe como del testimonio rendido por el señor Julio Cesar Rodríguez Céspedes, funcionario de la Auditoría del MEP, quien aseveró que las ordenes de pedido contenidas en el SIGAF fueron firmadas por el actor y atestiguo que en el documento de justificación de los procesos de contratación administrativa aparece su firma, lo cual no es cierto, cuando en realidad la única que se consigna es la del ministro al igual que afirmó que entre el actor, PROMECE y la Proveeduría Institucional del MEP, existía una relación de jerarquía, no indicando en que basaba su afirmación. Señala que en el Informe de Auditoría, no incluyó documentación e información solicitada por ese órgano, según el oficio A.I-024-08 del 22 de febrero de 2009, en la que formula su descargo y aporta prueba. Indica que sin justificación alguna, esa prueba e información no se hace referencia en el informe, ni para rechazarla ni para aceptarla. Se requiere acá en consecuencia, una aclaración fundamental respecto a la naturaleza de las relaciones de hechos que formula una auditoria y su carácter de investigación preliminar. En primer lugar, no es necesario de previo a la iniciación de un procedimiento administrativo, como requisito procedimental sustancial, dar audiencia sobre los resultados de una investigación preliminar, a los presuntos implicados, por cuanto las conclusiones que se derivan a partir de un informe de auditoría, como bien lo ha resuelto la Sala Constitucional, se limita a evidenciar posibles situaciones que puedan originar responsabilidad administrativa e individualizar e identificar a los presuntos funcionarios responsables. Nótese que, la Administración, una vez que recibe la relación de hechos por parte de la Auditoría interna, en esta etapa inicial, no considera ni valora aspectos de fondo, ni mucho menos se valora prueba a efectos de determinar a priori, la responsabilidad de los funcionarios supuestamente involucrados. Con el recibo de la relación de hechos, en esta etapa, no se efectúa un juicio de valor, si no de probabilidades, es una valoración somera, en el sentido que no se estima el fondo de lo informado, sino la probabilidad de la ocurrencia de los hechos, al existir los elementos que justifican la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo. Desde este punto de vista, una vez rendido la relación de hechos, debe ordenarse la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo, a fin de determinar, mediante las garantías que ofrece el procedimiento ordinario, la verdad real de los hechos que se imputan, y será en esa etapa, en la que se conocerá, tramitará y evacuará las pruebas, tanto documentales como testimoniales, y tendrán la oportunidad, los funcionarios involucrados, de ejercer en forma amplia y sin restricción alguna su derecho de defensa, consustancial al Debido Proceso. En este sentido, la Sala Constitucional ha distinguido claramente entre la investigación preliminar y el procedimiento administrativo propiamente, así: “Este Tribunal Constitucional ha dispuesto reiteradamente que es válido para la Administración Pública realizar una investigación preliminar en los procedimientos administrativos y ha señalado que una correcta inteligencia del carácter y fundamentos del debido proceso, admite que, de previo a la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo, en ocasiones resulte indispensable efectuar una serie de indagaciones preliminares. Así, la Administración –con anterioridad a la apertura del expediente administrativo– podría requerir la realización de una investigación previa, por medio de la cual se pueda no solo individualizar al posible responsable de la falta que se investiga, sino también determinar la necesidad de continuar con las formalidades del procedimiento si se encuentra mérito para ello.” (Voto 04420-2003 de las 9:21 horas del 23-5-2003). Sostuvo además: "IV.- Sobre el fondo. Proceso administrativo y procedimientos previos. Ni el Concejo ni la recurrente tienen clara la diferencia que existe entre las investigaciones previas al proceso administrativo y el proceso mismo. Si la Administración, en casos complejos, no distingue contra quiénes se debe dirigir el procedimiento, puede y debe abrir una investigación previa con el fin de identificar los posibles o presuntos responsables, para luego abrir contra ellos el proceso respectivo. En esta etapa previa de investigación no es preciso notificar a los interesados, porque no se sienta ninguna responsabilidad. La posibilidad del proceso de investigación previo la Sala lo ha admitido en jurisprudencia reiterada desde hace muchos años. En sentencia No. 676-97 (antecedida, entre otras, por las sentencias No. 7259-94, No. 598-95 y No. 5796-96), la Sala dijo: “Una correcta inteligencia del carácter y fundamentos del debido proceso, exige admitir -como lo ha hecho también la Sala- que, de previo a la apertura o a la continuación de un trámite formal, a veces puede resultar útil o necesario efectuar una serie de indagaciones preliminares.”/ En el caso del proceso administrativo, esta investigación preliminar tiene como objeto individualizar a los posibles responsables de las irregularidades y recomendar si debe abrir contra ellos un proceso, de qué tipo y con qué fin. Sigue agregando la sentencia citada: / “La enunciada potestad administrativa de efectuar investigaciones previas a la apertura del procedimiento formal, no puede contrariar en ningún momento el conjunto de derechos y garantías que están cobijados por los institutos de la defensa y el debido proceso. Dicho resumidamente: la indagación previa es correcta y pertinente en tanto necesaria para reunir los elementos de juicio necesarios para descartar o confirmar la necesidad del procedimiento formal, o bien para permitir su correcta sustanciación (por ejemplo, cuando se deba identificar a quienes figurarán como accionados en el proceso). En cualquier otro supuesto, es enteramente inexcusable subsumir dentro de la etapa de investigación un acto o actos propios del trámite formal, lo cual comportaría un quebranto indubitable del derecho de defensa o de las garantías del debido proceso. El caso prototípico ocurre cuando, sin intervención de las partes interesadas, se evacuan ciertas pruebas durante la investigación para luego hacerlas valer durante el procedimiento, siendo el caso que -por la naturaleza de la prueba (por ejemplo, testimonial)- la participación de aquéllas podría haber colaborado para arrojar un resultado o una valoración distinta. Dichas probanzas, a no dudarlo, son inútiles para los efectos de fundamentar el acto final, debiendo repetirlas en su momento con participación del afectado, para que puedan cobrar eficacia. Por el contrario, y sólo para efectos de clarificar el punto, no se ve objeción en que, durante la etapa preliminar, se recopilen documentos o se preparen informes, a fin de identificar a las partes del futuro proceso o para preparar los alegatos contra ellas, sometiendo luego el resultado ese trabajo al procedimiento administrativo como parte de la evidencia, que los interesados podrán entonces examinar y valorar.” (Voto número 10824-2003). Por lo que cualquier reproche formulado en contra del Informe de Auditoría respecto a la limitación o la falta de análisis de prueba, resulta inatendible, siendo en el procedimiento administrativo donde se debe ofrecer y proveer la defensa y las pruebas en su sustento. Respecto del testimonio rendido en la audiencia oral y privada del procedimiento administrativo por el señor Rodríguez Céspedes, resalta que sus aseveraciones a título de opinión o errores de hecho o contradicción con la realidad, en nada modifican el cuadro fáctico investigado, ni su supresión de manera alguna, modifica, altera o exime la participación del señor Barrantes Rivera en los hechos investigados. De todas formas, tampoco el actor explicó o fundamentó como ese testimonio, en esos aspectos puntuales, afecta o perjudica las conclusiones consignadas en el acto administrativo impugnado. De igual manera, se advierte que las objeciones y señalamientos que realiza el demandante respecto de la actuación del señor Alberto Orozco Canossa, en su condición de Jefe de Recursos Humanos del MEP, por haber declinado la competencia en su caso, se encuentran alegada incompetencia del señor ministro en la conformación del órgano director y el dictado del acto de despido del actor. Finalmente se achaca, en etapa de conclusiones del juicio oral y público, que la sanción impuesta deviene en ilegal por haber sido impuesta estando ya prescrita la facultad disciplinaria del empleador. Para ello se aduce que los hechos que se imputan son de una licitación de junio de 2006, sobre una factura del 13 de diciembre de ese mismo año y cuyo oficio firmó el 13 (sic) de ese mismo mes y año, y que el ministro de Educación, de su puño y letra firma autorizando el pago de la factura en diciembre de 2006. Que no es hasta junio de 2009 el ministro ordena la conformación de un órgano director en su contra, sea dos años y medio después. Como se tuvo ocasión de comentar con cita de lo resuelto por este mismo Tribunal, en materia de prescripción de la facultad disciplinaria de la Administración Pública, tenemos dos sistemas o regímenes. El general, en que aplica el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, salvo disposición especial en contrario, en que se dispone que la prescripción opera en un mes. Por otro lado, el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, establece un plazo de 5 años, cuando se trata de transgresiones al ordenamiento de Control y Fiscalización. Directamente relacionado, el artículo 43 de la Ley General de Control Interno y 44 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, establecen el plazo de los 5 años cuando se trata de transgresiones al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización. Con lo que se afirma, que existen dos plazos de prescripción, aplicables a los funcionarios públicos, en cuanto al ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria, sin perjuicio de otros ordenamientos especiales que tienen sus propios plazos, como lo es el caso de la Ley General de Policía n.º 7410. Específicamente las normas que regulan la prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria en el campo del control y la fiscalización, disponen: artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, reformado mediante la Ley Nº 8292 del 31 de julio de 2002: "Artículo 71.—Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: a) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho. b) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea notorio –entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad- la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo. La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo. Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo. Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar que la responsabilidad del infractor prescriba, sin causa justificada." (Así reformado por el inciso a) del artículo 45 de la Ley N° 8292 de 31 de julio del 2002, Ley de Control Interno). Por su parte, la Ley General de Control Interno, n.º 8292, en el numeral 43 indica lo siguiente: "Artículo 43.—Prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley, prescribirá según el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Nº 7428, de 7 de setiembre de 1994. Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar prescribir la responsabilidad del infractor, sin causa justificada." /Finalmente, la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, n.º 8422, señala: "Artículo 44.—Prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley, y en el ordenamiento relativo a la Hacienda Pública, prescribirá, según el artículo 43 de la Ley General de Control Interno y el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Nº 7428, de 7 de setiembre de 1994." De los numerales mencionados, se desprende un criterio material objetivo que permite determinar cuándo aplica la prescripción mencionada a una falta en contra de la Hacienda Pública. En ese sentido, si existe una transgresión al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización o relativo a la Hacienda Pública, aplica el plazo de los 5 años de prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria. Este criterio permite diferenciar la prescripción aplicable en casos de naturaleza laboral de un mes, de acuerdo con lo que dispone el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo. Con la reforma que sufrió el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, al variar el criterio de valoración, para determinar el plazo de prescripción aplicable, se pasa de un régimen subjetivo a uno objetivo. Anteriormente era necesario llevar a cabo el ejercicio para determinar, a efectos de aplicar el plazo de prescripción, si era un servidor de la Hacienda Pública (aspecto subjetivo). Como se mencionó supra, el criterio que rige en la actualidad es material objetivo, que se determina con la transgresión al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización, que lo componen entre otras las leyes mencionadas, así como la Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos, n.º 8131 y su Reglamento, la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.º 7494 y su Reglamento. Así pues, es claro que la inteligencia de la normativa citada, permite aplicar el plazo de prescripción, a cualquier funcionario público que, independientemente que ocupe o no un cargo de la Hacienda Pública, incurre en un quebrantamiento al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización, si esto se produce, le aplica el plazo de los 5 años. En virtud de lo cual, en el caso que nos ocupa, no se ha producido la prescripción alegada, dado que la infracción cometida implica una transgresión al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización o relativo a la Hacienda Pública, cuyo plazo de prescripción es de cinco años, como se manifestó.

VIII.- DE LAS PRETENSIONES DE LA DEMANDA: Se solicita que en sentencia se disponga: "1. Que se declare como ilegal, violatorio del ordenamiento jurídico, del debido proceso, y nulo, el oficio 633-09, de fecha 27 de junio del año 2009, dictado por el MINISTERIO DE EDUCACIÓN PÚBLICA, en la persona de su Ministro LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, en que se ordena la instauración de un órgano director en mi contra." Esta pretensión, aparte que impugna un acto de mero trámite, recurrible únicamente junto con el acto final, se fundamentaba en la posición del actor en el sentido que el ministro era incompetente para ordenar la conformación de un órgano director en su contra, no obstante como se tuvo la oportunidad de aclarar, tal reparo resulta improcedente, en virtud de la naturaleza de la relación de empleo público del actor, dado que su plaza como Director de PROMECE, se encuentra excluida del régimen de Servicio Civil, por lo que el funcionario competente para ordenar la instauración de un órgano director y el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria recae en el ministro del MEP, por lo que se rechaza la pretensión. Se solicita además: "2. Que se declare ilegal, violatorio del ordenamiento jurídico, violatorio del debido proceso, y nulo, las resoluciones del MINISTERIO DE EDUCACIÓN, dictas (sic) por el Ministro del ramo, LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, números 701-09, de las 8 horas del 23 de setiembre del año 2009, y resolución 742-09 de las 10 horas 45 minutos del 28 de setiembre del año 2009./" En el apartado correspondiente, se analizó y ponderó todos y cada uno de los argumentos y reparos expuestos por el actor, los que fueron rechazados, al no llevar razón en su fundamentación, en virtud de lo cual, no queda más que rechazar por igual esta pretensión. Se pide: "3. Que se declare nulo el despido, realizado por el MINISTERIO DE EDUCACIÓN, en la persona de su Ministro LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, en mi contra, que se dio por medio de las resoluciones dichas en la pretensión anterior." rechazada la pretensión anterior, por consecuencia y conexidad, procede el rechazo de esta pretensión. Asimismo se pretende: "4. Que se condene al Estado Costarricense, al pago de los daños y perjuicios, que se me hubiese causado, con su actuar ilegal, daños y perjuicios, que se liquidaran en ejecución de sentencia." Rechazada la pretensión principal, y no habiéndose establecido la nulidad del acto de despido del actor, no se han producido los daños y perjuicios pretendidos, lo que obliga a su rechazo. Se demanda: "5. Que se declare a los funcionarios públicos, aquí demandados LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, GABRIELA VALVERDE MURILLO, JEANETTE CALERO ARAYA, DAVER ROJAS CHAVES, ALBERTO OROZCO CANOSSA, JULIO CESAR RODRÍGUEZ CÉSPEDES, todos de calidades dichas, como responsables solidarios, con el estado (sic) de los daños y perjuicios que se me causó, con sus actuaciones ilegales. Daños y Perjuicios que se liquidarán en ejecución de sentencia." De igual suerte, rechazada la pretensión principal y por consiguiente la indemnización solicitada, se debe rechazar la petición de declarar a los funcionarios codemandados como responsables solidarios. Habiéndose desestimado la demanda en su totalidad, no proceden las pretensiones siguientes, las que de igual forma se rechazan: "6. Que se condene al MINISTERIO DE EDUCACIÓN PÚBLICA, al pago de ambas costas de este proceso. y "7. Que se condene a los demandados LEONARDO GARNIER RÍMOLO, GABRIELA VALVERDE MURILLO, JEANETTE CALERO ARAYA, DAVER ROJAS CHAVES, ALBERTO OROZCO CANOSSA, JULIO CESAR RODRÍGUEZ CÉSPEDES, en forma solidaria con el Ministerio de Educación, al pago de ambas costas de este proceso." Como la presente demanda ha sido desestimada en todos sus extremos, no habiéndose acreditado la inconformidad de la conducta administrativa con el ordenamiento jurídico, ni tampoco se logró demostrar las demás pretensiones subsidiarias, ante la ausencia total de prueba en tal sentido, no resta más que declarar sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos, tanto en sus pretensiones de carácter principal como accesorias y/o subsidiarias.

IX.- SOBRE LAS EXCEPCIONES OPUESTAS: Como se indicó oportunamente, el ESTADO, por intermedio de su representación, los codemandados personas físicas por intermedio de su apoderado especial judicial y la CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA, en su condición de coadyuvante pasivo, por intermedio de su representación, opusieron todos la excepción de Falta de Derecho y los codemandados personas físicas además opusieron las excepciones de Falta de Legitimación en ambas modalidades, la que denominaron Falta de legitimación ad causam y Cosa Juzgada respecto a la discusión sobre violación al debido proceso a nivel de intimación e imputación (folios: 1427 a 1581, 1586 a 1623 y 1633 a 1730, respectivamente). Al respecto se resuelve: Nos ocuparemos en primer lugar de la Excepción de Falta de Derecho, que se resolverá en forma conjunta para todos los demandados. El derecho material, se constata cuando se acogen las pretensiones solicitadas, situación que no se da en el caso del actor, por los motivos ya esgrimidos en los considerandos anteriores, ya que al actor no les asiste el derecho material que invocan en su demanda, al no acreditar la nulidad del acto administrativo que dispuso su despido sin responsabilidad patronal. En virtud de lo cual se acoge la excepción opuesta y se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda interpuesta. De la excepción de Falta de Legitimación, tanto Activa como Pasiva: Los codemandados personas físicas, opusieron la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam activa como pasiva. A manera de preámbulo, recuérdese que la legitimación ad causam, alude a la aptitud de un sujeto para ser considerado parte de un proceso, idoneidad que está íntimamente relacionada con la pretensión que se deduzca en la acción. En el presente proceso, el actor pretende la nulidad del oficio 633-09 del 27 de junio de 2009, que ordenó la instauración de un órgano director en su contra y las resoluciones números 701-09 de las ocho horas del 23 de setiembre de año 2009 y 742-09 de las diez horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del 28 de setiembre de 2009. Actos dictados por el ministro de Educación Pública, pretendiendo se declare nulo su despido como Director de PROMECE, condenando al Estado y los funcionarios codemandados en su carácter personal en forma solidaria al pago de los daños y perjuicios causados, al considerar que en su condición de funcionarios públicos, en virtud de su participación, le causaron dichos daños y perjuicios. De acuerdo con ello, y a partir de tales pretensiones, tanto el actor como los codemandados, se encuentran legitimados para accionar y ser accionados, toda vez que uno ejerce una pretensión indemnizatoria en contra de los otros, en virtud de su participación y responsabilidad en la emisión del acto impugnado, por lo que se rechaza la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam activa como pasiva interpuesta por los codemandados personas físicas. De la excepción de Cosa Juzgada respecto a la discusión sobre violación al debido proceso a nivel de intimación e imputación. Efectivamente como se tuvo ocasión de reseñar, la Sala Constitucional, en el voto 3586-2010, conoció, resolvió y desestimó el planteamiento del actor respecto a la imputación de cargos realizada por el órgano director del procedimiento administrativo, lo que motivó como un elemento más a desestimar por igual ese reparo en esta sede, lo que en todo caso constituye una razón más para acoger la excepción de falta de derecho, por lo que resulta innecesario pronunciarse sobre la alegada cosa juzgada.”