Customs official improperly overseeing spouse's agencyUso indebido del cargo por funcionario al fiscalizar aduanas de agencia de su cónyuge

**Third:** That from the initial complaint brief, the plaintiff has been alleging a violation of the one-month period provided for in Article 603 of the Labor Code (CT) for the exercise of the employer's disciplinary sanctioning power against its subordinate. As is well understood, in disciplinary matters in general, there are at least three identifiable time periods in the actions of the Administration: an initial period to open the investigation from when the fact or fault becomes known; another to instruct, substantiate, or process the respective administrative procedure (procedimiento); and another to impose the sanction and its execution (Cfr. Sala Constitucional, judgment 2006-13926 of 2:44 p.m. on September 20, 2006, Considering VII, and Sala II of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment #2004-00671 of 9:20 a.m. on August 18). That Article 603, insofar as it provides “The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from when cause for separation arose or, as the case may be, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction became known.”, effectively blocks the late initiation of actions aimed at sanctioning or punishing faults, whether active or by omission. The brevity or fleetingness of the period is due to the need to give continuity to the employer-worker relationship; it is inspired by public order reasons linked to the heightened protection (tutela reforzada) that constitutionally receives the implicated fundamental rights (Title V, Social Rights and Guarantees (Derechos y garantías sociales), single chapter, articles 50 to 74), and that at the legal level, ordinary legislation develops through the protective principle underlying Article 17 of the Labor Code (CT), which mandates interpreting and applying norms in the sense most favorable to the worker (Cfr. Sala Constitucional, judgment #5969-93 of 3:21 p.m. on November 16, 1993, Considering I). Thus, those known faults that are not timely pursued must be considered forgiven. That is, if the disciplinary sanctioning power is not exercised within the legally established period, it is extinguished, perempted, or terminates. And if it were exercised in a timely manner, it is interrupted with a continued effect during the processing, instruction, or substantiation of the administrative procedure (procedimiento), and is born again from the moment when the person who must decide or resolve is in objective conditions to exercise the decision-making power (doctrine of articles 51 of the INA Autonomous Service Regulation of January 28, 1982 and its amendments, in relation to numerals 211 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, 164 of the Notarial Code, and 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República; judgment #2006-013926 cited supra).” (Case #11-003789-1027-CA).

In this case, the claim is reduced to a declaration of “the expiration (caducidad) of the State's right to initiate the dismissal action.” In the absence of a specific rule in the Ley General de Aduanas (Title X), and its supplementary legislation (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, Title III), the same one-month statute of limitations (prescripción) period must be applied to the expiration (caducidad), as a rule more favorable to the worker or public servant.

If someone who is aware of facts constituting misconduct committed by the worker or servant, and must adopt corrective disciplinary measures, does not act, the law necessarily intervenes as an instrument of social peace and legal certainty, blocking the untimely exercise of the disciplinary *action*. In this case, that time limit could not have run either, according to the recount of background facts set forth for the statute of limitations; the Customs <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración" w:st="on">Administration</st1:PersonName> acted in a timely manner, once it became aware of the fact.

**Fourth**: **On the substantive issues raised**. That as far as the merits of the matter are concerned, it is noted that the plaintiff in his complaint criticizes both the reason for and the content of the dismissal act; in his understanding, the fact that in the performance of his duties he reviewed customs declarations of the company “Agencias Marítimas <span class=SpellE>SRL</span>”, in which his wife appeared as the owner of the share capital, does not involve any anomaly or irregularity; he argues that this Agency is not the holder of the subjective rights involved in the customs declaration, being only a representative of the importer, who is ultimately the taxpayer; that <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Agencia" w:st="on">the Agency</st1:PersonName> neither gained nor lost money; he adds that calculation errors were found in only 2 of the 15 declarations investigated. In his oral conclusions he summarized his grievances as defects of form and substance of the act; of these he specified three. The Civil Service Tribunal, in its final resolution, # 11384 of September 22, 2009, endorsed by the Labor Tribunal, Section One, in its resolution #191 of June 29, 2010, accepted the attributed facts as true (proven facts c} and d}), that is, it accepted as proven the plaintiff's participation in the processing of <span class=SpellE>DUA'S</span> of said Agency; from which it concluded that he failed in his duties of office. This Court concludes that the arguments raised by the plaintiff lack sufficient driving force to overturn the challenged administrative acts.

**Fifth**: **Brief reference to the Customs Agent as an auxiliary of the Public Customs <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración Pública" w:st="on">Administration</st1:PersonName>**. That the Customs Agent is an auxiliary of the Public Customs <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración Pública" w:st="on">Administration</st1:PersonName>, a fundamental instrument and collaborator within the National Customs System, whose legal powers not only authorize him to act in the name and on behalf of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración" w:st="on">the Administration</st1:PersonName> but also to make decisions capable of determining the tax obligation and, therefore, capable of affecting tax collection; his work is subject to inalienable, immediate, subsequent, and permanent administrative controls (articles 22, 23, 24, 58, 59 and 86 <span class=SpellE>LGA</span>, in relation to 59 and 66 <span class=SpellE>LGAP</span>, and judgment <span class=SpellE>N°</span> 246-F-S1-2011 of 8:40 a.m. on March 10, 2011, First Chamber of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Corte Suprema" w:st="on">the Supreme Court</st1:PersonName> of Justice). The functions whose exercise <st1:PersonName ProductID="la LGA" w:st="on">the <span class=SpellE>LGA</span></st1:PersonName> entrusts to the Customs Agent are of special importance for the treasury; the trust that the legislator has placed in this public auxiliary demands performance in the manner that best satisfies the general interest, without errors, actions, or omissions that could endanger the customs system or cause harm. To guarantee the functioning of that system, by expelling conduct outside the law, <st1:PersonName ProductID="la LGA" w:st="on">the <span class=SpellE>LGA</span></st1:PersonName> incorporates a special Title regarding customs crimes, administrative and tax customs infractions with significant penalties or sanctions aimed at both preventing and punishing illicit acts that may occur.

**Sixth: On customs personnel**. That the public servant in general must perform his duties in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered, which shall prevail over the interest of the <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración" w:st="on">Administration</st1:PersonName> when they may be in conflict. That servant, when executing normative mandates or administrative directives, must do so with efficiency and effectiveness, with the purpose of guaranteeing the effective satisfaction of the general interest, based on an efficient use of institutional resources; so that the acts, facts, or omissions that through his fault or negligence cause unjustified or arbitrary obstacles or hindrances to the administered, constitute irregular performance of the position (articles 4 of the <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley" w:st="on">Law</st1:PersonName> on Administrative Procurement -<span class=SpellE>LCA</span>, 111, 113 and 114 of the <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">General Law</st1:PersonName> of Public Administration -<span class=SpellE>LGAP</span>). In the case “*of customs personnel*”, they are obligated to *know* and *apply* the legislation pertaining to customs activity; in the performance of their duties, they are personally responsible before the treasury for sums not received due to willful actions or omissions or gross negligence, without prejudice to the administrative and criminal responsibilities they may incur; their entry into the Service is achieved through occupational profiles according to what the position to be performed determines and documented knowledge; they enjoy an administrative career; they are subject to rotation, so that their services must be rendered in any unit, according to technical criteria; technical officials are subject to rendering services in different tasks within the same class of position, in order to guarantee comprehensive knowledge of customs operations (article 13 a to 21 <span class=SpellE>LGA</span>). This model of customs personnel requires having technical and legal knowledge; staying in one workplace does not prevent their internal mobility, the flow of personnel, according to the occupational needs of the System, based on considering it as a unitary whole and not as watertight compartments.

**Seventh**: That the demands emanating from the principle of probity, objectivity, transparency, or impartiality transcend circular or regulatory notes. These principles have a strong constitutional foundation, both in the norms and principles that guarantee access to public positions based on proven suitability and capacity (articles 191 and 192), and especially in the duty of accountability, control, and evaluation of results (article 11, according to the amendment introduced by Ley #8003 of June 8, 2000). Their legislative development is abundant, suffice it to cite <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley" w:st="on">the Law</st1:PersonName> against <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Corrupción" w:st="on">Corruption</st1:PersonName> and Illicit Enrichment in the <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Función Pública" w:st="on">Public Service</st1:PersonName>, #8422 of September 14, 2004, published in <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Gaceta" w:st="on">La Gaceta</st1:PersonName> #212 of October 29, 2004), whose article 3 contains the duty of probity; according to this, the public official is obligated to orient his management toward the satisfaction of the public interest; to identify and attend to the priority collective needs in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la República" w:st="on">the Republic</st1:PersonName>; to demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred on him by law; to ensure that the decisions he adopts in compliance with his attributions conform to impartiality and the objectives proper to the institution; to administer public resources in accordance with the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily. Infractions of this duty, duly proven and after prior defense, constitute just cause for separation from the public position without liability (article 4 <span class=SpellE>ibidem</span>). We are before norms of a very high ethical and moral content that aim for the public servant's conduct or actions to be an archetype of social behavior, of quality and efficiency in the provision of services, in the execution of the tasks entrusted; so that those conducts, actions, or omissions that, due to the way they are executed, their effects, or consequences, are harmful to the general interest, to the objectivity and impartiality that nourishes the Public <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración Pública." w:st="on">Administration</st1:PersonName>, must be expelled. How this principle was infringed or was deemed to have been infringed in the case at hand is a question we will address in the following lines.

**Eighth**: That in the specific case, the plaintiff is accused of not having demonstrated rectitude and good faith in the exercise of his customs powers of supervision and control of the <span class=SpellE>DUA'S</span>. It was proven that García Quirós, in the exercise of his position, reviewed fifteen customs declarations processed by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Agencia Marítima" w:st="on">Agencia Marítima</st1:PersonName> <span class=SpellE>SRL</span>, of which his wife <span class=SpellE>Lidiette</span> María Arias Córdoba, is a shareholder and manager with powers of generalísimo attorney-in-fact, with judicial and extrajudicial representation, and that in two there was a shortfall of uncollected taxes. How was the alleged legal injury configured? If, as expressed in previous paragraphs, the Customs Agent is an auxiliary of the public customs function, situated between <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración" w:st="on">the Administration</st1:PersonName> and the taxpayer, responsible for determining the customs tax obligation, fixing the amount of the tax debt, and the plaintiff, as a worker or servant of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Aduana" w:st="on">Customs</st1:PersonName>, was the one called to control and verify the correct exercise of the position by the former, it is evident that impartiality and rectitude prevented him from processing <span class=SpellE>DUA'S</span> of a Customs Agent where his wife appeared as its “owner.” Impediment, excuse, and recusal are the three procedural institutions that guarantee the impartiality of public servants; in the first, it is the law that distances the servant from the case; in the second, it is the party who removes him, and in the third, the withdrawal takes place by initiative of the official himself. These grounds were originally in <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley Orgánica" w:st="on">the Organic Law</st1:PersonName> of the Judicial Branch, which later moved to the Code of Civil Procedure -<span class=SpellE>CPC</span> (Ley #7130 of August 16, 1989); among the grounds for impediment of the public official are: hearing matters in which he has a direct interest, or in those that interest his spouse in the same manner (article 49, inciso 1 and 2 <span class=SpellE>CPC</span>). The point is not whether <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Agencia Marítima" w:st="on">Agencia Marítima</st1:PersonName> <span class=SpellE>SRL</span> is the owner of the goods or the taxpayer, whether it is the *party* in relation to <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración" w:st="on">the Administration</st1:PersonName>, nor even whether the benefits from the shortfall of taxes not collected by the State went to its coffers. The reproach lies in the fact that the plaintiff, knowing that his wife is the shareholder and manager with said powers of the Customs Agent, did not disqualify himself, recuse himself, or withdraw from processing the <span class=SpellE>DUA'S</span>. His participation under such conditions casts doubt on the principles of equality and impartiality or objectivity, as it is very possible, or nothing rules out, that a more expeditious, privileged, or accelerated treatment was dispensed compared to other Agents. As recorded on pages <st1:metricconverter ProductID="103 a" w:st="on">103 to</st1:metricconverter> 108, among the plaintiff's duties were reviewing the documentation presented by the Agents, in order to determine the corresponding tax obligation, rectify them, and determine the correct tariff classification, value, and amount of taxes. In a case like this, at its core, those duties and obligations were not correctly executed, as they should have been, or, conversely, were executed in a manner that generated tax shortfalls, and therefore, reasonable doubts regarding the rectitude and probity with which it was done. It is precisely these inconsistencies that demonstrate the seriousness of the misconduct incurred. It is not possible for someone who works for the treasury and has the responsibility of ensuring full compliance with the rules governing the matter, to intervene in cases in which his spouse has an interest. Hence, the attributed loss of objective confidence has been demonstrated and constituted on the basis of negligence or breach of the duty of care. The foregoing renders it unnecessary to determine the true classification of the corporate shares as community property, as an expectation and not as a subjective right, since, as stated, that is not the point on which the imputation of charges hinges.

**Ninth**: **On the principle of legality (tipicidad) in Administrative sanctioning law**. That the principle of legality (tipicidad), originating from Criminal Law and, more precisely, from the State's <span class=SpellE><i>ius</i></span> <span class=SpellE><i>puniendi</i></span>, is applied in the field of Administrative sanctioning law with certain nuances; its rigor is softened, constituting a more flexible and open catalog. <st1:PersonName ProductID="La Sala Constitucional" w:st="on">La Sala Constitucional</st1:PersonName> conceives it as follows:

“<span class=SpellE><b><i>III</i></b></span><b><i>. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME</i></b><i>. … In disciplinary law, due to the purpose it pursues, which is the protection of the general social order, and the matter it regulates, --discipline--, the determination of the disciplinary infraction is less demanding than the criminal sanction, since it includes acts that can be classified as a violation of the duties of office, which in some legislations are not specified, and, in others, they are. So, the exercise of this power is discretionary, hence it is appropriate to apply sanctions for any breach of functional duties, without the need for them to be specifically detailed as a sanctionable act, for which reason, the enumeration of punishable acts made by regulation is not limitative. Motivated by the variety of causes that can generate its application, by the frequent imprecision of its precepts, and by the sphere of application, it is not always organic nor clear in literal expression, which is why breaches not specifically foreseen, but understood to be included in the text, may be sanctioned discretionally, as long as they result from the verification of the disciplinary infraction, through a procedure created for this purpose. The disciplinary infraction or misconduct has been defined as a violation of any duty inherent to one's condition, even if it has not been specially defined though foreseen. The determining facts of disciplinary infractions are innumerable, as they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of the "subordinate" subjects, behaviors or conducts that are truly unlimited in number given their variety; therefore, the existence of three elements of disciplinary infraction is deduced: 1.- a material element: which is an act or an omission; 2.- a moral element: which is the imputation of the act to a free will; and 3.- a formal element: which is the disturbance to the functioning of the service or immediate or possible affectation of its effectiveness</i>.” (Judgment #5594-94 of 3:48 p.m. on September 27, 1994).

In the case <span class=SpellE>subjudice</span>, the attributed misconduct is provided for in <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley" w:st="on">the Law</st1:PersonName> #8422, articles 3, 4, 38 and 41, fundamentally. So the alleged lack of legality (tipicidad) is not acceptable.

**Tenth**: That the defects of form attributed to the act do not have the significance or the consequences claimed. Apart from the fact that this report <span class=SpellE>DGH</span>-<span class=SpellE>TH</span>-006-08-D/02-03 does contain the signature of the official in charge of the case and an approval (visto bueno) of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Dirección General" w:st="on">the Dirección General</st1:PersonName> de Hacienda, as recorded and as <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Procuraduría" w:st="on">the Procuraduría</st1:PersonName> alleges, the truth is that this irregularity is not of the type that causes defenselessness and, consequently, of the type that generates absolute nullity, according to article 223 <span class=SpellE>LGAP</span>. The statement of charges is duly reasoned; the plaintiff had ample opportunity to exercise his defense before <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Dirección General" w:st="on">the Dirección General</st1:PersonName> de Servicio Civil. And during the preparation of that report, there was no reason to grant him a hearing and procedural participation, as it is clear that it was a matter of documenting the evidence necessary for the subsequent opening of the administrative procedure, as indeed occurred. In the presence of a preliminary investigation, the party exercises its defense in the procedure, just as happened.

**Eleventh**: **Conclusions and exceptions**: That ultimately the Court concludes that the grievances alleged by the plaintiff have not occurred. There is no merit to annul the challenged acts. The administrative conduct has developed with juridical regularity; the misconduct attributed, on grounds of negligence, has been demonstrated; facts occurred that cast doubt on the objective and impartial performance of the plaintiff, all of which leads to dismissing the complaint in all its aspects, as well as the exceptions of payment and lack of current interest, and admitting the exception of lack of right.

Although the plaintiff has expressed disagreement with the classification and grading of the offense, since in his understanding dismissal should not have been applied but rather a reprimand, given that intent was not proven, the fact is that he did not bring any claim in that regard, so addressing the issue serves no purpose."</span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> </div> </body> </html> In the case of "customs personnel," they are obligated to know and apply the legislation pertaining to customs activity; in the performance of their duties, they are personally liable to the treasury for sums it fails to collect due to willful actions or omissions or gross negligence (culpa grave), without prejudice to the administrative and criminal liabilities they may incur; their entry into the Service is achieved through occupational profiles as determined by the position to be filled and documented knowledge; they enjoy an administrative career; they are subject to rotation, such that their services must be rendered at any office, according to technical criteria; technical officials are subject to rendering services in different tasks within the same job class, in order to guarantee comprehensive knowledge of customs operations (articles 13 to 21 LGA). This customs personnel model requires knowledge in technical and legal matters; presence in a workplace does not prevent internal mobility, personnel flows, according to the System's occupational needs, based on considering it as a unified whole and not as watertight compartments.

**Seventh:** That the demands emanating from the principle of probity, objectivity, transparency, or impartiality transcend circular notes or regulations. These principles have strong constitutional roots, both in the norms and principles that guarantee access to public positions based on proven suitability and capacity (articles 191 and 192), and especially in the duty of accountability, control, and evaluation of results (article 11, as amended by Ley 8003 of June 8, 2000). Its legislative development is abundant, it suffices to cite the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, #8422 of September 14, 2004, published in La Gaceta #212 of October 29, 2004), whose article 3 encompasses the duty of probity; according to this, the public official is obligated to orient their management toward the satisfaction of the public interest; to identify and address priority collective needs in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; to demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; to ensure that the decisions they adopt in fulfillment of their duties conform to impartiality and the institution's own objectives; to administer public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily. Infractions of this duty, duly proven and after defense, constitute just cause for separation from public office without liability for the employer (article 4 ibidem). We are faced with norms of the highest ethical and moral content that tend to make the public servant’s actions or conduct a model of social behavior, of quality and efficiency in the provision of services, in the execution of entrusted tasks; such that those conducts, actions, or omissions that, by the manner in which they are executed, by their effects or consequences, prove harmful to the general interest, to the objectivity and impartiality that nourishes the Public Administration, must be expelled. How this principle was infringed or deemed infringed in the case at hand is a matter we will address in the following lines.

**Eighth:** That in the specific case, the plaintiff is accused of not having demonstrated rectitude and good faith in the exercise of his customs powers of supervision and control of the DUAs. It was demonstrated that García Quirós, in the exercise of his duties, reviewed fifteen customs declarations processed by the Agencia Marítima SRL, of which his wife, Lidiette María Arias Córdoba, is a shareholder and manager with the powers of a generalísimo legal representative, with judicial and extrajudicial representation, and that in two cases, a shortfall of uncollected taxes was incurred. How was the attributed legal harm configured? If, as expressed in previous paragraphs, the Customs Agent is an auxiliary of the public customs function situated between the Administration and the taxpayer, tasked with determining the customs tax obligation, setting the amount of the tax debt, and the plaintiff, as a worker or servant of the Customs Office, was the one called to control and verify the correct exercise of the duty by the former, it is evident that impartiality and rectitude prevented him from processing DUAs of a Customs Agent in which his wife appeared as its "owner." The disqualification (impedimento), the excuse (excusa), and the recusal (recusación) are the three procedural institutes that guarantee the impartiality of public servants; in the first, it is the law that removes the servant from the case; in the second, it is the party who separates them; and in the third, the withdrawal occurs on the initiative of the official himself. These grounds were originally in the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, which later passed to the Código Procesal Civil (Civil Procedure Code, CPC) (Ley #7130 of August 16, 1989); among the grounds for disqualification (impedimento) of the public official are: hearing matters in which they have a direct interest, or in which their spouse is interested in the same manner (article 49, subsections 1 and 2 CPC). The point is not whether the Agencia Marítima SRL is the owner of the goods or the taxpayer, whether it is the party before the Administration, nor whether the benefits of the tax shortfall uncollected by the State ended up in its coffers. The reproach lies in that the plaintiff, knowing that his wife is the shareholder and manager with the stated powers of the Customs Agent, did not recuse himself (inhibió), separate, or withdraw from processing the DUAs. His participation in such conditions casts doubt on the principles of equality and impartiality or objectivity, for it is very possible, or nothing excludes, that more expeditious, privileged, or accelerated treatment was dispensed to it, relative to the other Agents. As recorded on pages 103 to 108, among the plaintiff’s duties were those of reviewing the documentation submitted by the Agents, in order to determine the corresponding tax obligation, correct them, and determine the correct tariff classification, value, and amount of taxes. In a case like this, at its core, those duties and obligations were not executed correctly, as was proper, or, stated inversely, they were executed in a manner that generated tax shortfalls, and therefore, reasonable doubts regarding the rectitude and probity with which it was done. It is precisely these inconsistencies that demonstrate the seriousness of the misconduct incurred. It is not possible for someone who works for the treasury and has the responsibility to ensure full compliance with the rules governing the matter to intervene in cases in which their spouse has an interest. Hence, the attributed loss of objective confidence has been demonstrated and configured as negligence (negligencia) or breach of the duty of care. The foregoing makes it pointless to determine the true classification of the corporate shares as community property (bien ganancial), as an expectation and not as a subjective right, for as stated, that is not the point on which the imputation of charges pivots.

**Ninth: On the principle of specificity (tipicidad) in Administrative sanctioning law.** That the principle of specificity (tipicidad), derived from criminal law and, more exactly, from the State's ius puniendi, is applied in the realm of administrative sanctioning law with certain nuances; its rigor is softened, constituting a more flexible and open catalog. The Sala Constitucional conceives it as follows:

"**III. THE PRINCIPLE OF SPECIFICITY (TIPICIDAD) IN THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME.** … In disciplinary law, given the purpose it pursues, which is the protection of the general social order, and the subject matter it regulates, --discipline--, the determination of the disciplinary infraction is less demanding than the criminal sanction, since it includes acts that can be classified as a violation of the duties of the office, which in some legislations are not specified, and in others, are. Thus, the exercise of this power is discretionary, hence it is appropriate to apply sanctions for any breach of functional duties, without needing them to be specifically detailed as a sanctionable act, for which reason the enumeration of punishable acts made through regulations is not of a limitative nature. Motivated by the variety of causes that may generate its application, by the frequent imprecision of its precepts, and by the sphere of application, it is not always organic nor clear in literal expression, reason for which discretional sanctions can be applied for misconduct not specifically foreseen, but which are understood to be included in the text, as long as they result from the verification of the disciplinary misconduct, through a procedure created for that purpose. The disciplinary misconduct or infraction has been defined as a violation of the functioning of any duty proper to their condition, even if it has not been specifically defined, although it is foreseen. The acts determining disciplinary misconduct are innumerable, as they depend on the nature of the behavior or conduct of the 'subordinate' subjects, behavior or conduct that are truly unlimited in number given their variety; therefore, the existence of three elements of disciplinary misconduct is deduced: 1.- a material element: which is an act or an omission; 2.- a moral element: which is the imputation of the act to a free will; and 3.- a formal element: which is the disturbance to the functioning of the service or immediate or possible affection of its efficacy." (Judgment #5594-94 of 3:48 p.m. on September 27, 1994).

In the subjudice case, the attributed misconduct is foreseen in Ley #8422, articles 3, 4, 38, and 41, fundamentally. Consequently, the alleged lack of specificity (tipicidad) is not acceptable.

**Tenth:** That the procedural defects or formal flaws attributed to the action have neither the significance nor the consequences claimed. Aside from the fact that this report DGH-TH-006-08-D/02-03 does contain the signature of the official in charge of the case and the approval (visto bueno) of the Dirección General de Hacienda, as is recorded and as the Procuraduría alleges, the truth is that this irregularity is not of the kind that causes defenselessness (indefensión) and, consequently, of those generating absolute nullity, according to article 223 LGAP. The notification of charges (traslado de cargos) is duly grounded; the plaintiff had ample opportunity to exercise his defense before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil. And during the preparation of that report, there was no reason to grant him a hearing and procedural participation, as it is clear that it involved documenting the evidence necessary for the subsequent opening of the administrative procedure, as indeed occurred. In the presence of a preliminary investigation, the party exercises their defense in the procedure, just as happened.

**Eleventh: Conclusions and exceptions:** That definitively, the Tribunal concludes that the injuries alleged by the plaintiff have not occurred. There is no merit to annul the challenged acts. The administrative conduct has developed with legal regularity; the attributed misconduct, as negligence (negligencia), has been demonstrated; there were facts that cast doubt on the objective and impartial performance of the plaintiff, all of which leads to dismissing the lawsuit in all its aspects, as well as the exceptions of payment and lack of current interest, admitting the exception of lack of right. Although the plaintiff has expressed disagreement with the classification and grading of the misconduct, since in his understanding, dismissal (despido) should not have been applied but rather a reprimand (amonestación), given that willful intent (dolo) was not proven, the truth is that he did not bring any claim in that regard, so there is no utility in addressing the topic."

“Tercero: Que desde el escrito inicial de demanda, la parte actora viene alegando violación al plazo de un mes previsto en el artículo 603 CT, para el ejercicio de la potestad sancionadora disciplinaria en cabeza del patrono contra su subordinado. Como bien se comprende, en materia disciplinaria en general hay al menos tres plazos identificables en el actuar de la Administración; un plazo inicial para abrir la investigación desde que se tiene conocimiento del hecho o falta; otro para instruir, substanciar o tramitar el procedimiento respectivo, y otro para imponer la sanción y su ejecución (Cfr. Sala Constitucional, sentencia 2006-13926 de 14.44 horas de 20 de septiembre de 2006, considerando VII, y Sala II de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia #2004-00671 de 9.20 horas de 18 de agosto). Ese artículo 603 en cuanto dispone “Los derechos y acciones de los patronos para despedir justificadamente a los trabajadores o para disciplinar sus faltas prescriben en un mes, que comenzará a correr desde que se dio causa para la separación o, en su caso, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria.”, efectivamente bloquea el paso al inicio tardío de acciones encaminadas a sancionar o castigar faltas, activas u omisivas. La brevedad o fugacidad del plazo obedece a la necesidad de darle continuidad a la relación obrero patronal; se inspira en razones de orden público vinculadas a la tutela reforzada que constitucionalmente reciben los derechos fundamentales implicados (Título V, Derechos y garantías sociales, capítulo único , artículos 50 a 74), y que a nivel legal desarrolla la legislación ordinaria a través del principio protector que subyace en el artículo 17 CT que obliga a interpretar y aplicar las normas en el sentido más favorable al trabajador (Cfr. Sala Constitucional, sentencia #5969-93 de 15.21 horas de 16 de noviembre de 1993, considerando I). De modo que aquellas faltas conocidas que no sean oportunamente perseguidas han de tenerse como perdonadas. Es decir, si la potestad sancionadora disciplinaria no se ejercita dentro del plazo legalmente establecido, se extingue, perime o fenece. Y si se ejerciera oportunamente, se interrumpe con efecto continuado durante la tramitación, instrucción o substanciación del procedimiento, y vuelve a nacer a partir de que, quien deba decidir o resolver, esté en condiciones objetivas de ejercer la potestad decisoria (doctrina de los artículos 51 del Reglamento Autónomo de Servicio del INA de 28 de enero de 1982 y sus reformas, en relación con los numerales 211 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, 164 del Código Notarial, y 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República; sentencia #2006-013926 supra citada).” (Caso #11-003789-1027-CA).

En el caso, la pretensión se reduce a que se declare “la caducidad del derecho del Estado para iniciar la acción de despido”. En ausencia de norma específica en la Ley General de Aduanas (Título X), y su legislación supletoria (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, Título III), debe aplicarse el mismo plazo de prescripción del mes, a la caducidad, en cuanto norma más favorable para el trabajador o servidor público. Si quien tiene conocimiento de hechos constitutivos de faltas cometidas por el trabajador o servidor, y debe adoptar las medidas correctivas disciplinarias, no actúa, necesariamente el derecho interviene como instrumento de paz social y seguridad jurídica, bloqueando el ejercicio tardío de la acción disciplinaria. En este caso ese plazo tampoco pudo operarse, según el recuento de antecedentes expuestos para la prescripción; la Administración aduanera actúo oportunamente, una vez que tuvo conocimiento del hecho.

Cuarto: Sobre las cuestiones de fondo planteadas. Que por lo que al fondo del asunto concierne, se advierte que el actor en su demanda critica tanto el motivo como el contenido del acto de despido; a su entender, el hecho de que en cumplimiento de sus labores revisara declaraciones aduaneras de la empresa “Agencias Marítimas SRL”, en la que figuraba su esposa como dueña del capital accionario, no envuelve ninguna anomalía o irregularidad; aduce que esa Agencia no es titular de los derechos subjetivos implicados en la declaración aduanera, siendo solo un representante del importador, quien es en definitiva el sujeto pasivo del arancel; que la Agencia no ganaba ni perdía dinero; agrega que solo en 2 de 15 declaraciones investigadas se encontraron errores de cálculo. En sus conclusiones orales resumió sus agravios en vicios de forma y fondo del acto; de estos puntualizó tres. El Tribunal de Servicio Civil, en su resolución final, # 11384 de 22 de septiembre de 2009, prohijada por el Tribunal de Trabajo, Sección Primera, en su resolución #191 de 29 de junio de 2010, tuvo por cierto los hechos atribuidos (hechos demostrados c} y d}), es decir, tuvo por demostrada la participación del actor en la tramitación de DUA'S de dicha Agencia; de donde concluyó que faltó a los deberes del cargo. Este Tribunal concluye que los alegatos planteados por la parte actora, no tienen la suficiente fuerza motriz para remover los actos administrativos impugnados.

Quinto: Somera referencia al Agente Aduanero como auxiliar de la Administración Pública Aduanera. Que el Agente Aduanero es un auxiliar de la Administración Pública Aduanera, instrumento y colaborador fundamental dentro del Sistema Aduanero Nacional, cuyas competencias legales no solo lo facultan para actuar en nombre y representación de la Administración sino para adoptar decisiones capaces de determinar la obligación tributaria y, por tanto, capaces de incidir en la recaudación fiscal; sobre su labor pesan controles administrativos irrenunciables, inmediatos, posteriores y permanentes (artículos 22, 23, 24, 58, 59 y 86 LGA, en relación con el 59 y 66 LGAP, y sentencia N° 246-F-S1-2011 de 8.40 horas de 10 de marzo del2011, Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Las funciones cuyo ejercicio la LGA encomienda al Agente Aduanero, son de una especial trascendencia para el fisco; la confianza que el legislador ha depositado en este auxiliar público, imponen desempeñarse del modo que mejor satisfaga el interés general, sin errores, acciones u omisiones que puedan poner en peligro el sistema aduanero o que causen perjuicio. Para garantizar el funcionamiento de ese sistema, expulsando conductas al margen de la legalidad, la LGA incorpora un Título especial relativo a los delitos aduaneros, las infracciones administrativas y tributarias aduaneras con penas o sanciones importantes dirigidas tanto a prevenir como a castigar los ilícitos que pudieran darse.

Sexto: Sobre el personal aduanero. Que el servidor público en general debe desempeñar sus funciones del modo que satisfagan primordialmente el interés público, considerado como la expresión de los intereses individuales coincidentes de los administrados, el cual prevalecerá sobre el interés de la Administración cuando pudieren estar en conflicto. Ese servidor, al ejecutar los mandatos normativos o las directivas administrativas, debe hacerlo con eficiencia y eficacia, con el propósito de garantizar la efectiva satisfacción del interés general, a partir de un uso eficiente de los recursos institucionales; de modo que los actos, hechos u omisiones que por su culpa o negligencia ocasionen trabas u obstáculos injustificados o arbitrarios a los administrados, configuran desempeño irregular del cargo (artículos 4º de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa -LCA, 111, 113 y 114 de la Ley General de Administración Pública -LGAP). En el caso “del personal aduanero”, está obligado a conocer y aplicar la legislación atinente a la actividad aduanera; en el desempeño del cargo, son personalmente responsables ante el fisco por las sumas que deje de percibir por acciones u omisiones dolosas o por culpa grave, sin perjuicio de las responsabilidades de carácter administrativo y penal en que incurran; su ingreso al Servicio se logra a través de perfiles ocupacionales según lo determine el puesto a desempeñar y los conocimientos documentales; gozan de una carrera administrativa; están sujetos a rotación, de modo que sus servicios habrán de prestarlos en cualquier dependencia, según criterios técnicos; los funcionarios técnicos están sujetos a prestar servicios en diferentes tareas dentro de la misma clase de puesto, a fin de garantizar el conocimiento integral de las operaciones aduaneras (artículo 13 a 21 LGA). Este modelo de personal aduanero, exige tener conocimientos en materia técnica y legal; la estancia en un centro de trabajo, no impide su movilidad interna, los flujos de personal, según las necesidades ocupacionales del Sistema, a partir de la consideración de éste como un todo unitario y no como compartimentos estanco.

Sétimo: Que las exigencias que emanan del principio de probidad, objetividad, transparencia o imparcialidad, trasciende las notas circulares o reglamentarias. Esos principios tienen una fuerte raigambre constitucional, tanto en las normas y principios que garantizan el acceso a los cargos públicos a partir de la idoneidad y capacidad comprobada (artículo 191 y 192), como especialmente en el deber de rendición de cuentas, control y evaluación de resultados (artículo 11, según reforma introducida por Ley #8003 de 8 de junio del 2000). Su desarrollo legislativo es abundante, bastando citar la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, #8422 de 14 de septiembre de 2004, publicada en la Gaceta #212 de 29 de octubre de 2004), cuyo artículo 3º alberga el deber de probidad; con arreglo a éste, el funcionario público está obligado a orientar su gestión a la satisfacción del interés público; a identificar y atender las necesidades colectivas prioritarias de manera planificada, regular, eficiente, continua y en condiciones de igualdad para los habitantes de la República; a demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley; asegurarse de que las decisiones que adopte en cumplimiento de sus atribuciones se ajustan a la imparcialidad y a los objetivos propios de la institución; a administrar los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad, eficacia, economía y eficiencia, rindiendo cuentas satisfactoriamente. Las infracciones a este deber, debidamente comprobadas y previa defensa, constituyen justa causa para la separación del cargo público sin responsabilidad (artículo 4º ibídem). Se está frente a normas de un altísimo contenido ético y moral que propenden a que las actuaciones o acciones del servidor público sean arquetipo de conducta social, de calidad y eficiencia en la prestación de los servicios, en la ejecución de las tareas encomendadas; de modo que ha de expulsarse aquellas conductas, acciones u omisiones que por la forma en que se ejecutan, por sus efectos o consecuencias, resulten lesivas del interés general, de la objetividad e imparcialidad que nutre a la Administración Pública. Cómo se infringió o se tuvo por infringido este principio en el caso a que se contrae este asunto, es cuestión que abordaremos en líneas siguientes.

Octavo: Que en el caso concreto, se atribuye al actor no haber demostrado rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de sus potestades aduaneras de fiscalización y control de las DUA'S. Se tuvo por demostrado que García Quirós, en ejercicio del cargo, revisó quince declaraciones aduaneras tramitadas por la Agencia Marítima SRL, de la que su esposa Lidiette María Arias Córdoba, es accionista y gerente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo, con la representación judicial y extrajudicial, y que en dos se incurrió en faltante de los impuestos dejados de percibir. ¿Cómo se configuró la lesión legal atribuida? Si conforme se expresó en párrafos anteriores, el Agente de Aduanas, es un auxiliar de la función pública aduanera situado entre la Administración y el sujeto pasivo, encargado de determinar la obligación tributaria aduanera, fijando la cuantía del adeudo tributario, y el actor como trabajador o servidor de la Aduana, era el llamado a controlar y verificar el correcto ejercicio del cargo por parte del aquel, es evidente que la imparcialidad y rectitud le impedían tramitar DUA'S de un Agente Aduanero en el que su esposa figuraba como “dueña” de éste. El impedimento, la excusa y la recusación, son los tres institutos procesales que garantizan la imparcialidad de los servidores públicos; en el primero, es la ley quien aleja al servidor del caso; en el segundo es la parte quien lo separa, y en el tercero, el apartamiento tiene lugar por iniciativa del propio funcionario. Esas causales estaban originalmente en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, las que luego pasaron al Código Procesal Civil -CPC (Ley #7130 de 16 de agosto de 1989); entre las causales de impedimento del funcionario público están: conocer asuntos en que tenga interés directo, o en los que interesen de la misma manera a su cónyuge (artículo 49, inciso 1 y 2 CPC). El punto no está en si la Agencia Marítima SRL es la dueña de las mercancías o el sujeto pasivo, si es ella la parte frente a la Administración, cuanto tampoco en si los beneficios del faltante de impuestos dejados de percibir por el Estado, fueron a dar a sus arcas. El reproche está en que conociendo el actor que su esposa es la accionista y gerente con las facultades dichas del Agente Aduanero, no se inhibió, separó o apartó de tramitar las DUA'S. Su participación en tales condiciones, ponen en duda los principios de igualdad e imparcialidad u objetividad, pues es muy posible o nada excluye que se dispensara un trato más expedito, privilegiado o acelerado, respecto de los demás Agentes. Según consta a folios 103 a 108, entre las funciones que tenía el actor estaban las de revisar la documentación que presentaran los Agentes, con el fin de determinar la obligación tributaria correspondiente, rectificarlas, determinar la correcta clasificación arancelaria, el valor y el monto de los tributos. En un caso como este, en el fondo, esos deberes y obligaciones no fueron ejecutados correctamente, tal cual correspondía, o, dicho en sentido inverso, fueron ejecutados de manera que generaron faltantes de impuestos, y por ende, dudas razonables respecto de la rectitud y probidad con que se hizo. Es precisamente esas inconsistencias las que demuestran la gravedad de la falta incurrida. No es posible que quien labora para el fisco y tiene la responsabilidad de velar por el cabal cumplimiento de las normas que rigen la materia, intervenga en casos en los que su esposa tiene interés. De ahí que la pérdida de confianza objetiva atribuida, se ha demostrado y configurado a título de negligencia o falta al deber de cuidado. Lo expuesto hace inane determinar la verdadera calificación de las acciones societarias como un bien ganancial, como una punto sobre el que bascula la imputación de cargos.

Noveno: Sobre el principio de tipicidad en el Derecho administrativo sancionador. Que el principio de tipicidad, tributario del Derecho penal y, más exactamente, del ius puniendi del Estado, se aplica en el ámbito del Derecho administrativo sancionador con ciertos matices; su rigor se ablanda, constituyendo un catálogo más flexible y abierto. La Sala Constitucional lo concibe así:

“III. EL PRINCIPIO DE TIPICIDAD EN EL REGIMEN DISCIPLINARIO. … En el derecho disciplinario, en razón del fin que persigue, cual es la protección del orden social general, y de la materia que regula, --la disciplina-, la determinación de la infracción disciplinaria es menos exigente que la sanción penal, ya que comprende hechos que pueden ser calificados como violación de los deberes del funcionamiento, que en algunas legislaciones no están especificados, y, en otras, sí. De manera que, el ejercicio de este poder es discrecional, de allí que proceda aplicar sanciones por cualquier falta a los deberes funcionales, sin necesidad de que estén detalladas concretamente como hecho sancionatorio, por lo cual, la enumeración que de los hechos punibles se haga vía reglamentaria no tiene carácter limitativo. Motivado en la variedad de causas que pueden generar su aplicación, en la imprecisión frecuente de sus preceptos y en la esfera de aplicación, no siempre es orgánico ni claro en la expresión literal, razón por la cual puede sancionarse discrecionalmente las faltas no previstas concretamente, pero que se entienden incluidas en el texto, siempre y cuando resulten de la comprobación de la falta disciplinaria, mediante un procedimiento creado al efecto. La falta o infracción disciplinaria se ha definido diciendo que es una violación al funcionamiento de cualquier deber propio de su condición, aún cuando no haya sido especialmente definida aunque si prevista. Los hechos determinantes de las faltas disciplinarias son innumerables, pues dependen de la índole de los comportamientos o conductas de los sujetos "subordinados", comportamientos o conductas en verdad ilimitados en número dada su variedad; por ello se deduce la existencia de tres elementos de la falta disciplinaria: 1.- un elemento material: que es un acto o una omisión; 2.- un elemento moral: que es la imputación del acto a una voluntad libre; y 3.- un elemento formal: que es la perturbación al funcionamiento del servicio o afección inmediata o posible de su eficacia.” (Sentencia #5594-94 de 15.48 horas de 27 de septiembre de 1994).

En el caso subjudice, la falta atribuida, está prevista en la Ley #8422, artículos 3, 4, 38 y 41, fundamentalmente. De suerte tal que la tipicidad aducida, no es de aceptación.

Décimo: Que los vicios o defectos de forma que se atribuyen al acto, no tienen ni la trascendencia ni las consecuencias que se afirma. Aparte de que ese informe DGH-TH-006-08-D/02-03, si contiene la firma del funcionario a cargo del caso y un visto bueno de la Dirección General de Hacienda, como consta y lo alega la Procuraduría, es lo cierto que esa irregularidad no es de las que producen indefensión y en consecuencia, de las que generan nulidad absoluta, según el artículo 223 LGAP. El traslado de cargos está debidamente fundamento; el actor tuvo amplia oportunidad para ejercer su defensa ante la Dirección General de Servicio Civil. Y durante la elaboración de ese informe, no había porqué darle audiencia y participación procesal, pues está claro que se trataba de documentar la evidencia necesaria para la posterior apertura del procedimiento administrativo, como en efecto ocurrió. En presencia de una investigación preliminar, la parte ejerce su defensa en el procedimiento, tal cual aconteció.

Décimo Primero: Conclusiones y excepciones: Que en definitiva el Tribunal concluye que los quebrantos aducidos por la parte actora, no se han producido. No hay mérito para anular los actos impugnados. La conducta administrativa se ha desarrollado con regularidad jurídica; la falta atribuida, a título de negligencia, ha sido demostrada; mediaron hechos que ponen en duda el objetivo e imparcial desempeño del actor, todo lo cual conduce a desechar la demanda en todos sus extremos, lo mismo que las excepciones de pago y falta de interés actual, admitiéndose la de falta de derecho. Aunque el actor ha manifestado inconformidad con la calificación y graduación de la falta, pues a su entender no debió aplicarse el despido sino una amonestación, dado que no se probó el dolo, lo cierto es que no dedujo ninguna pretensión en ese sentido, por lo que no tiene utilidad alguna ocuparse del tema.”