Municipal purchase option breached by sellerOpción de compraventa municipal incumplida por la vendedora

V.- On the merits: As a first claim, the plaintiff requests that the Municipality of Golfito be ordered to fulfill its obligations under the purchase-sale contract for the property, registered in the Partido de Puntarenas, real folio registration number 104.294-000, to execute the respective transfer deed of the property and to make the corresponding payment. In this regard, the defendant Municipality states first that there was no agreement on the thing and price between the parties, so the contractual relationship was not formalized, and thus the plaintiff's right to claim performance of said agreement has prescribed. In that sense, it has been demonstrated in the record that by means of a note dated December 17, 2008, the representatives of the plaintiff company made a lease and purchase option offer for the farm of the Partido de Puntarenas real folio registration number 6-104294-000, for the sum of one thousand dollars monthly and four hundred thirty thousand dollars for the sale of the property. Said option was established for a term of six months. Subsequently, when the respective purchase was not formalized, on August 4, two thousand ten, the then Mayor of Golfito, Mr. Jimmy Cubillo Mora, signed with the Legal Representative of Inversiones Jericó S.A., a purchase-sale option for said property, for a price of three hundred thirty million colones, with a term of five months and on the understanding that the sale would be made free of liens (gravámenes) and annotations and with taxes up to date. In this vein, by means of agreement nineteen, article thirty-one, of chapter eight of ordinary session number 50-2010 of December 17, 2010, of the Municipal Council of Golfito, it was decided to accept the request made by the then Mayor, Mr. Jimmy Cubillo Mora, to award the direct purchase of the property of the farm of the Partido de Puntarenas real folio registration number 6-104294-000, for a price of three hundred thirty million colones, owned by the plaintiff company. As a result of the foregoing, on December 20, 2010, the Procurement Department (Departamento de Proveeduría) of the Municipality of Golfito issued purchase order for goods and services number 006689, in the name of the supplier Inmobiliaria Jericó Internacional S.A., for the sum of three hundred twenty-three million four hundred thousand colones, and that same day, expeditiously, check number 1005-6 of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica was issued in the name of Inmobiliaria Jericó Internacional S.A., for the sum of three hundred twenty-three million four hundred thousand colones. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is evident in the record that on that date, not all the conditions established by the Contraloría General de la República, in its official letter 12455 of DCA-0912 of December 16, 2010, for the purchase of the property had yet been met, given that the same was not free of liens (gravámenes). It is for this reason that by means of a deed granted on January 14, 2011, the plaintiff canceled the existing mortgages. Due to the foregoing, by means of official letter AMJ-MG-O-003-2011 of January 18, 2011, Mr. Jimmy Cubillo Mora, sends the respective certification to the State Notary's Office (Notaría del Estado), so that the respective deed may be prepared. Despite the foregoing, the purchase was never formalized, given that check 1005-6 of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica lacked funds, since the money had been spent on other purposes, and therefore the necessary budgetary content did not exist. Based on the foregoing, as has been indicated, the plaintiff seeks to impose on the Municipal entity the acquisition of the respective property, its payment, and the formalization of the respective deed. In order to rule on the merits of this point, it is necessary to define the scope of the document signed between the parties and called a purchase-sale option. In this sense, it is understood as such the promise of sale that the owner makes to the option holder, who may decide or not to acquire the respective property within a determined period, whether contractual or legal (art. Civil Code). In this regard, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia has indicated the following: "The contract entered into between the parties must consequently be analyzed to determine its scope and which legal figure we are facing.- It is therefore interesting here to cite some national doctrine and jurisprudence on the matter, that is, when it is discussed whether the transaction is a promise or a consummated purchase-sale.- Mr. Alberto Brenes Córdoba in his Tratado de los Contratos tells us: 'It is called thus, "promise of sale", the offer that the seller makes to the buyer to transfer the ownership of a thing to him for a determined price. If the promise is accepted immediately, the purchase-sale is concluded, and any of the stipulating parties may demand performance of the contract from the other. But if the buyer has reserved the right to reply within a certain period, the transfer of ownership does not take place until he expresses his acceptance. This is the promise of sale properly speaking, which does not imply a commitment except on the part of the owner: it constitutes a simple project of future sale, an "option", as it is usually said, because it is optional for the one to whom the promise is made to accept it or not.' (See Tratado de los Contratos, Alberto Brenes Córdoba. Editorial Juricentro S.A., 1995, San José, Costa Rica, pp. 108 and 109).- The master Mr. Pablo Casafont Romero expresses: 'Precontract'... a preliminary or preparatory agreement by which the obligation to enter into another contract is assumed, either as a declaration that a future contract is desired... The figure of the 'precontract', only by its modality of being preparatory, differs from the future contract that constitutes its object or purpose, because it is noticed, from its structure... that strictly it is a contract, since all the elements of a contract are present in it, with the agreement of the parties from which an obligation to do arises, consisting of the conclusion of the future contract. Indeed, the requirements of substance and form required for the main contract that the parties declare they want through it are indicated by Doctrine as elements of the precontract, among them and with the agreement that presupposes capacity, the object with a possible, lawful, determined or determinable performance, and the term that is equally essential in it, assuming that it generates a term obligation given the legal impossibility of assuming an indefinite commitment.' (Ensayos de Derecho Contractual. Pablo Casafont Romero. Antonio Lehmann Librería, Imprenta y Litografía Ltda. 1968, pp. 236 and 237).- In judgment No. 615 of 8:25 a.m. on September 28, 1990, of this same Tribunal and Section, judgment No. 41 of 3:30 p.m. on July 29, 1986, of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia is cited, in which the following was stated: 'As expressed in doctrine, whether it is a unilateral or bilateral promise, an option or an option contract, which comprise the category of contracts called preparatory, prior or preliminary, or with modern technique, precontracts, it is necessary to differentiate them from the definitive contract itself. The object of the precontract or preliminary contract is the subsequent conclusion of that other one that cannot be finalized at the moment. Regarding the purchase-sale, the unilateral promise and the bilateral promise should not be confused with the definitive purchase-sale contract. In the promise, the object is the future stipulation of a purchase-sale contract whose effects can never coincide with those of the sale. Because from the promise neither the transfer of ownership, nor the seller's obligation to deliver the thing, nor the buyer's obligation to pay the price are derived, because even though the thing and the price must be determined in the precontract, this does not imply the delivery of the first nor the payment of the second; the promisors are only obligated to give their consent in the future to conclude the purchase-sale, which is of utmost importance, because even if there is a precontract at the time of concluding the definitive contract, a new manifestation of the parties' consent is required, however, in the promise of sale, if it is accepted immediately, the purchase-sale is concluded, and any of the stipulating parties may demand performance of the contract from the other. But if the buyer has reserved the right to reply within a certain period, the transfer of ownership does not take place until he expresses his acceptance...'.- In judgment No. 51 of 3:00 p.m. on August 11, 1993, of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, it was considered: 'The sale option contract, a figure much debated in doctrine and jurisprudence, is currently conceived as an autonomous, preliminary or preparatory contract. Through it, a person commits to sell a good to another, for a determined price, if the latter decides to accept the option within the period set for this purpose. This is how the promisor undertakes to keep the offer open for a certain period, and to sell a good at a determined price; the option holder, for his part, accepts the commitment acquired by the other contracting party, but does not commit to accept the offer, he therefore enjoys a period to study the proposal, which must be considered firm during the time of the option, without the possibility of being revoked. If it is accepted, there would be an agreement between the parties and the definitive contract would then be configured, according to the rules provided for by articles 1009, 1049 and 1054 of the Civil Code'.- In judgment No. 9 of 2:40 p.m. on January 13, 1995, of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, it reads: 'It is important to clearly establish when one is facing a precontract whose object is a purchase-sale contract and when one is facing a purchase-sale properly speaking, it being necessary to keep in mind that both the sale option and the reciprocal promise of purchase-sale, being pre-negotiable figures, contain the essential elements of the projected negotiation. This is why the precontract is considered as a "base contract" in which the characteristics of the definitive contract are projected, in such a way that once the respective offers are accepted, a new declaration of will is not necessary. In the option - or promise of sale - and in the reciprocal promise of purchase-sale, it is sufficient that, within the period, the acceptance of the option holder operates in the first case, or of either of the two parties in the second case so that, as has been pointed out, the purchase-sale is perfected. It is clear, then, that the difference between the pre-negotial figure and the definitive purchase-sale business is the definitive agreement on thing and price manifested, precisely, in the acceptance of the option holders. That is, the pre-negotial contractual relationship designs the definitive contract by referring to the essential elements of which the former is composed, but without there being a definitive agreement on thing and price, which occurs upon acceptance of the offers. In the option and in the reciprocal promise of purchase-sale, because their object is the future stipulation of a purchase-sale contract, their effects can never coincide with those of the sale, and neither the transfer of ownership nor the seller's obligation to deliver the thing nor the buyer's obligation to pay the price can be derived, because even though the thing and the price are determined in the precontract, the promisors only obligate themselves to respect the period and to carry out the definitive contract if consent is given on the price and the thing as it was foreseen. Hence, if it is inferred from a determined contract that the phase of simple offers -unilateral or reciprocal, as the case may be- has been surpassed because in reality there is nothing pending acceptance, the purchase-sale, independently of its eventual registration in the Public Registry, since this is not a requirement ad substantiam for its perfection, remains for the execution phase of the contract as an obligation of the seller to grant the public deed and deliver the good.' In judgment No. 37 of 3:15 p.m. on March 8, 1995, of the same Chamber, it was expressed: 'It is true that in the reciprocal promise of purchase-sale, due to the nature of this precontract, the essential elements of the projected negotiation must be contained. However, its effects can never coincide with those of the definitive purchase-sale contract, because from the promise neither transfer of ownership, nor the seller's obligation to deliver the thing, nor the buyer's obligation to pay the price can be derived; the promisors are solely obligated to give their subsequent consent to conclude the definitive contract.'" (vote 00096 of September 4, 1996). Due to the foregoing, it is evident that in the sale option contract there is no definitive agreement on thing and price, but a mere promise of sale, in which the acquirer is free to accept or not what is offered. This differs from the reciprocal promise of purchase-sale in which there are mutual commitments, both to sell and to acquire within a determined period. In this regard, an analysis of the signed document reveals that we are in the presence of a commitment by the plaintiff to sell the property in question, but without expressing a correlative obligation of the representation of the defendant Municipality to acquire the respective property. In this sense, clause two of the document states the following: 'That THE SELLER in this act grants an EXCLUSIVE AND IRREVOCABLE SALE OPTION over said property to THE BUYER who accepts the same.' No correlative commitment to acquire by the Municipality is observed, which if it had been adopted, would in any case have been illegal. In this sense, the non-existence of acceptance or commitment to acquire by the defendant Municipality is confirmed by the demonstrated fact that the respective purchase option was signed by the Mayor, Mr. Jimmy José Cubillo Mora, on August 4, two thousand ten, without yet having the authorization for the direct purchase from the Contraloría General de la República (which was not given until December 16, 2010, and which was a condition sine qua non for any valid and effective act in terms of direct administrative procurement) and without the prior agreement of the Municipal Council (which was decided on December 17 of said year, the respective purchase approval being the exclusive competence of the same). There is therefore no obligation of the defendant that can be the object of a ruling against the defendant, as requested by the plaintiff company based on its particular reading of the respective purchase-sale option contract. Although the plaintiff might interpret that the agreement of said collegiate body meant acceptance of the terms established in the purchase option regarding object and price, it must be taken into consideration that said document had a validity of five months starting from the day of its signing, so it expired on January 4, two thousand eleven. However, on said date, it is noted that the plaintiff did not have the property free of liens (gravámenes), which did not occur until January 14, two thousand eleven, a date by which the indicated option had already lapsed. Due to the foregoing, within the validity period of the option and once the approval of the competent instances for the act of purchasing the property was given, the plaintiff incurred in non-compliance with its commitment to sell the land free of mortgage liens (gravámenes hipotecarios), which was expressly contemplated as a condition for the purchase by official letter 12455 of DCA-0912 of December 16, 2010, of the comptroller body and by agreement nineteen, article thirty-one, of chapter eight of ordinary session number 50-2010 of December 17, 2010, of the Municipal Council. Additionally, said obligation was part of the offers made at all times by the seller, so its late performance is not excusable. It must be highlighted that even though subsequently, the plaintiff company proceeded to cancel the respective liens (gravámenes), it did so outside the validity of the purchase option when there had already been non-compliance on its part with the same. Given the foregoing, as the option term had expired, without the party that was eventually the seller having fully complied with its obligations, the municipal entity was released from any obligation that could be interpreted as originating from said precontract (which, as has been seen, in any case, is not observed given the unilateral nature of the commitments set forth therein). In a complementary manner, it must be noted that if check 1005-6 of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica was not issued at the time in favor of the plaintiff, this occurred due to the indicated non-compliance and not so much due to the non-existence of budgetary content (note how it is issued at the end of the 2009 period and the party belatedly complies with its obligations to release the farm from mortgage liens (gravámenes hipotecarios) in another budget period, that is, the 2010 period), so the non-payment and lack of formalization are not originally due to reasons attributable to the Administration but to the omissions of the plaintiff company. The fact that subsequently the check was left without budgetary content is a direct consequence of said non-compliance -by moving into another subsequent period- and the expiration of the budgetary availability by the Administration of the time, insofar as the respective sale deed was not formalized -for reasons attributable to the seller party- and which would have committed the necessary budget had it been carried out. (see art. 46 of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos). The defendant additionally alleges that the provisions of article 1055 of the Civil Code must apply to the case, which establishes, for purposes of Expiration (Caducidad), the following: 'The promise of sale and the reciprocal promise of purchase-sale whose performance has not been demanded within one month from when it is enforceable, expires by that very fact.' In this regard, it must be taken into consideration that the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia has repeatedly held that the scope of application of article 1055 is limited to cases in which there is an enforceable promise of sale or reciprocal promise of purchase-sale without a stipulated period for the option holder to accept and perfect the definitive contract. In such cases, it is indicated that the option holder may accept, and thus perfect the definitive purchase-sale, within the term of one month, which runs from the enforceability of the precontract. In this sense, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, since its judgment No 51 of three o'clock in the afternoon on August eleventh, nineteen ninety-three, has held the following in this regard: 'VII.- The proper understanding of the aforementioned article 1055 supposes another situation. Namely, that of option contracts where a deadline for acceptance by the option holder is not recorded. In them, it would be inconvenient to leave open, without definition, the possibility of concluding the definitive contract, since legal certainty would be harmed. This problem has arisen in other legislations, such as the French, Italian, and Spanish, where diverse solutions have been given. The French Civil Code has consecrated only one article for the promise of sale, 1589, in which it establishes: "... when there is reciprocal consent of the two contracting parties regarding the thing and the price", the promise is equated to a definitive purchase-sale. No term is set for acceptance when the contracting parties have stipulated nothing in this regard. Faced with this situation, French doctrine has considered, not without first expressing some perplexity, that the offer remains open indefinitely, since that was the obligation assumed by the promisor, unless the event of withdrawing the consent related to the definitive purchase-sale was contemplated. The possibility of scrutinizing the will of the parties is accepted, in any case, to determine if there is any implicit term or if, on the contrary, they intended to remain bound to the preliminary contract indefinitely. On the subject, the authors Henri, León and Jean MAZEAUD, in their LECCIONES DE DERECHO CIVIL, Part III, Vol. III, Editorial EJEA, Buenos Aires, p. 66, state: "The promisor's obligation does not raise difficulties when a term has been stipulated upon whose expiry the option becomes invalid. But, is the promisor still obligated indefinitely if no term has been set for the exercise of the option? It must be admitted so; since, unlike the offeror, the promisor has concluded a contract, whose terms he cannot modify without the beneficiary's agreement; he has given his consent for the purchase-sale, without reserving the right to withdraw it after a certain time, in the absence of acceptance by the beneficiary; his consent persists as long as the beneficiary does not renounce the option. But the judge of the interpretation of the contract is not forbidden from discovering in it the tacit stipulation of a term upon whose expiry the promisor regains his freedom. In truth, the offer of sale and the unilateral promise of sale are thus brought closer together; but would it not be unreasonable to bind the promisor and his heirs for centuries on end?" For their part, Professors Planiol and Ripert, in their TRATADO PRACTICO DE DERECHO CIVIL FRANCES, Tomo X, Editorial Cultural, Havana, p. 192, indicate: "The promisor is obligated to maintain his promise for all the time that has been agreed upon in the contract. But sometimes the case arises where no term has been set for the option; in that case, it is up to the Courts to have the power to assess in fact the intention of the parties." Nor does Spanish legislation contain a specific rule regarding the case of an option without a term. Article 1451 of the Spanish Civil Code only provides: "The promise to sell or buy, there being agreement on the thing and the price, will give the contracting parties the right to reciprocally demand performance of the contract." Faced with this, doctrine generally considers the inclusion of a term for its exercise as an indispensable element for the validity of the option. In Italian law, on the contrary, the problem was directly addressed, when article 1331 of the Civil Code established the following: "When the parties agree that one of them remains bound by his declaration and the other has the faculty to accept it or not, the declaration of the first is considered as an irrevocable proposal for the purposes provided for by article 1329. If a term for acceptance has not been set, this may be established by the judge." The promisor, prevailing jurisprudence and doctrine in that country estimate, when he wishes to free himself from the bond for which no term has been set, can only ask the judge to set it and, once the period has elapsed without the option holder having perfected the contract, the option will cease to have legal effects. In none of the three legal systems referred to is there any expiration (caducidad) term for the exercise of the buyer's rights once the definitive sale is perfected, the ordinary prescription terms being applicable, as pertinent. Once the option is accepted, in the three said systems, the definitive contract is considered perfected and the legal situation is identical to that of any purchase-sale stipulated through the mechanisms of contracting between parties present, between absent parties, or after the acceptance of a firm unilateral proposal. In relation, it is considered that there is no reasonable reason to subject the action to demand performance of a perfect purchase-sale to expiration (caducidad) periods when it has been formed as a result of an option; in other cases, only the principles of ordinary prescription govern. In our environment, scientific doctrine, represented in the specific case by Doctor Diego Baudrit Carrillo, also joins the thesis advocated here. In his work "LOS CONTRATOS TRASLATIVOS DEL DERECHO PRIVADO", when referring to the conception that has been criticized in these considerations, he says: "This interpretation makes a distinction between purchase-sales formalized without a precontract and purchase-sales perfected by acceptance of a promise made in a precontract. The first purchase-sales would be governed by the rules of ordinary prescription; the second by the expiration (caducidad) period of one month. This distinction is artificial and is not based on a valid analysis of the norms, since, in our opinion, the law does not distinguish regarding the effects of a purchase-sale that has been perfected, whether or not it has the antecedent of a precontract, since what matters is the exchange of wills referring to thing and price. In our view, the provision of article 1055 could only be interpreted, if it is to have any meaning, as referring to promises of sale without an agreed term, a hypothesis in which the law sets one month for the option to be exercised." (Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, p. 31). VIII.- On the subject in question, it is worth noting, the need has been felt to establish maximum periods within which the firm offer, generated by the option contract, retains its validity, since its indefinite permanence when no term has been agreed upon is considered absolutely inconvenient. In matters of contracting, there exists in Costa Rica, in principle, an interest in giving proposals validity limited in time, since as time passes, a discrepancy may arise between the content of the proposal and the real will of the offeror. Thus, for example, article 443 of the Commercial Code gives the proposer the possibility to set a waiting period, which he is obligated to respect, but, if he does not establish one, the offer is deemed valid within the terms expressly indicated in subsection b). Furthermore, if the acceptance is not received by the offeror within the cited periods, the contract is not considered perfect. Likewise, a recent judgment of this Chamber, No. 137 of two twenty in the afternoon on September thirtieth, nineteen ninety-two, interpreted the term provided for in article 1399 of the Civil Code, relating to donations, as a term referring to the donee to accept the contract, under penalty of expiration (caducidad), which upon occurring frustrates the perfection of the contract. Article 1012 of the Civil Code also obliges the interested party to accept the proposal within the term set by the other party, but if this does not exist, he must do so "... within three days when he is in the same province; within ten, when he is not in the same province, but is in the Republic; and within sixty days, when he is outside the Republic." These provisions demonstrate our legislator's interest in limiting in time the effectiveness of contractual proposals, when the offeror has not established a period for this. It is in this context where the interpretation of article 1055 of the Civil Code finds its true dimension. By establishing this norm a one-month period to demand performance of the promise of sale or the reciprocal promise of purchase-sale, it does not refer in a technical procedural sense to a "judicial demand," but to the manifestation of the option holder accepting the option, which, being already enforceable, does not have a deadline for its validity. The norm refers to an enforceable promise of sale or reciprocal promise of purchase-sale, that is, not yet accepted.

If a manifestation of intent by the option holder accepting it were to occur, it would no longer be a matter of that enforceable promise, but rather of a perfected purchase-sale contract. Now, breach of the latter would give the buyer the right, as provided in Article 1066, to request from the judge a registrable title, if necessary, and the delivery of the thing, in the event of the seller's refusal to fulfill the obligations arising from the principal contract. In conclusion, the scope of application of Article 1055 is limited to cases in which there exists an enforceable promise of sale or reciprocal promise of purchase-sale without a stipulated term. In such events, the option holder may accept, and thereby perfect the definitive purchase-sale, within the term of one month, which runs from the enforceability of the pre-contract. If this is not done, the option becomes ineffective and any subsequent acceptance would be unsuitable to configure the projected contract.” As can be observed from the case file, none of the claims of the lawsuit refer to the situation regulated by Article 1055 of the Civil Code; it does not concern the claim of the option holder for the perfection of the definitive contract in the absence of a contractual term for that purpose, but rather that of the potential seller seeking compliance with the conditions of the purchase-sale option, given that it was deemed that what was agreed within its term was perfected, in view of the existence of conduct by the entity in that regard. Thus, the arguments made by the representation of the defendant Municipality in that regard must be rejected, and rather the indicated claim must be dismissed, based on the breach of a substantial obligation of the selling party (the non-cancellation of the mortgage lien) and its remedy, once the expiration of said option had occurred, such that it was no longer binding (given the foregoing and its content) on the defendant Administration. The plaintiff must take into account that this is not a pure and simple civil relationship, since, when a public entity is involved, the pre-contractual or even contractual relationship is transversally affected by a series of principles, conditions, and requirements specific to administrative law. Thus, unlike a relationship between two private parties, in the case of any link with a subject of public law, the formalization of any agreement could not disregard compliance with the public purpose of the good or service acquired, the powers of the officials responsible for the approval and/or authorization of the final acts, and, above all, the regulations applicable in matters of administrative procurement and budgetary rules. It is for this reason that Article 32 of the General Law of Administrative Procurement (Ley General de la Contratación Administrativa) indicates that “The administrative contract that is substantially in accordance with the legal system will be valid...”. In the case under analysis, besides the considerations made regarding the expiration of the purchase-sale option and the breach by the selling party of its duty to deliver the real property free of mortgage liens, it must be taken into consideration that the failure to formalize the deed in the respective budgetary period, that is, in December 2010, for reasons attributable to the plaintiff, had an impact on the existence of sufficient budget to perfect the relationship. It should be noted that as of December 1, two thousand ten, it was certified that the Municipality of Golfito had budgeted the following sums for the acquisition of the building for the municipal operations center: a) Buildings: C. 337,789,999.80. b) Land: C. 258,756,000.00, but subsequently it was indicated that the existing cash was allocated to other different purposes. Therefore, there is no current contract that has not been fulfilled by the plaintiff company, and thus, in any case, as there is no budgetary content as of this date, as evidenced by the proof and the statement of the witness for the defendant Municipality, Mrs. Karen Moya Díaz, by the principle of legality, it is not possible to order what the plaintiff has requested in accordance with Articles 5.f), 12, 110. f) of the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets (Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos), which establish as a limit for the acquisition of any budgetary commitment, the necessary existence of available funds to cover said expense.

VI.- As a second claim, the plaintiff requests that the defendant Municipality be ordered to pay the sum of ten million eight hundred sixty-five thousand six hundred eighty-three colones with twenty-four céntimos, corresponding to ten months of lease canceled in the year 2010. In this regard, there is express acknowledgment of said pending obligation by the defendant Administration, and in that sense, through official letter DP-MG-064-2012 of May 8, 2012, from the Supplier of the Municipality of Golfito, such obligation is recorded. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be considered that this Court ordered, in the trial hearing, evidence for a better ruling where it is clearly demonstrated that in the case of the lease of the property that is the subject of the present proceeding, there was neither authorization from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic nor authorization for its direct procurement for the purposes of a lease relationship (permission was only requested for the purchase of the property), nor were the necessary administrative procurement procedures followed. In this sense, it is recorded in the case file that on March 4, 2009, through official letter AMJ-MG-O-081-2009, the Municipal Mayor authorized the Municipal Supplier to directly procure, among other procurements, the lease with the plaintiff company for the sum of one thousand dollars per month, plus one thousand dollars as a security deposit, such that on the same day, the parties to this proceeding signed a lease contract for the property owned by the plaintiff for three months. All of the foregoing, without it being noted that any administrative procurement procedure had been previously complied with or that at least the principles of administrative procurement had been respected. Thus, from the case file, it is not evident that for the indicated decision, at least other offers were evaluated or that the free concurrence of other interested parties was guaranteed. In this sense, it must be remembered that the Public Administration employs various means for the fulfillment of public purposes, which are not exhausted in mere material actions or formal administrative acts, insofar as the technique of administrative procurement is also used, wherein the fulfillment of an object is agreed with a contractor, as a collaborating subject in achieving the public interest sought. However, unlike a private contract, in administrative procurement, there exists a series of elements that transcend the mere agreement of wills initialed in a document and that condition its creation, development, and extinction. It is thus that the administrative contract is conditioned in its origin, evolution, and termination by the specific legal framework that governs the matter and the specific procurement. In this regard, the act of the contractor's free and sovereign will is filtered by the administrative legal system, and fundamentally by the regulations governing the procurement, that is, the bid documents or statement of conditions, which form its basis. Moreover, a series of principles will always underlie every administrative procurement procedure, principles that have been outlined by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) starting from ruling 0998-98 at 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, and reiterated in subsequent decisions, and which basically can be summarized as free concurrence, equal treatment among bidders, publicity, legal certainty, legality and transparency, good faith, balance of interests, mutability of the contract, asset intangibility, and control of procedures. From the point of view of positive law, the general regulatory framework for the obligations of both the contracting entities and the contractor companies is set forth in the Law of Administrative Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa). Article 15 of said normative body expressly states the following as an obligation of every contracting Administration: “The Administration is obliged to fulfill all commitments, validly acquired, in administrative procurement and to provide collaboration so that the contractor executes the agreed object in a suitable manner.” On the other hand, correlative to said duty, Article 20 of the same law establishes the following obligation for contractors: “Contractors are obliged to fully comply with what was offered in their proposal and in any documented formal manifestation that they have provided additionally during the course of the procedure or in the formalization of the contract.” Both obligations arise from a principle of good faith in procurement, by virtue of which both parties, as a reference point in the fulfillment of their obligations, have a duty of mutual fulfillment and collaboration. In the specific case of lease contracts signed by the Administration, what is provided in Article 76 of the Law of Administrative Procurement and 159 of its Regulation must be applied, insofar as they provide the following: “Article 76. — Applicable procedure. To lease real property, with or without constructions, the administration must resort to the public bidding procedure, abbreviated bidding, or direct procurement, as appropriate, according to the amount.” “Article 159.— Lease of real property. The Administration may lease real property, with or without a purchase option, through the public bidding procedure, abbreviated bidding, or direct procurement, as appropriate, according to the estimated amount; without prejudice to the provisions regarding the lease or purchase of unique goods in this Regulation. The owner of the property shall not provide any kind of performance bond in favor of the Administration. For the readjustment of the rent price, the provisions of Article 67 of the General Law of Urban and Suburban Leases (Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos) shall apply.” In the same vein, Article 6 of the Law of Urban and Suburban Leases indicates the application of said normative body to contractual relations between the Public Administration and lessors, as follows: "ARTICLE 6.- State, decentralized entities and municipalities. The State, decentralized public entities, and municipalities, in their capacity as lessors or lessees, are subject to this law, unless expressly provided otherwise in their own legal system. The bidding procedure is governed by the legal and regulatory provisions of administrative procurement.” By reason of the foregoing, any legal analysis regarding this contractual figure cannot disregard either the general regulations specific to administrative matters or the specific provisions on tenancy matters established in said law, given its specialty and specific normative scope. By reason of the indicated breach in the present case of the procedures and principles specific to administrative procurement, this Chamber considers that Articles 21 of the Law of Administrative Procurement, amended by Law No. 8511 of May 16, 2006, published in La Gaceta No. 128 of July 4, 2006, and 210 of the Regulation of Administrative Procurement (Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa) must be applied to the present case. In that sense, said rules provide: ‘ Article 21. — Verification of procedures. It is the responsibility of the contractor to verify the correctness of the administrative procurement procedure and the contractual execution. By virtue of this obligation, to support compensatory claims, they may not allege ignorance of the applicable legal system or of the consequences of the administrative conduct. The Regulation to this Law shall define the circumstances and the manner in which it is appropriate to indemnify the irregular contractor. Likewise, the official who has promoted an irregular procurement shall be sanctioned according to the provisions of Article 96 bis of this Law.’ "Article 210. — Duty of verification. It is the responsibility of the contractor to verify the correctness of the administrative procurement procedure and the contractual execution. By virtue of this obligation, to support compensatory claims, they may not allege ignorance of the applicable legal system or of the consequences of the administrative conduct. The contract shall be deemed irregular, when in its processing, serious and evident defects are incurred, which are easily verifiable, such as omission of the corresponding procedure or having illegitimately resorted to some exception. In such cases, no payment may be recognized to the interested party, except in qualified cases, where it proceeds in accordance with general principles of Law, regarding supplies, works, services, and other objects, executed with evident benefit to the Administration. In that scenario, the intended profit shall not be recognized, and if this is unknown, a reduction of 10% of the total amount shall be applied for that concept. The same solution shall be applied to those contracts that are executed without the internal approval or endorsement, when this is required. The failure to formalize the contract shall not be an impediment to applying this provision as may be pertinent.” In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that in the present case we are in the presence of an irregular procurement by the plaintiff company, considering that, as has been indicated, no procedure was followed in its selection process, nor were at least the applicable principles in the matter complied with, with evident disregard for the provisions of Article 76 of the Law of Administrative Procurement. The plaintiff must take into account that the figure of direct procurement does not legitimize an arbitrary or unfounded selection and that although it allows the possibility of greater flexibility in determining the subject to which a good and service is awarded, it does not imply that it is carried out in mockery of all procedural mechanisms and internal control mechanisms or that the Municipal Mayor can award at his whim, without the proper justification of the act, after compliance with the principles mentioned above. This Court misses the presence of at least a reasoned and technical administrative decision regarding the reasons why it was chosen to contract directly with the plaintiff company and cannot ignore the various extensions to the lease relationship that were presented from the month of September 2009 until December 2011, with evident subdivisions (fraccionamientos) in the total amount of the procurement and with increases exceeding 100% of the previous rent, lacking any reasoning. That arbitrary attitude of the Municipal Mayor at the time, Mr. Jimmy Cubillo Mora, and the silent connivance of the representatives of Inmobiliaria Jericó Internacional S.A., lead this Court to consider evident the existence of an absolutely irregular procurement totally removed from the regulations applicable to the matter and from ethics and public interests. In this sense, the duty to verify the correctness of the administrative procedure cannot be circumvented in the case of the said company, which openly benefited from the illegal actions of Mr. Cubillo Mora. Regarding the figure of irregular procurement, the jurisprudence of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) has indicated: ".- Irregular Procurement occurs when, despite an anomaly in the procedure, the Administration effectively and in good faith receives goods or services (previously agreed upon), partially or totally, with clear benefit to it. The right of the provider then arises to receive an indemnification (not payment) for executing a public order, provided that, in principle, three circumstances concur: irregularity in the procedure; the Administration obtains an advantage or benefit; and the good faith of the contractor. It is necessary to reiterate that it is through the partial amendment introduced by Law no. 8511 of May 16, 2006 (effective as of January 4, 2007) that the LCA alludes to that figure, as considered by the Court. Thus, Article 21 is added to establish that the Regulation ‘…shall define the circumstances and the manner in which it is appropriate to indemnify the irregular contractor. Likewise, the official who has promoted an irregular procurement shall be sanctioned according to the provisions of Article 96 bis of this Law.’ (The underlining is not from the original). Simultaneously with the entry into force of the indicated partial amendment, the current Regulation to the LCA, promulgated by Executive Decree no. 33411 of September 27, 2006, also began to govern. In this regard, it is appropriate to clarify that it is not correct what was indicated by the Court in the sense that this Regulation ‘…came into force on November 2, 2006…’, because while that is the date of its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, it is true that in Article 227 ibid, it was expressly provided: ‘…it governs as of January 4, 2007.’ It is through Article 210 that what is established in legal Article 21 is developed. In reality, in accordance with what was considered by the Court, with both normative provisions, which as it indicated ‘…were not in force at the time the Ministry of Public Education issued the resolution being challenged…’, the repeated pronouncement of the CGR regarding that figure was formalized, among others, in the one referenced in the appealed ruling and from which it transcribes an excerpt. Thus, in essence and of interest to this matter, the CGR classifies a procurement as irregular when it is carried out without complying with the due procedure (by rule, bidding); it alludes to an agreement that is irregularly entered into between the Administration and the supplier; and a negotiation with the consent of the interested entity, provided that there is good faith in the conduct of the contractor, which is fundamental to determine the possible compensation for service. This implies honorable and loyal behavior in the exercise of rights, demanding coherence in the behavior of business relations; it is an informing principle of the entire legal system and that imposes the rejection of interpretations that lead to a result contrary to that one ‘…such as when procurement procedures are used for a purpose different from that intended by the legal system, or are exercised in circumstances that render them absolutely null.’ (official letters nos. 6180 (DAGJ-933-2000) of June 22, 2000; 8558 (DAGJ-1326-2001) of August 6, 2001; and 4864 (DAGJ-609-2003) of May 9, 2003) (ruling N° 1246-2009 at 10:25 a.m. on December 3, 2009). According to resolution R-CO-10-2009 of the Office of the Comptroller General at nine o'clock on January twenty-seventh, two thousand nine, for the year in which the contractual lease relationship with the plaintiff company began, the Municipality of Golfito was in stratum "H" for purposes of determining procurement limits, for which reason it could only contract directly for amounts less than four million five hundred seventy thousand colones. For sums exceeding that amount and up to forty-five million seven hundred thousand colones, an abbreviated bidding process had to be carried out. In the case under review, it is noted that the existing lease under analysis in this resolution greatly exceeds the said limit amount for direct procurement for the defendant Municipality, with increases set by the said former Municipal Mayor in a unilateral and unfounded manner. Based on the foregoing considerations, this Chamber finds that in the case at hand, the elements of judgment set forth both in the public procurement regulations and in the cited jurisprudential precedents are present, for the purpose of concluding that the plaintiff company provided its services under the figure of an irregular procurement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is appropriate to compensate the lease enjoyed by the municipal administration (acknowledged by it expressly as pending payment), in order not to incur unjust enrichment. Starting then from the fact that both parties acknowledge that the amount owed is the sum of ten million eight hundred sixty-five thousand six hundred eighty-three colones with twenty-four céntimos, applying the provisions of Article 210 of the Regulation of Administrative Procurement, it would be appropriate to recognize to the plaintiff the sum of nine million seven hundred seventy-nine thousand one hundred fourteen colones with ninety-two céntimos. It must be pointed out that the acceptance made by the defendant Municipality of the pending payment obligation does not mean per se an automatic acknowledgment of the debt in its entirety by this Court. The existence of a duty to verify the legality of the conducts adopted both by the Administration and by its collaborators, and with the determination of public funds at stake, makes it necessary to consider the irregular nature of the procurement that is the subject of this proceeding by this Chamber. In turn, and because it is a monetary obligation determined in this resolution – given the application of Article 210 of the Regulation of Administrative Procurement, to said award the indexing mechanism provided in Article 123 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, CPCA) must be applied ex officio – as the law so requires– in order to compensate for the loss of purchasing power that the national currency may have experienced or may still experience in the period that runs from the finality of this resolution, all of which shall be determined in the stage of execution of judgment.-” For the foregoing reasons, on December 20, 2010, the Procurement Department of the Municipality of Golfito issued purchase order for goods and services number 006689, in the name of the supplier Inmobiliaria Jericó Internacional S.A., for the sum of three hundred twenty-three million four hundred thousand colones, and on that same day, expeditiously, check number 1005-6 of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica was issued in the name of Inmobiliaria Jericó Internacional S.A., for the sum of three hundred twenty-three million four hundred thousand colones. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the case file shows that as of that date, not all of the conditions established by the Contraloría General de la República, in its official communication 12455 of DCA-0912 of December 16, 2010, for the purchase of the property had been met, given that it was not free of liens. It is for this reason that, by means of a public deed granted on January 14, 2011, the plaintiff canceled the existing mortgages. In view of the foregoing, through official communication AMJ-MG-O-003-2011 of January 18, 2011, Mr. Jimmy Cubillo Mora sent the respective certification to the Notaría del Estado, so that the respective public deed could be prepared. Despite the foregoing, the purchase was never formalized, given that check 1005-6 of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica lacked funds, as the money had been spent on other purposes, and therefore the necessary budgetary content did not exist. Based on the foregoing, as has been indicated, the plaintiff seeks to impose upon the Municipal entity the acquisition of the respective property, its payment, and the formalization of the respective public deed. In order to resolve on the merits of this aspect, it is necessary to define the scope of the document signed between the parties and denominated as a purchase-sale option (opción de compra venta). In this sense, this is understood as the promise of sale that the owner makes to the option holder, who may decide whether or not to acquire the respective property within a determined period, whether contractual or legal (art. Civil Code). In this regard, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia has indicated the following: <span style='color:#010101'>"<i>Consequently, the contract signed between the parties must be analyzed to determine its scope and which legal figure we are facing.- It is therefore interesting here to make some citations of national doctrine and jurisprudence on the matter, that is, when it is disputed whether the transaction is a promise or a consummated sale.- Don Alberto Brenes Córdoba in his Tratado de los Contratos (Treatise on Contracts) points out to us: "It is thus called, 'promise of sale,' the offer made by the seller to the buyer to transfer ownership of a thing for a determined price. If the promise is immediately accepted, the sale is concluded, and either of the stipulators can demand the fulfillment of the contract from the other. But if the buyer has reserved the right to respond within a certain period, the transfer of ownership only takes place once acceptance is expressed. <u>This is the promise of sale properly so called, which does not imply a commitment except on the part of the owner: it constitutes a simple project of future sale, an 'option,' as it is often called, because it is optional for the one to whom the promise is made to accept it or not</u>." (See Tratado de los Contratos, Alberto Brenes Córdoba. Editorial Juricentro S.A., 1995, San José, Costa Rica, pp. 108 and 109).- The master Don Pablo Casafont Romero expresses: "'Pre-contract'... a preliminary or preparatory agreement by which one assumes the obligation to enter into another contract, either as a declaration that a future contract is desired... The figure of the 'pre-contract,' solely by its modality of being preparatory, differs from the future contract that constitutes its object or purpose, because it is observed, from its structure... that strictly speaking it is a contract, since all the elements of one are present in it, with the agreement of the parties from which arises an obligation to do, consisting of the execution of the future contract. In effect, the Doctrine points out as elements of the pre-contract the same requirements of substance and form demanded for the main contract that through it the parties declare they want, among them and with the agreement that presupposes capacity, the object with a possible, lawful, determined or determinable performance, and the term which is equally essential in it, an assumption that generates an obligation for a term given the legal impossibility of assuming a commitment indefinitely." (Ensayos de Derecho Contractual. Pablo Casafont Romero. Antonio Lehmann Librería, Imprenta y Litografía Ltda. 1968, pp. 236 and 237).- In judgment No. 615 of 8:25 a.m. on September 28, 1990, from this same Court and Section, judgment No. 41 of 3:30 p.m. on July 29, 1986, from the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia is cited, in which the following was stated: "As expressed in doctrine, whether it is a unilateral or bilateral promise, an option or option contract, which make up the category of so-called preparatory, prior, or preliminary contracts, or in modern technique, pre-contracts, it is necessary to differentiate them from the definitive contract itself. The object of the pre-contract or preliminary contract is the subsequent conclusion of that other contract which cannot be finalized at the moment. As far as the sale is concerned, the unilateral and bilateral promise must not be confused with the definitive contract of sale. In the promise, the object is the future stipulation of a sales contract whose effects can never coincide with those of the sale. Because the promise does not give rise to the transmission of ownership, nor the obligation of the seller to deliver the thing, nor of the buyer to pay the price, because even though the pre-contract must determine the thing and the price, this does not imply the delivery of the first or the payment of the second; the promisors are only obliged to give their consent in the future to conclude the sale, which is of the utmost importance, because even with a pre-contract, at the moment of concluding the definitive contract, a new manifestation of the consent of the parties is required. Now, in the promise of sale, if it is immediately accepted, the sale is concluded, and either of the stipulators can demand the fulfillment of the contract from the other. But if the buyer has reserved the right to respond within a certain period, the transfer of ownership does not take place until acceptance is expressed..."- In judgment No. 51 of 3 p.m. on August 11, 1993, from the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, it was considered: "The option-to-sell contract, a figure much debated in doctrine and jurisprudence, is currently conceived as an autonomous, preliminary, or preparatory contract. Through it, a subject commits to selling another a property, for a certain price, if the latter decides to accept the option within the period set for that purpose. Thus, the promisor commits to maintaining the offer for a certain period and to selling a property at a certain price; the option holder, for their part, accepts the commitment acquired by the other contracting party, but does not commit to accepting the offer; they thus enjoy a period to study the proposal, which must be considered firm during the time of the option, without the possibility of being revoked. If it is accepted, there would be an agreement between the parties, and the definitive contract would then be configured, according to the rules provided for by articles 1009, 1049, and 1054 of the Civil Code."- In judgment No. 9 of 2:40 p.m. on January 13, 1995, from the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, one reads: "It is important to clearly establish when one is facing a pre-contract whose object is a sales contract and when one is facing a sale proper, it being necessary to keep in mind that both the option to sell and the reciprocal promise of sale, being pre-negotiable figures, contain the essential elements of the projected negotiation. Therefore, the pre-contract is considered a 'base contract' in which the characteristics of the definitive contract are projected, in such a way that once the respective offers are accepted, a new declaration of will is not necessary. In the option—or promise of sale—and in the reciprocal promise of sale, it is sufficient that, within the period, the acceptance of the option holder operates in the first case, or of either of the two parties in the second, for, as has been indicated, the sale to be perfected. It is clear, then, that the difference between the pre-negotial figure and the definitive transaction of sale is the definitive agreement on the thing and price manifested, precisely, in the acceptance of the optants. That is, the pre-negotial contractual relationship designs the definitive contract by referring to the essential elements of which it is composed, but without there being a definitive agreement on the thing and price, which occurs with the acceptance of the offers. In the option and in the reciprocal promise of sale, because their purpose is the future stipulation of a sales contract, their effects can never coincide with those of the sale, and they cannot give rise to either the transmission of ownership, the obligation of the seller to deliver the thing, or the obligation of the buyer to pay the price. Even though the pre-contract determines the thing and the price, the promisors only commit to respecting the term and to executing the definitive contract if consent is given on the price and the thing as it was foreseen. Hence, if a certain contract reveals that the phase of simple offers—unilateral or reciprocal, as the case may be—has been surpassed, because in reality there is nothing pending acceptance, the sale, independently of its eventual registration in the Public Registry, is perfected, for this is not a requirement ad substantiam for its perfection, leaving for the execution phase of the contract, as an obligation of the seller, the granting of the public deed and the delivery of the property." In judgment No. 37 of 3:15 p.m. on March 8, 1995, from the same Court, it was expressed: "It is true that in the reciprocal promise of sale, due to the nature of this pre-contract, the essential elements of the projected negotiation must be contained therein. However, its effects can never be coincident with those of the definitive sales contract, for the promise cannot give rise to the transmission of ownership, nor the obligation of the seller to deliver the thing, nor of the buyer to pay the price; the promisors are only obliged to give their subsequent consent to conclude the definitive contract.</i>." <b>(vote 00096 of September 4, 1996). </b>For the foregoing reasons, it is evident that in the option-to-sell contract, there is no definitive agreement on thing and price, but rather a mere promise of sale, in which the acquirer is free to accept or not accept what is offered.<b> </b> The foregoing as opposed to the reciprocal promise of sale where mutual commitments exist, both to sell as well as to acquire within a certain period.<b> </b></span>In this regard, an analysis of the signed document reveals that we are in the presence of a commitment by the plaintiff to sell the property in question, but without expressing a correlative obligation of the representation of the defendant Municipality to acquire the respective property. In this sense, the second clause of the document indicates the following: "<i>That THE SELLER in this act grants an EXCLUSIVE AND IRREVOCABLE OPTION TO SELL over said property to THE BUYER who accepts the same.</i>" No correlative commitment of acquisition by the Municipality is observed, and if it had been adopted, it would have been illegal in any case. In this vein, the demonstrated fact that the respective purchase option (opción de compra) was signed by the Municipal Mayor, Mr. Jimmy José Cubillo Mora, on August 4, two thousand ten, without yet having the authorization for direct purchase from the Contraloría General de la República (which was not given until December 16, 2010, and which was a condition sine qua non for any valid and effective act in terms of direct administrative contracting) and without the prior agreement of the Municipal Council (which was arranged on December 17 of that year, with the respective purchase approval being its exclusive competence) confirms the non-existence of acceptance or commitment of acquisition by the defendant Municipality. There is, then, no obligation on the part of the defendant that can be the object of a ruling against the defendant, just as the plaintiff company requests, based on the particular reading it makes of the respective purchase-sale option contract. Although the plaintiff might interpret that the agreement of said collegiate body signified acceptance of the terms established in the purchase option regarding object and price, it must be taken into consideration that said document had a validity of five months counted from the day of its signing, and therefore expired on January 4, two thousand eleven. However, on that date, it is observed that the plaintiff did not have the property free of liens, which did not happen until January 14, two thousand eleven, a date by which the indicated option had already expired. Consequently, within the validity period of the option and once the approval of the competent bodies for the act of purchasing the property was given, the plaintiff incurred a breach of its commitment to sell the land free of mortgage liens, which was expressly contemplated as a condition for the purchase by official communication 12455 of DCA-0912 of December 16, 2010, from the controlling body and by agreement nineteen, article thirty-one, of chapter eight of ordinary session number 50-2010 of December 17, 2010, of the Municipal Council. Additionally, said obligation was part of the offers made at all times by the seller, so its late fulfillment is not excusable. It must be emphasized that although subsequently, the plaintiff company proceeded to cancel the respective liens, it did so outside the validity of the purchase option when it had already incurred a breach thereof. Given the foregoing, upon the expiration of the option period, without the eventual selling party having fully complied with its obligations, it released the municipal entity from any obligation that could be interpreted as originating from said pre-contract (which, as has been seen, is not discernible in any case, given the unilateral nature of the commitments set forth therein). As a complementary matter, it must be noted that if check 1005-6 of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica was not issued at that time in favor of the plaintiff, this occurred by reason of the indicated breach and not so much due to the non-existence of budgetary content (note how it is issued at the end of the 2009 period and the party belatedly fulfills its obligations to free the property from mortgage liens in another budget period, that is, the 2010 period), so the non-payment and lack of formalization are not originally due to reasons attributable to the Administration but to the omissions of the plaintiff company. The fact that the check subsequently lacked budgetary content is a direct consequence of said breach—by extending into a later period—and the lapsing of the budgetary availability by the Administration at the time, insofar as the respective deed of sale was not formalized—for reasons attributable to the seller—and which would have committed the necessary budget had it been performed. (see art. 46 of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos). The defendant party additionally alleges that the provisions of article <span style='color:#010101'>1055 of the Civil Code must be applied to the case, which establishes, for the purposes of Lapse, the following: "<i>The promise of sale and the reciprocal promise of sale whose fulfillment has not been demanded within one month counted from when it is enforceable, lapses by that very fact.</i>" In this regard, it must be taken into consideration that the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia has repeatedly held that the scope of application of article 1055 is limited to cases in which there is an enforceable promise of sale or reciprocal promise of sale <u>without a stipulated term</u> for the option holder to accept and perfect the definitive contract. In such instances, it is indicated that the option holder can accept, and thus perfect the definitive sale, within the term of one month, which runs from the enforceability of the pre-contract. In this sense, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, since its ruling No. 51 of three o'clock in the afternoon on August eleventh, nineteen ninety-three, has maintained the following in this regard: </span></span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:\r\n150%;font-family:Arial;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>"VII.- The proper understanding of the aforementioned article 1055 presupposes another situatio</span></i><span lang=EN style='font-family:\"Century Gothic\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'> </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;\r\nfont-family:\"Century Gothic\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>n. Namely, that of option contracts where a final date for acceptance by the option holder is not recorded. In these cases, it would be inconvenient to leave open, without definition, the possibility of concluding the definitive contract, as it would harm legal certainty. This problem has arisen in other legislations, such as French, Italian, and Spanish law, where diverse solutions have been given. The French Civil Code has consecrated only one article for the promise of sale, 1589, which establishes: '... when there is mutual consent of the two contracting parties as to the thing and the price,' the promise is equated to a definitive sale. No term for acceptance is fixed when the contracting parties have stipulated nothing in this regard. Faced with this situation, French doctrine has considered, not without first expressing some perplexity, that the offer remains open indefinitely, for that was the obligation assumed by the promisor, unless the event of withdrawing the consent related to the definitive sale was contemplated. It is accepted, in any case, the possibility of scrutinizing the will of the parties, in order to determine if an implicit term exists or if, on the contrary, they wanted to remain bound to the preliminary contract indefinitely. On the topic, the authors Henri, León, and Jean MAZEAUD, in their <u>LECCIONES DE DERECHO CIVIL</u>, Part III, Vol. III, Editorial EJEA, Buenos Aires, p. 66, state: 'The obligation of the promisor does not raise difficulties when a term has been stipulated, upon the expiration of which the option is invalidated. But, is the promisor obliged indefinitely if no term has been fixed for the exercise of the option? It must be admitted so; since, unlike the offeror, the promisor has concluded a contract, the terms of which he cannot modify without the agreement of the beneficiary; he has given his consent for the sale, without reserving the right to withdraw it after a certain time, in the absence of acceptance by the beneficiary; his consent persists as long as the beneficiary does not renounce the option. But the judge is not prohibited from the interpretation of the contract to discover in it the tacit stipulation of a term, upon the expiration of which the promisor regains his freedom. Truly, the offer of sale and the unilateral promise of sale are thus brought closer; but would it not be unreasonable to bind the promisor and his heirs for ever and ever?' For their part, the professors Planiol and Ripert, in their <u>TRATADO PRACTICO DE DERECHO CIVIL FRANCES,</u> Volume X, Editorial Cultural, Havana, p. 192, indicate: 'The promisor is obliged to maintain his promise for all the time that has been agreed in the contract. But, sometimes the case arises that no term at all has been fixed for the option; in that supposition, it is up to the Courts to appreciate in fact the intention of the parties.' Spanish legislation also does not contain a specific norm regarding the supposition of an option without a term. Article 1451 of the Spanish Civil Code only provides: 'The promise to sell or buy, there being conformity on the thing and the price, shall give the contracting parties the right to mutually demand the fulfillment of the contract.' Given this, doctrine generally considers the inclusion of a term for its exercise as an indispensable element for the validity of the option. In Italian law, on the contrary, the problem was addressed directly, by establishing article 1331 of the Civil Code the following: 'When the parties agree that one of them remains bound to his declaration and the other has the power to accept it or not, the declaration of the first is considered as an irrevocable proposal for the purposes provided for by article 1329. If a term has not been fixed for acceptance, it may be established by the judge.' The promisor, according to the prevailing jurisprudence and doctrine in that country, when he wishes to free himself from the bond to which no term has been fixed, can only request the judge to fix one, and once the term has elapsed without the option holder having perfected the contract, the option will cease to have legal effects. In none of the three cited legal systems is there any lapse term for the exercise of the buyer's rights once the definitive sale has been perfected, the ordinary prescription terms being applicable, where pertinent. Once the option is accepted, in all three systems, the definitive contract is considered perfected, and the legal situation is identical to that of any sale stipulated through the contracting mechanisms between parties present, between absent parties, or following the acceptance of a firm unilateral proposal. In relation to this, it is considered that there is no reasonable motive to subject the action to demand the fulfillment of a perfect sale to lapse periods when it has been formed due to an option; in other cases, only the principles of ordinary prescription apply. In our context, the scientific doctrine, represented in the specific case by Doctor Diego Baudrit Carrillo, also joins the thesis propounded here. In his work <u>"LOS CONTRATOS TRASLATIVOS DEL DERECHO PRIVADO,"</u> when referring to the conception that has been criticized in these considerations, he says: 'This interpretation makes a distinction between sales formalized without a pre-contract and sales perfected by acceptance of a promise formulated in a pre-contract. The first sales would be governed by the rules of ordinary prescription; the second by the lapse term of one month. This distinction is artificial and is not based on a valid analysis of the norms, since, in our opinion, the law does not distinguish regarding the effects of a sale that has been perfected, whether it has the antecedent of a pre-contract or not, since what matters is the exchange of wills referring to the thing and price. In our judgment, the provision of article 1055 could only be interpreted, if it is to have any meaning, as referring to promises of sale without an agreed term, a hypothesis in which the law fixes one month for the option to be exercised.' (Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, p. 31).</span></i><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:\"Century Gothic\";\r\ncolor:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'> <i><u>VIII.- </u>On the topic in question, it should be noted, the need has been felt to establish maximum terms within which the firm offer, generated by the option contract, retains its validity, as its indefinite permanence is considered absolutely inconvenient when no term has been agreed. In matters of contracting, there exists in Costa Rica, in principle, an interest in giving proposals limited validity over time, because as time passes, a discordance can arise between the content of the proposal and the real will of the offeror. Thus, for example, article 443 of the Commerce Code gives the proposer the possibility of fixing a waiting period, which he is obliged to respect, but, if he does not establish one, the offer is deemed valid within the terms expressly indicated by subsection b). Furthermore, if the acceptance is not received by the offeror within the cited deadlines, the contract is not considered perfect. Similarly, a recent judgment of this Court, No. 137 of two twenty in the afternoon on September thirty, nineteen ninety-two, interpreted the term provided for by art</i></span><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;color:#010101;\r\nmso-ansi-language:EN'> <i>icle 1399 of the Civil Code, relating to donations, as a term </i></span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;\r\nline-height:150%;font-family:\"Century Gothic\";color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'>referring to the donee to accept the contract, under penalty of lapse, which upon occurring frustrates the perfection of the contract. Also, article 1012 of the Civil Code obliges the interested party to accept the proposal within the term fixed by the other party, but if one does not exist, they must do so '... within three days when in the same province; within ten, when not in the same province, but in the Republic; and within sixty days, when outside the Republic.' These provisions demonstrate our legislator's interest in limiting the effectiveness of contractual proposals over time, when the offeror has not established a term for it. It is in this context where the interpretation of article 1055 of the Civil Code finds its true dimension. When this norm establishes the term of one month to demand the fulfillment of the promise of sale or the reciprocal promise of sale, it does not refer in a procedural technical sense to a 'judicial demand,' but to the manifestation of the option holder accepting the option, which, already being enforceable, lacks a final term for its validity.

The rule refers to an <b>enforceable</b> <b>promise</b> of sale or reciprocal sale, that is, not yet accepted. If there were an expression of will by the option holder accepting it, it would no longer be that <b>enforceable promise</b>, but rather a <b>perfected purchase-sale contract.</b> Now, the breach of the latter would entitle the buyer, as provided in Article 1066, to request from the judge a registrable title, if necessary, and the delivery of the thing, in the event of the seller's refusal to fulfill the obligations arising from the principal contract. In conclusion, the scope of application of Article 1055 is limited to cases in which there exists an enforceable promise of sale or reciprocal purchase-sale without a stipulated term. In such events, the option holder may accept, and thus perfect the definitive purchase-sale, within a period of one month, which runs from the enforceability of the pre-contract. Failure to do so renders the option ineffective, and any subsequent acceptance would be unsuitable to configure the projected contract." As can be observed from the record, none of the claims in the lawsuit refer to the situation regulated by Article 1055 of the Civil Code; it is not a matter of the option holder's claim for the perfection of the definitive contract in the absence of a contractual term for that purpose, but rather of the eventual transferor's claim for compliance with the conditions of the purchase-sale option, given that it deemed the agreement perfected within its term, considering the existence of the entity's own conduct in that regard. In light of the foregoing, the arguments made by the representation of the defendant Municipality in this regard must be dismissed, and instead the indicated claim must be rejected, based on the breach of a substantial obligation by the transferring party (the non-cancellation of the mortgage lien) and its correction, once the expiration of said option had occurred, whereby it was no longer binding (given the foregoing and its own content) on the defendant Administration. The plaintiff must take into account that we are not in a pure and simple civil relationship, as when a public entity is involved, the pre-contractual or even contractual relationship is transversally affected by a series of principles, conditions, and requirements specific to administrative matters. Thus, unlike a relationship between two private parties, in the case of any link with a subject of public law, the formalization of any agreement necessarily could not ignore compliance with the public purpose of the acquired good or service, the competencies of the subjects responsible for the approval and/or authorization of the final acts, and above all, the regulations applicable in matters of administrative contracting and budgetary rules. It is for this reason that Article 32 of the General Law of Administrative Contracting indicates that "An administrative contract substantially conforming to the legal system shall be valid...". In the case under analysis, in addition to the considerations made regarding the expiration of the purchase-sale option and the breach by the transferring party of its duty to deliver the real property free of mortgage liens, it must be taken into consideration that the failure to formalize the deed in the respective budgetary period, i.e., in December 2010, for reasons attributable to the plaintiff, had an impact on the existence of sufficient budget to perfect the relationship. Note how as of December 1, two thousand ten, it was certified that the Municipality of Golfito had budgeted the following sums for the acquisition of the municipal operations center building: a) Buildings: C. 337,789,999.80. b) Land: C. 258,756,000.00, but subsequently it was indicated that the existing cash was allocated to other, different purposes. There is not, therefore, a current contract that has not been fulfilled by the plaintiff company, and in any case, given the absence of budgetary content as of this date, as evidenced by the proof and the testimony of the witness for the defendant Municipality, Mrs. Karen Moya Díaz, by the principle of legality, it is not possible to order what was requested by the plaintiff in accordance with Articles 5.f), 12, 110.f) of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, which establish as a limit for the acquisition of any budgetary commitment, the necessary existence of available funds to cover said expense.

**VI.-** As a second claim, the plaintiff requests that the defendant Municipality be ordered to pay the sum of ten million eight hundred sixty-five thousand six hundred eighty-three colones with twenty-four céntimos, corresponding to ten months of rent left unpaid in the year 2010. In this regard, there is express acknowledgment of said outstanding obligation by the defendant Administration, and in this vein, said obligation is recorded via official letter DP-MG-064-2012 of May 8, 2012, from the Procurement Officer of the Municipality of Golfito. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be taken into consideration that this Court ordered, in the trial hearing, evidence for a better resolution, wherein it is clearly demonstrated that in the case of the lease of the property subject to this proceeding, there was neither authorization from the Comptroller General of the Republic nor authorization for its direct contracting for purposes of a lease relationship (permission was only requested for the purchase of the property), nor were the necessary administrative contracting procedures followed. In this vein, the record shows that on March 4, 2009, via official letter AMJ-MG-O-081-2009, the Municipal Mayor authorized the Municipal Procurement Officer to directly contract, among other contracts, the lease with the plaintiff company for the sum of one thousand dollars per month, plus one thousand dollars as a security deposit, so that on the same day, the parties to this proceeding signed a lease contract for the plaintiff's property for three months. All of the foregoing took place without any evidence that any administrative contracting procedure had been previously fulfilled, or that at least the principles of administrative contracting had been respected. Thus, the record does not show that for the indicated decisions, at least other offers were compared or that free concurrence of other interested parties was guaranteed. In this vein, it must be remembered that the Public Administration employs various means for the fulfillment of public purposes, which are not exhausted in mere material actions or formal administrative acts, as it also resorts to the technique of administrative contracting, in which the fulfillment of an object with a contractor is agreed upon, as a collaborating subject in achieving the sought public interest. However, unlike a private contract, in administrative contracting, there exists a series of elements that transcend the mere agreement of wills signed in a document and that condition its creation, development, and termination. Thus, the administrative contract is conditioned in its origin, evolution, and completion by the specific legal system governing the matter and the specific contract. In this sense, the contractor's free and sovereign act of will is filtered by the administrative legal system, and fundamentally by the contracting rules, i.e., the tender specifications or conditions, the basis thereof. Furthermore, there will always be underlying any administrative contracting procedure, a series of principles that have been delimited by the Constitutional Chamber from Voto 0998-98 at 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, and reiterated in subsequent rulings, and which are basically summarized as free concurrence, equal treatment among bidders, publicity, legal certainty, legality and transparency, good faith, balance of interests, mutability of the contract, patrimonial intangibility, and control in the procedures. From the standpoint of positive law, the general regulatory framework for the obligations of both contracting entities and contracting companies is set forth in the Law of Administrative Contracting. Article 15 of said regulatory body expressly indicates the following obligation for every contracting Administration: "The Administration is obliged to comply with all commitments validly undertaken in administrative contracting and to provide collaboration so that the contractor executes the agreed object in a suitable manner." On the other hand, in correlation with said duty, Article 20 of the same law establishes the following obligation for contractors: "Contractors are obliged to fully comply with what was offered in their proposal and in any formal, documented manifestation they have additionally provided during the course of the procedure or in the formalization of the contract." Both obligations arise from a principle of good faith in contracting, by which both parties have, as a reference in the fulfillment of their obligations, a duty of mutual compliance and collaboration. In the specific case of lease contracts signed by the Administration, the provisions of Article 76 of the Law of Administrative Contracting and Article 159 of its Regulations must be applied, as they provide the following: "*Article 76.* — *Applicable procedure.* To lease real property, with or without constructions, the administration must resort to the procedure of public bidding, abbreviated bidding, or direct contracting, as appropriate, according to the amount". "*Article 159.*— *Lease of Real Property.* The Administration may lease real property, with or without a purchase option, through the procedure of public bidding, abbreviated bidding, or direct contracting, as appropriate, according to the estimated amount; without prejudice to the provisions relating to the lease or purchase of unique goods in this Regulation. The owner of the property shall not provide any type of performance guarantee in favor of the Administration. For the adjustment of the rent price, the provisions of Article 67 of the General Law of Urban and Suburban Leases shall apply". In this same sense, Article 6 of the Law on Urban and Suburban Leases indicates the application of said regulatory body to contractual relationships between the Public Administration and lessors, as follows: "*ARTICLE 6.- **State, decentralized entities, and municipalities.** The State, decentralized public entities, and municipalities, in their capacity as lessors or lessees, are subject to this law, unless an express provision in their own legal system provides otherwise. The bidding procedure is governed by the legal and regulatory provisions of administrative contracting*." By reason of the foregoing, any legal analysis regarding this contractual figure cannot ignore either the general regulations specific to administrative matters, or the specific provisions on leasing matters established in said law, given its specialty and specific normative scope. By reason of the indicated non-compliance, in the present case, with the procedures and principles specific to administrative contracting, this Court deems that in the present case, Articles 21 of the Law of Administrative Contracting, as amended by Law No. 8511 of May 16, 2006, published in La Gaceta No. 128 of July 4, 2006, and 210 of the Regulations of Administrative Contracting must be applied. In that sense, said rules provide: '*Article 21.* — *Verification of procedures.* It is the responsibility of the contractor to verify the correctness of the administrative contracting procedure and contractual execution. By virtue of this obligation, to base compensatory claims, the contractor may not allege ignorance of the applicable legal system or of the consequences of the administrative conduct. *The Regulations of this Law shall define the cases and the manner in which an irregular contractor shall be indemnified. Likewise, the official who has promoted an irregular contracting shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of Article 96 bis of this Law*" "*Article 210.*— *Duty of verification.* It is the responsibility of the contractor to verify the correctness of the administrative contracting procedure, and contractual execution. By virtue of this obligation, to base compensatory claims, the contractor may not allege ignorance of the applicable legal system or of the consequences of the administrative conduct. *The contract shall be deemed irregular when, in its processing, gross and evident defects are incurred, of easy verification, such as omission of the corresponding procedure or when an exception has been illegitimately resorted to. In those cases, no payment whatsoever may be recognized to the interested party, except in qualified cases, where it proceeds in accordance with general principles of Law, with respect to supplies, works, services, and other objects, executed with evident benefit to the Administration. In that event, the expected profit shall not be recognized, and if unknown, a reduction of 10% of the total amount shall be applied for that concept. The same solution shall be given to those contracts executed without having the endorsement or internal approval when required.* The non-formalization of the contract shall not be an impediment to applying this provision as pertinent." In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that in the present case, we are in the presence of an irregular contracting by the plaintiff company, given that, as has been indicated, no procedure was followed in its selection process, nor were at least the applicable principles in the matter complied with, with evident disregard of the provisions of Article 76 of the Law of Administrative Contracting. The plaintiff must take into consideration that the figure of direct contracting does not legitimize arbitrary or unfounded selection, and that while it allows for greater flexibility in determining the subject to whom a good or service is awarded, it does not imply that it is carried out in mockery of any procedural mechanism and internal control mechanism, or that the Municipal Mayor may award at will, without proper motivation of the act, following compliance with the principles indicated supra. This Court notes the absence of at least one well-founded, technical administrative decision regarding the reasons for choosing to contract directly with the plaintiff company and cannot ignore the various extensions to the lease relationship that occurred from the month of September 2009 until December 2011, with evident subdivisions (fraccionamientos) in the total amount of the contract and with increases exceeding 100% of the previous rent, devoid of any reasoning. This arbitrary attitude of the Municipal Mayor at the time, Mr. Jimmy Cubillo Mora, and the silent connivance of the representatives of Inmobiliaria Jericó Internacional S.A., lead this Court to deem evident the existence of an absolutely irregular contracting, totally removed from the applicable regulations on the matter and from public ethics and interests. In this vein, the duty to verify the correctness of the administrative procedure cannot be ignored in the case of said company, which openly benefited from the illegal actions of Mr. Cubillo Mora. Regarding the figure of irregular contracting, the jurisprudence of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: "**.-** *Irregular Contracting occurs when, despite an anomaly in the procedure, the Administration effectively and in good faith receives goods or services (previously agreed upon), partially or totally, with clear benefit to it. The right of the service provider to receive compensation (not payment) for executing a public order then arises, provided that, it has been said, in principle, three circumstances concur: irregularity in the procedure; the Administration obtains an advantage or benefit; and good faith on the part of the contractor. It is necessary to reiterate that it is through the partial reform introduced by Law No. 8511 of May 16, 2006 (effective as of January 4, 2007) that the LCA refers to this figure, as the Court considered. Thus, Article 21 is added to establish that the Regulations '…shall define the cases and the manner in which an irregular contractor shall be indemnified. Likewise, the official who has promoted an irregular contracting shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of Article 96 bis of this Law.' (Underlining is not from the original). Simultaneously with the entry into force of the indicated partial reform, the current Regulations of the LCA, promulgated by Executive Decree No. 33411 of September 27, 2006, also came into effect. In this regard, it is pertinent to clarify that it is not correct what the Court indicated in that these Regulations '…entered into force on November 2, 2006…', since although that is the date of its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, it is true that Article 227 thereof expressly provided: '…it shall be effective as of January 4, 2007.' It is through ordinal 210 that the provisions of legal Article 21 are developed. In reality, concordant with what the Court considered, with both normative provisions, which, as it indicated '…were not in force at the time the Ministry of Public Education issued the contested resolution…', the reiterated pronouncement of the CGR regarding that figure was positivized, among others, in the one referred to in the appealed ruling and from which an extract is transcribed. Thus, in its core and of interest to this matter, the CGR qualifies a contracting as irregular when it is carried out without complying with the due procedure (as a rule, bidding); it refers to an *agreement* that is irregularly reached between the Administration and the supplier; and a *negotiation* with the *consent* of the interested entity, *provided there is good faith in the contractor's action*, which is fundamental to determine the possible compensation for the service. This implies honest and loyal behavior in the exercise of rights, demanding coherence in the behavior of business relationships; it is an informing principle of the entire legal system that imposes the rejection of interpretations leading to a result contrary to that '…when contracting procedures are used for a purpose other than that intended by the legal system, or are exercised in circumstances that render them absolutely null.' (Official letters No. 6180 (DAGJ-933-2000) of June 22, 2000; 8558 (DAGJ-1326-2001) of August 6, 2001; and 4864 (DAGJ-609-2003) of May 9, 2003)* **(Voto N° 1246-2009 at 10:25 a.m. on December 3, 2009).** According to resolution R-CO-10-2009 from the Office of the Comptroller General at nine o'clock on January twenty-seven, two thousand nine, for the year in which the contractual lease relationship with the plaintiff company began, the Municipality of Golfito was in stratum "H" for purposes of determining contracting limits, and therefore could only contract directly for amounts less than four million five hundred seventy thousand colones. For amounts exceeding that figure up to forty-five million seven hundred thousand colones, an abbreviated bidding was required. In the case under review, it is noted that the existing lease under analysis in this resolution greatly exceeds the indicated limit amount for direct contracting for the defendant Municipality, with increases set by the indicated former Municipal Mayor in a unilateral and unfounded manner. Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court deems that in the *sub lite*, the elements of judgment set forth both in the regulations on public contracting and in the cited jurisprudential precedents are present, leading to the conclusion that the plaintiff company provided its services, under the figure of an irregular contracting. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is appropriate to compensate for the lease enjoyed by the municipal administration (expressly acknowledged by it as pending payment), so as not to incur in unjust enrichment. Starting then from the fact that both parties acknowledge that the amount owed is the sum of ten million eight hundred sixty-five thousand six hundred eighty-three colones with twenty-four céntimos, applying the provisions of Article 210 of the Regulations of Administrative Contracting, it would be appropriate to recognize to the plaintiff the sum of nine million seven hundred seventy-nine thousand one hundred fourteen colones with ninety-two céntimos. It should be noted that the acceptance made by the defendant Municipality of the outstanding payment obligation does not per se mean an automatic acknowledgment of the debt in full by this Court. The existence of a duty to verify the legality of the conduct adopted by both the Administration and its collaborators, and since the determination of public funds is at stake, makes it necessary to consider the irregular nature of the contracting subject to this proceeding by this Court.

In turn, and because this is a monetary obligation determined in this resolution—given the application of article 210 of the Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa, the indexation (indexación) mechanism provided for in numeral 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA) must be applied ex officio to this estimate—as mandated by law—in order to compensate for the loss of purchasing power that the national currency may have experienced or may still experience in the period starting from the finality of this resolution, all of which shall be determined in the judgment enforcement stage.-” In light of the foregoing, it is evident that in the option to sell contract, there is no final agreement on the thing and price, but rather a mere promise of sale, in which the acquirer is free to accept or not what is offered. This differs from the reciprocal promise of purchase and sale, where mutual commitments exist, both to sell and to acquire within a specified period. In this regard, from an analysis of the signed document, it is clear that we are in the presence of a commitment by the plaintiff to sell the property in question, but without expressing a corresponding obligation on the part of the sued Municipality to acquire said asset. In this sense, the second clause of the document indicates the following: "That THE SELLER in this act grants an EXCLUSIVE AND IRREVOCABLE OPTION TO SELL said property to THE BUYER, who accepts it". No corresponding commitment to acquire is evident on the part of the Municipality, which, if it had been adopted, would have been illegal in any case. In this sense, the non-existence of acceptance or commitment to acquire on the part of the sued Municipality is confirmed by the demonstrated fact that the respective option to purchase was signed by the Municipal Mayor, Mr. Jimmy José Cubillo Mora, on the 4th day of August of the year two thousand and ten, without yet having the authorization for direct purchase from the Contraloría General de la República (which was not given until the 16th day of December 2010 and which was a sine qua non condition for any valid and effective act in terms of direct administrative contracting) and without prior agreement of the Municipal Council (which was ordered on the 17th of December of said year, the respective approval of the purchase being the exclusive competence of the same). There is, then, no obligation on the part of the defendant that can be the subject of a ruling against the defendant, as requested by the plaintiff company based on its own particular reading of the respective option to purchase and sell contract. Although the plaintiff could interpret that the agreement of said collegiate body meant acceptance of the terms established in the option to purchase regarding the thing and price, it must be taken into consideration that said document had a validity of five months counted from the day of its signing, such that it expired on the 4th day of January two thousand and eleven. However, on said date, it is evident that the plaintiff did not have the property free of encumbrances, which only occurred until the 14th day of January two thousand and eleven, a date on which the indicated option had already expired. In light of the foregoing, within the validity period of the option and once the approval of the competent instances for the purchase of the property had been given, the plaintiff incurred a breach of its commitment to sell the land free of mortgage encumbrances, which was expressly contemplated as a condition for the purchase by official letter 12455 of DCA-0912 of the 16th of December 2010 from the audit body and by agreement nineteen, article thirty-one, of the eighth chapter of ordinary session number 50-2010 of the 17th of December 2010, of the Municipal Council. Additionally, said obligation formed part of the offers made at all times by the seller, such that its late fulfillment is not excusable. It must be highlighted that despite the fact that subsequently, the plaintiff company proceeded to cancel the respective encumbrances, it did so outside the validity of the option to purchase, when a breach on its part had already occurred. Given the foregoing, as the term of the option expired without the potentially selling party having fully complied with its obligations, the municipal entity was released from any obligation that could be interpreted as originating from said pre-contract (which, as has been seen, is not evident in any case, given the unilateral nature of the commitments set forth therein). Complementarily, it must be noted that if check 1005-6 from the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica was not issued in favor of the plaintiff at the time, this occurred due to the indicated breach and not so much due to the lack of budget content (note how it was issued at the end of the 2009 period and the party belatedly fulfilled its obligations to free the property of mortgage encumbrances in another budget period, that is, the 2010 period), such that the non-payment and non-formalization are not originally due to reasons attributable to the Administration but to the omissions of the plaintiff company. The fact that the check subsequently lacked budget content is a direct consequence of said breach—by extending into a later period—and the available budget of the Administration at the time lapsing, insofar as the respective deed of sale was not formalized—for reasons attributable to the selling party—and which would have encumbered the necessary budget had it been executed. (see Art. 46 of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos). The defendant additionally alleges that the provisions of Article 1055 of the Civil Code should apply to the case, which establishes, for purposes of Expiration, the following: "The promise of sale and the reciprocal promise of purchase and sale, whose fulfillment has not been demanded within one month counted from when it is enforceable, expires by that very fact." In this regard, it must be taken into consideration that the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has repeatedly held that the scope of application of Article 1055 is limited to cases in which there exists a promise of sale or reciprocal promise of purchase and sale enforceable without a stipulated term for the opting party to accept and perfect the definitive contract. In such cases, it is indicated that the option holder may accept, and thus perfect the definitive purchase and sale, within the term of one month, which runs from the enforceability of the pre-contract. In this sense, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, since its ruling No. 51 at fifteen hours on the eleventh of August of nineteen ninety-three, has held the following in this regard: "VII.- The proper understanding of the aforementioned article 1055 supposes another situation. Namely, that of option contracts where no deadline is stated for acceptance by the option holder. In those cases, it would be inconvenient to leave open, without definition, the possibility of concluding the definitive contract, as it would harm legal certainty. This problem has arisen in other legal systems, such as the French, Italian, and Spanish, where diverse solutions have been given. The French Civil Code has consecrated only one article for the promise of sale, 1589, which establishes: '... when there is reciprocal consent of the two contracting parties regarding the thing and the price', the promise is equated to a definitive purchase and sale. No term is set for acceptance when the contracting parties have stipulated nothing in this regard. Faced with this situation, French doctrine has considered, with some initial perplexity, that the offer remains open indefinitely, because that was the obligation assumed by the promisor, unless the event of withdrawing the consent pertaining to the definitive purchase and sale was contemplated. The possibility is accepted, in any case, to scrutinize the will of the parties, in order to determine if there is an implicit term or if, on the contrary, they wanted to remain bound to the preliminary contract indefinitely. On the subject, the authors Henri, León and Jean MAZEAUD, in their LECCIONES DE DERECHO CIVIL, Part III, Vol. III, EJEA Publishing House, Buenos Aires, p. 66, state: 'The obligation of the promisor does not raise difficulties when a term has been stipulated at the expiration of which the option is invalidated. But, does the promisor remain bound indefinitely if no term has been set for the exercise of the option? It must be admitted so; since, unlike the offeror, the promisor has concluded a contract, the terms of which he cannot modify without the agreement of the beneficiary; he has given his consent for the purchase and sale, without reserving the right to withdraw it after a certain time, in the absence of acceptance by the beneficiary; his consent persists as long as the beneficiary does not renounce the option. But the judge is not prohibited, in the interpretation of the contract, from discovering in it the tacit stipulation of a term at the expiration of which the promisor regains his freedom. In truth, the sale offer and the unilateral promise of sale are thus brought closer; but would it not be unreasonable to bind the promisor and his heirs for ages?' For their part, Professors Planiol and Ripert, in their TRATADO PRACTICO DE DERECHO CIVIL FRANCES, Volume X, Cultural Publishing House, Havana, p. 192, indicate: 'The promisor is obliged to maintain his promise for all the time that has been agreed in the contract. But, sometimes it happens that no term has been fixed for the option; in that case, it is for the Courts to have the power to assess in fact the intention of the parties.' The Spanish legislation also does not contain a specific rule regarding the case of an option without a term. Article 1451 of the Spanish Civil Code only provides: 'The promise to sell or buy, there being conformity in the thing and the price, will give the contracting parties the right to reciprocally demand compliance with the contract.' Faced with this, doctrine generally considers the inclusion of a term for its exercise as an indispensable element for the validity of the option. In Italian law, on the contrary, the problem was directly addressed, by establishing in Article 1331 of the Civil Code the following: 'When the parties agree that one of them remains bound to its declaration and the other has the power to accept it or not, the declaration of the former is considered an irrevocable proposal for the purposes provided for by Article 1329. If a term for acceptance has not been fixed, it can be established by the judge.' The promisor, according to the prevailing jurisprudence and doctrine in that country, when he wishes to free himself from the bond for which no term has been set, can only request the judge to fix it and, once the term has elapsed without the option holder having perfected the contract, the option will cease to have legal effects. In none of the three referenced legal systems is there any expiration period for the exercise of the buyer's rights once the definitive sale has been perfected, the ordinary terms of prescription being applicable, as pertinent. Once the option is accepted, in the three said systems, the definitive contract is considered perfected, and the legal situation is identical to that of any purchase and sale stipulated through the mechanisms of contracting between parties present, between absent parties, or after the acceptance of a firm unilateral proposal. In this regard, it is considered that there is no reasonable reason to subject the action to demand compliance with a perfected purchase and sale to expiration periods when it has been formed as a result of an option; in other cases, only the principles of ordinary prescription govern. In our context, the scientific doctrine, represented in this specific case by Dr. Diego Baudrit Carrillo, also joins the thesis advocated here. In his work 'LOS CONTRATOS TRASLATIVOS DEL DERECHO PRIVADO', when referring to the conception that has been criticized in these considerations, he says: 'This interpretation makes a distinction between purchase and sales formalized without a pre-contract and purchase and sales perfected by acceptance of a promise formulated in a pre-contract. The former purchase and sales would be governed by the rules of ordinary prescription; the latter by the expiration period of one month. This distinction is artificial and is not based on a valid analysis of the norms, since, we believe, the law does not distinguish regarding the effects of a purchase and sale that has been perfected, whether or not it has the antecedent of a pre-contract, since what matters is the exchange of wills referring to the thing and the price. In our view, the provision of Article 1055 could only be interpreted, if it must have any meaning, as referring to promises of sale without an agreed term, a hypothesis in which the law sets one month for exercising the option.' (Juricentro Publishing House, San José, 1984, p. 31). VIII.- On the subject in question, it should be pointed out that the need has been felt to establish maximum periods within which the firm offer generated by the option contract retains its validity, as its indefinite permanence when no term has been agreed upon is considered absolutely inconvenient. In matters of contracting, there exists in Costa Rica, in principle, an interest in giving proposals limited validity in time, because as time passes, a discrepancy may arise between the content of the proposal and the real will of the offeror. Thus, for example, Article 443 of the Commercial Code gives the proposer the possibility of setting a waiting period, which he is obliged to respect, but, if he does not establish it, the offer is deemed valid within the terms expressly indicated by subsection b). Furthermore, if the acceptance is not received by the offeror within the cited periods, the contract is not considered perfect. Similarly, a recent ruling from this Chamber, No. 137 at fourteen hours and twenty minutes on the thirtieth of September of nineteen ninety-two, interpreted the period provided for by Article 1399 of the Civil Code, relating to donations, as a term for the donee to accept the contract, under penalty of expiration, which upon occurring frustrates the perfection of the contract. Also, Article 1012 of the Civil Code obliges the interested party to accept the proposal within the term set by the other party, but if this does not exist, it must be done '... within three days when in the same province; within ten, when not in the same province, but within the Republic; and within sixty days, when outside the Republic.' These provisions demonstrate our legislator's interest in limiting the effectiveness of contractual proposals in time, when the offeror has not established a period for it. It is in this context that the interpretation of Article 1055 of the Civil Code finds its true dimension. By establishing in this norm the term of one month to demand compliance with the promise of sale or the reciprocal promise of purchase and sale, it does not refer in a technical procedural sense to a 'judicial demand', but to the manifestation of the option holder accepting the option, which, being already enforceable, lacks a deadline for its validity. The norm refers to a promise of sale or reciprocal promise of purchase and sale that is enforceable, that is, not yet accepted. If a manifestation of will from the option holder accepting it exists, one would no longer be dealing with that enforceable promise, but with a perfected purchase and sale contract. Now, non-compliance with the latter would give the buyer the right, according to what Article 1066 provides, to request from the judge a registrable title, if necessary, and the delivery of the thing, in the event of the seller's refusal to comply with the obligations derived from the main contract. In conclusion, the scope of application of Article 1055 is limited to cases in which there exists a promise of sale or reciprocal promise of purchase and sale enforceable without a stipulated term. In such events, the option holder may accept, and thus perfect the definitive purchase and sale, within the term of one month, which runs from the enforceability of the pre-contract. Failure to do so renders the option ineffective D ineffectiveness and any subsequent acceptance would be unsuitable to configure the projected contract." As can be observed from the case file, none of the claims in the lawsuit refer to the situation regulated by Article 1055 of the Civil Code; it is not about the claim of the option holder for the perfection of the definitive contract in the absence of a contractual term for that purpose, but rather the claim of the potential transferor for the conditions of the option to purchase and sell to be complied with, given that it considered what was agreed upon within its term to have been perfected, taking into account the existence of conducts by the entity in that sense. Thus, the arguments made by the representation of the sued Municipality in this sense must be rejected, and instead the indicated claim must be rejected, based on the breach of a substantial obligation by the transferring party (the non-cancellation of the mortgage encumbrance) and its rectification once said option had expired, such that it was no longer binding (given the foregoing and its own content) on the sued Administration. The plaintiff must take into account that we are not in a pure and simple civil relationship, insofar as, by being a public entity involved, the pre-contractual or even contractual relationship is transversally affected by a series of principles, conditions, and requirements specific to the administrative matter. Thus, unlike a relationship between two private parties, in the case of any bond with a subject of public law, the formalization of any agreement could not necessarily ignore the fulfillment of the public purpose of the acquired good or service, the competencies of the subjects responsible for the approval and/or authorization of the final acts, and above all, the regulations on administrative contracting and budget regulations that are applicable to it. It is for this reason that Article 32 of the Ley General de la Contratación Administrativa indicates that "An administrative contract substantially in accordance with the legal system shall be valid...". In the case under analysis, in addition to the considerations made regarding the expiration of the option to purchase and sell and the breach by the transferring party of its duty to deliver the property free of mortgage encumbrances, it must be taken into consideration that the non-formalization of the deed in the respective budget period, that is, in December 2010, for reasons attributable to the plaintiff, had an impact on the existence of a sufficient budget to perfect the relationship. Note how, as of the 1st day of December two thousand and ten, it was certified that the Municipality of Golfito had budgeted the following sums for the acquisition of the municipal operations center building: a) Buildings: C. 337,789,999.80. b) Land: C. 258,756,000.00, but subsequently it was indicated that the existing cash was allocated to other different purposes. There does not exist, then, a valid contract that has not been breached by the plaintiff company, it being the case that in any event, as there is no budget content as of this date, as evidenced by the proof and testimony of the witness from the sued Municipality, Mrs. Karen Moya Díaz, by the principle of legality, it is not possible to order what is requested by the plaintiff in accordance with Articles 5.f), 12, 110. f) of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, which establish as a limit for the acquisition of any budget commitment, the necessary existence of available resources to cover said expense.

VI.- As a second claim, the plaintiff requests that the sued Municipality be ordered to pay the sum of ten million eight hundred sixty-five thousand six hundred eighty-three colones and twenty-four céntimos, which corresponds to ten months of lease payments left unpaid in the year 2010. In this regard, there is express acknowledgment of said pending obligation by the sued Administration, and along these lines, by official letter DP-MG-064-2012 of the 8th of May 2012 from the Provider of the Municipality of Golfito, such obligation is recorded. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be taken into consideration that this Court ordered, in the trial hearing, proof for a better ruling, where it is clearly evidenced that in the case of the lease of the property that is the subject of this process, there was neither authorization from the Contraloría General de la República nor authorization for its direct contracting for purposes of a lease relationship (permission was only requested for the purchase of the property), nor were the necessary administrative contracting procedures followed. In this line of thought, the case file shows that on the 4th of March 2009, by official letter AMJ-MG-O-081-2009, the Municipal Mayor authorized the Municipal Provider to directly contract, among other contracts, the lease with the plaintiff company for the sum of one thousand dollars per month, plus one thousand dollars as a security deposit, such that on the same day, the parties in this process signed a lease contract for the property owned by the plaintiff for three months. All the foregoing, without it being evident that any administrative contracting procedure was previously complied with, or that at least the principles of administrative contracting were respected. Thus, it is not evident from the case file that for the indicated decisions, other offers were at least sufficiently considered or that the free concurrence of other interested parties was guaranteed. In this line of thought, it must be remembered that the Public Administration employs diverse means for the fulfillment of public purposes, which are not exhausted in mere material actions or formal administrative acts, given that it also resorts to the technique of administrative contracting, in which the fulfillment of an object is agreed upon with a contractor, as a collaborating subject in achieving the public interest sought. However, unlike a private contract, in administrative contracting, there is a series of elements that transcend the mere agreement of wills signed in a document and that condition its creation, development, and extinction. That is how the administrative contract is conditioned in its origin, evolution, and conclusion by the specific legal system governing the matter and the specific contract. In this sense, the act of will, free and sovereign, of the contractor, is filtered by the administrative legal system, and fundamentally by the regulations of the contracting, that is, the tender specifications or conditions sheet, the basis thereof. Furthermore, a series of principles that have been delimited by the Constitutional Chamber starting from vote 0998-98 at 11:30 hours on the 16th of February 1998 and reiterated in subsequent rulings will always underlie every administrative contracting procedure, and these are basically summarized as free concurrence, equality of treatment among bidders, publicity, legal certainty, legality and transparency, good faith, balance of interests, mutability of the contract, patrimonial intangibility, and control in the procedures. From the point of view of positive law, the general regulatory framework for the obligations of both the contracting entities and the contracting companies is contemplated in the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Article 15 of said regulatory body expressly indicates the following as an obligation of every contracting Administration: "The Administration is obliged to comply with all commitments, validly acquired, in administrative contracting and to provide collaboration so that the contractor executes the agreed object in an ideal manner." On the other hand, correlative to said duty, Article 20 of the same law establishes the following obligation for contractors: "Contractors are obliged to fully comply with what is offered in their proposal and in any formal documented manifestation, that they have additionally contributed, during the procedure or in the formalization of the contract." Both obligations arise from a principle of good faith in contracting, through which both parties have, as a reference in the fulfillment of their obligations, a duty of mutual compliance and collaboration.

In the specific case of lease contracts entered into by the Administration, the provisions of Article 76 of the Public Procurement Law (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa) and Article 159 of its Regulation must be applied, as they provide the following: "<i>Article 76.</i> <i>—</i> <b><i>Applicable Procedure</i></b><i>. To lease real estate, with or without buildings, the administration must use the public tender (licitación pública), abbreviated tender (licitación abreviada), or direct contracting (contratación directa) procedure, as appropriate, according to the amount</i> ". "<i>Article 159.</i> <b><i>Lease of Real Estate</i></b><i>. The Administration may lease real estate, with or without a purchase option, through the public tender, abbreviated tender, or direct contracting procedure, as appropriate, according to the estimated amount; without prejudice to the provisions regarding the lease or purchase of unique goods in this Regulation. The property owner shall not provide any type of performance guarantee (garantía de cumplimiento) in favor of the Administration. For the adjustment of the rent price, the provisions of Article 67 of the General Law of Urban and Suburban Leases (Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos) shall apply</i>". In this same sense, Article 6 of the Law of Urban and Suburban Leases (Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos) indicates the application of said regulatory body to contractual relationships between the Public Administration and lessors, as follows: "<i>ARTICLE 6.- <b>State, decentralized entities, and municipalities.</b> The State, decentralized public entities, and municipalities, in their capacity as lessors or lessees, are subject to this law, unless expressly provided otherwise in their own legal system. The tender procedure is governed by the legal and regulatory provisions of public procurement (contratación administrativa)</i>".

By reason of the foregoing, any legal analysis regarding this contractual figure cannot disregard either the general regulations specific to the administrative field or the specific provisions on tenancy matters established in said law, given its specialty and specific normative scope. By reason of the indicated non-compliance in the present case with the procedures and principles inherent to public procurement, this panel considers that in the present case, Article 21 of the Public Procurement Law, amended by Law No. 8511 of May 16, 2006, published in La Gaceta No. 128 of July 4, 2006, and Article 210 of the Regulation of Public Procurement (Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa) must be applied. In that sense, said rules provide: <i>'</i> <i>Article 21. </i><i>—</i> <i>Verification of procedures. It is the contractor's responsibility to verify the correctness of the public procurement procedure and contractual execution. By virtue of this obligation, to base compensatory claims (gestiones resarcitorias), the contractor may not allege ignorance of the applicable legal system or the consequences of the administrative conduct. <u>The Regulation of this Law shall define the assumptions and the manner in which the irregular contractor shall be compensated. Likewise, the official who has promoted an irregular procurement (contratación irregular) shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of Article 96 bis of this Law</u>" "Article 210.</i> <i>—</i> <i>Duty of verification. It is the contractor's responsibility to verify the correctness of the public procurement procedure and contractual execution. By virtue of this obligation, to base compensatory claims, the contractor may not allege ignorance of the applicable legal system or the consequences of the administrative conduct. <u>The contract shall be deemed irregular when, in its processing, serious and evident defects are incurred, easily verifiable, such as, omission of the corresponding procedure or illegitimately resorting to some exception. In those cases, no payment whatsoever may be recognized to the interested party, except in qualified cases, where it proceeds in accordance with general principles of Law, regarding supplies, works, services, and other objects, executed with evident benefit to the Administration. In that case, the intended profit shall not be recognized and if it is unknown, a reduction of 10% of the total amount shall be applied for that concept. The same solution shall be given to those contracts that are executed without having the countersignature (refrendo) or internal approval, when this is required</u>. The non-formalization of the contract shall not be an impediment to applying this provision as pertinent". </i>In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that in the present case we are in the presence of an irregular procurement (contratación irregular) by the plaintiff company, given that, as has been indicated, no procedure was followed in its selection process, nor were at least the applicable principles in the matter fulfilled, with evident disregard for the provisions of Article 76 of the Public Procurement Law. The plaintiff must take into consideration that the figure of direct contracting does not legitimize an arbitrary or unfounded selection and that although it offers the possibility of greater flexibility in determining the subject to whom a good or service is awarded, it does not imply that it be carried out in mockery of all procedural mechanisms and internal control mechanisms or that the Municipal Mayor can award at will, without due motivation of the act, prior compliance with the principles indicated supra. This Court misses the presence of at least a founded and technical administrative decision regarding the reasons for choosing to contract directly with the plaintiff company and cannot ignore the various extensions to the lease relationship that occurred from the month of September 2009 until December 2011, with evident subdivisions (fraccionamientos) in the total amount of the procurement and with increases exceeding 100% of the previous rent, lacking any reasoning. That arbitrary attitude of the Municipal Mayor at the time, Mr. Jimmy Cubillo Mora, and the silent connivance of the representatives of Inmobiliaria Jericó Internacional S.A. lead this Court to deem evident the existence of an absolutely irregular procurement and totally removed from the applicable regulations on the matter and from ethics and public interests. In this vein, the duty to verify the correctness of the administrative procedure cannot be ignored in the case of the indicated company, which openly benefited from the illegal actions of Mr. Cubillo Mora. Regarding the figure of irregular procurement, the jurisprudence of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated: "<b>.- </b><i>Irregular Procurement occurs when, despite an anomaly in the procedure, the Administration effectively and in good faith receives goods or services (previously agreed upon), partially or totally, with clear benefit to it. The right of the provider then arises to receive compensation (indemnización, not payment) upon executing a public order, provided that, it has been said, in principle, three circumstances concur: irregularity in the procedure; the Administration obtains an advantage or benefit; and the good faith of the contractor. It is necessary to reiterate that it is through the partial amendment introduced by Law No. 8511 of May 16, 2006 (effective as of January 4, 2007) that allusion is made to that figure in the LCA, just as the Court considered. Thus, Article 21 is added, to establish that the Regulation “…shall define the assumptions and the manner in which the irregular contractor shall be compensated. Likewise, the official <u>who has promoted</u> an irregular procurement shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of Article 96 bis of this Law." (The underlining is not from the original). Simultaneously with the entry into force of the indicated partial amendment, the current Regulation to the LCA also came into effect, promulgated by Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 33411 of September 27, 2006. In this regard, it is appropriate to clarify that it is not correct what was indicated by the Court regarding this Regulation “…entered into force on November 2, 2006…”, because although that is the date of its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, it is true that Article 227 ibidem, expressly provided: “…it governs as of January 4, 2007.” It is through Article 210 that what is established in legal Article 21 is developed. In reality, concordant with what was considered by the Court, with both normative provisions, which, as it indicated, “…were not in force at the time the Ministry of Public Education issued the resolution being challenged…”, the reiterated pronouncement of the CGR regarding that figure was formalized, among others, in the one referenced in the appealed decision and from which an excerpt is transcribed. Thus, in what is essential and of interest to this matter, the CGR qualifies a procurement as irregular when it is carried out without complying with due process (as a rule, the tender); allusion is made to an <u>agreement</u></i> <i>that irregularly arises between the Administration and the provider; and a <u>negotiation</u></i> <i>with the <u>consent</u> of the interested entity, <u>provided there is good faith in the contractor's conduct</u>, which is fundamental to determine the possible compensation for service. This implies honest and loyal behavior in the exercise of rights, demanding coherence in the behavior of business relationships; it is an informing principle of the entire legal system and imposes the rejection of interpretations that lead to a result contrary to it “…as when procurement procedures are used for a purpose other than that intended by the legal system, or are exercised in circumstances that render them absolutely void.” (official letters Nos. 6180 (DAGJ-933-2000) of June 22, 2000; 8558 (DAGJ-1326-2001) of August 6, 2001; and 4864 (DAGJ-609-2003) of May 9, 2003)</i> <b>(Voto N° 1246-2009 of 10:25 a.m. on December 3, 2009). </b>According to resolution R-CO-10-2009 from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic at 9:00 a.m. on January 27, 2009, for the year in which the contractual lease relationship with the plaintiff company began, the Municipality of Golfito was in stratum "H" for purposes of determining contracting limits, meaning it could only contract directly for amounts less than four million five hundred seventy thousand colones. For sums exceeding that amount and up to forty-five million seven hundred thousand colones, an abbreviated tender (licitación abreviada) had to be conducted. In the case under examination, it is noted that the existing lease under analysis in this resolution far exceeds the indicated limit amount for direct contracting for the defendant Municipality, with increases set by the indicated former Municipal Mayor unilaterally and unfoundedly. Based on the foregoing considerations, this panel considers that in the sub lite, the elements of judgment are present as stated both in the regulations on public procurement and in the cited jurisprudential precedents, in order to conclude that the plaintiff company provided its services under the figure of an irregular procurement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is appropriate to compensate for the lease enjoyed by the municipal administration (expressly recognized by it as pending payment), in order not to incur in unjust enrichment. Starting then from the fact that both parties recognize that the amount owed is the sum of ten million eight hundred sixty-five thousand six hundred eighty-three colones with twenty-four céntimos, applying the provisions of Article 210 of the Regulation of Public Procurement, it would proceed to recognize to the plaintiff the sum of nine million seven hundred seventy-nine thousand one hundred fourteen colones with ninety-two céntimos. It must be noted that the acceptance made by the defendant Municipality of the obligation pending payment does not mean per se an automatic recognition of the debt integrally by this Court. The existence of a duty to verify the legality of the conduct adopted by both the Administration and its collaborators, and since the determination of public funds is at stake, makes it necessary to consider the irregular nature of the procurement object of this process by this Panel. In turn, and because it is a monetary obligation determined in this resolution – given the application of Article 210 of the Regulation of Public Procurement, to said award the indexation mechanism contemplated in numeral 123 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, CPCA) must be applied ex officio – as provided by law – to compensate for the loss of purchasing power that the national currency may have experienced or may still experience in the period from the finality of this resolution, all of which shall be determined in the judgment execution stage.-"

“V.- Sobre el fondo: Como primera pretensión, la parte actora solicita se ordene a la Municipalidad de Golfito a cumplir con sus obligaciones en el contrato de compra venta del inmueble, inscrito en el Partido de Puntarenas, folio real matrícula número 104.294-000, suscribir la respectiva escritura de traspaso del bien y realizar el pago correspondiente. Al respecto, la Municipalidad demandada señala en primer término que no hubo acuerdo de cosa y precio entre las partes, por lo que la relación contractual no se formalizó, siendo así que además prescribió el derecho de la parte actora para reclamar el cumplimiento de dicho acuerdo. En ese sentido, en autos se ha tenido por demostrado que mediante nota de fecha 17 de diciembre de 2008, los representantes de la sociedad actora realizaron oferta de arrendamiento y opción de compra de la finca del Partido de Puntarenas folio real matrícula número 6-104294-000, por la suma de mil dólares mensuales y cuatrocientos treinta mil dólares la venta del inmueble. Dicha opción se estableció por un plazo de seis meses. Con posterioridad, al no formalizarse la compra respectiva, el día 4 de agosto de dos mil diez, el entonces Alcalde Municipal de Golfito, Señor Jimmy Cubillo Mora suscribió con el Apoderado Legal de Inversiones Jericó S.A., una opción de compraventa de la propiedad dicha, por un precio de trescientos treinta millones de colones, con un plazo de cinco meses y en el entendido de que la venta se realizará libre de gravámenes y anotaciones y con los impuestos al día. En este orden de ideas, mediante acuerdo diecinueve, artículo treinta y uno, del capítulo octavo de la sesión ordinaria número 50-2010 de 17 de diciembre de 2010, del Concejo Municipal de Golfito, se dispuso acoger la solicitud hecha por el Alcalde Municipal del momento, Señor Jimmy Cubillo Mora para adjudicar la compra directa del inmueble de la finca del Partido de Puntarenas folio real matrícula número 6-104294-000, por un precio de trescientos treinta millones de colones, propiedad de la empresa actora. En razón de lo anterior, el 20 de diciembre de 2010 el Departamento de Proveeduría de la Municipalidad de Golfito emitió la orden de compra de bienes y servicios número 006689, a nombre del proveedor Inmobiliaria Jericó Internacional S.A., por la suma de trescientos veintitrés millones cuatrocientos mil colones y ese mismo día, de manera célere, se emitió el cheque número 1005-6 del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica a nombre de Inmobiliaria Jericó Internacional S.A., por la suma de trescientos veintitrés millones cuatrocientos mil colones. No obstante lo anterior, de los autos consta que a esa fecha aún no se cumplían todas las condiciones establecidas por la Contraloría General de la República, en su oficio 12455 de DCA-0912 de 16 de diciembre de 2010, para la compra del inmueble, dado que el mismo no se encontraba libre de gravámenes. Es por ese motivo que mediante escritura otorgada el día 14 de enero de 2011, la actora canceló las hipotecas existentes. En razón de lo anterior, mediante oficio AMJ-MG-O-003-2011 de 18 de enero de 2011, el señor Jimmy Cubillo Mora, envia la respectiva certificación a la Notaría del Estado, a fin de que elabore la escritura respectiva. A pesar de lo anterior, la compra nunca fue formalizada, habida cuenta que el cheque 1005-6 del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica no contaba con fondos, ya que el dinero había sido gastado en otros fines, por lo que no existió el contenido presupuestario necesario. Fundado en lo anterior, como se ha indicado, la parte actora pretende que se imponga al ente Municipal la adquisición del respectivo inmueble, su pago y formalización de la respectiva escritura. A fin de resolver sobre el fondo de este extremo, es menester definir los alcances del documento rubricado entre las partes y denominado como opción de compra venta. En este sentido, se entiende como tal la promesa de venta que el propietario realiza al optante, quien puede decidir o no adquirir el bien respectivo en un plazo determinado, ya sea contractual, ya sea legalmente (art. Código Civil). Al respecto, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha indicado, lo siguiente: "Se debe analizar en consecuencia el contrato suscrito entre las partes para determinar sus alcances y ante qué figura jurídica nos encontramos.- Resulta por lo tanto interesante aquí hacer algunas citas de doctrina y jurisprudencia nacional sobre el particular, es decir cuando se discute si el negocio es una promesa o una compraventa consumada.- Don Alberto Brenes Córdoba en su Tratado de los Contratos nos señala: "Llamase así, "promesa de venta", el ofrecimiento que hace el vendedor al comprador de transmitirle la propiedad de una cosa mediante un precio determinado. Si la promesa es aceptada inmediatamente, la compraventa queda concluida, pudiendo cualquiera de los estipulantes exigir del otro el cumplimiento del contrato. Pero si el comprador se ha reservado el derecho de contestar en cierto plazo, el traslado del dominio no tiene lugar sino una vez que exprese su aceptación. Esta es la promesa de venta propiamente tal, que no implica compromiso sino de parte del propietario: constituye un simple proyecto de futura venta, una "opción", como suele decirse, por ser optativo para aquel a quien se hace la promesa, aceptarla o no". ( Ver Tratado de los Contratos, Alberto Brenes Córdoba. Editorial Juricentro S.A., 1995, San José, Costa Rica, págs. 108 y 109).- El maestro don Pablo Casafont Romero expresa: "Precontrato"...convenio preliminar o preparatorio por el cual se asume la obligación de celebrar otro contrato, sea como declaración de que se quiere un contrato futuro...La figura del "precontrato", tan sólo por su modalidad de ser prepatarorio, difiere del contrato futuro que constituye su objeto o finalidad, porque se advierte, de su estructura... que en rigor es un contrato, por darse en el mismo todos los elementos de éste, con el acuerdo de partes del que surge una obligación de hacer, consistente en la celebración del futuro contrato. Son, en efecto, señalados por la Doctrina como elementos del precontrato, los mismos requisitos de sustancia y forma exigidos para el contrato principal que por su medio las partes declaran querer, entre ellos y con el acuerdo que presupone la capacidad, el objeto con la prestación posible, lícita, determinada o determinable, y el plazo que igualmente es esencial en el mismo, supuesto que genera una obligación a término ante la imposibilidad legal de asumir un compromiso indefinidamente." (Ensayos de Derecho Contractual. Pablo Casafont Romero. Antonio Lehmann Librería, Imprenta y Litografía Ltda. 1968, págs. 236 y 237).- En la sentencia N ° 615 de las 8:25 hrs. del 28 de setiembre de 1990 de este mismo Tribunal y Sección, se cita la sentencia N ° 41 de 15:30 hrs. del 29 de julio de 1986 de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en que se expuso lo siguiente: "Conforme se expresa en doctrina ya se trate de promesa unilateral o bilateral, de opción o contrato de opción, que integran la categoría de los contratos llamados preparatorios, previos o preliminares, o con técnica moderna, precontratos, es necesario diferenciarlos del contrato definitivo en sí mismo. El objeto del precontrato o contrato preliminar es la ulterior conclusión de aquel otro que no se puede ultimar por el momento. En cuanto a la compraventa se refiere, no se deben confundir la promesa unilateral y la bilateral con el contrato definitivo de compra venta. En la promesa el objeto es la futura estipulación de un contrato de compraventa cuyos efectos no pueden nunca coincidir con los de la venta. Porque de la promesa no se deriva ni la transmisión de propiedad, ni obligación del vendedor de entregar la cosa, ni del comprador de pagar el precio, porque aún cuando en el precontrato deben estar determinados la cosa y el precio, ello no supone la entrega de la primera ni el pago del segundo; los prometientes solo están obligados a prestar en el futuro su consentimiento para concluir la compraventa, lo que es de suma importancia, porque aún habiendo precontrato al momento de celebrar el contrato definitivo, se requiere una nueva manifestación del consentimiento de las partes, ahora bien, en la promesa de venta, si ésta es aceptada inmediatamente la compraventa queda concluida pudiendo cualquiera de los estipulantes exigir del otro el cumplimiento del contrato. Pero si el comprador se ha reservado el derecho de contestar en determinado plazo, el traslado del dominio no tiene lugar sino una vez que de agosto de 1993 de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, se consideró: " El contrato de opción de venta, figura muy debatida en doctrina y jurisprudencia, es concebido en la actualidad como un contrato autónomo, preliminar o preparatorio. Por medio de él, un sujeto se compromete a vender a otro un bien, por determinado precio, si éste decide aceptar la opción dentro del plazo fijado al efecto. Es así como el promitente se compromete a mantener la oferta durante un cierto plazo, y a vender un bien a un precio determinado; el optante, por su parte acepta el compromiso adquirido por el otro contratante, pero no se compromete a aceptar la oferta, goza por ende, de un plazo estudiar la propuesta, la cual debe considerarse firme durante el tiempo de la opción, sin posibilidad de ser revocada. Si es aceptada, habría acuerdo entre las partes y se configuraría entonces el contrato definitivo, según las reglas previstas por los artículos 1009, 1049 y 1054 del Código Civil".- En la sentencia N ° 9 de las 14:40 horas del 13 de enero de 1995 de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia se lee: " Es importante establecer con claridad cuando se está frente a un precontrato cuyo objeto es un contrato de compraventa y cuando se está frente a una compraventa propiamente dicha, siendo necesario tener presente que tanto la opción de venta como la promesa recíproca de compraventa, por ser figuras prenegociables, contienen los elementos esenciales de la negociación proyectada. Por eso se considera al precontrato como un "contrato base" en el cual se proyectan las características del contrato definitivo, de tal forma que aceptadas las ofertas respectivas, no es necesaria una nueva declaración de voluntad. En la opción - o promesa de venta - y en la promesa recíproca de compraventa, basta que, dentro del plazo, opere la aceptación del optante en el primer caso, o de cualquiera de las dos partes en el segundo para que, como se ha señalado, se perfeccione la compraventa. Resulta claro, entonces, que la diferencia entre la figura prenegocial y el negocio definitivo de compraventa es el acuerdo definitivo de cosa y precio manifestado, precisamente, en la aceptación de los optantes. Es decir, la relación contractual prenegocial diseña el contrato definitivo haciendo referencia a los elementos esenciales de que se compone aquél, pero sin que haya acuerdo definitivo sobre cosa y precio, que se da con la aceptación de las ofertas. En la opción y en la promesa recíproca de compraventa por ser su objeto la futura estipulación de un contrato de compraventa, sus efectos nunca pueden coincidir con los de la venta, no pudiendo derivar ni la transmisión de propiedad ni la obligación del vendedor de entregar la cosa ni del comprador de pagar el precio, porque aún cuando en el precontrato se determina la cosa y el precio, los promitentes sólo se obligan a respetar el plazo y a realizar el contrato definitivo de mediar consentimiento sobre el precio y la cosa tal y como fue previsto. De allí que si en un determinado contrato se desprende que la fase de las simples ofertas -unilateral o recíproca, según el caso - ha sido superada pues en realidad no hay nada pendiente de aceptación, la compraventa, en forma independiente de su eventual inscripción en el Registro Público, pues ésta no es un requisito ad substantiam para su perfeccionamiento, quedando para la fase de ejecución del contrato como una obligación del vendedor el otorgamiento de escritura pública y la entrega del bien" En la sentencia No.37 de las 15:15 hrs. del 8 de marzo de 1995 de la misma Sala se expresó: Es verdad que en la promesa recíproca de compraventa, por la índole de este precontrato, deben contenerse los elementos esenciales de la negociación proyectada. Empero, sus efectos nunca pueden resultar coincidentes con los del contrato definitivo de compra - venta, pues de la promesa no puede derivar ni transmisión de propiedad, ni obligación del vendedor de entregar la cosa ni del comprador de pagar el precio; los promitentes, únicamente están obligados a prestar su consentimiento ulterior para celebrar el contrato definitivo." (voto 00096 de 4 de setiembre de 1996). En razón de lo anterior, es evidente que en el contrato de opción de venta no hay acuerdo definitivo de cosa y precio, sino una mera promesa de venta, en la cual, el adquirente queda en libertad de aceptar o no lo ofrecido. Lo anterior a diferencia de la promesa recíproca de compra venta en donde median compromisos mutuos, tanto de vender como de adquirir en determinado plazo. Al respecto, de un análisis del documento suscrito que advierte que estamos en presencia de un compromiso de la parte actora de vender el inmueble en cuestión, mas sin que se exprese una correlativa obligación de la representación de la Municipalidad demandada de adquirir el respectivo bien. En este sentido, la cláusula segunda del documento indica lo siguiente: " Que LA VENDEDORA en este acto otorga OPCION EXCLUSIVA E IRREVOCABLE DE VENTA sobre dicha propiedad a EL COMPRADOR quien acepta la misma". No se advierte un correlativo compromiso de adquisición por parte de la Municipalidad, el cual se haberse adoptado, en todo caso había sido ilegal. En este sentido, confirma la no existencia de aceptación o compromiso de adquisición por parte de la Municipalidad demandada, el hecho demostrado de que la opción de compra respectiva fue rubricada por el Alcalde Municipal, Señor Jimmy José Cubillo Mora, el día 4 de agosto del años dos mil diez, sin contar aún con la autorización de compra directa por parte de la Contraloría General de la República (la cual no se dio hasta el día 16 de diciembre de 2010 y que era condición sine qua non para cualquier acto válido y eficaz en términos de contratación administrativa directa) y sin acuerdo previo del Concejo Municipal (el cual se dispuso el 17 de diciembre de dicho año, siendo competencia exclusiva del mismo la aprobación respectiva de compra). No hay entonces ninguna obligación de la parte demandada que pueda ser objeto de condena la parte demandada, tal y como lo pide la sociedad actora fundada en la lectura particular que realiza del respectivo contrato de opción de compra venta. Si bien podría interpretarse por la parte actora que el acuerdo de dicho órgano colegiado significó aceptacíón de los términos establecidos en la opción de compra en cuanto a objeto y precio, debe tomarse en consideración que dicho documento tenía una vigencia de cinco meses contado a partir del día de su rúbrica, por lo que vencía el día 4 de enero de dos mil once. No obstante, a dicha fecha, se advierte que la parte actora no tenía el inmueble libre de gravámenes, lo cual no se dio sino hasta el día 14 de enero de dos mil once, fecha a la cual, la indicada opción ya había fenecido. En razón de lo anterior, dentro del plazo de vigencia de la opción y una vez que se dio la aprobación de las instancias competentes del acto de compra del inmueble, la parte actora incurrió en incumplimiento de su compromiso de venta del terreno libre de gravámenes hipotecarios y que fue expresamente contemplado como condición para la compra por el oficio 12455 de DCA-0912 de 16 de diciembre de 2010 del órgano contralor y por el acuerdo diecinueve, artículo treinta y uno, del capítulo octavo de la sesión ordinaria número 50-2010 de 17 de diciembre de 2010, del Consejo Municipal. Adicionalmente dicha obligación formaba parte de las ofertas hechas en todo momento por la vendedora, por lo que no resulta excusable su cumplimiento tardío. Debe destacarse que a pesar de que con posterioridad, la sociedad actora procedió a la cancelación de los respectivos gravámenes, lo realizó fuera de la vigencia de la opción de compra cuando ya había mediado incumplimiento de su parte de la misma. Dado lo anterior, al existir vencimiento del plazo de la opción, sin que la parte eventualmente vendedora hubiera cumplido con la plenitud de sus obligaciones, se liberó al ente municipal de cualquier obligación que pudiere interpretarse como originada en dicho pre contrato (lo cual como se ha visto, en todo caso, no se advierte dado el carácter unilateral de los compromisos consignados en él). De manera complementaria debe advertirse que si el cheque 1005-6 del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica no fue girado en su momento a favor de la actora, ello ocurrió en razón del indicado incumplimiento y no tanto por la inexistencia de contenido presupuestario (nótese como el mismo es emitido a finales del período 2009 y la parte cumple de manera tardía sus obligaciones de liberar la finca de gravámenes hipotecarios en otro período presupuestario, sea el período 2010), por lo que el no pago y formalización no se deben originalmente a motivos imputables a la Administración sino a las omisiones de la empresa actora. El hecho de que con posterioridad el cheque quedara sin contenido presupuestario es consecuencia directa de dicho incumplimiento - al trascender a otro período posterior- y caducar el disponible presupuestario por parte de la Administración del momento, en tanto no se formalizó la respectiva escritura de venta - por motivos imputables a la parte vendedora - y que hubiera comprometido el presupuesto necesario de haberse realizado. (ver art. 46 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos). La parte demandada alega de manera adicional que al caso debe aplicarse lo dispuesto por el artículo 1055 del Código Civil que establece, para efectos de Caducidad, lo siguiente: "La promesa de venta y la recíproca de compraventa cuyo cumplimiento no se hubiere demandado dentro de un mes contado desde que es exigible, caduca por el mismo hecho." Al respecto ha de tomarse en consideración que la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha sostenido de manera reiterada que el ámbito de aplicación del artículo 1055 se circunscribe a los casos en los cuales exista una promesa de venta o recíproca de compraventa exigible sin plazo estipulado para que la parte optante acepte y perfeccione el contrato definitivo. En tales supuestos, se indica que el optante puede aceptar, y así perfeccionar la compraventa definitiva, en el término de un mes, el cual corre a partir de la exigibilidad del precontrato. En tal sentido, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, desde su sentencia No 51 de las quince horas del once de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y tres, ha sostenido al respecto lo siguiente: “VII.- La debida inteligencia del susodicho artículo 1055 supone otra situació n. A saber, la de los contratos de opción donde no consta una fecha límite para la aceptación por parte del optante. En ellos sería inconveniente dejar abierta, sin definición, la posibilidad de concluir el contrato definitivo, pues se lesionaría la seguridad jurídica. Este problema ha surgido en otras legislaciones, como las francesa, italiana y española, donde se les ha dado soluciones diversas. El Código Civil Francés ha consagrado tan sólo un artículo para la promesa de venta, el 1589, en el cual se establece: "... cuando exista el consentimiento recíproco de las dos partes contratantes en cuanto a la cosa y al precio", la promesa se equipara a una compraventa definitiva. No se fija ningún término para la aceptación cuando los contratantes nada hubieran estipulado al respecto. Ante esta situación, la doctrina francesa ha considerado, no sin antes manifestar alguna perplejidad, que la oferta queda abierta indefinidamente, pues fue esa la obligación asumida por el promitente, salvo si se contempló el evento de retirar el consentimiento atingente a la compraventa definitiva. Se acepta, en todo caso, la posibilidad de escudriñar en la voluntad de las partes, a fin de determinar si existe algún plazo implícito o si, por el contrario, querían permanecer vinculados al contrato preliminar indefinidamente. Sobre el tema, los autores Henri, León y Jean MAZEAUD, en sus LECCIONES DE DERECHO CIVIL, Parte III, Vol. III, Editorial EJEA, Buenos Aires, pág. 66, manifiestan: "La obligación del promitente no suscita dificultades cuando se haya estipulado un plazo a la expiración del cual se invalide la opción. Pero, ¿sigue obligado indefinidamente el promitente si no se ha fijado plazo alguno para el ejercicio de la opción? Debe admitirse así; ya que, a diferencia del oferente, el promitente ha concluido un contrato, cuyos términos no puede modificar sin el acuerdo del beneficiario; ha dado aquél su consentimiento para la compraventa, sin reservarse el derecho de retirarlo al cabo de cierto tiempo, a falta de aceptación por el beneficiario; su consentimiento persiste mientras que el beneficiario no renuncie a la opción. Pero no le está prohibido al juez de la interpretación del contrato descubrir en él la estipulación tácita de un plazo a la expiración del cual el promitente recobra su libertad. En verdad, se acercan así la oferta de venta y la promesa unilateral de venta; pero ¿no sería irrazonable obligar por los siglos de los siglos al promitente y a sus herederos?". Por su parte, los profesores Planiol y Ripert, en su TRATADO PRACTICO DE DERECHO CIVIL FRANCES, Tomo X, Editorial Cultural, La Habana, pág 192, indican: "El promitente está obligado a mantener su promesa por todo el tiempo que haya sido convenido en el contrato. Pero, a veces se da el caso de que no se ha fijado plazo alguno para la opción; en ese supuesto a los Tribunales corresponde el poder de apreciar de hecho la intención de las partes". Tampoco la legislación española contiene norma específica en cuanto al supuesto de una opción sin plazo. El artículo 1451 del Código Civil Español, únicamente dispone: "La promesa de vender o comprar, habiendo conformidad en la cosa y el precio, dará derecho a los contratantes para reclamar recíprocamente el cumplimiento del contrato". Ante esto, la doctrina estima, generalmente, como elemento indispensable para la validez de la opción, la inclusión de un término para su ejercicio. En el derecho italiano, por el contrario, sí se abordó directamente el problema, al establecer el artículo 1331 del Código Civil lo siguiente: "Cuando las partes convienen que una de ellas permanezca vinculada a su declaración y la otra tenga la facultad de aceptarla o no, la declaración de la primera es considerada como propuesta irrevocable para los efectos previstos por el artículo 1329. Si para la aceptación no ha sido fijado un término, éste puede ser establecido por el juez.". El promitente, estiman la jurisprudencia y doctrina prevalecientes en ese país, cuando desee liberarse del vínculo al cual no se le ha fijado un término, tan sólo puede solicitar al juez su fijación y, una vez transcurrido el plazo sin haber el optante perfeccionado el contrato, la opción dejará de surtir efectos jurídicos. En ninguno de los tres ordenamientos jurídicos referidos, se encuentra término de caducidad alguno para el ejercicio de los derechos del comprador una vez perfeccionada la venta definitiva, siendo aplicables, en cuanto fuere pertinente, los términos de prescripción ordinarios. Una vez aceptada la opción, en los tres sistemas dichos, se estima perfeccionado el contrato definitivo y la situación jurídica es idéntica a la de cualquier compraventa estipulada a través de los mecanismos de la contratación entre presentes, entre ausentes o luego de la aceptación de una propuesta unilateral firme. En relación, se considera, no existe motivo razonable alguno para someter a plazos de caducidad la acción para exigir el cumplimiento de una compraventa perfecta cuanto se ha formado a raíz de una opción; en los demás casos, únicamente rigen los principios propios de la prescripción ordinaria. En nuestro medio, la doctrina científica, representada en el caso concreto por el Doctor Diego Baudrit Carrillo, se une también a la tesis aquí propugnada. En su obra "LOS CONTRATOS TRASLATIVOS DEL DERECHO PRIVADO", al referirse a la concepción que en estas consideraciones se ha venido criticando, dice: "Esta interpretación hace una distinción entre compraventas formalizadas sin precontrato y compraventas perfeccionadas por aceptación de una promesa formulada en un precontrato. Las primeras compraventas se regirían por las reglas de la prescripción ordinaria; las segundas por el plazo de caducidad de un mes. Esta distinción es artificial y no se fundamenta en un análisis valedero de las normas, puesto que, opinamos, la ley no distingue en cuanto a los efectos de una compraventa que se haya perfeccionado, ya sea que tenga el antecedente de un precontrato o no, puesto que lo que interesa es el intercambio de voluntades referido a cosa y precio. En nuestro criterio, la disposición del artículo 1055 sólo podría interpretarse, si es que algún sentido debe tener, como referida a promesas de venta sin plazo convenido, hipótesis en la cual la ley fija un mes para que se ejercite la opción." (Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, pág. 31). VIII.- Sobre el tema en cuestión, cabe apuntar, se ha sentido la necesidad de establecer plazos máximos dentro de los cuales la oferta firme, generada por el contrato de opción, conserve su validez, pues se estima absolutamente inconveniente su permanencia indefinida cuando no se ha acordado término. En materia de contratación, existe en Costa Rica, en principio, un interés por dar a las propuestas validez limitada en el tiempo, pues conforme éste transcurre, puede presentarse una discordancia entre el contenido de la propuesta y la voluntad real del oferente. Así, por ejemplo, el artículo 443 del Código de Comercio da la posibilidad al proponente de fijar un plazo de espera, el cual está obligado a respetar, pero, de no establecerlo, la oferta se reputa vigente dentro de los términos expresamente señalados por el inciso b). Además, si la aceptación no es recibida por el oferente dentro de los plazos citados, el contrato no se considera perfecto. De igual manera, una reciente sentencia de esta Sala, la Nº 137 de las catorce horas veinte minutos del treinta de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y dos, interpretó el plazo previsto por art ículo 1399 del Código Civil, relativo a las donaciones, como un término referido al donatario para aceptar el contrato, so pena de caducidad, la cual al sobrevenir frustra el perfeccionamiento del contrato. También el artículo 1012 del Código Civil obliga al interesado a aceptar la propuesta dentro del término fijado por la otra parte, pero de no existir éste, deberá hacerlo "... dentro de los tres días cuando se halle en la misma provincia; dentro de diez, cuando no se halle en la misma provincia, pero si en la República; y dentro de sesenta días, cuando se hallare fuera de la República.". Estas disposiciones demuestran el interés de nuestro legislador por limitar en el tiempo la eficacia de las propuestas contractuales, cuando el oferente no ha establecido un plazo para ello. Es en esta tesitura, donde la interpretación del artículo 1055 del Código Civil encuentra su verdadera dimensión. Al establecer esta norma el plazo de un mes para demandar el cumplimiento de la promesa de venta o la recíproca de compraventa, no se refiere en sentido técnico procesal a una "demanda judicial", sino a la manifestación del optante aceptando la opción, la cual, siendo ya exigible, no cuenta con un término límite para su vigencia. La norma se refiere a una promesa de venta o de compraventa recíproca exigible , o sea, aún no aceptada. De mediar una manifestación de voluntad del optante aceptándola, ya no se estaría ante esa promesa exigible, sino ante un contrato de compraventa perfecto. Ahora, el incumplimiento de éste daría derecho al comprador, según dispone el artículo 1066, a solicitar al juez un título inscribible, si fuere necesario, y la entrega de la cosa, en caso de renuencia del vendedor a cumplir con las obligaciones derivadas del contrato principal. En conclusión, el ámbito de aplicación del artículo 1055 se circunscribe a los casos en los cuales exista una promesa de venta o recíproca de compraventa exigible sin plazo estipulado. En tales eventos, el optante puede aceptar, y así perfeccionar la compraventa definitiva, en el término de un mes, el cual corre a partir de la exigibilidad del precontrato. De no hacerlo así, la opción resulta ineficaz y cualquier aceptación posterior sería inidónea para configurar el contrato proyectado.” Como puede observarse de los autos, ninguna de las pretensiones de la demanda se refieren a la situación regulada por el artículo 1055 del Código Civil, no se trata del reclamo del optante para el perfeccionamiento del contrato definitivo ante la ausencia de un plazo contractual al efecto, sino más bien del eventual enajenante para que se cumpla con las condiciones de la opción de compra venta, dado que estimó perfeccionado lo acordado en el plazo de la misma, habida cuenta de la existencia de conductas propias del ente en tal sentido. Así las cosas, debe rechazarse lo alegado por la representación de la Municipalidad demandada en tal sentido y más bien rechazar la pretensión indicada, fundada en el incumplimiento de una obligación sustancial de la parte enajenante (la no cancelación del gravámen hipotecario) y su subsanación, una vez que operó el vencimiento de la opción dicha, por lo que la misma no resultaba ya vinculante (dado lo anterior y su contenido mismo) para con la Administración demandada. Debe tomar en cuenta la parte actora que no estamos en una relación civil pura y simple, en tanto que al estar vinculado un ente pùblico, la relación precontractual o inclusive contractual, se ve afectada de manera transversal por una serie de principios, condiciones y requisitos propios de la materia administrativa. Así, a diferencia de una relación entre dos privados, en el caso de cualquier vínculo con un sujeto de derecho público, necesariamente la formalización de todo acuerdo no podría desatender el cumplimiento del fin público del bien o servicio adquirido, las competencias de los sujetos responsables de la aprobación y/o autorización de los actos finales y ante todo de las regulaciones que en materia de contratación administrativa y normativa presupuestaria le son aplicables. Es por dicha razón que el artículo 32 de la Ley General de la Contratación Administrativa indica que "Será válido el contrato administrativo sustancialmente conforme al ordenamiento jurídico...". En el caso de análisis, además de las consideraciones hechas sobre el vencimiento de la opción de compra venta y del incumplimiento de la parte enajenante de su deber de entregar el bien inmueble libre de gravámenes hipotecarios, debe tomarse en consideración que la no formalización de la escritura en el respectivo período presupuestario, sea en diciembre de 2010, por motivos imputables a la actora, tuvo incidencia en la existencia de un presupuesto suficiente para perfeccionar la relación. Nótese como al día 1 de diciembre de dos mil diez, se certificó que la Municipalidad de Golfito tenía presupuestadas las siguientes sumas para la adquisición el edificio del centro de operaciones municipales: a) Edificios: C.337.789.999,80. b) Terrenos: C. 258.756.000,00, mas con posterioridad se indicó que el efectivo existente se destinó a otros motivos diferentes. No existe entonces, un contrato vigente que no haya sido cumplido por la sociedad actora, siendo así que en todo caso, al no existir contenido presupuestario a esta fecha, tal y como consta de la prueba y declaración de la testigo de la Municipalidad demandada, Señora Karen Moya Díaz, por principio de legalidad, no es posible ordenar lo pedido por la parte actora de conformidad con los artículos 5.f), 12, 110. f) de la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, que establecen como límite para la adquisición de cualquier compromiso presupuestario, la necesaria existencia de disponible para cubrir dicho gasto.

VI.- Como segunda pretensión, la parte actora solicita se ordene a la Municipalidad demandada al pago de la suma de diez millones ochocientos sesenta y cinco mil seiscientos ochenta y tres colones con veinticuatro céntimos, que corresponde a diez meses de arrendamiento dejados de cancelar en el año 2010. Al respecto existe reconocimiento expreso de dicha obligación pendiente por parte de la Administración demandada y en este orden de ideas, mediante oficio DP-MG-064-2012 de 8 de mayo de 2012 de la Proveedora de la Municipalidad de Golfito se consigna tal obligación. No obstante lo anterior, debe tomarse en consideración que este Tribunal ordenó en audiencia de juicio prueba para mejor resolver en donde se evidencia con claridad que en el caso del arrendamiento del inmueble objeto del presente proceso no medió ni autorización de la Contraloría General de la República ni autorización para su contratación directa para efectos de una relación arrendaticia (sólo se solicitó permiso para la compra del inmueble), ni se siguieron los procedimientos de contratación administrativa necesarios. En este orden de ideas, consta en autos que con fecha 4 de marzo de 2009, mediante oficio AMJ-MG-O-081-2009, el Alcalde Municipal autorizó a la Proveedora Municipal a contratar de manera directa, entre otras contrataciones, el arrendamiento con la sociedad actora por la suma de mil dólares mensuales, más mil dólares por concepto de depósito de garantía, por lo que el mismo día, las partes en presente proceso suscribieron contrato de arrendamiento del inmueble propiedad de la actora por tres meses. Todo lo anterior, sin que se advierta que se haya cumplido previamente el procedimiento de contratación administrativa alguno ni de que al menos se hayan respetado los principios de contratación administrativa. Así de los autos no se evidencia que para la decisiones indicada, al menos se haya bastanteado otras ofertas o se haya garantizado la libre concurrencia de otros interesados. En este orden de ideas, debe recordarse que la Administración Pública emplea diversos medios para el cumplimiento de los fines públicos, que no se agotan en las meras actuaciones materiales o en actos administrativos formales, en tanto que también se recurre a la técnica de la contratación administrativa, en la cual, se pacta el cumplimiento de un objeto con un contratista, como sujeto colaborador del logro del interés público buscado. No obstante, a diferencia de un contrato privado, en la contratación administrativa existe una serie de elementos que trascienden el mero acuerdo de voluntades rubricado en un documento y que condicionan su nacimiento, desarrollo y extinción. Es así como el contrato administrativo está condicionado en su origen, evolución y finalización al ordenamiento propio que rige la materia y la contratación en específico. En este sentido, el acto de voluntad, libre y soberano del contratista, queda filtrado por el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo, y fundamentalmente por la reglamentación de la contratación, sea el cartel o pliego de condiciones, base de la misma. Además siempre estará subyacente en todo procedimiento de contratación administrativa, una serie de principios que han sido delimitados por la Sala Constitucional a partir del voto 0998-98 de las 11:30 horas del 16 de febrero de 1998 y reiterado en los fallos posteriores, y que se resumen básicamente en la libre concurrencia, igualdad de trato entre los oferentes, la publicidad, la seguridad jurídica, la legalidad y transparencia, la buena fe, el equilibrio de intereses, mutabilidad del contrato, intangibilidad patrimonial y control en los procedimientos. Desde el punto de vista del derecho positivo, el marco general regulador de las obligaciones tanto de los entes contratantes como de las empresas contratistas se encuentra contemplado en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. En el artículo 15 de dicho cuerpo normativo, expresamente se señala como obligación de toda Administración contratante, lo siguiente: "La Administración está obligada a cumplir con todos los compromisos, adquiridos válidamente, en la contratación administrativa y a prestar colaboraci ón para que el contratista ejecute en forma idónea el objeto pactado". Por otra parte, de manera correlativa a dicho deber, el artículo 20 de la misma ley, establece la siguiente obligación para los contratistas: "Los contratistas están obligados a cumplir, cabalmente, con lo ofrecido en su propuesta y en cualquier manifestación formal documentada, que hayan aportado adicionalmente, en el curso del procedimiento o en la formalización del contrato". Ambas obligaciones surgen de un principio de buena fe en la contratación, mediante el cual, ambas partes, tienen como referente en el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones un deber de cumplimiento y colaboración mutuos. En el caso concreto de los contratos de arrendamiento suscritos por la Administración, debe aplicarse lo dispuesto en el artículo 76 de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa y 159 de su reglamento, en tanto disponen lo siguiente: "Artículo 76. — Procedimiento aplicable. Para tomar en arrendamiento bienes inmuebles, con construcciones o sin ellas, la administración deberá acudir al procedimiento de licitación pública, licitaci ón abreviada o contratación directa, según corresponda, de acuerdo con el monto ". "Artículo 159.— Arrendamiento de inmuebles. La Administración podrá tomar en arrendamiento bienes inmuebles, con o sin opción de compra, mediante el procedimiento de licitación pública, licitación abreviada o contratación directa, según corresponda, de acuerdo con el monto estimado; sin perjuicio de lo establecido en relación con el arrendamiento o compra de bienes únicos de este Reglamento. El propietario del inmueble no rendirá ninguna clase de garantía de cumplimiento a favor de la Administración. Para el reajuste de la renta precio se aplicará lo dispuesto en el artículo 67 de la Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos". En este mismo sentido, el artículo 6 de la Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos, indica la aplicación de dicho cuerpo normativo a las relaciones contractuales entre la Administración Pública y los arrendantes, de la siguiente manera: "ARTICULO 6.- Estado, entes descentralizados y municipalidades. El Estado, los entes públicos descentralizados y las municipalidades, en calidad de arrendadores o arrendatarios, están sujetos a esta ley, salvo disposición expresa de su propio ordenamiento jurídico. El procedimiento de licitación se rige por las disposiciones legales y reglamentarias de la contratación administrativa". En razón de lo anterior, todo análisis jurídico con relación a este figura contractual no puede desatender ni las regulaciones generales propias de la materia administrativa, ni las disposiciones específicas que sobre la materia inquilinaria se establecen en la ley dicha, dada su especialidad y alcances normativos específicos. En razón del indicado incumplimiento en el presente caso de los procedimientos y principios propios de la contratación administrativa, estima este colegio que al presente caso, deben aplicarse los artículos 21 de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, reformado por la Ley No. 8511 del 16 de mayo del 2006, publicada en La Gaceta No. 128 del 04 de julio del 2006, y el 210 del Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa. En ese sentido, dichas normas disponen: ‘ Artículo 21. — Verificación de procedimientos. Es responsabilidad del contratista verificar la corrección del procedimiento de contratación administrativa, y la ejecución contractual. En virtud de esta obligación, para fundamentar gestiones resarcitorias, no podrá alegar desconocimiento del ordenamiento aplicable ni de las consecuencias de la conducta administrativa. El Reglamento de esta Ley definirá los supuestos y la forma en que proceda indemnizar al contratista irregular. Asimismo, el funcionario que haya promovido una contratación irregular será sancionado conforme a lo previsto en el artículo 96 bis de esta Ley" "Artículo 210. — Deber de verificación. Es responsabilidad del contratista verificar la corrección del procedimiento de contratación administrativa, y la ejecución contractual. En virtud de esta obligación, para fundamentar gestiones resarcitorias, no podrá alegar desconocimiento del ordenamiento aplicable ni de las consecuencias de la conducta administrativa. El contrato se tendrá como irregular, cuando en su trámite se incurra en vicios graves y evidentes, de fácil constatación, tales como, omisión del procedimiento correspondiente o se haya recurrido de manera ilegítima a alguna excepción. En esos casos, no podrá serle reconocido pago alguno al interesado, salvo en casos calificados, en que proceda con arreglo a principios generales de Derecho, respecto a suministros, obras, servicios y otros objetos, ejecutados con evidente provecho para la Administración. En ese supuesto, no se reconocerá el lucro previsto y de ser éste desconocido se aplicará por ese concepto la rebaja de un 10% del monto total. Igual solución se dará a aquellos contratos que se ejecuten sin contar con el refrendo o aprobación interna, cuando ello sea exigido. La no formalización del contrato no será impedimento para aplicar esta disposición en lo que resulte pertinente". De conformidad con lo anterior, es evidente que en el presente caso estamos en presencia de una contratación irregular por parte de la sociedad actora, habida cuenta que como se ha indicado, no se siguió ningún procedimiento en el proceso de su selección, ni se cumplió al menos los principios aplicables en la materia, con evidente desprecio de lo dispuesto en el artículo 76 de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa. Debe tomar en consideración la parte actora que la figura de la contratación directa no legitima una selección arbitraria o infundada y que si bien aquella da la posibilidad de una mayor flexibilidad en la determinación del sujeto al cual se le adjudica un bien y servicio, no implica que se realice con burla de todo mecanismo procedimental y mecanismo de control interno o que el Alcalde Municipal pueda adjudicar a su capricho, sin la debida motivación del acto, previo cumplimiento de los principios señalados ut supra. Este Tribunal extraña la presencia de al menos una decisión administrativa fundada y técnica respecto de los motivos por los cuales se opta por contratar de manera directa con la sociedad actora y no puede obviar las diferentes prorrogas a la relación de arrendamiento que se presentó desde el mes de setiembre del año 2009 hasta diciembre de 2011, con evidentes fraccionamientos en el monto total de la contratación y con incrementos superiores al 100% de la renta anterior, carentes de todo razonamiento. Esa actitud arbitraria del Alcalde Municipal del momento, señor Jimmy Cubillo Mora y la silenciosa connivencia de los representantes de Inmobiliaria Jericó Internacional S.A. hacen que este Tribunal tenga por evidente la existencia de una contratación absolutamente irregular y totalmente alejada de la normativa aplicable a la materia y a la ética e intereses públicos. En este orden de ideas, el deber de verificación de la corrección del procedimiento administrativo no puede ser soslayado en el caso de la indicada empresa, la cual, se benefició abiertamente de las actuaciones ilegales del señor Cubillo Mora. Sobre la figura de la contratación irregular, ha señalado la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia: ".- La Contratación Irregular, ocurre cuando, a pesar de una anomalía en el procedimiento, la Administración percibe de manera efectiva y de buena fe, bienes o servicios (previamente pactados), parcial o totalmente, con claro provecho para ella. Surge entonces, el derecho del prestatario a percibir una indemnización (no pago) al ejecutar una orden pública, siempre y cuando concurran, se ha dicho, en principio, tres circunstancias: irregularidad en el procedimiento; la Administración obtenga una ventaja o beneficio; y la buena fe del contratista. Resulta necesario reiterar que es, mediante la reforma parcial introducida por la Ley no. 8511 de 16 de mayo de 2006 (vigente a partir del 4 de enero de 2007) que en la LCA se hace alusión a esa figura, tal y como lo consideró el Tribunal. Así, se adiciona el artículo 21, para establecer que el Reglamento “…definirá los supuestos y la forma en que proceda indemnizar al contratista irregular. Asimismo, el funcionario que haya promovido una contratación irregular será sancionado conforme a lo previsto en el artículo 96 bis de esta Ley.” (El subrayado no es del original). Simultáneamente a la entrada en vigencia de la reforma parcial indicada, también empezó a regir el vigente Reglamento a la LCA, promulgado por Decreto Ejecutivo no. 33411 de 27 de setiembre de 2006. Al respecto, es oportuno aclarar, que no es correcto lo indicado por el Tribunal en cuanto a que este Reglamento “…entró en vigencia el 2 de noviembre de 2006…”, pues si bien esa es la fecha de su publicación en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta, cierto es que en el artículo 227 ibídem, de manera mediante el ordinal 210, que se desarrolla lo estatuido en el 21 legal. En realidad, concordante con lo considerado por el Tribunal, con ambas disposiciones normativas, que como lo indicó “…no se encontraban vigentes al momento en que el Ministerio de Educación Pública emitió la resolución que se impugna…”, se positivizó el reiterado pronunciamiento de la CGR respecto de esa figura, entre otros, en el que se hace referencia en el fallo recurrido y del que transcribe un extracto. Así, en lo medular y de interés a este asunto, la CGR califica a una contratación de irregular, cuando se realiza sin cumplir con el procedimiento debido (por regla la licitación); se alude a un acuerdo que de forma irregular se suscita entre la Administración y el proveedor; y una negociación con el consentimiento de la entidad interesada, siempre que medie buena fe en la actuación del contratista, la que es fundamental para determinar el posible resarcimiento de servicio. Ello supone un comportamiento honrado y leal en el ejercicio de los derechos, exigiendo coherencia en el comportamiento de las relaciones negociales; es un principio informador de todo el ordenamiento jurídico y que impone el rechazo de interpretaciones que conduzcan a un resultado contrario a aquel “…como cuando los procedimientos de contratación se utilizan con un fin distinto del querido por el ordenamiento jurídico, o se ejerciten en circunstancias que los vician de nulidad absoluta.” (oficios nos. 6180 (DAGJ-933-2000) de 22 de junio de 2000; 8558 (DAGJ-1326-2001) de 6 de agosto de 2001; y 4864 (DAGJ-609-2003) de 9 de mayo de 2003) (voto N° 1246-2009 de las 10:25 horas del 3 de diciembre del 2009). De conformidad con la resolución R-CO-10-2009 del Despacho de la Contralora General de las nueve horas del veintisiete de enero del dos mil nueve, para el año en que en se inició la relación contractual de arrendamiento con la sociedad actora, la Municipalidad de Golfito se encontraba en el estrato "H" para efectos de determinación de los límites de contratación, por lo que sólo podía contratar directamente por montos inferiores a cuatro millones quinientos setenta mil colones. Para sumas superiores a esa cantidad y hasta cuarenta y cinco millones setecientos mil colones, debía realizarse una licitación abreviada. En el caso de examen se advierte que el arrendamiento existente y de análisis en la presente resolución, excede en mucho la indicada cantidad límite de la contratación directa para la Municipalidad demandada, con incrementos fijados por el indicado ex Alcalde Municipal de manera unilateral e infundados. Con base en las anteriores consideraciones, estima este colegio que en el sub lite, están presentes los elementos de juicio enunciados tanto en la normativa sobre contratación pública como en los precedentes jurisprudenciales citados, a efectos de concluir que la sociedad actora prestó sus servicios, bajo la figura de una contratación irregular. No obstante lo anterior, es procedente retribuir el arrendamiento disfrutado por la administración municipal (reconocido por ésta de manera expresa como pendiente de pago), a fin de no incurrir en un enriquecimiento sin causa. Partiendo entonces de que ambas partes reconocen que el monto adeudado lo es la suma de diez millones ochocientos sesenta y cinco mil seiscientos ochenta y tres colones con veinticuatro céntimos, aplicando lo dispuesto en el artículo 210 del Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa, procedería reconocer a la actora la suma de nueve millones setecientos setenta y nueve mil ciento catorce colones con noventa y dos céntimos. Debe señalarse que la aceptación hecha por la Municipalidad demandada de la obligación pendiente de pago no significa per se un reconocimiento automático de la deuda de manera íntegra por este Tribunal. La existencia de un deber de verificación de la legalidad de las conductas adoptadas tanto por la Administración, como por sus colaboradores y al estar de por medio la determinación de fondos públicos, hace que se torne necesario considerar el carácter irregular de la contratación objeto del presente proceso por parte de este Colegio. A su vez y por tratarse de una obligación dineraria determinada en esta resolución – dada la aplicación del artículo 210 del Reglamento de la Contratación Administrativa, a dicha estimatoria debe aplicarse oficiosamente – por así disponerlo la ley– el mecanismo de indexación contemplado en el numeral 123 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), a efecto de compensar la pérdida de poder adquisitivo que pueda haber experimentado o llegue aun a experimentar la moneda nacional en el lapso que va a partir de la firmeza de la presente resolución, todo lo cual se determinará en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia.-”