Reinstatement Inappropriate Despite Prescription of Disciplinary Power When Serious Misconduct Is ProvenImprocedencia de reinstalación por falta grave pese a prescripción de potestad disciplinaria

**III. – ON THE PRESCRIPTION OF THE DISCIPLINARY POWER:** Having examined the grievances raised in the appeal, the Chamber concludes that the solution given by the court to the defense of prescription (prescripción) alleged by the plaintiff is correct. The appellant's argument that, because the misuse of public funds was involved, the prescription period provided for in the special rule of Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) applies to the plaintiff's misconduct, is untrue. The text of that rule, in force at the time the sanctioned events occurred, that is, in the month of November 2001, established:* "The disciplinary liability of the servant of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), shall prescribe within a period of two years, counted from the proven knowledge of the misconduct by the competent body, to initiate the respective sanctioning procedure. For these purposes, Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and any other legal provisions that oppose it, are hereby reformed with respect to public officials or servants". * * * Regarding the scope of said rule, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in Voto 6750 of 11:12 a.m. on October 17, 1997, stated: “In effect, this Chamber considers that although Article 8 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General defines the 'Hacienda Pública', as '...the organization formed by the public entities and bodies, including non-state ones, owners or in charge, by any title, of the administration of the public patrimony', and that the latter is '...the universality constituted by public funds, and by the liabilities chargeable to the Hacienda Pública', such concepts must be understood and applied in relation to what constitutes the main objective of the Law, that is, the establishment of the sphere of competence of the Office of the Comptroller General. However, when it comes to matters generally outside the scope of said body, as is the case of the challenged Article 71, the truth is that the interpretation of the concept of servant of the Hacienda Pública must be restricted to one who is in charge of the management of public funds. For this Chamber, this interpretation is necessary, because only in that way is the difference in the prescription periods for the application of disciplinary sanctions justified and explainable. Put another way, the two-year period established in the challenged article is constitutionally adequate only if it is understood that it is intended to enable the State to exercise greater control over its functions that are directly related to the management and disposal of public funds, due to the undeniable relevance of the matter and the great need to ensure the most sound and clean possible management of public funds”; that is, when analyzing the constitutionality of this rule, the Constitutional Chamber concluded that this prescription period is not generally applicable to all public sector servants; and that the expression “servant of the Hacienda Pública” should be understood as the servant in charge of the management and disposal of public funds, and that only to these was the period provided for in that rule applicable. The plaintiff was an official of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería) assigned to the Animal Health Unit (Unidad de Salud Animal) where he held a class B Agricultural Technician (Técnico Agropecuario B) position. Regarding his duties, the witness [Nombre1] stated, in the administrative venue: “He is hired as an Agricultural Technician (Técnico agropecuario), and these exercise duties as assistants to the veterinary doctors in the tasks of taking, in the field or (sic) or samples to laboratories, animal vaccination, collection of services, and they are obligated to drive vehicles and support administrative management, especially in regions where there are no such officials” (folio 109 of the administrative file). Furthermore, it has not been demonstrated that within that position he was directly related to the management or administration of public funds. Consequently, that provision was not applicable to him. Now then. The Audit report that allowed proven knowledge of the misconduct is dated December 4, 2002, a time at which the rule under discussion had been reformed by Article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, the Internal Control Law (Ley de Control Interno), in these terms:* "Article 71.-Prescription of disciplinary liability. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight legal framework (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores), shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules:* a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act.* b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious -understood as that act which requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity- the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is made known to the head or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure.* Prescription shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible party of the act that agrees to initiate the administrative procedure. * When the author of the misconduct is the head, the period shall begin to run from the date on which he/she terminates his/her service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body * .* It shall be deemed a serious misconduct of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure, to not initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the infractor's liability to prescribe, without justified cause.* * * From the highlighted text, it is extracted that the extended period provided for in that new text is applicable not only to officials of the "Hacienda Pública" but to any public official who incurs the infractions provided for in the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and in the higher control and oversight legal framework -Internal Control Law- whose objective was to set a framework of minimum criteria that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the entities or bodies subject to its oversight must observe, for the establishment, operation, maintenance, improvement, and evaluation of internal control systems, understood as the series of actions executed by the active administration, designed to provide security in the achievement of the following objectives: a) Protect and conserve public patrimony against any loss, waste, misuse, irregularity, or illegal act; b) demand reliability and timeliness of information; c) guarantee efficiency and effectiveness of operations; d) comply with the legal and technical legal system (Article 8 of the Internal Control Law). Thus, the reasoning made by the ad quem court is correct in its treatment of the nature of the misconducts for whose prescription the period established by Article 603 of the Labor Code does not apply, but rather the one specially regulated by Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. That is, the mere involvement of damages caused to assets or funds of a public nature does not imply per se, as the State's representation intends to assert, the application of that extended prescription period. Furthermore, it is incorrect to argue that the provision contained in numeral 603 of the Labor Code is for relationships of a private nature. In accordance with numeral 14 of that same regulatory body, its provisions are of public order and all companies, exploitations, or establishments of any nature whatsoever, whether public or private, are subject to them. Consequently, the rules on prescription also govern in public sector institutions, unless there is an express rule to the contrary, as is the case with the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic - Article 71 - for the infractions provided for in that Law and in the higher control and oversight legal framework, which is not the plaintiff's case. The conduct attributed to the plaintiff, when his dismissal was ordered, was having altered the amount in colones and the quantity of fuel stated on two invoices submitted by him, in his name and with his signature, for reimbursement and settlement in his favor. Moreover, as mentioned, there has been no dispute whatsoever that the plaintiff's position is class B Agricultural Technician in the Animal Health Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock; unrelated to the management or administration of the public funds involved in the impropriety attributed to him; nor linked to the exercise of duties of the internal control and oversight system of the office where he worked. On the other hand, the appellant's argument that Article 99(c) of the Regulations of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil) indicates a one-month prescription period for the actions of ministers to initiate dismissal proceedings - a period that runs from the time the events were known by the head - is also not acceptable to change what has been decided. According to the admitted facts, the Minister of Agriculture and Livestock knew of the Audit report on December 4, 2002, and the cited head did not file the dismissal proceeding before the Directorate General of the Civil Service (Dirección General del Servicio Civil) until May 11, 2005, meaning that also under this other provision, the employer's sanctioning power is prescribed. Now then, based on what has been said in the preceding lines, in the sense that the prescriptive period of the cited numeral 71 is not applicable to the plaintiff, it is impossible to accede to the appellant's reasoning by which he intends to apply that five-year period from the moment the minister became aware of that report. Consequently, the respondent's arguments for applying that special provision are not acceptable to vary the sentencing by the court regarding that defense.* **IV.- ON THE PRINCIPAL CLAIM FOR REINSTATEMENT WITH PAYMENT OF BACK PAY:** By upholding the defense raised by the plaintiff, the court deemed it inappropriate to analyze the reproaches related to the merits of the case. Consequently, it denied the defense of lack of right and ordered the State to reinstate him in his job with the recognition of the lost wages. In relation to this specific topic of reinstatement (reinstalación), this Chamber, in a majority vote of its members, has repeatedly ruled that when the prescription (prescripción) of the disciplinary power is declared, the dismissal carried out under those conditions becomes improper. However, to uphold the claim for reinstatement, the motivating cause of the sanction must be examined, because if it is established that there was serious misconduct by the servant, the reinstatement would not be appropriate because it is not possible to oblige the Public Administration (understood in a broad sense) to readmit a person who transgressed the duties inherent to the employment contract, making the maintenance of the service relationship untenable. Thus, in Voto No. 218 of 9:45 a.m. on February 12, 2010, it was stated: “In the specific case, it was established that the cause for dismissal attributed to the plaintiff is not a mere unfounded employer appreciation. Quite the opposite. It was based on a specific fact that was deemed demonstrated: a serious misconduct in attempting to take different types of food out of the Institutional Care Center of Cartago (Centro de Atención Institucional de Cartago) in an official vehicle, which generated an objective loss of trust. Hence, the administration could not be forced, by reason of its extemporaneous action in sanctioning the serious misconduct attributable to the worker, to reinstate him in his duties. It is therefore necessary to clarify that we are not in the hypothesis of an unjustified dismissal -due to the nonexistence of a justifying cause-, since the cause for dismissal did exist; nor before a null dismissal -for being discriminatory or violating fundamental rights-, but rather we are before an improper dismissal due to the elapsed prescription (prescripción). The doctrine indicates as effects of a null dismissal the immediate readmission of the worker and the payment of the back pay. In our environment, unlike other legislations (for example the Spanish one, see Alonso Olea, Manuel [Nombre2], María Emilia. Derecho del Trabajo. Madrid, Civitas Ediciones S.L., twentieth ed., 2002, pp. 469-489), the possibility for the employer to choose between the reinstatement (readmisión) of the worker to his employment (with payment of back pay) or the rupture of the employment relationship (with payment of an indemnity) is not established once the improcedence of the challenged dismissal is declared in the jurisdictional venue. Our legislation makes no distinction between the consequences derived from a declaration of unjustified dismissal (Articles 28 and 29 in relation to 82, all of the Labor Code) and those originating from a judgment that declares the impropriety of a dismissal due to the prescription of the disciplinary power - even if the misconduct accused of the worker is demonstrated -, as occurs in the case at hand. Nor are we in a case where: there is nullity of the administrative act of dismissal, due to the non-existence of any of the essential elements of the act (motive, content, or purpose); there was no disciplinary liability of the plaintiff in the acts charged, as required by Article 211 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)-; the file that would have allowed determining the existence of the disciplinary misconduct was not formed - failing to comply with what is required by the cited Law regarding due legal process, numerals 215 to 229 -, which is sanctioned by numeral 219 of the same law, with the nullity of the proceedings; the motive of the dismissal act was illegitimate or did not exist as indicated when issuing the dismissal (ordinal 133 of that legal body); the body that issued the act lacked competence for its action in the specific case; the content of the act, what it ultimately orders, declares, or commands, was not proportional to the purpose and corresponding to the motive (numeral 132); those constitutive elements of the act did not maintain proportionality and reasonableness or that there was an excess of power as the motive and content did not adjust to the purpose (see [Nombre3], , 2002. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. San José, Costa Rica. Biblioteca Jurídica Diké. [Nombre4]*,); and, in general, that the administrative act of dismissal does not substantially conform to the legal system, particularly regarding the motive, for its emergence into legal life, as required, for its validity, by Article 128 of the cited General Law of Public Administration. Thus, this Chamber has upheld the criterion that in cases where the misconduct attributed to the worker is accredited, as happens in the present matter, reinstatement is not appropriate despite the employer's sanctioning power having prescribed. On this topic, it has been said that “The right to reinstatement, when it exists, functions as a guarantee for the worker, to remain in the labor activity, provided that he/she fulfills the duties and obligations inherent to the contract and not despite any conduct - serious misconduct - as happened in the sub lite, all of this, independently of whether the disciplinary power is exercised extemporaneously or not” (judgment number 99, at 9:00 a.m., of April 16, 1998. In the same sense, see numbers 194, at 9:00 a.m., of October 3, 1984; 81, at 3:20 p.m., of June 13, 1990; 150, at 3:10 p.m., of June 2 and 176, at 2:30 p.m., of June 30, both of 1999; 217, at 10:20 a.m., of April 18, 2001; and, 47, at 10:00 a.m., of January 26, 2007; all from this Chamber). In this way, reinstatement is appropriate to grant, in a case like the one under study, only under the assumption that the dismissal sanction was unjustified; that is, when there are no serious, reliable, and justified motives for the dismissal; with which the administrative act that declared it lacks a motive. In other words “reinstatement supposes the existence of an employment relationship in accordance with the basic ethical principles that characterize it, since reinstatement is inspired by the worker's right to job stability, which, when it exists, is a guarantee for the employee to remain in the labor activity provided that he/she complies with those basic principles and not to do so despite any conduct, because in that way the convenience for employers to be able to dispense with those workers who have committed serious misconducts and who are not trustworthy is seriously affected” (judgment of this Chamber number 152, at 3:20 p.m., of September 20, 1989)”. (In this sense, judgment No. 314 of 10:10 a.m. of March 30, 2012). In the case now before us, according to the physical administrative file submitted to the proceedings, it is evident that the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal de Servicio Civil), when declaring the dismissal proceeding filed by the Minister of Agriculture and Livestock admissible, deemed the following as demonstrated: “B) That the Head of the Department of National Zoosanitary Services (Departamento de Servicios Zoosanitarios Nacionales) requested the reimbursement of several invoices for fuel consumption, among which are numbers 005498, of November 2, 2001, whose amount is ¢5,500.00, for 24 liters of diesel for the official vehicle license plate [Placa1]; and No. 79576, of November 19, 2001, for the sum of ¢5,000.00, for 34.10 liters of gasoline, for the official vehicle license plate [Placa1], both in the name and with the signature of the servant [Nombre5]. . … C) That in the stub of invoice No. 005498 of November 2, 2001, kept by the Bomba Santa María service center, it is indicated that the invoiced amount is for ¢1,500.00, and that it corresponds to 11 liters of diesel… d) That the price of diesel, at the time of issuing invoice No. 005498, was ¢135.70 per liter, and that of regular gasoline was ¢146.62 per liter, at the time of issuing invoice No. 79576, so the amounts to be reimbursed and indicated on said invoices are higher than what truly corresponded, in the event that the quantity of liters of fuel was that which is indicated in said documents (folio 45). Specifically, that court concluded:* “There is no doubt that the invoices under discussion present serious and evident irregularities, detectable at a glance, some of them, as is the case of the alteration of the numbers of the amount in colones indicated on both documents. This means that the servant [Nombre5]. . could not have been unaware of such irregularities and the least he could have done was to report the case to his superiors, but he remained silent, and he also does not refer to or give explanations about these irregularities in the processing and content of said invoices in his defense statement; he simply limits himself to saying that he collaborated with other colleagues in the processing of these. The respondent alleges that there is no proof that he altered any document and that the Internal Audit report does not involve him in those events. Such an allegation lacks foundation, as this Tribunal understands that, in the species, it is not about proving, in this administrative venue, whether the plaintiff altered a document or not, the matter is that the servant [Nombre6] used documents - invoices for reimbursement - with evident alterations, to acquire a personal benefit, obtained in totally anomalous conditions, such as the refund of a sum of money, coming from public funds, that did not truly correspond. The respondent did not notice that the invoices under discussion had another number superimposed on the figure for the amount in colones to make it larger, nor that the superimposed sum of money did not coincide with the quantity of liters of fuel assigned, according to the price that both diesel and regular gasoline had at that time. The accused also does not inform about the colleague for whom he would have been doing the favor of receiving and processing those invoices, if that were the case, because before the Internal Audit the respondent indicated that: ‘The data recorded on the back of said invoice, are indeed in my own handwriting, because many times I signed invoices of my colleagues which came without the required information from them, in order to expedite the procedures for the respective settlement’. Folio 36 of the management's file. As can be observed, servant Q.V. acknowledges that he had to review the information contained in the invoices being processed for reimbursement, which is logical, since these are documents for the settlement or refund of monies coming from public funds. Consequently, this Tribunal considers that the conduct of servant [Nombre6] was incorrect, in that he uses, for his own benefit, the conditions of his position to request a reimbursement of some clearly altered invoices with amounts in colones higher than what truly correspond” (folios 148 to 154 of the administrative file).* * * In the lawsuit, the plaintiff criticized the merits of the employer's decision considering it inconsistent with the demonstrated facts; because within the administrative procedure it was not accredited with sufficient certainty that he was responsible for the alleged acts, nor that he had been the one who altered the invoices or had obtained any economic benefit from the alleged alteration, also pointing out that those invoices were also in the hands of other persons and he was not the sole person responsible for the vehicle to which the fuel was supplied. As the legal representative of the State properly noted, when providing the response to the lawsuit -folio 106-, the fact that the cited invoices did not correspond to the reality of what happened is an aspect that is not questioned, that is, the plaintiff did not object that the invoices presented before the Financial Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, for their corresponding settlement and reimbursement of what was paid, contained alterations. It was accredited that for this procedure, the official who settled and sought the refund of what was paid had to record, on the back of the invoice, the vehicle's license plate number, his name, identification number, and signature, with the approval of the immediate superior (see folios 144 and following of the administrative file). On folios 119 and 120 of the submitted physical administrative file, there is a copy of those invoices numbers 005498 and 79576, both with the name “[Nombre7]”; the identification number “CED1” and two signatures. The plaintiff, at no time, has rejected the authorship of that data, that is, of having been the person who stamped his name, identification number, and the signature that appears on said invoices, for their refund. On the contrary, indeed, in the investigation conducted by the Internal Audit of the institution, he expressly acknowledged having recorded that data, on the back of those invoices (see folios 32 and 33 of the physical administrative file). In the defense statement, in the administrative venue, what he refuted was that the Audit report aimed to determine the origin of the questioned system, investigate the procedure implemented in the Administrative Unit to exercise controls over said system, and determine the name of the officials who used vehicles with license plates [Placa2] and [Placa3], on the days October 1st; November 2nd and 19th, all of the year 2001, as well as the consumption recorded for said vehicles and the veracity of the data recorded on the commercial invoices numbers 005498, 79576, and 214119. He expressly denied being responsible for having implemented the system of reimbursement of fuel amounts because he does not hold any supervisory position, nor is he the one who gives the approvals for the invoices presented for collection, nor is he the one who carries out the payment procedure. He pointed out that his action was simply limited to collaborating as is customary, by requesting the reimbursement procedure, sometimes for invoices paid by oneself and on other occasions, for invoices paid by other colleagues. In this sense, it is worth remembering that, because we often have to go on field trips to areas far from the Animal Health office, Cartago office, the custom was to request the reimbursement procedure for paid invoices through other colleagues who were in the office located in Cartago or near it, in order to expedite the payment to the colleagues who were on field trips away from the central plateau… (see folio 75 of the administrative file), with which the plaintiff ended up pointing out that “... there is no element that leads to the conclusion that the undersigned is responsible for the alleged acts.” As can clearly be seen, the plaintiff's defense was based on the idea that the invoices under discussion could have corresponded to other colleagues because there was a custom of doing that procedure for someone else as a favor. However, he did not prove this argument nor provide any other sufficient evidence to rebut the fact that those invoices were signed and assumed by him, for their settlement, as the beneficiary of that procedure. That is, if the plaintiff presented those invoices with his personal data before the employer's instances, in order to achieve the reimbursement of the amount of said invoices, it is because it is assumed that the amount indicated on those invoices was paid by him and he must be reimbursed. Therefore, if those invoices truly corresponded to other work colleagues, there is no doubt that the plaintiff was fully capable of indicating the identity of those persons, in order to be exonerated from liability for the verified alteration. By not doing so, the logical and reasonable thing is to dismiss that defense and conclude that the plaintiff was responsible for managing the collection of altered invoices, an action that, furthermore, would evidently benefit only him, as the subscriber of the mentioned invoices. Moreover, the possibility that other colleagues could have been responsible for the alteration of those documents was not even raised when he responded to the dismissal proceeding. For that reason, his dismissal decision could not have been vitiated in any way if it did not consider that argument. On the other hand, there are also no elements in the file that reasonably make it possible to admit that the alteration of the documents had been carried out by other officials, after the plaintiff delivered the documentation. In the first place, because the participation of those other officials was due to the need for the approval that the superior had to give so that the holder of the invoice could make the reimbursement effective; and also because said reimbursement would generate no personal benefit for them, its recipient being solely the official who presented the invoice as payer of the amount stated on the document. At this point, the undeniable economic benefit that this alteration would derive for the plaintiff must be highlighted, since the amount to be received would have been, at least in one of the invoices, far higher than what was actually paid for the service. Indeed, there is no doubt for this Chamber that at least in invoice number 005498, the original amount was one thousand five hundred colones (¢1,500.00) for 11 liters of diesel, and it was modified to improperly obtain the collection of five thousand five hundred colones (¢5,500.00). Finally, it should be noted that in the first instance, the judge deemed the plaintiff's dismissal justified considering that there was sufficient merit for that decision, insofar as the invoices submitted for collection did not reflect the reality of what happened, and on the back of these appear the plaintiff's name, as well as his identification number and signature, data with which the Administration deemed it accredited that it was he who bought the fuel with his own money and, consequently, it is he who is the creditor and person to whom the money would be refunded (folios 339 and 340). Faced with such a conclusion, in the appeal (folios 350 and 351) the plaintiff's attorney merely protested that the respondent did not demonstrate the true responsibility of the plaintiff for the alleged acts; did not accredit with the due certainty the existence of the alleged misconduct committed; did not accredit who was truly responsible for those alterations; nor who obtained economic benefit from that alleged alteration; allegations that, with what has been said, have been refuted.

In conclusion, the plaintiff did not manage to disprove that he processed, before the defendant's administration, the reimbursement of invoices for fuel purchases with altered data, an alteration for which he failed to provide a reasonable justification as the person responsible for signing said documents for their collection, and therefore the dismissal decision must be deemed justified due to loss of trust in the official. The State, as a public entity, requires individuals of irreproachable conduct not only because the object of its administration is public assets, which are of interest and belong to the community, but also because oversight is difficult given the large number of people in its service, the system of structuring functions and responsibilities, and the breadth of its assets. For this reason, although trust is a transcendental element in every employment relationship, its assessment is more rigorous in public employment relationships. In the case under study, it is evident that the system used by the defendant for supplying fuel to its vehicles operated on a basis of trust: the official paid the invoice and the amount was reimbursed to him through the procedure of submitting said invoices, whose data serve for the respective settlement. If that is the system under which the defendant operates, it is impossible to demand that, once the plaintiff's improper management was verified, it keep him in his job, because, from that moment on, it could no longer trust the veracity of the data recorded on the fuel purchase invoices that he submitted for settlement. Moreover, through said conduct, the plaintiff demonstrated contempt for the employer's interests, with which the trust that might be required in other areas of their relationship was also broken. Thus, the impossibility of continuing the employment relationship resulted solely from the actions committed by the plaintiff himself, from which the loss of employer trust derived. Given the loss of a fundamental and unavoidable element of the employment contract, ordering the official's reinstatement to his job is not appropriate, because through that means the employer would be forced to restore an employment relationship mutilated of the subjective aspect upon which it subsists. The principle of job stability in employment does not extend to those who commit infractions that demonstrate their unsuitability for the position. That principle was constitutionally established as a guarantee of immovability, meaning that, once appointed to a public position, the person may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal set forth in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof (Article 192 of the Constitution). However, that same constitutional provision supports as a principle the appointment to a position based on proven suitability, for which the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), which regulates existing relationships in the Ministry where the plaintiff worked, establishes a specific procedure for that purpose. Article 20 of that regulation states, among other requirements, that to enter the Civil Service, one must possess the moral and physical aptitude proper for the performance of the position, which shall be verified through information on life and customs and certifications issued by the National Archives (Archivo Nacional), the National Registry (Registro Nacional), the Criminal Investigation Unit (Gabinete de Investigación), and the respective Department of the Ministry of Health; in addition to demonstrating suitability by undergoing the tests, exams, or competitions contemplated by that law and its regulations. In the field of employment relationships subject to Private Law, the effect of the limitation of disciplinary authority becomes the employer's obligation to compensate the worker with the benefits corresponding to a dismissal considered illegal. No provision obliges the employer to reinstate to their position a person in whom, for example, it no longer has trust, a fundamental element for the existence of this type of relationship. In the field of public employment relationships, the guarantee of stability implies, as stated, that the person remains in their position because they were appointed based on a procedure through which their suitability was guaranteed. However, if the administration manages to verify that the person has ceased to be suitable because they incurred a serious fault that authorizes their dismissal, this implies that the basis for stability has been undermined, and for that reason, it would be counterproductive to order reinstatement as a consequence of the limitation. That is, if the person has ceased to be suitable for the position, due to having incurred a serious fault against their employer, there is no basis for applying the principle of stability to order reinstatement. In the sub examine, if it is demonstrated that the plaintiff incurred a serious fault, an exception by which the constitution itself exempts from stability, the consequence of the limitation of the employer's disciplinary authority can never be reinstatement with all its consequences—back pay, year-end bonuses, and school bonuses—due to the objective demonstration of the cause for dismissal. Instead, in accordance with the provision contained in Article 63 of the Constitution, developed by the Labor Code, in its Articles 28 and 29, the defendant must be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount corresponding for advance notice and severance pay, the settlement of which shall be carried out in the sentence execution stage." *", "III.- OF THE LIMITATION OF DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY: Having reviewed the grievances raised in the appeal, the Chamber concludes that the solution given by the court to the defense of limitation raised by the plaintiff is correct. The appellant's argument that, since the improper use of public funds was involved, the plaintiff's fault is subject to the limitation period provided for by the special rule of Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) is not true. The text of that rule, in force at the time the sanctioned events occurred, that is, in the month of November 2001, established: '* “The disciplinary responsibility of the public treasury servant shall prescribe within a period of two years, counted from the proven knowledge of the fault by the competent body, to initiate the respective sanctioning procedure. For these purposes, Article 603 of the Labor Code, and any other conflicting legal provisions, are hereby amended regarding officials or public servants”. *' Regarding the scope of said rule, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in vote No. 6750 at 11:12 a.m. on October 17, 1997, stated: “In effect, this Chamber considers that although Article 8 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General defines the “Public Treasury” as "...the organization formed by public entities and bodies, including non-state ones, that are owners or responsible, by any title, for the administration of public assets," and that the latter is "...the universality constituted by public funds and the liabilities chargeable to the Public Treasury," such concepts must be understood and applied in relation to what constitutes the main objective of the Law, that is, the establishment of the sphere of competence of the Comptroller. However, when dealing with matters generally foreign to said body, as is the case of Article 71 in question, the truth is that the interpretation of the concept of public treasury servant must be restricted to one who is in charge of handling public funds. For this Chamber, this interpretation is necessary, because only in this way is the difference in limitation periods for the application of disciplinary sanctions justified and explainable. In other words, the two-year period established in the questioned article is constitutionally adequate only if it is understood that it aims to allow the State greater control over its functions that are directly related to the handling and disposal of public funds, due to the undeniable relevance of the matter and the great need to ensure the most sound and clean management possible of public funds”; that is, when analyzing the constitutionality of this rule, the Constitutional Chamber concluded that this limitation period should not be generally applied to all public sector servants; and that the expression “public treasury servant” should be understood as the servant in charge of handling and disposing of public funds, it being that only to these was the period provided in that rule applicable. The plaintiff was an official of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock assigned to the Animal Health Unit where he held a Technical Agricultural B class position. Regarding his functions, witness [Name1] stated, in an administrative setting: “He is hired as an Agricultural Technician, and these perform auxiliary functions for veterinary doctors in taking samples - via or (sic) or to laboratories, vaccinating animals, charging for services, and they are obligated to drive vehicles and support administrative management, especially in regions where there are no such officials” (folio 109 of the administrative file). Furthermore, it has not been demonstrated that within that position he was directly related to the handling or administration of public funds. Consequently, that provision was not applicable to him. Now then, the Audit report that allowed for proven knowledge of the fault is dated December 4, 2002, a time by which the rule under discussion had been amended by Article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, Internal Control Law (Ley de Control Interno), in these terms: '* “Article 71.- Limitation of Disciplinary Responsibility. The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight regulations, shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious - understood as an act that requires an inquiry or audit study to report its possible irregularity - responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the head or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. The limitation period shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible party of the act agreeing to the initiation of the administrative procedure. When the author of the fault is the head, the period shall begin to run from the date on which they terminate their service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. The failure to initiate this procedure in a timely manner or allowing the offender's responsibility to prescribe, without justified cause, shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure.” *' From the highlighted text, it is deduced that the extended period provided in that new text is applicable not only to “Public Treasury” officials but to any public official who incurs the infractions provided for in the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic and in the superior control and oversight regulations - Internal Control Law - whose objective was to establish a framework of minimum criteria that the Comptroller General of the Republic and the entities or bodies subject to its oversight must observe for the establishment, operation, maintenance, improvement, and evaluation of internal control systems, understood as the series of actions executed by active administration, designed to provide security in the achievement of the following objectives: a) Protect and conserve public assets against any loss, waste, improper use, irregularity, or illegal act; b) demand reliability and timeliness of information; c) guarantee efficiency and effectiveness of operations; d) comply with the legal and technical framework (Article 8 of the Internal Control Law). Thus, the reasoning made by the ad quem is correct in its treatment of the nature of the faults for whose limitation the period provided by Article 603 of the Labor Code does not apply, but rather the one specially regulated by Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic. That is, the mere involvement of damages caused to public assets or funds does not imply per se, as the State's representation intends to assert, the application of that extended limitation period. Furthermore, it is incorrect to argue that the provision contained in Article 603 of the Labor Code is for relationships of a private nature. In accordance with Article 14 of that same normative body, its provisions are of public order and all companies, exploitations, or establishments of any nature whatsoever, public or private, are subject to them. Consequently, the rules on limitation also govern public sector institutions, unless there is an express rule to the contrary, as is the case with the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic - Article 71 - for the infractions provided for in that Law and in the superior control and oversight regulations, which is not the plaintiff's case. The conduct attributed to the plaintiff, when his dismissal was ordered, was having altered the amount in colones and the quantity of fuel recorded on two invoices presented by him, in his name and with his signature, for reimbursement and settlement in his favor. Furthermore, as mentioned, there has been no discussion whatsoever that the plaintiff's position is of the Technical Agricultural B class in the Animal Health Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock; not related to the handling or administration of the public funds involved in the inaccuracy attributed to him; nor linked to the exercise of functions of the internal control and oversight system of the office where he worked. On the other hand, the appellant's argument that Article 99, subsection c) of the Civil Service Statute Regulations (Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil) indicates a one-month limitation period for the actions of ministers to initiate the dismissal procedure - a period that runs from when the facts were known by the head - is also not acceptable to change what has been ordered. According to the admitted facts, the Minister of Agriculture and Livestock learned of the Audit report on December 4, 2002, and the cited head did not file the dismissal procedure before the Civil Service Directorate General (Dirección General del Servicio Civil) until May 11, 2005, whereby, also in application of that other provision, the employer's sanctioning authority is found to be time-barred. Now, based on what was stated in the preceding lines, to the effect that the prescriptive period of the cited Article 71 is not applicable to the plaintiff, it is impossible to accept the appellant's reasoning by which it intends for that period -of five years- to be applied from the moment the minister learned of that report. Consequently, the defendant's arguments for applying that special provision are not acceptable to vary what the court ruled regarding that defense.

IV.- ON THE PRINCIPAL CLAIM FOR REINSTATEMENT WITH PAYMENT OF BACK PAY: In accepting the defense raised by the plaintiff, the court deemed it inappropriate to analyze the objections related to the merits of the case. Consequently, it denied the defense of lack of right and condemned the State to reinstate him to his job with the recognition of lost wages. Regarding this specific issue of reinstatement, this Chamber, in a majority vote of its members, has repeatedly resolved that when the limitation of disciplinary authority is declared, the dismissal carried out under those conditions becomes inappropriate. However, to accept the claim for reinstatement, the motivating cause for the sanction must be examined, because if it is established that there was a serious fault by the servant, reinstatement would not be appropriate because it is not possible to force the Public Administration (understood in a broad sense) to readmit a person who transgressed the duties inherent to the employment contract, making the maintenance of the service relationship untenable. Thus, in Vote No. 218 at 9:45 a.m. on February 12, 2010, it was stated: “In the specific case, it was established that the cause for dismissal attributed to the plaintiff is not a mere appreciation by the employer without any basis. Quite the contrary. It was based on a specific fact that was taken as proven: a serious fault by attempting to take various types of food out of the Cartago Institutional Attention Center in an official vehicle, which generated an objective loss of trust. Hence, the administration could not be forced, due to its untimely action in sanctioning the serious fault attributable to the worker, to reinstate him in his duties. It is necessary then to clarify that we are not in the hypothesis of an unjustified dismissal - due to the non-existence of justifying cause -, since the cause for dismissal did exist; nor before a null dismissal - because it was discriminatory or violative of fundamental rights -, but rather we are before an inappropriate dismissal due to the elapsed limitation period. The doctrine indicates as effects of null dismissal the immediate readmission of the worker and the payment of lost wages. In our context, unlike other legislations (for example, Spanish legislation, can be seen by Alonso Olea, Manuel [Name2] , María Emilia. Labor Law (Derecho del Trabajo). Madrid, Civitas Ediciones S.L., twentieth ed., 2002, pp. 469-489), it is not established, once the inappropriateness of the challenged dismissal is declared in the jurisdictional route, that the employer may opt for the reinstatement (readmission) of the worker to their employment (with credit for lost wages) or the severance of the employment relationship (with payment of compensation). Our legislation does not distinguish between the consequences derived from a declaration of unjustified dismissal (Articles 28 and 29 in relation to Article 82, all of the Labor Code) and those originating from a judgment that declares the inappropriateness of a dismissal due to the limitation of disciplinary authority - even if the fault accused against the worker is demonstrated -, as occurs in the case before us. Nor are we in a case where: there is nullity of the administrative act of dismissal, due to the non-existence of any of the essential elements of the act (motive, content, or purpose); that there was no disciplinary responsibility of the plaintiff in the imputed acts, as required by Article 211 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública); that the file was not formed to determine the existence of the disciplinary fault - failing to comply with what is required by the cited Law regarding due legal process, Articles 215 to 229 -, which is sanctioned by Article 219 of the same law, with the nullity of what was acted; that the motive for the dismissal act was illegitimate or did not exist as stated when issuing the dismissal (Article 133 of that legal body); that the body that issued the act lacked competence for its action in the specific case; that the content of the act, what it finally provides, declares, or orders, was not proportional to the purpose and corresponding to the motive (Article 132); that those constitutive elements of the act did not maintain proportionality and reasonableness, or that there was an excess of power by not adjusting the motive and content to the purpose (can be seen by [Name3], , 2002. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo (Treatise on Administrative Law). San José, Costa Rica. Biblioteca Jurídica Diké. [Name4]*); and, in general, that the administrative dismissal act does not substantially conform to the legal system, particularly regarding the motive, for its emergence into legal life, as required, for its validity, by Article 128 of the cited General Law of Public Administration. Thus, this Chamber has maintained the criterion that in cases where the fault attributed to the worker is proven, as happens in the present matter, reinstatement is not appropriate despite the limitation of the employer's sanctioning authority having operated. On this topic, it has been said that “The right to reinstatement, when it exists, functions as a guarantee for the worker to remain in the labor activity, provided they comply with the duties and obligations inherent to the contract and not despite any conduct - serious fault - as happened in the sub lite, all of this, regardless of whether the disciplinary authority is exercised untimely or not” (judgment number 99, at 9:00 a.m., on April 16, 1998. In the same sense, see numbers 194, at 9:00 a.m., on October 3, 1984; 81, at 3:20 p.m., on June 13, 1990; 150, at 3:10 p.m., on June 2, and 176, at 2:30 p.m., on June 30, both of 1999; 217, at 10:20 a.m., on April 18, 2001; and, 47, at 10:00 a.m., on January 26, 2007; all from this Chamber). Thus, reinstatement is appropriate to grant, in a case like the one under study, only on the assumption that the dismissal sanction was unjustified; that is, when there are no serious, reliable, and justified reasons for dismissal; whereby the administrative act that declared it lacks motive. In other words, “reinstatement presupposes the existence of an employment relationship in accordance with the basic ethical principles that characterize it, since reinstatement is inspired by the worker's right to immovability, which, when it exists, is a guarantee for the employee to remain in the labor activity provided they comply with those basic principles and not to do so despite any conduct, because in that way the advisability that employers may dispense with those workers who have committed serious faults and do not deserve trust is seriously affected” (judgment of this Chamber number 152, at 3:20 p.m., on September 20, 1989)”. (In this sense, judgment No. 314 at 10:10 a.m. on March 30, 2012). In the case now before us, according to the physical administrative file provided to the record, it is known that the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal de Servicio Civil), upon granting the dismissal procedure filed by the Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, considered as demonstrated: “B) That the Head of the Department of National Zoosanitary Services requested reimbursement for several fuel consumption invoices, among which are numbers 005498, dated November 2, 2001, for an amount of ¢5,500.00, for 24 liters of diesel for the official vehicle plates [LicensePlate1]; and No. 79576, dated November 19, 2001, for the sum of ¢5,000.00, for 34.10 liters of gasoline, for the official vehicle plates [LicensePlate1], both in the name and with the signature of the servant [Name5]. . … C) That in the stub book for invoice No. 005498 dated November 2, 2001, kept by the Bomba Santa María service center, it is indicated that the invoiced amount is for ¢1,500.00, and that it corresponds to 11 liters of diesel… d) That the price of diesel, at the time invoice No. 005498 was issued, was ¢135.70 per liter, and that of regular gasoline was ¢146.62 per liter, at the time invoice No. 79576 was issued, whereby the amounts to be reimbursed and indicated on said invoices are higher than those actually applicable, in the event that the quantity of liters of fuel was that indicated in said documents (folio 45).

Concretely, that court concluded:</span><span>*</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">“There is no doubt that the invoices in question present serious and evident irregularities, some of them detectable at a glance, as is the case of the alteration of the colón amount numbers indicated in both documents. This means that the employee [Name5]. . should not have ignored such irregularities, and the least he could have done was to report the case to his superiors, but he remained silent, and neither in his response to the complaint does he refer to, nor give explanations regarding, those irregularities in the processing and content of said invoices; he simply limits himself to saying that he collaborated with other colleagues in processing them. The respondent argues that there is no evidence that he altered any document and that the Internal Audit report does not implicate him in those acts. Such an argument lacks merit, for this Court understands that, in this instance, the matter is not one of demonstrating, in this administrative venue, whether or not the plaintiff altered a document; the issue is that the employee [Name6]</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">used documents—invoices for reimbursement—with evident alterations, to obtain a personal benefit, and obtained under totally anomalous conditions, such as the reimbursement of a sum of money, coming from public funds, which really was not owed. The respondent did not notice that the invoices in question had another number superimposed on the colón amount figure to make it larger, nor that the superimposed sum of money did not coincide with the quantity of liters of fuel allocated, according to the price that both diesel and regular gasoline had at that time. Nor does the defendant inform about the colleague for whom he would be doing the favor of receiving and processing those invoices, if that were the case, for before the Internal Audit, the respondent stated that: ‘</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">The data recorded on the reverse side of said invoice are indeed in my own handwriting, since I often signed invoices for my colleagues which came without the required information from them, in order to expedite the procedures for the respective settlement</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">’. Folio 36 of the administrative file. As can be seen, the employee Q.V. acknowledges that he had to review the information contained in the invoices being processed for reimbursement, which is logical, as these are documents for the settlement or reimbursement of monies from public funds. Consequently, this Court considers that the conduct of the employee [Name6]</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">was incorrect, in that he uses, for his own benefit, the conditions of his position to request a reimbursement for invoices that were evidently altered, with colón amounts higher than those actually owed” (folios 148 to 154 of the administrative file).</span><span>*</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>*</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>*</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">In the complaint, the plaintiff criticized the substance of the employer’s decision, considering it incongruent with the demonstrated facts; because within the administrative procedure it was not proven with sufficient certainty that he was responsible for the acts alleged, nor that he had been the one who altered the invoices or had derived any economic benefit from the alleged alteration, also noting that those invoices were also in the hands of other persons and that he was not the only person responsible for the vehicle to which the fuel was supplied. As the State’s legal representative rightly noted, when providing the response to the complaint -folio 106-, the fact that the cited invoices did not reflect the reality of what occurred is an aspect that is not questioned, meaning the plaintiff did not object that the invoices submitted to the Financial Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, for their corresponding settlement and reimbursement of the amount paid, contained alterations. It was proven that for said procedure, the official who settled and sought the reimbursement of the amount paid had to record, on the back of the invoice, the vehicle license plate number, his name, ID number, and signature, with the approval (visto bueno) of the immediate superior (see folio 144 and following of the administrative file). At folios 119 and 120 of the physical administrative file provided, there is a copy of those invoices numbers 005498 and 79576, both with the name “[Name7]”; the ID number “CED1” and two signatures. The plaintiff has at no time denied authorship of those data points, meaning that he was the person who affixed his name, ID number, and the signature appearing on said invoices, for their reimbursement. On the contrary, indeed, in the investigation conducted by the institution’s Internal Audit, he expressly acknowledged having recorded those data on the reverse side of said invoices (see folios 32 and 33 of the physical administrative file). In the statement of defense (escrito de descargo), in the administrative venue, what he refuted was that the Audit report had as its objective to determine the origin of the questioned system, to investigate the procedure implemented in the Administrative Unit to exercise controls over said system, and to determine the names of the officials who used vehicles with plates [Placa2] and [Placa3], on the days October 1; November 2 and 19, all of the year 2001, as well as the consumption recorded for said vehicles and the veracity of the data recorded on commercial invoices numbers 005498, 79576 and 214119. He expressly denied being responsible for having implemented the fuel reimbursement system because he does not hold any supervisory position, nor is he the one who approves (da los vistos buenos) the invoices submitted for payment, nor is he the one who carries out the payment procedure. He pointed out that his actions were simply limited to </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">collaborating, as was customary, by requesting the reimbursement procedure, sometimes for invoices paid by oneself and on other occasions, for invoices paid by other colleagues. In this sense, it is worth remembering that, because we often have to make field trips (giras) to areas far from the Animal Health office, the Cartago office, the custom was to request the reimbursement procedure for invoices paid through other colleagues who were at the office located in Cartago or near it, in order to expedite payment to colleagues who were on field trips outside the central plateau… </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">(see folio 75 of the administrative file), whereupon the plaintiff ended up stating that “</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">... there is no element whatsoever that leads to the conclusion that the undersigned is responsible for the acts alleged.” </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">As is clearly seen, the plaintiff’s defense was based on the fact that the invoices in question could have belonged to other colleagues because there was a custom of carrying out that procedure for another person, as a favor. However, he did not demonstrate that argument nor provide any other sufficient evidence to rebut the fact that those invoices were signed and taken on by him, for their settlement, as the beneficiary of that procedure. That is, if the plaintiff presented those invoices with his personal data to the employer’s instances, in order to obtain the reimbursement of the amount of said invoices, it is because it is assumed that the amount indicated on those invoices was paid by him and must be reimbursed to him. Therefore, if those invoices actually corresponded to other work colleagues, there is no doubt that the plaintiff was fully able to indicate the identity of those persons, so that he could be exonerated from liability for the confirmed alteration. By not doing so, the logical and reasonable course is to dismiss that defense and conclude that the plaintiff was the one responsible for managing the collection of altered invoices, an action which, moreover, evidently would only benefit him, as the signatory of the aforementioned invoices. Furthermore, he did not even raise the possibility that other colleagues could have been responsible for the alteration of those documents when responding to the dismissal proceeding. Therefore, the decision to dismiss him could not in any way have been flawed for not considering that argument. On the other hand, the file also lacks elements that reasonably make it possible to admit that the alteration of the documents was carried out by other officials, after the submission of the documentation by the plaintiff. In the first place, because the participation of those other officials was due to the need for the approval (visto bueno) that the superior had to give so that the invoice holder could collect the reimbursement; and also because said reimbursement, the recipient of which was solely the official who submitted the invoice as the payer of the amount stated in the document, would generate no personal benefit for them. On this point, the undeniable economic benefit that this alteration would have derived for the plaintiff must be highlighted, since the amount to be received would have been, at least in one of the invoices, far greater than what was actually paid for the service. Indeed, this Chamber has no doubt that, at least on invoice number 005498, the original amount was one thousand five hundred colones (¢1,500.00) for 11 liters of diesel, and it was modified to unduly collect five thousand five hundred colones (¢5,500.00). Lastly, it should be noted that in the first instance, the judge deemed the plaintiff’s dismissal justified by considering that there was sufficient merit for that decision, as the invoices submitted for collection did not reflect the reality of what occurred, and on the reverse side of these appear the plaintiff’s name, as well as his ID number and his signature, data with which the Administration considered it proven that it was he who bought the fuel with money from his own pocket and, consequently, is the creditor and the person to whom the money should be reimbursed (folios 339 and 340). Faced with such a conclusion, in the appeal (folios 350 and 351) the plaintiff’s legal representative merely protested that the defendant did not demonstrate the true responsibility of the plaintiff for the acts alleged; did not prove with due certainty the existence of the alleged fault committed; was not proven who was truly responsible for those alterations; nor who obtained an economic benefit from that alleged alteration; arguments which, with what has been stated, have been disproved. In conclusion, the plaintiff failed to disprove that he managed before the defendant’s administration the reimbursement of invoices for the purchase of fuel with altered data, an alteration for which he was unable to provide a reasonable justification as the person responsible upon signing said documents for their collection, and therefore the dismissal decision must be considered justified due to loss of confidence in the official. The State, as a public entity, requires individuals of irreproachable conduct, not only because the object of its administration is public assets, which are of interest to and belong to the community, but because oversight is difficult given the large number of people in its service, the system for structuring functions and responsibilities, and the breadth of its patrimony. Therefore, although confidence is a transcendental element in every employment relationship, its assessment is more rigorous in public employment relationships. In the case under study, it is evident that the system used by the defendant for supplying fuel to its vehicles operated on a foundation of trust: the official paid the invoice and the amount was reimbursed to him through the procedure of presenting said invoices, the data of which are used for the respective settlement. If that is the system under which the defendant operates, it is impossible to demand that, once the plaintiff’s incorrect action was confirmed, the defendant keep him in his job position, because from that moment on, it could no longer trust the veracity of the data recorded on the fuel purchase invoices that he presented for settlement. Furthermore, with such conduct, the plaintiff demonstrated contempt for the employer’s interests, with which the trust that might be required in other areas of their relationship was also broken. Thus, the impossibility of continuing the employment relationship derived only from the actions committed by the plaintiff himself, from which the loss of the employer’s confidence derived. Given the loss of a fundamental and unavoidable element of the employment contract, ordering the employee’s reinstatement (reinstalación) to his job position is not appropriate, because by that means the employer would be forced to recompose an employment relationship mutilated of the subjective aspect upon which it subsists. The principle of job stability in employment does not extend to those who incur infractions that demonstrate their unsuitability for the position. That principle was constitutionally established as a guarantee of immovability (inamobilidad), meaning that, once appointed to a public office, a person may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal set forth in labor legislation, or in the case of a forced reduction of services, either due to a lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof (Article 192 of the Constitution). Now, that same constitutional provision upholds as a principle appointment to the position based on </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">proven suitability (idoneidad comprobada)</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">, for which purpose, the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) that regulates the relationships in force at the Ministry where the plaintiff worked, establishes a specific procedure for that end. Article 20 of that regulation states, among other requirements, that to enter the Civil Service, one must possess the moral and physical aptitude proper for the performance of the position, which shall be verified through information on life and customs and certifications issued by the Judicial Registry of Delinquents (Registro Judicial de Delincuentes), the National Archive (Archivo Nacional), the Investigation Cabinet (Gabinete de Investigación), and the respective Department of the Ministry of Health; in addition to demonstrating suitability by undergoing the tests, exams, or competitions contemplated by that law and its regulations. In the sphere of employment relationships subject to Private Law, the effect of the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power becomes the employer’s obligation to compensate the worker with the severance payments corresponding to a dismissal considered illegal. No provision obliges the employer to reinstate in their position a person in whom, for example, they no longer have confidence, a fundamental element for the existence of this type of relationship. In the field of public employment relationships, the guarantee of stability, as stated, implies that the person remains in their position because they were appointed based on a procedure through which their suitability was guaranteed. However, if the administration manages to confirm that the person has ceased to be suitable because they committed a serious fault (falta grave) that empowers their dismissal, this implies that the foundation of stability has been undermined, and for that same reason, it would be contradictory to order reinstatement as a consequence of the statute of limitations. That is, if the person has ceased to be suitable for the position, for having committed a serious fault against their employer, there is no basis to apply the principle of stability to order reinstatement. In the case under examination (subexamine), if it is demonstrated that the plaintiff committed a serious fault, an exception for which the Constitution itself exempts from stability, the consequence of the statute of limitations of the employer’s disciplinary power can never be reinstatement with all its consequences—back pay (salarios caídos), year-end bonuses (aguinaldos) and school bonuses (salarios escolares)—due to the objective demonstration of the cause for dismissal. In its place, in accordance with the provision contained in Article 63 of the Constitution, developed by the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), in its Articles 28 and 29, the defendant must be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount corresponding to him for the concept of notice (preaviso) and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), the settlement of which shall be made in the sentence execution stage.</span><span>” *</span><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>" The audit report that provided verified knowledge of the fault is dated December 4, 2002, at which time the rule under discussion had been amended by Article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, the Internal Control Law (Ley de Control Interno), as follows:</span><span>*</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">“Article 71.-Statute of limitations (Prescripción) for disciplinary liability. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">The administrative liability of the public official for</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">* </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the infractions set forth in this Law and in the superior oversight and control legal framework</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">, shall be time-barred (prescribirá) according to the following rules:</span><span>*</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall be time-barred in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act.</span><span>*</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as an act requiring an investigation or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—liability shall be time-barred in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is made known to the hierarch (jerarca) or the competent official to initiate the respective proceeding.</span><span>*</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding. </span><span>*</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">When the perpetrator of the fault is the hierarch, the period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body *</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">.</span><span>*</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">The failure of the competent official to initiate the sanctioning proceeding in a timely manner, or allowing the offender’s liability to become time-barred without justified cause, shall be deemed a serious fault.</span><span>*</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>*</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>*</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">From the highlighted text, it is inferred that the extended period provided for in that new text is applicable not only to officials of the “Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública)” but to any public official who incurs the infractions set forth in the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) and in the superior oversight and control legal framework—the Internal Control Law (Ley de Control Interno)—whose purpose was to establish a framework of minimum criteria to be observed by the Comptroller General of the Republic and the entities or bodies subject to its oversight, for the establishment, operation, maintenance, improvement, and evaluation of </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">internal control systems (sistemas de control interno)</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">, understood as the series of actions executed by the active administration, </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">designed to provide reasonable assurance in the achievement</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> of the following objectives: a) Protect and conserve public assets against any loss, waste, misuse, irregularity, or illegal act; b) require reliability and timeliness of information; c) guarantee efficiency and effectiveness of operations; d) comply with the legal and technical framework (Article 8 of the Internal Control Law). Therefore, the reasoning carried out by the ad quem is correct in its treatment of the nature of the faults for which the statute of limitations (prescripción) does not apply the period set forth in Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) but rather the period specially regulated by Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic. That is, the mere involvement of damages caused to assets or funds of a public nature does not per se entail, as the State’s representation seeks to assert, the application of that extended statute of limitations period. Moreover, it is incorrect to argue that the provision contained in Article 603 of the Labor Code is for relationships of a private nature. In accordance with Article 14 of that same regulatory body, its provisions are of public order and apply to all companies, operations, or establishments of whatever nature they may be, public or private. Consequently, the rules on statute of limitations also govern public sector institutions, unless there is an express provision to the contrary, as occurs with the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic—Article 71—for the infractions set forth in that Law and in the superior oversight and control legal framework, which is not the case for the plaintiff. The conduct attributed to the plaintiff, when his dismissal was ordered, was having altered the amount in colones and the quantity of fuel stated on two invoices submitted by him, in his name and with his signature, for reimbursement and settlement in his favor. Furthermore, as mentioned, there has been no discussion whatsoever that the plaintiff’s position is of the class Agricultural Technician B (Técnico Agropecuario B) in the Animal Health Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería); not related to the handling or administration of the public funds involved in the impropriety imputed to him; nor linked to the exercise of functions of the internal oversight and control system (sistema de control y fiscalización interna) of the office where he worked. On the other hand, the appellant’s argument to the effect that Article 99(c) of the Regulations of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil) provides for a one-month statute of limitations on the actions of ministers to initiate dismissal proceedings—a period that runs from when the facts became known to the hierarch (jerarca)—is also unacceptable to change what has been ordered. According to the admitted facts, the Minister of Agriculture and Livestock learned of the audit report on December 4, 2002, and the aforementioned hierarch did not file the dismissal proceeding before the Directorate General of the Civil Service (Dirección General del Servicio Civil) until May 11, 2005, whereby, also under the application of that other provision, the employer’s sanctioning power is time-barred (prescrita). Now, based on what has been stated in the preceding lines, to the effect that the statute of limitations period of the cited Article 71 is not applicable to the plaintiff, it is impossible to accept the appellant’s reasoning by which it seeks to apply that period—of five years—from the moment the minister learned of that report. Consequently, the defendant’s arguments for applying that special provision are unacceptable to vary what was sentenced by the court regarding that defense.</span><span>*</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">IV.- ON THE PRINCIPAL CLAIM FOR REINSTATEMENT WITH PAYMENT OF BACK PAY (SALARIOS CAÍDOS):</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> By upholding the defense raised by the plaintiff, the court deemed it improper to analyze the objections related to the merits of the case. Consequently, it denied the defense of lack of right and ordered the State to reinstate him in his job with recognition of the lost salaries. In relation to this specific topic of reinstatement, this Chamber, in a majority vote of its members, has repeatedly held that when the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power is declared, the dismissal carried out under such conditions becomes </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">improper (improcedente).</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> However, to uphold the claim for reinstatement, the motivating cause of the sanction must be examined, because if it is established that a serious fault by the employee existed, reinstatement would not be appropriate because it is not possible to oblige the Public Administration (understood in a broad sense) to readmit a person who violated the duties inherent to the employment contract, making the maintenance of the service relationship untenable. Thus, in Vote No. 218 of 9:45 a.m. on February 12, 2010, it was stated: “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">In the specific case, it was established that the cause for dismissal imputed to the plaintiff is not a mere unfounded assessment by the employer. Quite the contrary. It was based on a concrete fact that was deemed proven: a serious fault in attempting to remove various types of food from the Cartago Institutional Care Center in an official vehicle, which generated an objective loss of confidence. Hence, the administration could not be obliged, due to its untimely action in sanctioning the serious fault attributable to the worker, to reinstate him in his duties. It is necessary, therefore, to clarify that we are not in the scenario of an unjustified dismissal—due to the absence of a justifying cause—since the cause for dismissal did exist; nor are we before a null dismissal—because it is discriminatory or violates fundamental rights—but rather we are before an improper dismissal (despido improcedente) due to the elapsed statute of limitations. The doctrine indicates as effects of a null dismissal the immediate readmission of the worker and the payment of lost salaries. In our legal system, unlike other legislations (for example, the Spanish one, see Alonso Olea, Manuel [Name2]</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> , María Emilia. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Labor Law (Derecho del Trabajo)</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">. Madrid, Civitas Ediciones S.L., 20th ed., 2002, pp. 469-489), it is not established, once the impropriety of the challenged dismissal is declared in the jurisdictional venue, the possibility for the employer to choose between the reinstatement (readmission) of the worker to his employment (with payment of lost salaries) or the severance of the employment relationship (with payment of compensation). Our legislation does not distinguish between the consequences derived from a declaration of unjustified dismissal (Articles 28 and 29 in relation to Article 82, all of the Labor Code) and those originating from a judgment declaring the impropriety of a dismissal due to the statute of limitations of the disciplinary power—even if the fault alleged against the worker is proven—as occurs in the case at hand. We are also not in a case where: there is nullity of the administrative act of dismissal, due to the nonexistence of any of the essential elements of the act (motive, content, or purpose); where the plaintiff had no disciplinary liability for the imputed acts, as required by Article 211 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública); where the case file that would have allowed determining the existence of the disciplinary fault was not created—failing to comply with what is required by the cited Law regarding due process of law, Articles 215 to 229—, which is sanctioned by Article 219 of the same law, with the nullity of the proceedings; where the motive for the dismissal act was illegitimate or did not exist as stated when ordering the dismissal (Article 133 of that legal body); where the body that issued the act lacked competence to act in the specific case; where the content of the act, what it ultimately orders, declares, or commands, was not proportional to the purpose and corresponding to the motive (Article 132); where those constitutive elements of the act did not maintain proportionality and reasonableness, or where there was an excess of power as the motive and content did not conform to the purpose (see [Name3] , , 2002. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Treatise on Administrative Law (Tratado de Derecho Administrativo)</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">. San José, Costa Rica. Biblioteca Jurídica Diké. [Name4]*,); and, in general, where the administrative act of dismissal does not substantially conform to the legal system, particularly regarding the motive, for its emergence into legal effect, as required, for its validity, by Article 128 of the cited General Law of Public Administration. Thus, this Chamber has maintained the criterion that in cases where the fault imputed to the worker is proven, as happens in the present matter, reinstatement is not appropriate despite the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the employer's sanctioning power having taken effect. On this topic, it has been stated: “The right to reinstatement, when it exists, functions as a guarantee for the worker to remain in the work activity, provided that he complies with the duties and obligations inherent to the contract, and not despite any conduct—serious fault—as occurred in the sub lite, all of this regardless of whether the disciplinary power was exercised untimely or not” (Judgment No. 99, of 9:00 a.m., on April 16, 1998. In the same sense, see Nos. 194, of 9:00 a.m., on October 3, 1984; 81, of 3:20 p.m., on June 13, 1990; 150, of 3:10 p.m., on June 2 and 176, of 2:30 p.m., on June 30, both of 1999; 217, of 10:20 a.m., on April 18, 2001; and 47, of 10:00 a.m., on January 26, 2007; all from this Chamber). In this manner, reinstatement is proper to grant, in a case like the one under study, only on the assumption that the dismissal sanction was unjustified; that is, when there are no serious, reliable, and justified reasons for the dismissal; whereby the administrative act that declared it lacks a motive. In other words, ‘reinstatement presupposes the existence of an employment relationship in accordance with the basic ethical principles that characterize it, since reinstatement is inspired by the worker's right to tenure (inamovilidad), which, when it exists, is a guarantee for the employee to remain in the work activity provided that he complies with those basic principles, and not to do so despite any conduct, because in that way the advisability of employers being able to dismiss those workers who have committed serious faults and who do not deserve confidence is severely affected’ (Judgment of this Chamber No. 152, of 3:20 p.m., on September 20, 1989).” (In this sense, Judgment No. 314 of 10:10 a.m. on March 30, 2012). </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">In the case now before us, according to the physical administrative case file (expediente administrativo) provided to the record, the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal de Servicio Civil), in declaring the dismissal proceeding filed by the Minister of Agriculture and Livestock admissible, deemed it proven: “B) That the Head of the Department of National Zoosanitary Services requested the reimbursement of several invoices for fuel consumption, among which are numbers 005498, of November 2, 2001, in the amount of ¢5,500.00, for 24 liters of diesel for the official vehicle with plates [Placa1]; and No. 79576, of November 19, 2001, for the sum of ¢5,000.00, for 34.10 liters of gasoline, for the official vehicle with plates [Placa1], both in the name and with the signature of the employee [Nombre5]. . … C) That in the stub of invoice No. 005498 of November 2, 2001, kept by the service center Bomba Santa María, it is indicated that the invoiced amount is for ¢1,500.00, and that it corresponds to 11 liters of diesel… d) That the price of diesel, at the time invoice No. 005498 was issued, was ¢135.70 per liter, and that of regular gasoline, ¢146.62 per liter, at the time invoice No. 79576 was issued, whereby the amounts to be reimbursed and indicated on those invoices are higher than what actually corresponded, assuming the quantity of liters of fuel was that indicated in said documents (folio 45). Specifically, that court concluded:</span><span>*</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">“There is no doubt that the invoices under discussion present serious and evident irregularities, some of them detectable at a glance, as is the case of the alteration of the numbers of the amount in colones indicated in both documents. This means that the employee [Nombre5]. . could not have been unaware of such irregularities and the least he could have done was report the case to his superiors, but he remained silent, and neither does he refer to it nor provide explanations regarding these irregularities in the process and content of said invoices in his defense statement; he simply limits himself to saying that he collaborated with other colleagues in the processing of these invoices. The respondent alleges that there is no proof that he altered any document and that the Internal Audit report does not involve him in those events. Such an argument lacks merit, since this Tribunal understands that, in this case, it is not a matter of proving, in this administrative venue, whether or not the plaintiff altered a document; the issue is that the employee [Nombre6]</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">used documents—invoices for reimbursement—with evident alterations, to gain a personal benefit, obtained under totally anomalous conditions, such as the refund of a sum of money, originating from public funds, that did not truly correspond. The respondent did not notice that the invoices under discussion had another number superimposed on the figure for the amount in colones to make it larger, nor that the superimposed sum of money did not coincide with the quantity of liters of fuel allocated, according to the price that both diesel and regular gasoline had at that time. Nor does the respondent inform about the colleague for whom he would allegedly be doing the favor of receiving and processing these invoices, if that were the case, since before the Internal Audit, the respondent stated that: ‘</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">The data written on the back of said invoice is indeed in my own handwriting, since I often signed invoices for my colleagues which came without the required information from them, in order to expedite the process for the respective settlement</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">.’ Folio 36 of the proceeding file. As observed, the employee Q.V. acknowledges that he had to review the information contained in the invoices being processed for reimbursement, which is logical, as they are documents for the settlement or refund of monies from public funds. Consequently, this Tribunal considers that the conduct of the employee [Nombre6]</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">was improper, in that he uses, for his own benefit, the conditions of his position to request reimbursement for some invoices that are evidently altered with amounts in colones higher than those that truly correspond” (folios 148 to 154 of the administrative case file).</span><span>*</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>*</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>*</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">In the complaint, the plaintiff criticized the substance of the employer’s decision, considering it inconsistent with the proven facts; because within the administrative proceeding it was not proven with sufficient certainty that he was responsible for the acts alleged, nor that he had been the one who altered the invoices or had obtained any economic benefit from the alleged alteration, further pointing out that those invoices were also in the hands of other persons and he was not the only one responsible for the vehicle to which the fuel was supplied. As the legal representative of the State correctly noted, when providing the answer to the complaint—folio 106—, the fact that the cited invoices did not correspond to the reality of what happened is an aspect that is not questioned; that is, the plaintiff did not object that the invoices submitted to the Financial Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, for their corresponding settlement and reimbursement of the amount paid, contained alterations. It was proven that for this process, the official who settled and sought the refund of the amount paid had to write, on the back of the invoice, the vehicle's plate number, his name, his identification number (cédula), and his signature, with the approval (visto bueno) of the immediate superior (see folios 144 and following of the administrative case file). At folios 119 and 120 of the provided physical administrative case file, there is a copy of those invoices numbers 005498 and 79576, both with the name “[Nombre7] ”; the identification number “CED1” and two signatures. The plaintiff has at no time denied the authorship of that information; that is, of having been the person who wrote his name, identification number, and the signature that appears on said invoices, for their reimbursement. On the contrary, indeed, in the investigation carried out by the institution’s Internal Audit, he expressly admitted to having written that information on the back of those invoices (see folios 32 and 33 of the physical administrative case file). In his defense submission, in the administrative venue, what he refuted was that the audit report aimed to determine the origin of the questioned system, investigate the procedure implemented in the Administrative Unit to exercise controls over said system, and determine the name of the officials who used vehicles with plates [Placa2] and [Placa3], on October 1; November 2 and 19, all of 2001, as well as the consumption recorded for said vehicles and the veracity of the data stated on commercial invoices numbers 005498, 79576, and 214119. He expressly denied being responsible for having implemented the system for reimbursement of fuel amounts because he does not hold any supervisory position, nor is he the one who approves the invoices submitted for collection, nor is he the one who carries out the payment process. He noted that his action was simply limited to </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">collaborating, as is the custom, by requesting the reimbursement process, sometimes for invoices paid by oneself and on other occasions, for invoices paid by other colleagues. In this sense, it is worth remembering that, because we often have to take field trips (giras) to areas far from the Animal Health office in Cartago, the custom was to request the reimbursement process for invoices paid by other colleagues who were at the office located in Cartago or near it, in order to expedite the payment to colleagues who were on field trips away from the central plateau… </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">(see folio 75 of the administrative case file), whereby the plaintiff ended up pointing out that “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">... there is no element that leads to the conclusion that the undersigned is responsible for the alleged events.” </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">As is clearly observed, the plaintiff’s defense was based on the idea that the invoices under discussion could have belonged to other colleagues because there was a custom of processing that third-party procedure as a favor. However, he did not prove that argument nor did he provide any other sufficient evidence to refute the fact that those invoices were signed and assumed by him, for their settlement, as the beneficiary of that process. That is, if the plaintiff submitted those invoices with his personal data to the employer's offices, in order to obtain the reimbursement of the amount of said invoices, it is because the premise is that the amount indicated on those invoices was paid by him and must be reimbursed to him. Therefore, if those invoices actually corresponded to other work colleagues, there is no doubt that the plaintiff was fully capable of indicating the identity of those persons, so that he could be exempted from liability for the verified alteration. By not doing so, it is logical and reasonable to dismiss that defense and conclude that the plaintiff was responsible for managing the collection of altered invoices, an action that, moreover, would evidently benefit only him, as the signatory of the mentioned invoices. Furthermore, the possibility that other colleagues could have been responsible for the alteration of those documents was not even raised when responding to the dismissal proceeding. For that reason, the decision to dismiss him could in no way have been flawed if it did not consider that argument. On the other hand, the case file also contains no elements that reasonably allow admitting that the alteration of the documents was carried out by other officials, after the documentation was submitted by the plaintiff. Firstly, because the participation of those other officials was due to the need for the approval (visto bueno) that the superior had to give so that the holder of the invoice could make the reimbursement effective; and also because that reimbursement, whose recipient was solely the official who submitted the invoice as the payer of the amount stated on the document, would generate no personal benefit for them. At this point, the undeniable economic benefit that this alteration would yield for the plaintiff must be highlighted, since the amount to be received would have been, at least in one of the invoices, much higher than what was actually paid for the service. Indeed, this Chamber has no doubt that, at least in invoice number 005498, the original amount was one thousand five hundred colones (¢1,500.00) for 11 liters of diesel, and it was altered to unduly obtain the collection of five thousand five hundred colones (¢5,500.00). Finally, it is worth noting that in the first instance, the judge found the plaintiff’s dismissal justified, considering that there was sufficient merit for that decision, since the invoices submitted for collection did not correspond to the reality of what happened, and the plaintiff’s name, as well as his identification number and his signature, appear on the back of them, data with which the Administration deemed it proven that he was the one who bought the fuel with his own money and, consequently, is the creditor and the person to whom the money would be reimbursed (folios 339 and 340). Faced with such a conclusion, in the appeal (folios 350 and 351), the plaintiff’s attorney only protested that the defendant did not prove the plaintiff’s true responsibility in the imputed events; did not prove with the required certainty the existence of the alleged fault committed; it was not proven who was truly responsible for those alterations; nor who obtained economic benefit from that alleged alteration; arguments that, given what has been said, have been refuted. In conclusion, the plaintiff was unable to refute that he petitioned the defendant’s administration for the reimbursement of invoices for the purchase of fuel with altered data, an alteration for which he was unable to give a reasonable justification as the person responsible when signing those documents for their collection, and therefore the dismissal decision must be considered justified due to loss of confidence in the official. The State, as a public entity, requires having persons of irreproachable conduct, not only because the object of its administration is public assets, which are of interest to and belong to the community, but also because oversight is made difficult by the large number of persons in its service, the system for structuring functions and responsibilities, and the breadth of its assets. Therefore, although confidence is a transcendental element in every employment relationship, its appraisal is more rigorous in public employment relationships.

In the case under study, it is evident that the system employed by the defendant for fueling its vehicles operated on a basis of trust: the employee paid the invoice and the amount was reimbursed to him through the process of submitting said invoices, the data from which serve for the respective settlement. If that is the system under which the defendant operates, it is impossible to demand that, once the plaintiff's improper management was verified, it keep him in his job, because, from that moment on, it could no longer trust the veracity of the data recorded on the fuel purchase invoices that he submitted for settlement. Moreover, by said conduct, the plaintiff showed disregard for the employer's interests, with which the trust that might be required in other areas of their relationship was also broken. Thus, the impossibility of continuing the employment relationship resulted solely from the actions committed by the plaintiff himself, from which the loss of the employer's trust derived. Given the loss of a fundamental and unavoidable element of the employment contract, ordering the reinstatement of the employee to his job is not appropriate because that would compel the employer to recompose an employment relationship mutilated of the subjective aspect on which it subsists. The principle of employment stability does not extend to those who commit infractions that demonstrate their unsuitability for the position. That principle was constitutionally established as a guarantee of protection from removal, that is, once appointed to a public office, the person may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal set forth in labor legislation, or in the case of a forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof (Constitutional Article 192). Now then, that same constitutional provision upholds, as a principle, appointment to the position based on <span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">proven suitability (idoneidad comprobada)</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">, for which the Civil Service Statute that regulates the relations in force at the Ministry where the plaintiff worked establishes a specific procedure to that end. Article 20 of that regulation states, among other requirements, that to enter the Civil Service one must possess the moral and physical aptitude appropriate for performing the duties of the position, which shall be verified through information on life and habits and certifications issued by the Judicial Registry of Delinquents, the National Archive, the Investigation Bureau, and the respective Department of the Ministry of Health; in addition to demonstrating suitability by undergoing the tests, examinations, or competitions contemplated in that law and its regulations. In the sphere of employment relations subject to Private Law, the effect of the statute of limitations on the disciplinary power becomes the employer's obligation to compensate the worker with the benefits corresponding to a dismissal considered illegal. No provision obliges the employer to reinstate to their position a person in whom, for example, they no longer have trust, a fundamental element for the existence of this type of relationship. In the field of public employment relations, the guarantee of stability presupposes, as stated, that the person remains in their position because they were appointed based on a procedure through which their suitability was guaranteed. However, if the administration manages to verify that the person has ceased to be suitable because they committed a serious fault that empowers their dismissal, this implies that the foundation of stability has been undermined and, for that same reason, ordering reinstatement as a consequence of the statute of limitations would be contradictory. That is, if the person has ceased to be suitable for the position, by having committed a serious fault against their employer, there is no basis to apply the principle of stability to order reinstatement. In the sub examine, if it is proven that the plaintiff committed a serious fault, an exception by which the constitution itself exempts from stability, the consequence of the statute of limitations on the employer's disciplinary power can never be reinstatement with all its consequences - back pay (salarios caídos), year-end bonuses (aguinaldos), and school bonuses (salarios escolares) - due to the objective demonstration of the cause for dismissal. Instead, in accordance with the provision contained in Constitutional numeral 63, developed by the Labor Code, in its articles 28 and 29, the defendant must be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount owed to him for advance notice (preaviso) and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), the settlement of which shall be carried out in the judgment enforcement stage.</span><span>" * </span><span>&#xa0;</span>

“III.- DE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN DE LA POTESTAD DISCIPLINARIA: Vistos los agravios planteados en el recurso la Sala concluye que la solución dada por el tribunal, a la defensa de prescripción alegada por la parte actora, es correcta. No es cierto el argumento del recurrente en el sentido de que al estar vinculado el uso indebido de fondos públicos, a la falta del actor se le aplica el plazo de prescripción previsto por la norma especial del artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. El texto de esa norma, vigente al momento cuando ocurrieron los hechos sancionados, es decir, en el mes de noviembre de 2001, establecía:* “La responsabilidad disciplinaria del servidor de la Hacienda Pública, prescribirá en el plazo de dos años, contados a partir del conocimiento comprobado de la falta por * * parte del órgano competente, para iniciar el respectivo procedimiento sancionatorio. Para estos efectos, quedan reformados, respecto de los funcionarios o de los servidores públicos, el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, y cualesquiera otras disposiciones jurídicas que se le opongan”. * * * Sobre los alcances de dicha norma, la Sala Constitucional en el voto n° 6750 de las 11:12 horas del 17 de octubre de 1997 señaló: “En efecto, considera esta Sala que si bien el artículo 8 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría define la “Hacienda Pública”, como “...la organización formada por los entes y órganos públicos, incluyendo los no estatales, propietarios o encargados, por cualquier título, de la administración del patrimonio público”, y que éste último es “...la universalidad constituida por los fondos públicos, y por los pasivos a cargo de la Hacienda Pública”, tales conceptos deben entenderse y aplicarse con relación a lo que constituye el objetivo principal de la Ley, vale decir, el establecimiento de la esfera de competencia de la Contraloría. Sin embargo, cuando se trata de temas ajenos en general a dicho órgano tal y como es el caso del artículo 71 cuestionado, lo cierto es que la interpretación del concepto de servidor de la hacienda pública debe restringirse a aquel que tiene a su cargo el manejo de fondos públicos. Para la Sala, esta interpretación es necesaria, pues solo de esa forma resulta justificada y explicable la diferencia de los plazos de prescripción para la aplicación de sanciones disciplinarias. Dicho de otra forma, el plazo de dos años establecido en el artículo cuestionado resulta constitucionalmente adecuado solo si se entiende que con él se pretende posibilitar al Estado un control mayor sobre sus funciones que están directamente relacionados con el manejo y disposición de los fondos públicos, ello por indudable relevancia del tema y la gran necesidad de asegurar el manejo más sano y limpio posible de los fondos públicos”; es decir, que al analizar la constitucionalidad de esta norma, la Sala Constitucional concluyó en la no aplicación generalizada, de ese plazo de prescripción, para todos los servidores del sector público; y que la expresión “servidor de la Hacienda Pública” debía entenderse como el servidor encargado del manejo y la disposición de fondos públicos, siendo que solo a estos les resultaba aplicable el plazo previsto en aquella norma. El actor era funcionario del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería destacado en la Unidad de Salud Animal donde ocupa un puesto clase Técnico Agropecuario B. Sobre sus funciones, dijo el testigo [Nombre1] , en sede administrativa: “El está contratado como Técnico agropecuario, y estos ejercen funciones de auxiliares de los médicos veterinarios en las labores de toma, en vía o (sic) o de muestras a laboratorios, vacunación de animales, cobros de servicios, y están obligados a conducir vehículos y se apoya la gestión administrativa, sobre todo en las regiones en donde no hay este tipo de funcionarios” (folio 109 del expediente administrativos). Además, no se ha demostrado que dentro de ese puesto estuviera directamente relacionado con el manejo o administración de fondos públicos. En consecuencia, no le resultaba aplicable esa disposición. Ahora bien. El informe de Auditoria que permitió tener un conocimiento comprobado de la falta es de fecha 4 de diciembre de 2002, momento para el cual la norma de comentario había sido reformada por el artículo 45 de la Ley n° 8292 de 31 de julio de 2002, Ley de Control Interno, en estos términos:* “Artículo 71.-Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las* infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas:* a) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho.* b) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea notorio -entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad- la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo.* La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo. * Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo * .* Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar que la responsabilidad del infractor prescriba, sin causa justificada.* * * Del texto resaltado se extrae que el plazo ampliado previsto en ese nuevo texto resulta de aplicación ya no solo a los funcionarios de la “Hacienda Pública” sino a toda persona funcionaria pública que incurra en las infracciones previstas en la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores -Ley de Control Interno- cuyo objetivo fue fijar un marco de criterios mínimos que deberán observar la Contraloría General de la República y los entes u órganos sujetos a su fiscalización, para el establecimiento, funcionamiento, mantenimiento, perfeccionamiento y evaluación de sistemas de control interno, entendido como la serie de acciones ejecutadas por la administración activa, diseñadas para proporcionar seguridad en la consecución de los siguientes objetivos: a) Proteger y conservar el patrimonio público contra cualquier pérdida, despilfarro, uso indebido, irregularidad o acto ilegal; b) exigir confiabilidad y oportunidad de la información; c) garantizar eficiencia y eficacia de las operaciones; d) cumplir con el ordenamiento jurídico y técnico (artículo 8° de la Ley de Control Interno). De manera que el razonamiento realizado por el ad quem es acertado en el tratamiento que realiza de la naturaleza de las faltas para cuya prescripción no aplica el plazo dispuesto por el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo sino el especialmente regulado por el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. Es decir, que el solo involucramiento de perjuicios generados a bienes o fondos de naturaleza pública no implica per se, tal y como lo pretende hacer valer la representación del Estado, la aplicación de aquel plazo ampliado, de prescripción. Además, resulta incorrecto argumentar que la disposición contenida en el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo es para relaciones de naturaleza privada. De conformidad con el numeral 14 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, sus disposiciones son de orden público y a ellas están sujetas todas las empresas, explotaciones o establecimientos de cualquier naturaleza que sean, públicos o privados. En consecuencia, las reglas sobre prescripción también rigen en las instituciones del sector público, salvo norma expresa en contrario, como sucede con la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República -artículo 71- para las infracciones previstas en esa Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, lo que no es el caso del actor. La conducta endilgada al actor, al ordenarse su despido, fue haber alterado el monto en colones y la cantidad de combustible consignados en dos facturas presentadas por él, a su nombre y con su firma, para el reembolso y la liquidación en su favor. Además, tal y como se mencionó, no ha existido discusión alguna en cuanto a que el puesto del actor es de clase Técnico Agropecuario B en la Unidad de Salud Animal del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería; no relacionado con el manejo o administración de los fondos públicos involucrados en la incorrección que se le imputa; ni tampoco vinculado con el ejercicio de funciones del sistema de control y fiscalización interna del despacho donde laboraba. Por otra parte, el argumento del recurrente en el sentido de que el artículo 99 inciso c) del Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil señala la prescripción de un mes, de las acciones de los ministros para iniciar la gestión de despido -plazo que corre desde que los hechos fueron conocidos por el jerarca- tampoco es de recibo para cambiar lo que viene dispuesto. De acuerdo con los hechos admitidos, el Ministro de Agricultura y Ganadería conoció del informe de Auditoría el 4 de diciembre de 2002 y el citado jerarca no presentó la gestión de despido, ante la Dirección General del Servicio Civil, sino hasta el 11 de mayo de 2005, con lo cual, también en aplicación de esa otra disposición se encuentra prescrita la potestad sancionatoria patronal. Ahora bien, por lo dicho en las líneas precedentes, en el sentido de que al actor no le es aplicable el plazo prescriptivo del numeral 71 citado, es imposible acceder al razonamiento del recurrente con el cual pretende que se aplique ese plazo -de cinco años- a partir del momento cuando el ministro tuvo conocimiento de ese informe. En consecuencia, los argumentos del demandado para que se aplique esa disposición especial no son de recibo para variar lo sentenciado por el tribunal en cuanto a esa defensa.* IV.- SOBRE LA PRETENSIÓN PRINCIPAL DE REINSTALACIÓN CON PAGO DE SALARIOS CAÍDOS: Al acoger la defensa opuesta por el actor, el tribunal estimó improcedente entrar a analizar los reproches relacionados con el fondo del asunto. En consecuencia, denegó la defensa de falta de derecho y condenó al Estado a reinstalarlo en su puesto de trabajo con el reconocimiento de los salarios dejados de percibir. En relación con este concreto tema de la reinstalción, de manera reiterada esta Sala, en voto de mayoría de sus integrantes ha resuelto que cuando se declare la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria, el despido efectuado en esas condiciones deviene en improcedente. Sin embargo, para acoger la pretensión de reinstalación debe examinarse la causa motivadora de la sanción, porque de establecerse que existió falta grave del servidor o servidora, la reinstalación no resultaría procedente porque no es posible obligar a la Administración Pública (entendida en sentido amplio) a readmitir a una persona que transgredió los deberes inherentes al contrato de trabajo tornando insostenible el mantenimiento de la relación de servicio. Así en el voto n°* 218 de las* 9:45 horas del 12 de febrero de 2010, se dijo: “En el caso concreto, quedó establecido, que la causal de despido que se le imputó al actor no es una mera apreciación del empleador sin fundamento alguno. Todo lo contrario. Se basó en un hecho concreto que se tuvo por demostrado: una falta grave al intentar sacar en un vehículo oficial, del Centro de Atención Institucional de Cartago, alimentos de distinto tipo, lo que generó una pérdida objetiva de confianza. De ahí que no podría obligarse a la administración en razón de su actuación extemporánea en sancionar la falta grave imputable al trabajador, a reinstalarlo en sus labores. Es necesario entonces aclarar que no nos encontramos en la hipótesis de un despido injustificado -por inexistencia de causa justificante-, pues sí existió la causal de despido; tampoco ante un despido nulo -por discriminatorio o violatorio de derechos fundamentales-, sino que nos encontramos ante un despido improcedente en razón de la prescripción corrida. La doctrina señala como efectos del despido nulo la readmisión del trabajador de manera inmediata y el pago de los salarios dejados de percibir. En nuestro medio, a diferencia de otras legislaciones (por ejemplo la española, puede verse a Alonso Olea, Manuel [Nombre2] , María Emilia. Derecho del Trabajo. Madrid, Civitas Ediciones S.L., vigésima ed., 2002, pp. 469-489), no se establece, declarada la improcedencia del despido impugnado en la vía jurisdiccional, la posibilidad de que el empleador opte por la reinstalación (readmisión) del trabajador a su empleo (con abono de los salarios dejados de percibir) o la ruptura del vínculo laboral (con abono de una indemnización). Nuestra legislación no hace distinción de las consecuencias derivadas de una declaratoria de despido injustificado (artículos 28 y 29 en relación con el 82, todos del Código de Trabajo) y las originadas en una sentencia que declara la improcedencia de un despido en razón de la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria -aunque se demuestre la falta que se acusa al trabajador-, como ocurre en el caso que nos ocupa. Tampoco nos encontramos en un caso en que: exista nulidad del acto administrativo de despido, por inexistencia de alguno de los elementos esenciales del acto (motivo, contenido o fin); que no existiera responsabilidad disciplinaria del actor en los hechos imputados, según lo exige el artículo 211 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública-; que no se hubiera formado el expediente que permitiera determinar la existencia de la falta disciplinaria -incumpliendo lo exigido por la citada Ley en cuanto a un debido proceso legal, numerales 215 a 229-, lo que es sancionado por el numeral 219 de la misma ley, con la nulidad de lo actuado; que el motivo del acto de despido fuere ilegítimo o no existiera como se indicó al dictar el despido (ordinal 133 de ese cuerpo legal); que el órgano que emitió el acto, careciera de competencia para su actuación en el caso concreto; que el contenido del acto, lo que finalmente dispone, declara u ordena, no fuera proporcional al fin y correspondiente al motivo (numeral 132); que aquellos elementos constitutivos del acto no guardaran proporcionalidad y razonabilidad o que existiera exceso de poder al no ajustarse el motivo y el contenido al fin (puede verse a [Nombre3] , , 2002. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. San José, Costa Rica. Biblioteca Jurídica Diké. [Nombre4]*,); y, en general, que el acto administrativo de despido no guarde conformidad sustancial con el ordenamiento jurídico, particularmente en cuanto al motivo, para su surgimiento a la vida jurídica, como lo exige, para su validez, el artículo 128 de la citada Ley General de Administración Pública. Así las cosas, esta Sala ha sostenido el criterio de que en los casos en que se acredita la falta imputada al trabajador, tal y como sucede en el presente asunto, no procede la reinstalación pese a haber operado la prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria del empleador. Sobre este tema se ha dicho que “El derecho de reinstalación, cuando existe, funciona como garantía para el trabajador, de mantenerse en la actividad laboral, siempre y cuando cumpla con los deberes y obligaciones propias del contrato y no a pesar de cualquier conducta -falta grave- como sucedió en el sub lite, todo ello, independientemente de que la potestad disciplinaria sea ejercida extemporáneamente o no” (sentencia número 99, de las 9:00 horas, del 16 de abril de 1998. En igual sentido pueden verse, las números 194, de las 9:00 horas, del 3 de octubre de 1984; 81, de las 15:20 horas, del 13 de junio de 1990; 150, de las 15:10 horas, del 2 y 176, de las 14:30 horas, del 30, ambas de junio de 1999; 217, de las 10:20 horas, del 18 de abril de 2001; y, 47, de las 10:00 horas, del 26 de enero de 2007; todas de esta Sala). De esta manera, la reinstalación procede concederla, en un caso como el de estudio, sólo en el supuesto de que la sanción de despido hubiese sido injustificada; es decir, cuando no existan motivos graves, fehacientes y justificados para el despido; con lo cual el acto administrativo que lo declaró carezca de motivo. En otras palabras “la reinstalación supone la existencia de una relación laboral acorde a los principios éticos básicos que la caracterizan, ya que la reinstalación se inspira en el derecho a la inamovilidad del trabajador, el cual, cuando existe, es una garantía para el empleado de mantenerse en la actividad laboral siempre y cuando cumpla con aquellos principios básicos y no para hacerlo a pesar de cualquier conducta, porque de ese modo se afecta gravemente la conveniencia de que los patronos puedan prescindir de aquellos trabajadores que han cometido faltas graves y que no merecen confianza” (sentencia de esta Sala número 152, de las 15:20 horas, del 20 de setiembre de 1989)”. (En este sentido la sentencia n° 314 de 10:10 horas de 30 de marzo de 2012). En el caso que ahora nos ocupa, de acuerdo con el expediente administrativo físico aportado a los autos se tiene que el Tribunal de Servicio Civil, al declarar con lugar la gestión de despido planteada por el Ministro de Agricultura y Ganadería tuvo por demostrado: “B) Que la Jefatura del Departamento de Servicios Zoosanitarios Nacionales solicitó el reembolso de varias facturas por consumo de combustible, entre las que se encuentran las números 005498, del 2 de noviembre de 2001, cuyo monto es de ¢5.500,00, por 24 litros de diesel para el vehículo oficial placas [Placa1]; y la n° 79576, del 19 de noviembre de 2001, por la suma de ¢5.000,00, por 34.10 litros de gasolina, para el vehículo oficial placas [Placa1], ambas a nombre y con la firma del servidor [Nombre5]. . … C) Que en el talonario de la factura n° 005498 del 2 de noviembre de 2001, que lleva el centro de servicios Bomba Santa María se indica que el monto facturado es por ¢1.500,00, y que corresponde a 11 litros de diesel… d) Que el precio de diesel, al momento de emitirse la factura n° 005498, era de ¢135.70 por litro, y el de gasolina regular de ¢146.62 por litro, al momento de emitirse la factura n° 79576, por la que los montos por reembolsar e indicados en dichas facturas es superior al que realmente correspondía, en caso de que la cantidad de litros de combustible fuera el que se indica en dichos documentos (folio 45). De manera concreta, ese tribunal concluyó:* “No cabe duda de que las facturas de comentario presentan serias y evidentes irregularidades, detectables a simple vista, algunas de ellas, como es el caso de la alteración de los números de la cantidad en colones señalada en ambos documentos. Eso significa que el servidor [Nombre5]. . no debió ignorar tales irregularidades y lo menos que pudo haber hecho era denunciar el caso a sus superiores, pero se quedó callado, y tampoco en el descargo de la demanda hace referencia, ni da explicaciones sobre esas irregularidades en el trámite y contenido de dichas facturas; sencillamente se limita a decir que él colaboraba con otros compañeros en el trámite de éstas. Alega el recurrido que no existe prueba de que él haya alterado documento alguno y que el informe de la Auditoría Interna no lo involucra en esos hechos. Tal alegato carece de fundamento, pues entiende este Tribunal que, en la especie, no se trata de demostrar, en esta sede administrativa, si el accionante alteró o no un documento, el asunto es que el servidor [Nombre6] utilizara documentos -facturas para reembolso- con evidentes alteraciones, para adquirir un beneficio personal, y obtenido en condiciones totalmente anómalas, como es el reintegro de una suma de dinero, proveniente de fondos públicos, que realmente no correspondía. No reparó el recurrido que las facturas de comentario tenían superpuesto otro número en la cifra de cantidad en colones para hacerla mayor, ni que la suma de dinero superpuesta no coincidía con la cantidad de litros de combustible asignado, de acuerdo con el precio que en ese momento tenían, tanto el diesel como la gasolina regular. Tampoco informa el accionado sobre el compañero al que le estaría haciendo el favor de recibirle y tramitarle esas facturas, si se tratara de ese supuesto, pues ante la Auditoría Interna el recurrido indicó que: “Los datos consignados en el reverso de dicha factura, sí son de mi puño y letra, pues muchas veces firmé facturas de mis compañeros las cuales venían sin la información requerida de ellos, con el fin de agilizar los trámites para la liquidación respectiva”. Folio 36 del expediente de la gestión. Como se observa, el servidor Q.V. reconoce que debía revisar la información contenida en las facturas en trámite para reembolso, lo que es lógico, por tratarse de documentos de liquidación o reintegro de dineros provenientes de fondos públicos. Consecuentemente, estima este Tribunal que el proceder del servidor [Nombre6] fue incorrecto, por cuanto utiliza, en beneficio propio, las condiciones de su cargo para solicitar un reembolso de unas facturas evidentemente alteradas con montos en colones superiores a los que realmente corresponden” (folios 148 al 154 del expediente administrativo).* * * En la demanda el actor criticó el fondo de la decisión patronal por considerarla incongruente respecto de los hechos demostrados; porque dentro del procedimiento administrativo no se acreditó con suficiente certeza que él fuera el responsable de los hechos acusados, ni que él hubiese sido quien alteró las facturas o hubiese tenido algún beneficio económico de la supuesta alteración, señalando además que esas facturas también estuvieron en manos de otras personas y él no era el único responsable del vehículo al cual se le suministró el combustible. Como bien advirtió el representante legal del Estado, al brindar la contestación a la demanda -folio 106-, el que las citadas facturas no respondían a la realidad de lo acontecido es un aspecto que no se cuestiona, es decir, el actor no objetó que las facturas presentadas ante el Departamento Financiero del Ministerio de Agricultura, para su correspondiente liquidación y reembolso de lo pagado, contenían alteraciones. Se acreditó que para dicho trámite, el funcionario que liquidaba y pretendía el reintegro de lo pagado debía consignar, al dorso de la factura, el número de placa del vehículo, su nombre, cédula y firma, con el visto bueno del superior inmediato (ver folios 144 y siguientes del expediente administrativo). A folio 119 y 120 del expediente administrativo físico aportado, consta la copia de esas facturas números 005498 y 79576, ambas con el nombre “[Nombre7] ”; el número de cédula “CED1” y dos firmas. El actor, en ningún momento ha rechazado la autoría de esos datos, es decir, de haber sido la persona que estampó su nombre, cédula y la firma que aparece en dichas facturas, para su reintegro. Por el contrario, efectivamente, en la investigación realizada por la Auditoría Interna de la institución expresamente, reconoció haber consignado esos datos, en el reverso de dichas facturas (ver folios 32 y 33 del expediente administrativo físico). En el escrito de descargo, en sede administrativa, lo que refutó fue que el informe de Auditoría tenía como objetivo determinar el origen del sistema cuestionado, investigar el procedimiento implementado en la Unidad Administrativa para ejercer controles sobre dicho sistema y determinar el nombre de los funcionarios que utilizaron los vehículos placa [Placa2] y [Placa3], en los días 1° de octubre; 2 y 19 de noviembre, todos del año 2001, así como el consumo registrado para dichos vehículos y la veracidad de los datos consignados en las facturas comerciales números 005498, 79576 y 214119. De manera expresa rechazó ser el responsable de haber implementado el sistema de reembolso de los montos de combustible debido a que no tiene ningún puesto de jefatura, ni es él quien da los vistos buenos a las facturas que se presentan para su cobro, ni es el que realiza el trámite de pago. Apuntó que su actuación simplemente se limitó a colaborar tal y como se acostumbra, de solicitar el trámite de reembolso, algunas veces por facturas pagadas por uno mismo y en otras ocasiones, por facturas canceladas por otros compañeros. En este sentido vale la pena recordar, que debido a que muchas veces nos toca realizar giras por zonas alejadas de la oficina de Salud Animal, oficina de Cartago, la costumbre era solicitar el trámite de reembolso de facturas canceladas por medio de otros compañeros que se encontraban en la oficina ubicada en Cartago o cerca de ella, con el fin de agilizar el pago a los compañeros que se encontraban de giras fuera de la meseta central… (ver folio 75 del expediente administrativo), con lo cual el actor terminó señalando que “... no existe ningún elemento que haga concluir que el suscrito es el responsable de los hechos acusados”. Como claramente se advierte, la defensa del actor se sustentó en que las facturas de comentario pudieron corresponder a otros compañeros porque existía la costumbre de hacer ese trámite ajeno, como un favor. Sin embargo, no demostró ese argumento ni aportó alguna otra prueba suficiente para rebatir el hecho de que esas facturas fueron firmadas y asumidas por él, para su liquidación, como beneficiario de ese trámite. Es decir, si el actor presentó esas facturas con sus datos personales ante instancias patronales, con el fin de lograr el reembolso del monto de dichas facturas, es porque se parte de que el monto indicado en esas facturas fue pagado por él y se le debe rembolsar. Por eso, si esas facturas correspondían en realidad a otros compañeros de labores, no cabe duda que el actor estuvo en plena posibilidad de indicar la identidad de esas personas, a fin de que se le eximiera de responsabilidad por la alteración constatada. Al no hacerlo, lo lógico y razonable es desestimar esa defensa y concluir que el actor fue el responsable de gestionar el cobro de facturas alteradas, acción que por lo demás, evidentemente solo a él beneficiaría, como suscribiente de las mencionadas facturas. Además, la posibilidad de que otros compañeros hubiesen podido ser los responsables de la alteración de esos documentos ni siquiera la planteó al responder la gestión de despido. Por eso, la decisión de su despido en modo alguno pudo estar viciada si no consideró ese argumento. Por otra parte, en el expediente tampoco existen elementos que razonablemente posibiliten admitir que la alteración de los documentos la hubieran realizado otros funcionarios, luego de la entrega de la documentación, por parte del actor. En primer lugar, porque la participación de esos otros funcionarios obedecía a la necesidad del visto bueno que debía dar el superior para que el titular de la factura pudiera hacer efectivo el reembolso; y porque además, ningún beneficio personal generaría para ellos, dicho reembolso, cuyo destinatario era únicamente el funcionario que presentaba la factura como pagador del monto constatado en el documento. En este punto debe evidenciarse el innegable beneficio económico que derivaría para el actor esa alteración pues el monto a recibir habría sido, al menos en una de las facturas, muy superior a lo realmente pagado por el servicio. En efecto, no cabe duda a esta Sala, que al menos en la factura número 005498, el monto original era de un mil quinientos colones (¢1.500,00) por 11 litros de diesel, y se modificó para lograr indebidamente, el cobro de cinco mil quinientos colones (¢5.500,00). Por último, cabe destacar que en primera instancia, la juzgadora tuvo por justificado el despido del actor al considerar que existió mérito suficiente para esa decisión, en tanto las facturas remitidas para su cobro no respondían a la realidad de lo acontecido, y en el reverso de estas aparece el nombre del actor, así como su número de cédula y su firma, datos con los que la Administración tuvo por acreditado que fue él quien compró el combustible con dinero de su peculio y, como consecuencia, es el acreedor y persona a la que se le reintegrara el dinero (folios 339 y 340). Frente a tal conclusión, en el recurso de apelación (folios 350 y 351) el apoderado del actor únicamente protestó que el demandado no demostró la verdadera responsabilidad del actor en los hechos imputados; no acreditó con la certeza debida la existencia de la supuesta falta cometida; no se acreditó quién fue realmente responsable de esas alteraciones; ni quien obtuvo beneficio económico con esa supuesta alteración; alegatos que, con lo que se ha dicho, han quedado desvirtuados. En conclusión, el actor no logró desvirtuar que gestionó ante la administración del demandado el reintegro de facturas por compra de combustible con datos alterados, alteración respecto de la cual no logró dar una justificación razonable como responsable al suscribir dichos documentos para su cobro, por lo cual la decisión del despido se debe estimar justificada por pérdida de confianza en el funcionario. El Estado como entidad pública requiere contar con personas de irreprochable proceder no sólo porque el objeto de su administración son bienes públicos, que interesan y pertenecen a la colectividad, sino porque la labor de fiscalización se dificulta ante la gran cantidad de personas a su servicio, el sistema de estructuración de funciones y responsabilidades, y la amplitud de su patrimonio. Por eso, aunque la confianza es un elemento trascendental en toda relación de trabajo, su apreciación es más rigurosa en las relaciones de empleo público. En el caso en estudio es evidente que el sistema empleado por el demandado para el abastecimiento de combustible de sus vehículos funcionaba sobre una base de la confianza: el funcionario cancelaba la factura y el monto le era reintegrado a través del trámite de la presentación de dichas facturas, cuyos datos sirven para la liquidación respectiva. Si ese es el sistema sobre el cual opera el demandado es imposible exigirle que una vez constatada la incorrecta gestión del actor lo mantuviera en su puesto de trabajo, debido a que, a partir de ese momento ya no podía confiar en la veracidad de los datos consignados en las facturas por compra de combustible, que él presentara para su liquidación. Además, con dicha conducta el actor evidenció desprecio a los intereses del patrono, con el que también resultó rota la confianza que pudiera requerirse en otros ámbitos de su relación. De modo que la imposibilidad de continuar con la relación de trabajo solo devino de las acciones cometidas por el propio actor, de las cuales derivó la pérdida de confianza patronal. Ante la pérdida de un elemento fundamental e insoslayable del contrato de trabajo no procede ordenar la reinstalación del funcionario a su puesto de trabajo porque por ese medio se obligaría al patrono a recomponer una relación laboral mutilada del aspecto subjetivo sobre el cual subsiste. El principio de estabilidad laboral en el empleo no alcanza a quienes incurren en infracciones que evidencian su inidoneidad para el puesto. Ese principio fue constitucionalmente establecido como una garantía de inamobilidad, es decir, que una vez nombrada en un cargo público, la persona sólo podrá ser removida por las causales de despido justificado que exprese la legislación de trabajo, o en el caso de reducción forzosa de servicios, ya sea por falta de fondos o para conseguir una mejor organización de los mismos (artículo 192 Constitucional). Ahora bien, esa misma disposición constitucional sustenta como principio el nombramiento en el cargo a base de idoneidad comprobada, para lo cual, el Estatuto de Servicio Civil que regula las relaciones vigentes en el Ministerio donde laboraba el actor, establece un procedimiento específico con ese fin. El artículo 20 de esa regulación enuncia entre otras exigencias que, para ingresar al Servicio Civil se requiere poseer aptitud moral y física propias para el desempeño del cargo, lo que se comprobará mediante información de vida y costumbres y certificaciones emanadas del Registro Judicial de Delincuentes, del Archivo Nacional, del Gabinete de Investigación y del Departamento respectivo del Ministerio de Salud; además de demostrar idoneidad sometiéndose a las pruebas, exámenes o concursos que contemplan esa ley y sus reglamentos. En el ámbito de las relaciones laborales sujetas al Derecho Privado, el efecto de la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria se convierte en la obligación del empleador de indemnizar a la persona trabajadora con las prestaciones correspondientes a un despido considerado ilegal. Ninguna disposición lo obliga a reinstalar en su puesto a una persona a la cual, por ejemplo, ya no le tiene confianza, elemento fundamental para la existencia de este tipo de relaciones. En el campo de las relaciones de empleo público, la garantía de estabilidad supone según se dijo, que la persona permanece en su puesto porque ha sido nombrada con base en un procedimiento a través del cual se garantizó su idoneidad. Sin embargo, si la administración logra constatar que la persona ha dejado de ser idónea porque incurrió en una falta grave que faculta a su despido ello implica que se ha socavado el sustento de la estabilidad y por lo mismo, resulta a contrapelo que como consecuencia de la prescripción se ordene la reinstalación. Es decir, si la persona ha dejado de ser idónea para el cargo, por haber incurrido en una falta grave contra su patrono, ningún fundamento tiene aplicar el principio de estabilidad para ordenar la reinstalación. En el subexamine, si está demostrado que el actor incurrió en una falta grave, excepción por la que la propia constitución exime de la estabilidad, la consecuencia de la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria patronal no podrá ser nunca la reinstalación con todas sus consecuencias -salarios caídos, aguinaldos y salarios escolares- debido a la demostración objetiva de la causa del despido. En su lugar, de conformidad con la disposición contenida en el numeral 63 Constitucional, desarrollada por el Código de Trabajo, en sus artículos 28 y 29, deberá condenarse al accionado a pagarle al actor el monto que le corresponda por concepto de preaviso y auxilio de cesantía, cuya liquidación se hará en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia.” *