Joint liability of ICE and contractor for electric shock during telephone line installationResponsabilidad solidaria del ICE y contratista por descarga eléctrica en instalación telefónica

V.- Regarding the liability of the Public Administration in general: The duty to compensate all damages and losses originating from the conduct and omissions of the Public Administration finds its own specificity in our country, beginning with the Political Constitution of 1949. In that normative body, the existence of a contentious-administrative jurisdiction was established, as part of the fundamental rights enjoyed by all Costa Rican citizens. In this sense, its Article 49, with the reforms subsequently introduced, provides the following: "The contentious-administrative jurisdiction is established as an attribution of the Judicial Power, with the purpose of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and all other public-law entities. Abuse of power shall be grounds for challenging administrative acts. The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered parties." This rule must be complemented by the provisions of Articles 9 and 41 of our Magna Carta, as they state: "The Government of the Republic is popular, representative, participatory, alternative, and responsible. It is exercised by the people and three distinct and independent Powers." (Our emphasis) and "By resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice, without denial and in strict accordance with the laws." Regarding the constitutional basis of State liability, the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber, No. 5207-2004, of 14:55 on May 18, 2004, literally indicated: "Our Political Constitution does not explicitly enshrine the principle of the patrimonial liability of public administrations for the unlawful injuries that, in the exercise of the administrative function, they cause to the administered parties. However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution, and can be inferred from a systematic and contextual interpretation of several constitutional precepts, principles, and values. Indeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Charter provides that 'The Government of the Republic is (…) responsible (…)', thereby establishing the liability of the larger public entity or State and its various organs—Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Power. Number 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the '(…) criminal liability (…)' of public officials, and the second paragraph refers us to the '(…) personal liability for officials in the fulfillment of their duties (…)'. Article 34 of the Political Constitution protects 'acquired patrimonial rights' and 'consolidated legal situations', which can only be effectively and truly protected with a broad-spectrum administrative liability system without immune or exempt zones when they are violated by public administrations in the deployment of their public operations or performance. Number 41 ibidem, establishes that 'By resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests (…)', this precept imposes the duty on the author and responsible party for the damage to compensate the unlawful injuries actually suffered by the administered parties as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through positive conduct by action or negative conduct by omission of public entities, thus becoming the cornerstone at the constitutional level for the legislative development of a strict, objective liability system in which compensation does not depend on the moral and subjective reproach of the public official's conduct for willful misconduct (dolo) or negligence (culpa), but solely and exclusively, on having inflicted or actually received '(…) injuries or damages (…) in their person, property, or moral interests (…)', that is, an unlawful injury which they have no duty to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. Number 41 of the Political Constitution establishes a fundamental compensatory right in favor of the administered party who has suffered an unlawful injury by an entity—through its normal or abnormal operation or its lawful or unlawful conduct—and the correlative obligation of the latter to compensate or repair it in full; the access to jurisdiction provided for in this same constitutional precept becomes, thereby, an instrumental right to forcibly ensure the enjoyment and exercise of the compensatory right of the injured party when the party obligated to make reparation voluntarily breaches the referenced obligation. Article 45 of the Magna Carta embraces the principle of the inviolability of property by providing that 'Property is inviolable; no one may be deprived of their own except for legally proven public interest, with prior compensation according to the law (…)', recognizing, in this way, in the fundamental text that the special sacrifices or singular burdens that the administered party has no duty to bear or tolerate, even if they arise from a lawful activity—such as the exercise of expropriation power—must be compensated. Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution, insofar as it implicitly recognizes the legal personality and, consequently, the possibility of suing public entities in court, when they breach their obligations, constitutes a clear foundation of administrative liability. For its part, the final paragraph of the aforementioned number 49 provides that 'The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered parties', being that one of the main forms of guaranteeing these is an objective, direct, broad, and complete administrative liability regime. The final paragraph of Article 50 of the Political Constitution, regarding environmental damage, establishes that 'The law shall determine the corresponding liabilities and sanctions', a liability regime from which, obviously, public economic entities (called public enterprises-public entity) and public enterprises (also called public enterprises-private law entity) cannot abstain when they pollute while deploying an industrial, commercial, or service activity, and, in general, the State when it breaches its obligations of defense and preservation of the environment through deficient supervision or control activities of public and private activities that are actually or potentially polluting. In the case of the members of the Boards of Directors of Autonomous Institutions, Article 188 of the fundamental norm provides that 'Their directors are responsible for their management.' Regarding the Executive Power, Title X of the constitutional text contains a Chapter V whose heading is 'Responsibilities of those who exercise the Executive Power', with Article 148 enshrining the responsibility of the President for the 'use he makes of those powers which according to this Constitution correspond to him exclusively', the joint responsibility of the latter with the respective Minister of the sector 'regarding the exercise of the powers that this Constitution grants to both'—which is specified by Article 149 ibidem—and that of the Government Council for the decisions it adopts. The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (Articles 18 and 33) which prevents imposing on the administered parties a singular or special burden or sacrifice that they have no duty to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or more administered parties and unjustly borne by them. Finally, it is necessary to consider that the Political Constitution includes an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered parties to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of numbers, interpreted, a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the fundamental Law as they contain, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as 'proper functioning of administrative services and offices', 'smooth running of the Government', and 'efficiency of the administration'. This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services efficiently and effectively and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when that constitutional guarantee is violated. In this way, it is evident that the original constituent implicitly included the principle of the liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter to interpret, apply, integrate, and delimit the entire legal system. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for an unlawful injury that its normal or abnormal operation or its lawful or unlawful conduct causes to the patrimonial and non-patrimonial sphere of the administered parties." (the emphasis is ours)." From the foregoing, it is evident that a duty of full compensability for damage operates, which, based on the indicated provisions, derives from Article 190.1 of the General Public Administration Law, as it provides that: "1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its lawful or unlawful, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure (fuerza mayor), fault of the victim, or act of a third party." As noted, a strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) regime prevails in our country, through which the Administration's duty to indemnify operates, independently of subjective evaluation criteria (willful misconduct or negligence), in the actions of its servants. On the other hand, our legislation even foresees the possibility of claiming liability from the Administration, on the grounds of lawful conduct, as Article 194 of the aforementioned normative body provides in this regard, the following:

"1. The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and for its normal operation when the same cause damage to the rights of the administered party in a special manner, due to the small proportion of affected persons or the exceptional intensity of the injury." By reason of the foregoing, as noted, the central axis of the state liability system in our country is the victim of damage, since that liability arises, provided that its normal or abnormal operation causes damage that the victim has no duty to bear, whether patrimonial or non-patrimonial, independently of their subjective legal situation. However, this compensatory duty is not fully plenary either, in the sense of being unrestricted for any type of damage, but rather it must originate, in the case that it originates from an unlawful or abnormal administrative conduct, from the abnormality that means departing from good administration (in accordance with the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102, subsection d., which among other things includes efficacy and efficiency) or that is, due to a malfunction, a delayed action, or the non-existence thereof, on the part of the Administration. This abnormality will determine unlawfulness (antijuricidad) as a prerequisite for the compensability of the damage. In the case of lawful operation of the Administration, where there is no abnormality or unlawfulness, the unlawfulness generating the possibility of indemnifying the damage occurs in the non-obligation to suffer an impact that has the characteristic of being of exceptional intensity or affecting a small proportion of people. In this sense, it is worth clarifying that this liability is subject to other general provisions on State liability contained in the General Public Administration Law. In this regard, the provision of Article 196 of the General Public Administration Law must be taken into consideration, as it expresses the following: "In any case, the alleged damage must be effective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group." With respect to the damages that can be subject to compensation in contentious-administrative jurisdiction, the decision of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice No. 112 of 14:15 on July 15, 1992, among other things, indicated: "IV. Damage constitutes one of the prerequisites for tort liability, since the duty to compensate is only configured if an unlawful damaging act has occurred that injures a legally relevant interest, capable of being protected by the legal system. Damage, in a juridical sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or non-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (injured party), which causes the deprivation of a legal good, regarding which its conservation was objectively expectable had the damaging event not occurred. Under this approach, there is no civil liability if no damage occurs, just as there is no damage if there is no injured party. Moreover, only damage that is proven (reality or existence) is compensable, this being a question of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In summary, damage constitutes the harmful gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the unlawful act with that subsequent to it. V.- On many occasions, the expressions 'damages' (daños) and 'losses' (perjuicios) are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to specify and distinguish both concepts. Damage constitutes the loss inflicted on the injured party (damnum emergens), while loss is made up of the frustrated or lost profit or utility (lucro cesans), which was reasonably and probably expectable had the unlawful act not occurred. VI.- Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For this purpose, the following characteristics must basically converge to be a 'compensable damage': A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical, it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations. Damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification turns out to be uncertain, indeterminate, or difficult to assess or prove; nor should certainty be confused with present occurrence, since reparation of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage should not be confused with lost profit or loss (lucro cesante), since the first refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating act of the damage, that is, its repercussions do not project at the time the process is initiated. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes an element of unique subjective concern to the injured party, however, the law cannot deal with claims based on insignificant damages, derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be an injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection. Thus, there can be a direct injured party and an indirect one: the first is the victim of the damaging act, and the second will be the successors of the victim. C) It must be caused by a third party, and subsistent, that is, if it has been repaired by the responsible party or a third party (insurer), it becomes non-subsistent. D) There must be a causal relationship between the unlawful act and the damage. VII.- Among the classes of damages, one finds, in the first place, material damage and bodily harm, the first being that which affects the things or material goods that make up the person's patrimony, while the second affects bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage, the specific ones of bodily harm and material damage, in a strict sense, are usually included. The second appears to be the better expression, since bodily harm often affects the patrimonial interests of the injured party (payment of medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage has incapacitated them from performing their usual occupations (losses), etc. This distinction was born in Roman Law, since a distinction was made between damage inflicted directly on things (damnun) and that which injured the physical personality of the individual (injuria). In patrimonial damage, the generated impairment turns out to be economically assessable…." In accordance with the foregoing, it is not sufficient to invoke a damage, but its existence and the causal link that binds it to the conduct or omission of the responsible entity must be convincingly demonstrated.

VI).- The plaintiff invokes the liability of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the damages caused to him, given that they occurred on account of the installation of a fixed telephone line acquired from said entity. For his part, the representative of said Institution invokes that its officials did not participate in what happened against Mr. Ríos Buján, given that it was caused by the co-defendants and the company Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L., which assumes at its own account the risk of providing the service, given that it was so stated in the specification sheet for the respective contracting. In this regard, from the case file it is evident that the officials of the company Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L., Messrs. Allan Eduardo Gómez García and Luis Ángel Marín Camacho, carried out the installation of a telephone line in the plaintiff's house on July 24, 2009, such that on account of this, an induced electric shock was caused to the plaintiff, which caused him physical and moral damages, as will be determined in subsequent considerandos. In this line of reasoning, it is noted that between the indicated company and the co-defendant entity, a contractual bond operates, through which the former is responsible for the installation of the telephone lines assigned to it by said public entity, according to the service requests that are generated in response to the requirements of its clients. Additionally, this Tribunal has considered it proven that the service request is carried out, after a prior inspection by an official of the Institution of the place where the respective electrical installation will be performed (it being necessary to take into consideration that even if there were no inspection, there would always be liability for said reason of lack of ex ante supervision and periodic review of the electrical network under its responsibility), such that in the area where the plaintiff resides, the electrical service drops (acometidas eléctricas) pass over and are supported above the low-tension lines to achieve greater height, and consequently the neutral wire of these lines is below the minimum height established for that purpose. There is also proof that before the installation of Mr. Ríos Buján’s telephone line, several different telephone lines were previously installed, despite the indicated situation. By reason of the foregoing proven facts, this Tribunal considers that in the present case there exists evident liability of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the damages caused to the plaintiff. In the first place, it must be taken into consideration that the strict liability of the defendant entity encompasses not only the conduct or omissions of its servants, but also of those third parties it contracts on account of its institutional objectives. In this line of reasoning, the liability arises, both from the creation of a risk situation on the occasion of the provision of a public service, and from the possible unlawfulness of its own conduct or that of a contracted third party that generates a harmful consequence. The contracting of the third party for the provision of all or part of a public service has a merely instrumental purpose for the fulfillment of the latter and the satisfaction of the public interest and in no way relieves the strict liability established in the legal system for a public entity. Put another way, the circumstance that the service is not provided directly by the entity and that it uses other means provided by the legal system for the fulfillment of the assigned public purposes, does not exonerate it from liability and, on the contrary, keeps its duty to compensate it intact, without prejudice to the determination of joint and several liability (solidaridad) vis-à-vis the affected party. In these cases, in the presence of conduct or omission by a contractor, the contracting entity cannot invoke the existence of the act of a third party to evade its liability, insofar as in the case of the company, its participation in the damaging conduct is immediate (having to answer for the act itself) and in the case of the Institution it may be immediate or mediate, depending on whether the existence of some degree of direct participation in what happened is demonstrated at trial, or simply, of the connecting link of the risk-generating situation. Precisely, the strict liability that every public entity possesses rests on the unlawfulness of a damage caused to the Administered Party that the latter has no duty to bear, and thus any unlawful situation that is during or on the occasion or account of the provision of a public service, implies the breaking of the Administration's obligation (whether it provides it directly or through third parties) to have an effective and efficient operation and correlatively signifies an impact on the citizen's right to obtain an opportune, technical, effective, efficient service and, above all, one that does not generate damage that, by its very existence, results in an abnormal operation of the Administration. In this line of reasoning, the provision of Article 4 of the General Public Administration Law must be recalled, as it provides the following: "The activity of public entities must be subject as a whole to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and the equality of treatment of the recipients, users, or beneficiaries." In the same sense, Article 5.a) of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law indicates: "The administration of the financial resources of the public sector shall be oriented to the general interests of society, attending to the principles of economy, efficacy, and efficiency, with full submission to the law." Given the foregoing, since strict liability is a liability without fault, the relevant aspect is the verification of the existence of the damage, which, for its compensability, must be linked to unlawful conduct related to the Administration, that is, connected by the guiding thread of the causal link. In cases of third parties contracted by the Administration, when these are considered collaborators of the latter for the due fulfillment of public purposes, said link will be based on the existence of a prior contractual relationship that generates conduct producing an unlawful damage, which occurs, despite the contractual and legal duties (Art. 13 of the Administrative Contracting Law, Art. 5 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, and 151 of its regulation) existing between the contractor company and the respective contracting administration. Said link would only be broken in those cases in which the Public Administration demonstrates that despite having employed and exhausted all means within its reach (warnings, sanctions, supervision, initiation of a contractual resolution procedure, etc.), the contractor persisted in carrying out a specific action and the damaging event still occurred. The foregoing considerations are based on the fact that the relationship between the parties is not linear (administered party-contractor-contracting administration), but rather is three-dimensional, in which the linkage of the parties is systemic and dynamic, and therefore the Public Administration holds direct obligations vis-à-vis the Administered Party, for purposes such as control, accountability, verification of due internal control, transparency, fulfillment of the public purpose, and above all, liability. Thus, there is no dissociation of the Administration from the final result of the contracting carried out, which ultimately has a merely instrumental nature of the public service finally provided. A service, as the product obtained, that is not satisfactory to the user, or is delivered late, or worse still, causes them damage, is attributable to the Administration itself, as a defective manifestation of its conduct. In the case of the defendant entity, the foregoing considerations are fully applicable, insofar as, as a public enterprise-entity, it is subject to the administrative legality framework applicable to the matter in accordance with Article 190 of the General Public Administration Law, in relation to the article of said normative body. Moreover, to what has been indicated regarding the entity's strict liability, it must be added that the duty to supervise contractual execution, established in Article 13 of the Administrative Contracting Law, applies to the relationship between the Institution and the contracted company, as it provides: "The Administration shall supervise the entire execution process, for which the contractor must offer the necessary facilities..." To determine the entity's liability, one must take into consideration not only the general strict liability that applies to it, but also its obligations for the correct verification of the execution of the contractual object, such that if damages arise on account of this execution and the fulfillment of said public duty is not demonstrated, the duty of reparation of the respective Public Administration is necessarily reinforced. On the other hand, it is also necessary to indicate that it was demonstrated in the case file, just as it has been said, that in the plaintiff's case, just as occurs in other cases of identical requests for telephone services, the service request is carried out, after a prior inspection by an official of the Institution of the place where the respective electrical installation will be performed, moreover, in the area where the plaintiff resides, the electrical service drops pass over and are supported above the low-tension lines to achieve greater height, and consequently the neutral wire of these lines is below the minimum height established for that purpose. That is, the risk situation generating the damage was public, evident, and notorious, and consequently known by the defendant entity, despite which it tolerated said situation and omitted to adopt any conduct to correct it. The foregoing is reinforced insofar as it has been considered proven that in the area where the plaintiff's telephone connection was made, several lines already existed that had been installed for a long time before.

As is noted, we are then, in addition to the considerations made above, in the presence of an omission to act by the defendant entity, translated into a material inactivity in which ICE did nothing to prevent the occurrence of a situation generating a risk and which ultimately caused the damages that are the subject of this proceeding. In the case file, it has been discussed whether said damages were caused by the effects of an electric arc (arco eléctrico) produced when electricity passed through said phenomenon to the telephone cable installed for the plaintiff or by a direct contact of cables. This Panel considers that such a discussion is irrelevant for the purposes of determining the existence of liability for the damage caused. In both cases, the existence of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) makes the duty to compensate necessary by the mere fact of the occurrence of the harmful event and the verification of the damage. In either case, the most relevant party in the situation described received an electric shock to their person, which they would not have suffered had the act of installing the telephone line not been carried out. This is the relevant fact for determining the liability that arose, and the party cannot be burdened with the duty to prove what caused the electric shock, when in this case it has been proven that it occurred and that it happened on the occasion of the provision of a service by a company contracted by a public entity. The discussions between the defendant parties in the aforementioned senses should not affect the plaintiff's rights, for the simple reason that both are vested with strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) by legal imperative, it not having been demonstrated the existence of an event that excludes their duty to compensate, given the causal link (nexo causal) of both with the harmful event. The representative of ICE invokes that the co-defendant company conventionally assumed any liability that could originate from the services it provides. In addition to the prior considerations that refute what was stated by the defendant entity, it must be indicated that admitting such a thesis would legitimize that via the contracting of services or works, the constitutionally protected strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) is blurred and, even more, rendered nugatory, especially in the current era, in which said mechanism of service provision by the State (e.g., construction of works, provision of social services, professional activities such as notary services, engineering, etc.) is a common thing, given the paradigm shift regarding its operation and impact on public activity. As has been indicated, the Public Administration maintains duties inherent to the principles that govern it and to the soundest norms and techniques applicable in the matter, which imply that contracting a third party for the provision of goods or services does not mean abdicating its responsibility nor the necessary oversight and follow-up of what was agreed, from the beginning until the termination of the effects of the contractual relationship, which may even extend beyond the mere expiration of the formal contract. This being the case, it is appropriate to grant the claim with respect to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and to determine the existence of a duty to repair the damages caused to the plaintiff on the occasion of the events that are the subject of this proceeding.- VII).- Regarding the Application of the Consumer Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Consumidor): The protection of consumer rights is based on Article 46 of the Political Constitution, amended by Law No. 7607 of May 29, 1996, as it establishes the following: "Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they constitute for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters." This constitutional provision arises on the occasion of the determination of a new generation of citizen rights, in the face of the phenomena arising from consumer society and market rules, and the evident inequality of the consumer before the producers and distributors of goods and services. In this vein, it has been indicated that "Modern techniques for introducing products, commercialization modalities, and the stimulation of demand via advertising constitute other elements that accentuate the defenselessness of consumers, disconcerted about the real content of their acquisitions, to which they feel psychologically driven through effective motivating mechanisms... The buyer's interlocutor is no longer generally a known merchant. Large supermarket chains appear that, as is the general case, sell products mass-produced by important national and international complexes. The imbalance between the economic agents involved is thus evident. Public authorities have also reacted to this situation, partly due to their sense of service, which cannot be alien to the existence of interests that affect the entire population in one way or another..." Ramón Martín Mateo. Derecho Público de la Economía, Editorial Ceura, P. 270. Regarding the first references to the recognition of consumer rights in our jurisprudence, it is necessary to cite judgment No. 1441-92 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) issued at 3:45 a.m. on June 2, 1992, which emphasizes the special protection of the consumer due to their position of inferiority in the consumer relationship, in this regard stating: “Indeed, it is notorious that the consumer is at the end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and commercialization of consumer goods they need to acquire for their personal satisfaction, and their participation in this process does not respond to technical or professional reasons, but rather to the constant conclusion of contracts on a personal basis. Therefore, their relationship in this commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection against the providers of goods and services, so that prior to expressing their contractual consent, they have all the necessary judgment elements that allow them to express it with complete freedom, and this implies thorough knowledge of the goods and services offered. Included therein, in a harmonious mix, are several constitutional principles, such as state concern for the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating individuals the free disposal of their assets with the assistance of the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health when it is involved, the ordering and systematization of reciprocal relations between the interested parties, the alignment of international commercial practices with the domestic system, and finally, the greatest protection of the inhabitant's functioning in their means of subsistence.” Based on these guidelines, in 1994, Law No. 7472, Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor), was approved, which in its Article 1 establishes the following: "The objective of this Law is to effectively protect the rights and legitimate interests of the consumer, the protection and promotion of the process of competition and free concurrence, through the prevention, the prohibition of monopolies, monopolistic practices, and other restrictions on the efficient functioning of the market, and the elimination of unnecessary regulations for economic activities." This Law establishes in its Article 29 a series of substantive and procedural rights of consumers, among which the following stand out for these purposes: "Without prejudice to what is established in treaties, international conventions to which Costa Rica is a party, ordinary domestic legislation, regulations, general principles of law, uses, and customs, the following are fundamental and inalienable rights of the consumer: a) Protection against risks that may affect their health, their safety, and the environment. b) The protection of their legitimate economic and social interests.... f) Effective mechanisms of access for the administrative and judicial protection of their rights and legitimate interests, which lead to adequately preventing, sanctioning, and promptly repairing the injury thereof, as appropriate....." In this vein, it is worth mentioning that the doctrine has analyzed the concept of consumer from two points of view: as a client and as a final recipient. Regarding the first concept, it is indicated: “it exceeds that of the acquirer consumer protected by Law 24,240 (Argentine Consumer Protection Law) as it refers to all subjects who contract to acquire goods or services offered in the market, both to meet their private needs and for a business activity (…) while as a final recipient, the concept refers to the person who acquires goods or services for their own consumption or private use, ‘who acquires goods or contracts services for a purpose foreign to any activity of production, transformation, commercialization, or provision to third parties…’.” (Barrantes Jaime and another, Derecho y Jurisprudencia en Materia de Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor. Ediciones Jurídicas ARETE, San José, C.R., 1999, p. 21). For its part, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in relation to the figure of the “consumer,” has stated: “… it is notorious that the consumer is at the end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and commercialization of consumer goods they need to acquire for their personal satisfaction, and their participation in this process does not respond to technical or professional reasons, but rather to the constant conclusion of contracts on a personal basis. Therefore, their relationship in this commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection against the providers of goods and services, so that prior to expressing their contractual consent, they have all the necessary judgment elements that allow them to express it with complete freedom, and this implies thorough knowledge of the goods and services offered. Included therein, in a harmonious mix, are several constitutional principles, such as state concern for the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating individuals the free disposal of their assets with the assistance of the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health when it is involved, the ordering and systematization of reciprocal relations between the interested parties, the alignment of international commercial practices with the domestic system, and finally, the greatest protection of the inhabitant's functioning in their means of subsistence…” (Voto 1441-92 of 3:45 p.m. on June 2, 1992). On the other hand, the cited law, in what is of interest for this proceeding, provides in its Article 32 the following provision on the liability of the producer and the merchant: "The producer, the provider, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or the service, of inadequate or insufficient information about them, or of their use and risks. Only he who demonstrates that he has been unconnected to the damage is released." With respect to this type of liability, it can be determined that it is strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) par excellence, and therefore, the verification of the causal link (nexo de causalidad) is fundamental - that is, the relationship of the damage with the events creating it and the objective imputation, according to the risky conduct created. The First Chamber (Sala Primera), in its Voto 646-F-2001 of 4:45 p.m. on August 22, 2001, in the same sense, indicates the elements of this type of liability, stating: "... There are three elements that make up this type of liability, namely: a) the use of things that entail danger or risk; b) causing damage of a patrimonial nature; and c) the relationship or cause-and-effect link (nexo de causa efecto) between the event and the damage. In summary, '... in objective civil liability, there must be a causal link between the risky activity set in motion by the agent and the damage caused' (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 354 of 10:00 a.m. on December 14, 1990). From a practical point of view - says the Costa Rican jurist Victor Pérez Vargas - '... strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) is summarized as an advantage in favor of the injured party that means a partial reversal of the burden of proof, in the sense that the latter is exonerated from the burden of proving the fault (negligence or intent) of the causer of the damage, and it would be vain the attempt of the latter to prove their lack of fault...' (Pérez Vargas, Victor, Derecho Privado, I Edition, Editorial Publitex, San José, Costa Rica, 1988, p. 417). That is, it is incumbent upon the person or company to whom liability is attributed to demonstrate that the damages were produced by force majeure (fuerza mayor) or by fault of the victim (doctrine that informs numerals 32, second paragraph, of Law No. 7472 and 1048, fifth paragraph, of the Civil Code)..." Based on the foregoing, we can determine that in the case of the economic agent's liability, the subjective concept of intent or negligence is also not relevant, and that determining the causal link between the event and the damage produced is of special importance, with the defendant being restricted solely to demonstrating the breaking of said link or the non-existence of the damage. In this vein, Voto No. 655 of 3:05 p.m. on September 19, 2007, issued by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, held: “(…) This conception arises because the fault model was insufficient to respond to the multiplication of dangers and damages typical of modern life. The theory of risk, understood in the sense that whoever exercises or benefits from an activity with potentially dangerous elements for others must also bear its inconveniences, came to change most legislations. It is also called the theory of created damage, whose imputation paradigm lies in attributing the damage to anyone who introduces into society a virtual element capable of producing it, having to dispense with the agent's subjectivity and focusing on the problem of reparation and its limits around material causality. It only matters to investigate which event was the cause of the effect in order to impute it, given that the production of the harmful result is sufficient, the configuration of an illicit act through traditional elements being unnecessary. As a corollary of the foregoing, fault, negligence, recklessness, or lack of skill of the agent are not the essential elements to give rise to the obligation within the parameters of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Hence, it is of no importance whatsoever, to refute it, to be able to demonstrate that one did not incur in any of them. In this same sense, see judgment No. 61 of 2:50 p.m. on June 19, 1997, from this Chamber. For this reason, the notion of risk replaces the concepts of fault and unlawfulness, being dispensed with as criteria for imputation. It focuses on a conduct or activity of a physical or legal subject, characterized by the setting in motion of a dangerous service, or the mere possession of a dangerous object. Therefore, the element to consider is the risk created. On this particular topic, see judgment No. 376 of 2:40 p.m. on July 9, 1999, from this collegiate body. It must be added that it is based on the assumption that the origin of the obligations is the lawful use of dangerous things, and that upon causing damage, they require the one who uses them to compensate. For the configuration of this type of liability, the following components must be present: a) the use of things that entail danger or risk; b) causing damage; and c) the relationship or cause-and-effect link (nexo de causa efecto) between the event and the damage. Finally, it is important to mention that, within this theme, a partial reversal of the burden of proof operates, in the sense that the injured party is exonerated from the burden of proving the fault or intent of whoever caused the damage. Consequently, it is the responsibility of the individual or legal entity to whom liability is attributed to demonstrate that the damages were produced by force majeure (fuerza mayor) or by fault of the victim. Doctrine that informs numerals 35, second paragraph, of Law No. 7472 and 1048, fifth paragraph, of the Civil Code.” (Equally, see ruling No. 646-F-2001 of 4:45 p.m. on August 22, 2001, from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). In this line of thought, the origin and scope of Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer must be understood and interpreted, which institutes a strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) for the producer, provider, and merchant who harm the legal sphere of the consumer by reason of the good or the service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks. In this manner, they must respond independently of incurring fault. The only exception occurs if they demonstrate that they have been unconnected to the damage. Consequently, the affected party is exempt from demonstrating the fault or intent of whoever caused the damage, and it is incumbent upon the latter to prove that it was produced by force majeure (fuerza mayor) or by fault of the victim, as the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice has specified in the cited rulings, in light of the doctrine that informs numerals 35, second paragraph, of Law No. 7472 and 1048, fifth paragraph, of the Civil Code. Complementary to the above, in order to determine the damage, it is necessary to indicate the need for the existence of a relationship between the claimed damage and the conduct deployed by the economic agent. In this vein, doctrinally, different criteria of objective imputation have been indicated, among which adequate causation stands out for these purposes. Regarding this criterion, the following has been doctrinally indicated: "The defendant's conduct is an adequate cause of the damage suffered by the victim if, ex ante, the causation of the damage was foreseeable – not very improbable – by the defendant. But authors have never agreed on what degree of probability – between 0 and 1 – is adequate according to the law; and they have always disagreed on whether the judgment on probability should consist of a purely subjective prognosis – similar to that carried out in the analysis of intent and fault – that is, in a judgment on the avoidability of the result, or whether, on the contrary, the prognosis must be objective in the sense that an agent endowed with special knowledge would have had to know the probability of the production of the result." (Causalidad y Responsabilidad. Pablo Salvador Coderch and Antonio Fernández Crende. Revista para el análisis del derecho. WWW.INDET.COM.) In this sense, the position of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice has been settled, as noted in Voto 467-F-2008 of 2:25 p.m. on July 4, 2008, which indicates: ".... fortuitous event (caso fortuito) does not allow exempting the merchant or producer from civil liability, since no judgment of reproach is made in relation to their activity. Only force majeure (fuerza mayor) and the act of the victim allow exonerating the merchant or producer from civil liability, insofar as both circumstances imply the exclusion of causality, an element that is indispensable for the existence of both subjective liability and strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). It is incumbent upon the judge to examine in each case whether or not there is direct and adequate causality between the damage claimed (and demonstrated) by the petitioner and the activity (active or omissive) deployed by the producer or merchant. It is clear that in the present case it would be excessive to require the consumer to have the level of security devices that the claim exposes in its second-instance grievances, since that, as the court well said, would imply forcing consumers to an excessive duty of care, beyond what is reasonably demandable of the average person. The defendant did not demonstrate that the cause of the accident was attributable to the victim themselves, due to lack of care, negligence, or imprudence...." It is based on these considerations that it is appropriate to determine the liability of the co-defendant company.

VIII).- The plaintiff indicates in their claim that the damages caused to them were immediately provoked by the conduct of the employees of Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L., given that it was on the occasion of the installation of their telephone line that the corresponding electric shock was caused to them. The representation of said company indicates that the electric shock suffered by the plaintiff was due to the conditions of the distribution lines at the location, such that in the case under analysis, all connections were made according to the established procedure and there was no direct contact with the electricity cables. It indicates that what occurred happened on the occasion of the phenomenon called "electric arc (arco eléctrico)," and not the contact of the telephone cable with the primary or secondary electricity line, given that if this had happened, a protection consisting of an automatic electrical cut-off would have been activated. In this regard, this Tribunal considers that although it has been demonstrated in the case file that the electrical cable in the area where the plaintiff resides is outside the established norm for this purpose, such that the electric service lines pass over and are supported above the low-voltage lines to achieve greater height, and the neutral of these lines is below the minimum height established for this purpose, there is strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) on the part of the defendant company. The foregoing, insofar as, as has been indicated, the damages caused to the plaintiff occurred on the occasion of the installation of his telephone line by the employees of the co-defendant company, Messrs. Allan Eduardo Gómez García and Luis Ángel Marín Camacho. That is, Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L. was an active participant in the process of installing the telephone line for Mr. Ríos Buján and was the direct and efficient cause of the invoked damages. Again, it is necessary to indicate that it is irrelevant whether the damage was caused by a direct contact of the telephone cable with the secondary electricity cables or by an "electric arc (arco eléctrico)," insofar as what is relevant is that damage was caused as a product of an activity carried out by the defendant company, which is duly demonstrated in trial and was not controverted. Moreover, it cannot be said that the very fact of the eventual existence of the so-called "electric arc (arco eléctrico)" is sufficient reason to exempt the plaintiff company from liability. Just as its existence as a situation of fortuitous event (caso fortuito) (an event proper to the activity, unforeseeable and unavoidable) would not have been a cause to break the causal link and exempt ICE from liability, neither is it for the defendant company, given that at no time has it demonstrated, as it was incumbent upon it to do, unconnectedness to the damage caused. On the contrary, the very evidence provided by the co-defendant party indicates the following: "... the electric service lines have had to pass over and be supported above the low-voltage lines to achieve greater height, and even so it is insufficient, since the height of 4.00 meters of the neutral of the low-voltage lines is far below the established minimum height. A risk has been identified for the technician in the need to install the telephone service lines above the low-voltage network, a situation present at the time of the accident. As an additional consideration, it is determined that the telephone cable is not built with adequate insulation for low voltage, a situation present at the time of the accident...". The foregoing was reinforced by the testimonial statement of the author of the indicated report, Mr. Edwin González Marroquín, and reinforces a fundamental consideration, namely, that despite the risky conditions in which the location, height, and situation of the telephone lines were found in the area where the plaintiff's residence is located, the decision was made to carry out the corresponding installation, without any objection or warning to ICE regarding the indicated situation being on record. That is, the company, reflected in the actions of its employees, accepted the risk that the installation of telephone lines under said conditions could entail, and the potential and uncertain, but possible, risk of creating the alleged electric arc. From the statements of the co-defendants, it is clear that they were aware of the existence of an inadequate situation in the location and height of the electrical lines and their specific relationship with the line to be installed, such that despite said risk, they chose to continue their work and not alert about the situation encountered in the specific case. The fact that other telephone lines had been previously placed cannot exempt their liability, since their work made them aware that said situation was neither correct nor safe. Now, independently of the previous judgment of reproach on the deployed activity (which can be used to refute any argument about the existence of an act of a third party), it must be understood that in the present case we are in a scenario of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) in which there is a duty to indemnify if the existence of an effective, assessable, individualizable, and unlawful damage is demonstrated, linked to a conduct or omission of the company, and with respect to which the client or user has no duty to bear it. In this vein, the necessary judgment must again be made to determine the so-called efficient cause. For this Tribunal, the damage to the plaintiff would not have been caused if the defendant company had not carried out the telephone installation despite the known and described conditions of the electrical lines. Furthermore, the liability of the defendant company occurs on the occasion of the very risk existing in its activity, where the causal link arises from the performance of the activity that, although lawful, constitutes a source of risk and, consequently, a source for whoever benefits from its profits to bear its inconveniences vis-à-vis the administration itself or third-party users or clients. The activity of installing telephone lines, placing cables, and transmitting electricity is per se risky and does not exclude an event such as the one that occurred, which, whether due to the placement of the electrical cable or the alleged "electric arc (arco eléctrico)," is inherent to the service provided, independently of any subjective assessment. That is why, even though there is proof of knowledge of the potential situation that could derive from the location and height of the cables to be placed vis-à-vis the electrical lines, the standards of fault, negligence, recklessness, or lack of skill of the agent are not requirements of the obligation under strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) in this case. For its configuration in the situation under analysis, consideration must be given to the demonstration of the existence of the commercial activity deployed by the defendant company (which has not been refuted), the damage caused (to which we will refer later), and the existence of the relationship or causal link between the two preceding assumptions (which are duly demonstrated) and where it has not been proven that the company was unconnected to what happened, due to the concurrence of force majeure (fuerza mayor), an act of a third party, or fault of the victim. In the case under examination, there is a consumer relationship, given the sui generis and three-dimensional relationship described above, in which the defendant company sells a service to ICE, but whose final recipient is a third party, the plaintiff, who directly receives the benefits of what was agreed.

It is thus that the plaintiff, as a client of the entity, is at the same time a consumer of the commercial activity carried out by the co-defendant company; he was the final recipient of the service and therefore found himself, for the purposes of said situation, at the lower end of the service chain ICE-Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L.-plaintiff. Due to the foregoing and in accordance with the very nature of consumer rights, within the framework of strict liability it is not possible to burden the individual with the duty to prove whether the damage was caused by an electrical contact or by an arc of such nature. What is relevant is that a damage occurred on the occasion of the service provided by the company (immediate and effective cause), as has been indicated, regardless of the underlying technical cause. It is the company's duty to prove that what happened was in no way linked to its actions, proof which in the case under examination was not provided and, on the contrary, the very statements of Messrs. Gómez García and Marín Camacho evidence their connection to the generating event of the invoked damage. Thus, this Tribunal concludes that the necessary elements converge to impute liability to the co-defendant company, and therefore, in accordance with Article 35 cited in the preceding considering clause, its scope is fully applicable and, consequently, it is appropriate to uphold the claim in respect thereof and determine the existence of a duty to repair the damages caused to the plaintiff on the grounds of the events that are the subject of this proceeding.- IX).- Regarding non-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extra contractual): The liability of private law subjects not linked by a prior contractual or consumer relationship is governed by the provisions of Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which stipulates: “Anyone who, by malice (dolo), fault (falta), negligence (negligencia), or imprudence (imprudencia), causes damage to another, is obliged to repair it together with the losses (perjuicios).” In accordance with the foregoing, unlike the more modern trends in liability matters where it is objectified, as we have seen in the case of both the co-defendant company and the entity, in the case of non-contractual civil liability provided for in the Civil Code, one must start from the existence of subjective imputation criteria, in order for a duty to compensate for the damages caused on the grounds of an act or omission of a private law subject to arise. The duty to indemnify arises on the grounds of the breach of a legal duty not to harm another (alterum non laedere), where an imputation criterion or judgment of reproach based on the fulfillment of the indicated subjective elements that render the respective conduct unlawful (antijurídica) is present. Thus, such will be an act or omission carried out with malice (dolo), fault (falta), negligence (negligencia), or imprudence (imprudencia). As noted, in said rule, incorporated into our Civil Code of 1888 and based on the Code Napoléon of March 18, 1803, the concepts of culpability (culpabilidad) and liability (responsabilidad) are linked, and it was understood that the former had to be present for the latter to proceed. Thus, the subject is only obliged to repair a damage if it is the product of their own malicious conduct or gross negligence (culpa grave) (assimilating to a punishment), which has its source in the penal origins of all determination of liability. Regarding the composite nature of this prerequisite for liability—damage plus conduct branded as unlawful by the legal system—Voto 335-2008 of 9:00 a.m. on December 19, 2008, of the First Section of the Superior Civil Court, indicated: “As can be verified, for damage to be configured, in the legal context, three prerequisites are required: 1) a pecuniary or non-pecuniary injury, 2) that it be caused by the action or omission of a person, to the affected subject (victim), and 3) that this injury has been caused in an unlawful manner. The damage constitutes the harmful gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the occurrence of the harmful action or omission with the situation subsequent to it; up to this point, one can speak of damage in a generic sense. However, for the damage produced to find protection in the legal system, such that it must be compensated by the producing agent, it must not only derive from an activity or omission imputable to the third party (the second prerequisite defined as causal link (nexo causal)), but this active or omissive conduct must also be classifiable as illicit (ilícita)…” In accordance with the foregoing, to impute liability, the demonstrated damage must be supplemented by proof that the conduct is classified as unlawful, according to what is stated in Article 1045 of the Civil Code. It is not sufficient, as it was in the case of the co-defendants, to prove the damage and the existence of the causal link to generate liability; rather, proof will also be necessary that the conduct of the one upon whom the duty to compensate is imputed was committed with malice (dolo), fault (falta), negligence (negligencia), or imprudence (imprudencia). In this case, the considerations made regarding the theory of causation are also applicable to the matter. In this vein, it has been indicated that “In Civil Law, we use the ‘theory of adequacy’ (teoría de la adecuación) for the causal relationship to establish the link between the act and the damages (and losses). The theory of adequacy is also known as the ‘theory of the adequate condition’ or the ‘theory of adequate causation’. According to this theory, only that cause which is adequate to produce the result is a condition of the result, and this cause is considered adequate when a person with discernment could foresee that this result may occur in the presence of certain circumstances, natural in the face of common sense and the good judgment of their reasoning. But since these concepts are so broad and so difficult to limit, the criterion of due diligence (debida diligencia) is also used, according to which, if a result occurs despite having acted without contravening the duty of due diligence, that is, acting without omitting the care required in a specific situation, one thereby acts within the field of what is legally permitted, and therefore that condition of the result will not be its cause in a legal sense. In this way, the foreseeability of the average person and due diligence are the criteria used by civil law to determine when a specific behavior—in the civil sense—is a condition of the result.” (Madrigal Navarro Javier. La imputación para la reparación del daño en sedes civil y penal, Revista Judicial, Costa Rica, No. 105, September 2012). On the other hand, it must be indicated that the subjective liability contemplated in the rule cited ut supra imposes upon the victim of the damage the duty to prove the malice (dolo) or fault (culpa) of their counterpart (which is based on an ideological postulate proper to criminal matters founded on the principle of innocence) and which is found in the onus probandi proper and classic to civil matters, established by Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. Once again, an important distinction arises with respect to the cases of strict liability analyzed previously, given that in this case, it is not enough for the defendant to prove lack of connection to the damage; rather, the plaintiff has the duty to prove the subjective liability prerequisites indicated above, under penalty of their claim being dismissed.- IX).- In the case under examination, it is noted that the party claims the existence of liability with respect to Messrs. Gómez García and Marín Camacho, by reason of their direct participation in the installation of the telephone line that caused the damages invoked by the plaintiff. For their part, the representation of the co-defendants indicates that all connections were made in accordance with the established procedure and that there was no direct contact with the electricity cables; rather, the phenomenon called an "electric arc" (arco eléctrico) occurred, because the electrical cable in the area where the plaintiff resides is outside the established standard. Given the foregoing, the situation was impossible to foresee and is imputable to the lack of regulation by ARESEP regarding the protection of the network and its distribution of heights and distances. It indicates that there is no proof of the existence of negligence or lack of duty of care on the part of the workers of the defendant company. In this regard, this Tribunal has deemed it established that the persons who directly carried out the installation that produced the plaintiff's injuries were the co-defendants; thus, it has been proven that when placing the telephone line in question, the co-defendants were aware of the risk situation posed by the fact that the telephone line would be left at a short distance from the electricity cables, that is, passing above the so-called pentagram (pentagrama) and with the respective telephone service drops in a situation such that they "... have had to pass and be supported above the low-voltage line....", as indicated in the very study requested by the Company that occupies the employment status of the co-defendants. For this Court, it is evident that what is described demonstrates a breach of the duties of average diligence by the indicated Messrs. Gómez García and Marín Camacho, insofar as it is not reasonable to accept that persons with experience in the matter would have been so negligent as to at least fail to warn of the situation posed, and have opted, without any objection, to carry out the respective telephone installation under said conditions. The atypical nature of the height and location of the electrical and telephone lines at the plaintiff's place of residence and the technical criteria expressed at trial indicate that, given the situation encountered at the work site, there was a level of foreseeability that a risk situation could occur if another telephone line were installed in said situation. The statements of the co-defendants present an express acknowledgment of their actions in the indicated sense, given that at the trial hearing they stated that throughout the sector the wiring is poorly designed, and that they had to install the plaintiff's telephone line despite this, above the electrical pentagram. Moreover, there is also proof that the installation of the electrical line was carried out by the co-defendants from the plaintiff's house toward the distribution box (caja de dispersión), whereas, on the contrary, the procedure established by ICE for the installation of fixed lines starts with actions from the latter toward the applicant's domicile. In this vein, in the sought-after judicial confession evidence, both co-defendants admit to having started the installation of the connection at the plaintiff's home, and then proceeding to carry out the rest of the installation procedure outward from it, even though the procedure manual for the installation of conventional services and E.R. technology indicates the steps to be followed as follows: "7.12. Dispatch technician to the Distribution Box. 7.13. Test for dial tone on the pair associated with the OTC. 7.13.1. If there is a dial tone, move to the client's property and continue with step 7.14.... 7.14. The required conditions exist (network and client infrastructure, client's address and location, client's presence at the property, and official documentation of service request) to execute the installation of the OTC in accordance with current regulations..." As noted, the non-compliance with the technical standard established in the procedure manual applicable to the matter indicates that in the installation of the telephone line for the plaintiff, the defendants deliberately departed from the conditions required in the matter, and imprudently allowed the electricity to run from the respective cable to his person. Had the established procedure been followed, that is, from the distribution box toward the home and not the reverse, the original conditions that generated the invoked damages, and which were produced when the plaintiff was the sole recipient of the respective electrical discharge, would have been modified. Even the witness offered by the co-defendants, who held the position of General Supervisor of the company at the time of the events, Mr. Carlos Luis Jiménez Fallas, expressly indicated that telephone lines should not be installed above the electrical pentagram. For the foregoing reasons, the defendants are incorrect when they indicate that all connections were made in accordance with the established procedure, given that the contrary is proven in the case file. Nor is it reasonable to accept the argument that the given situation was impossible to foresee, since the electrical and telephone line presented an evident abnormality in terms of its height and location, impossible not to be seen by the responsible officials, who, by their experience, were clearly aware of the risks generated. On the other hand, the defendant party did not prove that the damage caused to the plaintiff was imputable to the lack of regulation by ARESEP regarding the protection of the network and its distribution of heights and distances. There is no proof in the case file of a negligent attitude on its part, nor is the existence of a normative duty on its part to regulate the matter evidenced. In any event, the liability in this regard lies with the public entity responsible for fixed telecommunications, which has already been jointly and severally condemned in this judgment. Given the foregoing considerations, it is deemed that there is proof of the existence of negligence or lack of duty of care on the part of the workers of the defendant company, and consequently, Thus, it is appropriate to uphold the claim with respect to the co-defendants and determine the existence of a duty to repair the damages caused to the plaintiff on the grounds of the events that are the subject of this proceeding.- XI).- Regarding material damage (daño material): The plaintiff in his claim invokes material damages consisting of severe damage caused to different parts of his body and possible damage to the heart, lungs, kidneys, and liver. He indicates burns, grafts, and the damage to his left toe to such a degree that it became useless for its basic functions. In the case under examination, one must start from the considerations made regarding the prerequisites of damage as such in order for it to be compensable. In this sense, Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code applies, insofar as it stipulates: "The burden of proof corresponds to: 1) The party formulating a claim, regarding the allegations of the facts constitutive of their right. 2) The party opposing a claim, regarding the allegations of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right." In this regard, while it is true that the existence of possible damage to the heart, lungs, kidneys, and liver has not been proven, as was indicated at some point in the claim, nor is any other material damage evidenced as proven, through expert report DML-2010-13694 of November 9, 2010, from the Department of Legal Medicine (Departamento de Medicina Legal), a temporary disability of five months for the plaintiff and a permanent disability of seven percent of his general capacity were determined. Notwithstanding the foregoing, with respect to the permanent impairment suffered by the plaintiff, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros indicated that the plaintiff presents an impairment of twelve percent of his general capacity. This Court deems it appropriate to apply this latter criterion, since the assessment made by the indicated entity, regardless of its etiology, corresponds to a decrease in faculties or aptitudes for work, given its legal nature; thus, the plaintiff is a salaried person, for whom what is relevant for purposes of determining the material damage is, above all, the verification of the degree of impairment suffered by him in his faculties to work. An impairment in the abstract, detached from the reference point of human aptitude to exercise one's work and thereby bring home the income necessary for the satisfaction of basic needs, is neither admissible nor relevant. In the case under examination, it must not be overlooked that the invoked material damage is fundamentally bodily harm, which is understood as "any somatic or psychic alteration that, in one way or another, disturbs, threatens, or distresses the health of the person who suffers it, or simply, limits or impairs the personal integrity of the affected party, whether organically or functionally. Any diminution of the integrity of individual biology is sufficient, regardless of its practical repercussions in one or more fields of human activity" (M. Rodríguez, cited by Laborda Calvo Eugenio in Cesión de Datos o Consentimiento Informado en Valoración del Daño Corporal). On the other hand, another more recent author defines it as "the consequences that a certain traumatic event has had on the psychophysical integrity and the health of a person. When the traumatic event is attributable to a third party, the latter is obliged to answer for said consequences, whether in a criminal, civil, labor, or contentious-administrative sphere." (Hernández Cueto cited by Laborda Calvo Eugenio in Cesión de Datos o Consentimiento Informado en Valoración del Daño Corporal). In our country, as the insurance monopoly prevailed for more than 60 years, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) has extensive experience in the administration of the bodily harm assessment and reparation program; thus, these assessments constitute an expert examination where the identity of the damage, the degree of disability, the possibilities of cure, the modifications imposed by physical pain are defined or diagnosed, and it also clearly indicates the consolidation of the injuries and their possible complications as well as the impact on life expectancy, but without there being rules in the assessment of bodily harm that can establish an economic equivalence with the harm suffered, which is why there is mention of the existence of a principle of expert discretion (principio de discrecionalidad pericial). For the foregoing reasons, taking into consideration that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff on his body, the existence of which on his left foot was duly verified by judicial inspection, affect his capacity to work, as demonstrated, it is deemed appropriate to use as a parameter for determining the material damage suffered the indicated impairment of twelve percent of general capacity and five months of temporary disability indicated by the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. In this vein, it is not that the existence of another expert report with a lower percentage is disqualified, but rather that it is estimated that for the particular situation of the plaintiff and his requirements for the use of his working capacity in the future, the expertise of the insurance entity is more applicable to the specific case. It is necessary to indicate that in the case under examination, the defendant parties have not demonstrated that the indicated damage does not meet the characteristics established in Article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration, that it is not "...effective, evaluable, and individualizable..." or that it was not caused on the grounds of the events that are the subject of this claim or imputable to the victim. In some parts of the interventions of the defendant parties, they suggest the eventuality that the damage could have been caused by an act of a third party, force majeure, or even by the victim's own conduct (lack of care with hygiene and dressings on the plaintiff's affected finger), resulting in the demonstrated level of injuries. None of this was proven, the mere assertion of the party in this regard being insufficient. Proof is necessarily required that in some way provides elements of conviction to determine that the causal link between the indicated events and the invoked damage has been broken. On the contrary, all existing evidence reliably indicates that the plaintiff's injuries were directly and evidently caused by the electrical discharge produced on the occasion of the installation service of his fixed telephone line by the co-defendants. Nor is the argument of the co-defendants' lawyer acceptable, to the effect that by not having provided the corresponding funds for the mathematical expert and the expert's work not having been carried out due to the plaintiff's fault, the plaintiff finds himself in a situation of evidentiary deficiency. It should be noted that the expert analysis to be carried out would concern the quantum of the damage and not the existence of the damage itself, it being possible for such work to be carried out in the sentence execution stage. Thus, it is appropriate to condemn in the abstract and jointly and severally the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, Técnicos en Telecomunicaciones SAL S.A., Allan Eduardo Gómez García, and Luis Ángel Masís Camacho to pay Mr. Diego Alonso Ríos Buján the sums corresponding to the permanent disability of twelve percent of the plaintiff's organic capacity, as well as five months of temporary disability, both suffered on the grounds of the events proven in this proceeding. Said amounts will be determined in the sentence execution stage.

XII).- Regarding moral damage (daño moral): With respect to the possibility of compensating the moral damage that may have been caused on the grounds of conduct by the Administration, Article 9 and Article 41 of the Political Constitution must also be applied, given that the former makes no type of distinction regarding the liability of the State, and the latter expressly refers to the possibility of protecting "moral" interests, among which is the possibility of compensating both subjective moral damage and objective moral damage. On the other hand, the American Convention on Human Rights stipulated on this matter: "Article 11: 1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. 3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." "Article 24: All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law." "Article 5.1: Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected." Even prior to the entry into force of the Political Constitution of 1949 or the approval of said Convention at the end of the 1960s, since the 19th century, Article 59 of the Civil Code prescribes: “The right to obtain compensation for moral damage is established, in cases of injury to personality rights.” In national administrative law specifically, Article 197 of the General Law of Public Administration stipulated: "Liability shall be applicable for damage to purely moral assets, as well as for the moral suffering and physical pain caused by the death or by the injury inflicted, respectively." Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is appropriate to make some clarifications on the matter, based on doctrine and several judicial resolutions issued on the subject, given the particularities existing with respect to this type of damage, considering that in the case of subjective moral damage, by affecting the most intimate sphere of the individual, the common rules regarding the proof of damage cannot be applied when the impairment occurs to the subject's assets. In this vein, it has been stated, "To prove moral damage in its existence and extent, it is not necessary to provide direct evidence; rather, the judge must assess the circumstances of the event and the personal qualities of the victim to objectively and presumptively establish the moral grievance in the reserved sphere of the passive subject's intimacy. We do not believe that the moral grievance must be the object of direct proof, since this is absolutely impossible due to the very nature of the same, which resides in the most intimate part of the personality, although it sometimes manifests itself through external signs that may not be an authentic expression ... no one can probe the spirit of another so deeply as to be able to state with certainty the existence and intensity of the pain, the truth of suffering, the reality of anguish or disappointment" (Bustamante Alsina, "Equitativa valuación del daño no mensurable", 1990. p 655 and 656). The foregoing considerations are based on the appreciation that moral damage must be seen as in re ipsa or in itself, given that in order to have a non-pecuniary injury (perjuicio espiritual) configured, it is not necessary to prove suffering or depression expressed to third parties, as it rather implies the alteration of the existential balance of individuals within their most intimate sphere and not necessarily made known or expressed in all its dimension to third parties, insofar as the latter depends on the personality of each injured individual and starting from the premise that human reactions have diverse forms and opportunities for manifestation. Therefore, in the event that the existence of conduct (death of a loved one, loss of or injury to a moral or patrimonial asset, impairment of fundamental rights, etc.) that could affect the intimate sphere of the person—by causing pain, anguish, suffering, etc.—is demonstrated, it is interpreted that moral damage necessarily exists; thus, its intensity and therefore the means for its compensation will be determined in accordance with the criteria that we will analyze later in this same considering clause. It is then, based on the impaired subjective rights, that we can speak of the existence of moral damage, given that this will occur upon the violation of any of the inherent personality rights, which are therefore considered extra-patrimonial. For this reason, it is stated that moral damage arises with the mere demonstrated occurrence of the formal or material act of the Administration or omission of action that violates said rights. In this vein, it is pertinent to refer to the following: "Since moral grievance is the necessary and inevitable consequence of the violation of some of the personality rights of a subject, the demonstration of the existence of said transgression will entail, at the same time, proof of the existence of the damage. The determination of the existence of moral damage can be carried out just as objectively as the verification of a pecuniary injury. For this purpose, it is only necessary to confront a fact with the legal norm that grants a subject a right inherent to personality, to verify whether the former constitutes or not a violation of what is prescribed in the latter..." (Brebbia Roberto. El Daño Moral. Editorial Orbir.) On the other hand, it must be noted that it has been accepted that within the framework of the theory of liability of the Public Administration, in principle, it would be valid to accept the possibility that the defendant can prove the existence of one of the circumstances exempting from liability established in Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration, namely, force majeure, the fault of the victim, or an act of a third party; or even prove its non-existence or a lesser severity than that invoked. Thus, it has been indicated that "The amount set must be a faithful reflection of the circumstances described in the case file, so that it results in an appropriate sum, given the problems suffered by the injured party, caused by the criminal or civil wrongful acts of the agent or agents producing the damage. Because these presumptions are iuris tantum, they admit proof to the contrary, for which the defendant or active subject of the damage must be extremely diligent, since the burden of proof falls upon them to rebut the presumptions of pain, suffering, mortification, or grievance, and for this, they may resort to any type of ordinary evidence." (Montero Piña Fernando. El Daño Moral, Page 61. Impresión Gráfica del este). Not without noting that some doctrine has held that for any damage resulting from a licit and normal conduct, when the level of intensity is excessive, no type of exemption is applicable.

In this vein, this Court considers it appropriate to make certain clarifications regarding moral damages (daño moral) that will be fully applicable to the resolution of the enforcement proceeding before it. Firstly, it must be emphasized that in matters of moral damages, we speak of a compensatory function and not the equivalence sought in the case of material damages. Additionally, it should not be overlooked that moral damages do not escape the certainty that they must be a consequence of the administration's action or omission, and the injured interest of the person invoking it must be certain. In this vein, the following has been stated: “Moral damages are not the pain, grief, or anguish but rather the spiritual diminishment derived from the injury to a non-proprietary interest. Said detriment exists even if the injured party lacks understanding of the harm suffered; in the absence of tears; even when the victim is not in physical or 'psychological' condition to 'feel' grief, pain, or anguish (e.g., a brain-dead person). The subjective disvalue exists when the victim may have 'matured' that pain and perhaps, ceased to 'feel' it. Thus conceived, it is immediately apparent that moral damages can project their effects into the future, with a sufficient degree of certainty…” (Daniel Pizarro Ramón Daño Moral. Ed. Hammurabi. Page 105) Furthermore, moral damages are personal in nature, depending on the impact on a legitimate interest of the affected party. Regarding the scope of moral damages in our country, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) in its ruling No. 112 of 14:15 hours on July 15, 1992, repeatedly cited and applied by various jurisdictional instances, stated: “IV.- Damages constitute one of the prerequisites for non-contractual civil liability, insofar as the duty to compensate only arises if there has been a harmful illicit act that injures a legally relevant interest, capable of being protected by the legal order. Damages, in a legal sense, constitute any impairment, loss, or detriment to the proprietary or extra-proprietary legal sphere of the person (injured party), which causes the deprivation of a legal good, regarding which it was objectively expectable to preserve had the harmful event not occurred. Under this approach, there is no civil liability if no damages occur, just as there are no damages if there is no injured party. On the other hand, only damages that can be proven (reality or existence) are compensable, this being a question of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In short, damages constitute the detrimental gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation before the illicit act with the situation after it. V.- The expressions 'damages' (daños) and 'losses' (perjuicios) are often used indiscriminately. It is necessary to clarify and distinguish both concepts. Damages constitute the loss inflicted on the injured party (damnum emergens), while losses consist of the frustrated gain or profit left unearned (lucro cesans), which was reasonably and probably expectable had the illicit act not occurred. VI.- Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For this purpose, the following characteristics must basically converge to be considered 'compensable damages' (daño resarcible): A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical; it cannot be based on assumed or conjectural realizations. Damages do not lose this characteristic if their quantification is uncertain, indeterminate, or difficult to assess or prove; nor should certainty be confused with present existence, as the reparation of certain but future damages is admissible; likewise, future damages should not be confused with lost profits or losses, as the former refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating event of the damage, i.e., its repercussions are not projected at the time the proceeding is initiated. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damages, this constitutes a matter of solely subjective concern to the injured party, yet the law cannot concern itself with claims based on insignificant damages, derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection. Thus, there can be a direct injured party and an indirect one: the first is the victim of the harmful event, and the second will be the victim's successors. C) It must be caused by a third party, and subsisting; that is, if it has been repaired by the responsible party or a third party (insurer), it becomes non-subsisting. D) There must be a causal relationship between the illicit act and the damages. VII.- Among the classes of damages, there is, firstly, material damage (daño material) and bodily harm (daño corporal), the former being that which affects the things or material goods that make up a person's patrimony, while the latter impacts bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damages, the specific ones of bodily harm and material damage, in the strict sense, are usually included. The latter seems to be the more apt expression, as bodily harm tends to affect the proprietary interests of the injured party (payment for medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the harm has incapacitated them from performing their usual occupations (losses (perjuicios)), etc. This distinction originated in Roman Law, which distinguished between damage inflicted directly on things (damnun) and that which injured the physical personality of the individual (injuria). In patrimonial damages, the generated impairment is economically assessable. VIII.- Moral damages (daño moral) (also called non-material (incorporal), extra-proprietary (extrapatrimonial), emotional (de afección) damages, etc. in doctrine) are verified when the sphere of extra-proprietary interest of the individual is injured; however, as their violation may generate patrimonial consequences, a distinction must be made between 'pure' subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), or emotional damages (de afección), and objective or 'objectified' moral damages (daño moral objetivo). Subjective moral damages occur when an extra-proprietary right has been injured, without impacting the patrimony, normally implying an unjust disturbance of the individual's emotional conditions (displeasure, discouragement, despair, loss of satisfaction in living, etc., e.g., the offense against honor, dignity, privacy, the so-called loss of enjoyment of life (daño a la vida en relación), grief over the death of a family member or loved one, etc.). Objective moral damages injure an extra-proprietary right with an impact on the patrimony, that is, they generate economically assessable consequences (e.g., the case of a professional who, due to the attributed act, loses their clientele in whole or in part). This distinction serves to demarcate the damage suffered by the individual in their social consideration (good name, honor, honesty, etc.) from that suffered in the individual sphere (grief over the death of a relative), thus one refers to the social part and the other to the emotional part of the patrimony. This distinction originally arose to determine the scope of compensable moral damages, as doctrine was initially reluctant to compensate pure moral damages due to the difficulty of quantification. For compensation, a distinction must be made between the different types of moral damages. In the case of objective moral damages, the corresponding demonstration must be made, as happens with patrimonial damages; but in the case of subjective moral damages, since their amount cannot be precisely structured and demonstrated, their determination remains at the prudent discretion of the judge, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity, the lack of proof regarding the magnitude of the damage not being an obstacle to setting its amount. The dogmatic difference between patrimonial and moral damages does not exclude that, in practice, one and the other occur concomitantly; this could be the case of injuries that generate physical pain or cause disfigurement or physical deformity (damage to health) and aesthetic damage (disruption of the physical harmony of the face or any other exposed part of the body), without moral damages thereby being deemed secondary or accessory, as they evidently have autonomy and peculiar characteristics. In short, moral damages consist of physical, psychological, emotional (de afección), or moral pain or suffering inflicted by an illicit act. The fertile ground for moral damages is normally that of personality rights when they are violated.” Based on the foregoing, it is evident that in the case of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), the existence of direct proof is not required; rather, certain criteria are applicable that delimit the Judge's discretion, arising from its own legal nature and developed by national jurisprudence. Thus, in the resolution mentioned ut supra, the general principles of law and equity are established as the first delimiting criterion. Consequently, through ruling 556-2003 of Section Two of the Contentious-Administrative Court (Sección Segunda del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), the following was also provided as a criterion:

VI.- Regarding subjective moral damages, the situation is different, and it is hereby made clear from the outset that the State is not correct in its opposition. It is an undeniable fact that there was injury due to the unlawful conduct of the Ministry of Education, as declared by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the consequence of which is, then, to seek, as far as possible, the effective restoration of the affected subjective sphere, given the lack of timely response to an administrative claim, for the granting of which, when dealing with this type of damage, proof is unnecessary, sometimes the mere confirmation of the generating event being sufficient for its compensation to proceed, independently of the recognition or rejection of other purely patrimonial aspects, for which the physical demonstration of those produced is indeed essential. This does not mean that it can be granted merely upon claim, as accreditation of its existence and severity is necessary, a burden that, without a doubt, corresponds to the victim; however, it has been permitted that its verification can be achieved through circumstantial evidence (indicios), since it is produced when intimacy, honor, the psyche, health, and physical integrity, among others, are affected, the severity of which, without a doubt, corresponds to the claimant to prove, its existence being accreditable through presumptions of fact (presunciones de hombre) inferred from circumstantial elements, and therefore its proof is in re ipsa, as the First Chamber of the Court (Sala Primera de la Corte) has repeatedly expressed.” (Emphasis is ours).

We then have that a second delimiting criterion for subjective moral damages is the presumptions of fact (presunciones del hombre) inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis. Likewise, from various judicial resolutions and from judgment 413 of November 19, 2002, of Section One of the Contentious-Administrative Court, Section I (Sección Primera del Tribunal Contencioso Adm. Sección I), other criteria are evident, namely:

“III. By subjective moral damages, doctrine has understood that emotional affectation which impacts the emotional sphere of individuals, causing worry, suffering, anxiety, and other negative and harmful emotions, the origin of which is the illicit acts caused by the petitioner. By their nature, they are difficult to prove through ordinary means, so the judge may assess them by examining the circumstances evident in the case file (expediente) and applying their experience, the general principles of law, and those of rationality and proportionality.” (Emphasis is ours).

These latter criteria have been developed in a relevant manner to limit the possibility of recognizing exaggerated or disproportionate compensations. In this vein, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) has indicated: “It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, as these are invaluable goods, but about setting a monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism the law can resort to, in order to thus repair, at least in part, their offense. Within such a philosophy, establishing exorbitant compensations would not be appropriate, as happens in other legal systems, for that would produce the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profiteering with one's own honor and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our system as having the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) #1739-92 of 11:45 hours on July first and 3495-92 of 14:30 hours on November nineteenth, both of 1992). Applying them to situations like the present one, it is indispensable, when establishing the obligations arising from compensatory legal situations, to attend to the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, moral damages, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to multi-million compensations, as claimed. This would open an inconvenient loophole, giving way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjust enrichment that, far from repairing tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations, making it fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber (Sala Primera) ruling 141 of 15:00 hrs. on June 18, 1993, and No. 99 of 16:00 hours on September 20, 1995) (Emphasis is ours).

The causality of the damage is another unavoidable criterion, insofar as the real cause thereof can determine the scope and limits of the compensatory estimate. This can be clearly inferred from ruling 00099-2003 of the Contentious-Administrative Court, Section II (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección II), in that it stated:

“IV.- It is indispensable to establish what is understood by moral damages (daño moral), for which purpose this Court allows itself to cite judgment No. 112 of 14:15 hours on July 15, 1992, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia): “VII.- Among the classes of damages, there is, firstly, material damage (daño material) and bodily harm (daño corporal), the former being that which affects the things or material goods that make up a person's patrimony, while the latter impacts bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damages, the specific ones of bodily harm and material damage, in the strict sense, are usually included. The latter seems to be the more apt expression, as bodily harm tends to affect the proprietary interests of the injured party (payment for medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the harm has incapacitated them from performing their usual occupations (losses (perjuicios)), etc. This distinction originated in Roman Law, which distinguished between damage inflicted directly on things (damnun) and that which injured the physical personality of the individual (injuria). In patrimonial damages, the generated impairment is economically assessable. VIII.- Moral damages (daño moral) (also called non-material (incorporal), extra-proprietary (extrapatrimonial), emotional (de afección) damages, etc. in doctrine) are verified when the sphere of extra-proprietary interest of the individual is injured; however, as their violation may generate patrimonial consequences, a distinction must be made between 'pure' subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), or emotional damages (de afección), and objective or 'objectified' moral damages (daño moral objetivo). Subjective moral damages occur when an extra-proprietary right has been injured, without impacting the patrimony, normally implying an unjust disturbance of the individual's emotional conditions (displeasure, discouragement, despair, loss of satisfaction in living, etc., e.g., the offense against honor, dignity, privacy, the so-called loss of enjoyment of life (daño a la vida en relación), grief over the death of a family member or loved one, etc.). Objective moral damages injure an extra-proprietary right with an impact on the patrimony, that is, they generate economically assessable consequences (e.g., the case of a professional who, due to the attributed act, loses their clientele in whole or in part). This distinction serves to demarcate the damage suffered by the individual in their social consideration (good name, honor, honesty, etc.) from that suffered in the individual sphere (grief over the death of a relative), thus one refers to the social part and the other to the emotional part of the patrimony. This distinction originally arose to determine the scope of compensable moral damages, as doctrine was initially reluctant to compensate pure moral damages due to the difficulty of quantification. For compensation, a distinction must be made between the different types of moral damages. In the case of objective moral damages, the corresponding demonstration must be made, as happens with patrimonial damages; but in the case of subjective moral damages, since their amount cannot be precisely structured and demonstrated, their determination remains at the prudent discretion of the judge, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity, the lack of proof regarding the magnitude of the damage not being an obstacle to setting its amount. The dogmatic difference between patrimonial and moral damages does not exclude that, in practice, one and the other occur concomitantly; this could be the case of injuries that generate physical pain or cause disfigurement or physical deformity (damage to health) and aesthetic damage (disruption of the physical harmony of the face or any other exposed part of the body), without moral damages thereby being deemed secondary or accessory, as they evidently have autonomy and peculiar characteristics. In short, moral damages consist of physical, psychological, emotional (de afección), or moral pain or suffering inflicted by an illicit act. The fertile ground for moral damages is normally that of personality rights when they are violated.” Also regarding the proof of moral damages, the same cited judgment expressed: “XIII.- Regarding the proof of moral damages, the principle is the following: their existence and severity must be accredited, a burden that corresponds to the victim; however, it has been admitted that such proof can be achieved through presumptions of fact (presunciones de hombre) inferred from circumstantial evidence (indicios), since the unlawful generating event makes manifest the moral damages, because when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, intimacy, etc., are damaged, it is easy to infer the damage, which is why it is said that the proof of moral damages exists 'in re ipsa'. On this matter, this Chamber has stated that regarding moral damages '… sometimes, the mere realization of the culpable act is sufficient for the damage to arise therefrom, according to the prudent assessment of the Merit Judges, when they are able to infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence (prueba de indicios)' (Judgment No. 114 of 16:00 hours on November 2, 1979).” In the present case, when the petitioner requested moral damages, they expressed: “The serious moral damages caused by the Respondents with their acts, Which (sic) came to psychologically harm my integrity, Which (sic) were duly reasoned by the Investigating Magistrate and For (sic) which I request a forensic expert examination to determine the sequelae of the coerced damage upon being subjected to humiliation and Internal Pressures (…) Upon being unjustly dismissed by Minae, it caused (sic) the destruction of my home, since my wife left me because I could not support her, and to this day I have not been able to find work, we were thrown (sic) out of the dwelling where we lived and I had to go and live crammed in at my mother's. Furthermore, a home loan was in process and due to my dismissal it could not be completed.” The entire issue of the petitioner's dismissal and, of course, its material or moral consequences, cannot be discussed within the present proceeding, because it bears no causal relationship with the facts that justified the upholding of the amparo appeal: non-payment of labor entitlements, which in this case was limited to the non-payment of vacation time in a timely manner. The enforcing party never referred, expressly or implicitly, to having suffered an emotional disturbance (small or large), be it pain, anguish, or grief, for that reason, but rather because of the dismissal. It is the Trial Court that speaks of moral damages due to the 'wait in the situation in which he found himself -unemployed- was pressing to resolve his status and meet his personal commitments'. In other words, Mr. Miranda Garita requested moral damages for one cause, and the Trial Court granted it to him for another that was not alleged. Under these circumstances, the appealed judgment must be reversed insofar as it grants compensation for moral damages.” On the other hand, always within the order of proportionality, the 'prudent assessment of the Judge' (prudente apreciación del Juez) regarding the damage and its compensation is spoken of, in the following manner: "For the foregoing, the court must consider the appropriateness of the head in question, to which effect the First Chamber (Sala 1º. de la Corte Suprema) has stated: 'VI. Although moral damages -in relation to the matter in question- due to their nature allow a broad margin of discretion to the judge regarding their determination, this must necessarily be observed within certain unavoidable parameters; for example, the former Court of Cassation (Sala de Casación), in judgment No. 114 of 16:00 hrs. on November 2, 1979, endorses the prudent assessment of judges '...when they are able to infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence (prueba de indicios).' This Chamber, in its decision No. 114-93, indicates that the mentioned prudent discretion (prudente arbitrio) must take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity. Around such concepts, the Chamber, in a later pronouncement, reasons in the following terms: 'It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, as these are invaluable goods, but about setting a monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism the law can resort to, in order to thus repair, at least in part, their offense. Within such a philosophy, establishing exorbitant compensations would not be appropriate, as happens in other legal systems, for that would produce the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profiteering with one's own honor and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our system as having the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 1739-92 of 11:45 hours on July 1 and No. 3495-92 of 14:30 hrs. on November 19, both of 1992). Applying them to situations like the present one, it is indispensable, when establishing the obligations arising from compensatory legal situations, to attend to the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, moral damages, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to multi-million compensations, as claimed. This would open an inconvenient loophole, giving way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjust enrichment that, far from repairing tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations, making it fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber (Sala Primera) No. 41 of 15:00 on June 18, 1993). VII. Recapitulating, it can be seen that the prudent discretion (prudente arbitrio) to be employed by the Judge in situations like the present one requires the observance of unavoidable parameters such as circumstantial evidence (prueba indiciaria), the specific circumstances of the concrete case, the general principles of law, equity, the position of the parties; the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. On such points, the interested party can and must offer proof as much as possible. Only thus can a prudent discretion (prudente arbitrio) be reached. Outside of such considerations, discretionary determination runs the serious risk of incurring an excess of power that distorts or vitiates res judicata. That is, the prudent assessment of the judge (prudente apreciación del juez), even counting on the realization of the generating event -as occurs in the present case- (principle 'in re ipsa'), requires the commented considerations or parameters concerning the damage, in order to establish the amount according to them. In the event that no elements of judgment on the matter are present in the court records, the judge must act accordingly, adopting a conservative attitude in the determination, for failure to do so could result in an excess of power.' Ruling 00093-2000 of the Contentious-Administrative Court, Section II (Tribunal Contencioso Adm. Sección II).

In accordance with the foregoing, the recognition of moral damages (daño moral) must be carried out with the understanding that, although direct proof is not required, Judges must exercise special prudence and proceed to their assessment under their prudent assessment (prudente apreciación), under criteria of equity, applying the presumptions of fact (presunciones del hombre) inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis, in order to determine the appropriateness and the quantum of the condemnatory judgment for this head within the limits of reasonableness and proportionality.

XII).- Regarding the moral damages invoked in the specific case: In the present proceeding, the plaintiff invokes moral damages consisting of moral affectations such as depression, fear, worry about the future of their family, uncertainty about their state and situation, powerlessness, and being impeded from carrying out a series of ordinary activities in their personal, professional, and family sphere. The defendants reject the existence of proof in this regard. With respect to this matter, this Court considers that from the experience of the events of Human Beings in general and of life, from logic, and from the consequences themselves of the situation that occurred, evident subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) to the detriment of Mr. Ríos Buján are apparent. As noted from what was stated by the plaintiff, the damages invoked are based fundamentally on the pain suffered and accessorily on the consequences of the proceeding elapsed due to the facts giving rise to the present lawsuit. In this sense, this Court is clear that in the specific case, there are three moments in which the moral damages suffered by the plaintiff occurred, namely:

• a)During the electric shock itself: At the moment when Mr. Ríos, and any other human being, suffers an electric shock (as was demonstrated in the court records), he feels pain, anguish, and uncertainty about his mortal existence. Added to the foregoing is the anguish about the situation and fate of his immediate family members and the doubt about the reason that caused the situation generating the damage and whether it will also affect his daughters. It must be noted that the event as it occurred was not foreseeable by the plaintiff and consequently prevented him from adopting any precaution for the well-being of his loved ones. An average human being facing a situation like the one demonstrated at trial will maintain a state of anguish, both about the future of their family nucleus, faced with the eventual loss of their person as head of the family and primary source of income, and about their own person. On the other hand, from the testimony of the witness Alejandro Matamoros León, it is evident that even the site where the plaintiff was located smelled of burnt flesh and hair, and thus, the fact that the electric shock caused significant burns on Mr. Ríos's body, which applying logic generates pain of special intensity, must also be taken into consideration for determining the existence of moral affectation.
• b)In the process subsequent to the electric shock: After having suffered the electric shock, it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff was subjected to a series of medical interventions, such as dressings, skin grafts, washings, bandage changes, which caused repeated pain. That fact alone is a cause of moral damages, to which must be added the uncertainty about the final consequences of what happened, the doubt about whether a definitive cure will be obtained or whether, on the contrary, the effects of what happened will persist in his life.

Additionally, the uncertainty about his family's condition and the impossibility of being with and socializing with his loved ones during the hospitalization period, coupled with the possibility of losing his left big toe (ortejo izquierdo) as a result of the incident and which still affects him today. To the above must be added stress from a potential loss of the economic income necessary to meet the food needs of his daughters, who are minors, and which contributed to the anguish the plaintiff must have suffered during his stay at the respective hospital. c) In the very after-effects of the electric discharge: After leaving the hospital, the plaintiff has also suffered other moral damages. On the one hand, the condition of his first left big toe (ortejo izquierdo), which despite the time elapsed still shows no signs of healing, the uncertainty about this aspect for the future and its consequences for normal walking, supporting his foot and even his work, imply damage to his inner self, given the anguish and moral pain this can entail. Correlatively, we have the statements made at trial by Mr. Ríos Buján’s spouse regarding the impact this event has had both on their private life and on his relationship with his daughters, given the current state of said big toe (ortejo) (which could be verified upon inspection by the Trial Court), as well as the statements of the affected person regarding its impact on ordinary aspects of life such as recreation – playing football with friends, work activities, running, etc. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff was subjected to rehabilitation therapies, which also entail an impact of pain and emotional distress. To the above, it must be added that the consequence of a permanent twelve percent impairment of his general capacity is sufficient cause to consider a moral damage (daño moral) to the plaintiff as established. The defendant parties are not correct when they deny the causality between the invoked harm and the facts that are the subject of this proceeding, since from these facts, in re ipsa and according to criteria of logic, experience, and common understanding, the indicated moral injuries are reliably inferred. By reason of the foregoing, the claim for compensation in this regard should be granted, but with the understanding that this Panel believes the amount requested by the plaintiff is not proportional and is therefore excessive. In this line of reasoning, the party requests a condemnation to pay the sum of thirty million colones. Notwithstanding the above, it is considered that for the indicated level of moral harm, a lower amount is appropriate, given that the sum of twenty-three million colones adequately compensates the affliction, uncertainty, pain, and anguish indicated above, since although serious, the damage caused does not transcend into a disability or major injury that would permanently or with greater severity and seriousness prevent him from other personal, family, work, or private spheres. This is not to detract from the fact that in the plaintiff's case, serious moral harms occurred, as are being recognized, but rather to emphasize that the events could have had even more serious consequences for the plaintiff, which fortunately did not transcend in his specific case. As has been demonstrated, on December 15, 2009, a pre-conciliation agreement was signed with the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad in which he was paid three million colones as an advance on the amount established as compensation, such that the plaintiff was paid the sum of said amount via electronic transfer. By reason of the foregoing, from the sum indicated for moral damage (daño moral), what has already been paid as compensation in the administrative venue must be deducted, and therefore the co-defendants must be ordered to pay the sum of twenty million colones as part of the judgment indicated in this ruling." For its part, the representative of said Institution argues that its officials did not participate in what occurred against Mr. <b>Ríos Buján</b>, given that it was caused by the co-defendants and the company <b>Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L.</b>, which assumes the risk of the service provision on its own account, as stated in the bidding terms for the respective procurement. In this regard, the case file shows that the employees of the company <b>Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L.</b>, Messrs. <b>Allan Eduardo Gómez García</b> and <b>Luis Ángel Marín Camacho</b>, carried out the installation of a telephone line at the plaintiff's home on July 24, 2009, such that as a result of this, an induced electrical discharge was caused to the plaintiff, which caused him physical and moral damages, as will be determined in subsequent considerandos. In this vein, it is noted that a contractual bond operates between the indicated company and the co-defendant entity, whereby the former is responsible for the installation of telephone lines assigned to it by said public entity, according to the service requests generated in response to the requirements of the entity's clients. Additionally, this Court has deemed it demonstrated that the service request is made after a prior inspection by an official of the Institution of the place where the respective electrical installation will be carried out (it must be taken into consideration that even if there were no inspection, there would always be liability for said reason of lack of ex ante oversight and periodic review of the electrical network under its responsibility), such that in the area where the plaintiff resides, the electrical service connections pass and are supported above the low-voltage lines to achieve greater height, and consequently the neutral of these lines is below the minimum height established for this purpose. There is also evidence that prior to the installation of Mr. <b>Ríos Buján</b>'s telephone line, there were different telephone lines previously installed, despite the indicated situation. By reason of the foregoing demonstrated facts, this Court deems that in the present case there is evident liability of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the damages caused to the plaintiff. Firstly, it must be taken into consideration that the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) of the defendant entity encompasses not only the conduct or omissions of its servants, but also those of third parties it contracts on the occasion of its institutional objectives. In this vein, the liability arises both from the creation of a risk situation on the occasion of the provision of a public service, and from the potential unlawfulness of a conduct of its own or of a contracted third party that generates a harmful consequence. The contracting of a third party for the provision of all or part of a public service has a merely instrumental purpose for the fulfillment thereof and the satisfaction of the public interest, and in no way relieves the strict liability established in the legal system for a public entity. Stated differently, the circumstance that the service is not provided directly by the entity and that it employs other means provided for by the legal system for the fulfillment of the assigned public purposes does not exonerate it from liability and, on the contrary, keeps its duty to compensate intact, without prejudice to the determination of joint and several liability (solidaridad) vis-à-vis the affected party. In these cases, given the existence of conduct or omission by a contractor, the contracting entity cannot invoke the existence of the act of a third party to evade its liability, since in the case of the company, its participation in the harmful conduct is immediate (having to answer for the act itself) and in the case of the Institution, it may be immediate or mediate, depending on whether the existence of some degree of direct participation in what occurred is demonstrated at trial, or simply, the conductive link of the situation generating the risk. Precisely the strict liability that every public entity possesses rests on the unlawfulness of a harm caused to the Administered Party that the latter has no duty to bear, and thus any unlawful situation that occurs during or on the occasion of the provision of a public service implies the breach of the Administration's obligation (whether it provides it directly or through third parties) to have effective and efficient functioning, and correlatively signifies an impact on the citizen's right to obtain a timely, technical, effective, efficient service and, above all, one that does not cause them a harm which by its mere existence results in an abnormal functioning of the Administration. In this vein, it should be recalled what is provided in Article 4 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, as it provides the following: "<i>The activity of public entities shall be subject as a whole to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and the equality of treatment of recipients, users, or beneficiaries</i>". In the same sense, Article 5.a) of the Ley de la Administración Financiera y de Presupuestos Públicos indicates: "<i>The administration of the financial resources of the public sector shall be oriented towards the general interests of society, attending to the principles of economy, effectiveness, and efficiency, with full subjection to the law</i>". In light of the foregoing, since strict liability is a liability without fault, what matters is the verification of the existence of the damage, which, for its compensability, must be linked to an unlawful conduct related to the Administration, that is, joined by the conductive thread of the causal nexus (nexo causal). In cases of third parties contracted by the Administration, as these are considered collaborators of the latter for the due fulfillment of public purposes, said link will be based on the existence of a prior contractual relationship that generates a conduct producing an unlawful damage, which occurs despite the contractual and legal duties (Art. 13 of the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, Art. 5 of the Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos and 151 of its Regulation) existing between the contracting company and the respective contracting administration. Said link would only be broken in those cases where the Public Administration demonstrates that, despite having employed and exhausted all means at its disposal (preventions, sanctions, oversight, initiation of contractual resolution proceedings, etc.), the contractor persisted in carrying out a specific action and the harmful event still occurred. The foregoing considerations are based on the fact that the relationship between the parties is not of a linear nature (administered party-contractor-contracting administration), but rather is three-dimensional, in which the linkage of the parties is systemic and dynamic, and therefore the Public Administration holds direct obligations vis-à-vis the Administered Party, for purposes such as control, accountability, verification of due internal control, transparency, fulfillment of the public purpose, and above all, liability. Thus, there is no disassociation of the Administration from the final result of the procurement carried out, which ultimately has a merely instrumental nature of the public service finally provided. A service as an obtained product that is not satisfactory to the user, or is delivered late, or worse, causes them harm, is attributable to the Administration itself, as a defective manifestation of its conduct. In the case of the defendant entity, the foregoing considerations are fully applicable, since as a public entity-company, it is subject to the administrative legality block applicable to the matter in accordance with Article 190 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, in relation to Article [space] of said normative body. Moreover, to what has been stated regarding the entity's strict liability, it must be added that the duty of oversight of contractual execution established in Article 13 of the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa applies to the relationship between the Institution and the contracted company, as it provides: "<i>The Administration shall oversee the entire execution process, for which the contractor must offer the necessary facilities...</i>" To determine the entity's liability, one must take into consideration not only the general strict liability that assists it, but also its obligations of correct verification of the execution of the contractual object, so that if damages arise on the occasion of this and the fulfillment of said public duty is not demonstrated, the duty of reparation of the respective Public Administration is necessarily reinforced. On the other hand, it is also necessary to indicate that it was demonstrated in the case file, as has been stated, that in the plaintiff's case, just as occurs in other cases of identical requests for telephone services, the service request is made after a prior inspection by an official of the Institution of the place where the respective electrical installation will be carried out, further that in the area where the plaintiff resides, the electrical service connections pass and are supported above the low-voltage lines to achieve greater height, and consequently the neutral of these lines is below the minimum height established for this purpose. That is, the risk situation generating the damage was public, evident, and notorious, and consequently known by the defendant entity, despite which it tolerated said situation and omitted to adopt any conduct to correct such a situation. The foregoing is reinforced since it has been deemed demonstrated that in the area where the plaintiff's telephone connection was made, several lines already existed, installed since some time ago. As noted, we are therefore, in addition to the considerations made ut supra, in the presence of an omission to act by the sued entity translated into a material inactivity in which ICE did nothing to prevent the occurrence of a situation generating a risk and which ultimately caused the damages that are the subject of this proceeding. The case file has discussed whether said damages were caused by the effects of an electric arc produced when electricity passed through said phenomenon to the telephone cable installed for the plaintiff, or by direct contact of wires. This Tribunal deems that such discussion is irrelevant for the purposes of determining the existence of liability for the damage caused. In both scenarios, the existence of strict liability makes the duty to compensate necessary by the mere fact of the occurrence of the harmful event and the verification of the damage. In either case, the most relevant part of the situation described is that the plaintiff received an electrical discharge to his person, which he would not have suffered had the act of installing the telephone line not been carried out. This is the relevant fact for the purposes of determining the arising liability, and the party cannot be burdened with the duty to prove what caused the electrical discharge, when in this case it has been deemed demonstrated that it occurred and that it occurred on the occasion of the provision of a service by a company contracted by a public entity. The discussions between the defendant parties in the indicated senses should not affect the plaintiff's rights, for the simple reason that both are vested with strict liability by legal imperative, it not having been demonstrated that there exists a circumstance excluding their duty to compensate, given the causal nexus of both with the harmful event. The representative of ICE invokes that the co-defendant company conventionally assumed any liability that might arise on the occasion of the services it provides. In addition to the foregoing considerations that refute what was stated by the sued entity, it must be pointed out that admitting such a thesis would legitimize that, through the procurement of services or works, the constitutionally protected strict liability is blurred and, even more so, rendered nugatory, especially in the current era, in which said mechanism for the provision of services by the State (e.g., construction of works, provision of social services, professional activities such as notary services, engineering, etc.) is commonplace, given the paradigm shift regarding its operation and impact on public affairs. As has been indicated, the Public Administration maintains duties inherent to the principles governing it and to the soundest standards and techniques applicable to the matter, which imply that contracting a third party for the provision of goods or services does not mean abdicating its liability or the necessary oversight and follow-up of what was agreed, from the beginning to the end of the effects of the contractual relationship, which may even extend beyond the mere expiration of the formal contract. Therefore, it is appropriate to uphold the claim with respect to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and to determine the existence of a duty to repair the damages caused to the plaintiff on the occasion of the events subject to this proceeding.- <b> VII).- <u>Regarding the Application of the Consumer Protection Law</u></b> <b>: </b>The protection of consumer rights is based on Article 46 of the Constitución Política, amended by Law No. 7607 of May 29, 1996, as it establishes the following: "<i>Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they constitute for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters.</i> " This constitutional provision arises on the occasion of the determination of a new generation of citizens' rights, in the face of phenomena arising from consumer society and market rules, and the evident inequality of the consumer vis-à-vis producers and distributors of goods and services. In this vein, it has been stated that "<i>Modern techniques for introducing products, marketing methods, and the stimulation of demand via advertising constitute other elements that accentuate the defenselessness of consumers, bewildered about the real content of their acquisitions towards which they feel psychologically driven through effective motivating mechanisms... The buyer's interlocutor is no longer generally a known merchant. Large supermarket chains appear that, as is the general case, sell products created in series by major national and international complexes. The imbalance between the economic agents involved is thus evident. Public authorities have also reacted to this situation, partly due to their awareness of service, to which the existence of interests that affect the entire population in one way or another cannot be foreign... </i>" Ramón Martín Mateo. Derecho Público de la Economía, Editorial Ceura, P. 270. Regarding the first references to the recognition of consumer rights in our jurisprudence, it is necessary to cite the judgment of the Sala Constitucional No. 1441-92 of 3:45 a.m. on June 2, 1992, which emphasizes the special protection of the consumer due to their position of inferiority in the consumer relationship, in this regard it expressed: “<i>Indeed, it is notorious that the consumer is at the extreme end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and commercialization of the consumer goods they need to acquire for their personal satisfaction and their participation in this process does not respond to technical or professional reasons, but rather to the constant conclusion of contracts in a personal capacity. Therefore, their relationship in that commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection against the suppliers of goods and services, to the effect that prior to expressing their contractual consent, they have all the necessary elements of judgment to allow them to express it with complete freedom, and this implies thorough knowledge of the goods and services offered. Included by what has been expressed, in a harmonious mix, are several constitutional principles, such as the state concern in favor of the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual liberty by facilitating individuals the free disposition of assets with the aid of the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health when involved, the ordering and systematization of reciprocal relationships between the interested parties, the alignment of international commercial practices with the internal system, and finally, the greater protection of the inhabitant's functioning in the means of subsistence.</i>“ Based on these orientations, in 1994 Law No. 7472, Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, was approved, which in its Article 1 establishes the following: "<i>The objective of this Law is to effectively protect the rights and legitimate interests of the consumer, the protection and promotion of the process of competition and free competition, through the prevention, prohibition of monopolies, monopolistic practices, and other restrictions on the efficient functioning of the market, and the elimination of unnecessary regulations for economic activities</i>" This Law establishes in its Article 29 a series of substantive and procedural rights of consumers, among which the following stand out, for the relevant purposes: <i>"Without prejudice to what is established in treaties, international conventions to which Costa Rica is a party, ordinary domestic legislation, regulations, general principles of law, usages, and customs, the following are fundamental and inalienable rights of the consumer: a) Protection against risks that may affect their health, safety, and the environment. b) The protection of their legitimate economic and social interests.... f) Effective access mechanisms for the administrative and judicial protection of their rights and legitimate interests, which lead to adequately preventing, sanctioning, and promptly repairing the injury thereof, as applicable....."</i> In this vein, it is worth mentioning that doctrine has analyzed the concept of consumer from two points of view, as a client and as a final recipient. Regarding the first concept, it is indicated: <b>“</b><i>it exceeds that of the acquiring consumer protected by Law 24,240 (Argentine Consumer Protection Law) because it refers to all subjects who contract to acquire goods or services offered in the market, both to meet their private needs and for a business activity (...) while as a final recipient the concept refers to the person who acquires goods or services for their consumption or private use, 'who acquires goods or contracts services for a destination unrelated to any activity of production, transformation, commercialization, or provision to third parties…'</i><b>. </b>(Barrantes Jaime and another, Derecho y Jurisprudencia en Materia de Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor. Ediciones Jurídicas ARETE, San José, C.R., 1999, p. 21). For its part, the Sala Constitucional of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, in relation to the figure of the “consumer,” has stated: “…<i>it is notorious that the consumer is at the extreme end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and commercialization of the consumer goods they need to acquire for their personal satisfaction and their participation in this process does not respond to technical or professional reasons, but rather to the constant conclusion of contracts in a personal capacity. Therefore, their relationship in that commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection against the suppliers of goods and services, to the effect that prior to expressing their contractual consent, they have all the necessary elements of judgment to allow them to express it with complete freedom, and this implies thorough knowledge of the goods and services offered. Included by what has been expressed, in a harmonious mix, are several constitutional principles, such as the state concern in favor of the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual liberty by facilitating individuals the free disposition of assets with the aid of the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health when involved, the ordering and systematization of reciprocal relationships between the interested parties, the alignment of international commercial practices with the internal system, and finally, the greater protection of the inhabitant's functioning in the means of subsistence…</i><b>” </b>(Voto No. 1441-92 of 15:45 hours on June 2, 1992). On the other hand, the cited law, in what is of interest for this proceeding, provides in its Article 32 the following provision regarding the liability of the producer and the merchant: <i>"The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, of inadequate or insufficient information about them, or of their use and risks.</i> <i>Only one who demonstrates that they were unrelated to the damage is released."</i>. With respect to this type of liability, it can be determined that it is strict by excellence and, therefore, the verification of the causal nexus —i.e., the relationship of the damage with the events creating it and the objective imputation, according to the risky conduct created— is fundamental. The Sala Primera, in its Voto 646-F-2001 of 16:45 hours on August 22, 2001, in the same sense, points out the elements of this type of liability, stating: <i>"... Three are the elements that make up this type of liability, namely: a) the use of things that entail danger or risk; b) causing damage of a pecuniary nature; and c) the relationship or causal nexus between the event and the damage. Summarizing: '...in objective civil liability there must be a causal nexus between the risky activity set in motion by the agent and the damage caused' (Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, No. 354 of 10:00 hours on December 14, 1990). From a practical point of view - says the Costa Rican jurist Víctor Pérez Vargas - '...objective liability is summed up as an advantage in favor of the injured party that means a partial reversal of the burden of proof, in the sense that the latter is exonerated from the burden of proving the fault (negligence or willful misconduct) of the person causing the damage, and the attempt of the latter to prove their lack of fault would be in vain...' (Pérez Vargas, Víctor, Derecho Privado, First Edition, Editorial Publitex, San José, Costa Rica, 1988, p. 417). That is, it corresponds to the person or company to whom the liability is attributed to demonstrate that the damages were produced by force majeure or by the fault of the victim (doctrine that informs numerals 32 second paragraph of Law No. 7472 and 1048 fifth paragraph of the Código Civil)... ”</i> Based on the foregoing, we can determine that in the case of the economic agent's liability, the subjective concept of willful misconduct or fault is also not relevant, and the determination of the causal nexus between the event and the damage produced is of special importance, the defendant being restricted only to demonstrating the breaking of said link or the nonexistence of the damage. In this vein, Voto No. 655 of 15:05 hours on September 19, 2007, issued by the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, provided: <i>“(…)This conception arises because the fault model was insufficient to respond to the multiplication of dangers and damages typical of modern life. The theory of risk, understood in the sense that whoever exercises or takes advantage of an activity with potentially dangerous elements for others must also bear its inconveniences, came to change most legislations. It is also called the created damage theory, whose imputation paradigm lies in attributing the damage to anyone who introduces into society an element with the potential to produce it, having to disregard the subjectivity of the agent, and focus on the problem of reparation and its limits around material causation. It only matters to investigate which event was the cause of the effect in order to impute it, given that the production of the harmful result is sufficient, the configuration of an unlawful act through the traditional elements being unnecessary. As a corollary of the foregoing, the fault, negligence, recklessness, or incompetence of the agent are not the essential elements for the birth of the obligation within the parameters of strict liability. Hence, it is of no importance, to disprove it, to demonstrate that one did not incur in any of them. In this same sense, see judgment No. 61 of 14:50 hours on June 19, 1997, of this Chamber. For this reason, the notion of risk substitutes the concepts of fault and unlawfulness, dispensing with them as criteria for imputation. It focuses on a conduct or activity of a physical or legal subject, characterized by the setting in motion of a dangerous service, or the mere possession of a dangerous object. Therefore, the element to consider is the created risk. On this particular topic, see judgment No. 376 of 14:40 hours on July 9, 1999, of this collegiate body. It must be added that it assumes that the origin of the obligations is the lawful use of dangerous things, and that by causing damage, they require whoever uses them to compensate it. For the configuration of this type of liability, the following components must be present: a) the use of things that entail danger or risk; b) causing damage; and c) the relationship or causal nexus between the event and the damage. Finally, it is important to mention that, within this subject matter, a partial reversal of the burden of proof operates, in the sense that the injured party is exonerated from the burden of proving the fault or willful misconduct of the person who caused the damage. Consequently, it falls upon the natural or legal person to whom the liability is attributed to demonstrate that the damages were produced by force majeure or by the victim's fault. Doctrine that informs numerals 35 second paragraph of Law No. 7472 and 1048 fifth paragraph of the Código Civil</i>.” (Likewise, see Resolution No.

646-F-2001 of 16:45 on August 22, 2001, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). In this line of reasoning, the origin and scope of Article 35 of the Law on the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense must be understood and interpreted as instituting strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) for the producer, supplier, and merchant who injure the consumer's legal sphere by reason of the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks. Thus, they must respond regardless of incurring fault. The only exception arises if they demonstrate they were unrelated to the damage. Consequently, the injured party is exempt from demonstrating the fault or willful misconduct of the party who caused the damage, and the latter must prove that it was caused by force majeure or by the fault of the victim, as the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has specified in the cited rulings, in light of the doctrine informing numerals 35, second paragraph, of Law No. 7472 and 1048, fifth paragraph, of the Civil Code. Complementary to the foregoing, in order to determine the damage, it is necessary to indicate the requirement of a relationship between the claimed damage and the conduct displayed by the economic agent. In this line of reasoning, doctrinally different criteria of objective imputation have been indicated, among which *adequate causation* (causalidad adecuada) stands out for these purposes. Regarding this criterion, the following has been doctrinally indicated: "<i>The defendant's conduct is an adequate cause of the damage suffered by the victim if, ex ante, the causation of the damage was foreseeable—not highly improbable—by the defendant. But authors have never agreed on what degree of probability—between 0 and 1—is adequate according to the law; and they have always disagreed about whether the judgment on probability should consist of a purely subjective prognosis—similar to that carried out in the analysis of willful misconduct and fault—that is, a judgment on the avoidability of the result, or whether, on the contrary, the prognosis must be objective in the sense that an agent endowed with special knowledge would have had to know the probability of the production of the result</i>". (<u>Causalidad y Responsabilidad</u>. Pablo Salvador Coderch and Antonio Fernández Crende. Revista para el análisis del derecho. WWW.INDET.COM.) In this sense, the position of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has settled, as noted in ruling 467-F-2008 of 14:25 on July 4, 2008, which indicates: <i>".... a fortuitous event does not allow the merchant or producer to be exempted from civil liability, since no judgment of reproach is made regarding their activity. Only force majeure and the act of the victim allow the merchant or producer to be exonerated from civil liability, insofar as both circumstances imply the exclusion of causation, an element that is indispensable for both subjective liability and strict liability to exist. It is for the judge to examine in each case whether or not there is direct and adequate causation between the damage claimed (and demonstrated) by the petitioner and the activity (active or omissive) displayed by the producer or merchant. It is clear that in the present case it would be excessive to require the consumer to have the level of safety devices that the lawsuit exposes in its second-instance grievances, since that, as the court rightly said, would imply obligating consumers to an excessive duty of care, beyond what is reasonably required of the average person. The defendant did not demonstrate that the cause of the incident was attributable to the victim herself, due to lack of care, negligence, or recklessness....</i>" It is based on these considerations that the liability of the co-defendant company must be determined.

**VIII).-** The plaintiff indicates in their lawsuit that the damages caused to them were immediately provoked by the conduct of the employees of **Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L.** , given that it was during the installation of their telephone line that the corresponding electric shock was caused to them. The representation of said company indicates that the electric shock suffered by the plaintiff was due to the conditions of the distribution lines in the area, such that in the case under analysis, all connections were made according to the established procedure and there was no direct contact with the electricity cables. It indicates that what occurred was due to the phenomenon called "<i>electric arc</i>" (arco eléctrico), and not the striking of the telephone cable with the primary or secondary electricity line, given that if this had happened, a protection consisting of an automatic electric cut-off would have been activated. In this regard, this Tribunal considers that although it has been demonstrated in the proceedings that the electric cable in the area where the plaintiff resides is outside the established standard for this purpose, such that the electric service drops pass over and are supported above the low-voltage lines to achieve more height and the neutral of these lines is below the minimum height established for this purpose, there is strict liability of the defendant company. The foregoing insofar as, as has been indicated, the damages caused to the plaintiff occurred during the installation of the telephone line for him by the employees of the co-defendant company, Messrs. **Allan Eduardo Gómez García** and **Luis Ángel Marín Camacho.** That is, Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L. was an active participant in the process of installing the telephone line for Mr. Ríos Buján, and this was a direct and efficient cause of the invoked damages. Again, it is necessary to indicate that it is irrelevant whether the damage was caused by direct contact of the telephone cable with the secondary electricity cables or by an "<i>electric arc</i>," insofar as what is relevant is that damage was caused as a product of an activity carried out by the defendant company, which is duly demonstrated in trial and was not contested. Even more, it cannot be said that the very fact of the potential existence of the so-called "<i>electric arc</i>" is sufficient grounds to exempt the plaintiff company from liability. Just as its existence as a situation of a fortuitous event (an event inherent to the activity, unforeseeable and inevitable) would not have been grounds to break the causal link and exempt ICE from liability, neither is it for the defendant company, given that at no time has it demonstrated, as it was its responsibility, that it was unrelated to the damage caused. On the contrary, the same evidence provided by the co-defendant party indicates the following: "<i>... the electric service drops have had to pass over and be supported above the low-voltage lines to achieve greater height</i> <i>and that even so it is insufficient, since the 4.00-meter height of the neutral of the low-voltage lines is well below the minimum established height.</i> <i>A risk has been identified for the technician in the need to install the telephone service drops above the low-voltage network, a situation present at the time of the accident. As an additional consideration, it is determined that the telephone cable is not constructed with adequate insulation for low voltage, a situation present at the time of the accident...</i>". The foregoing was reinforced by the testimonial declaration of the author of the indicated report, Mr. Edwin González Marroquín, and it reinforces a fundamental consideration, namely, that despite the risky conditions in terms of the location, height, and situation of the telephone lines in the area where the plaintiff's residence is found, it was decided to carry out the corresponding installation, without any objection or warning to ICE about the indicated situation being recorded. That is, the company, reflected in the actions of its employees, accepted the risk that the installation of telephone lines under the stated conditions could entail, and the potential and uncertain, but possible, risk of the creation of the alleged electric arc. From the statements of the co-defendants, it is inferred that they were aware of the existence of an inadequate situation in the location and height of the electric lines and of their specific relationship with the line to be installed, such that despite said risk, they chose to continue their work and not alert anyone about the situation encountered in the specific case. Their liability cannot be exempted by the fact that other telephone lines had been placed previously, inasmuch as their work made them aware that said situation was neither correct nor safe. Now, independently of the previous judgment of reproach regarding the activity displayed (which can be used to refute any argument about the existence of an act of a third party), it must be understood that in the present case we are in a scenario of strict liability in which there is a duty to indemnify if the existence of effective, assessable, individualizable, and unlawful damage is demonstrated, linked to conduct or omission by the company, and regarding which, the client or user has no duty to bear it. In this line of reasoning, again the necessary judgment must be made to determine the so-called efficient cause. For this Tribunal, the damage to the plaintiff would not have been caused if the defendant company had not carried out the telephone installation despite the known and described conditions of the electric lines. Moreover, the liability of the defendant company occurs by reason of the very risk existing in its activity, wherein the causal link arises from the performance of the activity which, although lawful, constitutes a source of risk and, consequently, an origin for the party who benefits from its profits to bear its drawbacks before the administration itself or third-party users or clients. The activity of installing telephone lines, placing cables, and transmitting electricity is per se risky and does not exclude an event such as the one that occurred, which, whether by the placement of the electric cable or by the alleged "<i>electric arc</i>," is inherent to the service provided, independently of any subjective assessment. It is for this reason that although there is proof of knowledge of the potential situation that could derive from the location and height of the cables to be placed, vis-à-vis the electric lines, the elements of fault, negligence, recklessness, or lack of skill of the agent are not requirements for the obligation of strict liability in this case. For its configuration in the situation under analysis, one must take into consideration the demonstration of the existence of the commercial activity carried out by the defendant company (which has not been refuted), the damage caused (to which we will refer later), and the existence of the relationship or causal link between the two previous presuppositions (which are duly demonstrated), and where it has not been proven that the company was unrelated to what happened, due to the concurrence of force majeure, an act of a third party, or the fault of the victim. In the case under examination, there is a consumer relationship, given the sui generis and three-dimensional relationship described supra, in which the defendant company sells a service to ICE, but whose final recipient is a third party, the plaintiff, who directly receives the benefits of what was agreed. Thus, the plaintiff, as a client of the entity, is at the same time a consumer of the commercial activity carried out by the co-defendant company, was the final recipient of the service, and therefore was, for purposes of said situation, at the lower end of the service chain ICE- Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L.- plaintiff. For the foregoing and in accordance with the very nature of consumer rights, within the scheme of strict liability, it is not possible to burden the administered party with the duty to demonstrate whether the damage was caused by electric contact or by an arc of such nature. What is relevant is that damage occurred on the occasion of the service provided by the company (immediate and effective cause), as has been indicated, regardless of the underlying technical cause. It is the company's duty to demonstrate that what happened was in no way linked to its actions, proof which in the case under examination was not provided and, on the contrary, the very statements of Messrs. Gómez García and Marín Camacho evidence their link to the generating event of the invoked damage. Thus, this Tribunal concludes that the necessary presuppositions converge to impute liability to the co-defendant company, and therefore, in accordance with Article 35 cited in the preceding considerando, its scope is fully applicable to it, and consequently, it is appropriate to uphold the lawsuit with respect to the same and determine the existence of a duty to repair the damages caused to the plaintiff on the occasion of the events that are the subject of this proceeding.- **IX).- <u>On extra-contractual civil liability:</u>** The liability of private law subjects not linked by a prior contractual or consumer relationship is governed by the provisions of Article 1045 of the Civil Code, insofar as it provides: "<i>Anyone who by willful misconduct, fault, negligence, or recklessness, causes damage to another, is obliged to repair it together with the losses</i>". In accordance with the foregoing, unlike the more modern trends in liability matters where this is objectified, as we have seen both in the case of the co-defendant company and the entity, in the case of extra-contractual civil liability provided for in the Civil Code, one must start from the existence of subjective imputation criteria, so that a duty arises to compensate the damages caused on the occasion of the conduct or omission of a private law subject. The duty of indemnification arises on the occasion of the breach of a legal duty not to harm another (<i>alterum non laedere</i>), where there is an imputation criterion or judgment of reproach based on the fulfillment of the indicated subjective presuppositions that charge the respective conduct as unlawful. Thus, such will be an action or omission that is carried out with willful misconduct, fault, negligence, or recklessness. As noted, in said norm, incorporated into our Civil Code of 1888 and based on the Code Napoléon of March 18, 1803, the figures of culpability and liability are linked, and it was assumed that the former had to be present for the latter to proceed. Thus, the subject is only obligated to repair damage if it is the product of willful conduct or gross fault (assimilating it to a punishment), which has its source in the penal origins of all determinations of liability. Regarding the composite nature of this presupposition of liability, damage plus conduct branded as unlawful by the legal system, ruling 335-2008 of 9:00 on December 19, 2008, of the First Section of the Superior Civil Tribunal, indicated: "<i>As can be verified, for damage to be configured, in the legal context, three presuppositions are required: 1) a patrimonial or extra-patrimonial loss, 2) that it is caused by the action or omission of a person, to the affected subject (victim), and 3) that this loss has been caused in an unlawful manner. The damage constitutes the harmful breach for the victim, resulting from confronting the situation prior to the occurrence of the harmful action or omission, with the situation subsequent to it; up to this point one can speak of damage in a generic sense. However, for the damage produced to find protection in the legal system, in such a way that it must be compensated by the producing agent, it must not only derive from an activity or omission imputable to the third party (the second presupposition defined as the causal link), but also this active or omissive conduct must be qualifiable as illicit…</i>" In accordance with the foregoing, to impute liability, the demonstration of the damage must be added to the verification that the conduct is classified as unlawful, according to what is stated in Article 1045 of the Civil Code. It is not enough, as was the case with the co-defendants, to verify the damage and the existence of the causal link to generate liability, but it will also be necessary, the proof that the conduct of the party to whom the duty to compensate is imputed, was done with willful misconduct, fault, negligence, or recklessness. In this case, the considerations made about the theory of causation in the matter are also applicable. In this line of reasoning, it has been indicated that "<i>In Civil Law we use the 'theory of adequacy' for the causal relationship to establish the relationship between the act and the damages (and losses). The adequacy theory is also known by the name of the 'adequate condition theory' or as the 'adequate causation theory.' According to this theory, only that cause which is adequate to produce the result is a condition of the result, and this cause is considered adequate when a person with discernment could foresee that this result could occur given the presence of certain circumstances, natural in the face of common sense and the good judgment of their reasoning. But since these concepts are so broad and so difficult to limit, the criterion of due diligence is also used, according to which, if a result occurs, despite having acted without contravening the duty of due diligence, that is, acting without omitting the care required in a specific situation, one acts within the field of what is legally permitted, so that said condition of the result will not be its cause in a legal sense. In this way, the foreseeability of the average person and due diligence are the criteria used by civil law to determine when a certain behavior—in the civil sense—is a condition of the result</i>". (Madrigal Navarro Javier. La imputación para la reparación del daño en sedes civil y penal Revista Judicial, Costa Rica, No. 105, September 2012). On the other hand, it must be indicated that the subjective liability contemplated in the norm cited supra imposes on the victim of the damage the duty to demonstrate the willful misconduct or fault of their counterpart (which starts from an ideological postulate proper to criminal matters based on the principle of innocence) and which is found in the <i>onus probandi</i> proper to and classic of civil matters, established in Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. Again, an important distinction arises regarding the cases of strict liability analyzed previously, given that in this case, it is not enough for the defendant to demonstrate that they were unrelated to the damage, but rather the plaintiff party has the duty to demonstrate the subjective liability presuppositions indicated above, under penalty of their lawsuit being declared without merit.- **IX).-** In the case under examination, it is noted that the party asserts the existence of liability with respect to Messrs. **Gómez García and Marín Camacho** , by reason of their direct participation in the installation of the telephone line that caused the damages invoked by the plaintiff. For their part, the representation of the co-defendants indicates that all connections were made according to the established procedure and there was no direct contact with the electricity cables, but rather the phenomenon called "<i>electric arc</i>" occurred, because the electric cable in the area where the plaintiff resides is outside the standard established for this purpose. Given the foregoing, the situation was impossible to foresee and is imputable to the lack of regulation by ARESEP regarding network protection and the distribution of heights and distances thereof. It indicates that there is no proof of the existence of negligence or lack of a duty of care on the part of the defendant company's workers. In this regard, this Tribunal has taken as demonstrated that the persons who directly carried out the installation that produced the plaintiff's injuries were the co-defendants, such that it has been demonstrated that when placing the telephone line in question, the co-defendants were aware of the risk situation implied by the fact that the telephone wiring would be left at a short distance from the electricity cables, that is, passing over the so-called pentagram and with the respective telephone service drops in a situation such that they "<i>... have had to pass over and be supported above the low-voltage line...</i>.", as indicated by the very study requested by the Company that holds the employer role of the co-defendants. For this Panel, it is evident that what is described demonstrates a breach of the duties of average diligence of the indicated Messrs. Gómez García and Marín Camacho, insofar as it is not reasonable to accept that persons with experience in the matter were remiss in at least warning of the situation presented and chose, without any objection, to carry out the respective telephone installation under the stated conditions. The atypical nature of the height and location of the electric and telephone lines at the plaintiff's place of residence and the technical criteria expressed in trial, indicate that given the situation encountered at the job site, there existed a level of foreseeability that a risk situation could occur, in the event of installing another telephone line under the stated situation. The statements of the co-defendants present an express acknowledgment of their acting in the indicated sense, insofar as in the trial hearing they stated that throughout the sector the wiring is poorly designed, and that they had to install the plaintiff's telephone line despite the foregoing, above the electric pentagram. On the other hand, there is also proof that the installation of the telephone line was carried out by the co-defendants from the plaintiff's house towards the distribution box, such that, on the contrary, the procedure established by ICE for the installation of fixed lines starts from actions at the latter towards the applicant's domicile. In this line of reasoning, in the requested confessional evidence, both co-defendants admit to having started the installation of the connection at the plaintiff's home, and then proceeding to carry out the rest of the installation procedure outward from the same, despite the fact that the procedure manual for the installation of conventional services and with E.R. technology indicates the steps to follow in the following manner: "<i>7.12. Displace technician to the Distribution Box. 7.13. Test for presence of tone on the pair associated with the OTC. 7.13.1. If there is a tone, displace to the client's property and continue with point 7.14.... 7.14. The required conditions exist (network and client infrastructure, client's address and location, client's presence on the property, and official service request documentation) to execute the installation of the OTC in accordance with current regulations...</i>" As can be seen, the breach of the technical standard established in the procedure manual applicable to the matter indicates that in the installation of the telephone line for the plaintiff, the defendants deliberately departed from the conditions required in the matter, and recklessly allowed the electricity to travel from the respective cable to his person. Had the established procedure been followed, that is, from the distribution box to the home and not the other way around, the original conditions that generated the invoked damages, and which were produced when the plaintiff was the sole recipient of the respective discharge, would have been modified. Even the witness offered by the co-defendants, who held the position of General supervisor of the company at the time of the events, Mr. **Carlos Luis Jiménez Fallas,** expressly indicated that telephone lines should not be installed above the electric pentagram.

For the reasons stated above, the defendants are incorrect when they indicate that all the connections were made in accordance with the established procedure, given that the case file demonstrates the contrary. Nor is it reasonable to accept the argument that the given situation was impossible to foresee, because the electrical and telephone line presented an evident abnormality in terms of its height and location, impossible not to be seen by the responsible officials, who, due to their experience, were clearly aware of the risks generated. Furthermore, the defendant party did not demonstrate that the harm caused to the plaintiff was attributable to a lack of regulation by ARESEP regarding the protection of the network and the distribution of its heights and distances. There is no evidence in the case file of an omission on its part, nor is the existence of a normative duty on its part to regulate the matter evident. In any case, the responsibility in this regard lies with the public entity responsible for the area of fixed telecommunications, which has already been found jointly and severally liable in this judgment. Given the foregoing considerations, it is deemed that sufficient evidence exists of negligence or lack of duty of care on the part of the workers of the defendant company and, consequently, it is appropriate to grant the claim with respect to the co-defendants and determine the existence of a duty to repair the damages caused to the plaintiff as a result of the facts that are the subject of this proceeding.- XI).- On the material damage: The plaintiff in his claim invokes material damages consisting of serious damage caused to different parts of his body and possible damage to his heart, lungs, kidneys, and liver. He indicates burns, grafts, and the impairment of his left toe to such a degree that it became useless for its basic functions. In the case under examination, one must begin from the considerations made regarding the prerequisites of damage as such for it to be compensable. In this sense, Article 317 of the Código Procesal Civil applies, insofar as it provides: "The burden of proof falls on: 1) The one who formulates a claim, regarding the affirmations of the constitutive facts of their right. 2) The one who opposes a claim, regarding the affirmations of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right". In this regard, although it is true that the existence of possible damage to the heart, lungs, kidneys, and liver has not been demonstrated, as was indicated at some point in the claim, nor is any other material damage evidenced as proven, by means of medical-legal opinion DML-2010-13694 of November 9, 2010, from the Department of Legal Medicine, a temporary disability of five months for the plaintiff and a permanent disability of seven percent of his general capacity were determined. Notwithstanding the foregoing, with respect to the definitive impairment suffered by the plaintiff, the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) indicated that the plaintiff presents an impairment of twelve percent of the general capacity. This court considers it appropriate to apply this latter criterion, since the assessment made by the indicated entity, independent of its etiology, corresponds to a diminution of faculties or aptitudes for work, given its legal nature, such that the plaintiff is a salaried person, for whom, for purposes of determining material damage, the relevant factor is, above all, the verification of the degree of the impairment suffered by him in his faculties to work. An impairment in the abstract, detached from the reference point of the human aptitude to exercise one's labor and thus bring to the family home the income necessary for the satisfaction of basic needs, is neither admissible nor relevant. In the case under examination, it should not be overlooked that the material damage invoked is fundamentally a bodily injury (daño corporal), which is understood as "any somatic or psychic alteration that, in one way or another, disturbs, threatens, or unsettles the health of the sufferer, or simply, limits or diminishes the personal integrity of the affected party, whether organically or functionally. Any diminution of the integrity of the individual's biology is sufficient, independent of its practical repercussions in one or more fields of human activity" (M. Rodríguez, cited by Laborda Calvo Eugenio in Cesión de Datos o Consentimiento Informado en Valoración del Daño Corporal). For his part, another author more recently defines it as "the consequences that a specific traumatic event has had on the psychophysical integrity and health of a person. When the traumatic event is attributable to a third party, the latter is obliged to answer for said consequences, whether of a criminal, civil, labor, or administrative-litigation nature." (Hernández Cueto cited by Laborda Calvo Eugenio in Cesión de Datos o Consentimiento Informado en Valoración del Daño Corporal). In our country, having had a monopoly on insurance for more than 60 years, the National Insurance Institute (INS) possesses extensive experience in the administration of the bodily injury assessment and repair program, such that these assessments constitute an expert evaluation where the identity of the injury, the degree of incapacity, the possibilities of recovery, the modifications imposed by physical pain are defined or diagnosed; furthermore, they clearly indicate the consolidation of the lesions and their possible complications, as well as the impact on life expectations, albeit without there being rules in the assessment of bodily injury that can establish an economic equivalence with the prejudice suffered, which is why one speaks of the existence of a principle of expert discretion. For the reasons stated above, taking into consideration that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff to his body, the existence of which in his left toe was duly verified during a judicial inspection, affect his capacity to work, as demonstrated, it is deemed appropriate to use the indicated impairment of twelve percent of the general capacity and five months of temporary disability, as stated by the National Insurance Institute, as a parameter for determining the material damage suffered. In this line of thought, it is not that the existence of another opinion with a lower percentage is disqualified, but rather that it is deemed that for the plaintiff's particular situation and his requirements for the use of his future work capacity, the expertise of the insurance entity is more applicable to the specific case. It is necessary to indicate that in the case under examination, the defendant parties have not demonstrated that the indicated damage does not meet the characteristics established in Article 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, that it is not "...effective, evaluable and individualizable..." or that it was not caused as a result of the facts that are the subject of this claim or is not attributable to the victim. In some parts of the interventions of the defendant parties, they suggest the possibility that the damage could be caused by the act of a third party, force majeure, or that the level of injuries demonstrated could even have arisen due to the victim's own conduct (lack of care with hygiene and dressings on the plaintiff's affected finger). None of this was proven, the mere statement of the party in this regard not being sufficient. Proof is necessarily required that in some way provides elements of conviction to determine that the causal link between the indicated facts and the invoked damage has been broken. On the contrary, all existing evidence reliably indicates that the plaintiff's injuries were caused directly and evidently by the electrical discharge produced as a result of the service for the installation of his fixed telephone line by the co-defendants. Nor is the argument of the co-defendants' lawyer acceptable, in the sense that, because the plaintiff did not provide the corresponding funds for the mathematical expert and the expert's work was not carried out due to his fault, he finds himself in a situation of evidentiary deficiency. It should be noted that the expert examination to be carried out would be on the quantum of the damage and not on its existence in itself, it being possible for such work to be carried out in the sentence execution phase. In this state of affairs, it is appropriate to find jointly and severally liable, in the abstract, the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, Técnicos en Telecomunicaciones SAL S.A., Allan Eduardo Gómez García and Luis Ángel Masís Camacho to pay Mr. Diego Alonso Ríos Buján the sums corresponding to the permanent disability of twelve percent of the plaintiff's organic capacity, as well as five months of temporary disability, both suffered as a result of the facts demonstrated in the present proceeding. Said amounts will be determined in the sentence execution phase.

XII).- On the moral damage: With respect to the possibility of compensating the moral damage that may have been caused as a result of conduct by the Administration, Articles 9 and 41 of the Constitución Política must also be applied, given that the former makes no distinction whatsoever regarding the responsibility of the State and the latter expressly refers to the possibility of protecting "moral" interests, among which is the possibility of compensating both subjective and objective moral damage. Furthermore, the American Convention on Human Rights provided on this subject: "Article 11: 1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. 3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." "Article 24: All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law." "Article 5.1: Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected." Even prior to the entry into force of the Constitución Política of 1949 or the approval of said Convention in the late 1960s, since the 19th century, Article 59 of the Civil Code prescribes: "The right to obtain compensation for moral damage is established in cases of injury to personality rights." Specifically, in national administrative law, Article 197 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública provided: "There shall be liability for damage to purely moral assets, as well as for the moral suffering and physical pain caused by death or by the injury inflicted, respectively." Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is appropriate to make some clarifications on the matter, based on doctrine and various judicial resolutions issued on the subject, given the particularities existing with respect to this type of damage, considering that in the case of subjective moral damage, since the most intimate sphere of the individual is affected, the common rules regarding the proof of damage cannot be applied when the injury affects the subject's estate. In this line of thought, it has been said, "To prove moral damage in its existence and entity, it is not necessary to provide direct proof; rather, the judge must assess the circumstances of the fact and the moral qualities of the victim to establish objectively and presumptively the moral grievance in the reserved sphere of the passive subject's privacy. We do not believe that moral grievance must be the object of direct proof, as this is absolutely impossible due to the nature of the same, which resides in the most intimate part of the personality, although it sometimes manifests through external signs that may not be an authentic expression ... no one can inquire into the spirit of another so deeply as to be able to affirm with certainty the existence and intensity of pain, the truth of suffering, the reality of anguish or disappointment" (Bustamante Alsina, "Equitativa valuación del daño no mensurable", 1990. p 655 and 656). The foregoing considerations are based on the appreciation that moral damage must be seen as in re ipsa or in itself, given that to have configured a spiritual prejudice, it is not necessary to prove suffering or depression manifested towards third parties, since it rather implies the alteration of the existential balance of persons, within their most intimate sphere, and is not necessarily disclosed or externalized in its full dimension towards third parties, insofar as the latter depends on the personality of each injured individual and based on the fact that human reactions have diverse forms and opportunities for manifestation. Therefore, in the event that the existence of conduct (death of a loved one, loss or injury of a moral or patrimonial asset, impairment of fundamental rights, etc.) that could affect the sphere of intimacy of the person—by causing pain, anguish, suffering, etc.—is demonstrated, it is interpreted that moral damage necessarily exists, such that its intensity and, therefore, the means for its compensation, will be determined in accordance with the criteria that we will analyze below in this same Considerando. It is, then, based on the impaired subjective rights that we can speak of the existence of moral damage, given that it arises from the violation of one of the inherent personality rights and that are therefore considered extra-patrimonial. For this reason, it is said that moral damage arises with the mere demonstrated occurrence of the formal or material action of the Administration or the omission of action that violates said rights. In this line of thought, it is appropriate to refer to the following: "Since moral grievance is the necessary and inescapable consequence of the violation of some of the personality rights of a subject, the demonstration of the existence of said transgression will entail, at the same time, the proof of the existence of the damage. The determination of the existence of moral damage can be carried out as objectively as the verification of patrimonial injury. It is necessary for this purpose only to confront a fact with the legal norm that grants a subject a right inherent to the personality, to verify whether the former constitutes or not a violation of what is prescribed in the latter..." (Brebbia Roberto. El Daño Moral. Editorial Orbir.) Furthermore, it should be noted that it has been accepted that within the framework of the theory of liability of the Public Administration, in principle, it would be valid to accept the possibility that the defendant can prove the existence of one of the circumstances exonerating from liability established in Article 190 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, namely, force majeure, the fault of the victim, or the act of a third party; or even prove its non-existence or lesser severity than that invoked. It has thus been indicated that "The amount that is fixed must be a faithful reflection of the circumstances described in the case file, so that it results in an appropriate sum, given the problems suffered by the injured party, caused by the criminal or civil wrongful acts of the agent or agents producing the damage. Because these are iuris tantum presumptions, they admit proof to the contrary, regarding which the defendant or active subject of the damage must be extremely diligent, since the burden of proof falls on them to rebut the presumptions of pain, suffering, mortification, or grievance, and for this purpose may resort to any type of ordinary proof." (Montero Piña Fernando. El Daño Moral, Page 61. Impresión Gráfica del Este). Not without noting that some doctrine has maintained that for any damage resulting from lawful and normal conduct, when the level of intensity is excessive, no type of exoneration is applicable. In this line of thought, this Court considers it advisable to make some clarifications with respect to moral damage that will be fully applicable for the resolution of the execution submitted for its knowledge. Firstly, it should be highlighted that regarding moral damage, we speak of a compensatory function and not the equivalence sought in the case of material damage. Additionally, it should not be overlooked that moral damage does not escape the certainty that it must be a consequence of the action or omission of the administration, and the injured interest of the person invoking it must be certain. In this line of thought, the following has been indicated: "Moral damage is not pain, sorrow, or anguish but the spiritual diminution derived from the injury to a non-patrimonial interest. Said detriment exists even if the injured party lacks comprehension of the prejudice suffered; in the absence of tears; even when the victim is not in physical or 'psychic' conditions to 'feel' sorrow, pain, or anguish (e.g., a brain-dead person). The subjective disvalue exists when the victim has 'matured' that pain and perhaps ceased to 'feel' it. Conceived in this way, it is immediately apparent that moral damage can project its effects into the future, with a sufficient degree of certainty..." (Daniel Pizarro Ramón Daño Moral. Ed. Hammurabi. Page 105). Furthermore, moral damage is personal in nature, depending on the impairment of a legitimate interest of the affected party. Regarding the scope of moral damage in our country, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) in its vote No. 112 at 14:15 hours of July 15, 1992, repeatedly cited and applied by different jurisdictional instances, indicated: "IV.- Damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of extra-contractual civil liability, since the duty to compensate is only configured if a harmful wrongful act has occurred that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the legal system. Damage, in the legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (injured party), which causes the deprivation of a legal asset, regarding which its conservation was objectively expectable had the harmful event not occurred. Under this approach, there is no civil liability if no damage occurs, just as there is no damage if there is no injured party. Furthermore, only damage that is proven (reality or existence) is compensable, this being a question of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In summary, damage constitutes the harmful gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the wrongful act with the situation subsequent to it. V.- On many occasions, the expressions 'damages' and 'losses' are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to clarify and distinguish both concepts. Damage constitutes the loss caused to the injured party (damnum emergens), while loss is made up of the frustrated or forgone profit or benefit (lucrum cessans), which was reasonably and probably expectable had the wrongful act not occurred. VI.- Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For this purpose, the following characteristics must basically concur for it to be a 'compensable damage': A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical; it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations. Damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, indeterminate, or difficult to assess or prove; certainty should also not be confused with present existence, since the repair of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage should not be confused with lost profit or loss, because the former refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating fact of the damage, that is, its repercussions do not project themselves at the time the process is initiated. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes a matter of unique subjective concern to the injured party; however, the law cannot concern itself with claims based on insignificant damages, derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be an injury to a legally relevant interest deserving of protection. Thus, there can be a direct injured party and an indirect one: the former is the victim of the harmful act, and the latter will be the successors of the victim. C) It must be caused by a third party and be subsistent, that is, if it has been repaired by the responsible party or a third party (insurer), it becomes unsubstantiated. D) There must be a causal relationship between the wrongful act and the damage. VII.- Within the classes of damages, material and bodily injury (daño material and daño corporal) are found in the first instance, the former being that which affects the things or material goods that make up the person's estate, while the latter impacts physical and bodily integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage, the specific ones of bodily injury and material damage, in the strict sense, are usually encompassed. The second seems to be the more appropriate expression, since bodily injury usually affects the injured party's patrimonial interests (payment of medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage has incapacitated them from performing their usual occupations (losses), etc. This distinction originated in Roman Law, distinguishing between damage inflicted on things directly (damnum) and that which injured the individual's physical person (injuria). In patrimonial damage, the diminishment generated proves to be economically assessable. VIII.- Moral damage (also called in doctrine non-material, extra-patrimonial, affective damage, etc.) occurs when the sphere of the individual's extra-patrimonial interest is injured; however, since its violation can generate patrimonial consequences, a distinction must be made between 'pure' subjective moral damage, or affective damage, and objective or 'objectified' moral damage. Subjective moral damage occurs when an extra-patrimonial right has been injured, without impacting the estate, normally involving an unjust disturbance of the individual's mental conditions (disgust, discouragement, despair, loss of satisfaction in living, etc., e.g., grievance against honor, dignity, intimacy, the so-called damage to the life of relation, affliction due to the death of a relative or loved one, etc.). Objective moral damage injures an extra-patrimonial right with repercussions on the estate, that is, it generates economically assessable consequences (e.g., the case of the professional who, due to the attributed act, loses their clientele in whole or in part). This distinction serves to separate the damage suffered by the individual in their social consideration (good name, honor, honesty, etc.) from that suffered in the individual field (affliction due to the death of a relative); thus, one refers to the social part and the other to the affective part of the estate. This distinction originally arose to determine the scope of compensable moral damage, since initially doctrine was reluctant to compensate pure moral damage due to its difficult quantification. For compensation, a distinction must be made between the different types of moral damage. In the case of objective moral damage, the corresponding demonstration must be made as occurs with patrimonial damage; but in the case of subjective moral damage, since its amount cannot be structured and demonstrated precisely, its determination falls to the prudent discretion of the judge, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, general principles of law, and equity, the lack of proof regarding the magnitude of the damage not being an obstacle to fixing its amount. The dogmatic difference between patrimonial and moral damage does not exclude that, in practice, one and the other occur concomitantly; this could be the case of injuries that generate physical pain or cause disfigurement or physical deformity (damage to health) and aesthetic damage (breaking of the physical harmony of the face or any other exposed part of the body), without moral damage thereby being deemed secondary or accessory, as it evidently has autonomy and peculiar characteristics. In summary, moral damage consists of physical, psychic, affective, or moral pain or suffering inflicted by a wrongful act. Normally, the fertile field of moral damage is that of personality rights when they are violated." Based on the foregoing, it is evident that in the case of subjective moral damage, the existence of direct proof is not required; rather, certain criteria are applicable that delimit the discretion of the Judge and that derive from its own legal nature and have been developed by national jurisprudence. Thus, in the resolution mentioned above, general principles of law and equity are established as the first delimiting criterion, such that through vote 556-2003 of the Second Section of the Contencioso-Administrative Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), the following was also provided as a criterion: VI.- Referring to subjective moral damage, the situation is different, and it is already made clear that the State is incorrect in its opposition. It is an undeniable fact that there was injury due to the unlawful conduct of the Ministry of Education, as declared by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the consequence of which is, therefore, to seek as far as possible the effective restoration of the affected subjective sphere, given the lack of timely response to an administrative claim, for the granting of which, when dealing with this type of damage, proof is unnecessary, the simple verification of the generating fact sometimes being sufficient for its compensation, independent of the recognition or rejection of other merely patrimonial aspects, for which the physical demonstration of those produced is indispensable.

The foregoing does not mean that it can be granted by the mere claim, since proof of its existence and severity is necessary, a burden that, without a doubt, corresponds to the victim; however, it has been allowed that its verification may be achieved based on indications, since this occurs when intimacy, honor, psyche, health, and physical integrity are affected, among others, the severity of which, without a doubt, corresponds to the claimant, <u>its existence being able to be proven through human presumptions (presunciones de hombre) inferred from circumstantial elements</u>, and therefore its proof is *in re ipsa*, as has been repeatedly stated by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Court". </i>(Emphasis added). We have then that a second delimiting criterion of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) are the human presumptions inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis. Likewise, from various judicial rulings and from judgment 413 of November 19, 2002, of the First Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Section I (Tribunal Contencioso Adm. Sección I), other criteria are evidenced, namely: <i>"III. By subjective moral damages, the doctrine has understood that affection that impacts the emotional sphere of persons causing worry, suffering, anxiety, and other negative and harmful emotions, the origin of which is the unlawful acts caused by the plaintiff. By their nature, they are difficult to prove by ordinary means, so the judge may estimate it by examining the circumstances contained in the case file and applying <u>his experience</u>, the general principles of law, and those of <u>rationality and proportionality.</u> " (Emphasis added)</i>. These latter criteria have been developed in a relevant manner to limit the possibility of recognizing exaggerated or disproportionate compensation. In this vein, the First Chamber has indicated: <i>" <u>The point is not, then, to quantify the value of a subject's honor and dignity, since these are invaluable assets, but rather to set monetary compensation for their injury</u></i> <i>, the only mechanism the law can resort to, to thus repair, at least in part, the offense. <u>It would not fit within such a philosophy to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems,</u></i> <i>because this would produce the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profiting from one's own honor</i> <i>and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law<b>, </b><u>are those of reasonableness (razonabilidad) and proportionality (proporcionalidad)</u><b> </b>, which have been recognized in our system as having the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) #1739 - 92 at 11:45 a.m. on July first and 3495-92 at 2:30 p.m. on November nineteenth, both of 1992). Applying them to situations such as the present one, it is essential, when setting the obligations arising in compensatory legal situations, to consider the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations.</i> <i>In this sense, moral damages, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to million-dollar compensation, as claimed. That would open an inconvenient loophole<b> </b>to give way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations making it fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber, vote 141 at 3:00 p.m. on June 18, 1993, and No. 99 at 4:00 p.m. on September 20, 1995) (Emphasis added). </i>The causality of the damage (daño) is another unavoidable criterion of nature, insofar as the real cause thereof can determine the scope and limits of the remedial estimation. This can be clearly inferred from vote 00099-2003 of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Section II (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección II), insofar as it indicated: <i>" IV.- It is essential to establish what is understood by moral damages, for which purpose, this Tribunal permits itself to cite judgment No. 112 of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992, from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice: “VII.- Within the classes of damages, material damage (daño material) and bodily damage (daño corporal) are found in the first place, the former being that which affects the things or material assets that make up a person's patrimony, while the latter affects bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage (daño material o patrimonial), the specific ones of bodily damage and material damage, in the strict sense, are usually included. The second seems to be the most felicitous expression, since bodily damage usually affects the patrimonial interests of the injured party (payment for medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), lost earnings if the damage has incapacitated them from performing their usual occupations (consequential damages (perjuicios)), etc. This distinction was born in Roman Law, since a distinction was made between damage inflicted on things directly (damnun) and that which injured the physical personality of the individual (injuria). In patrimonial damage, the impairment generated turns out to be economically assessable. VIII.- Moral damages (daño moral) (also called in doctrine incorporal, extra-patrimonial, of affection, etc.) is verified when the sphere of the individual's extra-patrimonial interest is injured; however, since its violation can generate patrimonial consequences, it is pertinent to distinguish between subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) "pure", or of affection, and objective moral damages (daño moral objetivo) or "objectified". Subjective moral damages occur when an extra-patrimonial right has been injured, without repercussion on the patrimony, normally supposing an unjust disturbance of the individual's mental conditions (disgust, discouragement, despair, loss of satisfaction with living, etc., e.g., the offense against honor, dignity, intimacy, the so-called damage to life in relation, affliction for the death of a family member or loved one, etc.). Objective moral damages injure an extra-patrimonial right with repercussion on the patrimony, that is, it generates economically assessable consequences (e.g., the case of the professional who, due to the attributed act, loses their clientele in whole or in part). This distinction serves to separate the damage suffered by the individual in their social consideration (good name, honor, honesty, etc.) from that suffered in the individual field (affliction for the death of a relative); thus, one refers to the social part and the other to the affective part of the patrimony. This distinction was born, originally, to determine the scope of compensable moral damage, since at first the doctrine was reluctant to compensate pure moral damage, due to its difficult quantification. For compensation, a distinction must be made between the different types of moral damage. In the case of objective moral damage, the corresponding demonstration must be made, as happens with patrimonial damage; but in the case of subjective moral damage, since its amount cannot be structured and demonstrated precisely, its determination is left to the prudent discretion of the judge, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity, the lack of proof regarding the magnitude of the damage not being an obstacle to setting its amount. The dogmatic difference between patrimonial and moral damage does not exclude that, in practice, one and the other may appear concomitantly; it could be the case of injuries that generate physical pain or cause disfigurement or physical deformity (damage to health) and aesthetic damage (daño estético) (breaking of the physical harmony of the face or any other exposed body part), without moral damage being thereby deemed secondary or accessory, since it evidently has autonomy and peculiar characteristics. In short, moral damages consist of physical, psychic, of affection, or moral pain or suffering inflicted by an unlawful act. Normally, the fertile field of moral damages is that of personality rights when they are violated." Also, regarding proof of moral damages, the same cited judgment stated: "XIII.- Regarding proof of moral damages, the principle is as follows: its existence and severity must be proven, a burden that corresponds to the victim; however, it has been admitted that such proof can be achieved through human presumptions inferred from indications, since the unlawful generating event reveals the moral damage, because when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, intimacy, etc. are damaged, it is easy to infer the damage, and for this reason it is said that proof of moral damages exists "in re ipsa". On this matter, this Chamber has stated that in matters of moral damages "... it is sufficient, on some occasions, with the performance of the culpable act for the damage to arise from it, according to the prudent assessment of the Trial Judges, when it is possible for them to infer the damage based on proof of indications " (Judgment No. 114 at 4:00 p.m. on November 2, 1979)". In the present case, when the plaintiff requested moral damages, he stated: “The serious moral damage that the Respondents caused with their acts, Which (sic) came to psychologically harm my integrity, Which (sic) were duly reasoned by the Investigating Magistrate and For (sic) which I request a forensic expert exam to determine the sequelae of the coerced damage upon being subjected to humiliations and Internal Pressures (…) Upon being unjustly dismissed by MINAE, it caused (sic) the destruction of my home, since my wife left me because I could not support her, and to this day I have not been able to find work, we were thrown (sic) out of the dwelling where we lived and I had to go live crammed in at my mother's. Also, a housing loan was in process and due to my dismissal it could not be done.” The entire issue of the plaintiff's dismissal and, of course, its material or moral consequences, cannot be discussed within the present process, because it bears no causal relationship with the facts that motivated the granting of the amparo appeal: non-payment of employment entitlements, which in this case, was limited to the non-payment of vacation time. The enforcing party never expressly or implicitly referred to having suffered a mental disturbance (small or large), be it pain, anguish, grief, for that reason, but rather because of the dismissal. It is the Trial Court that speaks of moral damages due to the “waiting in the situation in which he found himself -unemployed- was pressing to resolve his state and face his personal commitments”. In other words, Mr. Miranda Garita requested moral damages for one cause, and the Court granted them for another not alleged. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to revoke the appealed judgment insofar as it grants compensation for moral damages." </i>On the other hand, always within the order of proportionality, mention is made of the "prudent assessment of the Judge" of the damage and its compensation, in the following manner: <i>"Therefore, the tribunal must consider the appropriateness of the item under discussion; to this effect, Chamber I of the Supreme Court has stated: " VI. Although moral damages -in relation to the subject in question- due to their nature allow a wide margin of discretion to the judge regarding their determination, this must necessarily be observed within certain unavoidable parameters; for example, the former Court of Cassation, in judgment No. 114 at 4:00 p.m. on November 2, 1979, endorses the prudent assessment of the judges "...when it is possible for them to infer the damage based on proof of indications." This Chamber, in its ruling No. 114-93, indicates that the aforementioned prudent discretion must take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity. Around such concepts, the Chamber, in a later pronouncement, reasons in the following terms: "The point is not, then, to quantify the value of a subject's honor and dignity, since these are invaluable assets, but rather to set monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism the law can resort to, to thus repair, at least in part, the offense. It would not fit within such a philosophy to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems, because this would produce the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profiting from one's own honor and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law, are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our system as having the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1739-92 at 11:45 a.m. on July 1 and No. 3495-92 at 2:30 p.m. on November 19, both of 1992). Applying them to situations such as the present one, it is essential, when setting the obligations arising in compensatory legal situations, to consider the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, moral damages, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to million-dollar compensation, as claimed. That would open an inconvenient loophole, to give way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations making it fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber No. 41 at 3:00 p.m. on June 18, 1993). VII. In summary, it is understood that the prudent discretion to be employed by the Judge in situations such as the present one supposes the observance of unavoidable parameters such as circumstantial evidence, the specific circumstances of the concrete case, the general principles of law, equity, the position of the parties; the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. On such extremes, the interested party can and must offer proof as far as possible. Only in this way can a prudent discretion be reached. Outside of such considerations, discretionary determination runs the serious risk of incurring an excess of power that disfigures or distorts what has been adjudicated. That is, the prudent assessment of the judge, even counting on the realization of the generating event -as occurs in the present case- (principle "in re ipsa"), requires the considerations or parameters discussed, regarding the damage, in order, in accordance with them, to establish the amount. In the event that elements of judgment on the matter are not present in the case file, the judge must act in consonance with such a situation, adopting a conservative attitude in the determination, since failure to do so could result in an excess of power."</i> Vote 00093-2000 of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Section II. In accordance with the foregoing, the recognition of moral damages must be carried out with the understanding that although it does not require direct evidence, the Judges must have special prudence and proceed with its assessment under their prudent assessment, under equity criteria, applying human presumptions inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis, in order to determine the appropriateness and the quantum of the condemnatory judgment on this point within the limits of reasonableness and proportionality.

**XII).- On the moral damages (daño moral) invoked in the specific case**: In the present process, the plaintiff invokes moral damages consisting of moral affections such as depression, fear, worry about the future of his family, uncertainty about its state and situation, impotence, and he was prevented from carrying out a series of ordinary activities in his personal, work, and family sphere. The defendant parties reject the existence of proof in this regard. With respect to this point, this Tribunal considers that from the experience of the facts of the Human Being in general and of life, from logic, and from the consequences in themselves of the situation that occurred, evident subjective moral damages are noted to the detriment of Mr. Ríos Buján. As is noted from what was stated by the plaintiff, the damage invoked is fundamentally based on the pain suffered and subsidiarily on the consequences of the process elapsed due to the facts giving rise to the present lawsuit. In this sense, this Tribunal is clear that in the specific case, there are three moments in which the moral damages suffered by the plaintiff occurred, namely: **a) <u>During the electric shock itself</u>:** At the moment when Mr. Ríos, and any other human being, suffers an electric shock (as was demonstrated in the case file), he feels pain, anguish, and uncertainty about his mortal existence. In addition to the above, there is the anguish about the situation and fate of his immediate family members and the doubt about the motive that originated the damage-generating situation and whether it will also affect his daughters. It must be noted that the event, as it occurred, could not have been foreseen by the plaintiff and, consequently, prevents him from adopting any provision for the well-being of his loved ones. An average human being facing a situation like the one demonstrated at trial will maintain a state of anguish, both for the future of his family nucleus, given the eventual loss of himself as head of the family and main source of income, and for itself. On the other hand, from the testimony of witness Alejandro Matamoros León, it is evidenced that even the site where the plaintiff was located smelled of burnt flesh and hair, thus it must also be taken into consideration for determining the existence of moral injury (afección moral) the fact that the electric shock caused significant burns on Mr. Ríos' body, which, applying logic, generate pain of special intensity. **b) <u>In the process following the electric shock:</u></b> After having suffered the electric shock, it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff was subjected to a series of medical interventions, such as wound dressings, grafts, washings, bandage changes, which caused repeated pain. That fact alone is a cause of moral damages, to which must be added the uncertainty about the final consequences of what happened, the doubt about whether a definitive cure will be obtained or whether, on the contrary, the effects of what occurred will persist in his life. Additionally, the uncertainty about his family's condition and the impossibility of being and socializing with his loved ones during the hospitalization period, coupled with the possibility of losing his left toe as a result of what happened and which still continues to affect him today. To the above must be added stress from a potential loss of economic income necessary for the satisfaction of the food needs of his minor daughters, which impacts the anguish that the plaintiff must have suffered during his stay in the respective hospital. **c) <u>In the very sequelae of the electric shock</u></b> **:** After leaving the hospital, the plaintiff has also suffered other moral injuries. On one hand, the condition of his first left toe, which despite the time elapsed still shows no signs of healing, the uncertainty about this aspect regarding the future and its consequences in the normal sphere of walking, standing on his foot, and even working, imply internal damage, given the anguish and moral pain that this may signify. Correlatively, we have the statements made at trial by Mr. Ríos Buján's spouse about the impact that this event has had both on his intimate life and his relationship with his daughters, given the current state of said toe (which could be verified upon examination by the Trial Tribunal), as well as the statements of the affected party about its impact on ordinary aspects of life such as recreation - playing soccer with friends, work activities, running, etc. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff was subjected to rehabilitation therapies, which also involve pain and emotional impact. To the above must be added that the consequence of a permanent impairment of twelve percent of the general capacity is sufficient cause to deem moral damages determined for the plaintiff. The defendant parties are not correct when they deny the causality of the injury invoked with the facts that are the object of the process, since from these, *in re ipsa* and according to criteria of logic, experience, and common understanding, the indicated moral injuries are reliably inferred. By reason of the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the claim for compensation in this aspect, but with the understanding that this Panel considers that the amount requested by the plaintiff is not proportional and therefore is excessive. In this vein, the party requests that payment of the sum of thirty million colones be ordered. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is considered that the level of moral injury indicated corresponds to a lower amount, given that with the sum of twenty-three million colones, the affliction, uncertainty, pain, and anguish indicated above are adequately compensated, insofar as, although serious, the damage caused does not transcend to a disability or greater injury that would permanently or with greater seriousness and severity make other personal, family, work, or intimate spheres impossible for him. By stating the foregoing, the fact that serious moral injuries occurred in the plaintiff's case is not diminished, as is being recognized; rather, emphasis is placed on the fact that the events could have had even more serious consequences for the plaintiff, which fortunately did not materialize in his specific case. As has been demonstrated, on December 15, 2009, a pre-conciliation agreement was signed with the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad whereby three million colones were advanced to him as an advance on the amount to be established as compensation, thus the plaintiff was paid said sum via electronic transfer.

In view of the foregoing, from the sum indicated for moral damages (daño moral), what has already been disbursed as compensation in the administrative venue must be deducted, and therefore the co-defendants must be ordered to pay the sum of twenty million colones as part of the judgment indicated in this ruling." **V.- Regarding the liability of the Public Administration in general**: The duty to compensate all damages and losses caused by the actions and omissions of the Public Administration finds its specific basis in our country in the Constitution (Constitución Política) of 1949. This normative body established, on the one hand, the existence of a contentious-administrative jurisdiction as part of the fundamental rights enjoyed by all Costa Rican citizens. In this regard, its Article 49, with the amendments subsequently introduced, provides the following: *"The contentious-administrative jurisdiction is established as a power of the Judiciary, for the purpose of ensuring the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and any other public-law entity. Deviation of power shall be grounds for challenging administrative acts. The law shall protect, at a minimum, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered."* This provision must be read in conjunction with Articles 9 and 41 of our Magna Carta, which state: "*The Government of the Republic is popular, representative, participatory, alternative, and responsible. It is exercised by the people and three distinct and independent Powers.*" (Emphasis added) and "*By recourse to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have suffered in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, full justice, without denial and in strict accordance with the laws.*" Regarding the constitutional basis of State liability, ruling of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 5207-2004, of 14 hours 55 minutes on May 18, 2004, literally stated: *"Our Constitution does not explicitly enshrine the principle of the patrimonial liability of public administrations for the unlawful injuries they cause to the administered in the exercise of the administrative function. However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution, and can be inferred from a systematic and contextual interpretation of several constitutional precepts, principles, and values. Indeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Charter provides that "The Government of the Republic is (...) responsible (...)", which assumes the liability of the larger public entity or State and its various bodies –Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Powers. Article 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the "(…) criminal liability (…)" of public officials and the second paragraph refers to the "(…) personal liability of officials in the performance of their duties (…)". Article 34 of the Constitution protects "acquired patrimonial rights" and "consolidated legal situations," which can only be effectively and truly protected with a broad-spectrum system of administrative liability, without immune or exempt zones, when they are violated by public administrations in the course of their business or public performance. Article 41 ibidem establishes that "By recourse to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have suffered in their person, property, or moral interests (…)", this precept imposes a duty on the author and party responsible for the damage to compensate for the unlawful injuries actually suffered by the administered as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through positive actions or negative omissions of public entities, thereby becoming the cornerstone at the constitutional level for the legislative development of a system of strict and direct liability in which compensation does not depend on a moral and subjective reproach of the public official's conduct for intent or negligence, but solely and exclusively on having actually inflicted or suffered "(…) injuries or damages (…) in their person, property, or moral interests (…)", that is, an unlawful injury that they have no duty to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. Article 41 of the Constitution establishes a fundamental compensatory right in favor of the administered who has suffered an unlawful injury by an entity –through its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct– and the correlative obligation of the entity to compensate or repair it in full; the access to jurisdiction provided for in this same constitutional precept thus becomes an instrumental right to forcibly ensure the enjoyment and exercise of the compensatory right of the injured party when the party obligated to provide reparation voluntarily fails to comply with the aforementioned obligation. Article 45 of the Magna Carta embraces the principle of the inviolability of property by providing that "Property is inviolable; no one may be deprived of their own except for legally proven public interest, upon prior compensation in accordance with the law (…)", the fundamental text thereby recognizes that special sacrifices or singular burdens that the administered has no duty to bear or tolerate, even if arising from a lawful activity –such as the exercise of expropriation power– must be compensated. Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Constitution to the extent that it implicitly recognizes legal personality and, consequently, the possibility of suing public entities in court when they fail to comply with their obligations, constitutes a clear foundation for administrative liability. For its part, the final paragraph of the aforementioned Article 49 provides that "The law shall protect, at a minimum, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered," one of the primary forms of guaranteeing these being an objective, direct, broad, and comprehensive system of administrative liability. The final paragraph of Article 50 of the Constitution, regarding environmental damage, establishes that "The law shall determine the corresponding responsibilities and sanctions," a liability regime from which, obviously, public economic entities (known as state-owned enterprises-public entity) and public enterprises (also called public enterprises-private law entity) cannot be exempted when they pollute in the course of an industrial, commercial, or service activity, and, in general, the State when it fails to comply with its obligations to defend and preserve the environment through deficient oversight or control of public and private activities that are actually or potentially polluting. In the case of members of the Boards of Directors of Autonomous Institutions, Article 188 of the fundamental norm provides that "Their directors are responsible for their management." With regard to the Executive Power, Title X of the constitutional text contains a Chapter V entitled "Responsibilities of Those Who Exercise the Executive Power," with Article 148 enshrining the responsibility of the President for "the use made of those powers which according to this Constitution correspond to him exclusively," the joint responsibility of the President with the respective Minister of the sector "regarding the exercise of the powers which this Constitution grants to both" –which is specified by Article 149 ibidem– and that of the Government Council for the agreements it adopts. The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (Articles 18 and 33), which prevents imposing on the administered a singular or special burden or sacrifice that they do not have a duty to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which, if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or more administered and unjustly suffered by them. Finally, it is necessary to consider that the Constitution includes an innominate or atypical fundamental right, which is the right of the administered to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relation of Articles, interpreted a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the fundamental Law, insofar as they respectively set forth the deontological parameters of the administrative function, such as the "proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies," "good governance," and "efficiency of the administration." This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the obligation to act in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services in an efficient and effective manner, and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when that constitutional guarantee is violated. In this way, it is evident that the original constituent implicitly enshrined the principle of the liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter for interpreting, applying, integrating, and delimiting the entire legal system. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for any unlawful injury caused to the patrimonial or non-patrimonial sphere of the administered parties by its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct." (emphasis is ours). From the foregoing, it is evident that a duty of full reparability of the damage exists, which, based on the indicated provisions, derives from Article 190.1 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), as it provides that: "1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party". As can be seen, a system of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) governs in our country, whereby the duty of indemnification of the Administration operates, regardless of subjective valuation criteria (fraud or fault), in the actions of its servants. Furthermore, our legislation even provides for the possibility of claiming liability from the Administration due to legitimate conduct, in as much as Article 194 of the aforementioned normative body provides the following in this regard:

"1. The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and for its normal functioning when they cause damage to the rights of the administered party in a special manner, due to the small proportion of affected persons or the exceptional intensity of the injury". By reason of the foregoing, as observed, the central axis of the state liability system in our country is the victim of the damage, since that liability arises whenever its normal or abnormal functioning causes damage that the victim does not have the duty to bear, whether patrimonial or non-patrimonial, regardless of his or her subjective legal situation. However, this duty of reparation is not absolute, in the sense of being unrestricted for any type of damage; rather, in the case of damage originating from non-legal or abnormal administrative conduct, it must originate from the abnormality that means departing from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102, subsection d., which among other things includes effectiveness and efficiency) or due to poor functioning, or late action, or its non-existence, on the part of the Administration. This abnormality shall determine the unlawfulness (antijuricidad) as a prerequisite for the reparability of the damage. In the case of the legitimate functioning of the Administration, where there is no abnormality or illegality, the unlawfulness generating the possibility of indemnifying the damage arises from the non-obligation to suffer an impact that has the characteristic of being of exceptional intensity or affecting a small proportion of people. In this sense, it is worth clarifying that this liability is subject to other general provisions on the liability of the State contained in the General Public Administration Law. In this regard, consideration must be given to what is indicated in Article 196 of the General Public Administration Law, as it states the following: " In any case, the alleged damage must be effective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group". With respect to the damages that may be subject to reparation in contentious-administrative proceedings, the ruling of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) No. 112 of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992, among other things, indicated: “IV. Damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of tort liability, since the duty to repair is only configured if there has been a harmful illegal act that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the legal system. Damage, in a legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment of the patrimonial or non-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (injured party), which causes the deprivation of a legal right, with respect to which its conservation was objectively expected if the harmful event had not occurred. Under this reasoning, there is no civil liability if there is no damage, just as there is no damage if there is no injured party. Moreover, only damage that can be proven (reality or existence) is indemnifiable, this being a matter of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In sum, damage constitutes the harmful breach for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the illegal act with that subsequent to it. V.- On many occasions, the expressions "damages" (daños) and "losses" (perjuicios) are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to specify and distinguish both concepts. Damage constitutes the loss caused to the injured party (damnum emergens), while loss is constituted by the frustrated or lost profit or gain (lucrum cessans), which was reasonably and probably expected if the illegal act had not occurred. VI.- Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to repair. For this purpose, the following characteristics must basically converge to be a "compensable damage": A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical; it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations. Damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification turns out to be uncertain, indeterminate, or difficult to appreciate or prove; certainty should also not be confused with actuality, since the repair of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage should not be confused with lost profit or loss, since the former refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating event of the damage, that is, its repercussions are not projected when the process is initiated. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes a point of unique subjective concern to the injured party; however, the law cannot concern itself with claims based on insignificant damages derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection. Thus, there may be a direct injured party and an indirect one: the former is the victim of the harmful act, and the latter will be the successors of the victim. C) It must be caused by a third party, and subsisting; that is, if it has been repaired by the responsible party or a third party (insurer), it becomes non-subsisting. D) There must be a causal relationship between the illegal act and the damage. VII.- Within the classes of damages, there is, first of all, material damage and bodily harm, the former being that which affects the things or material goods that make up the person's patrimony, while the latter affects bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage, the specific ones of bodily harm and material damage, in a strict sense, are usually encompassed. The second appears to be the better expression, since bodily harm often affects patrimonial interests of the injured party (payment of medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage has disabled him from performing his usual occupations (losses), etc. This distinction was born in Roman Law, since a distinction was made between damage inflicted on things directly (damnum) and that which injured the physical personality of the individual (injuria). In patrimonial damage, the impairment generated is economically assessable….” In accordance with the foregoing, it is not sufficient to invoke damage; rather, its existence and the causal link that binds it to the conduct or omission of the responsible entity must be convincingly demonstrated.

VI).- The plaintiff claims the liability of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, ICE) for the damages caused to him, given that they occurred on the occasion of the installation of a fixed telephone line acquired from said entity. For its part, the representative of said Institution claims that its officials did not participate in what occurred against Mr. Ríos Buján, since it was caused by the co-defendants and the company Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L., which assumes the risk of providing the service on its own account, as indicated in the tender specifications for the respective contracting. In this regard, it is evident from the case record that the employees of the company Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L., Messrs. Allan Eduardo Gómez García and Luis Ángel Marín Camacho, carried out the installation of a telephone line at the plaintiff's house on July 24, 2009, and that on the occasion of this, an induced electric shock was caused to the plaintiff, which caused him physical and moral damages, as will be determined in subsequent recitals (considerandos). Following this line of thought, it is noted that a contractual bond operates between the indicated company and the co-defendant entity, whereby the former is responsible for installing the telephone lines assigned to it by said public entity, according to the service requests generated in response to the requirements of the entity's clients. Additionally, this Tribunal has held as proven that the service request is made after a prior inspection by an official of the Institution of the place where the respective electrical installation will be carried out (it must be considered that even if there were no inspection, there would always be liability for said reason of lack of ex ante supervision and periodic review of the electrical network under its responsibility), and that in the area where the plaintiff resides, the service drops (acometidas eléctricas) pass and are supported above the low-voltage lines to achieve greater height, and consequently, the neutral conductor of these lines is below the minimum height established for this purpose. There is also proof that prior to the installation of the telephone line for Mr. Ríos Buján, there were different telephone lines previously installed, despite the indicated situation. By reason of the foregoing proven facts, this Tribunal considers that in the present case there is evident liability of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute for the damages caused to the plaintiff. Firstly, it must be taken into consideration that the strict liability of the defendant entity encompasses not only the conduct or omissions of its servants but also those of third parties it contracts for its institutional objectives. In this line of thought, the liability derives both from the creation of a risk situation on the occasion of the provision of a public service and from the eventual unlawfulness of the entity's own conduct or that of a contracted third party that generates a harmful consequence. The contracting of a third party for the provision of all or part of a public service has a merely instrumental purpose for the fulfillment of the latter and the satisfaction of the public interest and in no way relieves the strict liability established in the legal system for a public entity. In other words, the circumstance that the service is not provided directly by the entity and that it uses other means provided by the legal system for the fulfillment of assigned public purposes does not exonerate it from liability and, on the contrary, keeps its duty to repair it intact, without prejudice to the determination of joint and several liability towards the affected party. In these cases, given the existence of conduct or omission by a contractor, the contracting entity cannot invoke the existence of the act of a third party to evade its liability, in as much as in the case of the company, its participation in the harmful conduct is immediate (it must respond for the act itself) and in the case of the Institution, it can be immediate or mediate, depending on whether the existence of some degree of direct participation in what occurred or simply the connecting link to the risk-generating situation is proven at trial. Precisely, the strict liability possessed by every public entity rests on the unlawfulness of damage caused to the Administered Party that he or she does not have the duty to bear, and thus any unlawful situation that occurs during, or on the occasion or motive of the provision of a public service implies the breach of the Administration's obligation (whether it provides it directly or through third parties) to have effective and efficient functioning and correlatively signifies an impact on the citizen's right to obtain timely, technical, effective, efficient service, and above all, one that does not generate damage that, by its mere existence, results in abnormal functioning of the Administration. In this line of thought, it must be remembered what is provided in Article 4 of the General Public Administration Law, as it provides the following: " The activity of public entities shall be subject as a whole to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and equality of treatment for the recipients, users, or beneficiaries". In the same sense, Article 5.a) of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law (Ley de la Administración Financiera y de Presupuestos Públicos) indicates: "The administration of the financial resources of the public sector shall be oriented to the general interests of society, adhering to the principles of economy, effectiveness, and efficiency, with full submission to the law". Given the foregoing, as strict liability is liability without fault, the relevant aspect is the verification of the existence of the damage, which, for its reparability, must be linked to unlawful conduct related to the Administration, that is, connected by the conductive thread of the causal link. In cases of third parties contracted by the Administration, as these are considered collaborators of the latter for the due fulfillment of public purposes, said link shall be based on the existence of a prior contractual relationship that generates conduct producing unlawful damage, which occurs despite the contractual and legal duties (Art. 13 of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa), Art. 5 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law and Art. 151 of its regulation) existing between the contractor company and the respective contracting administration. Said link would only be broken in those cases in which the Public Administration proves that, despite having employed and exhausted all means at its disposal (preventions, sanctions, supervision, initiation of contractual resolution procedure, etc.), the contractor persisted in carrying out a specific action and the harmful event still occurred. The foregoing considerations are based on the fact that the relationship between the parties is not linear (administered party-contractor-contracting administration), but rather is three-dimensional, in which the linkage of the parties is systemic and dynamic, and therefore the Public Administration holds direct obligations towards the Administered Party for purposes such as control, accountability, verification of due internal control, transparency, fulfillment of the public purpose, and above all, liability. It is thus that the Administration is not disassociated from the final result of the contracting carried out, which, in the final analysis, has a merely instrumental nature of the public service finally provided. Service as the product obtained that is not satisfactory to the user, or is delivered late, or worse still, causes him damage, is attributable to the Administration itself, as a defective manifestation of its conduct. In the case of the defendant entity, the foregoing considerations are fully applicable, in as much as, as a public entity-company, it is subject to the body of administrative legality applicable to the matter in accordance with Article 190 of the General Public Administration Law, in relation to Article [sic] of said normative body. Furthermore, to what has been indicated regarding the entity's strict liability, it must be added that the duty of supervision of contractual execution established in Article 13 of the Administrative Contracting Law, as it provides: " The Administration shall supervise the entire execution process; for this, the contractor must offer the necessary facilities..." applies to the relationship between the Institution and the contracted company. To determine the entity's liability, one must take into consideration not only the general strict liability that assists it, but also its obligations for the correct verification of the execution of the contractual object; therefore, if damages arise on the occasion of this and compliance with said public duty is not proven, the duty of reparation of the respective Public Administration is necessarily reinforced. Moreover, it is also necessary to indicate that it was proven in the case record, as has been said, that in the plaintiff's case, as occurs in other cases of identical requests for telephone services, the service request is made after a prior inspection by an official of the Institution of the place where the respective electrical installation will be carried out, yet in the area where the plaintiff resides, the service drops pass and are supported above the low-voltage lines to achieve greater height, and consequently, the neutral conductor of these lines is below the minimum height established for this purpose. That is, the risk situation generating the damage was public, evident, and notorious, and consequently known by the defendant entity, despite which, it tolerated said situation and omitted adopting any conduct to correct such situation. The foregoing is reinforced in as much as it has been held as proven that in the area where the plaintiff's telephone connection was made, several lines already existed, installed for some time. As can be seen, we are therefore, in addition to the considerations made ut supra, in the presence of an omission to act by the defendant entity, translated into material inactivity in which ICE did nothing to prevent the occurrence of a risk-generating situation that ultimately caused the damages that are the subject of this proceeding. It has been discussed in the case record whether said damages were caused by the effects of an electric arc produced when electricity passed through said phenomenon to the telephone cable installed for the plaintiff, or by direct contact of cables. This Panel considers that such discussion is irrelevant for the purposes of determining the existence of liability for the damage caused. In both scenarios, the existence of strict liability makes the duty of reparation necessary by the mere fact of the occurrence of the harmful event and the verification of the damage. In either case, the most relevant party in the situation described received an electric shock to his person, which he would not have suffered if the act of installing the telephone line had not been carried out. This is the relevant fact for determining the liability incurred, and the party cannot be burdened with the duty of proving what caused the electric shock, when in this case it has been held as proven that it occurred and that it occurred on the occasion of the provision of a service by a company contracted by a public entity. The discussions between the defendant parties along the lines mentioned should not affect the plaintiff's rights, for the simple reason that both are vested with strict liability by legal imperative, and the existence of a circumstance that excludes their duty to repair has not been proven, given the causal link of both to the harmful event. ICE's representative invokes that the co-defendant company contractually assumed any liability that might arise on the occasion of the services it provides. In addition to the foregoing considerations that refute what was stated by the defendant entity, it must be indicated that accepting such a thesis would legitimize that, via the contracting of services or works, constitutionally protected strict liability is blurred and, even more so, rendered nugatory, especially in the current era, in which said mechanism for the provision of services by the State (e.g., construction of works, provision of social services, professional activities such as notarial services, engineering, etc.) is common, given the paradigm shift regarding its operation and impact on public activity. As has been indicated, the Public Administration maintains duties inherent to the principles that govern it and to the soundest norms and techniques applicable in the matter, which imply that contracting a third party for the provision of goods or services does not mean abdicating its responsibility or the necessary supervision and follow-up of what was agreed upon, from the beginning until the end of the effects of the contractual relationship, which may even go beyond the mere expiration of the formal contract. Consequently, it is appropriate to uphold the claim with respect to the Costa Rican Electricity Institute and determine the existence of a duty to repair the damages caused to the plaintiff on the occasion of the events that are the subject of this proceeding.- VII).- On the Application of the Consumer Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Consumidor) : The protection of consumer rights is based on Article 46 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), reformed by Law No. 7607 of May 29, 1996, as it establishes the following: "Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they establish for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters". This constitutional provision arises on the occasion of the determination of a new generation of citizen rights in the face of phenomena emerging with the consumer society and market rules, and the evident inequality of the consumer vis-à-vis producers and distributors of goods and services. In this line of thought, it has been indicated that " Modern techniques of product introduction, marketing modalities, and demand stimulation via advertising constitute other elements that accentuate the defenselessness of consumers, bewildered about the real content of their purchases which they feel psychologically driven towards through effective motivational mechanisms... The interlocutor of the buyer is generally no longer a known merchant. Large supermarket chains appear, which, as is generally the case, sell products created in series by important national and international complexes. The imbalance between the economic agents involved is thus evident. Public authorities have also reacted to this situation, partly out of their sense of service, to which the existence of interests that affect the entire population in one way or another cannot be alien..." Ramón Martín Mateo. Derecho Público de la Economía, Editorial Ceura, P. 270. Regarding the first references to the recognition of consumer rights in our jurisprudence, it is necessary to cite the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 1441-92 of 3:45 a.m. on June 2, 1992, which emphasizes the special protection of the consumer due to his or her position of inferiority in the consumer relationship; in this regard, it stated: “ In effect, it is notorious that the consumer is at the end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and commercialization of the consumer goods he or she needs to acquire for personal satisfaction, and his or her participation in this process does not respond to technical or professional reasons but rather to the constant conclusion of contracts on a personal basis. Therefore, his or her relationship in that commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection against suppliers of goods and services, for the purposes that, prior to expressing his or her contractual consent, he or she has all the necessary elements of judgment that allow him or her to express it with complete freedom, and this implies thorough knowledge of the goods and services offered. Included by what has been expressed, in a harmonious mix, are several constitutional principles, such as state concern in favor of the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating individuals the free disposition of their patrimony with the aid of the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health when it is involved, the ordering and systematization of reciprocal relations between the interested parties, the alignment of international commercial practices with the domestic system, and finally, the greater protection of the functioning of the inhabitant in the means of subsistence." Based on these guidelines, in 1994, Law No. 7472, the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor), was approved, which in its Article 1 establishes the following: "<i>The objective of this Law is to effectively protect the rights and legitimate interests of the consumer, the oversight and promotion of the process of competition and free concurrence, through the prevention and prohibition of monopolies, monopolistic practices, and other restrictions on the efficient functioning of the market, and the elimination of unnecessary regulations for economic activities</i>." This Law establishes in its Article 29 a series of substantial and procedural rights of consumers, among which the following are highlighted for these purposes: <i>"Without prejudice to the provisions established in treaties, international conventions to which Costa Rica is a party, ordinary domestic legislation, regulations, general principles of law, uses and customs, the following are fundamental and inalienable rights of the consumer: a) Protection against risks that may affect their health, safety, and the environment. b) The protection of their legitimate economic and social interests.... f) Effective access mechanisms for the administrative and judicial defense (tutela) of their rights and legitimate interests, which lead to adequately preventing, sanctioning, and promptly repairing the injury thereof, as appropriate....." </i>In this vein, it is worth mentioning that doctrine has analyzed the concept of consumer from two points of view, as a client and as a final recipient. Regarding the first concept, it is indicated: <b>“</b><i>it exceeds that of the acquiring consumer protected by Law 24,240 (Argentine Consumer Protection Law) as it refers to all subjects who contract to acquire goods or services offered in the market, both to attend to their private needs and for a business activity (…) while as a final recipient the concept refers to the person who acquires goods or services for their private consumption or use, “who acquires goods or contracts services for a destination unrelated to any activity of production, transformation, commercialization, or provision to third parties…”</i><b>. </b>(Barrantes Jaime and others, Law and Jurisprudence in Matters of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Derecho y Jurisprudencia en Materia de Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor). Ediciones Jurídicas ARETE, San José, C.R., 1999, page 21). For its part, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in relation to the figure of the "consumer," has stated: "…<i> it is notorious that the consumer is at the extreme end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and commercialization of the consumer goods they need to acquire for their personal satisfaction, and their participation in this process does not respond to technical or professional reasons, but rather in the constant execution of contracts on a personal basis. Therefore, their relationship, in this commercial sequence, is one of inferiority and requires special protection against the suppliers of the goods and services, so that before expressing their contractual consent, they have all the necessary elements of judgment, which allow them to express it with complete freedom, and this implies thorough knowledge of the goods and services offered. Included in the foregoing, in a harmonious mixture, are several constitutional principles, such as the state concern in favor of the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating the free disposition of assets by individuals with the concurrence of the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health when involved, the ordering and systematization of the reciprocal relationships between the interested parties, the homologation of international commercial practices into the internal system, and finally, the greater protection of the inhabitant's functioning in their means of subsistence …</i><b>” </b>(vote No. 1441-92 of 15:45 hours on June 2, 1992). Furthermore, the cited law, where relevant to the present proceeding, provides in its Article 32 the following provision regarding the liability of the producer and the merchant: <i>"The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks.</i> <i>Only one who demonstrates that they were unrelated to the damage is released."</i> With respect to this type of liability, it can be determined that it is objective par excellence, and therefore, the verification of the causal link (nexo de causalidad) is essential – that is, the relationship of the damage with the facts creating it and the objective imputation, according to the risky conduct created. The First Chamber (Sala Primera), in its vote 646-F-2001 of 16 hours 45 minutes on August 22, 2001, in the same vein, points out the elements of this type of liability, stating: <i>"... Three are the elements that make up this type of liability, namely: a) the use of things that entail danger or risk; b) causing damage of a patrimonial nature; and c) the relationship or causal link between the fact and the damage. Summarizing "…in objective civil liability there must be a causal link between the risky activity set in motion by the agent and the damage caused” (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 354 of 10 hours on December 14, 1990). From a practical point of view - says the Costa Rican jurist Victor Pérez Vargas - “…objective liability is summed up as an advantage in favor of the injured party that means a partial reversal of the burden of proof (inversión de la prueba), in the sense that the latter is exonerated from the burden of proving the fault (negligence or willful misconduct) of the person causing the damage, and any attempt by the latter to prove their lack of fault would be futile...” (Pérez Vargas, Victor, Private Law (Derecho Privado), First Edition, Editorial Publitex, San José, Costa Rica, 1988, page 417). That is, it is incumbent upon the person or company to whom liability is attributed to demonstrate that the damages were produced by force majeure or by fault of the victim (doctrine informing numerals 32 second paragraph of Law No. 7472 and 1048 fifth paragraph of the Civil Code)... " </i>Based on the foregoing, we can determine that in the case of the economic agent's liability, the subjective concept of willful misconduct or negligence is also not relevant, and that the determination of the causal link between the act and the damage produced is of special importance, with the defendant being restricted solely to demonstrating the breaking of said link or the non-existence of the damage. In this vein, vote number 655 of 15 hours 05 minutes on September 19, 2007, issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice provided: <i>“(…)This conception arises because the fault model was insufficient to respond to the multiplication of dangers and damages inherent in modern life. The theory of risk, understood in the sense that whoever exercises or takes advantage of an activity with potentially dangerous elements for others must also bear its drawbacks, came to change most legislations. It is also called the theory of created damage (teoría del daño creado), whose paradigm of imputation lies in attributing the damage to anyone who introduces into society a virtual element of producing it, dispensing with the agent's subjectivity, and focusing on the problem of reparation and its limits around material causality. It is only of interest to investigate which fact was the cause of the effect in order to impute it, given that the production of the harmful result is sufficient, the configuration of an illicit act through traditional elements being unnecessary. As a corollary of the foregoing, the fault, negligence, imprudence, or lack of skill of the agent are not the essential elements for giving rise to the obligation within the parameters of objective liability. Hence, it is of no importance, to disprove it, to succeed in demonstrating that one did not incur in any of them. In this same sense, see judgment no. 61 of 14 hours 50 minutes on June 19, 1997, of this Chamber. For this reason, the notion of risk replaces the concepts of fault and unlawfulness, dispensing with them as criteria for imputation. It focuses on a conduct or activity of a physical or juridical person, characterized by the execution of a dangerous service, or the mere possession of a dangerous object. Therefore, the element to consider is the created risk. On this particular topic, see judgment no. 376 of 14 hours 40 minutes on July 9, 1999, of this collegiate body. It must be added that it starts from the assumption that the origin of the obligations is the lawful use of dangerous things, and that upon causing damage, they require the one who uses them to compensate for it. For the configuration of this type of liability, the following components must be present: a) the use of things that entail danger or risk; b) causing damage; and c) the relationship or causal link between the fact and the damage. Finally, it is important to mention that, within this subject matter, a partial reversal of the burden of proof operates, in the sense that the injured party is exonerated from the burden of proving the fault or willful misconduct of the person who caused the damage. Consequently, it is incumbent upon the physical or juridical person to whom liability is attributed to demonstrate that the damages were produced by force majeure or by fault of the victim. Doctrine informing numerals 35 second paragraph of Law No. 7472 and 1048 fifth paragraph of the Civil Code</i>.” (Likewise, see resolution no. 646-F-2001 of 16 hours 45 minutes on August 22, 2001, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice).&nbsp;&nbsp; In this vein, the origin and scope of Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor) must be understood and interpreted, which institutes objective liability for the producer, supplier, and merchant who harm the legal sphere of the consumer by reason of the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks. In this way, they must respond independently of incurring in fault. The only exception occurs if they demonstrate that they have been unrelated to the damage. Consequently, the affected person is exempt from demonstrating the fault or willful misconduct of the person who caused the damage, and it is incumbent upon the latter to prove that it was produced by force majeure or by fault of the victim, as the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has specified in the cited rulings, in light of the doctrine informing numerals 35 second paragraph of Law No. 7472 and 1048 fifth paragraph of the Civil Code. Complementary to the foregoing, in order to determine the damage, it is necessary to indicate the necessity of the existence of a relationship between the damage claimed and the conduct deployed by the economic agent. In this vein, doctrine has indicated different criteria for objective imputation, among which adequate causation (causalidad adecuada) is highlighted for these purposes. Regarding this criterion, doctrine has indicated the following: "<i>The conduct of the defendant is an adequate cause of the damage suffered by the victim if, ex ante, the causation of the damage was foreseeable – not very improbable – by the defendant. But authors have never agreed on what degree of probability – between 0 and 1 – is the adequate one according to law; and they have always disagreed about whether the judgment on probability should consist of a purely subjective prognosis – similar to that carried out in the analysis of willful misconduct and negligence – that is, a judgment on the avoidability of the result, or if, on the contrary, the prognosis must be objective in the sense that an agent endowed with special knowledge would have had to know the probability of the production of the result</i>". (Causality and Liability (Causalidad y Responsabilidad). Pablo Salvador Coderch and Antonio Fernández Crende. Journal for the Analysis of Law. WWW.INDET.COM.)&nbsp;&nbsp; In this sense, the position of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has been settled, as is evident from vote 467-F-2008 of 14 hours 25 minutes on July 4, 2008, which indicates: <i>".... fortuitous events do not allow the merchant or producer to be exempted from civil liability, since no judgment of reproach is made in relation to their activity. Only force majeure and the act of the victim allow the merchant or producer to be exonerated from civil liability, insofar as both circumstances imply the exclusion of causality, an element that is indispensable for both subjective and objective liability to exist equally. It is for the judge to examine in each case whether or not there is direct and adequate causation (causalidad directa y adecuada) between the damage claimed (and demonstrated) by the petitioner and the activity (active or omissive) deployed by the producer or merchant. It is clear that in the present case it would be excessive to require the consumer to have the level of security devices that the lawsuit sets forth in its second-instance grievances, since that, as the court rightly stated, would imply forcing consumers into an excessive duty of care, beyond what is reasonably required of the average person. The defendant did not demonstrate that the cause of the incident was attributable to the victim themselves, due to lack of care, negligence, or imprudence....</i>" It is based on these considerations that it is appropriate to determine the liability of the co-defendant company.

**VIII).-** The plaintiff indicates in their lawsuit that the damages caused to them were immediately provoked by the conduct of the officials of **Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L.,** given that it was on account of the installation of their telephone line that the corresponding electrical discharge was caused to them. The representation of said company indicates that the electrical discharge suffered by the plaintiff was due to the conditions of the distribution lines in the area, it being the case that in the analysis at hand, all connections were made according to the established procedure and there was no direct contact with the electricity cables. It indicates that what occurred happened on account of the phenomenon called "<i>electrical arc</i>", and not the collision of the telephone cable with the primary or secondary electricity line, given that had this occurred, a protection consisting of an automatic electrical cutoff would have been activated. In this regard, this Court finds that although it has been demonstrated in the record that the electrical cable in the area where the plaintiff resides is outside the established standard for this purpose, it being the case that the electrical service connections pass and are supported above the low-tension lines to achieve more height and the neutral of these lines is below the minimum height established for this purpose, there is objective liability on the part of the defendant company. The foregoing insofar as, as has been indicated, the damages caused to the plaintiff occurred on account of the installation of their telephone line by the officials of the co-defendant company, Messrs. **Allan Eduardo Gómez García** and **Luis Ángel Marín Camacho.** That is, Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L. was an active participant in the process of installing the telephone line for Mr. Ríos Buján, which was the direct and efficient cause of the damages invoked. Once again, it is necessary to indicate that it is irrelevant whether the damage was caused by direct contact of the telephone cable with the secondary electricity cables or by an "<i>electrical arc</i>", insofar as what is relevant is that damage was caused as a product of an activity carried out by the defendant company, which is duly demonstrated in the trial and was not controverted. Indeed, it cannot be said that the very fact of the eventual existence of the so-called "<i>electrical arc</i>" is sufficient reason to exempt the plaintiff company from liability. Just as its existence as a situation of fortuitous event (an event inherent to the activity, unforeseeable and inevitable) would not have been a cause to break the causal link and exempt ICE from liability, neither is it for the defendant company, given that it has at no time demonstrated, as was its responsibility, its unrelatedness to the damage caused. On the contrary, the very evidence provided by the co-defendant party indicates the following: "<i>... the electrical service connections have had to pass and be supported above the low-tension lines to achieve greater height</i> <i>and even so it is insufficient, since the neutral height of 4.00 meters of the low-tension lines is far below the minimum height established.</i> <i> A risk has been identified for the technician in the need to install the telephone service connections above the low-tension network, a situation present at the time of the accident. As an additional consideration, it is determined that the telephone cable is not built with adequate insulation for low tension, a situation present at the time of the accident...</i>". The foregoing was reinforced by the testimonial declaration of the author of the indicated report, Mr. Edwin González Marroquín, which reinforces a fundamental consideration, namely, that despite the risky conditions present in the location, height, and situation of the telephone lines in the area where the plaintiff's residence is located, it was opted to carry out the corresponding installation, without there being any record of any objection or warning to ICE regarding the indicated situation. That is, the company, reflected in the actions of its officials, accepted the risk that the installation of telephone lines under said conditions could entail, and the potential and uncertain, but possible, risk of creation of the alleged electrical arc. From the declarations of the co-defendants, it can be deduced that they were aware of the existence of an inadequate situation in the location and height of the electrical lines and their specific relationship with the line to be installed, it being the case that despite said risk, they opted to continue their work and not alert about the situation encountered in the specific case. Their liability cannot be exempted because other telephone lines had been placed previously, since their work made them aware that said situation was neither correct nor safe. Now, irrespective of the foregoing judgment of reproach regarding the deployed activity (which can be used to counteract any argument about the existence of an act of a third party), it must be understood that in the present case we are in a scenario of objective liability where there is a duty to compensate if the existence of effective, assessable, individualizable, and unlawful damage is demonstrated, linked to a conduct or omission of the company, and regarding which the client or user does not have the duty to bear it. In this vein, the necessary judgment must once again be made to determine the so-called efficient cause (causa eficiente). For this Court, the damage to the plaintiff would not have been caused if the defendant company had not carried out the telephone installation despite the known and described conditions of the electrical lines. Furthermore, the liability of the defendant corporation occurs on account of the very risk existing in its activity, where the causal link arises from the performance of the activity, which, although lawful, constitutes a source of risk and, consequently, the origin for whoever benefits from its profits of bearing its drawbacks before the administration itself or third-party users or clients. The activity of installing telephone lines, the placement of cables, and the transmission of electricity is per se risky and does not exclude an event like the one that occurred, which, whether due to the placement of the electrical cable or the alleged "<i>electrical arc</i>", is inherent to the service provided, independently of any subjective assessment. It is for this reason that, although there is evidence of knowledge of the potential situation that could derive from the location and height of the cables to be placed in relation to the electrical lines, the elements of fault, negligence, imprudence, or lack of skill of the agent are not requirements for the obligation under objective liability in this case. For its configuration in the situation under analysis, one must take into consideration the demonstration of the existence of the commercial activity deployed by the defendant company (which has not been refuted), the damage caused (to which we will refer later), and the existence of the relationship or causal link between the two previous elements (which are duly demonstrated), and where it has not been proven that the company was unrelated to what happened, due to the concurrence of force majeure, an act of a third party, or fault of the victim. In the case under examination, there is a consumer relationship, given the sui generis and three-dimensional relationship described ut supra, in which the defendant company sells a service to ICE, but whose final recipient is a third party, the plaintiff, who directly receives the benefits of what was agreed. This is how the plaintiff, as a client of the entity, is at the same time a consumer of the commercial activity deployed by the co-defendant corporation, was the final recipient of the service, and therefore found themselves, for the purposes of said situation, at the lower end of the service chain ICE- Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L.- plaintiff. For the foregoing, and in accordance with the very nature of consumer rights, within the objective liability scheme, it is not possible to burden the citizen with the duty to demonstrate whether the damage was caused by an electrical contact or by an arc of that nature. What is relevant is that damage occurred on account of the service provided by the company (immediate and effective cause), as has been indicated, independently of the underlying technical cause. It is the duty of the company to demonstrate that what occurred was in no way linked to its actions, a proof that in the case under examination was not provided, and on the contrary, the very declarations of Messrs. Gómez García and Marín Camacho evidence their link to the generating fact of the invoked damage. This being the case, this Court concludes that the necessary elements converge to impute liability to the co-defendant corporation, and therefore, in accordance with Article 35 cited in the previous considering (considerando), its scope is fully applicable to it, and consequently, it is appropriate to uphold the lawsuit with respect to the same, and determine the existence of a duty to repair the damages caused to the plaintiff on account of the facts that are the subject of the present proceeding.- **IX).- <u>On extra-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extra contractual):</u>** The liability of private law subjects not bound by a prior contractual or consumer relationship is governed by the provisions of Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which provides: “<i>Anyone who, through willful misconduct, fault, negligence, or imprudence, causes damage to another, is obliged to repair it together with the perjudices</i>”. In accordance with the foregoing, unlike the more modern tendencies in matters of liability where it is made objective, as we have seen both in the case of the company and the co-defendant entity, in the case of extra-contractual civil liability provided for in the Civil Code, one must start from the existence of subjective imputation criteria, in order for a duty to compensate the damages caused on account of a conduct or omission of a private law subject to arise. The duty to compensate arises on account of the breach of a legal duty not to harm another (<i>alterum non laedere</i>), where there is an imputation criterion or judgment of reproach based on the fulfillment of the indicated subjective elements that render the respective conduct unlawful. Thus, such will be an action or omission carried out with willful misconduct, fault, negligence, or imprudence. As can be seen, in said norm, incorporated into our Civil Code of 1888 and based on the Napoleonic Code of March 18, 1803, the figures of culpability and liability are linked, and it was assumed that the former had to be present for the latter to proceed. Thus, the subject is only obliged to repair damage if it is the product of their own willful conduct or gross negligence (assimilating to a punishment), which has its source in the penal origins of all liability determinations. Regarding the composite nature of this element of liability, damage plus conduct labeled as unlawful by the legal system, vote 335-2008 of 9:00 hours on December 19, 2008, from the First Section of the Superior Civil Court (Tribunal Superior Civil), indicated: “<i>As can be verified, for damage to be configured, in the legal context, three elements are required: 1) a patrimonial or extra-patrimonial injury, 2) caused by the action or omission of a person to the affected subject (victim), and 3) this injury must have been caused in an unlawful manner. The damage constitutes the harmful breach for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the occurrence of the harmful action or omission with that subsequent to it. Up to this point, one can speak of damage in a generic sense. However, for the damage produced to find protection in the legal system, so that it must be compensated by the producing agent, it must not only derive from an activity or omission attributable to the third party (the second element defined as the causal link), but also this active or omissive conduct must be classifiable as illicit…</i>” In accordance with the foregoing, to impute liability, to the demonstrated damage must be added the proof that the conduct is classified as unlawful, according to what is stated in Article 1045 of the Civil Code.

It is not enough, as was the case with the co-defendants, to prove the damage and the existence of the causal link to generate liability; rather, it will also be necessary to prove that the conduct of the person charged with the duty to compensate was committed with intent (dolo), fault, negligence, or recklessness. In this case, the considerations made regarding the theory of causation in this matter are also applicable. In this vein, it has been stated that “<i>In Civil Law we use the ‘theory of adequacy’ for the causal relationship to establish the connection between the act and the damages (and losses). The theory of adequacy is also known as the ‘adequate condition theory’ or the ‘adequate causation theory.’ According to this theory, only that cause which is adequate to produce the result is a condition of the result, and this cause is considered adequate when a person with discernment could foresee that this result might occur in the presence of certain circumstances, natural in light of common sense and the good judgment of their reasoning. But because these concepts are so broad and so difficult to limit, the criterion of due diligence (debida diligencia) is also used, according to which, if a result occurs despite having acted without contravening the duty of due diligence, that is, acting without omitting the care required in a specific situation, one thereby acts within the field of what is legally permitted, so that condition of the result will not be its cause in a legal sense. Thus, the foreseeability of the average person and due diligence are the criteria used by civil law to determine when a specific behavior—in the civil sense—is a condition of the result</i>.” (Madrigal Navarro Javier. La imputación para la reparación del daño en sedes civil y penal Revista Judicial, Costa Rica, Nº 105, Septiembre 2012). On the other hand, it must be noted that the subjective liability contemplated in the rule cited ut supra imposes on the victim of the damage the duty to demonstrate the intent or fault of their adversary (which stems from an ideological postulate specific to criminal matters based on the principle of innocence) and which is found in the specific and classic burden of proof (onus probandi) of civil matters, established by Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil). Once again, there is an important distinction with respect to the cases of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) analyzed previously, given that in this case, it is not enough for the defendant to demonstrate lack of connection to the damage; rather, the plaintiff has the duty to demonstrate the aforementioned subjective elements of liability, under penalty of their claim being dismissed.- IX).- In the case under review, it is noted that the plaintiff asserts the existence of liability with respect to Messrs. Gómez García and Marín Camacho, due to their direct participation in the installation of the telephone line that caused the damages invoked by the plaintiff. For their part, the representation of the co-defendants indicates that all connections were made in accordance with the established procedure and there was no direct contact with the electrical cables, but rather the phenomenon called "electric arc (arco eléctrico)" occurred, because the electrical cable in the area where the plaintiff lives is outside the established standard for this purpose. Given the foregoing, the situation was impossible to foresee and is attributable to the lack of regulation by ARESEP regarding network protection and the distribution of its heights and distances. They indicate that there is no proof of the existence of negligence or lack of duty of care on the part of the workers of the defendant company. In this regard, this Court has found it proven that the persons who directly performed the installation that produced the plaintiff's injuries were the co-defendants, and it has thus been demonstrated that when placing the mentioned telephone line, the co-defendants were aware of the risk situation implied by the fact that the telephone wiring would be a short distance from the electrical cables, that is, passing over the so-called pentagram (pentagrama) and with the respective telephone service drops being in a situation such that they “...<i> had to pass over and be supported above the low-voltage line...</i>”, as indicated by the very study requested by the company that occupies the employer status of the co-defendants. For this Panel, it is evident that what has been described demonstrates a failure to fulfill the duties of average diligence by the indicated Messrs. Gómez García and Marín Camacho, insofar as it is not reasonable to accept that persons with experience in the matter were remiss in at least noticing the situation presented and opted, without any objection, to perform the respective telephone installation under the stated conditions. The atypical nature of the height and location of the electrical and telephone lines at the plaintiff's place of residence and the technical criteria expressed at trial indicate that, given the situation found at the work site, there was a level of foreseeability that a risk situation could arise, should another telephone line be installed in that stated situation. The statements of the co-defendants present an express acknowledgment of their actions in the indicated sense, given that at the trial hearing they stated that in the entire sector the wiring is poorly designed, and that they had to install the plaintiff's telephone line despite the foregoing, above the electrical pentagram (pentagrama eléctrico). Furthermore, there is also proof that the installation of the electrical line was performed by the co-defendants from the plaintiff's house towards the distribution box, whereas, on the contrary, the procedure established by ICE for the installation of fixed lines starts with actions at the latter towards the applicant's domicile. In this vein, in the requested judicial confession evidence, both co-defendants admit to having begun the installation of the connection at the plaintiff's home, and then proceeding to perform the rest of the installation procedure outwards from it, despite the fact that the procedures manual for the installation of conventional services and those with E.R. technology indicates the steps to follow as follows: " <i>7.12. Deploy technician to the Distribution Box. 7.13. Test for the presence of dial tone on the pair associated with the OTC. 7.13.1. If there is a tone, proceed to the client's property and continue with point 7.14.... 7.14. The required conditions exist (network and client infrastructure, client's address and location, client's presence on the property, and official service request documentation) to execute the installation of the OTC in accordance with current regulations...</i>” As can be seen, the breach of the technical standard established in the procedures manual applicable to the matter indicates that in installing the telephone line for the plaintiff, the defendants deliberately departed from the conditions required in the matter, and recklessly allowed the electricity to flow from the respective cable to his person. Had the established procedure been followed, that is, from the distribution box towards the home and not the reverse, the original conditions that generated the invoked damages, and which were produced when the plaintiff was the sole recipient of the respective discharge, would have been modified. Even the witness offered by the co-defendants, who held the position of General Supervisor of the company at the time of the events, Mr. Carlos Luis Jiménez Fallas, expressly indicated that telephone lines should not be installed above the electrical pentagram (pentagrama eléctrico). For the foregoing reason, the defendants are incorrect when they indicate that all connections were made in accordance with the established procedure, given that the case file proves the contrary. Nor is it reasonable to accept the argument that the given situation was impossible to foresee, because the electrical and telephone line presented an evident abnormality in terms of its height and location, impossible not to be seen by the responsible officials, who, due to their experience, were clearly aware of the risks generated. Moreover, the defendant party did not prove that the damage produced to the plaintiff was attributable to the lack of regulation by ARESEP regarding network protection and the distribution of its heights and distances. There is no proof in the case file of a remiss attitude on its part, nor is the existence of a normative duty on its part to regulate the matter evident. In any case, the liability in this sense lies with the public entity responsible for the subject of fixed telecommunications, which has already been held jointly and severally liable in this judgment. Given the foregoing considerations, it is deemed that there is indeed proof of the existence of negligence or lack of duty of care on the part of the workers of the defendant company and, consequently, it is appropriate to grant the claim with respect to the co-defendants and determine the existence of a duty to repair the damages caused to the plaintiff due to the events that are the subject of this proceeding.- XI).- Regarding material damage (daño material): The plaintiff in their claim invokes material damages consisting of serious damage caused to different parts of their body and possible damage to the heart, lungs, kidneys, and liver. They indicate burns, grafts, and the impairment of their left toe to such a degree that it became useless for its basic functions. In the case under review, we must start from the considerations made regarding the requirements for damage as such to be compensable. In this sense, Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) applies, as it provides: “<i>The burden of proof rests upon: 1) Whoever formulates a claim, regarding the affirmations of the facts constituting their right. 2) Whoever opposes a claim, regarding the affirmations of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right</i>”. In this regard, although it is true that the existence of possible damage to the heart, lungs, kidneys, and liver has not been proven, as was at some point indicated in the claim, nor is other material damage evident as proven, a temporary disability of five months for the plaintiff and a permanent disability of seven percent of their general capacity were determined through expert opinion DML-2010-13694 of November 9, 2010, from the Department of Forensic Medicine (Departamento de Medicina Legal). Notwithstanding the foregoing, with respect to the definitive impairment suffered by the plaintiff, the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) indicated that the plaintiff has an impairment of twelve percent of their general capacity. This panel deems it appropriate to apply this latter criterion, insofar as the assessment made by the indicated entity, regardless of its etiology, corresponds to a diminution of faculties or aptitudes for work, given its legal nature, and as such the plaintiff is a salaried person, for whom what is relevant for the purposes of determining material damage is, above all, the verification of the degree of impairment suffered by them in their faculties to work. An impairment in the abstract, detached from the reference point of the human aptitude to perform one's work and thus bring into the family core the income necessary for satisfying basic needs, is neither admissible nor relevant. In the case under review, it must not be overlooked that the material damage invoked is fundamentally bodily harm (daño corporal), which is understood as “<i>any somatic or psychic alteration that, in one form or another, disturbs, threatens, or worries the health of the sufferer, or simply limits or impairs the personal integrity of the affected person, whether organically or functionally</i>. <i>Any diminution of the integrity of the individual's biology is sufficient, regardless of its practical repercussions in one or more fields of human activity</i>” (M. Rodríguez, cited by Laborda Calvo Eugenio in Cesión de Datos o Consentimiento Informado en Valoración del Daño Corporal). For his part, another author more recently defines it as “<i>the consequences that a specific traumatic event has had on the psychophysical integrity and health of a person. When the traumatic event is attributable to a third party, the latter is obliged to answer for said consequences, whether they be of a criminal, civil, labor, or administrative-litigation nature</i>”. (Hernández Cueto cited by Laborda Calvo Eugenio in Cesión de Datos o Consentimiento Informado en Valoración del Daño Corporal). In our country, having had a monopoly on insurance for more than 60 years, the National Insurance Institute (INS) has extensive experience in managing the program for the assessment and repair of bodily harm, and as such these assessments constitute an expert examination where the identity of the damage, the degree of disability, the possibilities of cure, the modifications imposed by physical pain are defined or diagnosed; in addition, it clearly indicates the consolidation of the injuries, and of their possible complications as well as the impairment of life expectations, but without there being rules in the assessment of bodily harm that can establish an economic equivalence with the suffered injury, which is why reference is made to the existence of a principle of expert discretion. For the reason stated above, taking into consideration that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff to their body, and whose existence on their left limb was duly verified in a judicial inspection, affect their capacity to work, as proven, it is deemed appropriate to use the indicated impairment of twelve percent of the general capacity and five months of temporary disability, as indicated by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), as a parameter for determining the material damage suffered. In this vein, it is not that the existence of another expert opinion with a lower percentage is disqualified, but rather that it is deemed that for the plaintiff's particular situation and their requirements for using their future work capacity, the expertise of the insuring entity is more applicable to the specific case. It is necessary to indicate that in the case under review, the defendant parties have not proven that the indicated damage does not meet the characteristics established in Article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), that it is not “...<i>effective, assessable, and individualizable.</i>...” or that it was not caused by the events that are the subject of this claim or attribu'... or attributable to the victim. In some parts of the interventions of the defendant parties, they suggest the possibility that the damage could have been caused by the act of a third party, force majeure, or even by the victim's own conduct (lack of care with hygiene and tending to the plaintiff's affected finger), resulting in the level of injuries proven. None of this was proven, the mere word of the party in this sense being insufficient. Proof is necessarily required that in some way provides elements of conviction to determine that the causal link between the indicated events and the damage invoked has been broken. On the contrary, all the existing evidence reliably indicates that the plaintiff's injuries were caused in a direct and evident manner by the electrical discharge produced during the service of installing their fixed telephone line by the co-defendants. Nor is the argument made by the co-defendants' attorney, to the effect that since the plaintiff did not provide the corresponding money for the mathematical expert and the expert's work was not performed due to their fault, they find themselves in a situation of evidentiary deficiency, acceptable. It should be noted that the expert examination to be performed would be on the quantum of the damage and not on its existence per se, it being possible for such work to be performed during the judgment enforcement stage. As such, it is appropriate to render an abstract judgment jointly and severally against the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, Técnicos en Telecomunicaciones SAL S.A., Allan Eduardo Gómez García and Luis Ángel Masís Camacho to pay Mr. Diego Alonso Ríos Buján the sums corresponding to the permanent disability of twelve percent of the plaintiff's organic capacity, as well as five months of temporary disability, both suffered due to the events proven in this proceeding. Said amounts will be determined during the judgment enforcement stage.

XII).- Regarding moral damage (daño moral): With respect to the possibility of indemnifying the moral damage that may have been caused due to conduct by the Administration, Article 9 and Article 41 of the Political Constitution must also apply, given that the former makes no type of distinction regarding State liability, and the latter expressly refers to the possibility of protecting "moral" interests, among which is found the possibility of compensating both subjective and objective moral damage. Moreover, the American Convention on Human Rights provided on this subject: <i>"Article 11: 1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. 3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." Article 24: All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law." "Article 5.1: Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected." </i>Even prior to the 1949 Political Constitution coming into force or said Convention being approved at the end of the 1960s, dating back to the 19th century, Article 59 of the Civil Code prescribes: <i>“The right to obtain compensation for moral damage is established, in cases of injury to personality rights”</i> In the matter of national administrative law proper, Article 197 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) provided: <i>"Liability shall apply for damage to purely moral assets, as well as for the moral suffering and physical pain caused by death or by the injury inflicted, respectively"</i>. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is appropriate to make some clarifications on the matter, based on doctrine and numerous judicial resolutions issued on the subject, given the particularities existing with respect to this type of damage, considering that in the case of subjective moral damage, by affecting the most intimate sphere of the individual, the common rules regarding proof of damage, when the impairment is to the subject's patrimony, cannot be applied. In this vein, it has been said, <i>"To prove moral damage in its existence and magnitude, it is not necessary to provide direct proof; rather, the judge must assess the circumstances of the event and the moral qualities of the victim to establish objectively and presumptively the moral grievance in the reserved orbit of the passive subject's intimacy. We do not believe that moral grievance must be the object of direct proof, as this is absolutely impossible due to its very nature, which resides in the innermost part of the personality, although it sometimes manifests itself through external signs that may not be an authentic expression ... no one can probe another's spirit so deeply as to be able to affirm with certainty the existence and intensity of pain, the truth of suffering, the reality of anguish or disappointment" (Bustamante Alsina, "Equitativa valuación del daño no mensurable", 1990. p 655 and 656).</i> The foregoing considerations are based on the appreciation that moral damage must be seen as in re ipsa or in itself, given that to have a spiritual injury configured, it is not necessary to prove suffering or depression externalized to third parties, as it rather implies the alteration of the existential equilibrium of persons, within their most intimate sphere and not necessarily made known or externalized in all its dimension to third parties, insofar as the latter is a function of the personality of each injured individual and based on the premise that human reactions have diverse forms and opportunities for manifestation. Therefore, in the event that the existence of conduct (death of a loved one, loss or injury of a moral or patrimonial asset, impairment of fundamental rights, etc.) that could affect the sphere of a person's intimacy—by causing pain, anguish, suffering, etc.—is proven, it is interpreted that moral damage necessarily exists, and as such the intensity of this damage and therefore the means for its compensation will be determined in accordance with the criteria that we will analyze below in this same considerando. It is, then, based on the subjective rights impaired that we can speak of the existence of moral damage, given that it will occur upon the violation of any of the inherent personality rights, which are therefore considered non-economic. That is why it is said that moral damage arises with the mere demonstrated occurrence of the formal or material action of the Administration or omission to act that violates said rights. In this vein, it is appropriate to refer to the following: <i>"Being the moral grievance the necessary and inescapable consequence of the violation of some of the personality rights of a subject, the demonstration of the existence of said transgression will imply, at the same time, proof of the existence of the damage. The determination of the existence of moral damage can be carried out in a manner as objective as the verification of a patrimonial grievance. To this end, it is only necessary to confront a fact with the legal norm that grants a right inherent to the personality in favor of a subject, to verify whether the former constitutes or does not constitute a violation of what is precepted in the latter..." (</i> <i>Brebbia Roberto. El Daño Moral. Editorial Orbir.)</i> <i> </i> Furthermore, it must be noted that it has been accepted that within the framework of the theory of liability of the Public Administration, in principle, it would be valid to accept the possibility that the defendant can prove the existence of one of the exempting circumstances from liability established in Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), namely, force majeure, fault of the victim, or the act of a third party; or even prove its non-existence or lesser severity than that invoked. It is thus that it has been indicated that <i>"The amount that is set must be a faithful reflection of the circumstances described in the case file, so that it results in an appropriate sum, given the problems suffered by the injured party, caused by the illicit criminal or civil acts of the agent or agents producing the damage. Because these presumptions are iuris tantum, they admit proof to the contrary, regarding which the defendant or active subject of the damage must be extremely diligent, since the burden of proof rests on them to rebut the presumptions of pain, suffering, mortification, or grievance, and for this purpose they may resort to any type of ordinary evidence." </i>(Montero Piña Fernando. El Daño Moral, Page 61. Impresión Gráfica del este). Not without warning that some doctrine has maintained that for any damage resulting from lawful and normal conduct, when the level of intensity is excessive, no type of exemption applies. In this vein, this Court considers it appropriate to make some clarifications regarding moral damage that will be fully applicable for the resolution of the enforcement submitted to its consideration. Firstly, it must be emphasized that in matters of moral damage, we speak of a compensatory function and not of the equivalence sought in the case of material damage. Additionally, it must not be overlooked that moral damage does not escape the certainty that it must be a consequence of the action or omission of the administration, just as the injured interest of the person invoking it must be certain. In this vein, the following has been indicated: <i>" Moral damage is not the pain, the sorrow, the anguish but rather the spiritual diminishment derived from the injury to a non-patrimonial interest. Said detriment exists even if the injured party lacks comprehension of the harm suffered; in the absence of tears; even when the victim is not in physical or 'psychic' condition to 'feel' sorrow, pain, or anguish (e.g., a brain-dead person).” </i> Subjective non-material damage exists when the victim has "processed" that pain and perhaps ceased to "feel" it. Conceived in this way, the issue immediately reveals that moral damage can project its effects into the future, with a sufficient degree of certainty..." (Daniel Pizarro Ramón Daño Moral. Ed. Hammurabi. Page 105) On the other hand, moral damage is of a personal nature, based on the affectation of a legitimate interest of the affected party. Regarding the scope of moral damage in our country, the First Chamber (Sala Primera), in its ruling Voto N 112 of 14 hours 15 minutes of July 15, 1992, repeatedly cited and applied by different jurisdictional instances, indicated: " IV.- Damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of extracontractual civil liability, since the duty to compensate is only configured if an unlawful damaging act has occurred that injures a legally relevant interest, capable of being protected by the legal system. Damage, in the legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (injured party), which causes the deprivation of a legal good, the conservation of which was objectively expected had the damaging event not occurred. Under this approach, there is no civil liability if there is no damage, just as there is no damage if there is no injured party. On the other hand, only damage that is proven (reality or existence) is compensable, this being a question of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In sum, damage constitutes the detrimental gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the unlawful act with the situation subsequent to it. V.- In many instances the expressions 'damages' (daños) and 'loss of profits' (perjuicios) are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to clarify and distinguish both concepts. Damage constitutes the loss inflicted on the injured party (damnum emergens), while loss of profits is comprised of the frustrated earnings or utility left unperceived (lucro cesans), which was reasonably and probably expected had the unlawful act not occurred. VI.- Not just any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For that purpose, the following characteristics must basically converge to constitute 'compensable damage': A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical, it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations. Damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, undetermined, or difficult to assess or prove; neither should certainty be confused with actuality, since reparation of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage should not be confused with loss of profits, since the former refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating act of the damage, meaning its repercussions are not projected upon the initiation of the process. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes a matter of sole subjective concern to the injured party; however, the law cannot concern itself with claims founded on insignificant damages, derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be an injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection. Thus, there can be a direct injured party and an indirect one: the former is the victim of the damaging act, and the latter will be the victim's successors. C) It must be caused by a third party, and subsisting, that is, if it has been repaired by the responsible party or a third party (insurer), it becomes non-subsisting. D) There must be a causal relationship between the unlawful act and the damage. VII.- Among the classes of damages, material damage and bodily damage are found in the first instance, the former being that which affects the things or material goods forming the person's patrimony, while the latter affects bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage, the specific ones of bodily damage and material damage, in the strict sense, are usually included. The latter seems the more felicitous expression, since bodily damage often affects the injured party's patrimonial interests (payment of medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage has incapacitated them from performing their usual occupations (loss of profits), etc. This distinction originated in Roman Law, where a distinction was made between damage inflicted directly on things (damnun) and that which injured the physical personality of the individual (injuria). In patrimonial damage, the impairment generated is economically assessable. VIII.- Moral damage (also called incorporal, extra-patrimonial, non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), etc. in doctrine) occurs when the sphere of the individual's extra-patrimonial interest is injured; however, as its violation can generate patrimonial consequences, it is necessary to distinguish between subjective moral damage 'pure', or non-pecuniary damage, and objective or 'objectified' moral damage. Subjective moral damage occurs when an extra-patrimonial right has been injured, without affecting the patrimony, normally implying an unjust disturbance of the individual's emotional conditions (displeasure, discouragement, despair, loss of satisfaction in living, etc., e.g., offense against honor, dignity, privacy, so-called loss of enjoyment of life, affliction for the death of a family member or loved one, etc.). Objective moral damage injures an extra-patrimonial right with repercussion on the patrimony, that is, it generates economically assessable consequences (e.g., the case of the professional who, due to the attributed act, loses their clientele in whole or in part). This distinction serves to demarcate the damage suffered by the individual in their social consideration (good name, honor, honesty, etc.) from that suffered in the individual sphere (affliction for the death of a relative), as one refers to the social part and the other to the affective part of the patrimony. This distinction originally arose to determine the scope of compensable moral damage, since initially doctrine was reluctant to compensate pure moral damage due to its difficult quantification. For compensation, a distinction must be made between the different types of moral damage. In the case of objective moral damage, the corresponding demonstration must be made, as occurs with patrimonial damage; but in the case of subjective moral damage, since its amount cannot be structured and demonstrated precisely, its determination falls to the prudent discretion of the judge, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity, the lack of proof regarding the magnitude of the damage not being an obstacle to determining its amount. The dogmatic difference between patrimonial and moral damage does not exclude that, in practice, both may occur concomitantly; this could be the case for injuries that generate physical pain or cause disfigurement or physical deformity (damage to health) and aesthetic damage (disruption of the physical harmony of the face or any other exposed part of the body), without moral damage thereby being considered secondary or accessory, since it evidently has autonomy and peculiar characteristics. In sum, moral damage consists of physical, psychic, affective, or moral pain or suffering inflicted by an unlawful act. Normally the fertile field of moral damage is that of personality rights when they are violated." Based on the foregoing, it is evident that in the case of subjective moral damage, the existence of direct proof is not required; rather, certain criteria applicable to it delimit the judge's discretion, criteria that derive from its own legal nature and that have been developed by national case law. Thus, in the resolution mentioned ut supra, the general principles of law and equity are established as the first delimiting criterion, such that through Voto 556-2003 of the Second Section of the Administrative Litigation Court (Sección Segunda del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), the following was also provided as a criterion: VI.- Regarding subjective moral damage, the situation is different, and it is hereby made clear from the outset that the State's opposition lacks merit. It is an undeniable fact that there was injury due to unlawful conduct by the Ministry of Education, as declared by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the consequence of which is, therefore, to seek, as far as possible, the effective restoration of the affected subjective sphere, given the lack of timely response to an administrative claim. For its granting, when dealing with this type of damage, proof is unnecessary; on occasions, mere verification of the generating event suffices for its compensation to proceed, independently of the recognition or rejection of other merely patrimonial aspects, for which physical demonstration of those produced is essential. This does not mean that it may be granted simply upon claim, since proof of its existence and severity is necessary, a burden that, without doubt, falls on the victim; however, it has been permitted that its proof may be achieved based on indicia, since it occurs when intimacy, honor, psyche, health, and physical integrity, among others, are affected, the severity of which, without doubt, corresponds to the claimant, and its existence may be proven through presumptions of fact (presunciones de hombre) inferred from circumstantial elements, and therefore its proof is in re ipsa, as the First Chamber of the Court (Sala Primera de la Corte) has repeatedly expressed." (Our emphasis). We have then that a second delimiting criterion of subjective moral damage are the presumptions of fact inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis. Likewise, from various judicial resolutions and from judgment 413 of November 19, 2002 of the First Section of the Administrative Litigation Court Section I, other criteria are evident, namely: "III. By subjective moral damage, doctrine has understood that affectation which impacts the emotional sphere of persons causing worry, suffering, anxiety, and other negative and harmful emotions, whose origin is the unlawful acts caused by the plaintiff. By their nature, they are difficult to prove by ordinary means, so the judge may estimate it by examining the circumstances recorded in the case file and applying their experience, the general principles of law, and those of rationality and proportionality." (Our emphasis). These latter criteria have been significantly developed to limit the possibility of granting exaggerated or disproportionate compensation. In this line of thought, the First Chamber has stated: " It is not, therefore, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, since these are invaluable goods, but about setting monetary compensation for their injury , the only mechanism available to the law, to thus repair, at least in part, the offense. It would not be fitting within such a philosophy to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems, since this would produce the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profit from their own honor and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law, are those of reasonableness and proportionality , which have been recognized in our system as having the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber #1739 - 92 of 11:45 hours on the first of July and 3495-92 of 14:30 hours on the nineteenth of November, both of 1992). Applying them to situations such as the present one, it is essential, when determining the obligations arising from compensatory legal situations, to consider the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, moral damage, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to million-dollar compensation, as sought. This would open an inconvenient loophole , to allow disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations, making it fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber Voto 141 of 15:00 hrs. of June 18, 1993 and No. 99 of 16 hours of September 20, 1995) (Our emphasis). The causation of damage is another unavoidable criterion, insofar as the real cause of it may determine the scope and limits of the compensatory estimate. This can be clearly inferred from Voto 00099-2003 of the Administrative Litigation Court, Section II, as it indicated: " IV.- It is essential to establish what is understood by moral damage, for which purpose, this Court permits itself to cite judgment No. 112 of 14:15 hours of July 15, 1992 from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice: 'VII.- Among the classes of damages, material damage and bodily damage are found in the first instance, the former being that which affects the things or material goods forming the person's patrimony, while the latter affects bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage, the specific ones of bodily damage and material damage, in the strict sense, are usually included. The latter seems the more felicitous expression, since bodily damage often affects the injured party's patrimonial interests (payment of medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage has incapacitated them from performing their usual occupations (loss of profits), etc. This distinction originated in Roman Law, where a distinction was made between damage inflicted directly on things (damnun) and that which injured the physical personality of the individual (injuria). In patrimonial damage, the impairment generated is economically assessable. VIII.- Moral damage (also called incorporal, extra-patrimonial, non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), etc. in doctrine) occurs when the sphere of the individual's extra-patrimonial interest is injured; however, as its violation can generate patrimonial consequences, it is necessary to distinguish between subjective moral damage "pure", or non-pecuniary damage, and objective or "objectified" moral damage. Subjective moral damage occurs when an extra-patrimonial right has been injured, without affecting the patrimony, normally implying an unjust disturbance of the individual's emotional conditions (displeasure, discouragement, despair, loss of satisfaction in living, etc., e.g., offense against honor, dignity, privacy, so-called loss of enjoyment of life, affliction for the death of a family member or loved one, etc.). Objective moral damage injures an extra-patrimonial right with repercussion on the patrimony, that is, it generates economically assessable consequences (e.g., the case of the professional who, due to the attributed act, loses their clientele in whole or in part). This distinction serves to demarcate the damage suffered by the individual in their social consideration (good name, honor, honesty, etc.) from that suffered in the individual sphere (affliction for the death of a relative), as one refers to the social part and the other to the affective part of the patrimony. This distinction originally arose to determine the scope of compensable moral damage, since initially doctrine was reluctant to compensate pure moral damage due to its difficult quantification. For compensation, a distinction must be made between the different types of moral damage. In the case of objective moral damage, the corresponding demonstration must be made, as occurs with patrimonial damage; but in the case of subjective moral damage, since its amount cannot be structured and demonstrated precisely, its determination falls to the prudent discretion of the judge, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity, the lack of proof regarding the magnitude of the damage not being an obstacle to determining its amount. The dogmatic difference between patrimonial and moral damage does not exclude that, in practice, both may occur concomitantly; this could be the case for injuries that generate physical pain or cause disfigurement or physical deformity (damage to health) and aesthetic damage (disruption of the physical harmony of the face or any other exposed part of the body), without moral damage thereby being considered secondary or accessory, since it evidently has autonomy and peculiar characteristics. In sum, moral damage consists of physical, psychic, affective, or moral pain or suffering inflicted by an unlawful act. Normally the fertile field of moral damage is that of personality rights when they are violated.' Also, regarding the proof of moral damage, the same cited judgment stated: ' XIII.- Regarding the proof of moral damage, the principle is the following: its existence and severity must be proven, a burden that falls on the victim; however, it has been admitted that such proof can be achieved through presumptions of fact inferred from indicia, since the unlawful generating event reveals the moral damage, for when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, intimacy, etc. are damaged, it is easy to infer the damage, and therefore it is said that the proof of moral damage exists "in re ipsa". On this matter, this Chamber has stated that regarding moral damage "... it is sufficient, on some occasions, with the occurrence of the culpable act for the damage to arise from it, according to the prudent assessment of the trial judges, when they are able to infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence" (Judgment N 114 of 16 hours of November 2, 1979)". In the present case, when the plaintiff claimed moral damage, he stated: “The serious moral damage that the Respondents caused with their acts, Which (sic) came to psychologically harm my integrity, Which (sic) were duly reasoned by the Investigating Magistrate and Of (sic) which I request an expert forensic examination in order to determine the sequelae of the damage coerced by being subjected to vexations and Internal Pressures (…) Upon being unjustly dismissed by MINAE, it caused (sic) the destruction of my home, since my wife left me because I could not support her, and to this day I have not been able to find work, they threw (sic) us out of the dwelling we lived in and I had to go stay with my mother. Additionally, a housing loan was in process and due to my dismissal it could not be arranged.” The entire issue of the plaintiff's dismissal and, of course, its material or moral consequences, cannot be discussed within the present process, because it bears no causal relationship with the facts that motivated the granting of the amparo appeal: non-payment of labor amounts, which in this case, was limited to the non-payment of vacation time. The petitioner never referred expressly or implicitly to having suffered an emotional disturbance (small or large), be it pain, anguish, grief, for that reason, but for the dismissal. It is the Trial Court that speaks of moral damage due to the “wait in the situation in which he found himself -unemployed- was pressing to resolve his state and meet his personal commitments.” In other words, Mr. Miranda Garita requested moral damage for one cause, and the Court granted it for another not alleged. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to revoke the appealed judgment insofar as it grants compensation for moral damage." On the other hand, always within the framework of proportionality, the "prudent assessment (prudente apreciación) of the Judge" regarding the damage and its compensation is discussed in the following manner: "Therefore, the court must consider the appropriateness of the item under comment; to that effect, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court has stated: " VI. Although moral damage -in relation to the subject at hand- due to its nature, allows a wide margin of discretion to the judge regarding its determination, this must necessarily be observed within certain unavoidable parameters; for example, the former Court of Cassation, in judgment Nº 114 of 16 hrs. of November 2, 1979, endorses the prudent assessment of the judges '...when they are able to infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence.' This Chamber, in its ruling Nº 114-93, indicates that the aforementioned prudent discretion must take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity. Around such concepts, the Chamber, in a subsequent pronouncement, reasons in the following terms: 'It is not, therefore, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, since these are invaluable goods, but about setting monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism available to the law, to thus repair, at least in part, the offense. It would not be fitting within such a philosophy to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems, since this would produce the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profit from their own honor and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law, are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our system as having the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber Nº 1739-92 of 11:45 hours of July 1 and Nº 3495-92 of 14:30 hrs. of November 19, both of 1992). Applying them to situations such as the present one, it is essential, when determining the obligations arising from compensatory legal situations, to consider the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, moral damage, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to million-dollar compensation, as sought. This would open an inconvenient loophole, to allow disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations, making it fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber Nº 41 of 15:00 of June 18, 1993). VII. Recapitulating, it is held that the prudent discretion to be employed by the Judge in situations such as the present one implies the observance of unavoidable parameters such as circumstantial evidence, the specific circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, equity, the position of the parties, the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. On such matters, the interested party can and must offer proof as far as possible. Only thus can a prudent discretion be reached. Outside such considerations, discretionary determination runs the serious risk of incurring an excess of power that disfigures or distorts what has been adjudicated. That is, the prudent assessment of the judge, even having the occurrence of the generating event -as occurs in the present case- (principle "in re ipsa"), requires the considerations or parameters discussed, regarding the damage, in order to, in accordance with them, establish the reason. In the event that no elements of judgment on the matter exist in the record of proceedings, the judge must act in accordance with such a situation by adopting a conservative stance in the determination, for not doing so could amount to an excess of power.'" Voto 00093-2000 of the Administrative Litigation Court Section II. In accordance with the foregoing, the recognition of moral damage must be made with the understanding that, although it does not require direct proof, the Judges must exercise special prudence and proceed to assess it under their prudent assessment, under criteria of equity, applying the presumptions of fact inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis, in order to determine the appropriateness and the quantum of the condemnatory judgment for this item within the limits of reasonableness and proportionality.

**XII).- Regarding the moral damage invoked in the specific case**: In the present proceeding, the plaintiff invokes moral damage consisting of moral affectations such as depression, fear, worry for the future of his family, uncertainty about their state and situation, impotence, and being prevented from carrying out a series of ordinary activities in his personal, work, and family sphere. The defendant parties reject the existence of proof in this regard. Regarding this point, this Court considers that from the experience of the facts of the Human Being in general and of life, from logic, and from the consequences in themselves of the situation that occurred, evident subjective moral damage is noted to the detriment of Mr. Ríos Buján. As noted from what was stated by the plaintiff, the damage invoked is based fundamentally on the pain suffered and accessorily on the consequences of the process elapsed due to the facts that give rise to the present claim. In this sense, this Court is clear that in the specific case, there are three moments in which the moral damage suffered by the plaintiff occurs, namely: **a) During the electrical shock itself:** At the moment when Mr. Ríos or any other human being suffers an electrical shock (as was demonstrated in the record of proceedings), they feel pain, anguish, and uncertainty about their mortal existence. Added to the above is the anguish about the situation and fate of their immediate family members and the doubt about the motive that originated the damage-causing situation and whether it will also affect his daughters. It must be noted that the event as it occurred was not foreseeable by the plaintiff and consequently prevents him from adopting any provision for the well-being of his loved ones. An average human being faced with a situation such as that demonstrated in trial will maintain a state of anguish, both for the future of their family nucleus, faced with the eventual loss of their person as head of the family and main source of income, and for themselves. On the other hand, from the testimony of the witness Alejandro Matamoros León, it is evident that even at the location where the plaintiff was, there was a smell of burnt flesh and hair; thus, the fact that the electrical shock caused significant burns on Mr. Ríos's body, which, applying logic, generate pain of special intensity, must also be taken into consideration for determining the existence of a moral affectation. **b) In the process following the electrical shock:** Subsequent to having suffered the electrical shock, it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff underwent a series of medical interventions, such as wound cleaning, grafts, washings, and bandage changes that caused repeated pain. That fact alone is a cause of moral damage, to which must be added the uncertainty about the final consequences of the event, the doubt about whether a definitive cure will be obtained or whether, on the contrary, the effects of the event will persist in his life.

Additionally, the uncertainty regarding the condition of his family and the impossibility of being with and socializing with his loved ones during the period of hospitalization, coupled with the possibility of losing his left big toe as a result of what happened and which continues to affect him to this day. To the above must be added stress from a potential loss of the economic income necessary to meet the food needs of his daughters, who are minors, which contributed to the anguish that the claimant must have suffered during his stay in the respective hospital. **c) <u>In the sequelae of the electrical discharge themselves</u>**: After leaving the hospital, the claimant has also suffered other moral harm. On the one hand, the condition of his first left big toe, which despite the time that has passed still shows no signs of healing, the uncertainty regarding this aspect in the future and its consequences in the normal realm of walking, standing on his foot, and even working, imply inner harm, given the anguish and moral pain this can signify. Correlatively, we have the declarations made at trial by Mr. Ríos Buján's spouse regarding the impact that this event has had on both his intimate life and his relationship with his daughters, given the current state of said big toe (which could be verified upon examination by the Trial Court), as well as the declarations of the affected party regarding its impact on ordinary aspects of life such as recreation - playing football with friends, work activities, running, etc. Additionally, it has been shown that the claimant underwent rehabilitation therapies, which also have an impact of pain and emotional distress. To the above must be added that the consequence of a permanent impairment of twelve percent of general capacity is sufficient cause to deem moral damage to the claimant established. The defendant parties are incorrect when they deny the causality of the invoked harm with the facts subject to the proceedings, given that from these, in re ipsa and according to criteria of logic, experience, and common understanding, the indicated moral injuries are reliably deduced. By reason of the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the claim for compensation in this respect, but with the understanding that this Panel deems the amount requested by the claimant to be disproportionate and therefore excessive. In this vein, the party requests that they be ordered to pay the sum of thirty million colones. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is considered that for the level of moral harm indicated, a lower amount corresponds, given that the sum of twenty-three million colones adequately compensates the affliction, uncertainty, pain, and anguish indicated above, since while serious, the damage caused does not transcend to a disability or greater injury that would permanently or more seriously and gravely disable other personal, family, work, or intimate spheres. This does not diminish the fact that in the claimant's case there were serious moral harms, as is being acknowledged, but rather, emphasis is placed on the fact that the events could have had even more serious consequences for the claimant, which fortunately did not transcend in his specific case. As has been shown, on December 15, 2009, a preliminary conciliatory agreement was signed with the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad through which three million colones were advanced as an advance on the amount established as compensation; thus, the claimant was paid the sum of said amount via electronic transfer. By reason of the foregoing, from the amount indicated for moral damages, what has already been turned over by way of compensation in the administrative venue must be deducted, and therefore the co-defendants must be ordered to pay the sum of twenty million colones as part of the penalty indicated in this judgment."

“V.- Sobre la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública en general : El deber de indemnizar todos los daños y perjuicios originados con motivo de las conductas y omisiones de la Administración Pública, encuentra su especificidad propia en nuestro país, a partir de la Constitución Política del año 1949. En dicho cuerpo normativo se estableció por una parte, la existencia de una jurisdicción contencioso administrativa, como parte de los derechos fundamentales de que gozan todos los ciudadanos costarricenses. En este sentido su artículo 49, con las reformas introducidas posteriormente, dispone lo siguiente: "Establécese la jurisdicción contencioso - administrativa como atribución del Poder Judicial, con el objeto de garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa del Estado, de sus instituciones y de toda otra entidad de derecho público. La desviación de poder será motivo de impugnación de los actos administrativos. La ley protegerá, al menos, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos de los administrados". Dicha norma, debe complementarse con lo señalado en los artículos 9 y 41 de nuestra Carta Magna, en tanto disponen: "El Gobierno de la República es popular, representativo, participativo, alternativo y responsable. Lo ejercen el pueblo y tres Poderes distintos e independientes entre sí ". (El destacado es nuestro) y "Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes". Con respecto al fundamento constitucional de la responsabilidad del Estado, la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional. N° 5207-2004, de las 14 horas y 55 minutos del 18 de mayo del 2004, literalmente indicó: “Nuestra Constitución Política no consagra explícitamente el principio de la responsabilidad patrimonial de las administraciones públicas por las lesiones antijurídicas que, en el ejercicio de la función administrativa, le causen a los administrados. Empero, este principio se encuentra implícitamente contenido en el Derecho de la Constitución, siendo que puede ser inferido a partir de una interpretación sistemática y contextual de varios preceptos, principios y valores constitucionales. En efecto, el artículo 9°, párrafo 1°, de la Carta Política dispone que “El Gobierno de la República es (…) responsable (…)”, con lo cual se da por sentada la responsabilidad del ente público mayor o Estado y sus diversos órganos –Poder Legislativo, Ejecutivo y Judicial-. El ordinal 11°, de su parte, establece en su párrafo primero la “(…) responsabilidad penal (…)” de los funcionarios públicos y el segundo párrafo nos refiere la “(…) responsabilidad personal para los funcionarios en el cumplimiento de sus deberes (…)”. El artículo 34 de la Constitución Política ampara los “derechos patrimoniales adquiridos” y las “situaciones jurídicas consolidadas”, los cuales solo pueden ser, efectiva y realmente, amparados con un sistema de responsabilidad administrativa de amplio espectro sin zonas inmunes o exentas cuando sean vulnerados por las administraciones públicas en el despliegue de su giro o desempeño público. El numeral 41 ibidem, estatuye que “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales (…)”, este precepto impone el deber al autor y responsable del daño de resarcir las lesiones antijurídicas efectivamente sufridas por los administrados como consecuencia del ejercicio de la función administrativa a través de conductas positivas por acción o negativas por omisión de los entes públicos, con lo cual se convierte en la piedra angular a nivel constitucional para el desarrollo legislativo de un sistema de responsabilidad objetiva y directa en el cual el resarcimiento no depende del reproche moral y subjetivo a la conducta del funcionario público por dolo o culpa, sino, única y exclusivamente, por habérsele inflingido o recibido, efectivamente, “(…) injurias o daños (…) en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales (…)”, esto es, una lesión antijurídica que no tiene el deber de soportar y, por consiguiente, debe serle resarcida. El numeral 41 de la Constitución Política establece un derecho fundamental resarcitorio a favor del administrado que haya sufrido una lesión antijurídica por un ente –a través de su funcionamiento normal o anormal o su conducta lícita o ilícita- y la obligación correlativa , de éste de resarcirla o repararla de forma integral, el acceso a la jurisdicción previsto en este mismo precepto constitucional, se convierte, así en un derecho instrumental para asegurar, forzosamente, el goce y ejercicio del derecho resarcitorio del damnificado cuando el sujeto obligado a la reparación incumpla voluntariamente con la obligación referida. El artículo 45 de la Carta Magna acoge el principio de la intangibilidad del patrimonio al disponer que “La propiedad es inviolable; a nadie puede privarse de la suya si no es por interés público legalmente comprobado, previa indemnización conforme a la ley (…)”, se reconoce, de esta forma, por el texto fundamental que los sacrificios especiales o las cargas singulares que el administrado no tiene el deber de soportar o tolerar, aunque devengan de una actividad lícita –como el ejercicio de la potestad expropiatoria- deben resarcirse. El artículo 49, párrafo 1°, de la Constitución Política en cuanto, de forma implícita, reconoce la personalidad jurídica y, por consiguiente, la posibilidad de demandar en estrados judiciales a los entes públicos, cuando incumplan con sus obligaciones constituye un claro basamento de la responsabilidad administrativa. De su parte el párrafo in fine del ordinal 49 ya citado dispone que “La ley protegerá, al menos, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos de los administrados”, siendo que una de las principales formas de garantía de éstos lo constituye un régimen de responsabilidad administrativa objetivo, directo, amplio y acabado. El párrafo final del artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, en materia del daño ambiental, establece que “La ley determinará las responsabilidad y las sanciones correspondientes”, régimen de responsabilidad del que, obviamente, no pueden abstraerse los entes públicos de carácter económico (denominados empresas públicas-ente público) y empresas públicas (llamadas también empresas públicas-ente de Derecho privado) cuando contaminan al desplegar una actividad industrial, comercial o de servicios y, en general, el Estado cuando incumple sus obligaciones de defensa y preservación del medio ambiente a través de una deficiente actividad de fiscalización o de control de las actividades públicas y privadas actual o potencialmente contaminantes. En la hipótesis de los miembros de las Juntas Directivas de las Instituciones Autónomas, el artículo 188 de la norma fundamental dispone que “Sus directores responden por su gestión”. En lo que se refiere al Poder Ejecutivo, el Título X del texto constitucional contiene un Capítulo V cuyo epígrafe es “Responsabilidades de quienes ejercen el Poder Ejecutivo”, siendo que el artículo 148 consagra la responsabilidad del Presidente por el “uso que hiciera de aquellas atribuciones que según esta Constitución le corresponden en forma exclusiva”, la conjunta de éste con el respectivo Ministro del sector “respecto al ejercicio de las atribuciones que esta Constitución les otorga a ambos” –la cual es especificada por el artículo 149 ibídem- y la del Consejo de Gobierno por los acuerdo (sic) que adopte. El principio de responsabilidad administrativa de los entes públicos y de sus funcionarios resulta complementado con la consagración constitucional del principio de igualdad en el sostenimiento de las cargas públicas (artículos 18 y 33) que impide imponerle a los administrados una carga o sacrificio singular o especial que no tienen el deber de soportar y el principio de la solidaridad social (artículo 74), de acuerdo con el cual si la función administrativa es ejercida y desplegada en beneficio de la colectividad, es ésta la que debe soportar las lesiones antijurídicas causadas a uno o varios administrados e injustamente soportadas por éstos. Finalmente, es menester tomar en consideración que la Constitución Política recoge un derecho fundamental innominado o atípico que es el de los administrados al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, el que se infiere claramente de la relación de los numerales, interpretados, a contrario sensu, 140, inciso 8°, 139, inciso 4° y 191 de la Ley fundamental en cuanto recogen, respectivamente, los parámetros deontológicos de la función administrativa tales como el “buen funcionamiento de los servicios y dependencias administrativas”, “buena marcha del Gobierno” y “eficiencia de la administración”. Este derecho fundamental al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos le impone a los entes públicos actuar en el ejercicio de sus competencias y la prestación de los servicios públicos de forma eficiente y eficaz y, desde luego, la obligación correlativa de reparar los daños y perjuicios causados cuando se vulnere esa garantía constitucional. De esta forma, queda en evidencia que el constituyente originario recogió de forma implícita el principio de la responsabilidad de las administraciones públicas, el que, como tal, debe servir a todos los poderes públicos y operadores del Derecho como parámetro para interpretar, aplicar, integrar y delimitar el entero ordenamiento jurídico. Bajo esta inteligencia, un corolario fundamental del principio constitucional de la responsabilidad administrativa lo constituye la imposibilidad para el legislador ordinario de eximir o exonerar de responsabilidad a algún ente público por alguna lesión antijurídica que le cause su funcionamiento normal o anormal o su conducta lícita o ilícita a la esfera patrimonial y extramatrimonial de los administrados.” (el destacado es nuestro).” De lo anterior, es evidente que opera un deber de resarcibilidad plena del daño, que con base en las indicadas disposiciones, se desprende del artículo 190.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en tanto dispone que: "1. La Administración responderá por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero". Como se advierte, en nuestro país impera un régimen de responsabilidad objetiva, mediante la cual opera el deber de indemnización de la Administración, con independencia de criterios de valoración subjetiva (dolo o culpa), en la actuación de sus servidores. Por otra parte, nuestra legislación prevee inclusive la posibilidad de reclamar responsabilidad de la Administración, con motivo de una conducta legítima, en tanto que el artículo 194 del cuerpo normativo mencionado, dispone al respecto, lo siguiente:

"1. La Administración será responsable por sus actos lícitos y por su funcionamiento normal cuando los mismos causen daño a los derechos del administrado en forma especial, por la pequeña proporción de afectados o por la intensidad excepcional de la lesión". En razón de lo anterior, como se advierte, el eje central del sistema de responsabilidad estatal en nuestro país, es la víctima de daño, ya que aquella surge, siempre que su funcionamiento normal o anormal, cause un daño que la víctima no tenga el deber de soportar, ya sea patrimonial o extrapatrimonial, con independencia de su situación jurídica subjetiva. No obstante, este deber resarcitorio, no es tampoco pleno, en el sentido tenga un carácter irrestricto para cualquier tipo de daño, sino que el mismo debe originarse, en el caso de que se origine de una conducta administrativa no lícita o normal, de la anormalidad que significa el apartarse de la buena administración (conforme al concepto utilizado por la propia Ley General en el artículo 102 inciso d., que entre otras cosas incluye la eficacia y la eficiencia) o sea con motivo de un mal funcionamiento, o un actuar tardío o inexistencia del mismo, por parte de la Administración. Esta anormalidad determinará la antijuricidad como presupuesto para la resarcibilidad del daño. En el caso del funcionamiento legítimo de la Administración, donde no hay anormalidad o ilicitud, la antijuricidad generadora de la posibilidad de indemnizar el daño, se da en la no obligatoriedad de sufrir una afectación que reviste la característica de ser de intensidad excepcional o pequeña proporción de afectados. En este sentido, vale aclarar que esta responsabilidad está sujeta a otras disposiciones generales sobre la responsabilidad del Estado contenidas en la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Al respecto, debe tomarse consideración lo indicado en el artículo 196 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en tanto expresa lo siguiente: " En todo caso el daño alegado habrá ser efectivo, evaluable e individualizable en relación con una persona o grupo". Con respecto a los daños que pueden ser objeto de resarcimiento en sede contencioso administrativa, el voto de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia N°112 de las 14 horas 15 minutos del 15 de julio de 1992 entre otras cosas, indicó: “IV. El daño constituye uno de los presupuestos de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, por cuanto el deber de resarcir solamente se configura si ha mediado un hecho ilícito dañoso que lesione un interés jurídicamente relevante, susceptible de ser tutelado por el ordenamiento jurídico. El daño, en sentido jurídico, constituye todo menoscabo, pérdida o detrimento de la esfera jurídica patrimonial o extrapatrimonial de la persona (damnificado), el cual provoca la privación de un bien jurídico, respecto del cual era objetivamente esperable su conservación de no haber acaecido el hecho dañoso. Bajo esta tesitura, no hay responsabilidad civil si no media daño, así como no existe daño si no hay damnificado. Por otra parte, sólo es daño indemnizable el que se llega a probar (realidad o existencia), siendo ello una cuestión de hecho reservada al prudente arbitrio del juzgador. En suma, el daño constituye la brecha perjudicial para la víctima, resultante de confrontar la situación anterior al hecho ilícito con la posterior al mismo. V.- En muchas ocasiones se utilizan indiscriminadamente las expresiones "daños" y "perjuicios". Es menester precisar y distinguir ambos conceptos. El daño constituye la pérdida irrogada al damnificado (damnum emergens), en tanto el perjuicio está conformado por la ganancia o utilidad frustrada o dejada de percibir (lucro cesans), la cual era razonable y probablemente esperable si no se hubiese producido el hecho ilícito. VI.- No cualquier daño da pie a la obligación de resarcir. Para tal efecto, han de confluir, básicamente las siguientes características para ser un "daño resarcible": A) Debe ser cierto; real y efectivo, y no meramente eventual o hipotético, no puede estar fundado en realizaciones supuestas o conjetúrales. El daño no pierde esta característica si su cuantificación resulta incierta, indeterminada o de difícil apreciación o prueba; tampoco debe confundirse la certeza con la actualidad, pues es admisible la reparación del daño cierto pero futuro; asimismo, no cabe confundir el daño futuro con el lucro cesante o perjuicio, pues el primero está referido a aquél que surge como una consecuencia necesaria derivada del hecho causal o generador del daño, es decir, sus repercusiones no se proyectan al incoarse el proceso. En lo relativo a la magnitud o monto (seriedad) del daño, ello constituye un extremo de incumbencia subjetiva única del damnificado, empero el derecho no puede ocuparse de pretensiones fundadas en daños insignificantes, derivadas de una excesiva susceptibilidad. B) Debe mediar lesión a un interés jurídicamente relevante y merecedor de amparo. Así puede haber un damnificado directo y otro indirecto: el primero es la víctima del hecho dañoso, y el segundo serán los sucesores de la víctima. C) Deberá ser causado por un tercero, y subsistente, esto es, sí ha sido reparado por el responsable o un tercero (asegurador) resulta insubsistente. D) Debe mediar una relación de causalidad entre el hecho ilícito y el daño. VII.- Dentro de las clases de daños, se encuentra en primer término el daño material y el corporal, siendo el primero el que incide sobre las cosas o bienes materiales que conforman el patrimonio de la persona, en tanto el segundo repercute sobre la integridad corporal y física. En doctrina, bajo la denominación genérica de daño material o patrimonial, suelen comprenderse las específicas de daño corporal y de daño material, en sentido estricto. La segunda parece ser la patrimoniales del damnificado (pago de tratamiento médico, gastos de hospitalización, medicamentos, etc.), ganancias frustradas si el daño lo ha incapacitado para realizar sus ocupaciones habituales (perjuicios), etc.. Esta distinción nació en el Derecho Romano, pues se distinguía entre el daño inferido a las cosas directamente (damnun) y el que lesionaba la personalidad física del individuo (injuria). En el daño patrimonial el menoscabo generado resulta ser valorable económicamente….”. De conformidad con lo anterior, no es suficiente invocar un daño, sino que se debe demostrar fehacientemente su existencia y el nexo de causalidad que le une con la conducta u omisión del ente responsable.

VI).- La parte actora invoca la responsabilidad del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad por los daños que le han sido ocasionados, habida cuenta que se dieron con motivo de la instalación de una línea telefónica fija adquirida a dicho ente. Por su parte, el representante de dicha Institución invoca que en lo acaecido en contra del Señor Ríos Buján , no participaron sus funcionarios, dado que fue ocasionado por los codemandados y la empresa Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L., quien asume por cuenta propia el riesgo de la prestación del servicio, dado que así lo indicó en el pliego de condiciones para la contratación respectiva. Al respecto, de los autos se evidencia que los funcionarios de la empresa Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L. , Señores Allan Eduardo Gómez García y Luis Ángel Marín Camacho, realizaron la instalación de una línea telefónica en la casa del actor el día 24 de julio de 2009, siendo así que con motivo de ésta se provocó una descarga eléctrica inducida al actor, que le provocó daños físicos y morales, según se determinará en considerandos posteriores. En este orden de ideas, se advierte que entre la indicada empresa y el ente codemandado opera un vínculo contractual, mediante el cual aquella se encarga de la instalación de las líneas telefónicas que le sean asignadas por dicho ente público, según las solicitudes de servicio que se generen ante los requerimientos de los clientes del mismo. Adicionalmente este Tribunal ha tenido por demostrado que la solicitud de servicio se realiza, previa inspección por parte de un funcionario de la Institución del lugar en donde se practicará la respectiva instalación eléctrica (debiendo tomarse en consideración que inclusive si no hubiera inspección, habría siempre responsabilidad por dicho motivo de falta de fiscalización ex ante y de revisión periódica de la red eléctrica bajo su responsabilidad), siendo así que en la zona en donde habita el actor las acometidas eléctricas pasan y son soportadas por encima de las líneas de baja tensión para lograr más altura y consecuentemente el neutro de estas líneas está por debajo de la altura mínima establecida al efecto. También hay prueba de que con anterioridad a la instalación de la línea telefónica del Señor Ríos Buján, había diferentes líneas telefónicas previamente instaladas, a pesar de la situación indicada. En razón de los anteriores hechos demostrados, este Tribunal estima que en el presente caso existe una evidente responsabilidad del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad por los daños ocasionados al actor. En primer término, debe tomarse en consideración que la responsabilidad objetiva del ente demandado abarca no sólo las conductas u omisiones de sus servidores, sino también de aquellos terceros que contrata con motivo de sus objetivos institucionales. En este orden ideas, la responsabilidad deviene, tanto de la creación de una situación de riesgo con ocasión de la prestación de un servicio público, como de la eventual antijuricidad de una conducta propia o de un tercero contratado que genera una consecuencia dañosa. La contratación del tercero para la prestación de todo o parte de un servicio público tiene un fin meramente instrumental para el cumplimiento de éste y la satisfacción del interés publico y de modo alguno releva la responsabilidad objetiva establecida en el ordenamiento jurídico para un ente público. Dicho de otro modo, la circunstancia de que el servicio no se preste de manera directa por el ente y éste emplee otros medios previstos por el ordenamiento para el cumplimiento de los fines públicos asignados, no le exonera de responsabilidad y por el contrario, mantiene incólume su deber de resarcirlo, sin perjuicio de la determinación de una solidaridad frente al afectado. En estos casos, ante la existencia de una conducta u omisión de una contratista, no puede el ente contratante invocar la existencia del hecho de un tercero para evadir su responsabilidad, en tanto que en el caso de la empresa, su participación en la conducta dañosa es inmediata (debiendo responder por el hecho en sí) y en el caso de la Institución puede ser inmediata o mediata, según se demuestre en juicio la existencia de algún grado de participación directo en lo acaecido o simplemente, del vínculo conductor de la situación generadora de riesgo. Precisamente la responsabilidad objetiva que posee todo ente público descansa en la antijuricidad de un daño ocasionado al Administrado que éste no tiene el deber de soportarlo y así cualquier situación antijurídica que sea durante o con motivo u ocasión de la prestación de un servicio público, implica el rompimiento de la obligación de la Administración (sea que lo preste de manera directa o por medio de terceros) de tener un funcionamiento eficaz y eficiente y correlativamente significa una afectación al derecho del ciudadano de obtener un servicio oportuno, técnico, eficaz, eficiente y ante todo, que no le genere un daño que por su mera existencia deviene en un funcionamiento anormal de la Administración. En este orden de ideas, debe recordarse lo dispuesto en el artículo 4 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en tanto dispone lo siguiente: " La actividad de los entes públicos deberá estar sujeta en su conjunto a los principios fundamentales del servicio público, para asegurar su continuidad, su eficiencia, su adaptación a todo cambio en el régimen legal o en la necesidad social que satisfacen y la igualdad de trato de los destinatarios, usuarios o beneficiarios". En el mismo sentido, el artículo 5.a) de la Ley de la Administración Financiera y de Presupuestos Públicos indica: "La administración de los recursos financieros del sector público se orientará a los intereses generales de la sociedad, atendiendo los principios de economía, eficacia y eficiencia, con sometimiento pleno a la ley". Dado lo anterior, al ser la responsabilidad objetiva una responsabilidad sin culpa, lo relevante es la comprobación de la existencia del daño, el cual para su resarcibilidad debe estar vinculado a una conducta antijurídica relacionada con la Administración, sea unido por el hilo conductor del nexo causal. En casos de terceros contratados por la Administración, al estimarse éstos como colaboradores de ésta para el debido cumplimiento de los fines públicos, dicho vínculo se fundamentará en la existencia de una relación contractual previa que genera una conducta productora de un daño antijurídico, el cual acaece, a pesar de los deberes contractuales y legales (art. 13 Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, art. 5 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos y 151 de su reglamento) existentes entre la empresa contratista y la respectiva administración contratante. Únicamente se rompería dicho vínculo en aquellos casos en que la Administración Pública demuestre que a pesar de haber empleado y agotado todos los medios a su alcance (prevenciones, sanciones, fiscalización, inicio de procedimiento de resolución contractual, etc), la contratista persistió en realizar determinada actuación y aún así ocurrió el hecho dañoso. Las anteriores consideraciones se fundan en que la relación entre las partes no es de carácter lineal (administrado-contratista-administración contratante), sino más bien es tridimensional, en la cual la vinculación de las partes es sistémica y dinámica y por ende la Administración Pública guarda frente al Administrado obligaciones directas, para efectos tales como control, rendición de cuentas, verificación del debido control interno, transparencia, cumplimiento del fin público y ante todo, de responsabilidad. Es así como no existe desvinculación de la Administración del resultado final de la contratación realizada, la cual al final de cuentas tiene una mera naturaleza instrumental del servicio público finalmente prestado. Servicio como producto obtenido no le es satisfactorio al usuario o le es entregado tardiamente o peor aún, le causa un daño, es imputable a la Administración misma, como una defectuosa manifestación de su conducta. En el caso del ente demandado le es plenamente aplicable las anteriores consideraciones, en tanto que como ente- empresa pública, está sometido al bloque de legalidad administrativa aplicable a la materia de conformidad con el artículo 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en relación con el artículo de dicho cuerpo normativo. Más aún, a lo indicado sobre la responsabilidad objetiva del ente, debe adicionarse que a la relación entre la Institución y la empresa contratada aplica el deber de fiscalización de la ejecución contractual establecido en el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, en tanto dispone: " La Administración fiscalizará todo el proceso de ejecución, para eso el contratista deberá ofrecer las facilidades necesarias..." Para determinar la responsabilidad del ente, se debe tomar en consideración no sólo la responsabilidad objetiva general que le asiste, sino además, sus obligaciones de la correcta verificación de la ejecución del objeto contractual, por lo que si devienen daños con motivo de ésta y no se demuestra el cumplimiento de dicho deber público, necesariamente se refuerza el deber de reparación de la respectiva Administración Pública. Por otra parte, también es menester indicar que se demostró en autos, tal y como se ha dicho que en el caso del actor, tal y como ocurre en otros casos de idénticas solicitudes de servicios telefónicos, la solicitud de servicio se realiza, previa inspección por parte de un funcionario de la Institución del lugar en donde se practicará la respectiva instalación eléctrica, más que en la zona en donde habita el actor las acometidas eléctricas pasan y son soportadas por encima de las líneas de baja tensión para lograr más altura y consecuentemente el neutro de estas líneas está por debajo de la altura mínima establecida al efecto. Es decir, la situación de riesgo generadora del daño era pública, evidente y notoria, y consecuentemente conocida por el ente demandado, a pesar de lo cual, toleró dicha situación y omitió adoptar alguna conducta que corrigiera tal situación. Lo anterior se ve reforzado en tanto se ha tenido por demostrado que en la zona en donde se hizo la conexión telefónica del actor, ya existían varias líneas ya instaladas desde tiempos atrás. Como se advierte, estamos entonces, además de las consideraciones hechas ut supra, en presencia de una omisión de actuación del ente accionado traducida en una inactividad material en la cual, el ICE no hizo nada para evitar la ocurrencia de una situación generadora de un riesgo y que a la postre, provocó los daños objeto del presente proceso. En autos se ha discutido si dichos daños se ocasionaron por efectos de un arco eléctrico producido al pasar electricidad por dicho fenómeno al cable telefónico instalado al actor o por un contacto directo de cables. Estima este Colegio que tal discusión es irrelevante para efectos de la determinación de existencia de responsabilidad por el daño causado. En ambos supuestos, la existencia de una responsabilidad objetiva, hace necesario el deber de resarcimiento por el mero hecho del acaecimiento del hecho dañoso y de la verificación del daño. En uno u otro caso, la parte más relevante en la situación descrita, recibió una descarga eléctrica en su persona, que no hubiera sufrido sino se realizara el acto de instalación de línea telefónica. Es este el hecho relevante para efectos de determinación de la responsabilidad surgida y no puede cargarse a la parte con el deber de probar lo que le provocó la descarga eléctrica, cuando en el caso se ha tenido por demostrado que la misma acaeció y que se dio con motivo de la prestación de un servicio por parte de una empresa contratada por un ente público. Las discusiones entre las partes demandadas en los sentidos dichos no deben afectar los derechos del actor, por la simple razón de que ambas están revestidas de responsabilidad objetiva por imperativo legal, no habiéndose demostrado la existencia de un supuesto que excluya su deber de resarcir, dado el nexo causal de ambas con el hecho dañoso. El representante del ICE invoca que la empresa codemandada asumió convencionalmente cualquier responsabilidad que se pudiere originar con motivo de los servicios que ésta presta. Adicional a las anteriores consideraciones que desvirtúan lo manifestado por el ente accionado, debe indicarse que admitir tal tesis, sería legitimar que vía contratación de servicios u obras, se difumine y más aún, se haga nugatoria la responsabilidad objetiva tutelada constitucionalmente, máxime en la época actual, en la cual, dicho mecanismo de prestación de servicios por parte del Estado (v.g. construcción de obras, prestación de servicios sociales, actividades profesionales como el notariado, la ingeniería, etc), es cosa común, ante el cambio de paradigma en cuanto a su operación e impacto en el quehacer público. Como se ha indicado, la Administración Pública mantiene deberes inherentes a los principios que le rigen y a las más sanas normas y técnicas aplicables en la materia, que implican que contratar a un tercero para la prestación de bienes o servicios no significa abdicar de su responsabilidad ni de la necesaria fiscalización y seguimiento de lo pactado, desde el inicio y hasta la finalización de los efectos de la relación contractual, los cuales inclusive pueden ir más allá del mero vencimiento del contrato formal. Así las cosas procede acoger la demanda en lo que respecta al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y determinar la existencia de un deber de reparar los daños causados al actor con motivo de los hechos objeto del presente proceso.- VII).- Sobre la Aplicación de la Ley de Protección al Consumidor : La tutela de los derechos del consumidor se fundamenta en el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, reformado mediante Ley No.7607 de 29 de mayo de 1996, en tanto establece lo siguiente: "Los consumidores y usuarios tienen derecho a la protección de su salud, ambiente, seguridad e intereses económicos; a recibir información adecuada y veraz; a la libertad de elección, y a un trato equitativo. El Estado apoyará los organismos que ellos constituyan para la defensa de sus derechos. La ley regulará esas materias". Esta disposición constitucional surge con motivo de la determinación de una nueva generación de derechos del ciudadano, frente a los fenómenos surgidos con motivo de la sociedad de consumo y las reglas del mercado y a la evidente desigualdad del consumidor ante los productores y distribuidores de bienes y servicios. En este orden de ideas, se ha indicado que " Las modernas técnicas de introducción de los productos, las modalidades de comercialización y la animación de la demanda vía publicidad, constituyen otros elementos que acentúan la indefensión de los consumidores, desconcertados sobre el contenido real de sus adquisiciones a las que se siente psicológicamente impulsado a través de eficaces mecanismos motivadores... El interlocutor del comprador no es ya por lo general un comerciante conocido. Aparecen grandes cadenas de supermercados que, como es el caso general, expiden productos creados en serie por importantes complejos nacionales e internacionales. El desequilibrio entre los agentes económicos implicados es así evidente. Los poderes públicos han reaccionado tambien ante esta situación, en parte por su conciencia de servicio, a la que no puede ser ajena la existencia de unos intereses que afectan de una u otra forma a toda la población..." Ramón Martín Mateo. Derecho Público de la Economía, Editorial Ceura, P. 270. Sobre las primeras referencias del reconocimiento de los derechos del consumidor en nuestra jurisprudencia es necesario citar la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional n.° 1441-92 de las 3:45 horas del 2 de junio de 1992, que recalca la especial protección del consumidor por su posición de inferioridad en la relación de consumo, al respecto expresó: “ En efecto, es notorio que el consumidor se encuentra en el extremo de la cadena formada por la producción, distribución y comercialización de los bienes de consumo que requiere adquirir para su satisfacción personal y su participación en este proceso, no responde a razones técnicas ni profesionales, sino en la celebración constante de contratos a título personal. Por ello su relación, en esa secuencia comercial es de inferioridad y requiere de una especial protección frente a los proveedores de los bienes y servicios, a los efectos que de previo a externar su consentimiento contractual cuente con todos los elementos de juicio necesarios, que le permitan expresarlo con toda libertad y ello implica el conocimiento cabal de los bienes y servicios ofrecidos. Van incluídos por lo expresado, en una mezcla armónica, varios principios constitucionales, como la preocupación estatal a favor de los más amplios sectores de la población cuando actúan como consumidores, la reafirmación de la libertad individual al facilitar a los particulares la libre disposición del patrimonio con el concurso del mayor conocimiento posible del bien o servicio a adquirir, la protección de la salud cuando esté involucrada, el ordenamiento y la sistematización de las relaciones recíprocas entre los interesados , la homologación de las prácticas comerciales internacionales al sistema interno y en fin, la mayor protección del funcionamiento del habitante en los medios de subsistencia.“. Con base en estas orientaciones, en el año 1994 se aprobó la Ley número 7472, Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, que en su artículo 1 establece lo siguiente: "El objetivo de la presente Ley es proteger, efectivamente, los derechos y los intereses legítimos del consumidor, la tutela y la promoción del proceso de competencia y libre concurrencia, mediante la prevención, la prohibición de monopolios, las prácticas monopolísticas y otras restricciones al funcionamiento eficiente del mercado y la eliminación de las regulaciones necesarias para las actividades económicas" Esta Ley establece en su artículo 29 una serie de derechos sustanciales y procesales de las personas consumidoras, en los que se destacan, a los efectos los siguientes: "Sin perjuicio de lo establecido en tratados, convenciones internacionales de las que Costa Rica sea parte, legislación interna ordinaria, reglamentos, principios generales de derecho, usos y costumbres, son derechos fundamentales e irrenunciables del consumidor, los siguientes: a) La protección contra los riesgos que puedan afectar su salud, su seguridad y el medio ambiente. b) La protección de sus legítimos intereses económicos y sociales.... f) Mecanismos efectivos de acceso para la tutela administrativa y judicial de sus derechos e intereses legítimos, que conduzcan a prevenir adecuadamente, sancionar y reparar con prontitud la lesión de estos, según corresponda....." En este orden de ideas cabe mencionar que la doctrina ha analizado el concepto de consumidor desde dos puntos de vista, como cliente y como destinatario final. En cuanto al primer concepto, se indica: “excede al de consumidor adquirente tutelado por la Ley 24.240 (Ley de protección al consumidor Argentina) pues se refiere a todos los sujetos que contratan para adquirir bienes o servicios ofrecidos en el mercado, tanto para atender sus necesidades privadas como para una actividad empresarial (…) en tanto que como destinatario final el concepto se refiere a la persona que adquiere bienes o servicios para su consumo o uso privado, “quien adquiere bienes o contrata servicios para un destino ajeno a cualquier actividad de producción transformación comercialización o prestación a terceros…”. (Barrantes Jaime y otro, Derecho y Jurisprudencia en Materia de Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor. Ediciones Jurídicas ARETE, San José, C.R., 1999 , pág. 21). Por su parte, Por su parte , la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en relación con la figura del “consumidor”, ha manifestado:“… es notorio que el consumidor se encuentra en el extremo de la cadena formada por la producción, distribución y comercialización de los bienes de consumo que requiere adquirir para su satisfacción personal y su participación en este proceso, no responde a razones técnicas ni profesionales, sino en la celebración constante de contratos a título personal. Por ello su relación, en esa secuencia comercial es de inferioridad y requiere de una especial protección frente a los proveedores de los bienes y servicios, a los efectos que de previo a externar su consentimiento contractual cuente con todos los elementos de juicio necesarios, que le permitan expresarlo con toda libertad y ello implica el conocimiento cabal de los bienes y servicios ofrecidos. Van incluídos por lo expresado, en una mezcla armónica, varios principios constitucionales, como la preocupación estatal a favor de los más amplios sectores de la población cuando actúan como consumidores, la reafirmación de la libertad individual al facilitar a los particulares la libre disposición del patrimonio con el concurso del mayor conocimiento posible del bien o servicio a adquirir, la protección de la salud cuando esté involucrada, el ordenamiento y la sistematización de las relaciones recíprocas entre los interesados, la homologación de las prácticas comerciales internacionales al sistema interno y en fin, la mayor protección del funcionamiento del habitante en los medios de subsistencia …” (voto N° 1441-92 de las 15:45 horas del 02 de junio de 1992). Por otra parte, la ley de cita, en lo que es de interés para el presente proceso, dispone en su artículo 32, la siguiente disposición sobre la responsabilidad del productor y del comerciante: "El productor, el proveedor y el comerciante deben responder concurrente e independientemente de la existencia de culpa, si el consumidor resulta perjudicado por razón del bien o el servicio, de informaciones inadecuadas o insuficientes sobre ellos o de su utilización y riesgos. Sólo se libera quien demuestre que ha sido ajeno al daño". Con respecto a este tipo de responsabilidad se puede determinar que es objetiva por excelencia y por ello, resulta fundamental la verificación del nexo de causalidad - sea la relación del daño con los hechos creadores de éste y la imputación objetiva, según la conducta riesgosa creada. La Sala Primera, en su voto 646-F-2001 de las 16 horas 45 minutos del 22 de agosto de 2001, en el mismo sentido, señala los elementos de este tipo de responsabilidad, al indicar: "... Tres son los elementos que conforman éste tipo de responsabilidad, a saber: a) el empleo de cosas que conlleven peligro o riesgo; b) causar un daño de carácter patrimonial; y c) la relación o nexo de causa efecto entre el hecho y el daño. Resumiendo “...en la responsabilidad civil objetiva debe existir un nexo causal entre la actividad riesgosa puesta en marcha por el agente y el daño ocasionado” (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, No. 354 de las 10 horas del 14 de diciembre de 1990). Desde el punto de vista práctico -dice el jurista costarricense Victor Pérez Vargas- “...la responsabilidad objetiva se resume en una ventaja a favor del lesionado que significa una parcial inversión la (sic) de la prueba, en el sentido de que ésta queda exonerado de la carga de probar la culpa (culpa o dolo) del causante del daño y vano sería el intento de éste de probar su falta de culpa...” (Pérez Vargas, Victor, Derecho Privado , I Edición, Editorial Publitex, San José, Costa Rica, 1988, pag. 417). Sea, le corresponde a la persona o empresa a quien se le atribuye la responsabilidad, demostrar que los daños se produjeron por fuerza mayor o por culpa de la víctima (doctrina que informa los numerales 32 párrafo segundo de la Ley No.7472 y el 1048 párrafo quinto del Código Civil)... ” Con base en lo anterior, podemos determinar que en el caso de la responsabilidad del agente económico, tampoco es relevante el concepto subjetivo de dolo o culpa, y que reviste especial importancia la determinación del nexo causal entre el hecho y el daño producido, estando restringido al demandado, únicamente la demostración del rompimiento de dicho vínculo o la inexistencia del daño. En este orden de ideas, el voto número 655 de las 15 horas 05 minutos del 19 de setiembre de 2007, emitido por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia dispuso:“(…)Esta concepción, surge porque el modelo de la culpa era insuficiente para dar respuesta a la multiplicación de los peligros y daños propios de la vida moderna. La teoría del riesgo, entendida en el sentido de que, quien ejerce o se aprovecha de una actividad con elementos potencialmente peligrosos para los demás, debe también soportar sus inconvenientes, vino a cambiar la mayor parte de las legislaciones. También se le denomina teoría del daño creado, cuyo paradigma de imputación radica en atribuir el daño a todo el que introduce en la sociedad un elemento virtual de producirlo, debiendo prescindirse de la subjetividad del agente, y centrarse en el problema de la reparación y sus límites en torno de la causalidad material. Solo interesa indagar cual hecho fue la causa del efecto para imputarlo, dado que es suficiente la producción del resultado dañoso, siendo innecesaria la configuración de un acto ilícito a través de los elementos tradicionales. Como corolario de lo expuesto, la culpa, negligencia, imprudencia o impericia del agente, no son los elementos esenciales para dar nacimiento a la obligación dentro de los parámetros de la responsabilidad objetiva. De allí que, no tiene ninguna importancia, para desvirtuarla, que se logre demostrar que no incurrió en alguno de ellos. En este mismo sentido, puede verse la sentencia no. 61 de las 14 horas 50 minutos del 19 de junio de 1997, de esta Sala. Por tal razón, la noción de riesgo sustituye los conceptos de culpa y antijuricidad, prescindiéndose como criterios de imputación. Se enfoca en una conducta o actividad de un sujeto físico o jurídico, caracterizada por la puesta en marcha de una prestación peligrosa, o la mera tenencia de un objeto de peligro. Por ende, el elemento a considerar es el riesgo creado. Sobre el tema en particular, puede consultarse la sentencia no. 376 de las 14 horas 40 minutos del 9 de julio de 1999, de este órgano colegiado. Debe agregarse, que se parte del supuesto de que el origen de las obligaciones es el uso lícito de cosas peligrosas, y que al provocar daño, exigen al que se sirve de ellas, a resarcirlo. Para la configuración de este tipo de responsabilidad deben darse los siguientes componentes: a) el empleo de cosas que conlleven peligro o riesgo; b) causar un daño; y c) la relación o nexo de causa efecto entre el hecho y el daño. Finalmente, es importante mencionar que, dentro de esta temática, opera una parcial inversión de la prueba, en el sentido de que el lesionado queda exonerado de la carga de probar la culpa o dolo de quien provocó el daño. En consecuencia, le atañe a la persona física o jurídica a quien se le atribuye la responsabilidad, demostrar que los daños se produjeron por fuerza mayor o por culpa de la víctima. Doctrina que informan los numerales 35 párrafo segundo de la Ley no.7472 y el 1048 párrafo quinto del Código Civil.” (Igualmente, puede verse la resolución no. 646-F-2001 de las 16 horas 45 minutos del 22 de agosto de 2001, de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). En orden de ideas, debe de entenderse e interpretarse el origen y alcance del artículo 35 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor que instituye una responsabilidad objetiva al productor, proveedor y comerciante que lesionen la esfera jurídica del consumidor por razón del bien o el servicio, de informaciones inadecuadas o insuficientes sobre ellos o de su uso y riesgos. De esta manera, deben responder independientemente de incurrir en culpa. La única excepción se da, si demuestran que han sido ajenos al daño. Consecuentemente, el afectado está exento de demostrar la culpa o dolo de quien provocó el daño, y a éste último le corresponde, probar que se produjo por fuerza mayor o por culpa de la víctima, según lo ha precisado la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en lo fallos citados, a la luz de la doctrina que informan los numerales 35 párrafo segundo de la Ley no. 7472 y el 1048 párrafo quinto del Código Civil. Complementario con lo anterior, a fin de determinar el daño, es menester indicar la necesidad de existencia de relación entre el daño reclamado y la conducta desplegada por el agente económico. En este orden de ideas, doctrinariamente se han indicado diferentes criterios de imputación objetiva, en los que se destaca para los efectos, la causalidad adecuada. Con respecto a este criterio, se ha indicado doctrinariamente lo siguiente: "La conducta del demandado es una causa adecuada del daño padecido por la víctima si, ex ante, la causación del daño era previsible –no muy improbable- por parte del demandado. Pero los autores nunca se han puesto de acuerdo en qué grado de probabilidad –entre 0 y 1- es el adecuado según el derecho; y siempre han discrepado acerca de si el juicio sobre la probabilidad debe consistir en una prognosis puramente subjetiva –similar a la que se lleva a cabo en el análisis del dolo y la culpa-, es decir, en un juicio sobre la evitabilidad del resultado, o si, por el contrario la prognosis ha de ser objetiva en el sentido de que un agente dotado de conocimientos especiales habría de haber conocido la probabilidad de la producción del resultado". ( Causalidad y Responsabilidad. Pablo Salvador Coderch y Antonio Fernández Crende. Revista para el análisis del derecho. WWW.INDET.COM.) En este sentido, se ha decantado la posición de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, como se advierte del voto 467-F-2008 de las 14 horas 25 minutos del 4 de julio de 2008, que indica: ".... el caso fortuito no permite eximir al comerciante o productor de la responsabilidad civil, puesto que no se hace ningún juicio de reproche en relación con su actividad. Únicamente la fuerza mayor y el hecho de la víctima permiten exonerar al comerciante o productor de la responsabilidad civil, en el tanto que ambas circunstancias implican la exclusión de la causalidad, elemento que resulta indispensable para que existan igualmente la responsabilidad subjetiva y la objetiva. Corresponde al juzgador examinar en cada caso si existe o no causalidad directa y adecuada entre el daño reclamado (y demostrado) por el petente y la actividad (activa u omisiva) desplegada por el productor o comerciante. Es claro que en el presente caso resultaría excesivo exigir al consumidor contar con el nivel de dispositivos de seguridad que expone la demanda en sus agravios de segunda instancia, puesto que ello, como bien lo dijo el tribunal, implicaría obligar a los consumidores a un deber de cuidado excesivo, más allá del razonablemente exigible a la persona media. No demostró la demandada que la causa del siniestro fuera atribuible a la propia víctima, por falta de cuidado, negligencia o imprudencia...." Es con base en estas consideraciones que procede determinar la responsabilidad de la empresa codemandada.

VIII).- La parte actora indica en su demanda que los daños que le fueron causados se provocaron de manera inmediata por la conducta de los funcionarios de Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L., habida cuenta que fue con motivo de la instalación de su línea telefónica que se le causó la correspondiente descarga eléctrica. La representación de dicha empresa indica que la descarga eléctrica sufrida por el actor obedeció a las condiciones de las líneas de distribución del lugar, siendo así que en el caso de análisis, todas las conexiones fueron realizadas conforme al procedimiento establecido y no hubo contacto directo con los cables de electricidad. Indica que lo ocurrido se dio con motivo del fenómeno llamado "arco eléctrico ", y no el choque del cable telefónico con la línea primaria o secundaria de electricidad, dado que de haber sucedido esto se habría activado una protección consistente en un corte eléctrico automático. Al respecto estima este Tribunal que si bien se ha demostrado en autos que el cable eléctrico en la zona donde habita el actor se encuentra fuera de la norma establecida al efecto, siendo así que las acometidas eléctricas pasan y son soportadas por encima de las líneas de baja tensión para lograr más altura y el neutro de estas líneas está por debajo de la altura mínima establecida al efecto, hay responsabilidad objetiva de la empresa demandada. Lo anterior en tanto que como se ha indicado, los daños causados al actor sucedieron con motivo de la instalación de la línea telefónica a éste, por parte de los funcionarios de la empresa codemandada, Señores Allan Eduardo Gómez García y Luis Ángel Marín Camacho. Es decir, Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L. fue partícipe activa en el proceso de instalación de la línea telefónica al señor Ríos Buján y que fue causa directa y eficiente de los daños invocados. Nuevamente es menester indicar que es irrelevante que el daño se haya causado por un contacto directo del cable telefónico con los cables secundarios de electricidad o por un "arco eléctrico", en tanto que lo relevante es que se ocasionó un daño como producto de una actividad realizada por la empresa demandada, lo cual está debidamente demostrado en juicio y no fue controvertido. Inclusive, no se puede decir que el hecho mismo de la eventual existencia del denominado "arco eléctrico" sea motivo suficiente para eximir de responsabilidad a la sociedad actora. Así como la existencia del mismo como situación de caso fortuito (hecho propio de la actividad, imprevisible e inevitable) no habría sido causal de romper el nexo causal y eximir de responsabilidad al ICE, tampoco lo es para la empresa demandada, dado en ningún momento ha demostrado, como le correspondía ajenidad al daño ocasionado. Por el contrario, la misma prueba aportada por la parte codemandada indica lo siguiente: "... las acometidas eléctricas han tenido que pasar y ser soportadas por encima de las líneas de baja tensión para lograr una mayor altura y que aún así es insuficiente, ya que la altura de 4.00 metros del neutro de las líneas de baja tensión está muy por debajo de la altura mínima establecida. Se ha identificado un riesgo para el técnico la necesidad de instalar las acometidas telefónicas por encima de la red de baja tensión, situación presentada en el momento del accidente. Como consideración adicional se determina que el cable telefónico no está construido con un aislamiento adecuado para baja tensión, situación presentada al momento del accidente...". Lo anterior fue reforzado por la declaración testimonial del autor del indicado informe, Señor Edwin González Marroquín y que refuerza una consideración fundamental, a saber, que a pesar de las condiciones riesgosas en que se encontraba la ubicación, altura y situación de las líneas telefónicas en la zona donde se encuentra la residencia del actor, se optó por realizar la instalación correspondiente, sin que conste objeción alguna o advertencia al ICE de la situación indicada. Es decir, la empresa, reflejada en la actuación de sus funcionarios, aceptó el riesgo que podría implicar la instalación de líneas telefónicas en las condiciones dichas, y en el potencial e incierto, pero posible, riesgo de creación del alegado arco eléctrico. De las declaraciones de los codemandados se desprende que ellos eran conscientes de la existencia de una situación inadecuada en la ubicación y altura de las líneas eléctricas y de la relación específica de éstas con la línea a instalar, siendo así que a pesar del riesgo dicho, optaron por continuar su trabajo y no alertar sobre la situación encontrada en el caso concreto. No puede eximir su responsabilidad el que hayan existido otras líneas telefónicas colocadas previamente, por cuanto, su labor los hacía conscientes de que dicha situación no era correcta ni segura. Ahora bien, independientemente del anterior juicio de reproche sobre la actividad desplegada, (que puede ser empleado para desvirtuar cualquier argumento sobre la existencia de un hecho de un tercero) debe entenderse que en el presente caso estamos en un supuesto de responsabilidad objetiva en que hay deber de indemnizar en caso de demostrarse la existencia de un daño, efectivo, evaluable, individualizable y antijurídico, vinculado con una conducta u omisión de la empresa, y respecto del cual, el cual el cliente o usuario no tiene el deber de soportarlo. En este orden de ideas, nuevamente debe realizarse el juicio necesario para determinar la denominada causa eficiente. Para este Tribunal el daño al actor no se hubiera causado, si la empresa demandada no hubiera realizado la instalación telefónica a pesar de las condiciones conocidas y descritas de las líneas eléctricas. Más aún, la responsabilidad de la sociedad demandada ocurre con motivo del propio riesgo existente en su actividad, en donde el nexo causal surge de la realización de la actividad que aunque lícita, constituye una fuente de riesgo y por consecuencia, origen para quien se beneficia de las ganancias de la misma, de soportar sus inconvenientes frente a la propia administración o terceros usuarios o clientes. La actividad de instalación de líneas telefónicas, la colocación de cables y transmisión de electricidad es per se riesgosa y no excluye un hecho como el acaecido, el cual, sea por la colocación del cable eléctrico o por el alegado "arco eléctrico" es inherente al servicio prestado, independientemente de cualquier valoración subjetiva. Es por ello, que si bien hay prueba del conocimiento de la situación potencial que podría derivar de la ubicación y altura de los cables a ser colocados, frente a las líneas eléctricas, los fueros de la culpa, negligencia, imprudencia o impericia del agente, no son requisitos de la obligación de la responsabilidad objetiva en este caso. Para la configuración de la misma en la situación de análisis, se debe tomar en consideración la demostración de la existencia de la actividad comercial desplegada por la empresa demandada (la cual no ha sido refutada), el daño ocasionado (sobre el cual nos referiremos con posterioridad) y la existencia de la relación o nexo causal de los dos anteriores presupuestos (los cuales están debidamente demostrados) y en donde no se ha probado que la empresa haya sido ajena a lo sucedido, por concurrir fuerza mayor, hecho de un tercero o por culpa de la víctima. En el caso en examen existe una relación de consumo, dada la relación sui generis y tridimensional descrita ut supra, en la cual, la empresa demandada vende un servicio al ICE, mas cuyo destinatario final es un tercero, el actor, quien recibe directamente los beneficios de lo pactado. Es así como el actor, como cliente del ente es a la vez, consumidor de la actividad comercial desplegada por la sociedad codemandada, era el destinatario final del servicio y por ende se encontraba, para efectos de dicha situación, en el extremo inferior de la cadena de servicio ICE- Técnicos en Comunicaciones S.A.L.- actor. Por lo anterior y de conformidad con la naturaleza propia de los derechos del consumidor, dentro del esquema de responsabilidad objetiva no es posible cargar al administrado con el deber de demostrar si el daño fue ocasionado por un contacto eléctrico o por un arco de tal naturaleza. Lo relevante es que sucedió un daño con ocasión del servicio prestado por la empresa (causa inmediata y efectiva), según se ha indicado, indistintamente de la causa técnica subyacente. Es deber de la empresa demostrar que lo sucedido de ninguna manera estuvo vinculado con su actuar, prueba que en el caso en examen no se realizó y por el contrario, las mismas declaraciones de los señores Gómez García y Marín Camacho, evidencian su vinculación con el hecho generador del daño invocado. Así las cosas, concluye este Tribunal que converge los supuestos necesarios para imputar responsabilidad a la sociedad codemandada, por lo que de conformidad con el artículo 35 citado en el considerando anterior, le es aplicable plenamente aplicable sus alcances y por consiguiente, procede acoger la demanda en lo que respecta a la misma y determinar la existencia de un deber de reparar los daños causados al actor con motivo de los hechos objeto del presente proceso.- IX).- Sobre la responsabilidad civil extra contractual: La responsabilidad de los sujetos de derecho privado no vinculados con una relación contractual previa o de consumo se rige por las disposiciones del artículo 1045 del Código Civil en tanto dispone: “Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia, causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los perjuicios”. De conformidad con lo indicado, a diferencia de las tendencias más modernas en materia de responsabilidad en donde se objetiviza ésta, tal y como hemos visto tanto en el caso de la empresa como del ente codemandados, en el caso de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual prevista en el Código Civil, se debe partir de la existencia de criterios de imputación subjetivos, a fin de que surja un deber de resarcir los daños ocasionados con motivo de una conducta u omisión de un sujeto de derecho privado. El deber de indemnización se da con motivo del quebranto de un deber jurídico de no dañar al otro (alterum non ladere), en donde se da un criterio de imputación o juicio de reproche fundado en el cumplimiento de los indicados presupuestos subjetivos que cargan de antijurídica la respectiva conducta. Así será tal una acción u omisión que sea realizada con dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia. Como se advierte, en la norma dicha, incorporada en nuestro Código Civil de 1888 y fundada en el Code Napoléon de 18 de marzo de 1803, se liga las figuras de la culpabilidad y la responsabilidad, y se parte que debía presentarse la primera para que procediera la segunda. Así el sujeto solo está obligado a reparar un daño si este es producto de una conducta propia dolosa o de culpa grave, (asimilando a un castigo) lo cual tiene su fuente en los orígenes penales de toda determinación de responsabilidad. Con relación al carácter compuesto de este presupuesto de responsabilidad, daño más conducta tildada de antijurídica por el ordenamiento, nos indica el voto 335-2008 de 9:00 horas de 19 de diciembre de 2008 de la Sección Primera del Tribunal Superior Civil, indicó: “Como se puede verificar para que se configure el daño, en el contexto jurídico, se requiere de tres presupuestos: 1) un perjuicio patrimonial o extra patrimonial, 2) que sea provocado por la acción u omisión de una persona, al sujeto afectado (víctima), y 3) que este perjuicio haya sido causado de manera antijurídica. El daño constituye la brecha perjudicial para la víctima, resultante de confrontar la situación anterior a la ocurrencia de la acción u omisión perjudicial, con la posterior a la misma, hasta aquí se puede hablar de daño en sentido genérico. Sin embargo, para que el daño producido, encuentre tutela en el ordenamiento jurídico, de forma tal que el mismo deba ser resarcido por el agente productor, el mismo, no solo debe derivarse de una actividad u omisión imputable al tercero, (segundo presupuesto definido como nexo causal) sino que también esta conducta activa u omisiva, debe ser calificable como ilícita…” De conformidad con lo indicado, para imputar responsabilidad, al daño demostrado debe adicionarse la comprobación de que la conducta es calificada como antijurídica, según lo dicho por el artículo 1045 del Código Civil. No basta, como lo fue en el caso de los codemandos, con la comprobación del daño y la existencia del vínculo causal para generar responsabilidad, sino que será necesario además, la prueba de que la conducta del que se imputa el deber de resarcir, lo fue con dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia. En este caso, también son aplicables las consideraciones hechas sobre la teoría de la causalidad a la materia. En este orden de ideas, se ha indicado que “En el Derecho Civil utilizamos “teoría de la adecuación” a la relación causal para establecer la relación entre acto y daños (y perjuicios). La teoría de la adecuación se conoce también con el nombre de la “teoría de la condición adecuada” o como la “teoría de la causalidad adecuada”. Según esta teoría sólo es condición del resultado aquélla causa que es adecuada para producirlo, y esta causa se considera que es adecuada cuando una persona con discernimiento pudiera prever que ese resultado puede producirse ante la presencia de determinadas circunstancias, naturales frente al sentido común y al buen juicio de su raciocinio. Pero como estos conceptos son tan amplios y de tan difícil limitación, se utiliza además el criterio de la debida diligencia, según el cual, si un resultado se presenta, a pesar de haber actuado sin contravenir el deber de la debida diligencia, esto es, actuando sin omitir los cuidados requeridos en una situación concreta, se actúa con ello dentro del campo de lo jurídicamente permitido, por lo que esa condición del resultado no será su causa en sentido jurídico. De esta forma, la previsibilidad del hombre medio y la debida diligencia, son los criterios utilizados por el derecho civil para determinar cuando un comportamiento determinado –en el sentido civil-, es condición del resultado”. (Madrigal Navarro Javier. La imputación para la reparación del daño en sedes civil y penal Revista Judicial, Costa Rica, Nº 105, Septiembre 2012). Por otra parte, debe indicarse que la responsabilidad subjetiva contemplada en la norma citada ut supra impone a la víctima del daño el deber de demostrar el dolo o la culpa de su contrario, (lo cual parte de un postulado ideológico propio de la materia penal fundado en el principio de inocencia) y que se encuentra en el onus probandi propio y clásico de la materia civil, que establece el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil. Nuevamente se da un distinción importante con respecto a los casos de responsabilidad objetiva analizados anteriormente, habida cuenta que en este caso, no sólo basta que el demandado demuestre ajenidad al daño, sino que la parte actora, tiene el deber de demostrar los presupuestos de responsabilidad subjetivos indicados anteriormente, so pena de que su demanda sea declarada sin lugar.- IX).- En el caso de examen se advierte que la parte manifiesta la existencia de responsabilidad con respecto a los señores Gómez García y Marín Camacho , en razón de su participación directa en la instalación de la línea telefónica que provocó los daños invocados por el actor. Por su parte, la representación de los codemandados indica que todas las conexiones fueron realizadas conforme al procedimiento establecido y no hubo contacto directo con los cables de electricidad, sino más bien se dio el fenómeno llamado " arco eléctrico", por cuanto el cable eléctrico en la zona donde habita el actor se encuentra fuera de la norma establecida al efecto. Dado lo anterior, la situación resultaba imposible de preveer y es imputable a la falta de regulación de la ARESEP respecto de la protección de la red y distribución de alturas y distancias de la misma. Indica que no hay prueba de existencia de negligencia o falta de deber de cuidado por parte de los trabajadores de la empresa demandada. Al respecto, este Tribunal ha tenido por demostrado que las personas que directamente realizaron la instalación productora de las lesiones al actor, fueron los codemandados, siendo así que se ha demostrado que al colocar la línea telefónica en mención, los codemandados eran conocedores de la situación de riesgo que significa el hecho de que el tendido telefónico quedaría a poca distancia de los cables de electricidad, sea pasando por encima del denominado pentagrama y encontrándose las respectivas acometidas telefónicas en una situación tal que éstas "... han tenido que pasar y ser soportadas por encima de la línea de baja tensión....", tal y como lo indica el propio estudio pedido por la Sociedad que ocupa la figura patronal de los codemandados. Para este Colegio, es evidente que lo descrito evidencia una falta al cumplimiento de los deberes de diligencia media de los indicados señores Gómez García y Marín Camacho, en tanto que no es razonable aceptar que personas con experiencia en la materia, hayan sido omisos de advertir la situación planteada al menos y hayan optado, sin objeción alguna, a realizar la instalación telefónica respectiva en las condiciones dichas. El carácter atípico de la altura y ubicación de las líneas eléctricas y telefónicas en el lugar de residencia del actor y los criterios de la técnica expresados en juicio, indican que ante la situación encontrada en el lugar de los trabajos, existía un nivel de previsibilidad de que podría darse una situación de riesgo, en caso de instalarse otra línea telefónica en la situación dicha. Las declaraciones de los codemandados presentan un reconocimiento expreso de su actuar en el sentido indicado, en tanto que en audiencia de juicio ellos manifestaron que en todo el sector el cableado se encuentra mal diseñado, y que ellos debieron instalar la línea telefónica del actor a pesar de lo anterior, por encima del pentagrama eléctrico. Por otra parte, también hay prueba de que la instalación de la línea eléctrica fue realizada por los codemandados de la casa del actor hacia la caja de dispersión, siendo así que por el contrario, el procedimiento establecido por el ICE para la instalación de líneas fijas, parte de acciones en ésta hacia el domicilio del solicitante. En este orden de ideas, en la prueba confesional solicitada, ambos codemandados admiten haber iniciado la instalación de la conexión en el hogar del actor, para luego proceder a realizar el resto del procedimiento de instalación hacia afuera del mismo, a pesar de que el manual de procedimientos para la instalación de servicios convencionales y con tecnología E.R. indica los pasos a seguir de la siguiente manera: " 7.12. Desplazar técnico a la Caja de Dispersión. 7.13. Probar presencia de tono en el par asociado a la OTC. 7.13.1. Si hay tono, se desplaza al inmueble del cliente y continúa con el punto 7.14.... 7.14. Existen las condiciones requeridas (infraestructura de red y el cliente, dirección y localización del cliente, presencia del cliente en el inmueble y documentación oficial de solicitud del servicio) para ejecutar la instalación de la OTC de acuerdo a la normativa vigente..." Como se advierte el incumplimiento de la norma técnica establecida en el manual de procedimientos aplicable a la materia, indica que en la instalación de la línea telefónica al actor, los demandados se apartaron las condiciones exigidas en la materia de manera deliberada, y de manera imprudente permitieron que la electricidad transcurriera del cable respectivo hasta su persona. De haberse seguido el procedimiento establecido, sea de la caja de dispersión hacia el hogar y no al contrario, se hubieran modificado las condiciones originales que generaron los daños invocados, y que fueron producidos al ser el actor el único depositario de la respectiva descarga. Inclusive el testigo ofrecido por los codemandados, quien ocupaba el cargo de Supervisor general de la empresa al momento de los hechos, Señor Carlos Luis Jiménez Fallas, indicó expresamente que no se deben instalar las líneas telefónicas por encima del pentagrama eléctrico. En razón de lo anterior, no llevan razón los demandados cuando indican que todas las conexiones fueron realizadas conforme al procedimiento establecido, dado que en autos se demuestra lo contrario. Tampoco es razonable aceptar el argumento de que la situación dada era imposible de preveer, por cuanto la línea eléctrica y telefónica presentaba una evidente anormalidad en cuanto a su altura y ubicación, imposible de no ser vista por los funcionarios responsables, los cuales, por su experiencia, tenían clara conciencia de los riesgos generados. Por otra parte, no demostró la parte demandada que el daño producido por el actor fuera imputable a la falta de regulación de la ARESEP respecto de la protección de la red y distribución de alturas y distancias de la misma. No hay prueba en autos de una actitud omisa por parte de ésta ni se evidencia la existencia de un deber normativo de regular la materia por su parte. En todo caso, la responsabilidad en este sentido es del ente público responsable del tema de las telecomunicaciones fijas, el cual ya ha sido condenado de manera solidaria en esta sentencia. Dadas la anteriores consideraciones, se estima que si se cuenta con prueba de existencia de negligencia o falta de deber de cuidado por parte de los trabajadores de la empresa demandada y por consiguiente, Así las cosas, procede acoger la demanda en lo que respecta a los codemandados y determinar la existencia de un deber de reparar los daños causados al actor con motivo de los hechos objeto del presente proceso.- XI).- Sobre el daño material: La parte actora en su demanda invoca daños materiales consistentes en daños graves ocasionados en diferentes partes de su cuerpo y un posible daño al corazón, pulmones, riñones e hígado. Indica quemaduras, injertos y la afectación a su ortejo izquierdo a un grado tal que el mismo quedó inútil para sus funciones básicas. En el caso en examen debe partirse de las consideraciones realizadas respecto a los presupuestos del daño como tal para que sea resarcible. En este sentido, se aplica el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil, en tanto dispone: "La carga de la prueba incumbe: 1) A quien formule una pretensión, respecto a las afirmaciones de los hechos constitutivos de su derecho. 2) A quien se oponga a una pretensión, en cuanto a las afirmaciones de hechos impeditivos, modificativos o extintivos del derecho del actor". Al respecto, si bien es cierto, no se ha demostrado la existencia de un posible daño al corazón, pulmones, riñones e hígado, tal y como en algún momento se indicó en la demanda ni se evidencia otro daño material como probado, mediante dictamen DML-2010-13694 de 9 de noviembre de 2010 del Departamento de Medicina Legal se determinó una incapacidad temporal de cinco meses al actor y una incapacidad permanente del siete por ciento de su capacidad general. No obstante lo anterior, con respecto al impedimento definitivo sufrido por el actor, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros indicó que el actor presenta impedimento de un doce por ciento de la capacidad general. Este colegio estima procedente aplicar este último criterio, en tanto que la valoración hecha por el indicado ente, con independencia a su etiología, corresponde a una disminución de facultades o aptitudes para el trabajo, dada la naturaleza jurídica del mismo, siendo así que el actor es una persona asalariada, en la cual, lo relevante para efectos de la determinación del daño material, es la verificación del grado de la afectación sufrida por él en sus facultades para laborar, ante todo. Una afectación en abstracto, desligada del punto de referencia de la aptitud humana para ejercer su labor y así llevar al seno familiar los ingresos necesarios para la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas, no es admisible ni relevante. En el caso en examen no debe obviarse que el daño material invocado es fundamentalmente un daño corporal, el cual se entiende como "cualquier alteración somática o psíquica que, de una forma u otra, perturbe, amenace o inquiete la salud de quien la sufre, o simplemente, limite o menoscabe la integridad personal del afectado, ya en lo orgánico, ya en lo funcional. Es suficiente cualquier merma de la integridad de la biología individual, con independencia de sus repercusiones prácticas en uno o más campos de la actividad humana" (M. Rodríguez, citado por Laborda Calvo Eugenio en Cesión de Datos o Consentimiento Informado en Valoración del Daño Corporal). Por su parte, otro autor más recientemente lo define como "las consecuencias que un suceso traumático determinado ha tenido sobre la integridad psicofísica y la salud de una persona. Cuando el suceso traumático es atribuible a un tercero, éste está obligado a responder de dichas consecuencias, sean de orden penal, civil, laboral o contencioso-administrativo". (Hernández Cueto citado por Laborda Calvo Eugenio en Cesión de Datos o Consentimiento Informado en Valoración del Daño Corporal). En nuestro país, al haber imperado el monopolio en materia de seguros por más de 60 años, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) posee amplia experiencia de la administración del programa de valoración y reparación del daño corporal, siendo así que los mismos significan una peritación en donde se define o diagnostica la identidad del daño, el grado de incapacidad, las posibilidades de curación, las modificaciones impuestas por el dolor físico, además indica con claridad la consolidación de las lesiones, y de sus posibles complicaciones así como la afectación de las expectativas de vida, mas sin que existan reglas en la valoración del daño corporal que puedan establecer una equivalencia económica con el perjuicio sufrido, por lo que se habla de la existencia de un principio de discrecionalidad pericial. En razón de lo anterior, tomando en consideración que las lesiones sufridas por el actor en su cuerpo y cuya existencia en su cortejo izquierdo fueron debidamente constatadas en reconocimiento judicial, inciden en su capacidad para laborar, según lo demostrado, se estima procedente utilizar como parámetro para la determinación del daño material sufrido, el indicado impedimento de un doce por ciento de la capacidad general y de cinco meses de incapacidad temporal señalado por el Instituto Nacional de Seguros. En este orden de ideas, no es que se descalifique la existencia de otro dictamen con un porcentaje menor, sino que se estima que para la situación particular del actor y sus requerimientos de uso de su capacidad laboral a futuro, es más aplicable al caso en concreto, la experticia del ente asegurador. Es menester indicar que en el caso en examen, no han demostrado las partes demandadas que el daño indicado no reúna las características establecidas en el artículo 196 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública no sea "...efectivo, evaluable e individualizable. .." o que el mismo no haya sido ocasionado con motivo de los hechos objeto de la presente demanda o imputables a la víctima. En algunas partes de las intervenciones de las partes demandadas, éstas sugieren la eventualidad de que el daño pudiere ser causado por hecho de un tercero, fuerza mayor o que inclusive por una conducta propia de la víctima (falta de cuidado con la higiene y curaciones en el dedo afectado del actor), se presentara el nivel de lesiones demostrado. Nada esto fue probado, no bastando el mero dicho de la parte en tal sentido. Necesariamente se requiere prueba que de alguna manera de elementos de convicción como para determinar que se ha roto el vínculo causal entre los indicados hechos y el daño invocado. Por el contrario, toda la prueba existente indica de manera fehaciente que las lesiones del actor fueron causadas de manera directa y evidente por la descarga eléctrica producida con motivo del servicio de instalación de su línea telefónica fija por los codemandados. Tampoco es de recibo el argumento del abogado de los codemandados en el sentido de que al no haber aportado el actor el dinero correspondiente al perito matemático y no haberse realizado la labor de éste por su culpa, se encuentra en una situación de ayuno probatorio. Es de advertir que la pericia a realizar sería sobre el quantum del daño y no sobre la existencia de éste en sí mismo, siendo posible que en etapa de ejecución de sentencia se realice tal labor. Así las cosas, procede condenar en abstracto de manera solidaria al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, Técnicos en Telecomunicaciones SAL S.A., Allan Eduardo Gómez García y Luis Ángel Masís Camacho a pagar al señor Diego Alonso Ríos Buján , la sumas correspondientes a la incapacidad permanente de un doce por ciento de la capacidad orgánica del actor, así como cinco meses de incapacidad temporal, ambas sufridas con motivo de los hechos demostrados en el presente proceso. Dichos montos se determinarán en etapa de ejecución de sentencia.

XII).- Sobre el daño moral: Con respecto a la posibilidad de indemnizar el daño moral que pudiere haberse ocasionado con motivo de una conducta de la Administración, también debe aplicarse el artículo 9 y 41 de la Constitución Política, habida cuenta que en el primero no se realiza en ningún tipo de distinción con respecto a la responsabilidad del Estado y en el segundo, se hace expresamente referencia a la posibilidad de tutelar intereses "morales", entre los cuales, se encuentra la posibilidad de resarcir tanto el daño moral subjetivo, como el objetivo. Por otra parte, la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, dispuso sobre este tema: "Artículo 11: 1. Toda persona tiene derecho al respeto de su honra y al reconocimiento de su dignidad. 2. Nadie puede ser objeto de injerencias arbitrarias o abusivas en su vida privada, en la de su familia, en su domicilio o en su correspondencia, ni de ataques ilegales a su honra o reputación. 3. Toda persona tiene derecho a la protección de la ley contra esas injerencias o esos ataques." Artículo 24: Todas las personas son iguales ante la ley. En consecuencia, tienen derecho, sin discriminación, a igual protección de la ley." "Artículo 5.1: Toda persona tiene derecho a que se respete su integridad física, psíquica y moral." Inclusive de manera previa a que entrara a regir la Constitución Política de 1949 o se aprobara dicha Convención a finales de la década de los 60, desde el siglo XIX, el numeral 59 del Código Civil preceptúa: “Se establece el derecho a obtener indemnización por daño moral, en los casos de lesión a los derechos de la personalidad” En materia del derecho administrativo nacional propiamente, el artículo 197 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, dispuso: "Cabrá responsabilidad por el daño de bienes puramente morales, lo mismo que por el padecimiento moral y el dolor físico causados por la muerte o por la lesión inferida, respectivamente". No obstante lo anterior, procede realizar algunas precisiones sobre la materia, con base en la doctrina y sendas resoluciones judiciales emitidas en la materia, dadas las particularidades existentes con respecto a este tipo de daño, habida cuenta que en el caso del daño moral subjetivo, al afectarse la esfera más íntima del individuo, no pueden aplicarse las reglas comunes con respecto a la prueba del daño, cuando la afectación se realiza en el patrimonio del sujeto. En este orden de ideas, se ha dicho, "Para probar el daño moral en su existencia y entidad no es necesario aportar prueba directa, sino que el juez deberá apreciar las circunstancias del hecho y las cualidades M. de la víctima para establecer objetiva y presuntivamente el agravio moral en la órbita reservada de la intimidad del sujeto pasivo. No creemos que el agravio moral deba ser objeto de prueba directa, pues ello resulta absolutamente imposible por la índole del mismo que reside en lo más íntimo de la personalidad, aunque se manifiesta a veces por signos exteriores que pueden no ser una auténtica para poder afirmar con certeza la existencia y la intensidad del dolor, la verdad de un padecimiento, la realidad de la angustia o de la decepción" ( Bustamante Alsina, "Equitativa valuación del daño no mensurable", 1990. p 655 y 656). Las anteriores consideraciones tienen como fundamento la apreciación de que el daño moral debe ser visto como in re ipsa o en sí mismo, dado que para tener configurado un perjuicio espiritual, no resulta necesario probar sufrimiento o depresión exteriorizados hacia terceros, dado que implica más bien la alteración del equilibrio existencial de las personas, dentro de su ámbito más íntimo y no necesariamente dado a conocer o exteriorizado en toda su dimensión hacia terceros, en tanto que esto último está en función de la personalidad de cada individuo lesionado y partiendo de que las reacciones del humano tienen diversas formas y oportunidades de manifestación. Por lo anterior, en el caso de que se demostrara la existencia de una conducta (muerte de un ser querido, pérdida o lesión de un bien moral o patrimonial, afectación a derechos fundamentales, etc) que pudiere afectar el ámbito de intimidad de la persona - por provocar dolor, angustia, sufrimiento, etc-, se interpreta que necesariamente existe un daño moral, siendo así que la intensidad de éste y por ende el medio para su resarcimiento, se determinarán de conformidad con los criterios que a continuación analizaremos en este mismo considerando. Es entonces, en función de los derechos subjetivos menoscabados, que podemos hablar de la existencia de un daño moral, dado que éste se producirá ante la violación de alguno de los derechos inherentes de la personalidad y que por ende son considerados extrapatrimoniales. Es por ello, que se habla que el daño moral surge con el mero acaecimiento demostrado de la actuación formal o material de la Administración u omisión de actuación que vulnera dichos derechos. En este orden de ideas, conviene hacer referencia a lo siguiente:"Siendo el agravio moral la consecuencia necesaria e ineludible de la violación de algunos de los derechos de la personalidad de un sujeto, la demostración de la existencia de dicha transgresión importará, al mismo tiempo, la prueba de la existencia del daño. La determinación de la existencia de un daño moral puede efectuarse de una manera tan objetiva como la comprobación de un agravio patrimonial. Se hace necesario a tal fin sólo confrontar un hecho con la norma jurídica que otorga a favor de un sujeto un derecho inherente a la personalidad, para comprobar si el primero constituye o no violación de lo preceptuado en la segunda.." ( Brebbia Roberto. El Daño Moral. Editorial Orbir.) Por otra parte, debe advertirse que se ha aceptado que dentro del marco de la teoría de la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública, en tesis de principio, sería válido aceptar la posibilidad de que el demandado puede probar la existencia de una de las circunstancias eximentes de responsabilidad establecidas en el artículo 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, a saber, la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima o de un hecho de un tercero; o inclusive probar su inexistencia o menor gravedad de lo invocada. Es así como se ha indicado que "La cantidad que se fije, debe ser fiel reflejo de las circunstancias descritas en el expediente, para que resulte una suma apropiada, dado los problemas sufridos por el perjudicado, causados por los actos ilícitos penales o civiles del agente o de los agentes productores del daño. En razón de que esas presunciones son iuris tantum, admiten prueba en contrario, de lo cual debe ser sumamente diligente el demandado o sujeto activo del daño, ya que le corresponde la carga de la prueba para desvirtuar las presunciones de dolor, sufrimiento, mortificación o agravio y para ello puede acudir a cualquier tipo de prueba ordinaria." (Montero Piña Fernando. El Daño Moral, Página 61. Impresión Gráfica del este). No sin advertir que alguna doctrina ha sostenido que cualquier daño producto de una conducta lícita y normal, cuando el nivel de intensidad es excesivo, no procede ningún tipo de eximente. En este orden de ideas, considera este Tribunal que conviene hacer algunas precisiones con respecto al daño moral que serán plenamente aplicables para la resolución de la ejecución sometida a su conocimiento. En primer término, debe destacarse que en materia de daño moral hablamos de una función compensadora y no de la equivalencia buscada en el caso del daño material. Adicionalmente, no debe obviarse que el daño moral no escapa de la certeza con relación a que éste debe ser consecuencia de la actuación u omisión de la administración, así como debe ser cierto el interés lesionado de la persona que lo invoca. En este orden de ideas, se ha indicado lo siguiente:" El daño moral no es el dolor, la pena, la angustia sino la minoración espiritual derivada de la lesión a un interés no patrimonial. Dicho detrimento existe aunque falte comprensión por parte del damnificado del perjuicio sufrido; en ausencia de lágrimas; inclusive cuando la víctima no se encuentre en condiciones físicas o "síquicas" para "sentir" pena, dolor o angustia (v.gr. una persona descerebrada). El disvalor subjetivo existe cuando la víctima haya "madurado" ese dolor y quizás, dejado de "sentirlo". Así concebida la cuestión, se advierte de inmediato que el daño moral puede derivar sus efectos hacia el futuro, con suficiente grado de certeza..." (Daniel Pizarro Ramón Daño Moral. Ed. Hammurabi. Página 105) Por otra parte, el daño moral es de orden personal, en función de la afectación de un interés legítimo del afectado. Con respecto a los alcances del daño moral en nuestro país, la Sala Primera en su voto N 112 de las 14 horas 15 minutos del 15 de julio de 1992, reiteradamente citado y aplicado por diferentes instancias jurisdiccionales, indicó: " IV.- El daño constituye uno de los presupuestos de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, por cuanto el deber de resarcir solamente se configura si ha mediado un hecho ilícito dañoso que lesione un interés jurídicamente relevante, susceptible de ser tutelado por el ordenamiento jurídico. El daño, en sentido jurídico, constituye todo menoscabo, pérdida o detrimento de la esfera jurídica patrimonial o extrapatrimonial de la persona (damnificado), el cual provoca la privación de un bien jurídico, respecto del cual era objetivamente esperable su conservación de no haber acaecido el hecho dañoso. Bajo esta tesitura, no hay responsabilidad civil si no media daño, así como no existe daño si no hay damnificado. Por otra parte, sólo es daño indemnizable el que se llega a probar (realidad o existencia), siendo ello una cuestión de hecho reservada al prudente arbitrio del juzgador. En suma, el daño constituye la brecha perjudicial para la víctima, resultante de confrontar la situación anterior al hecho ilícito con la posterior al mismo. V.- En muchas ocasiones se utilizan indiscriminadamente las expresiones "daños" y "perjuicios". Es menester precisar y distinguir ambos conceptos. El daño constituye la pérdida irrogada al damnificado (damnum emergens), en tanto el perjuicio está conformado por la ganancia o utilidad frustrada o dejada de percibir (lucro cesans), la cual era razonable y probablemente esperable si no se hubiese producido el hecho ilícito. VI.- No cualquier daño da pie a la obligación de resarcir. Para tal efecto, han de confluir, básicamente las siguientes características para ser un "daño resarcible": A) Debe ser cierto; real y efectivo, y no meramente eventual o hipotético, no puede estar fundado en realizaciones supuestas o conjeturables. El daño no pierde esta característica si su cuantificación resulta incierta, indeterminada o de difícil apreciación o prueba; tampoco debe confundirse la certeza con la actualidad, pues es admisible la reparación del daño cierto pero futuro; asimismo, no cabe confundir el daño futuro con el lucro cesante o perjuicio, pues el primero está referido a aquél que surge como una consecuencia necesaria derivada del hecho causal o generador del daño, es decir, sus repercusiones no se proyectan al incoarse el proceso. En lo relativo a la magnitud o monto (seriedad) del daño, ello constituye un extremo de incumbencia subjetiva única del damnificado, empero el derecho no puede ocuparse de pretensiones fundadas en daños insignificantes, derivadas de una excesiva susceptibilidad. B) Debe mediar lesión a un interés jurídicamente relevante y merecedor de amparo. Así puede haber un damnificado directo y otro indirecto: el primero es la víctima del hecho dañoso, y el segundo serán los sucesores de la víctima. C) Deberá ser causado por un tercero, y subsistente, esto es, sí ha sido reparado por el responsable o un tercero (asegurador) resulta insubsistente. D) Debe mediar una relación de causalidad entre el hecho ilícito y el daño. VII.- Dentro de las clases de daños, se encuentra en primer término el daño material y el corporal, siendo el primero el que incide sobre las cosas o bienes materiales que conforman el patrimonio de la persona, en tanto el segundo repercute sobre la integridad corporal y física. En doctrina, bajo la denominación genérica de daño material o patrimonial, suelen comprenderse las específicas de daño corporal y de daño material, en sentido estricto. La segunda parece ser la patrimoniales del damnificado (pago de tratamiento médico, gastos de hospitalización, medicamentos, etc.), ganancias frustradas si el daño lo ha incapacitado para realizar sus ocupaciones habituales (perjuicios), etc.. Esta distinción nació en el Derecho Romano, pues se distinguía entre el daño inferido a las cosas directamente (damnun) y el que lesionaba la personalidad física del individuo (injuria). En el daño patrimonial el menoscabo generado resulta ser valorable económicamente. VIII.- El daño moral (llamado en doctrina también incorporal, extrapatrimonial, de afección, etc.) se verifica cuando se lesiona la esfera de interés extrapatrimonial del individuo, empero como su vulneración puede generar consecuencias patrimoniales, cabe distinguir entre daño moral subjetivo "puro", o de afección, y daño moral objetivo u "objetivado". El daño moral subjetivo se produce cuando se ha lesionado un derecho extrapatrimonial, sin repercutir en el patrimonio, suponiendo normalmente una perturbación injusta de las condiciones anímicas del individuo (disgusto, desánimo, desesperación, pérdida de satisfacción de vivir, etc., vg. el agravio contra el honor, la dignidad, la intimidad, el llamado daño a la vida en relación, aflicción por la muerte de un familiar o ser querido, etc.). El daño moral objetivo lesiona un derecho extrapatrimonial con repercusión en el patrimonio, es decir, genera consecuencias económicamente valuables (vg. el caso del profesional que por el hecho atribuido pierde su clientela en todo o en parte). Esta distinción sirve para deslindar el daño sufrido por el individuo en su consideración social (buen nombre, honor, honestidad, etc.) del padecido en el campo individual (aflicción por la muerte de un pariente), así uno refiere a la parte social y el otro a la afectiva del patrimonio. Esta distinción nació, originalmente, para determinar el ámbito del daño moral resarcible, pues en un principio la doctrina se mostró reacia a resarcir el daño moral puro, por su difícil cuantificación. Para la indemnización debe distinguirse entre los distintos tipos de daño moral. En el caso del objetivo, se debe hacer la demostración correspondiente como acontece con el daño patrimonial; pero en el supuesto del daño moral subjetivo al no poder estructurarse y demostrarse su cuantía de modo preciso, su fijación queda al prudente arbitrio del juez, teniendo en consideración las circunstancias del caso, los principios generales del derecho y la equidad, no constituyendo la falta de prueba acerca de la magnitud del daño óbice para fijar su importe. La diferencia dogmática entre daño patrimonial y moral no excluye que, en la práctica, se presenten concomitantemente uno y otro, podría ser el caso de las lesiones que generan un dolor físico o causan una desfiguración o deformidad física (daño a la salud) y el daño estético (rompimiento de la armonía física del rostro o de cualquier otra parte expuesta del cuerpo), sin que por ello el daño moral se repute como secundario o accesorio, pues evidentemente tiene autonomía y características peculiares. En suma el daño moral consiste en dolor o sufrimiento físico, psíquico, de afección o moral infligido con un hecho ilícito. Normalmente el campo fértil del daño moral es el de los derechos de la personalidad cuando resultan conculcados." Con base en lo anterior, se evidencia que en el caso del daño moral subjetivo, no se requiere de la existencia de una prueba directa, sino que le es aplicable determinados criterios que delimitan la discrecionalidad del Juzgador y que desprenden de su propia naturaleza jurídica y que han sido desarrollados por la jurisprudencia nacional. Así, en la resolución mencionada ut supra se establece como primer criterio delimitador, los principios generales del derecho y la equidad, siendo así que mediante voto 556-2003 de la Sección Segunda del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, se dispuso además como criterio, lo siguiente: VI.- Referente al daño moral subjetivo, la situación es distinta, y desde ya se deja de manifiesto, que no lleva razón el Estado en cuanto a su oposición. Es un hecho innegable, que hubo lesión por conducta antijurídica del Ministerio de Educación, según lo declaró la Sala Constitucional, cuya consecuencia es, entonces, procurar en lo posible, el restablecimiento efectivo de la esfera subjetiva afectada, dada la falta de respuesta oportuna a un reclamo administrativo, para cuya concesión, al tratarse de este tipo de daño, es innecesaria la prueba, bastando en ocasiones, la simple constatación del hecho generador para que proceda su indemnización, con independencia del reconocimiento o rechazo de otros aspectos meramente patrimoniales, para los cuales sí es imprescindible la demostración física de los producidos. No significa lo anterior, que por el simple reclamo pueda otorgarse, ya que es necesaria la acreditación de su existencia y gravedad, carga que, sin lugar a dudas, le corresponde a la víctima no obstante, se ha permitido, que su comprobación pueda lograrse a base de indicios, ya que éste se produce, cuando se afecta la intimidad, el honor, la psiquis, la salud y la integridad física, entre otros, cuya gravedad, sin lugar a dudas, corresponde al reclamante, pudiendo acreditarse su existencia a través de presunciones de hombre inferidas de elementos circunstanciales, y por ello su prueba, es in re ipsa, tal y como reiteradamente lo ha expresado la Sala Primera de la Corte". (El destacado es nuestro). Tenemos entonces que un segundo criterio delimitador del daño moral subjetivo son las presunciones del hombre inferidas de los elementos circunstanciales del caso de análisis. Asimismo de diversas resoluciones judiciales y de la sentencia 413 de 19 de noviembre de 2002 de la Sección Primera del Tribunal Contencioso Adm. Sección I, se evidencian otros criterios, a saber: "III. Por daño moral subjetivo, ha entendido la doctrina aquella afección que incide sobre la esfera emocional de las personas causando preocupación, sufrimiento, ansiedad y otras emociones negativas y perjudiciales, cuyo origen sea los actos ilícitos provocados por el accionante. Por su naturaleza, son difíciles de probar por los medio ordinarios, por lo que puede el juzgador estimarlo con examen de las circunstancias que consten en el expediente y aplicado su experiencia, los principios generales de derecho y los de racionalidad y proporcionalidad. " (El destacado es nuestro). Estos últimos criterios han sido desarrollados de manera relevante para limitar la posibilidad de reconocimiento de indemnizaciones exageradas o desproporcionadas. En este orden de ideas, la Sala Primera ha señalado: " No se trata, entonces, de cuantificar el valor de la honra y dignidad de un sujeto, pues estos son bienes inapreciables, sino de fijar una compensación monetaria a su lesión , único mecanismo del cual puede echar mano el derecho, para así reparar, al menos en parte su ofensa. No cabría dentro de tal filosofía, establecer indemnizaciones exorbitantes, como sucede en otros sistemas jurídicos, pues ello produciría el enriquecimiento injusto del ofendido, mediante el lucro inmoral con la honra y dignidad propias. Dentro de los principios fundamentales del derecho, hállanse los de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad , a los cuales se les ha reconocido en nuestro medio el rango de principios constitucionales (ver al respecto, las resoluciones de la Sala Constitucional #1739 - 92 de las 11:45 horas del primero de julio y 3495-92 del las 14:30 horas del diecinueve de noviembre, ambas de 1992). Aplicándolos a situaciones como la presente, resulta indispensable, al fijar las obligaciones nacidas en situaciones jurídicas indemnizatorias, atender la posición de las partes y la naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento, sin llegar a crear situaciones absurdas, dañinas o gravemente injustas. En tal sentido, el daño moral, en casos como el analizado, no podría dar lugar a indemnizaciones millonarias, como la pretendida. Ello abriría un portillo inconveniente , para dar paso a pretensiones desproporcionadas las cuales, so pretexto de tutelar el ámbito subjetivo del individuo, conducirían a un enriquecimiento injustificado que lejos de reparar la dignidad mancillada, socavaría sus fundamentos haciéndola caer en valores eminentemente económicos (Sala Primera voto 141 de 15:00 hrs. del 18 de junio de 1993 y No. 99 de 16 horas de 20 de setiembre de 1995) (El destacado es nuestro). La causalidad del daño es otro criterio de naturaleza insoslayable, en tanto que la causa real de éste puede determinar los alcances y límites de la estimación reparadora. Esto se puede inferir claramente del voto 00099-2003 del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección II, en tanto indicó: " IV.- Resulta indispensable, establecer qué se entiende por daño moral, para lo cual, este Tribunal se permite citar la sentencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia No. 112 de las 14:15 horas del 15 de julio de 1992: “VII.- Dentro de las clases de daños, se encuentra en primer término el daño material y el corporal, siendo el primero el que incide sobre las cosas o bienes materiales que conforman el patrimonio de la persona, en tanto el segundo repercute sobre la integridad corporal y física. En doctrina, bajo la denominación genérica de daño material o patrimonial, suelen comprenderse las específicas de daño corporal y de daño material, en sentido estricto. La segunda parece ser la expresión más feliz, pues el daño corporal suele afectar intereses patrimoniales del damnificado (pago de tratamiento médico, gastos de hospitalización, medicamentos, etc.), ganancias frustradas si el daño lo ha incapacitado para realizar sus ocupaciones habituales (perjuicios), etc.. Esta distinción nació en el Derecho Romano, pues se distinguía entre el daño inferido a las cosas directamente (damnun) y el que lesionaba la personalidad física del individuo (injuria). En el daño patrimonial el menoscabo generado resulta ser valorable económicamente. VIII.- El daño moral (llamado en doctrina también incorporal, extrapatrimonial, de afección, etc.) se verifica cuando se lesiona la esfera de interés extrapatrimonial del individuo, empero como su vulneración puede generar consecuencias patrimoniales, cabe distinguir entre daño moral subjetivo "puro", o de afección, y daño moral objetivo u "objetivado". El daño moral subjetivo se produce cuando se ha lesionado un derecho extrapatrimonial, sin repercutir en el patrimonio, suponiendo normalmente una perturbación injusta de las condiciones anímicas del individuo (disgusto, desánimo, desesperación, pérdida de satisfacción de vivir, etc., vg. el agravio contra el honor, la dignidad, la intimidad, el llamado daño a la vida en relación, aflicción por la muerte de un familiar o ser querido, etc.). El daño moral objetivo lesiona un derecho extrapatrimonial con repercusión en el patrimonio, es decir, genera consecuencias económicamente valuables (vg. el caso del profesional que por el hecho atribuido pierde su clientela en todo o en parte). Esta distinción sirve para deslindar el daño sufrido por el individuo en su consideración social (buen nombre, honor, honestidad, etc.) del padecido en el campo individual (aflicción por la muerte de un pariente), así uno refiere a la parte social y el otro a la afectiva del patrimonio. Esta distinción nació, originalmente, para determinar el ámbito del daño moral resarcible, pues en un principio la doctrina se mostró reacia a resarcir el daño moral puro, por su difícil cuantificación. Para la indemnización debe distinguirse entre los distintos tipos de daño moral. En el caso del objetivo, se debe hacer la demostración correspondiente como acontece con el daño patrimonial; pero en el supuesto del daño moral subjetivo al no poder estructurarse y demostrarse su cuantía de modo preciso, su fijación queda al prudente arbitrio del juez, teniendo en consideración las circunstancias del caso, los principios generales del derecho y la equidad, no constituyendo la falta de prueba acerca de la magnitud del daño óbice para fijar su importe. La diferencia dogmática entre daño patrimonial y moral no excluye que, en la práctica, se presenten concomitantemente uno y otro, podría ser el caso de las lesiones que generan un dolor físico o causan una desfiguración o deformidad física (daño a la salud) y el daño estético (rompimiento de la armonía física del rostro o de cualquier otra parte expuesta del cuerpo), sin que por ello el daño moral se repute como secundario o accesorio, pues evidentemente tiene autonomía y características peculiares. En suma el daño moral consiste en dolor o sufrimiento físico, psíquico, de afección o moral infligido con un hecho ilícito. Normalmente el campo fértil del daño moral es el de los derechos de la personalidad cuando resultan conculcados." También sobre la prueba del daño moral, en la misma sentencia citada se expresó: " XIII.- En lo referente a la prueba del daño moral el principio es el siguiente: debe acreditarse su existencia y gravedad, carga que le corresponde a la víctima, sin embargo se ha admitido que tal prueba se puede lograr a través de presunciones de hombre inferidas de los indicios, ya que, el hecho generador antijurídico pone de manifiesto el daño moral, pues cuando se daña la psiquis, la salud, la integridad física, el honor, la intimidad, etc. es fácil inferir el daño, por ello se dice que la prueba del daño moral existe "in re ipsa". Sobre el particular, esta Sala ha manifestado que en materia de daño moral "... basta, en algunas ocasiones, con la realización del hecho culposo para que del mismo surja el daño, conforme a la prudente apreciación de los Jueces de mérito, cuando le es dable inferir el daño con fundamento en la prueba de indicios " (Sentencia N 114 de las 16 horas del 2 de noviembre de 1979)". En el presente caso, cuando el actor solicitó el daño moral, (sic) cuales llegaron a perjudicar psicológicamente mi integridad, los Cuales (sic) fueron debidamente razonados por el Magistrado Instructor y De (sic) los cuales solicito una prueba pericial forense a fin de determinar las secuelas del daño coaccionado al ser sometido a vejámenes y Presiones internas (…) Al ser despedido injustamente por parte del Minae, ocasiono (sic) la destrucción de mi hogar, ya que mi esposa me dejó porque no podía mantenerla, y al día de hoy no he podido conseguir trabajo, nos hecharon (sic) de la vivienda en que vivíamos y tuve que irme de arrimado donde mi mamá. Además estaba en proceso un préstamo para vivienda y por mi despido no se pudo hacer.” Todo el tema del despido del actor y por supuesto sus consecuencias materiales o morales, no es posible discutirlo dentro del presente proceso, porque no guarda relación de causalidad con los hechos que motivaron se acogiera el recurso de amparo: no pago de los extremos laborales, que en este caso, se limitó a la no cancelación en tiempo de vacaciones. El ejecutante nunca se refirió expresa o implícitamente, a que haya sufrido una perturbación anímica (pequeña o grande), sea dolor, angustia, congoja, por ese motivo, sino por el despido. Es el Juzgado de instancia, el que habla de un daño moral por la “espera en la situación en que se encontraba -cesante- era apremiante para resolver su estado y afrontar sus compromisos personales” . En otras palabras, el señor Miranda Garita pidió daño moral por una causa, y el Juzgado se lo concede por otra no alegada. Bajo estas circunstancias, procede revocar la sentencia apelada en cuanto concede una indemnización por daño moral." Por otra parte, siempre dentro del orden de la proporcionalidad, se habla de la "prudente apreciación del Juez" del daño y su resarcimiento, de la siguiente manera: "Por lo anterior, el tribunal debe considerar la procedencia del extremo en comentario, al efecto la Sala 1º. de la Corte Suprema ha dicho: " VI. Si bien el daño moral -en relación con el tema en cuestión- debido a su naturaleza, permite un amplio margen de discrecionalidad al juzgador en cuanto a su fijación, éste debe observarse necesariamente dentro de ciertos parámetros insoslayables, por ejemplo, la antigua Sala de Casación, en sentencia Nº 114 de las 16 hrs. del 2 de noviembre de 1979 avala la prudente apreciación de los jueces "...cuando les es dable inferir el daño con fundamento en la prueba de indicios. Esta Sala, en su fallo Nº 114-93 señala que el prudente arbitrio aludido, ha de tener en consideración las circunstancias del caso, los principios generales del derecho y la equidad. Alrededor de tales conceptos, la Sala, en un pronunciamiento posterior razona en los siguientes términos: "No se trata, entonces, de cuantificar el valor de la honra y dignidad de un sujeto, pues estos son bienes inapreciables, sino de fijar una compensación monetaria a su lesión, único mecanismo del cual puede echar mano el derecho, para así reparar, al menos en parte su ofensa. No cabría dentro de tal filosofía, establecer indemnizaciones exorbitantes, como sucede en otros sistemas jurídicos, pues ello produciría el enriquecimiento injusto del ofendido, mediante el lucro inmoral con la honra y dignidad propias. Dentro de los principios fundamentales del derecho, hállanse los de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, a los cuales se les ha reconocido en nuestro medio el rango de principios constitucionales (ver al respecto, las resoluciones de la Sala Constitucional Nº 1739-92 de 11,45 horas del 1 de julio y Nº 3495-92 de 14,30 hrs. del 19 de noviembre, ambas de 1992). Aplicándolos a situaciones como la presente, resulta indispensable, al fijar las obligaciones nacidas en situaciones jurídicas indemnizatorias, atender la posición de las partes y la naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento, sin llegar a crear situaciones absurdas, dañinas o gravemente injustas. En tal sentido, el daño moral, en casos como el analizado, no podría dar lugar a indemnizaciones millonarias, como la pretendida. ello abriría un portillo inconveniente, para dar paso a pretensiones desproporcionadas las cuales, so pretexto de tutelar el ámbito subjetivo del individuo, conducirían a un enriquecimiento injustificado que lejos de reparar la dignidad mancillada, socavaría sus fundamentos haciéndola caer en valores eminentemente económicos (Sala Primera Nº 41 de 15,00 de 18 de junio de 1993 ). VII. Recapitulando, se tiene que el prudente arbitrio a emplear por el Juzgador en situaciones como la presente, supone la observancia de parámetros ineludibles como la prueba indiciaria, las circunstancias propias del caso concreto, los principios generales del derecho, la equidad, la posición de las partes; la naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento y los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Sobre tales extremos puede y debe la parte interesada ofrecer prueba en lo posible. Solo así puede arribarse a un prudente arbitrio. Al margen de tales consideraciones la fijación discrecional corre el grave riesgo de incurrir en un exceso de poder que desfigure o desvirtúe lo ejecutoriado. Sea, la prudente apreciación del juez, aún contando con la realización del hecho generador -cual ocurre en la especie- (principio "in re ipsa"), precisa de las consideraciones o parámetros comentados, en torno al daño, para, con arreglo a ellos establecer el motivo. En el evento de que no militaren en autos elementos de juicio sobre el particular, tendrá el juzgador que actuar en consonancia con tal situación adoptando una actitud conservadora en la fijación, pues de no hacerlo así podría incidir en exceso de poder." Voto 00093-2000 del Tribunal Contencioso Adm. Sección II. De conformidad con lo anterior, el reconocimiento del daño moral debe realizarse en el entendido de que si bien no requiere prueba directa, los Juzgadores deben tener especial prudencia y proceder a su valoración bajo su prudente apreciación, bajo criterios de equidad, aplicando las presunciones del hombre inferidas de los elementos circunstanciales del caso de análisis, a efecto de determinar la procedencia y el quantum de la sentencia condenatoria por este extremo dentro de los límites de la razonabilidad y la proporcionalidad.

XII).- Sobre el daño moral invocado en el caso concreto : En el presente proceso, la parte actora invoca un daño moral consistente en afectaciones morales como depresión, temor, preocupación por el futuro de su familia, incertidumbre sobre el estado y situación de ésta, impotencia y se vio impedido de realizar una serie de actividades ordinarias en su ámbito personal, laboral y familiar. Las partes demandadas rechazan la existencia de prueba al respecto. Con respecto a este extremo, estima este Tribunal que de la experiencia de los hechos del Ser Humano en general y de la vida, de la lógica y de las consecuencias en sí mismas de la situación ocurrida, se advierte un evidente daño moral subjetivo en perjuicio del señor Ríos Buján. Como se advierte de lo manifestado por la parte actora, el daño invocado se funda básicamente en el dolor sufrido y accesoriamente en las consecuencias del proceso transcurrido con motivo de los hechos que dan origen a la presente demanda. En este sentido, este Tribunal tiene claro que en el caso concreto, existen tres momentos en los cuales se da el daño moral sufrido por el actor, a saber: a) Durante la descarga eléctrica misma: En el momento en que el señor Ríos y cualquier otro ser humano surge una descarga eléctrica, (tal y como fue demostrado en autos) siente dolor, angustia e incertidumbre sobre su existencia mortal. A lo anterior se suma la angustia sobre la situación y destino de sus familiares inmediatos y la duda del motivo que originó la situación generadora del daño y si ésta afectará también a sus hijas. Debe advertirse que el hecho tal y como se dio, no era posible de ser previsto por el actor y que por consiguiente le impide adoptar cualquier previsión sobre el bienestar de sus seres queridos. Un ser humano medio ante una situación como la demostrada en juicio mantendrá una situación de angustia, tanto por el devenir de su núcleo familiar, ante la eventual pérdida de su persona como cabeza de familia y principal fuente de ingresos, como de sí misma. Por otra parte, de la declaración del testigo Alejandro Matamoros León se evidencia que inclusive en el sitio en donde se encontraba el actor olía a carne y cabello quemado, siendo así que también debe tomarse en consideración para la determinación de existencia de una afectación moral el hecho de que la descarga eléctrica le ocasionó importantes quemaduras en el cuerpo del Señor Ríos, que aplicando la lógica, generan un dolor de especial intensidad. b) En el proceso posterior a la descarga eléctrica: Con posterioridad a haber sufrido la descarga eléctrica, se ha demostrado que el actor fue sometido a una serie de intervenciones médicas, como curaciones, injertos, lavados, cambios de vendajes que provocaron dolor reiterado. Ese solo hecho es causa de un daño moral, al cual debe sumarse la incertidumbre sobre las consecuencias finales de los acaecido, la duda sobre si se obtendrá una curación definitiva o si por el contrario, se mantendrán los efectos de lo acaecido en su vida. Adicionalmente, la incertidumbre sobre el estado de su familia y la imposibilidad de estar y socializar con sus seres queridos en el período de internamiento, aunado a la posibilidad de perder el ortejo izquierdo como producto de lo sucedido y que aún hoy le continúa afectando. A lo anterior debe sumarse estrés por una potencial pérdida de ingresos económicos necesarios para la satisfacción de las necesidades alimentarias de sus hijas, menores de edad y que inciden en la angustia que debió sufrir el actor en su estadía en el respectivo hospital. c) En las secuelas mismas de la descarga eléctrica : Luego de la salida del hospital, el actor también ha sufrido otras afectaciones morales. Por un lado, el estado de su primero ortejo izquierdo, que a pesar del tiempo transcurrido aún no muestra signos de curación, la incertidumbre sobre este aspecto hacia futuro y sus consecuencias en el ámbito normal de caminar, sostener su pie e inclusive laboral, implican un daño en su interior, dada la angustia y dolor moral que ello puede significar. De manera correlativa, tenemos las declaraciones hechas en juicio por la cónyuge del Señor Ríos Buján sobre la incidencia que tal hecho ha tenido tanto en su vida íntima como en su relación con sus hijas, dado el estado actual de dicho ortejo (que pudo ser constatado en reconocimiento por parte del Tribunal de Juicio), así como las declaraciones del afectado sobre su incidencia en aspectos ordinarios de la vida como son la diversión - jugar fútbol con amistades, actividades laborales, correr, etc- . Adicionalmente, se ha demostrado que el actor fue sometido a terapias de rehabilitación, que también tienen una incidencia de dolor y afectación emocional. A lo anterior debe adicionarse que la consecuencia de un impedimento permanente de un doce por ciento de la capacidad general, es causa suficiente como para tener por determinado un daño moral en el actor. No llevan razón las partes demandadas cuando niegan la causalidad de la afectación invocada con los hechos objeto del proceso, dado que de éstos in re ipsa y según criterios de lógica, experiencia y del común entender, se desprende de manera fehaciente las lesiones morales indicadas. En razón de lo anterior, procede acoger la pretensión de indemnización en este aspecto, mas en el entendido de que este Colegio estima que el monto requerido por el actor no es proporcional y por ende resulta excesivo. En este orden de ideas, solicita la parte se condene al pago de la suma de treinta millones de colones. No obstante lo anterior, se considera que al nivel de afectación moral indicada, corresponde un monto inferior, habida cuenta que con la suma de veintitres millones de colones se compensa de manera adecuada la aflicción, incertidumbre, dolor, angustia indicados anteriormente, en tanto que si bien grave, el daño ocasionado no trasciende a una invalidez o lesión mayor que le imposibilitara permanente o de mayor seriedad y gravedad otros ámbitos personales, familiares, laborales o de intimidad. Con lo anterior no se demerita que en el caso del actor se dieron afectaciones morales graves, tal y como se están reconociendo, sino más bien, se hace énfasis, en que los hechos pudieron haber tenido consecuencias aún más graves en el actor, que afortunadamente no trascendieron en su caso en concreto. Como se ha demostrado, el 15 de diciembre de 2009, se suscribió con el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad un pre acuerdo conciliatorio en donde se le gira tres millones de colones como un adelanto del monto que se establezca como indemnización, siendo así que al actor se le hizo pago de la suma de dicha suma mediante transferencia electrónica. En razón de lo anterior, de la suma indicada por concepto de daño moral, deberá deducir lo ya girado a modo de compensación en sede administrativa, por lo que se debe condenar a los codemandados al pago de la suma de veinte millones de colones como parte de la condena indicada en la presente sentencia.”