Credit Reconstruction and Lender's Responsibility in the Real Payment SystemReconstrucción crediticia y responsabilidad del acreedor en el sistema de cuota real

**IV.—On the prohibition of compounding interest and the** **real installment system in housing loans**. This is an issue that has already been addressed by this Tribunal, among others, in ruling No. 926-2010, issued at 7:49 a.m. on March 11, 2010. In relevant part, it stated that "(…) the national legal system prohibits the practice of interest capitalization, that is, the so-called compounding interest (anatocismo), which entails, in simple terms, the application of interest upon interest. In this regard, canon 505 of the Commercial Code clearly states: 'It is prohibited to capitalize interest. However, if upon the settlement of a debt interest is owed, it may be added to the principal to form a single total. When granting a new instrument or extending the previous one, interest may be stipulated on the totality of the obligation.' From that standpoint, it is evident that unless a rule provides otherwise, every commercial loan obligation is onerous and therefore, compensated with legal interest (article 496 of the Commercial Code). This dimension implies that in the payment of the loan installments, the current interest is amortized first and the remainder is applied to the principal of the obligation. Now then, the Law of the National Financial System for Housing and Creation of the BANHVI, No. 7052 of November 27, 1986, establishes in its article 167: ' The authorized entities may grant their loans through payment systems in which the installment is adjusted based on the variation of minimum wages. These installments may be less than the minimum necessary to cover interest and amortization—refinanced installment—and the uncovered differences shall accumulate in the loan balance as a form of capitalization, without article 505 of the Commercial Code therefore being applicable. In any case, the amount of the installment thus established shall be applied first to cover interest, and if anything remains it shall be applied to amortize the debt. Similar treatment may be applied to loans already established. / The authorized entities may use systems based on other parameters established by the Bank's Board of Directors. (Thus reformed by article 165 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica No.7558 of November 3, 1995)' This is a system that seeks to establish a financing mechanism for housing with installments more accessible to applicants for loans of this nature. The provision contemplates the so-called graduated installment, which entails the percentage increase of the installment, previously agreed upon by the parties, usually each year, in order to be able to compensate in the installments of the successive years the deficit in the payment of the principal that may arise with the initial installment, so that as the loan progresses, the installment increases. It is worth noting at this point that, in principle, the agreed-upon installment must allow for the payment of interest and amortization to principal. However, within this modality, the cited article 167 permits, as an exception, that the initial installment not cover the minimum necessary to cover the interest and the amortization to the principal. In that case, variations may arise; on the one hand, when the installment only allows for coverage of the current interest, the principal will remain unchanged until the graduated increase of the installment allows for covering that interest and applying a contribution to the principal balance. On the other hand, when the installment does not allow for covering the interest in full, exceptionally and given the legal permissibility, the uncovered differences of the interest accumulate to the loan balance as a form of capitalization, without this entailing, the aforementioned law states, applying article 505 of the Commercial Code. From the foregoing, it follows that in this scenario, one is faced with a refinanced installment with respect to the interest, that is, that fraction of interest not paid due to the insufficiency of the installment, becomes part of the primary capital. In this context, that interest may later be paid off with the graduated increase in payment. In short, it begins with a low installment that increases over the course of time, an increase that allows for covering not only the current interest and balance, but also the interest not previously covered. It bears reiterating that this is an exception in the credit regime based on the ratio of the housing system. (…)”. This Tribunal reaffirms the above criterion and proceeds to the examination of the claims brought.

**V.- On the validity of the contested clause.** As a first matter, the claim seeking to annul the clause of the deed signed by the plaintiff with the Consorcio Cooperativo de Vivienda Fedecrédito R.L., through which she received from the latter the sum of six million fifty-eight thousand exact colones (¢6,058,000.00), must be analyzed. Specifically contested are the lines of the public instrument from 7 to 23 which state "(…) The installments shall be set in accordance with the provisions of article 167 of the Law of the National Financial System for Housing and the BANHVI, which is established under the following parameters: the installment shall be calculated as a percentage of the debtor's family income, not exceeding thirty percent of her salary at this date. Each time there is an increase in the minimum wages, the monthly installment shall be increased by the same percentage starting the month after that increase in said minimum wage, decreed by the corresponding authorities, takes effect. For this purpose, the percentage variation corresponding to the minimum wage of a non-specialized laborer in the construction industry shall be used as a reference. In the event that the minimum wage disappears or is not applied, the percentage variation of the average salary calculated by the CCSS shall be used as a reference to set the increase in the percentage of the installments, and in the event that this other mechanism cannot be applied either, the percentage variation of the consumer price index, issued by the corresponding governmental authorities, shall be used as a reference. The payments made by the debtor shall be applied to cover, to the extent possible, the payment of insurance, the interest for each month, and once the payment exceeds said amount the difference shall be applied as a credit to the principal. In the event that the installment set for the debtor party is not sufficient to cover the amount of the interest, this balance shall be capitalized with the principal, consequently increasing the balance of the transaction. For now, each initial installment shall be seventy-two thousand five hundred ninety-six colones and six céntimos, a sum that includes the mandatory insurance policies provided by legislation for this type of transaction, the loan interest, and the amortization to the principal. (…)”. At its core, the plaintiff considers that said clause is absolutely null due to the non-existence of the will of one of the parties, since the duty of consumer information was breached. Also, due to non-existence of object and cause since her apparent motive for contracting was to have a house with an installment she could pay, not exceeding thirty percent of her base salary. However, her future payment capacity or other credit alternatives that could have been applied to her were not analyzed. For their part, the defendants consider that, in general, the defects afflicting the clause are not listed with due clarity. They consider it to be valid because it reproduces legal and regulatory provisions that have not been challenged. They add, furthermore, that the required information for making the consumer decision was indeed provided to her and that this is verified in that she signed the deed and stated that she understood its implications. Having examined the contested clause, the Tribunal finds that it substantially conforms to the legal system for the following reasons. As we indicated supra and as the attorney for the defendants points out, the payment system called the real installment is permitted by our legislation, as indicated by the clause itself, which refers to article 167 of the LSFV. Then, as the main adjustment mechanism, the variation of minimum wages of an unskilled laborer in the construction industry is established, as provided both by the cited provision and by articles 117 and 119 of the Regulations for Operations of the National Financial System for Housing. The reference to other adjustment mechanisms is supplementary, that is, only in case the minimum wage disappears or is not applied. Moreover, it is a possibility (to establish alternative adjustment mechanisms) that is contemplated by article 167 itself and articles 117 subsection a) and 122 of the aforementioned Regulations and which, in any case, we consider reasonable insofar as they resort to objective parameters such as the percentage variation of the average salary calculated by the CCSS, and in the event that this other mechanism cannot be applied either, the percentage variation of the consumer price index, issued by the corresponding governmental authorities. Subsequently, the clause refers to the manner in which the payment shall be allocated and the manner of proceeding in the event that the installment set for the debtor party is not sufficient to cover the amount of the interest; regulations that conform to what is established by the cited legal and regulatory provisions. Finally, the amount of the initial or starting installment is established, in the terms required by articles 117 and 119 of the aforementioned Regulations. From this standpoint, the Tribunal finds no defect whatsoever in either the cause or the object, insofar as the motive for contracting exists from the moment one resorts to a credit mechanism to obtain a housing solution that is valid and regulated by the legal system, under the terms in which the contractual object was agreed upon. Then, if what the plaintiff questions is the constitutionality of the real installment credit system, the truth is that she should have filed the corresponding constitutional challenge action (acción de inconstitucionalidad), or if she claimed the illegality of the regulatory provisions, she could have challenged them directly in this jurisdiction. Since this was not done, the Tribunal limits itself to a comparison of what was agreed upon in relation to the normative provisions that govern the specific credit modality, with the conditions stipulated in the deed being substantially consistent with the legal system, and it must be so declared.

**VI.—Regarding the alleged defects of consent**, the following must be noted. Article 46 of the Political Constitution establishes as fundamental rights the protection of the consumer's health, safety, and economic interests; freedom of choice—from which the principle of free contracting, derived from article 28 of the same constitutional text, arises—and equitable treatment—which is developed in articles 31 and following of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Protection (hereinafter LPCDEC), as well as articles 40 and following of the Regulations to that Law. This entails a duty to provide adequate, timely, clear, truthful, and sufficient information about all the elements that directly affect the consumer's consumption decision. In the matter before us, the correct understanding of this guarantee implies that the person intending to sign a credit contract is sufficiently and timely aware of the conditions under which the transaction is being adopted. Specifically, those seeking housing options and intending to sign a loan under the real installment system must be informed of the implications of that mechanism in their particular case, and with greater emphasis, if their situation will fall within a module of interest capitalization. The foregoing because the application of a credit formula in which interest is capitalized is only possible, in the specific case regulated by article 167 of Law No. 7052, and is only valid when the financial service consumer, that is, the person who goes to financial institutions to seek credit options for various needs (in this case housing), is informed in a clear manner about the implications of that modality, i.e., the graduated increase of the installment, but also, that their installment does not cover current interest in a portion that will become part of the principal owed in the next payment and therefore, the calculation of the interest for the following installment will be made based on the original balance plus the fraction of interest not covered, and not on the original principal. The implications of this modality further require, as a determining aspect, the express and voluntary consent of the debtor, i.e., their agreement to this effect in their loan. Such an aspect cannot be inferred by interpretive or deductive means, but must be clearly established, we insist, due to its repercussions. It must be taken into account that, as both parties rightly admit, we are faced with bilateral, onerous, and adhesion or pre-drafted contracts. This implies a necessary safeguard of the balance and equity in the obligations of the parties involved in the consumer relationship, protecting the rights and guarantees of the consumer (potential debtor), since the very nature of this type of legal transaction implies a position of advantage on the part of the economic agent, for the purpose of maintaining or at least promoting equity in the distribution of contractual obligations in said bilateral regime. Having stated the above, it must be noted that from the elements contained in the case file, it is not observed that there was a violation by the creditor financial institution of the duty to inform the plaintiff at the time of signing the loan at issue here. We have that the deed clearly specified the type of credit mechanism being contracted, that is, the real installment; it explained that the installment was set based on a percentage of the minimum wage not exceeding thirty percent, that it would be increased semi-annually, and the parameters to be used for such purposes; a clear reference to the payment allocation mechanism, explaining that the payments made shall be applied to cover, to the extent possible, the payment of insurance, the interest for each month, and once the payment exceeds said amount, the difference shall be applied as a credit to the principal, as well as the possibility that interest would be capitalized if the installment set for the debtor party was not sufficient to cover the amount of interest, with the consequent increase of the principal. Then, the deed states that the plaintiff understood and expressly accepted the referenced conditions and, once read, approved and signed it. Although the plaintiff alleged that the deed was not read to her and provided her mother's testimony in that regard, it is the Tribunal's criterion that this does not rebut the evidentiary presumption of that public instrument. From this perspective, and taking into account the plaintiff's level of education, the Tribunal understands that her will at the time of contracting was free and conscious, without observing defects attributable to a lack of information on the part of the creditor entity. In conclusion, we do not observe that the contested clause suffers from defects that would lead to its nullity; rather, it is found to be valid and bound the parties to its fulfillment, with precisely this last aspect being relevant to the object of the proceedings, as will be discussed below.

**VII.—On the fulfillment of the obligations arising from the** **loan contract**. On this point, the plaintiff explains that she always complied with the payment of the installments that her creditor charged her and that the receipts were deficient because they never indicated the outstanding balance of the debt. She then relays that she found out that for 11 years she had not amortized anything toward the debt and that, rather, interest had been capitalized to the principal balance, increasing it in an excessive manner. When she goes to the BANHVI, they explain that this was because, due to an error, the creditor did not timely make the semi-annual adjustments to which it was obligated. She claims that she does not have to assume the bank's error and that they now seek to disregard the payments she has made since 1997. After an analysis of the various evidentiary items presented in the proceedings, the Tribunal concludes that during the contractual relationship, the plaintiff has generally complied with the obligations incumbent upon her, referring fundamentally to the payment of the loan installments, initially to the original creditor and later to two different trustees that succeeded it. However, upon examining the actions of the defendants regarding compliance with the agreed-upon conditions, the same evidence demonstrates that there have been instances of neglect attributable to the holders of the credit right that have affected the plaintiff's subjective sphere. The first of these is observed in the fact that for 11 years, none of the creditor entities made the semi-annual adjustments to the monthly loan installment, as was established in the agreed-upon contract. This is an omission or error that is expressly acknowledged by the Internal Audit of BANHVI in the preliminary report on the attention to a request for assessment related to the granting of financing under the real installment system to Mrs. Medrano Valverde and by the witness Ana Julia Fernández in her statement. Moreover, the report concludes that the lack of modifications or adjustments to the mortgage installment in a timely manner from the date of formalization of the mortgage transaction until February 2003, is the responsibility of Coovivienda R.L. in the first instance, and of La Vivienda Mutual de Ahorro y Préstamo, in its capacity as trustee, after the transfer of the transaction, since although the plaintiff knew the contractual terms, she could not calculate and determine the new installment to pay for her transaction (pages 253 to 255 of the judicial file). The Tribunal shares that conclusion, given that it (the semi-annual adjustment) is an obligation incumbent upon the creditor and also constitutes a pillar within this modality or credit system. This is because the real installment entails a system of periodic readjustment of the nominal installments of credit transactions (in this case, housing) according to which the setting of the installments will not depend on nor be made taking interest rates as a parameter, but rather will be made proportionally to the variation, principally, of the minimum wage of an unskilled laborer in the construction industry. If these readjustments are not made, the obligation is not updated and brings as a consequence that the value of the installment diminishes in such a way that what is paid under that item is not even enough for interest, capitalizing them to the principal as happened here. But, we insist, adjusting the installment was the responsibility of the creditor. The audit report and the witness Ana Julia Fernández acknowledge this. Therefore, what was stated in December 2004 by the FONAVI Directorate of the BANHVI, indicating that "(…) the variations in the installment amount were clearly established at the time of formalization and were accepted accordingly… during some period the monitoring of the loan portfolio was affected, generating a delay in the execution of the corresponding adjustments to the installment. This situation occurred despite the fact that the debtor had express knowledge of the adjustment policy and, therefore, was in a position to make the respective adjustment, thereby avoiding the lack of updating of the installment amount. In this sense, it is not considered reasonable to argue that the debtor is not responsible for the fact that the increases in the installment amount were not executed in a timely manner, because the loan conditions were clearly established and it is the responsibility of both the portfolio administrators and the debtor to ensure compliance. (…)”, is not shared under any perspective. Note that we are faced with a credit right that may even be exercised or not by the creditor. Thus, it is the Tribunal's criterion that the omission of not having adjusted the monthly installment semi-annually and under the parameters established by the loan contract is attributable exclusively to those who acted as creditors of the obligation, and it is they who must assume the economic consequences derived from that neglect; without it being appropriate to transfer that omission to the debtor, as has been attempted. A second determining aspect that must be evaluated is that although the plaintiff paid her installments as established in the contract, the receipts delivered as proof of payment did not record the outstanding balance of the debt or the amortization to the principal (pages 20 to 99 and 253 to 255 of the judicial file). We find that by omitting this information, the plaintiff's rights were harmed since it prevented her from knowing the status and behavior of her debt over time. But furthermore, it prevented her from knowing whether the referenced semi-annual adjustments were being made or not. That situation continued until February 2003, a date after which the receipts include the outstanding debt balance and the amortization to the principal (pages 75 to 88 and 253 to 255 of the judicial file). Precisely, the receipt issued on February 2, 2003, indicates that, as of that date, the outstanding debt balance was ₡10,639,890.35 (ten million six hundred thirty-nine thousand eight hundred ninety colones and thirty-five céntimos) (pages 75 of the judicial file). Thus, after almost six years of paying the monthly installment charged by the creditor (which rightly led the debtor to presume that what was charged was what was owed), the receipt reflects that she had amortized no sum toward the capital and that, rather, it had grown. Faced with this state of affairs, the plaintiff went to the BANHVI to present her case and request a review and adjustment of her mortgage transaction, due to the increase in the debt balance, despite the fact that she has been paying the installments monthly. However, far from finding a solution in accordance with the law, they propose a series of alternatives that, in the end, seek to transfer to her the neglect and omissions of the creditor entities, which, as will be explained infra, renders them illegitimate. It is equally serious that despite BANHVI having known about the failure to make semi-annual adjustments to the installments since 2003, as the witness Ana Julia Fernández admits, they took no proactive action aimed at regularizing such omission and preventing the capital from increasing in the manner it did. That is to say, these conducts seek not only to disregard the effects of the inertia of the creditor entity regarding the adjustment of the installments, but also to transfer the implications of such indolence to the debtor, aggravating her financial situation and attempting to evade their duty to adjust. In short, to obtain economic advantage from their own neglectfulness and inadvertence, which the Tribunal does not consider consistent with the good faith that must prevail in the execution of the loan contract. The justifications provided, according to which the adjustments were not made due to the impasse that occurred with the transfer of the transaction from Coovivienda to Grupo Mutual (because they had approximately five years to adjust the installment, without it having been done), or that this was done so as not to harm the plaintiff due to the change in the installment amount, are not acceptable. Not having made the semi-annual adjustments from 2003 onwards (knowing of the omission) only allowed more interest to be capitalized to the principal owed, to the evident detriment of the plaintiff. Proof of this is that by July 2009, the receipts showed an outstanding debt balance of ₡34,162,599.63 (thirty-four million one hundred sixty-two thousand five hundred ninety-nine colones and sixty-three céntimos), despite the fact that the plaintiff continued to pay the installment charged by the creditor entity monthly. For the reasons stated, if in accordance with articles 1022 and 1023 of the Civil Code, contracts obligate not only what is expressed in them but also the consequences that equity, custom, or the law give rise to from the obligation, according to its nature; the truth is that there did exist an express agreement on the manner in which the adjustments to the installments would be made, and the errors and omissions in the adjustment and calculation thereof, committed from the very moment the loan was granted to her, are exclusively attributable to the different creditors, who even knowing of such omission did not adjust their conduct to what was agreed upon. Therefore, we find that it is notoriously unjust that, after many years of complying with her payment obligation, the defendants transfer to the plaintiff the economic consequences of such neglectfulness, as they have attempted to do.

**VIII.—Indeed**, as both witnesses in this proceeding have acknowledged, from the moment the defendants realized the error committed, instead of correcting and regularizing the situation, they proposed to the plaintiff a series of proposals that the Tribunal deems illegitimate. Let us examine. In December 2004, the BANHVI rejected the cancellation proposal made by the plaintiff, proposing, instead, alternatives such as restructuring the debt for the remaining term of the transaction, changing from a real installment to a fixed installment, or paying the difference generated due to the adjustments not made to the installments as established in the deed (a sum that at that time exceeded two million colones) and authorizing that the adjustments to the installments continue to be made semi-annually (thus it follows from audit report No. AI-X-045-2010, visible from pages 141 to 156 of the judicial file, particularly on pages 147 to 153, as well as from the testimony of Ana Julia Fernández). Then, in February 2010, the BANHVI informed the plaintiff that there was a possibility of surrendering the property in dation in payment and reacquiring it for the value of the administrative appraisal, plus costs, amounts that according to the fiduciary approximate twelve million colones, a payment she had to make in cash (thus it follows from audit report No. AI-X-045-2010, visible from pages 141 to 156 of the judicial file, particularly on pages 147 to 153, as well as from the testimony of Ana Julia Fernández). Finally, through official letter DFNV-DF-0317-2011, dated March 28, 2011, the BANHVI reiterated to the plaintiff the proposals to reach a definitive solution to the problems of her loan, which were reduced to surrendering the property in dation in payment and reacquiring it for the value of the updated appraisal plus costs, or paying the amounts not applied to the installments due to the variations stipulated in the deed and that from that moment on she pay the corresponding installment and the periodic variations be applied (pages 134 to 137 of the judicial file). We find that such proposals are illegitimate because they suggest alternatives not agreed upon and that are not consistent with the credit modality initially agreed upon by the parties (and, rather, seek to change the credit system from a real installment to a linear one), nor do they acknowledge that the error of not adjusting the installment was the responsibility of the creditor. Rather, they constitute illegitimate interpretations by which they seek to take advantage of their own non-compliance and transfer the economic consequences derived therefrom (the payment of the principal that increased because interest had been capitalized to the principal for not adjusting the installment at the timely moment agreed upon) to the plaintiff. Moreover, it is not possible to conclude that these alternatives weighed the plaintiff's current credit conditions and payment capacity.

Ana Julia Fernández stated that the readjustment proposals were made based on the conditions set forth in the public deed and Mauricio González Zumbado indicated that he did not participate in the proposals, that he was unaware of the parameters used to arrive at them, and that he relied on the data contained in the case file. Up to this point, we have that during the execution of the loan contract, there have been instances of neglect and errors that resulted in the creditor breaching its duty to adjust the monthly installment as agreed, and abusive and illegitimate interpretations insofar as they depart from what was agreed and shift the economic repercussions of those omissions to the plaintiff, who up to that date had been paying her installments. Now, based on the testimony of Ana Julia Fernández, the Court certifies that on an unspecified date but between March and November 2011, BANHVI carried out a reconstruction of the plaintiff's credit operation in which they considered the installments that should have been paid according to the adjustments stipulated in the public deed (and not made by the creditors), comparing them with the installments paid, in order to determine how the principal of the obligation was affected by those amounts. Thus, they obtained a corrected balance and adjusted the debt to ₡19,400,000.00 (nineteen million four hundred thousand colones exactly), which they communicated to Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda so that it would make the corresponding variations (this is also inferred from folios 132 to 137 of the judicial file). This act constitutes, in the Court's opinion, the legitimate action whereby the defendants assume the consequences of not having adjusted the installment for approximately eleven years and reduce the principal owed. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not a debt forgiveness (condonación de deuda), as indicated by the defendants' legal representative in his conclusions. Rather, it implies assuming the economic consequences of their own neglect for almost eleven years, in the mechanism for adjusting the monthly installment that the plaintiff was required to pay. If the error is attributable to the creditor, it is the latter who must assume the resulting economic consequences. The foregoing is excepted in those situations where an evident abuse of right (abuso de derecho) on the part of the debtor is observed, which this Chamber considers is not observed in the present case. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the matter related to the principal owed was regularized, the fact is that when that decision was communicated to the plaintiff and to Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda, the error was again made of proposing alternatives that do not conform to the conditions and the payment plan that the plaintiff had agreed to since 1997. In this regard, it is observed that through official letters DFNV-DF-1119-2011 and DFNV-DF-1120-2011, dated November 25, 2011, they informed not only of the reconstruction and reduction of the principal owed (a decision that is compliant with the legal system) but also, once again, proposed to the plaintiff alternatives that do not conform to the conditions and payment plan agreed to since 1997. It is for this reason that we deem those formal actions to be absolutely null and void only insofar as they proposed alternatives that deviate from what was agreed and without considering the payment capacity that the plaintiff had at that time. That is, they are based on a nonexistent reason and their content is illegitimate. The nullity does not extend to the reconstruction and adjustment of the debt for two reasons. First, because it is a decision that was adopted previously and the challenged acts merely communicate it. Second, because with the adjustment to the principal owed, the defendants assume their errors and omissions regarding the agreed obligations. Thus, the debt balance shall be as of that readjustment and taking into account the considerations that will be set forth below. In conclusion, the absolute nullity of official letters DFNV-DF-317-2011, DFNV-DF-1119-2011, and DFNV-DF-1120-2011, already cited, must be declared, in the terms set forth.

IX.- Strictly speaking, we consider that the reconstruction of the plaintiff's credit operation, in which they considered the installments that should have been paid according to the adjustments stipulated in the public deed and compared them with the installments paid, in order to determine how the principal of the obligation was affected by those amounts, was the action that the creditors were obligated to take from the moment they learned of the error committed. If that action had been timely, the contract would have been possible to fulfill as agreed. Thus, it is clear that since November 2011, the principal owed was adjusted and the installments have been adjusted as agreed. However, the fact is that there are other conditions within the contract that must also be considered because both parties obligated themselves to them. Specifically, we refer to the term of the obligation. According to the contract, the loan term was for twenty years and was to be paid through two hundred forty successive, due monthly installments starting June twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-seven. According to the provisions of numeral 764 of the Civil Code, payment—for it to have an extinctive or liberating effect—must be made “in all respects in accordance with the terms of the obligation”; that is, exactly as set forth in the agreement. From that perspective, it is the creditor's responsibility to verify that the conditions agreed upon in the payment plan are those necessary and sufficient to pay off the debt. Thus, the Court considers that, given the circumstances that have occurred in the specific case, the defendants must respect the term and installments originally agreed upon. We insist that the plaintiff has, in good faith, been complying with the agreed obligations and paying, for approximately fifteen years, the installment that the creditor entities have established. No other conclusion can be reached if one observes the payment history and the interest that the plaintiff has maintained from the moment she learned of the increase in the principal owed. She was the one who went to BANHVI and who requested the Audit that concludes by revealing the errors both in the semiannual adjustment of the installment and in the failure to update the interest rates, a breach that the witness González Zumbado also pointed out. It is also ruled out that she contracted with the intention of not complying with her obligations. At the time, she contracted under conditions that were accessible to her and that, in any event, it was the creditor entity's responsibility to verify; without any intention of failing to comply with what was agreed being observed. To that end, it suffices to refer, we insist, to the fact that for more than fifteen years she has been complying with the payment of the installments. The Audit's conclusions regarding the fact that she took advantage of the benefits of contracting under the real installment mechanism because it allowed her to acquire a dwelling with a value exceeding her credit capacity are not shared. Strictly speaking, the plaintiff's payment capacity in relation to her credit options was an aspect that the creditor should have assessed and analyzed prior to the contract. If at that time it was deemed that she could contract under modalities other than those agreed upon. Nor is it intended that responsibility be attributed to the plaintiff for not having updated the amount of the installment to be paid. We reiterate that this is an obligation inherent to the creditor. If it did not do so, or did so in a way that is currently unviable, it must assume the economic repercussions of that omission. It is for this reason that we consider that the plaintiff's obligation must be extinguished within the term established by the contract and with the 240 installments originally agreed upon. Note that the contract does not establish the possibility of the term increasing. Rather, it indicates that said term could be reduced by application of the agreed payment system and which the debtor expressly accepts. Thus, we are of the opinion that the payment plan and conditions for extinguishing the debt as agreed must be respected. If, due to the creditors' errors, the term is not sufficient to pay off the debt, they must be the ones to assume the financial consequences of their neglect and not transfer them to a debtor who, for more than fifteen years, has complied with her obligations. This does not mean, under any circumstances, that the defendants are prevented from collecting their receivables or that there is unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) in favor of the debtor. It is reiterated that it was the various creditors who failed to exercise the credit right under the agreed conditions and that the installment that will be set for the remainder of the contractual term is a consequence of their inertia and to guarantee the plaintiff's right as a consumer, that the terms agreed upon and complied with by her be respected. Thus, it is declared that the plaintiff must pay, for the remainder of the term and until the two hundred forty agreed installments are completed, a monthly installment that must be adjusted according to the parameters established in the contract. Specifically, the installment she currently pays must be adjusted in the same percentage as the increase in the minimum wage decreed by the corresponding authorities for the second half of this year. Subsequently, and until the contractual term concludes, each time an increase in minimum wages occurs, by the same percentage thereof. The reference used shall be the percentage variation corresponding to the minimum wage of an unskilled laborer in the construction industry. In the event that the minimum wage disappears or is not applied, the percentage variation of the average wage calculated by the CCSS shall be used as a reference to set the percentage increase of the installments, and in the event that this other mechanism also cannot be applied, the percentage variation of the consumer price index, issued by the corresponding governmental authorities, shall be used as a reference. In any case, the installment may not exceed thirty percent of the plaintiff's family income at that date. Nor shall it consider the increases not applied throughout the duration of the credit operation. Once the twenty-year term has expired or the two hundred forty agreed installments have been paid, the obligation must be considered extinguished and the mortgage lien affecting it must be lifted." We have that the deed clearly specified the type of credit mechanism being contracted, that is, real quota; it explained that the quota was set based on a percentage of the minimum wage not exceeding thirty percent, which would increase semiannually, and the parameters that would be used for such purposes; a clear reference to the payment imputation mechanism explaining that the payments made will be applied to cover, to the extent the payment reaches, the insurance, the interest for each month, and once the payment exceeds that amount, the difference will be applied as a credit to the principal, as well as the possibility that interest would be capitalized if the quota set for the debtor was not sufficient to cover the amount of interest, with the consequent increase in the principal. Then, the deed indicates that the plaintiff expressly understood and accepted the referenced conditions and, having read it, approved and signed it. Despite the fact that the plaintiff alleged that the deed was not read to her and offered her mother's testimony to that effect, it is the Tribunal's criterion that this does not undermine the evidentiary presumption of that public instrument. From this perspective and considering the plaintiff's level of education, the Tribunal understands that her will at the time of contracting was free and conscious, without observing defects attributable to a lack of information on the part of the creditor entity. In conclusion, we do not observe that the challenged clause suffers from defects that lead to its nullity; rather, it is considered valid and obligated the parties to its fulfillment, this last aspect being precisely what is relevant to the object of the proceeding, as will be explained below.

**VII.- On the fulfillment of obligations arising under the loan contract.** On this point, the plaintiff explains that she always fulfilled the payment of the quotas that her creditor charged her and that the receipts were deficient because they never indicated the outstanding balance of the debt. Then, she relates that she found out that for 11 years she had not amortized anything toward the debt and that, rather, interest had been capitalized to the principal balance, increasing it disproportionately. When she goes to BANHVI, they explain to her that this is because, by error, the creditor did not timely make the semiannual adjustments to which it was obligated. She claims that she does not have to assume the bank's error and that they now seek to disregard the payments she has made since 1997. After an analysis of the various pieces of evidence brought to the proceeding, the Tribunal concludes that during the contractual relationship, the plaintiff has, in general, fulfilled the obligations under her responsibility, referring fundamentally to the payment of the loan quotas, initially before the original creditor and later before two different trustees that succeeded it. However, upon examining the actions of the defendants regarding the fulfillment of the agreed conditions, the same evidence allows it to be established that there have been acts of neglect attributable to the holders of the credit right, which have impacted the subjective sphere of the plaintiff. The first of these is observed in the fact that for 11 years, none of the creditor entities made the semiannual adjustments to the monthly loan quota, as was established in the agreed contract. This is an omission or error expressly recognized by the Internal Audit Office of BANHVI in the preliminary report on the attention to a request for appraisal related to the granting of financing under the real quota system to Mrs. Medrano Valverde and the witness Ana Julia Fernández in her statement. But additionally, the report concludes that the lack of modifications or adjustments to the mortgage quota in a timely manner from the date of formalization of the mortgage operation until February 2003 are the responsibility of Coovivienda R.L. in the first instance and of La Vivienda Mutual de Ahorro y Préstamo, as trustee, after the transfer of the operation, since although the plaintiff knew the contractual terms, she could not calculate and provide the new quota to pay for her operation *(folios 253 to 255 of the judicial file).* The Tribunal shares this conclusion, since it involves (the semiannual adjustment) an obligation under the responsibility of the creditor and that also constitutes a pillar within this credit modality or system. This is because the real quota presupposes a system of periodic readjustment of the nominal quotas of credit operations (in this case, housing) according to which the setting of the quotas will not depend on nor be carried out using interest rates as a parameter, but rather will be done in proportion to the variation, essentially, of the minimum wage of an unskilled construction worker. If these readjustments are not made, the obligation does not update and brings as a consequence that the value of the quota decreases in such a way that what is paid under that heading does not even cover interest, capitalizing it to the principal, as happened here. But, we insist, readjusting the quota was incumbent upon the creditor. The audit report and the witness Ana Julia Fernández recognize this. For this reason, what was indicated in December 2004 by the FONAVI Directorate of BANHVI is not shared under any perspective, when it indicates that *"(...) the variations in the amount of the quota were clearly established at the time of formalization and were accepted in conformity... for a certain period, the monitoring of the loan portfolio was affected, generating a delay in the execution of the adjustments corresponding to the quota. This situation arose despite the fact that the debtor had express knowledge of the adjustment policy and, therefore, was in a position to make the respective adjustment, thereby avoiding the outdated amount of the quota. In this sense, it is not considered reasonable to argue that the debtor is not responsible for the increases in the quota amount not being executed at the opportune moment, because the credit conditions were clearly established and it is the responsibility of both the portfolio administrators and the debtor to ensure their fulfillment.(...)"*. Note that we are facing a credit right that, even, may or may not be exercised by the creditor. Thus, it is the Tribunal's criterion that the omission of having failed to adjust the monthly quota semiannually and under the parameters established by the loan contract is attributable, exclusively, to those who served as creditors of the obligation, it being these who must assume the economic consequences derived from that neglect; it is not appropriate to transfer that omission to the debtor, as has been attempted. A second determining aspect that must be assessed is that although the plaintiff paid her quotas according to what was established in the contract, the receipts delivered as proof of payment did not record the outstanding balance of the debt or the amortization to capital *(folios 20 to 99 and 253 to 255 of the judicial file).* We consider that omitting this information harmed the plaintiff's rights since it prevented her from knowing the status and behavior of her debt over time. Furthermore, it prevented her from knowing whether the referenced semiannual adjustments were being made or not. That situation existed until February 2003, a date from which the receipts include the outstanding balance of the debt and the amortization to capital *(folios 75 to 88 and 253 to 255 of the judicial file).* Precisely, the receipt issued on February 2, 2003, indicates that, as of that date, the outstanding balance of the debt was Ë 10,639,890.35 (ten million six hundred thirty-nine thousand eight hundred ninety colones with thirty-five céntimos) *(folio 75 of the judicial file).* Thus, after almost six years of paying the monthly quota charged by the creditor (which led the debtor to reasonably presume that what was charged was what corresponded), the receipt reflects that she had not amortized any sum toward the capital and that, rather, it had increased. Faced with this state of affairs, the plaintiff goes to BANHVI to present her case and request a review and adjustment of her mortgage operation, due to the increase in the outstanding balance of the debt, despite the fact that she has been paying the quotas monthly. However, far from finding a solution in accordance with the law, they propose a series of alternatives that, ultimately, seek to transfer the neglect and omissions of the creditor entities to her, which, as will be explained below, makes them illegitimate. It is considered equally serious that despite BANHVI knowing about the lack of semiannual adjustment of the quotas since 2003, as admitted by the witness Ana Julia Fernández, it took no proactive action tending to regularize such omission and prevent the capital from increasing in the way it did. That is to say, these conducts seek not only to disregard the effects of the creditor entity's inaction regarding the adjustment of the quotas, but also to transfer the implications of such negligence to the debtor, worsening her financial situation and seeking to disassociate itself from its duty to adjust. In sum, to obtain economic advantage from its own failures and inadvertences, which the Tribunal does not consider in keeping with the good faith that must prevail in the execution of the credit contract. The justifications provided, according to which the adjustments were not made due to the impasse that occurred with the transfer of the operation from Coovivienda to Grupo Mutual (because they had nearly five years to adjust the quota, without it having been done) or that this was done so as not to harm the plaintiff due to the change in the quota amount, are not acceptable. Not having made the semiannual adjustments starting in 2003 (knowing of the omission) only allowed more interest to be capitalized to the indebted capital, to the evident detriment of the plaintiff. Proof of this is that by July 2009, the receipts showed an outstanding balance of the debt of Ë 34,162,599.63 (thirty-four million one hundred sixty-two thousand five hundred ninety-nine colones with sixty-three céntimos), despite the fact that the plaintiff continued paying monthly the quota that the creditor entity was charging. For the reasons set forth, if, in accordance with articles 1022 and 1023 of the Civil Code, contracts obligate both what is expressed in them and the consequences that equity, usage, or the law create from the obligation, according to its nature; the truth is that there was an express agreement on the way in which the adjustments to the quotas would be made, the errors and omissions in the adjustment and calculation thereof, committed from the very moment the loan was granted, are attributable exclusively to the different creditors, who, even knowing of such omission, did not adjust their conduct to what was agreed. Therefore, we consider that it is manifestly unjust that, after many years of fulfilling her payment obligation, the defendants transfer the economic consequences of such failures to the plaintiff, as they have attempted.

**VIII.-** And indeed, as both witnesses in this proceeding have recognized, from the moment the defendants realized the committed error, instead of rectifying and regularizing the situation, they proposed to the plaintiff a series of proposals that the Tribunal considers illegitimate. Let us examine them. In December 2004, BANHVI rejected the cancellation proposal made by the plaintiff, proposing, instead, alternatives such as restructuring the debt for the remaining term of the operation, switching from real quota to leveled quota, or paying the difference generated by the adjustments not made to the quotas as established in the deed (a sum that at that time exceeded two million colones) and authorizing that semiannual adjustments to the quotas continue to be made *(this is evident from audit report No. AI-X-045-2010, visible at folios 141 to 156 of the judicial file, particularly at folios 147 to 153, as well as from the statement of Ana Julia Fernández).* Then, in February 2010, BANHVI communicated to the plaintiff that there was a possibility of delivering the property in dation in payment and acquiring it again for the value of the administrative appraisal, plus expenses, amounts that according to the trustee total approximately twelve million colones, a payment that had to be made in cash *(this is evident from audit report No. AI-X-045-2010, visible at folios 141 to 156 of the judicial file, particularly at folios 147 to 153, as well as from the statement of Ana Julia Fernández).* Finally, through official letter DFNV-DF-0317-2011, dated March 28, 2011, BANHVI reiterated to the plaintiff the proposals to reach a definitive solution to her credit problem, which essentially involved delivering the property in dation in payment and acquiring it again for the value of the updated appraisal plus expenses, or paying the amounts not applied to the quotas due to the variations stipulated in the deed and that from that moment on, the corresponding quota be paid and the periodic variations applied *(folios 134 to 137 of the judicial file).* We consider that such proposals are illegitimate because they suggest alternatives not agreed upon and that do not conform to the credit modality initially agreed upon by the parties (and rather seek to change the credit system from real quota to a linear one), nor acknowledge that the error of not adjusting the quota was the creditor's responsibility. Rather, they constitute illegitimate interpretations through which one seeks to take advantage of its own breach and transfer the economic consequences derived therefrom (the payment of the capital that increased as interest was capitalized to the principal because the quota was not adjusted at the opportune time agreed upon) to the plaintiff. But additionally, it is not possible to conclude that these alternatives weighed the plaintiff's current credit conditions and payment capacity. Ana Julia Fernández stated that the restructuring proposals were made based on the conditions established in the deed, and Mauricio González Zumbado indicated that he did not participate in the proposals, that he was unaware of the parameters used to arrive at them, and that he relied on the data contained in the file. Thus far, we have that during the execution of the loan contract, there have been failures and errors that resulted in the creditor breaching its duty to adjust the monthly quota as agreed, and abusive and illegitimate interpretations insofar as they deviate from what was agreed and transfer the economic repercussions of those omissions to the plaintiff, who up to that date was paying her quotas. Now, based on the testimony of Ana Julia Fernández, the Tribunal finds it proven that on an unspecified date between March and November 2011, BANHVI carried out a reconstruction of the plaintiff's credit operation in which they considered the quotas that should have been paid due to the adjustments stipulated in the deed (and not made by the creditors), comparing them with the quotas paid, to determine how the principal of the obligation was affected by those amounts. Thus, they obtained a corrected balance and adjusted the debt to Ë 19,400,000.00 (nineteen million four hundred thousand colones exactly), which they communicated to Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda for it to make the corresponding variations *(this is also inferred from folios 132 to 137 of the judicial file).* This act constitutes, in the Tribunal's judgment, the legitimate action through which the defendants assume the consequences of not having adjusted the quota for approximately eleven years and reduce the outstanding capital. It is emphasized, however, that this does not constitute a debt forgiveness, as the defendants' legal representative indicated in his conclusions. Rather, it represents assuming the economic consequences of their own failures for almost eleven years in the adjustment mechanism for the monthly quota the plaintiff had to pay. If the error is attributable to the creditor, it is the latter who must assume the derived economic consequences. The foregoing except in those situations where an evident abuse of right on the part of the debtor is observed, which this Chamber considers is not observed in the present case. However, despite regularizing the matter regarding the outstanding capital, the truth is that when this decision was communicated to the plaintiff and to Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda, the error was again made of proposing alternatives that do not conform to the conditions and the payment plan that the plaintiff had agreed upon since 1997. In this sense, it is observed that through official letters DFNV-DF-1119-2011 and DFNV-DF-1120-2011, dated November 25, 2011, not only was the reconstruction and reduction of the outstanding capital communicated (a decision that conforms to the legal order), but also, alternatives were again proposed to the plaintiff that do not conform to the conditions and payment plan agreed upon since 1997. It is for this reason that we consider these formal conducts to be absolutely null only insofar as they proposed alternatives that depart from what was agreed and without considering the payment capacity that the plaintiff had at that time. That is, they stem from a nonexistent motive and their content is illegitimate. The nullity does not extend to the reconstruction and adjustment of the debt for two reasons. First, because it involves a decision that was adopted previously and the challenged acts only communicate it. Second, because with the adjustment to the outstanding capital, the defendants assume their errors and omissions regarding the agreed obligations. Thus, the outstanding balance of the debt shall be as of that readjustment and taking into account the considerations that will be set forth below. In conclusion, the absolute nullity of official letters DFNV-DF-317-2011, DFNV-DF-1119-2011, and DFNV-DF-1120-2011 already cited must be declared, in the terms expressed.

**IX.-** Strictly speaking, we consider that the reconstruction of the plaintiff's credit operation in which they considered the quotas that should have been paid due to the adjustments stipulated in the deed and compared them with the quotas paid, in order to determine how the principal of the obligation was affected by those amounts, was the action to which the creditors were obligated from the moment they learned of the committed error. If this action had been timely, the contract would have been capable of being fulfilled according to what was agreed. Thus, it is clear that as of November 2011, the outstanding capital was adjusted and the quotas have been adjusted according to what was agreed. However, the truth is that there are other conditions within the contract that must also be considered because both parties obligated themselves to them. Specifically, we refer to the term of the obligation. According to the contract, the term of the loan was for twenty years and would be paid through two hundred forty successive, overdue monthly quotas starting from June twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-seven. According to what is stipulated in article 764 of the Civil Code, payment—for it to have an extinctive or liberating effect—must be made *"in all respects according to the tenor of the obligation"*; that is, exactly as set forth in the agreement. From this perspective, it is the creditor's responsibility to verify that the conditions agreed upon in the payment plan are necessary and sufficient to cancel the debt. Thus, the Tribunal considers that given the circumstances that have occurred in the specific case, the defendants must respect the originally agreed term and quotas. We insist that the plaintiff has been, in good faith, fulfilling the agreed obligations and paying, for approximately fifteen years, the quota that the creditor entities have established. No other conclusion can be reached if one observes the payment history and the interest that the plaintiff has maintained from the moment she learned of the increase in the outstanding capital. It was she who went to BANHVI and she who requested the Audit that concludes by revealing the errors both in the semiannual adjustment of the quota and in the non-updating of the interest rates, a breach that the witness González Zumbado also noted. It is also ruled out that she contracted with the intention of not fulfilling her obligations. At the time, she contracted under conditions that were affordable to her and that, in any case, it was the creditor entity's duty to verify; without any intention to not comply with what was agreed being observed. For this, it suffices to refer, we insist, to the fact that for more than fifteen years she has been fulfilling the payment of the quotas. The conclusions of the Audit stating that she took advantage of the benefits of contracting under the real quota mechanism because it allowed her to acquire a home with a value greater than her credit capacity are not shared. Strictly speaking, the plaintiff's payment capacity in relation to her credit options was an aspect that the creditor should have assessed and analyzed prior to the contract. If at that time it was considered that she could contract under modalities that were not the ones agreed upon. Nor with the attempt to blame the plaintiff for not having updated the amount of the quota to be paid. We reiterate that this is an obligation inherent to the creditor. If it did not do so, or did so in a way that currently proves unfeasible, it must assume the economic repercussions of that omission. It is for this reason that we consider that the plaintiff's obligation must be extinguished within the term established by the contract and with the originally agreed 240 quotas. Note that the contract does not establish the possibility of the term increasing. Rather, it indicates that said term could be reduced in application of the agreed payment system and which the debtor expressly accepts. Thus, we are of the criterion that the payment plan and conditions for extinguishing the debt agreed upon must be respected. If, due to errors by the creditors, the term is not sufficient to settle the debt, it will be the latter who must assume the financial consequences of their failures and not transfer them to a debtor who, for more than fifteen years, has fulfilled her obligations. This does not mean, under any circumstance, that the defendants are prevented from collecting their credits or that there is unjust enrichment in favor of the debtor. It is reiterated that it was the different creditors who did not exercise the credit right under the agreed conditions, and that the quota to be set for the remainder of the contractual term is a consequence of their inaction and to guarantee the plaintiff's right as a consumer, that the terms agreed upon and fulfilled by her be respected. Thus, it is declared that the plaintiff must pay, for the remainder of the term and until the two hundred forty agreed quotas are completed, a monthly quota that must be adjusted according to the parameters established in the contract. Specifically, the quota she currently pays must be adjusted by the same percentage as the increase in the minimum wage decreed by the corresponding authorities for the second half of this year. Subsequently, and until the contractual term concludes, each time an increase in the minimum wages occurs, by the same percentage. The percentage variation corresponding to the minimum wage of an unskilled construction worker will be used as a reference. In the event that the minimum wage disappears or is not applied, the percentage variation of the average salary calculated by the CCSS will be used as a reference to set the percentage increase of the quotas, and in the event that this other mechanism also cannot be applied, the percentage variation of the consumer price index, issued by the corresponding governmental authorities, will be used as a reference. In any case, the quota may not exceed thirty percent of the plaintiff's family income at that date.

Nor shall it consider increases not applied throughout the life of the credit transaction. Once the twenty-year term has expired or the two hundred forty agreed-upon installments have been paid, the obligation must be deemed extinguished and the mortgage lien (gravamen hipotecario) affecting it lifted." **IV.- On the prohibition of compounding interest (anatocismo) and the real installment system in housing loans**. This is an issue that has already been addressed by this Court, among others, in judgment No. 926-2010, issued at 7:49 a.m. on March 11, 2010. In what is relevant, it was stated that *"(...) the national legal system prohibits the figure of interest capitalization, that is, the so-called compounding interest (anatocismo), which entails, in simple terms, the application of interest on interest. In this regard, canon 505 of the Commercial Code clearly states: 'It is prohibited to capitalize interest. However, if upon settling a debt, interest is owed, such interest may be added to the principal to form a single total. When issuing a new document or extending the previous one, interest may be stipulated on the total amount of the obligation.' From that standpoint, it is evident that unless there is a rule to the contrary, every commercial loan obligation is onerous and therefore compensated with legal interest (Article 496 of the Commercial Code). Such a dimension implies that in the payment of credit installments, the current interest is amortized first, and the remainder is applied to the principal of the obligation. Now then, the Law of the National Financial System for Housing and the Creation of BANHVI, No. 7052 of November 27, 1986, establishes in its Article 167: 'Authorized entities may grant their loans through payment systems in which the installment is adjusted based on the variation of minimum wages. Those installments may be less than the minimum necessary to cover interest and amortization—refinanced installment—and the outstanding differences shall accumulate to the loan balance in the form of capitalization, without this allowing the application of Article 505 of the Commercial Code. In any case, the amount of the installment thus set shall first be applied to cover interest, and if any remains, it shall be applied to amortize the debt. Similar treatment may be applied to already established loans. / Authorized entities may use systems based on other parameters set by the Bank's Board of Directors. (Thus amended by Article 165 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica No. 7558 of November 3, 1995)' This is a system that seeks to establish a financing mechanism for housing with more accessible installments for applicants for loans of this nature. The rule provides for the so-called stepped installment, which entails the percentage increase of the installment, previously agreed upon by the parties, usually each year, in order to compensate, in the installments of subsequent years, for the deficit in the payment of the principal that may exist with the initial installment, so that as the loan progresses, the installment increases. It is worth pointing out here that, as a matter of principle, the agreed-upon installment must allow for the payment of interest and amortization toward principal. However, within this modality, the aforementioned Article 167 allows, as an exception, for the initial installment not to cover the minimum necessary to pay the interest and the amortization toward principal. In that case, variations may arise; on the one hand, when the installment only allows coverage of current interest, the principal will remain unchanged until the stepped increase of the installment allows for covering that interest and applying a contribution to the principal balance. On the other hand, when the installment does not fully cover the interest, exceptionally and given the legal permissibility, the uncovered differences in interest are accumulated to the loan balance in the form of capitalization, without this entailing, as the cited law states, the application of Article 505 of the Commercial Code. From the foregoing, it follows that in this scenario, we are facing a refinanced installment as far as interest is concerned, that is, that fraction of interest not paid due to the insufficiency of the installment becomes part of the primary capital. In this context, that interest may later be paid off with the stepping up of the payment. In sum, it begins with a low installment that increases over time, an increase that allows covering not only current interest and balance, but also the interest not previously covered. It bears reiterating that this is an exception in the credit regime based on the rationale of the housing system. (...)"*. This Court reaffirms the foregoing criterion and proceeds to examine the claims asserted.

**V.- On the validity of the challenged clause.** As a first point, the claim seeking to annul the clause of the deed signed by the plaintiff with the Housing Cooperative Consortium Fedecrédito R.L., through which she received from the latter the sum of exactly six million fifty-eight thousand colones (¢6,058,000.00), must be analyzed. Particularly challenged are the lines of the public instrument from line 7 to line 23, which state *"(...) The installments shall be set according to the provisions of Article 167 of the Law of the National Financial System for Housing and BANHVI, which is established under the following parameters: the installment shall be calculated as a percentage of the debtor's family income, not exceeding thirty percent of their salary at this date. Every time an increase in minimum wages occurs, the monthly installment shall be increased by the same percentage starting the month after the increase in said minimum wage comes into effect, as decreed by the corresponding authorities. For this purpose, the percentage variation corresponding to the minimum wage of an unskilled construction industry worker shall be used as a reference. In the event that the minimum wage disappears or is not applied, the percentage variation of the average salary calculated by the CCSS shall be used as a reference to set and increase the percentage of the installments, and in the event that this other mechanism also cannot be applied, the percentage variation of the consumer price index, issued by the corresponding governmental authorities, shall be used as a reference. Payments made by the debtor shall be applied to cover, to the extent possible, the payment of insurance, the interest for each month, and once the payment exceeds said amount, the difference shall be applied as a payment toward principal. In the event that the installment set for the debtor is not sufficient to cover the interest amount, this balance shall be capitalized with the principal, consequently increasing the balance of the transaction. For now, each initial installment shall be seventy-two thousand five hundred ninety-six colones and six céntimos, a sum that includes the mandatory insurance premiums provided by legislation for this type of transaction, the loan interest, and the amortization toward principal.(...)"*. In essence, the plaintiff considers that said clause is absolutely null due to the non-existence of the will of one of the parties, as the duty to inform the consumer was breached. Also, due to the non-existence of object and cause, since her apparent motive for contracting was to have a house with an installment she could pay, not exceeding thirty percent of her base salary. However, her future payment capacity was not analyzed, nor were other credit alternatives that could have been applied to her. For their part, the defendants consider that, in general, the defects afflicting the clause are not listed with due clarity. They consider that it is valid because it reproduces legal and regulatory provisions that have not been challenged. They further add that she was indeed provided with the information required to make the consumer decision, and that this is evidenced by the fact that she signed the deed and stated that she understood its scope. Having examined the challenged clause, the Court considers that it substantially conforms to the legal system for the following reasons. As we indicated above and as the attorney for the defendants points out, the payment system called real installment is permitted by our legislation, as indicated by the clause itself, which refers to numeral 167 of the LSFV. Then, as the main adjustment mechanism, the variation of the minimum wages of an unskilled construction industry worker is established, as set forth by both the cited norm and Articles 117 and 119 of the Regulations for Operations of the National Financial System for Housing. The reference to other adjustment mechanisms is supplementary, that is, only in the event that the minimum wage disappears or is not applied. Moreover, it is a possibility (to set alternative adjustment mechanisms) contemplated by said numeral 167 and Articles 117, subsection a), and 122 of the aforementioned regulations, and which, in any case, we consider reasonable insofar as they rely on objective parameters such as the percentage variation of the average salary calculated by the CCSS, and in the event that this other mechanism also cannot be applied, the percentage variation of the consumer price index, issued by the corresponding governmental authorities. Subsequently, the clause refers to the manner in which payment is to be allocated and the manner of proceeding in the event that the installment set for the debtor is not sufficient to cover the interest amount; regulations that conform to what the cited legal and regulatory norms establish. Finally, the amount of the initial or starting installment is established, under the terms required by numerals 117 and 119 of the already cited Regulations. From this standpoint, the Court finds no defect in either the cause or the object, insofar as the motive for contracting exists from the moment a credit mechanism is used to obtain a housing solution that is valid and regulated by the legal system, under the terms in which the contractual object was agreed upon. Then, if what the plaintiff questions is the constitutionality of the real installment credit system, the truth is that she should have filed the corresponding action of unconstitutionality, or if she claimed the illegality of the regulatory provisions, she could have challenged them directly in this jurisdiction. As this was not done, the Court limits itself to a comparison of what was agreed upon in relation to the normative provisions that regulate the specific credit modality, finding that the conditions stipulated in the deed are substantially in conformity with the legal system, and it must be so declared.

**VI.-** Regarding the defects of will alleged, the following must be noted. Article 46 of the Political Constitution establishes as fundamental rights the protection of the consumer's health, safety, and economic interests; the freedom of choice—from which the principle of free contracting derived from Article 28 of the same constitutional text is inferred—and equitable treatment—developed by Articles 31 and following of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (hereinafter LPCDEC), as well as Article 40 and following of the Regulations to that Law. This entails a duty to provide adequate, timely, clear, truthful, and sufficient information about all elements that directly affect their consumer decision. In the matter before us, the correct understanding of this guarantee implies that the person intending to enter into a credit contract knows sufficiently and in a timely manner the conditions under which the negotiation is undertaken. Specifically, those seeking housing options and intending to enter into a credit under the real installment system must be informed of the implications of that mechanism in their particular case, and with greater emphasis, if their situation is to fall within a module of interest capitalization. The foregoing because the application of a credit formula in which interest is capitalized is only possible in the specific case regulated by numeral 167 of Law No. 7052, and is only valid when the consumer of the financial service, that is, the person turning to financial entities to seek credit options for different needs (in this case, housing), is clearly informed about the scope of that modality, that is, the stepped increase of the installment, and furthermore, that their installment does not cover current interest in a portion that will become part of the principal owed in the next payment, and therefore, the calculation of the interest for the next installment will be made on the basis of the original balance plus the fraction of uncovered interest, and not on the original principal. The implications of this modality also require, and as a determining aspect, the express and voluntary consent of the debtor, that is, their consent to this effect in their loan. Such an aspect cannot be inferred through interpretive or deductive means but must be clearly established, it is insisted, due to its repercussions. It must be taken into account that, as both parties correctly admit, we are dealing with bilateral, onerous, and adhesion or pre-formulated contracts. This entails a necessary safeguarding of balance and equity in the burdens of the parties involved in the consumer relationship, protecting the rights and guarantees of the consumer (potential debtor), since the very dimension of this type of legal business implies a position of advantage on the part of the economic agent, for the purpose of maintaining or at least enhancing equity in the distribution of contractual burdens in said bilateral regime. Having set forth the foregoing, it must be indicated that from the elements contained in the case file, it is not observed that there was a violation by the creditor financial entity of the duty to inform the plaintiff at the time of signing the loan that concerns us here. We have that the deed clearly specified the type of credit mechanism being contracted, that is, real installment; it explained that the installment was set based on a percentage of the minimum wage not exceeding thirty percent, that it would be increased semiannually, and the parameters that would be used for such purposes; a clear reference to the payment allocation mechanism explaining that payments made shall be applied to cover, to the extent possible, the payment of insurance, the interest for each month, and once the payment exceeds said amount, the difference shall be applied as a payment toward principal, as well as the possibility that interest would be capitalized if the installment set for the debtor was not sufficient to cover the interest amount, with the consequent increase of the principal. Then, the deed indicates that the plaintiff understood and expressly accepted the referred-to conditions, and once read, she approved and signed it. Although the plaintiff alleged that the deed was not read to her and provided her mother's testimony in that regard, it is the Court's criterion that this does not undermine the evidentiary presumption of that public instrument. From this perspective, and considering the plaintiff's level of education, the Court understands that her will at the time of contracting was free and conscious, without observing defects attributable to a lack of information on the part of the creditor entity. In conclusion, we do not observe that the challenged clause suffers from defects that would entail its nullity; rather, it is considered valid and bound the parties to its fulfillment, it being precisely this latter aspect that is relevant for the purpose of the proceeding, as will be set forth below.

**VII.- On the fulfillment of the obligations arising in light of the loan contract.** At this point, the plaintiff explains that she always complied with the payment of the installments that her creditor charged her and that the receipts were deficient because they never indicated the outstanding balance of the debt. She then relates that she learned that for 11 years she had not amortized any amount toward the debt and that, rather, interest had been capitalized to the principal balance, enlarging it disproportionately. When she goes to BANHVI, they explain that this is because, by error, the creditor did not timely make the semiannual adjustments to which it was obligated. She claims that she should not have to assume the bank's error and that they now attempt to disregard the payments she has made since 1997. After an analysis of the various items of evidence brought to the process, the Court concludes that during the contractual relationship, the plaintiff has, in general, complied with the obligations under her charge, referring fundamentally to the payment of the loan installments, initially before the original creditor and then before two different fiduciaries that have succeeded it. However, upon examining the actions of the defendants regarding compliance with the agreed conditions, the same evidence permits crediting that there have been instances of neglect attributable to the holders of the credit right, which have affected the subjective sphere of the plaintiff. The first of these is observed in the fact that for 11 years, none of the creditor entities made the semiannual adjustments to the monthly loan installment, as established in the agreed contract. This is an omission or error expressly recognized by the Internal Audit of BANHVI in the Preliminary report on the attention to the valuation requirement related to the granting of financing under the real installment system to Mrs. Medrano Valverde and the witness Ana Julia Fernández in her statement. Furthermore, the report concludes that the lack of modifications or adjustments to the mortgage installment in a timely manner from the date of formalization of the mortgage operation until February 2003 are the responsibility of Coovivienda R.L. in the first instance and of La Vivienda Mutual de Ahorro y Préstamo, in its capacity as fiduciary, after the transfer of the operation, since although the plaintiff knew the contractual terms, she could not calculate and arrange for the new installment to pay for her operation *(folios 253 to 255 of the judicial file).* The Court shares that conclusion, given that it concerns (the semiannual adjustment) an obligation under the charge of the creditor and that it also constitutes a pillar within this modality or credit system. This is because the real installment assumes a system of periodic readjustment of the nominal installments of credit operations (in this case, housing) according to which the setting of the installments will not depend on nor be carried out taking interest rates as a parameter, but rather will be done proportionally to the variation, fundamentally, of the minimum wage of an unskilled construction industry worker. If those readjustments are not made, the obligation is not updated and results in the value of the installment decreasing in such a way that the amount paid under that heading is not sufficient even for interest, capitalizing them to the principal as happened here. But, we insist, readjusting the installment was incumbent upon the creditor. The audit report and the witness Ana Julia Fernández so recognize. Therefore, what was indicated in December 2004 by the FONAVI Directorate of BANHVI is not shared under any perspective when it indicates that *"(...) the variations in the amount of the installment were clearly established at the time of formalization and were accepted in conformity... during a certain period the monitoring of the credit portfolio was affected, generating a delay in the execution of the adjustments corresponding to the installment. This situation occurred despite the fact that the debtor had express knowledge of the adjustment policy and, therefore, was in a position to make the respective adjustment, thus avoiding the deactualization of the amount of the installment. In this sense, it is not considered reasonable to argue that the debtor is not responsible for the increases in the amount of the installment not being executed at the opportune moment, because the conditions of the credit were clearly established and it is the responsibility of both the portfolio administrators and the debtor to ensure their compliance.(...)".* Note that we are faced with a credit right that, even, may or may not be exercised by the creditor. Thus, it is the Court's criterion that the omission of not having adjusted the monthly installment semiannually and under the parameters established by the loan contract is attributable exclusively to those who acted as creditors of the obligation, and it is they who must assume the economic consequences derived from that neglect; without it being appropriate to transfer that omission to the debtor, as has been attempted. A second determining aspect that must be assessed is that although the plaintiff paid her installments as established in the contract, the receipts delivered as proof of payment did not state the outstanding balance of the debt nor the amortization to capital *(folios 20 to 99 and 253 to 255 of the judicial file).* We consider that by omitting this information, the plaintiff's rights were injured, given that it prevented her from knowing the state and behavior of her debt over time. Furthermore, it prevented her from knowing whether or not the referred semiannual adjustments were being made. That situation existed until February 2003, a date from which the receipts include the outstanding balance of the debt and the amortization to capital *(folios 75 to 88 and 253 to 255 of the judicial file).* Precisely, the receipt issued on February 2, 2003, indicates that, on that date, the outstanding balance of the debt was ₡ 10,639,890.35 (ten million six hundred thirty-nine thousand eight hundred ninety colones with thirty-five céntimos) *(folio 75 of the judicial file).* Thus, after almost six years of paying the monthly installment charged by the creditor (which rightly led the debtor to presume that what was charged was what corresponded), the receipt reflects that she had not amortized any sum to capital and that, rather, it had increased. Faced with this state of affairs, the plaintiff goes to BANHVI to present her case and request a review and adjustment of her mortgage operation, due to the increase in the outstanding balance, despite the fact that she has been paying the installments monthly. However, far from finding a legal solution, they propose a series of alternatives that, ultimately, attempt to transfer to her the neglect and omissions of the creditor entities, which, as will be explained infra, renders them illegitimate. It is considered equally serious that despite BANHVI knowing of the lack of semiannual adjustment of the installments since 2003, as admitted by the witness Ana Julia Fernández, it took no proactive action aimed at regularizing such omission and preventing the capital from increasing in the way it did. That is, those conducts attempt not only to disregard the effects of the creditor entity's inertia regarding the adjustment of the installments but also to transfer the implications of such indolence to the debtor, worsening her financial situation and attempting to disassociate itself from its duty to adjust. In sum, to derive economic advantage from its own neglect and inadvertence, which the Court does not consider compliant with the good faith that must prevail in the execution of the credit contract. The justifications given are not admissible, according to which the adjustments were not made due to the impasse that occurred with the transfer of the operation from Coovivienda to Grupo Mutual (because they had nearly five years to adjust the installment, without it having been done) or that this was to avoid harming the plaintiff by changing the amount of the installment. Not having made the semiannual adjustments as of 2003 (knowing of the omission) only allowed more interest to be capitalized to the indebted capital to the evident detriment of the plaintiff. Proof of this is that by July 2009, the receipts showed an outstanding balance of ₡ 34,162,599.63 (thirty-four million one hundred sixty-two thousand five hundred ninety-nine colones with sixty-three céntimos), despite the fact that the plaintiff continued to pay monthly the installment that the creditor entity charged. For the reasons stated, if in accordance with articles 1022 and 1023 of the Civil Code the contracts bind both as to what is expressed in them and as to the consequences that equity, usage, or the law give rise to from the obligation, according to its nature; the truth is that there was an express agreement on the manner in which adjustments to the installments would be made; the errors and omissions in the adjustment and calculation of these, committed from the very moment the loan was granted, are attributable exclusively to the different creditors, who even knowing of such omission did not adjust their actions to what was agreed. Therefore, we consider that it is notoriously unjust that, after many years of complying with her payment obligation, the defendants transfer to the plaintiff the economic consequences of such instances of neglect, as they have attempted.

             **VIII.-** And it is that, as both witnesses in this process have recognized, from the moment the defendants become aware of the error committed, instead of correcting and regularizing the situation, they propose to the plaintiff a series of proposals that the Court deems illegitimate. Let us see. In December 2004, BANHVI rejected the cancellation proposal made by the plaintiff, proposing, instead, alternatives such as restructuring the debt for the remaining term of the operation, changing from real installment to leveled installment, or paying the difference generated by the adjustments not made to the installments as established in the deed (a sum that at that time exceeded two million colones) and authorizing that the adjustments to the installments continue to be made semiannually *(as follows from audit report No. AI-X-045-2010, visible on folios 141 to 156 of the judicial file, particularly on folios 147 to 153, as well as from the statement of Ana Julia Fernández).* Then, in February 2010, BANHVI informed the plaintiff that there was a possibility of handing over the property in dation in payment (dación de pago) and acquiring it again for the value of the administrative appraisal, plus expenses, amounts that according to the fiduciary total approximately twelve million colones, payment that she had to make in cash *(as follows from audit report No. AI-X-045-2010, visible on folios 141 to 156 of the judicial file, particularly on folios 147 to 153, as well as from the statement of Ana Julia Fernández).* Finally, by means of official communication DFNV-DF-0317-2011, dated March 28, 2011, BANHVI reiterated to the plaintiff the proposals to reach a definitive solution to the problem of her credit, which were reduced to handing over the property in dation in payment and acquiring it again for the value of the updated appraisal plus expenses, or paying the amounts not applied to the installments for the variations stipulated in the deed and that from that moment on she pay the corresponding installment and the periodic variations be applied *(folios 134 to 137 of the judicial file).* We consider that such proposals are illegitimate because they suggest alternatives not agreed upon and that do not conform to the credit modality initially agreed upon by the parties (and rather attempt to change the credit system from real installment to a linear one) nor do they recognize that the error of not adjusting the installment was the creditor's responsibility. Rather, they constitute illegitimate interpretations through which there is an attempt to take advantage of its own non-compliance and transfer the economic consequences derived therefrom (the payment of the capital that increased due to interest having been capitalized to the principal for not adjusting the installment at the opportune agreed time) to the plaintiff. Furthermore, it is not possible to conclude that these alternatives have weighed the plaintiff's current credit conditions and payment capacity. Ana Julia Fernández stated that the restructuring proposals were made based on the conditions established in the deed, and Mauricio González Zumbado indicated that he did not participate in the proposals, that he did not know the parameters used to arrive at them, and that he referred to the data contained in the file. So far, we have that during the execution of the loan contract, there have been instances of neglect and errors that resulted in the creditor failing to comply with its duty to adjust the monthly installment as agreed, and abusive and illegitimate interpretations insofar as they depart from what was agreed and transfer the economic repercussions of those omissions to the plaintiff, who up to that date had been paying her installments. Now, based on the testimony of Ana Julia Fernández, the Court credits that on an unspecified date but between March and November 2011, BANHVI performed a reconstruction of the plaintiff's credit operation in which they considered the installments that should have been paid for the adjustments stipulated in the deed (and not made by the creditors), comparing them with the installments paid, in order to determine how the principal of the obligation was affected by those amounts. Thus, they obtained a corrected balance and adjusted the debt to ₡ 19,400,000.00 (nineteen million four hundred thousand exact colones), which they communicated to Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda so that it could make the corresponding variations *(it is also inferred from folios 132 to 137 of the judicial file).* This act constitutes, in the Court's opinion, the legitimate action from which the defendants assume the consequences of not having adjusted the installment for approximately eleven years and reduce the capital owed. It is emphasized, however, that this is not a condonation of debt, as indicated by the legal representative of the defendants in his conclusions. Rather, it entails assuming the economic consequences of their own neglect for almost eleven years, in the mechanism for adjusting the monthly installment that the plaintiff had to pay. If the error is attributable to the creditor, it is the latter who must assume the derived economic consequences. The foregoing, except in those situations where evident abuse of right on the part of the debtor is observed, which this Chamber considers is not observed in the present case. However, despite the regularization of the capital owed, when that decision was communicated to the plaintiff and to Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda, the error is incurred once again of proposing alternatives that do not conform to the conditions and the payment plan that the plaintiff had agreed upon since 1997. In that sense, it is observed that through official communications DFNV-DF-1119-2011 and DFNV-DF-1120-2011, of November 25, 2011, it was reported not only the reconstruction and reduction of the capital owed (a decision that is in accordance with the legal system) but, once again, alternatives are proposed to the plaintiff that do not conform to the conditions and payment plan agreed upon since 1997. It is for this reason that we consider those formal acts to be absolutely null only insofar as they proposed alternatives that depart from what was agreed and without considering the payment capacity that the plaintiff had at that time. That is, they are based on a non-existent motive and their content is illegitimate. The nullity does not extend to the reconstruction and adjustment of the debt for two reasons. First, because it is a decision that was adopted previously and the contested acts only communicate it. Second, because with the adjustment to the capital owed, the defendants assume their errors and omissions regarding the agreed obligations. Thus, the outstanding balance of the debt will be as of that readjustment and taking into account the considerations that will be set forth infra. In conclusion, the absolute nullity of the cited official communications DFNV-DF-317-2011, DFNV-DF-1119-2011, and DFNV-DF-1120-2011 must be declared, in the terms stated.

             **IX.-** Strictly speaking, we consider that the reconstruction of the plaintiff's credit operation, in which they considered the installments that should have been paid per the adjustments stipulated in the deed and compared them with the installments paid, in order to determine how the principal of the obligation was affected by those amounts, was the action to which the creditors were obligated from the moment they learned of the error committed. If that action had been timely, the contract would have been capable of being fulfilled as agreed. Thus, it is clear that since November 2011, the capital owed was adjusted and the installments have been adjusted as agreed. However, the truth is that there are other conditions within the contract that must also be considered because both parties obligated themselves to them. Specifically, we refer to the term of the obligation. According to the contract, the term of the loan was for twenty years and would be paid by means of two hundred forty successive monthly installments, due and payable starting from June twenty-eighth, nineteen hundred and ninety-seven. In accordance with the provisions of article 764 of the Civil Code, the payment – in order to have extinctive or liberating effect – must be made *"in all respects according to the tenor of the obligation"**; that is, exactly as it was set forth in the agreement. From this perspective, it is up to the creditor to verify that the conditions agreed in the payment plan are those necessary and sufficient to cancel the debt. Thus, the Court considers that given the circumstances that occurred in the specific case, the defendants must respect the originally agreed term and installments. We insist that the plaintiff has been, in good faith, complying with the agreed obligations and paying, for approximately fifteen years, the installment that the creditor entities have established. No other conclusion can be reached if one observes the payment history and the interest that the plaintiff has maintained from the moment she learned of the increase in the capital owed. It was she who went to BANHVI and who requested the Audit that concludes by noting the errors both in the semiannual adjustment of the installment and in the non-updating of interest rates, non-compliance that was also noted by the witness González Zumbado. It is also ruled out that she contracted with the intention of not fulfilling her obligations. At the time, she contracted under conditions that were affordable to her and that, in any case, it was up to the creditor entity to verify; without any intention of not complying with what was agreed being observed. For that, it is sufficient to refer, we insist, to the fact that for more than fifteen years she has been complying with the payment of the installments. The Audit's conclusions are not shared, referring to the fact that she took advantage of the benefits of contracting under the real installment mechanism because it allowed her to acquire a home with a value superior to her credit capacity. Strictly speaking, the plaintiff's payment capacity in relation to her credit options was an aspect that the creditor should have assessed and analyzed prior to the contract. If at that time it was deemed that she could contract under modalities that were not those agreed upon. Nor is it acceptable to attempt to blame the plaintiff for not having updated the amount of the installment to be paid. We reiterate that it is an obligation inherent to the creditor. If it did not do so, or did so in a way that is currently unfeasible for it, it must itself assume the economic repercussions of that omission. It is for this reason that we consider that the plaintiff's obligation must be extinguished within the term established by the contract and with the 240 originally agreed installments. Note that the contract does not establish the possibility of the term increasing. Rather, it indicates that said term could be reduced by application of the agreed payment system and which the debtor expressly accepts. Thus, we are of the criterion that the payment plan and conditions for the extinction of the debt agreed must be respected. If due to errors by the creditors the term is not sufficient to settle the debt, it will be the latter who must assume the patrimonial consequences of its neglect and not transfer them to a debtor who, for more than fifteen years, has fulfilled her obligations. That does not mean, under any circumstance, that the defendants are prevented from collecting their debts or that there is unjust enrichment in favor of the debtor. It is reiterated that it was the various creditors who did not exercise the credit right under the agreed conditions and that the installment to be set for the remainder of the contractual term is a consequence of their inertia and to guarantee the plaintiff's right as a consumer, that the terms agreed and fulfilled by her be respected. Thus, it is declared that the plaintiff must pay, for the remainder of the term and until the two hundred forty agreed installments are completed, a monthly installment that must be adjusted according to the parameters established in the contract. Specifically, the installment she currently pays must be adjusted by the same percentage as the increase in the minimum wage decreed by the corresponding authorities for the second semester of this year. Subsequently, and until the contractual term concludes, each time an increase in minimum wages occurs, by the same percentage thereof. The percentage variation corresponding to the minimum wage of an unskilled construction industry worker shall be used as a reference. In the event that the minimum wage disappears or is not applied, the percentage variation of the average salary calculated by the CCSS will be used as a reference to set the percentage increase of the installments, and in the event that this other mechanism also cannot be applied, the percentage variation of the consumer price index, issued by the corresponding governmental authorities, will be used as a reference. In any case, the installment may not exceed thirty percent of the plaintiff's family income on that date. Nor shall it consider the increases not applied throughout the validity of the credit operation. Once the twenty-year term has expired or the two hundred forty agreed installments have been paid, the obligation must be deemed extinguished and the mortgage lien affecting it must be lifted."

“IV.-Sobre la prohibición de anatocismo y el sistema de cuota real en créditos de vivienda. Se trata de un tema que ya ha sido tratado por este Tribunal, entre otras, en la sentencia No. 926-2010, dictada a las 7 horas 49 minutos del 11 de marzo de 2010. En lo que interesa, se indicó que "(...) el ordenamiento jurídico nacional veda la figura de la capitalización de intereses, sea, el denominado anatocismo, que supone, en términos simples, la aplicación de intereses sobre intereses. En este sentido, el canon 505 del Código de Comercio indica de manera diáfana: "Es prohibido capitalizar intereses. Sin embargo, si hecha la liquidación de una deuda se estuvieran debiendo intereses, se podrán sumar éstos al capital para formar un solo total. Al otorgar nuevo documento o prorrogar el anterior, pueden estipularse intereses sobre la totalidad de la obligación." Desde ese plano, es evidente que salvo regla en contrario, toda obligación de préstamo mercantil es onerosa por tanto, retribuido con intereses legales (artículo 496 Código de Comercio). Tal dimensión supone que en el pago de las cuotas del crédito, primero se amortizan los réditos corrientes y el remanente se aplica al capital de la obligación. Ahora bien, la Ley del Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda y Creación del BANHVI , No. 7052 del 27 de noviembre de 1986, establece en su artículo 167: " Las entidades autorizadas podrán otorgar sus créditos mediante sistemas de pago, en los cuales la cuota se ajuste con base en la variación de los salarios mínimos. Esas cuotas pueden ser menores al mínimo necesario para cubrir intereses y amortización -cuota refinanciada- y las diferencias en descubierto se acumularán en el saldo del crédito en forma de capitalización, sin que por ello se pueda aplicar el artículo 505 del Código de Comercio. En todo caso, el monto de la cuota así fijada será aplicable primero a cubrir intereses, y si queda algo será aplicado a amortizar la deuda. Similar tratamiento podrá aplicarse a créditos ya establecidos. / Los entes autorizados podrán utilizar sistemas mediante otros parámetros fijados por la Junta Directiva del Banco. (Así reformado por el artículo 165 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica No.7558 del 3 de noviembre de 1995) " Se trata de un sistema que busca establecer un mecanismo de financiamiento para vivienda con cuotas más accesibles a los postulantes a créditos de esta naturaleza. La norma prevé la denominada cuota escalonada, que supone el incremento porcentual de la cuota, previamente pactado por las partes, usualmente cada año, a efectos de poder compensar en las cuotas de los años sucesivos, el déficit en el pago del principal que pueda tenerse con la cuota inicial, de manera que conforme avanza el crédito, la cuota se incrementa. Cabe en este punto indicar, que en tesis de principio, la cuota pactada debe permitir el pago de intereses y amortización a capital. Sin embargo, dentro esta modalidad, el citado ordinal 167 permite, a modo de excepción, que la cuota inicial no abarque el mínimo necesario para cubrir los intereses y la amortización al capital. En ese caso, pueden surgir variaciones; por un lado, cuando la cuota solo permita la cobertura del interés corriente, el capital se mantendrá invariable hasta que el incremento escalonado de la cuota permita cubrir esos réditos y aplicar aporte al saldo principal. Por otra parte, cuando la cuota no permita cubrir los intereses a plenitud, de manera excepcional y dada la permisibilidad legal, las diferencias al descubierto de los intereses se acumulan al saldo del crédito en forma de capitalización, sin que ello suponga, señala la ley aludida, aplicar el artículo 505 del Código de Comercio. De lo anterior se desprende que en este escenario, se está frente a una cuota refinanciada en lo que a intereses se refiere, es decir, esa fracción de réditos no cancelada por la insuficiencia de la cuota, pasan a engrosar el capital primario. En su contexto, esos intereses luego podrán ser cancelados con el escalonamiento del pago. En suma, se inicia con una cuota baja que va subiendo con el curso del tiempo, incremento que permite cubrir no solo los intereses y saldo actuales, sino los réditos no cubiertos con antelación. Cabe reiterar que se trata de una excepcional en el régimen crediticio que se sustenta en la ratio del sistema de vivienda. (...)". Este Tribunal reafirma el anterior criterio e ingresa al examen de las pretensiones deducidas.

V.- Sobre la validez de la cláusula impugnada. Como primer aspecto, ha de analizarse la pretensión dirigida a que se anule la cláusula de escritura suscrita por la accionante con el Consorcio Cooperativo de Vivienda Fedecrédito R.L., mediante la cual recibió del segundo la suma de seis millones cincuenta y ocho mil colones exactos (¢6.058.000,00). Particularmente se impugnan las líneas del instrumento público que van de la 7 a la 23 y que indican "(...) Las cuotas se fijarán de acuerdo a lo dispuesto por el artículo 167 de la Ley del Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda y el BANHVI el que se establece bajo los siguientes parámetros: la cuota se calculará como un porcentaje del ingreso familiar del deudor, no superior al treinta por ciento de su salario a esta fecha. Cada vez que se produzca un aumento en los salarios mínimos en igual porcentaje se incrementará la cuota mensual a partir del mes siguiente en que rige el incremento en dicho salario mínimo, decretado por las autoridades correspondientes. Para ello se utilizará como referencia la variación porcentual correspondiente al salario mínimo de un obrero no especializado de la industria de la construcción. En caso de que el salario mínimo desaparezca o bien que no se aplicare, se utilizará como referencia para fijar e incremento del porcentaje de las cuotas, la variación porcentual del salario promedio calculado por la CCSS, y en caso de que este otro mecanismo tampoco pueda ser aplicado, se utilizará como referencia la variación porcentual del índice de precios al consumidor, emanado de las autoridades gubernamentales correspondientes. Los pagos que haga el deudor se aplicarán para cubrir hasta donde alcance el pago de los seguros, de los intereses de cada mes, y una vez que el pago exceda dicho monto se aplicará la diferencia como abono al principal. En caso de que la cuota fijada a la parte deudora no sea suficiente para cubrir el monto de los intereses, este saldo se capitalizará con el principal aumentando consiguientemente el saldo de la operación. Por ahora cada cuota inicial será de setenta y dos mil quinientos noventa y seis colones con seis céntimos, suma que comprende los seguros obligatorios previstos por la legislación para este tipo de operaciones, los intereses del préstamo y la amortización al capital.(...)". En lo medular, la parte actora estima que dicha cláusula es absolutamente nula por inexistencia de la voluntad de uno de los sujetos ya que se faltó al deber de información al consumidor. También, por inexistencia de objeto y causa ya que su motivo aparente para contratar era tener una casa con una cuota que pudiera pagar, no mayor al treinta por ciento de su salario base. Sin embargo, no se analizó su capacidad de pago a futuro ni otras alternativas de crédito que pudieron aplicarle. Por su parte, los demandados estiman que, en general, no se enlistan, con la claridad debida, los vicios que aquejan a la cláusula. Consideran que ésta es válida porque reproduce normas legales y reglamentarias que no han sido impugnadas. Agrega, además, que sí se le suministró la información requerida para la toma de la decisión de consumo y que ello se constata en que ella firmó la escritura y manifestó que entendía sus alcances. Una vez examinada la cláusula impugnada, el Tribunal estima que ésta se conforma sustancialmente con el ordenamiento jurídico por las siguientes razones. Como indicamos supra y apunta el apoderado de las demandadas, el sistema de pago denominado cuota real está permitido por nuestra legislación, tal y como lo señala la propia cláusula que remite al numeral 167 de la LSFV. Luego, como principal mecanismo de ajuste, se establece la variación de los salarios mínimos de un obrero no calificado de la industria de la construcción, tal y como lo establece tanto la norma citada como los artículos 117 y 119 del Reglamento de Operaciones del Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda. La referencia a otros mecanismos de ajuste es supletoria, esto es, solo en caso de que el salario mínimo desaparezca o bien que no se aplicare. Además, se trata de una posibilidad (fijar mecanismos alternativos de ajuste) que contempla el propio numeral 167 y los artículos 117 inciso a) y 122 del referido reglamento y que, en todo caso, estimamos razonable en tanto acuden a parámetros objetivos como lo son la variación porcentual del salario promedio calculado por la CCSS, y en caso de que este otro mecanismo tampoco pueda ser aplicado, la variación porcentual del índice de precios al consumidor, emanado de las autoridades gubernamentales correspondientes. Posteriormente, la cláusula refiere a la forma en que se va imputar el pago y la forma de proceder en caso de que la cuota fijada a la parte deudora no sea suficiente para cubrir el monto de los intereses; regulaciones que se ajustan a lo que establecen las normas legales y reglamentarias citadas. Finalmente, se establece el monto de la cuota inicial o de partida, en los términos que exige los numerales 117 y 119 del Reglamento ya citado. Desde este plano, no encuentra el Tribunal vicio alguno ni en la causa ni en el objeto, en tanto el motivo para contratar existe desde el momento en que se acude a un mecanismo crediticio para obtener solución habitacional que es válido y regulado por el ordenamiento jurídico, en los términos que fue pactado el objeto contractual. Luego, si lo que la accionante cuestiona es la constitucionalidad del sistema de crédito de cuota real, lo cierto es que debió haber ejercido la correspondiente acción de inconstitucionalidad o si reclamaba la ilegalidad de las regulaciones reglamentarias pudo haberlas impugnado directamente en esta jurisdicción. Como no se hizo, el Tribunal se limita a un cotejo de lo pactado en relación con las disposiciones normativas que regulan la modalidad de crédito específica, siendo que las condiciones estipuladas en la escritura resultan sustancialmente conformes con el ordenamiento jurídico y así debe declararse.

VI.- En cuanto a los vicios de la voluntad que se acusan cabe señalar lo siguiente. El artículo 46 de la Constitución Política establece como derechos fundamentales la protección de la salud, seguridad e intereses económicos del consumidor; la libertad de elección –de la cual, se deriva el principio de libre contratación que se extrae del artículo 28 del mismo texto constitucional y a un trato equitativo –que desarrollan los artículos 31 y siguientes de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor (en adelante LPCDEC), así como el 40 y siguientes del Reglamento a esa Ley. Esto supone un deber de brindar información adecuada, oportuna, clara, veraz y suficiente acerca de todos los elementos que incidan de forma directa en su decisión de consumo. En el tema que nos ocupa, la correcta comprensión de esta garantía supone que la persona que pretende suscribir un contrato de crédito, conozca suficiente y oportunamente las condiciones en que se adopta la negociación. Específicamente, quienes busquen opciones de vivienda y pretendan suscribir un crédito bajo el sistema de cuota real deben ser informados de las implicaciones de ese mecanismo en su caso particular y con mayor énfasis, si su situación va a encuadrar dentro de un módulo de capitalización de intereses. Lo anterior porque, la aplicación de una fórmula crediticia en la que se capitalizan intereses solo es posible, en el caso específico que regula el numeral 167 de la Ley No. 7052 y solo es válida cuando el consumidor del servicio financiero, esto es, quien accede a entidades financieras a buscar opciones de crédito para diversas necesidades (en este caso vivienda), es informado de manera diáfana sobre los alcances de esa modalidad, sea, el incremento escalonado de la cuota, pero además, que su cuota no cubre intereses corrientes en una porción que pasará a formar parte del capital adeudado en el siguiente pago y por ende, el cálculo de los réditos de la siguiente cuota, se realizará sobre la base del saldo original más la fracción de intereses no cubiertos y no sobre el capital original. Las implicaciones de esta modalidad exigen, además, y como aspecto determinante, la anuencia expresa y voluntaria del deudor, sea, su consentimiento a este efecto en su crédito. Tal aspecto no puede colegirse por medios interpretativos o deductivos, sino que debe estar claramente establecido, se insiste, por sus repercusiones. Debe tomarse en cuenta que, como bien admiten ambas partes, estamos frente a contratos bilaterales, onerosos y adhesivos o predispuestos. Ello supone un necesario resguardo del equilibrio y equidad en las cargas de las partes involucradas en la relación de consumo, tutelando los derechos y garantías del consumidor (potencial deudor), ya que la dimensión misma de este tipo de negocios jurídicos supone una posición de ventaja por parte del agente económico, a efectos de mantener o al menos potenciar una equidad en la distribución de las cargas contractuales en dicho régimen bilateral. Expuesto lo anterior debe señalarse que de los elementos que constan en autos, no se observa que haya existido una violación por parte de la entidad financiera acreedora al deber de información de la accionante al momento de suscribir el crédito que aquí nos ocupa. Tenemos que la escritura especificaba claramente el tipo de mecanismo de crédito que se contrataba, sea, de cuota real; explicaba que la cuota se fijaba con base en un porcentaje del salario mínimo no superior al treinta por ciento, que se iría incrementando semestralmente y los parámetros que se utilizarían para tales efectos; una clara referencia al mecanismo de imputación de pagos explicando que los pagos que se efectúen se aplicarán para cubrir hasta donde alcance el pago de los seguros, de los intereses de cada mes, y una vez que el pago exceda dicho monto se aplicará la diferencia como abono al principal así como la posibilidad de que se capitalizaran intereses si la cuota fijada a la parte deudora no era suficiente para cubrir el monto de los intereses, con el consecuente aumento del principal. Luego, la escritura señala que la actora entendió y aceptó expresamente las referidas condiciones y una vez leída la aprobó y firmó. Pese a que la accionante adujo que no se le leyó la escritura y aportó el testimonio de su madre en ese sentido, es criterio del Tribunal ello no desvirtúa la presunción probatorio de ese instrumento público. Desde esta perspectiva y tomando en cuenta el nivel de escolaridad de accionante entiende el Tribunal que su voluntad al momento de contratar fue libre y conciente, sin que se observen vicios imputables a una falta de información por parte del ente acreedor. En conclusión, no observamos que la cláusula impugnada adolezca de vicios que conlleven su nulidad, más bien, se estima que es válida y obligaba a las partes a su cumplimiento, siendo precisamente este último aspecto el que reviste relevancia para el objeto del proceso, según se expondrá de seguido.

VII.- Sobre el cumplimiento de las obligaciones surgidas a la luz del contrato de préstamo. En este punto, la parte demandante explica que ella siempre cumplió con el pago de las cuotas que su acreedor le cobraba y que los recibos fueron omisos porque nunca señalaron cuál era el saldo de la deuda. Luego, relata que se enteró de que durante 11 años no había amortizado nada a la deuda y que más bien se habían capitalizado intereses al saldo principal acrecentándolo en forma desmedida. Cuando acude al BANHVI, le explican que ello se debe a que, por error, el acreedor no efectuó oportunamente los ajustes semestrales a los que se obligó. Reclama que ella no tiene porque asumir el error del banco y que ahora pretenden desconocer los pagos que desde 1997 ha efectuado. Luego de un análisis de las distintas probanzas traídas al proceso, el Tribunal concluye que durante la relación contractual, la accionante ha cumplido, en general, con las obligaciones a su cargo referidas fundamentalmente al pago de las cuotas del préstamo, inicialmente ante el acreedor primigeneo y luego ante dos diferentes fiduciarios que lo han sucedido. No obstante, al examinar las actuaciones de los demandados respecto del cumplimiento de las condiciones pactadas, las mismas pruebas permiten acreditar que han existido desatenciones atribuibles a los titulares del derecho de crédito y que han incidido en la esfera subjetiva de la demandante. La primera de ellas, se observa en el hecho que durante 11 años, ninguno de los entes acreedores efectuó los ajustes semestrales de la cuota mensual del préstamo, tal y como se establecía en el contrato pactado. Se trata de una omisión o error que reconoce expresamente la Auditoría Interna del BANHVI en el Informe preliminar sobre la atención de requerimiento de valoración relacionada con el otorgamiento de financiamiento bajo el sistema cuota real a la señora Medrano Valverde y la testigo Ana Julia Fernández en su declaración. Pero además, el informe concluye que la carencia de modificaciones o ajustes en la cuota hipotecaria en forma oportuna desde la fecha de formalización de la operación hipotecaria hasta febrero de 2003, son responsabilidad de Coovivienda R.L. en primera instancia y de La Vivienda Mutual de Ahorro y Préstamo, en calidad de fiduciario, luego del traslado de la operación, ya que aunque la actora conocía los términos contractuales, ella no podía calcular y disponer de la nueva cuota a pagar por su operación (folios 253 a 255 del expediente judicial). El Tribunal comparte esa conclusión, toda vez que se trata (el ajuste semestral) de una obligación a cargo del acreedor y que además constituye un pilar dentro de esta modalidad o sistema de crédito. Ello toda vez que la cuota real supone un sistema de reajuste periódico de las cuotas nominales de las operaciones de crédito (en este caso habitacional) conforme al cual la fijación de las cuotas no va a depender ni se va efectuar tomando como parámetro las tasas de interés, sino que lo será en forma proporcional a la variación, en lo medular, del salario mínimo de un obrero no calificado de la industria de la construcción. Si esos reajustes no se efectúan, la obligación no se va actualizando y trae como consecuencia que el valor de la cuota disminuya de modo tal que lo pagado en ese rubro no alcance, siquiera para intereses, capitalizándolos al principal como aquí aconteció. Pero, insistimos, que reajustar la cuota incumbía al acreedor. Así lo reconocen el informe de auditoría y la testigo Ana Julia Fernández. Por ello no se comparte, bajo ninguna perspectiva lo señalado en diciembre de 2004, por la Dirección FONAVI del BANHVI cuando indica que "(...) las variaciones en el monto de la cuota se encontraban claramente establecidos al momento de la formalización y fueron aceptados de conformidad...durante algún período el seguimiento a la cartera de créditos se vio afectado, generando un atraso en la ejecución de los ajustes correspondientes a la cuota. Esta situación se presentó a pesar de que la deudora contaba con conocimiento realizar el ajuste respectivo, evitando de esta forma la desactualización del monto de la cuota. En este sentido, no se considera razonable argumentar que la deudora no es responsable de que los aumentos del monto de la cuota no fueran ejecutados en el momento oportuno, porque las condiciones del crédito se encontraban claramente establecidas y es responsabilidad tanto de los administradores de la cartera como del deudor velar por su cumplimiento.(...)". Nótese que estamos frente a un derecho de crédito que, incluso, puede o no ser ejercido por el acreedor. Así, es criterio del Tribunal que la omisión de no haber ajustado la cuota mensual semestralmente y bajo los parámetros que establecía el contrato de préstamo es atribuible, exclusivamente, a quienes fungían como acreedores de la obligación, siendo éstos quienes deben asumir las consecuencias económicas que se deriven de esa desatención; sin que resulte procedente trasladar esa omisión a la deudora, como se ha pretendido. Un segundo aspecto determinante que debe ser valorado es que aunque la accionante pagó sus cuotas conforme lo establecido en el contrato, los recibos que se entregaron como comprobante del pago no consignaron cuál era el saldo de la deuda ni la amortización al capital (folios 20 al 99 y 253 a 255 del expediente judicial). Estimamos que al omitir esta información se lesionaron los derechos de la accionante toda vez que le impidió conocer el estado y comportamiento de su deuda en el tiempo. Pero además, le impedía conocer si se estaban o no efectuando los referidos ajustes semestrales. Esa situación se presentó hasta febrero de 2003, fecha a partir de la cual los recibos incluyen el saldo de la deuda y la amortización al capital (folios 75 al 88 y 253 a 255 del expediente judicial). Precisamente, el recibo emitido el 2 de febrero de 2003 indica que, a esa fecha, el saldo de la deuda era de Ë 10.639.890.35 (diez millones seiscientos treinta y nueve mil ochocientos noventa colones con treinta cinco céntimos) (folios 75 del expediente judicial). Así, luego de casi seis años de pago de la cuota mensual cobrada por el acreedor (lo que bien hacía presumir a la deudora que lo cobrado era lo que correspondía) el recibo refleja que no había amortizado ninguna suma al capital y que más bien aquel se había acrecentado. Ante ese estado de cosas, la demandante acude al BANHVI para exponer su caso y solicitar una revisión y ajuste de su operación hipotecaria, debido al incremento en el saldo de la deuda, a pesar de que ella ha venido pagando las cuotas mensualmente. Sin embargo, lejos de encontrar una solución ajustada a derecho, le proponen una serie de alternativas que, al fin de cuentas, pretenden trasladarle las desatenciones y omisiones de los entes acreedores, lo que, según se explicará infra, las vuelve ilegítimas. Se estima igualmente grave que a pesar de que el BANVHI conocía de la falta de ajuste semestral de las cuotas desde el 2003, como lo admite la testigo Ana Julia Fernández, no haya tomado ninguna acción proactiva tendente a regularizar tal omisión y que impidiera que el capital se acrecentará de la forma en que lo hizo. Es decir, esas conductas pretenden no solo desconocer los efectos de la inercia del ente acreedor respecto del ajuste de las cuotas, sino también trasladar las implicaciones de tal indolencia a a deudora, agravando su situación financiera y pretendiendo desvincularse de su deber de ajuste. En suma, sacar provecho económico de sus propias desantenciones e inadvertencias, lo que el Tribunal no considera apegado a la buena fe que debe privar en la ejecución del contrato de crédito. No resultan atendibles las justificaciones otorgadas según las cuales los ajustes no se hicieron debido al impase que hubo con el traslado de la operación de Coovivienda a Grupo Mutual (porque tuvieron cerca de cinco años para ajustar la cuota, sin que se hubiera hecho) o que ello lo fue para no perjudicar a la demandante por el cambio del monto de la cuota. No haber efectuado los ajustes semestrales a partir del 2003 (conociendo de la omisión) solo permitió que se capitalizaran más intereses al capital endeudado en evidente perjuicio de la accionante. Prueba de ello es que para julio del 2009, los recibos mostraban un saldo de la deuda por Ë 34.162.599.63 (treinta y cuatro millones ciento sesenta y dos mil quinientos noventa y nueve colones con sesenta y tres céntimos), pese a que la accionante continuó cancelando mensualmente la cuota que la entidad acredora cobraba. Por las razones expuestas, si de conformidad con los ordinales 1022 y 1023 del Código Civil los contratos obligan tanto a lo que se expresa en ellos, como a las consecuencias que la equidad, el uso o la ley hacen nacer de la obligación, según la naturaleza de ésta; lo cierto es que sí existía convenio expreso sobre la forma en que se efectuarían los ajustes a las cuotas, los errores y omisiones en el ajuste y cálculo de éstas, cometido desde el momento mismo en que se le otorgó el préstamo, son imputables exclusivamente a los diferentes acreedores, quienes incluso conociendo de tal omisión no ajustaron su actuación a lo pactado. Por ello, estimamos que resulta notoriamente injusto que, tras muchos años de cumplir con su obligación de pago, los demandados trasladen a la actora las consecuencias económicas de tales desatenciones, como han pretendido.

VIII.- Y es que, tal y como lo han reconocido ambos testigos en este proceso, a partir de que los demandados se dan cuenta del error cometido, en lugar de enmendar y regularizar la situación, plantean a la accionante una serie de propuestas que el Tribunal estima ilegítimas. Veamos. En diciembre de 2004, el BANHVI rechazó la propuesta de cancelación que realizara la accionante proponiendo, en su lugar, alternativas como readecuar la deuda por el plazo restante de la operación, pasando de cuota real a cuota nivelada o cancelar la diferencia que se ha generado por los ajuste no realizados a las cuotas según lo establecía la escritura (suma que en ese momento superaba los dos millones de colones) y autorizar que semestralmente se siguieran efectuando los ajustes a las cuotas (así se desprende del informe de auditoría No. AI-X-045-2010, visible de folios 141 al 156 del expediente judicial, particularmente en los folios 147 a 153, así como de la declaración de Ana Julia Fernández). Luego, en febrero de 2010, el BANHVI comunicó a la demandante que existía posibilidad de entregar la propiedad en dación de pago y adquirirla nuevamente por el valor del avalúo administrativo, más gastos, montos que según el fiduciario asciende aproximadamente a los doce millones de colones, pago que debía realizar de contado (así se desprende del informe de auditoría No. AI-X-045-2010, visible de folios 141 al 156 del expediente judicial, particularmente en los folios 147 a 153, así como de la declaración de Ana Julia Fernández). Finalmente, mediante oficio DFNV-DF-0317-2011, de 28 de marzo de 2011, el BANHVI reiteró a la actora las propuestas para llegar a una solución definitiva de la problemática de su crédito, que se reducían a entregar la propiedad en dación en pago y adquirirla nuevamente por el valor del avalúo actualizado más gastos, o cancelar los montos no aplicados a las cuotas por las variaciones estipuladas en la escritura y que a partir de ese momento se cancele la cuota que corresponda y se apliquen las variaciones periódicas (folios 134 a 137 del sugieren alternativas no pactadas y que no se aviene a la modalidad crediticia pactada por las partes inicialmente (y más bien pretenden cambiar el sistema de crédito de cuota real a uno lineal) ni reconoce que el error de no ajustar la cuota era responsabilidad del acreedor. Más bien constituyen interpretaciones ilegitimas mediante las cuales se pretende sacar provecho de su propio incumplimiento y trasladar las consecuencias económicas que de ahí se derivan (el pago del capital que aumentó al haberse capitalizado los intereses al principal por no ajustar la cuota en el momento oportuno pactado) a la actora. Pero además, no es posible concluir que esas alternativas hayan ponderado las condiciones crediticias y la capacidad de pago actuales de la actora. Ana Julia Fernández manifestó que las propuestas de readecuación las hicieron con base en las condiciones que se establecían la escritura y Mauricio González Zumbado señaló que él no participó en las propuestas, que desconocía los parámetros que se utilizaron para llegar a ellas y que acudió a los datos que constaban en el expediente. Hasta aquí tenemos que durante la ejecución del contrato de préstamo han habido desatenciones y errores que trajeron como consecuencia que el acreedor incumpliera con su deber de ajustar la cuota mensual conforme lo pactado, e interpretaciones abusivas e ilegítimas en tanto se apartan de lo convenido y trasladan las repercusiones económicas de esas omisiones a la accionante, quien hasta esa fecha venía cancelando sus cuotas. Ahora bien, a partir del testimonio de Ana Julia Fernández, el Tribunal acredita que en una fecha no precisada pero entre marzo y noviembre de 2011, el BANHVI efectúa una reconstrucción de la operación crediticia de la accionante en la que consideraron las cuotas que debieron cancelarse por los ajustes estipulados en la escritura (y no efectuados por los acreedores), comparándolos con las cuotas pagadas, a efectos de determinar como se vio afectado el principal de la obligación por esos montos. Así, obtuvieron un saldo corregido y ajustaron la deuda a Ë 19.400.000.00 (diecinueve millones cuatrocientos mil colones exactos), lo que comunicaron al Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda para que efectúe las variaciones correspondientes (se infiere, también, de los folios 132 a 137 del expediente judicial). Este acto constituye, a juicio del Tribunal, la actuación legítima a partir de la cual los demandados asumen las consecuencias de no haber ajustado la cuota durante aproximadamente once años y disminuyen el capital adeudado. Se recalca, eso sí, que no se trata de una condonación de deuda, como indicó el apoderado de las demandadas en sus conclusiones. Más bien, supone asumir las consecuencias económicas de sus propias desatenciones por casi once años, en el mecanismo de ajuste de la cuota mensual que debía pagar la actora. Si el error es atribuible al acreedor, es éste quien debe asumir las consecuencias económicas derivadas. Lo anterior salvo aquellas situaciones en que se observe un evidente abuso de derecho de parte del deudor, lo que estima esta Cámara, no se observa en el presente caso. No obstante, pese a que se regulariza lo relativo al capital adeudado, lo cierto es que cuando se comunicó a la demandante y al Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda esa decisión, se incurre nuevamente en el error de plantear alternativas que no se avienen a las condiciones y al plan de pago que había pactado la actora desde 1997. En ese sentido, se observa que mediante oficios DFNV-DF-1119-2011 y DFNV-DF-1120-2011, del 25 de noviembre del 2011 se informó no solo la reconstrucción y disminución del capital adeudado (decisión que resulta conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico) sino que, nuevamente, se plantean a la actora alternativas que no se avienen a las condiciones y plan de pago pactado desde 1997. Es por ello que estimamos que esas conductas formales son absolutamente nulas únicamente en cuanto plantearon alternativas que distan de lo convenido y sin considerar la capacidad de pago que, en ese momento, tenía la actora. Esto es, parten de un motivo inexistente y su contenido es ilegítimo. La nulidad no se extiende a la reconstrucción y ajuste de la deuda por dos razones. Primero, porque se trata de una decisión que fue adoptada con anterioridad y los actos impugnados solo la comunican. Segundo, porque con el ajuste al capital adeudado los demandados asumen sus errores y omisiones respecto de las obligaciones pactadas. Así, el saldo de la deuda lo será a partir de ese reajuste y tomando en cuenta las consideraciones que se expondrán infra. En conclusión, deberá declararse la nulidad absoluta de los oficios DFNV-DF-317-2011, DFNV-DF-1119-2011 y DFNV-DF-1120-2011 ya citados, en los términos expuestos IX.- En rigor, estimamos que la reconstrucción de la operación crediticia de la accionante en la que consideraron las cuotas que debieron cancelarse por los ajustes estipulados en la escritura y compararlos con las cuotas pagadas, a efectos de determinar como se vio afectado el principal de la obligación por esos montos, era la actuación a la que estaban obligadas los acreedores a partir de que conocieron del error cometido. Si esa actuación hubiese sido oportuna, el contrato hubiese sido posible de cumplir conforme a lo pactado. Así, es claro que desde noviembre del 2011 se ajustó el capital adeudado y las cuotas se han venido ajustando conforme a lo pactado. No obstante, lo cierto es que existen otras condiciones dentro del contrato que también debe ser consideradas porque a ellas se obligaron ambas partes. Específicamente nos referimos al plazo de la obligación. Conforme al contrato, el plazo del préstamo lo fue por veinte años y se pagaría por medio de doscientos cuarenta cuotas mensuales, sucesivas y vencidas a partir del veintiocho junio de mil novecientos noventa y siete. Conforme a lo estipulado en el numeral 764 del Código Civil, el pago –para que tenga efecto extintivo o liberatorio– debe hacerse “bajo todos respectos conforme al tenor de la obligación” ; es decir, tal cual quedó plasmado en el convenio. Desde es perspectiva, corresponde al acreedor verificar que las condiciones pactadas en el plan de pago sean las necesarias y suficientes para cancelar la deuda. Así, estima el Tribunal que dadas las circunstancias acaecidas en el caso concreto, los demandados deben respetar plazo y cuotas pactadas originalmente. Insistimos que la actora ha venido, de buena fe, cumpliendo con las obligaciones pactadas y cancelando durante aproximadamente quince años, la cuota que los entes acreedores han establecido. No a otra conclusión puede llegarse si se observa el historial de pagos y el interés que la accionante ha mantenido desde el momento en que supo del aumento del capital adeudado. Fue ella quien acudió al BANHVI y quien solicitó la Auditoría que concluye haciendo ver los errores tanto en el ajuste semestral de la cuota como en la no actualización de las tasas de interés, incumplimiento que también hizo ver el testigo González Zumbado. Se descarta, también, que ella hubiera contratado con la intención de no cumplir con sus obligaciones. En su momento, ella contrató bajo condiciones que le eran asequibles y que, en todo caso correspondía al ente acreedor verificar; sin que se observe intención alguna de no cumplir con lo pactado. Para ello basta remitirse, insistimos, a que durante más de quince años ha venido cumpliendo con el pago de las cuotas. No se comparten las conclusiones de la Auditoría referidas a que ella sacó provecho de los beneficios de contratar bajo el mecanismo de cuota real porque le permitió adquirir una vivienda con un valor superior a su capacidad crediticia. En rigor, la capacidad de pago de la actora en relaciones con sus opciones crediticias era un aspecto que el acreedor debió valorar y analizar previo al contrato. Si en aquel se estimó que podía contratar bajo modalidades que no fueron las pactadas. Tampoco en que se pretenda achacar a la accionante responsabilidad por no haber actualizado el monto de la cuota a cancelar. Reiteramos que se trata de una obligación inherente al acreedor. Si no lo hizo o lo hizo de modo que, actualmente, le resulta inviable, debe asumir él las repercusiones económicas de esa omisión. Es por ello que estimamos que la obligación de la actora deberá extinguirse en el plazo que establece el contrato y con las 240 cuotas originalmente pactadas. Nótese que el contrato no establece la posibilidad de que el plazo aumente. Más bien indica que dicho plazo podría verse reducido en aplicación del sistema de pago convenido y que la parte deudora acepta expresamente. Así, somos del criterio que debe respetarse el plan de pagos y condiciones de extinción de la deuda pactadas. Si por errores de los acreedores el plazo no es suficiente para saldar la deuda, será éste quien deba asumir las consecuencias patrimoniales de sus desatenciones y no trasladarlos a una deudora que, por más de quince años, ha cumplido sus obligaciones. Ello no significa, bajo ninguna circunstancia, que se impida a los demandados cobrar sus acreencias o un enriquecimiento sin causa en favor de la deudora. Se reitera que quien no ejerció el derecho de crédito en las condiciones pactadas fueron los distintos acreedores y que la cuota que se va fijar para el resto del plazo contractual es consecuencia de su inercia y para garantizar el derecho de la actora como consumidora, a que se respeten los términos pactados y por ella cumplidos. Así, se declara que la accionante deberá cancelar, por el resto del plazo y hasta que se cumplan las doscientos cuarenta cuotas pactadas, una cuota mensual que deberá ser ajustada a conforme a los parámetros establecidos en el contrato. Específicamente, la cuota que actualmente paga, deberá ajustarse en igual porcentaje al aumento del salario mínimo decretado por la autoridades correspondientes para el segundo semestre de este año. Posteriormente, y hasta que concluya el plazo contractual, cada vez que se produzca un aumento en los salarios mínimos en igual porcentaje a éste. Se utilizará como referencia la variación porcentual correspondiente al salario mínimo de un obrero no especializado de la industria de la construcción. En caso de que el salario mínimo desaparezca o bien que no se aplicare, se utilizará como referencia para fijar e incremento del porcentaje de las cuotas, la variación porcentual del salario promedio calculado por la CCSS, y en caso de que este otro mecanismo tampoco pueda ser aplicado, se utilizará como referencia la variación porcentual del índice de precios al consumidor, emanado de las autoridades gubernamentales correspondientes. En todo caso, la cuota no podrá superar el treinta por ciento del del ingreso familiar de la accionante a esa fecha. Tampoco deberá considerar los incrementos no aplicados a lo largo de la vigencia de la operación crediticia. Vencido el plazo de veinte años o canceladas las doscientos cuarenta cuotas pactadas, la obligación deberá darse por extinguida y levantarse el gravamen hipotecario que le afecte.”