Exclusion of defendant from reception of testimony of older adultExclusión de imputada de la recepción de testimonio de adulta mayor

**III.** As a second procedural objection, she alleges a violation of the defendant's right to material defense when the Trial Court decided to prevent her from remaining present while the witness [Name 015] gave her statement, pursuant to the Law for the Protection of the Elderly Person when the victim is harmed at a patrimonial level. The complainant points out that there are two errors that warrant annulling the oral and public trial: *i)* the audio problems prevent hearing the reasoning that the lower court (*a quo*) provided regarding said decision; and, *ii)* Article 3 of the regulatory body indicated above refers to the State's obligation to create programs that prevent violence against the elderly person and does not state that the material defense of an accused person is limited. She even notes that the witness [Name 015] never expressed any fear against the accused but simply did not wish for her to enter her property. She expresses disagreement with the violation of due process and the principle of immediacy, to the detriment of her client. She reiterates the request to annul the trial and remand the case for a new hearing to be held. **The reproach is rejected.** Despite the existence of international regulations duly incorporated in our country that support the intrinsic rights possessed by every person investigated for punishable acts, such as Article 8.1.f) of the American Convention on Human Rights, which establishes: *“...the right of the defense to examine witnesses present in the court and to obtain the appearance, as witnesses or expert witnesses, of other persons who may shed light on the facts.”*, as well as numeral 14.3.e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which protects the right of the defendant: *“To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.”*; that is, the right possessed by the accused not only to hear but also to participate in the reception of evidence during the hearing is protected; however, there also exists the possibility –in exceptional cases– of restricting these rights, in order to protect other legal interests of constitutional rank. It is important to note that under no circumstances should the access or participation of the technical defense in the production of evidence be limited. The Constitutional Chamber has indicated this in vote number 3020-96, of 11:48 hours, on June 9, 1995, where it noted that: *“...in accordance with what was stated in ruling 1739-92 of eleven hours and forty-five minutes on July first, nineteen ninety-two, the accused has the right to be assisted by a qualified defense counsel, or to defend himself personally, and whatever method he chooses, that right implies unrestricted access to the evidence and proceedings, with only those restrictions that are indispensable to prevent obstruction of the investigation of the real truth of the facts being admissible. This Chamber has also indicated that not every nullity entails a violation of due process, but only those that cause serious harm to the interests of the defense. In that sense, it is considered that although adequate defense and representation at all times is an integral element of due process, since the Trial Court immediately informed the accused of what was declared by the co-defendant, as recorded in the trial record, the accused was informed of everything declared with the opportunity to cross-examine, a right that was recognized for him and which he did not exercise, as recorded in the trial record (volume II, folio 749), no harm was caused to the principle under analysis, for although its exercise was disturbed, the Trial Court recognized an effective way for its respect, which was not timely objected to by the interested party; the judge, as balancer of the process, gave him full and unrestricted access to the information and even the opportunity to exercise his defense regarding that act through cross-examination. Of course, as the Cassation Chamber notes in Considering X of the ruling, the sentencing Trial Court could have used other criteria in the hearing that would not have caused the disturbance now objected to, to the exercise of the defense, such as calling the accused to testify first (…) or even allowing his permanence and intervention in the hearing at the time of taking the co-defendant’s statement (…) but -as already stated-, the fact of not having done so does not produce the nullity of the proceedings because the affectation or disturbance to the exercise of the defense was not of such magnitude as to affect that right, causing defenselessness.”* Now, bearing in mind the importance of the rights that assist the accused with respect to the evacuation of evidence, it is also relevant to know the regulations that protect the elderly population, as occurs in the present matter, where the public defender questions the manner in which the testimony of the victim [Name 015], 95 years of age at the time of the oral and public trial, was received. In the first place, the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person, No. 7935, in its second article defines the elderly adult as a person who is 65 years of age or older. Regarding the legal framework of interest concerning this population, the Political Constitution is of primary importance, where numeral 51 literally establishes the following: “The family, as the natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State. Likewise, the mother, the child, the elderly, and the helplessly ill shall have the right to that protection.” (the emphasis is not from the original). Meanwhile, the Brasilia Regulations Regarding Access to Justice for Vulnerable People (approved in the Extraordinary Session of the Full Court No. 17-2008, held at 8:30 hours, on May 26, 2008, Article II), which defines in Chapter I, Second Section, people in vulnerable conditions: “(3) Those persons who, by reason of their age, gender, physical or mental state, or by social, economic, ethnic and/or cultural circumstances, find special difficulties in fully exercising before the justice system the rights recognized by the legal system, are considered to be in a vulnerable condition. (4) The following, among others, may constitute causes of vulnerability: age, disability, belonging to indigenous communities or minorities, victimization, migration and internal displacement, poverty, gender, and deprivation of liberty (…) (6) Aging can also constitute a cause of vulnerability when the elderly person finds special difficulties, attending to their functional capacities, in exercising their rights before the justice system.” Likewise, the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person stipulates in its first ordinal and as one of its main objectives: “…f) To guarantee the protection and social security of elderly persons…”. Equally, the State is ordered in Article 12 to: “…guarantee optimal conditions of health, nutrition, housing, integral development, and social security for elderly persons…” (the underlining does not belong to the original). Furthermore, subsection j) of numeral 3 of the same regulation indicates one of the rights of interest possessed by said population: “…The juridical and psychosocial protection for elderly persons affected by physical, sexual, psychological, and patrimonial violence…”. In the same vein, in section six ibidem, the following is also contemplated as a relevant right that the State must protect: “…Elderly persons shall have the right to have their physical, psychological, and moral integrity respected. This right includes the protection of their image, autonomy, thought, dignity, and values.” (the emphasis is imposed).

In the case under examination, upon observing in detail the audiovisual records of the trial hearings and the oral judgment, the following important facts are known: Once the adversarial proceeding began, and after the reading of the accusation by attorney Ronald Segura Mena, representative of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, he expressed before the Trial Court the request made to him by the aggrieved party [Name 015], to the effect of testifying in her home without the presence of the defendant [Name 014], because she is “….very resentful about this situation that occurred and has asked us if it is possible, the Court to assess this situation (sic). She has no objection to the defense attorney going, but she does not want to see the accused anymore, because she was a person of great trust for her and she (sic) feels very offended by this situation…” (see file c0003110211094459.vgz, sequence from 09:44:59 to 10:00:02 hours, on February 11, 2011, segment from 10:00:51 to 10:01:19 hours). The request was positively resolved by the Trial Court (however, it is noted, contrary to what the technical defense claims, that the oral reasoning can indeed be heard, with some difficulty due to the extremely low audio level, because the judges did not turn on the microphone), with the president stating specifically: “…Law 7935, that is why the Trial Court must specify a description and reasoning supported by law, because there is even an obligation that this law imposes on the State and evidently, the Trial Court is part of the State, to provide protection to the elderly person (…) therefore this regulation must be commented upon and must be integrated –logically- with Article 212 which establishes special testimonies. Article number 3 of Law 7935 establishes the rights, the rights (sic) that elderly persons have to the juridical and psychosocial protection for elderly persons affected by physical, sexual, psychological, and patrimonial violence. It already establishes the budgetary allocation for juridical protection, and the State is obliged to comply (…) this is in Article 12, where it is established that the State must guarantee those conditions of health, nutrition, housing, integral development, social security (…) That is why this regulation is going to be integrated with that of the special testimonies that allow the State, the Courts, to receive testimony in a way that is the best possible, in the most suitable and most appropriate way, so that they can be incorporated into the criminal process and, although they are going to limit a right of the accused, that right is not so abrupt, that it can be made possible, for example in cases of sexual abuse (…) and that is why the accused is removed from the courtroom, placed in a room, where she can not only hear the evidence or where she can have access to that evidence, but also can have access to the defense’s questions that may arise. We also have to take this situation in harmony with the regulations that were previously cited, which is Article 338, we must start from the premise that this regulation already provides for an exception. The ordinary process in the trial phase finally says that the evidence must be evacuated (…) with the presence of the parties, but this Article 338, in the face of an exception –even-, allows (…) for only one of the judges (…) which already suggests that the legislator disrupts the continuity and integration of the Trial Court so that a single judge receives just the evidence (…) this, not by mere authorization of the judges but by authorization of the law, due to a specific case (…) Here, the Trial Court has made the decision that the testimony of Mrs. [Name 015] will be received in her home with the presence of the defense, with the presence (sic) of the parties, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the civil party, the full Trial Court will attend and if there exists, as well, some health situation of the Court that imposes on the site that the quantity of people that are there (…) the decision may even be taken that only one person is present (…) the accused will remain outside the residence of the victim, outside where the reception is taking place, although she will not be able to hear the testimony because there is no audio or video system for this to be done, the defense will be able to do so to ask her questions (…) and once we are back in the courtroom, reconstituted, we will proceed to read (…) the complete testimony (…) That is the way in which the Trial Court, by applying these regulations, can give substance not only to the protection of the right of an elderly person but also to a defense right that covers an accused (…) Before continuing, it must be established that likewise everything that the Trial Court has resolved at this moment stems from a programmatic regulation which is Article 51 of the Political Constitution that establishes, even since our Constitution, special protection for the elderly person and it is there where the Trial Court must give substance not only to the constitutional regulation but also to the special regulation and to the fundamental right that the Court has contemplated in this same manner and that is why, faced with the collision of rights this way, the Trial Court must harm the existing ones as little as possible (…) For practical purposes, as indicated, the accused will be outside the victim’s house and will have the necessary contact with her to ask the questions that are necessary…” (see file c0003110211101454.vgz, sequence from 10:14:54 to 10:23:04 hours, on February 11, 2011, segment from 10:15:32 to 10:22:47 hours).

Subsequently, once said testimony was received and the parties and the Trial Court were reconstituted in the trial courtroom, the court proceeded to read the deposition of the victim so that the accused would be aware of said version and, eventually, could ask whatever questions she wished to interrogate the witness again; however, she had no interest in doing so.

Now, having analyzed the events, the condition of vulnerability of the victim, the right of material defense that covers the accused, and the analysis presented by the judges, this Chamber observes that the measures adopted by the Trial Court reflect a balance and safeguard between the best interest of the elderly person, in this case the aggrieved party, and the right of defense of the accused, also considering the other parties to the proceedings. It is recorded that all parties had the opportunity to witness the victim’s statement –with the exception of the accused–, and to formulate the questions they deemed appropriate at different times, both the public defender and her client. In the present case, Mrs. [Name 015], victim of the present cause, felt deeply disappointed and hurt by the events of which the accused [Name 014] is accused, the latter being the person in whom all trust was placed, because she was hired to protect the victim and other family members and to provide them with all the rigorous care for their various illnesses and advanced ages. This breach of trust that occurred between such close people, and of course, the theft that the aggrieved party [Name 015] suffered, generated great pain on an emotional level for her (as she stated to the representative of the prosecuting entity), which was not verified at an expert witness level; however, the Trial Court, having knowledge that the injured party was 95 years of age in a condition of old age and in a state of vulnerability, it was sufficient to understand that it was probable to re-victimize her or harm her emotional state if she gave her account in the presence of the accused. For a better understanding regarding the protection that must be granted to persons of advanced age, we have Article 2 of the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person, which details the areas of violence that must be protected: “…Any action or omission, direct or indirect, exercised against an elderly person, which produces, as a consequence, the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial integrity…”. Likewise, said regulation incorporates the framework in which disability in elderly persons should be understood: “(7) Disability is understood as the physical, mental, or sensory impairment, whether of a permanent or temporary nature, that limits the capacity to exercise one or more essential activities of daily life, which can be caused or aggravated by the economic and social environment. (8) Efforts will be made to establish the necessary conditions to guarantee the accessibility of persons with disability to the justice system, including those measures conducive to using all required judicial services and having all the resources that guarantee their safety, mobility, comfort, comprehension, privacy, and communication.” (the underlining is not from the original). Further on, said regulation points out, specifically regarding the re-victimization of persons in vulnerable conditions and the due protection that the State must provide them in criminal proceedings where they are victims: “(12)…Likewise, efforts will be made so that the harm suffered by the victim of the crime is not increased as a consequence of their contact with the justice system (secondary victimization). And efforts will be made to guarantee, in all phases of a criminal proceeding, the protection of the physical and psychological integrity of the victims, especially in favor of those at risk of intimidation, reprisals, or reiterated or repeated victimization (the same person is a victim of more than one criminal offense during a period of time). It may also be necessary to grant particular protection to those victims who are going to provide testimony in the judicial process...”.

Therefore, this Chamber considers the Trial Court’s decision to be correct in accepting what the regulation regarding special testimonies dictates, ordinal 212 of the Criminal Procedure Code, during the reception of Mrs. [Name 015]’s statement, a precept that indicates in the pertinent part: “…When the testimony of minors who are victims or witnesses must be received, their best interest must be considered at the time of its reception; for this purpose, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the judge, or the trial court that hears the cause, and depending on the procedural stage in which it is found, shall adopt the necessary measures to reduce the procedures and to receive the testimony under the special conditions that are required, arranging for its reception in private or through the use of special cameras to avoid the contact of the minor with the parties, and allowing the assistance of family members or specialized expert witnesses…” (the underlining is supplied), which was reformed by the Law for the Protection of Victims, Witnesses and other Participants in the Criminal Process, No. 8720 of March 4, 2009. This Chamber in previous pronouncements has set forth the cases in which the deposition of the witness can only be received while the accused is not present: “…Even though Article 212 of the Criminal Procedure Code only refers to the possibility of conducting this type of special evidence in private (that is, in the absence of the public, within which obviously the accused is not included), it is the Chamber’s criterion that the accused can be removed from the hearing when the value of the legal interests in conflict is attended to, as well as based on various legal norms of supra-legal hierarchy that order weighing the interests of certain groups of people (…) such measures can only be decreed when they constitute the only way to eliminate a real and verifiable grievance, not in the face of the mere hypothetical expectation that things could have happened otherwise…” (Resolution No. 2001-001226, of 09:50 hours, on December 14, 2001). This Chamber has issued various pronouncements, where it admits that only in exceptional cases can the accused be removed from the hearing to guarantee the physical and psychological safety of the declarants, provided that there are corroborating elements that evidence a risk of some serious impairment (cf. votes No. 1043-97 of 14:35 hours, on September 30 and No. 1474-97 of 08:40 hours, on December 23, both of the year 1997; as well as No. 483-01 of 9:15 hours, on May 25, 2001).

By virtue of the foregoing, it is evident that the measures adopted by the judges were directed at primarily protecting the psychological integrity of the deponent, by avoiding physical and visual contact with the accused, in consideration of the particular circumstances in which the aggrieved party found herself, such as her advanced age, ailments, and resentment against the defendant, and at the same time, communication between the accused and her technical defense was always maintained. Furthermore, the subsequent disclosure made by the court of the deposition given by the victim allowed the accused to hear the testimony and formulate the questions of interest, an aspect that the material defense rejected. In this position, the Chamber does not find that there was any impediment whatsoever to the exercise of the material or technical defense, much less consider that the principles of immediacy, publicity, adversarial procedure, continuity, and concentration of the hearing were disrespected during the reception of [Name 015]’s testimony. Under such an understanding, her statement is indeed valid, and to that extent, the reproach made in this regard by Attorney Andrea González Céspedes must be rejected.

In that regard, it is estimated that while adequate defense and representation at all times is an integral element of due process, having the Trial Court immediately inform the defendant of what was declared by the co-defendant, as recorded in the trial transcript, thus leaving her informed of everything declared with the opportunity to cross-examine, a right that was recognized to her and which she did not exercise, as recorded in the trial transcript (Volume II, folio 749), did not cause an injury to the principle under analysis, for although its exercise was disturbed, the Court recognized an effective way for its respect, which was not timely protested by the interested party; the judge, as balancer of the process, gave her full and unrestricted access to the information and even the opportunity to exercise her defense regarding that act through cross-examination. Of course, as noted by the Court of Cassation in Considerando X of the ruling, the sentencing court could have employed other criteria in the oral hearing that would not have caused the disturbance to the exercise of the defense that is now protested, such as calling the accused to testify first (…) or even allowing her to remain and participate in the hearing at the time the co-defendant’s statement was taken (…) but —as already stated—, not having done so does not produce nullity of the proceedings because the affectation or disturbance to the exercise of the defense was not of such magnitude as to affect that right causing defenselessness. Now then, keeping in mind the importance of the rights that assist the accused with respect to the taking of evidence, it is also relevant to know the regulations that protect the elderly population, as occurs in the present matter, where the public defender questions the manner in which the testimony of the offended party [Name 015], 95 years of age, was received at the time of the oral and public trial. In the first place, the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person, No. 7935, in its second article defines an elderly person as a person who is 65 years of age or older. Regarding the legal framework of interest concerning this population, we have in the first order the Political Constitution, where its numeral 51 literally establishes the following: “The family, as the natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State. Equally entitled to that protection shall be the mother, the child, the elderly, and the destitute sick person.” (the emphasis is not from the original). Meanwhile, the Brasilia Regulations Regarding Access to Justice for Vulnerable People (approved in Extraordinary Session of the Full Court No. 17-2008, held at 8:30 a.m., on May 26, 2008, Article II), which defines in Chapter I, Second Section, persons in a condition of vulnerability: “(3) Those persons are considered in a condition of vulnerability who, by reason of their age, gender, physical or mental state, or due to social, economic, ethnic and/or cultural circumstances, find special difficulties in fully exercising before the justice system the rights recognized by the legal order. (4) Causes of vulnerability may include, among others, the following: age, disability, membership in indigenous communities or minorities, victimization, migration and internal displacement, poverty, gender, and deprivation of liberty (…) (6) Aging may also constitute a cause of vulnerability when the elderly person finds special difficulties, given their functional capacities, in exercising their rights before the justice system.” Likewise, the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person stipulates in its first ordinal and as one of its main objectives: “…f) To guarantee the protection and social security of elderly persons…”. Equally, the State is ordered in its article number 12 to: “…guarantee the optimal conditions of health, nutrition, housing, integral development and social security to elderly persons…” (the underlining does not belong to the original). Furthermore, subparagraph j) of numeral 3 of the same norm points out one of the rights of interest possessed by said population: “…Legal and psychosocial protection for elderly persons affected by physical, sexual, psychological, and patrimonial violence…”. In the same sense, in the sixth section ibidem, the following relevant right that the State must protect is also contemplated: “…Elderly persons shall have the right to have their physical, mental, and moral integrity respected. This right comprises the protection of their image, autonomy, thought, dignity, and values.” (the emphasis is imposed). In the sub-examine, upon observing in detail the audiovisual records of the trial hearings and the oral judgment, the following important facts are known: Once the adversarial proceedings began, and after the reading of the accusation by licensed attorney Ronald Segura Mena, representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, he expressed before the Court the request made to him by the aggrieved party [Name 015], in the sense of declaring in her home without the presence of the defendant [Name 014], given that she is “…very resentful of this situation that occurred and has asked us if it is possible, for the Court to assess this situation (sic). She has no objection to the public defender being present, but she does not want to see the defendant anymore, as the result of her being a person of great trust for her and she (sic) feels very offended by this situation…” (see file c0003110211094459.vgz, sequence from 09:44:59 to 10:00:02 hours, of February 11, 2011, segment from 10:00:51 to 10:01:19 hours). The request was resolved positively by the Court (however, contrary to what the technical defense claims, it is noted that the oral reasoning can indeed be heard, with some difficulty due to the very low audio level, because the judges did not turn on the microphone), with the president stating punctually: “…Law 7935, that is why the Court must specify a description and reasoning supported by law, because, even, there exists an obligation that this law imposes on the State and evidently, the Court is part of the State, so that protection is given to the elderly person (…) for this reason this norm must be commented on and must be integrated —logically— with Article 212 which establishes special testimonies. Article number 3 of Law 7935 establishes rights, the rights (sic) that elderly persons have to the legal and psychosocial protection that elderly persons affected by physical, sexual, psychological, and patrimonial violence have. It already establishes the budget for legal protection, and the State is obliged to comply (…) this in Article 12, where it is established that the State must guarantee those conditions of health, nutrition, housing, integral development, social security (…) That is why this norm is going to be integrated with that of special testimonies which allows reception by the State, by the Courts so that they can be received in a manner that is the best possible, in the most suitable and most apt way, so that they can be incorporated into the criminal process and that, although, they will limit a right of the defendant, that right not be so abrupt, that it can be made possible, for example in cases of sexual abuse (…) and that is why the defendant is removed from the courtroom, placing her in a room, where not only can she listen to the evidence or where she can have access to that evidence, but also, that she can have access to the defense of the questions that may arise. This situation we must also take in harmony with the norms that were previously cited, which is Article 338, we must start from the fact that this norm already foresees an exception. The ordinary process in the trial stage states that the evidence must be taken (…) with the presence of the parties, but this Article 338 in the face of an exception —even—, allows (…) that it be only one of the judges (…) which already suggests that, even, the legislator breaks the continuity and integration of the Court so that it is a judge who only receives the evidence (…) this, not by mere authorization of the judges but by authorization of the law, due to a specific case (…) Hence, the Court has made the decision that the testimony of Mrs. [Name 015] will be received in her home with the presence of the defense, with the presence (sic) of the parties, the Public Prosecutor's Office and the civil party, the full Court will attend and if there exists, likewise, any health situation of the Court that imposes on the site that the number of people who are (…) even, the decision could be made that only one person be present (…) the defendant will remain outside the offended party’s residence, outside of where the reception is taking place, although she will not be able to hear the testimony because there is no form of audio or video system for this to be done, the defense will be able to do so in order to ask her (…) and once we are back in the courtroom, reconstituted, we will proceed to read (…) the complete testimony (…) That is the way in which the Court, in application of these norms, can give content not only to the protection of the right of an elderly person but to a right of defense that covers a defendant (…) Before continuing, it must be established that equally everything that the Court has resolved at this moment comes from a programmatic norm which is Article 51 of the Political Constitution that establishes, even from our Constitution, a special protection for the elderly person and it is there where the Court has to give content not only to the constitutional norm but to the special norm and to the fundamental right that the Court has come to contemplate in this same manner and for this reason, it is that, faced with the collision of rights in this way, the Court must injure the existing ones as little as possible (…) For practical purposes, as indicated, the defendant will be outside the offended party’s house and will have the necessary contact with her to ask whatever questions are necessary…” (see file c0003110211101454.vgz, sequence from 10:14:54 to 10:23:04 hours, of February 11, 2011, segment from 10:15:32 to 10:22:47 hours). Subsequently, having received said testimony and once the parties and the Court were reconstituted in the trial courtroom, the adjudicating body proceeded to read the deposition of the victim so that the accused would have knowledge of said version and eventually, ask whatever questions she wished to interrogate the witness again; however, she had no interest in doing so. Now then, having analyzed the events, the condition of vulnerability of the offended party, the right of material defense that covers the accused, and the analysis set forth by the judges, this Chamber observes that the measures adopted by the Trial Court reflect a balance and safeguard between the best interest of the elderly person, in this case the aggrieved party, and the right of defense of the defendant, equally considering the other procedural subjects. It is on record that all the parties had the opportunity to witness the victim’s declaration —with the exception of the defendant—, and to formulate the questions they deemed appropriate at different times, both the public defender and her represented party. In the present case, Mrs. [Name 015], victim in the present cause, felt deeply betrayed and hurt by the events accused against the defendant [Name 014], the latter being the person in whom all trust was deposited, by virtue of having been contracted to protect the offended party and other family members and to provide them with all the rigorous care due to their various illnesses and advanced ages. This breach of trust that occurred between such close persons, and of course, the theft suffered by the aggrieved party [Name 015], generated great emotional pain (as she stated to the representative of the prosecuting entity), which was not verified at an expert level; however, the Court, upon knowing that the injured party was 95 years old, in a condition of old age and in a state of vulnerability, this was sufficient to understand that she was likely to be revictimized or have her emotional state harmed if she gave her account in the presence of the defendant. For a better understanding of the protection that must be granted to persons of advanced age, there is Article 2 of the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person, which details the areas of violence that must be protected: “…Any action or omission, direct or indirect, exercised against an elderly person, that produces, as a consequence, the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial integrity…”. Likewise, said norm incorporates the framework in which disability in elderly persons must be understood: “(7) Disability is understood as the physical, mental, or sensory deficiency, whether of a permanent or temporary nature, that limits the capacity to exercise one or more essential activities of daily life, which can be caused or aggravated by the economic and social environment. (8) Efforts shall be made to establish the necessary conditions to guarantee the accessibility of persons with disabilities to the justice system, including those measures conducive to using all required judicial services and having all the resources that guarantee their safety, mobility, comfort, comprehension, privacy, and communication.” (the underlining is not from the original). Further on, said regulation points out, specifically regarding the revictimization of persons in a condition of vulnerability and the due protection that the State must provide them in criminal proceedings where they are victims: “(12)…Likewise, efforts shall be made so that the harm suffered by the victim of the crime is not increased as a consequence of their contact with the justice system (secondary victimization). And efforts shall be made to guarantee, in all phases of a criminal proceeding, the protection of the physical and psychological integrity of the victims, especially in favor of those who run the risk of intimidation, reprisals, or repeated or reiterated victimization (the same person is the victim of more than one criminal offense during a period of time). It may also be necessary to grant particular protection to those victims who are going to give testimony in the judicial process...”. Therefore, this Chamber considers the Court's decision correct in accepting what the norm related to special testimonies dictates, ordinal 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, during the reception of the statement of Mrs. [Name 015], a precept that points out in the pertinent part: “…When the testimony of minors who are victims or witnesses must be received, their best interest must be considered at the time of its reception; for this purpose, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the judge or trial court hearing the cause, and according to the procedural stage in which it is located, will adopt the necessary measures so that the procedures are reduced and the testimony is received in the special conditions that are required, ordering its reception in private or through the use of special cameras to avoid the minor's contact with the parties, and allowing the assistance of family members or specialized experts…” (the underlining is supplied), which was reformed by the Law for the Protection of Victims, Witnesses, and other Participants in the Criminal Process, No. 8720 of March 4, 2009. This Chamber, in previous pronouncements, has set forth the cases in which the witness’s deposition can only be received while the defendant is not present: “…Even though Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only refers to the possibility of practicing this type of special evidence in private (that is, in the absence of the public, which obviously does not include the defendant), it is the Chamber’s criterion that the defendant can be removed from the hearing when attending to the value of the legal interests in conflict, as well as based on various legal norms of supra-legal hierarchy that order weighing the interests of certain groups of persons (…) such measures can only be decreed when they constitute the only way to eliminate a real and verifiable grievance, not in the face of the mere hypothetical expectation that things could have happened another way…” (Resolution No. 2001-001226, of 09:50 hours, of December 14, 2001). This Chamber has issued various pronouncements, where it admits that only in exceptional cases can the defendant be removed from the hearing to guarantee the physical and psychological safety of the declarants, provided that there are elements of conviction that demonstrate that there is a risk of some serious impairment (cfr.

votes No. 1043-97 of 2:35 p.m., of September 30, and No. 1474-97 of 8:40 a.m., of December 23, both of the year 1997; as well as No. 483-01 of 9:15 a.m., of May 25, 2001). By virtue of the foregoing, it is evident that the measures adopted by the judges were aimed at primarily protecting the psychological integrity of the deponent, by avoiding physical and visual contact with the accused, in consideration of the particular circumstances in which the aggrieved party found herself, such as her advanced age, ailments, and resentment against the defendant, and at the same time, communication between the latter and her technical defense was always maintained. Furthermore, from the subsequent disclosure that the adjudicating body made of the deposition given by the offended party, which allowed the accused to hear the testimony and formulate questions of interest, an aspect that the material defense rejected. In this context, the Chamber finds no impediment whatsoever to the exercise of the material or technical defense, much less reason to consider that the principles of: immediacy (inmediación), publicity, adversarial procedure (contradictoriedad), continuity, and concentration of the debate were disrespected during the reception of the testimony of [Name 015]. Under this understanding, her declaration is indeed valid, and to that extent, the reproach raised in this regard by attorney Andrea González Céspedes must be rejected.” This situation must also be taken in harmony with the rules previously cited, namely Article 338, and we must start from the premise that this rule already provides for an exception. The ordinary process at the final trial stage says that the evidence must be taken (…) in the presence of the parties, but this Article 338, in the face of an exception –even–, allows (…) that it be only one of the judges (…) which already suggests that the legislator itself breaks the continuity and integrity of the Tribunal so that a single judge receives the evidence (…) not merely by authorization of the judges but by authorization of the law, by reason of a specific case (…) Hence, the Tribunal has made the decision that the testimony of Mrs. [Name 015] will be received at her home with the presence of the defense, with the presence </i>(sic) <i>of the parties, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the civil party; the full Tribunal will attend, and if there is, likewise, any health situation of the Tribunal that imposes at the site that the number of persons present (…) even the decision may be made that only one person be present (…) the accused will remain outside the residence of the victim, outside where the reception is taking place; although she will not be able to hear the testimony because there is no audio or video system for that purpose, the defense will be able to hear it in order to ask her questions (…) and once we are back in the courtroom, duly reconvened, we shall proceed to read (…) the complete testimony (…) That is the manner in which the Tribunal, in application of these rules, can give substance not only to the protection of the right of an older person but also to a defense right that covers an accused person (…) Before continuing, it must be established that likewise everything the Tribunal has resolved at this time derives from a programmatic provision, which is Article 51 of the Political Constitution, which establishes, even from our Constitution, a special protection for older adults, and it is there that the Tribunal must give substance not only to the constitutional provision but also to the special provision and to the fundamental right that the Tribunal has come to contemplate in this same manner, and that is why, in the face of the collision of rights in this way, the Tribunal must impair existing rights as little as possible (…) For practical purposes, as indicated, the accused will be outside the victim’s house and will have the necessary contact with her to ask whatever questions are necessary...” </i>(see file c0003110211101454.vgz, sequence from 10:14:54 to 10:23:04, on February 11, 2011, segment from 10:15:32 to 10:22:47). Subsequently, having received said testimony and with the parties and the Tribunal reconvened in the courtroom, the adjudicating body proceeded to read the victim’s deposition aloud so that the accused would have knowledge of that version and, eventually, could pose any questions she wished in order to interrogate the witness again; however, she had no interest in doing so. Now, having analyzed the events, the condition of vulnerability of the victim, the right of material defense that covers the accused, and the analysis set forth by the judges, this Chamber observes that the measures adopted by the Trial Court reflect a balance and safeguarding between the best interest of the older adult, in this case the aggrieved party, and the right of defense of the accused, likewise considering the other procedural subjects. The record shows that all parties had the opportunity to witness the victim’s statement –with the exception of the accused–, and to formulate whatever questions they deemed appropriate at different times, both the public defender and her client. In the present case, Mrs. [Name 015], victim in this cause, felt very betrayed and hurt by the events of which accused [Name 014] stands charged, the latter being the person in whom all trust was placed, by virtue of the fact that she was hired to protect the victim and other family members and to provide them all required care due to their various illnesses and advanced ages. This rupture of trust that occurred between such close individuals, and certainly the theft suffered by the aggrieved party [Name 015], caused her great emotional pain (as she expressed to the representative of the prosecuting body), which was not proven at the expert level; however, the Tribunal, knowing that the harmed party was 95 years of age, in a condition of old age and a state of vulnerability, it was sufficient to understand that she would likely be re-victimized or have her emotional state harmed if she gave her account in the presence of the accused. For a better understanding of the protection that must be afforded to persons of advanced age, Article 2 of the Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor sets out the areas of violence that must be protected: <i>“…Any action or omission, direct or indirect, exercised against an older adult, which produces, as a consequence, the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial integrity…”</i>. Likewise, said law incorporates the framework within which disability in older adults must be understood: <i>“(7) Disability is understood to mean the physical, mental, or sensory deficiency, whether of a permanent or temporary nature, that limits the capacity to exercise one or more essential activities of daily life, <u>which may be caused or aggravated by the economic and social environment</u></i> <i>. (8) Efforts shall be made to establish the necessary conditions to guarantee the accessibility of persons with disabilities to the justice system, including those measures conducive to using all required judicial services and having available all resources that guarantee their safety, mobility, comfort, comprehension, privacy, and communication.” </i>(the underlining is not in the original). Further on, said law points, specifically regarding the re-victimization of persons in a condition of vulnerability and the due protection that the State must provide them in criminal proceedings where they are victims: <i>“(12)…Likewise, efforts shall be made to ensure that the harm suffered by the victim of the crime is not increased as a consequence of their contact with the justice system (secondary victimization). And efforts shall be made to guarantee, in all phases of a criminal proceeding, the protection of the physical and psychological integrity of victims, especially in favor of those at risk of intimidation, retaliation, or repeated or recurring victimization (the same person is the victim of more than one criminal offence over a period of time). It may also be necessary to grant particular protection to those victims who are going to testify in the judicial process...”</i>. Therefore, this Chamber considers correct the decision of the Tribunal to adopt what is dictated by the provision concerning special testimony, Article 212 of the Código Procesal Penal, during the reception of the statement of Mrs. [Name 015], a provision that states in the relevant part: <i>“…When the statement of minor victims or witnesses must be received, their best interest shall be considered at the time of its reception; to this end, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the judge, or the trial court hearing the case, depending on the procedural stage, shall adopt the necessary measures to reduce formalities and <u>to receive the testimony under the special conditions required, arranging for its reception in private</u> or through the use of special cameras to avoid the minor’s contact with the parties, and allowing the assistance of family members or specialized experts…” </i>(the underlining is supplied), which was reformed by the Ley de Protección a Víctimas, Testigos y demás intervinientes en el Proceso Penal, No. 8720 of March 4, 2009. This Chamber, in prior rulings, has set forth the cases in which the witness’s deposition may only be received while the accused is not present: <i>“…Even though Article 212 of the Código Procesal Penal only refers to the possibility of conducting this type of special evidence in private (that is, in the absence of the public, which does not obviously include the accused), it is the Chamber’s criterion that the accused can be removed from the hearing when attending to the value of the legal interests in conflict, as well as based on various legal provisions of supra-legal hierarchy that order the balancing of the interests of certain groups of persons (…) such measures may only be ordered when they constitute the only way to eliminate a real and verifiable injury, not in the face of a mere hypothetical expectation that things could have happened differently…” </i>(Resolution No. 2001-001226, of 09:50 hours, of December 14, 2001). This Chamber has issued various rulings in which it admits that only in exceptional cases can the accused be removed from the hearing to guarantee the physical and psychological safety of the declarants, provided that there are elements of conviction showing that a risk of some serious impairment exists (cf. Votes No. 1043-97 of 14:35 hours, of September 30, and No. 1474-97 of 08:40 hours, of December 23, both of 1997; as well as No. 483-01 of 9:15 hours, of May 25, 2001). By virtue of the foregoing, it is evident that the measures adopted by the adjudicators were aimed at protecting primarily the psychological integrity of the deponent, by avoiding physical and visual contact with the accused, in consideration of the particular circumstances in which the aggrieved party found herself, such as her advanced age, ailments, and resentment toward the defendant, and at the same time, communication between the latter and her technical defense was maintained at all times. Furthermore, the adjudicating body’s subsequent disclosure of the deposition given by the victim allowed the accused to hear the testimony and formulate any questions of interest, an aspect that the material defense rejected. In this context, the Chamber does not find that any impediment existed to the exercise of the material or technical defense, much less to consider that the principles of immediacy, publicity, adversarial process, continuity, and concentration of the debate were disrespected during the reception of the testimony of [Name 015]. Under this understanding, her statement is indeed valid, and to that extent, the objection raised in this regard by licensed attorney Andrea González Céspedes must be rejected.<b>”</b></span></span>

“III. Como segunda protesta de forma, aduce violación al Derecho de defensa material de la justiciable cuando el Tribunal decidió impedir que se mantenga presente, mientras la testigo [Nombre 015] rindiera su declaración, en virtud de la Ley de Protección a la persona adulta mayor cuando la víctima sea perjudicada a nivel patrimonial. La quejosa señala que existen dos yerros que ameritan anular el juicio oral y público: i) los problemas de audio impiden escuchar la fundamentación que el a quo brindó en cuanto a dicha decisión; y, ii) el artículo 3 del cuerpo normativo indicado anteriormente, se refiere a la obligación del Estado por crear programas que impidan la violencia contra la persona adulta mayor y no señala que se limite la defensa material de un imputado. Inclusive, apunta que la testigo [Nombre 015] nunca manifestó algún temor en contra de la acusada simplemente no deseaba que ésta ingresara a su propiedad. Se muestra inconforme con la violación al debido proceso y al principio de inmediación, en perjuicio de su cliente. Reitera la solicitud de anular el juicio y reenviar la causa para la celebración de un nuevo debate. Se rechaza el reproche. A pesar de que exista normativa internacional debidamente incorporada en nuestro país que respaldan derechos intrínsecos que posee toda persona investigada por hechos punibles, tales como el artículo 8.1.f) de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, que establece: “...derecho de la defensa de interrogar a los testigos presentes en el tribunal y de obtener la comparecencia, como testigos o peritos, de otras personas que puedan arrojar luz sobre los hechos.”, así como el numeral 14.3.e) del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, que protege el derecho del justiciable: “A interrogar o hacer interrogar a los testigos de cargo y a obtener la comparecencia de los testigos de descargo y que éstos sean interrogados en las mismas condiciones que los testigos de cargo.”; es decir, se protege el derecho que posee el encartado de, no sólo escuchar sino también participar en la recepción de las pruebas durante el debate, sin embargo, también existe la posibilidad –en supuestos excepcionales- de restringírselos, a fin de proteger otros bienes jurídicos de rango constitucional. Siendo importante señalar, que en ningún caso se deberá limitar el acceso ni la participación de la defensa técnica en la producción de la prueba. Así lo ha señalado la Sala Constitucional en el voto número 3020-96, de las 11:48 horas, del 9 de junio de 1995, donde apuntó que: “...conforme a lo expuesto en la sentencia 1739-92 de las once horas y cuarenta y cinco minutos del primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y dos, el imputado tiene derecho a ser asistido por un defensor letrado, o a defenderse personalmente y que sea cual sea el método que escoja, ese derecho implica el irrestricto acceso a las probanzas y actos, siendo procedentes sólo aquellas restricciones indispensables para impedir el entorpecimiento de la averiguación de la verdad real de los hechos. También ha señalado esta Sala que no toda nulidad conlleva una violación al debido proceso sino sólo aquellas que causen un grave perjuicio a los intereses de la defensa. En ese sentido se estima que si bien la adecuada defensa y representación en todo momento, es un elemento integrante del debido proceso, al haber puesto el Tribunal en conocimiento inmediato al imputado de lo declarado por el co-imputado, según consta en el acta de debate, quedando informado de todo lo declarado con oportunidad de repreguntar, derecho éste que se le reconoció y no ejerció, según consta en el acta de debate (tomo II, folio 749), no se causó una lesión al principio en análisis, pues si bien se le perturbó su ejercicio, el Tribunal reconoció una forma eficaz para su respeto, lo que no fue protestado oportunamente por el interesado; el juez como equilibrador del proceso, le dio acceso pleno e irrestricto a la información e incluso oportunidad de ejercer su defensa sobre ese acto a través de la repregunta. Desde luego que, como lo hace notar la Sala de Casación en el Considerando X del fallo, el Tribunal sentenciador pudo emplear otros criterios en el debate que no causaran la perturbación que ahora se protesta, al ejercicio de la defensa, como sería llamar primero a declarar al acusado (…) o aún permitirle su permanencia e intervención en la audiencia al momento de tomarse la declaración al co-imputado (…) pero -como ya se dijo-, al no haberlo hecho así no se produce nulidad de lo actuado pues la afectación o perturbación al ejercicio de la defensa no fue de tal magnitud que afectara ese derecho causando indefensión”. Ahora bien, teniendo presente la importancia de los derechos que le asisten al acusado con respecto a la evacuación de la prueba, también es relevante conocer la normativa que protege a la población adulta mayor, como sucede en el presente asunto, donde la defensora pública cuestiona la manera en que se recibió el testimonio de la ofendida [Nombre 015] de 95 años de edad, al momento de realizarse el juicio oral y público. En primer lugar, la Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor, Nº 7935, en su segundo artículo define al adulto mayor como la persona que tenga 65 años o más. Con respecto al marco legal de interés sobre esta población, se tiene en primer orden la Constitución Política, donde se establece literalmente en su numeral 51 lo siguiente: “La familia, como elemento natural y fundamento de la sociedad, tiene derecho a la protección especial del Estado. Igualmente tendrán derecho a esa protección la madre, el niño, el anciano y el enfermo desvalido.” (lo que se resalta no es del original). Mientras que las Reglas de Brasilia Sobre Acceso a la Justicia de las Personas en Condición de Vulnerabilidad (aprobadas en Sesión extraordinaria de Corte Plena N° 17-2008, celebrada a las 8:30 horas, del 26 de mayo de 2008, artículo II), la cual define en el Capítulo I, Sección segunda, a las personas en condición de vulnerabilidad: “(3) Se consideran en condición de vulnerabilidad aquellas personas que, por razón de su edad, género, estado físico o mental, o por circunstancias sociales, económicas, étnicas y/o culturales, encuentran especiales dificultades para ejercitar con plenitud ante el sistema de justicia los derechos reconocidos por el ordenamiento jurídico. (4) Podrán constituir causas de vulnerabilidad, entre otras, las siguientes: la edad, la discapacidad, la pertenencia a comunidades indígenas o a minorías, la victimización, la migración y el desplazamiento interno, la pobreza, el género y la privación de libertad (…) (6) El envejecimiento también puede constituir una causa de vulnerabilidad cuando la persona adulta mayor encuentre especiales dificultades, atendiendo a sus capacidades funcionales, para ejercitar sus derechos ante el sistema de justicia.”. Asimismo, la Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor, estipula en su primer ordinal y como uno de sus principales objetivos: “…f) Garantizar la protección y la seguridad social de las personas adultas mayores…”. Igualmente, se ordena al Estado en su artículo número 12, a: “…garantizar las condiciones óptimas de salud, nutrición, vivienda, desarrollo integral y seguridad social a las personas adultas mayores…” (lo subrayado no pertenece al original). Además, en el inciso j) del numeral 3 de la misma norma se señala uno de los derechos de interés que posee dicha población: “…La protección jurídica y psicosocial a las personas adultas mayores afectadas por la violencia física, sexual, psicológica y patrimonial…”. En el mismo sentido, en el acápite sexto ibídem, también se contempla como derecho relevante que debe proteger el Estado, el siguiente: “…Las personas adultas mayores tendrán derecho a que se respete su integridad física, psíquica y moral . Este derecho comprende la protección de su imagen, autonomía, pensamiento, dignidad y valores.” (lo resaltado se impone). En el sub-exámine, al observar con detalle los registros audiovisuales de las audiencias del debate y de la sentencia oral, se conocen los siguientes hechos de importancia: Una vez iniciado el contradictorio, y luego de leída la acusación por parte del licenciado Ronald Segura Mena, representante del Ministerio Público, éste expresó ante el Tribunal, la solicitud que le hiciere la agraviada [Nombre 015], en el sentido de declarar en su casa de habitación sin la presencia de la justiciable [Nombre 014], en razón de que se encuentra “….muy resentida con esta situación que se dio y nos ha solicitado que si es posible, el Tribunal valore esta situación (sic) . Ella no tiene ninguna objeción en que vaya la defensora pero sí, no quiere ver más a la imputada, producto de que era una persona de mucha confianza para ella y ella (sic) se siente muy ofendida con esta situación…” (ver archivo c0003110211094459.vgz, secuencia de las 09:44:59 a las 10:00:02 horas, del 11 de febrero de 2011, segmento de las 10:00:51 a las 10:01:19 horas). La gestión fue resuelta positivamente por el Tribunal (sin embargo se advierte contrario a lo que reclama la defensa técnica, que sí se logra escuchar la fundamentación oral con cierta dificultad por el nivel ínfimo del audio, debido a que los juzgadores no encendieron el micrófono), manifestando puntualmente el presidente: “…Ley 7935, por eso es que el Tribunal debe concretar una descripción y fundamentación amparada por la ley, porque, incluso, existe una obligación que esta ley impone al Estado y evidentemente, el Tribunal es parte del Estado, para que se de una protección al adulto mayor (…) por ello esta norma debe ser comentada y debe ser integrada –lógicamente- con el artículo 212 que establece los testimonios especiales. El artículo número 3 de la Ley 7935 establece derechos, los derechos (sic) que tienen las personas adultas mayores a la protección jurídica y psicosocial que tienen las personas adultas mayores afectadas por la violencia física, sexual, psicológica y patrimonial. Ya establece el presupuesto de protección jurídica, y se obliga al Estado a cumplir (…) ello en el artículo 12, en donde se establece que el Estado deberá garantizar esas condiciones de salud, nutrición, vivienda, desarrollo integral, seguridad social (…) Por eso es que esta norma va a ser integrada con la de los testimonios especiales que permite la recepción por parte del Estado, por parte de los Tribunales para que puedan recibirse en una forma en que sea lo mejor posible, de la forma más idónea y más apta, para que puedan ser incorporados al proceso penal y que, si bien, van a limitar un derecho del imputado, ese derecho no sea tan abrupto, que pueda hacerse posible, por ejemplo los casos de abuso sexual (…) y por eso es que se saca al imputado de la sala, colocándolo en un cuarto, en donde no sólo pueda escuchar la prueba o donde pueda tener acceso a esa prueba, sino además, que pueda tener acceso a la defensa de las preguntas que se puedan dar. Esta situación también tenemos que tomarla en armonía con la normas que anteriormente fueron citadas, que es el artículo 338, debemos partir que esta norma ya prevee una excepción. El proceso ordinario en la etapa de juicio final dice que la prueba tiene que ser evacuada (…) con la presencia de las partes, pero este artículo 338 ante una excepción –incluso-, permite (…) que sea uno solo de los jueces (…) lo que ya deja entrever que, inclusive el legislador quebranta la continuidad e integración del Tribunal para que sea un juez que reciba nada más la prueba (…) ello, no por autorización meramente de los jueces sino por autorización de la ley, en razón de un caso específico (...) He ahí que el Tribunal ha tomado la decisión de que se va a recibir el testimonio de la señora [Nombre 015] en su casa de habitación con la presencia de la defensa, con la presencia (sic) de las partes, del Ministerio Público y la parte civil, va a concurrir el Tribunal en pleno y si existen, igual, alguna situación de salud del Tribunal que le imponga en el sitio que la cantidad de personas que están (…) inclusive podrá tomarse la decisión de que sólo una persona esté presente (…) la imputada va a permanecer afuera de la residencia de la ofendida, afuera de donde está la recepción, si bien no va a poder escuchar el testimonio porque no hay forma de sistema de audio ni video para que esto se haga, sí va poder hacerlo la defensa para que le pregunte (…) y una vez que estemos en la sala, nuevamente constituidos se procederá a leer (…) el testimonio completo (…) Esa es la forma en que el Tribunal en aplicación de estas normas pueda dar contenido no sólo a la protección del derecho a una persona mayor sino a un derecho de defensa que cubre a un imputado (…) Antes de continuar, debe establecer que igualmente todo lo que el Tribunal en este momento ha resuelto deviene de una norma programática que es el artículo 51 de la Constitución Política que establece, inclusive desde nuestra Constitución una protección especial para el adulto mayor y es ahí donde el Tribunal tiene que darle contenido no sólo a la norma constitucional sino a la norma especial y al derecho fundamental que ha venido el Tribunal a contemplar de esta misma manera y por eso, es que, ante la colisión de derechos de esta forma el Tribunal tiene que lesionar los existentes lo menos posible (…) Para efectos prácticos, tal y como se indicó, la imputada va a estar afuera de la casa de la ofendida y tendrá el contacto necesario con ella para hacer las preguntas que sea necesarias...” (ver archivo c0003110211101454.vgz, secuencia de las 10:14:54 a las 10:23:04 horas, del 11 de febrero de 2011, segmento de las 10:15:32 a las 10:22:47 horas). Posteriormente, recibido dicho testimonio y ya constituidas las partes y el Tribunal en la sala de juicios, el órgano juzgador procedió a dar lectura de la deposición de la víctima a fin de que la acusada tenga conocimiento de dicha versión y eventualmente, realice las preguntas que desee para interrogar nuevamente a la testigo, sin embargo, no tuvo interés en ello. Ahora bien, analizados los acontecimientos, la condición de vulnerabilidad de la ofendida, el derecho de defensa material que cubre a la endilgada y el análisis expuesto por los juzgadores, observa esta Sala que las medidas adoptadas por el Tribunal de Juicio refleja un balance y resguardo entre el interés superior de la persona adulta mayor, en este caso la agraviada y el derecho de defensa de la encartada, considerando igualmente, los demás sujetos procesales. Consta que todas las partes tuvieron oportunidad de presenciar la declaración de la víctima -a excepción de la imputada-, y formular las preguntas que consideren oportunas en momentos distintos, tanto la defensora pública como su representada. En el presente caso, la señora [Nombre 015], víctima de la presente causa, se sintió muy defraudada y dolida por los acontecimientos que se le acusan a la imputada [Nombre 014], siendo ésta la persona a quien le depositaron toda la confianza, en virtud de que fue contratada para proteger a la ofendida y otras familiares y brindarles todos los cuidados de rigor por sus diversas enfermedades y edades avanzadas. Esta ruptura de confianza que se dio entre personas tan cercanas, y por supuesto, el robo que sufrió la agraviada [Nombre 015], le generaron un gran dolor a nivel emocional (según le manifestó al representante del ente acusador), la cual no fue comprobada a nivel pericial, sin embargo el Tribunal al tener conocimiento de que la perjudicada tenía 95 años de edad en condición de ancianidad y en estado de vulnerabilidad, bastaba para comprender que era probable revictimizarla o dañar su estado emocional si brindaba su relato en presencia de la encartada. Para mayor comprensión acerca de la protección que se les debe otorgar a las personas de avanzada edad, se tiene el artículo 2 de la Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor, el cual detalla los ámbitos de violencia que se deben proteger: “…Cualquier acción u omisión, directa o indirecta, ejercida contra una persona adulta mayor, que produzca, como consecuencia, el menoscabo de su integridad física, sexual, psicológica o patrimonial…”. Asimismo, dicha norma incorpora el marco en el que se debe entender la discapacidad en las personas adultas mayores: “(7) Se entiende por discapacidad la deficiencia física, mental o sensorial, ya sea de naturaleza permanente o temporal, que limita la capacidad de ejercer una o más actividades esenciales de la vida diaria, que puede ser causada o agravada por el entorno económico y social . (8) Se procurará establecer las condiciones necesarias para garantizar la accesibilidad de las personas con discapacidad al sistema de justicia, incluyendo aquellas medidas conducentes a utilizar todos los servicios judiciales requeridos y disponer de todos los recursos que garanticen su seguridad, movilidad, comodidad, comprensión, privacidad y comunicación.” (lo subrayado no es del original). Más adelante, dicha normativa apunta, específicamente acerca de la revictimización de las personas en condición de vulnerabilidad y la debida protección que el Estado debe brindarles en los procesos penales donde son víctimas: “(12)…Asimismo se procurará que el daño sufrido por la víctima del delito no se vea incrementado como consecuencia de su contacto con el sistema de justicia (victimización secundaria). Y se procurará garantizar, en todas las fases de un procedimiento penal, la protección de la integridad física y psicológica de las víctimas, sobre todo a favor de aquéllas que corran riesgo de intimidación, de represalias o de victimización reiterada o repetida (una misma persona es víctima de más de una infracción penal durante un periodo de tiempo). También podrá resultar necesario otorgar una protección particular a aquellas víctimas que van a prestar testimonio en el proceso judicial...”. Por tanto, esta Cámara considera acertada la decisión del Tribunal al acoger lo que dicta la norma relativa a los testimonios especiales, ordinal 212 del Código Procesal Penal, durante la recepción de la declaración de la señora [Nombre 015], precepto que señala en lo conducente: “…Cuando deba recibirse la declaración de personas menores de edad víctimas o testigos, deberá considerarse su interés superior a la hora de su recepción; para ello el Ministerio Público, el juez o tribunal de juicio que conozca de la causa y según la etapa procesal en la que se encuentre, adoptarán las medidas necesarias para que se reduzcan los trámites y se reciba el testimonio en las condiciones especiales que se requieran, disponiendo su recepción en privado o mediante el uso de cámaras especiales para evitar el contacto del menor con las partes, y permitiendo el auxilio de familiares o de los peritos especializados…” (lo subrayado es suplido), el cual fue reformado por la Ley de Protección a Víctimas, Testigos y demás intervinientes en el Proceso Penal, N° 8720 del 4 de marzo de 2009. Esta Sala en anteriores pronunciamientos ha expuesto los casos en los que únicamente se puede recibir la deposición del testigo mientras el encartado no se encuentre presente: “…Aun cuando el artículo 212 del Código Procesal Penal solo se refiere a la posibilidad de practicar este tipo de pruebas especiales en privado (es decir, en ausencia del público, dentro del cual no se incluye obviamente al imputado), es criterio de la Sala que este puede ser alejado de la audiencia cuando se atiende al valor de los bienes jurídicos en conflicto, así como con base en diversas normas jurídicas de jerarquía supralegal que ordenan ponderar los intereses de ciertos grupos de personas (…) tales medidas solo pueden decretarse cuando constituyan el único modo de eliminar un agravio real y constatable, no ante la simple expectativa hipotética de que las cosas pudieron suceder de otra manera…” (Resolución Nº 2001-001226, de las 09:50 horas, del 14 de diciembre de 2001). Esta Sala ha emitido diversos pronunciamientos, donde admite que sólo en casos excepcionales se puede alejar al imputado de la audiencia para garantizar la seguridad física y psicológica de los declarantes, siempre que concurran elementos de convicción que evidencien que existe el riesgo de algún serio menoscabo (cfr. votos Nº 1043-97 de las 14:35 horas, del 30 de setiembre y Nº 1474-97 de las 08:40 horas, del 23 de diciembre, ambas del año 1997; así como el Nº 483-01 de las 9:15 horas, del 25 de mayo de 2001). En virtud de lo anterior, se evidencia que las medidas adoptadas por los juzgadores fueron encaminadas a proteger de manera primordial la integridad psicológica de la deponente, al evitar el contacto físico y visual con la imputada, en atención a las particulares circunstancias en que se encontraba la agraviada, tales como su avanzada edad, padecimientos y resentimiento en contra de la justiciable y al mismo tiempo, siempre se mantuvo la comunicación entre ésta y su defensa técnica. Además, de la divulgación posterior que hizo el órgano juzgador de la deposición que realizó la ofendida, lo cual le permitió a la acusada escuchar el testimonio y formular las preguntas de interés, aspecto que la defensa material rechazó. En esta tesitura, no encuentra la Sala que existiera impedimento alguno para el ejercicio de la defensa material ni técnica ni mucho menos considerar que los principios de: inmediación, publicidad, contradictoriedad, continuidad y concentración del debate, fuesen irrespetados durante la recepción del testimonio de [Nombre 015]. Bajo tal entendido, su declaración sí resulta válida, y en ese tanto, el reproche que al respecto plantea la licenciada Andrea González Céspedes, debe rechazarse.”