No civil liability for CCSS in third-party assault on doctor during parking transferAusencia de responsabilidad civil de la CCSS por agresión de tercero a médico durante traslado de parqueo

“II […] The factual backdrop of this case is that a doctor at the Marcial Fallas Clinic was assaulted by a third party, who threw several stones at his car, damaging the windshield and the front of the vehicle, and struck the victim on the left hand and left knee, while he was moving said vehicle from one parking lot to another, both belonging to that institution, because he was required to do so by administrative provisions given that he had to work an extraordinary night shift. The aggressor, a third party unconnected to the Clinic, had had a dispute with the civil claimant minutes earlier in a cubicle at the Clinic and was convicted, through an expedited proceeding, as the perpetrator of the crimes of aggravated battery and aggravated robbery, and both said individual personally and the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) were ordered to pay, in the abstract, damages and losses (see proven facts and judgment at folios 188 to 199). The trial judgment was appealed on cassation (the available appellate remedy at that time) by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (folios 206 to 210), and the Court, with a different judicial panel than the current one, by means of vote number 2010-999, upheld the appeal and partially annulled the judgment, only with respect to the judgment against the state entity, on the grounds that the decision lacked a sufficient statement of reasons regarding the basis for attributing liability to said entity, which had opposed it. Following the ordered remand, a second judgment was issued, this time orally, on that issue (see folios 215-216), in which the civil claim against the social security entity was dismissed, a decision again appealed on cassation, this time by the attorney for the civil claimant (see folios 297 to 302), which resulted in a second annulment, this time by vote number [Telf1], by this Chamber with another judicial panel. On that occasion, the annulment was due to the trial decision lacking the descriptive content of the evidence received orally. The third judgment, the one now under appeal, again dismisses the civil action, now indicating that the legal nexus alleged by the civil claimant (indirect subjective civil liability for culpa in eligiendo or in vigilando) did not exist, but rather that there was objective liability for risk, which was not argued by that party, and therefore, in the opinion of the trial judges, it was not possible to grant it in the judgment, even though it was outlined as existing, since that would entail modifying the cause of action (causa petendi), affecting due process and the right of defense. This Chamber disagrees with that conclusion. It is true that, as the trial judges analyzed, there is no subjective liability for culpa in eligendo or in vigilando in this case, no matter how much the appellant insists on characterizing it as such, because it was not proven that the security personnel hired for that purpose were unsuitable or were incorrectly supervised in their duties by the contracted state entity. On the contrary, it was proven that the four guards present at that time were all duly occupied in various parts of the building, were correctly performing their duties, and that this was not the cause of the event; and if there was any delay on their part in exiting and opening the gate, it was probably due to an excess of duties and the insufficient personnel to perform them. The appellant has probably confused the state's duty to safeguard the safety of its personnel with the legal concept of "supervision (vigilancia)," but that is due to her error, which should not distort legal concepts. In this regard, the trial judgment is correct, as is its determination of proven facts (similar to those of the first final judgment) and its weighing of the evidence, indicating which evidence it found credible and which it did not, and considering it proven that no obligation-creating nexus could arise from the prior fact (that the defendant invaded the doctor's private office), since this was not reported to the hospital's security. In this Chamber's opinion, where the trial Court errs is in considering, first, that when procedural legislation refers to the legal nexus between the fact and the accused (Article 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) or the grounds on which the civil claim for damages is based, this refers to strict or specific nomen iura, without whose exact identification the principle of congruence is lost, which has been mentioned doctrinally in our legal community but does not arise from the literal text of the special articles contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though it is desirable that they were formulated differently, which is a de lege ferenda discussion that cannot affect the parties in their effort, adhering to the regulations, to find protection for their specific claims. Thus, this Chamber does not agree that the trial judges stated that: "Regarding the correct criterion of imputation that should have prevailed in this case, this Court considers that the criterion of imputation that should have been used by the civil claimant was that derived from a risky activity or a risk created by the administration itself, under an objective liability criterion and not a subjective liability criterion; however, even though the Court may establish, after the evidence was gathered during the adversarial proceedings, that the correct criterion of imputation was different, this Authority cannot modify it because the factual framework established in the claim was different and the criterion of imputation expressed in the claim was also different, and the Court would be wrong to vary this factual scenario because it would be to the detriment of due process and the right of defense of the counterparty, as well as openly violating the principle of congruence between the cause of action (causa petendi) (...) the judgment would be null and void due to defects of ultra petita and extra petita (...) However, beyond the impossibility of this Court to rule in favor of the civil claimant given the incongruity that exists based on the facts he formulated in the civil action and the criterion of imputation he set forth in it, this Chamber does wish to make it clear that the change of parking lot that the doctors had to make at the time of the event (including Doctor [Name1]) was derived from an administrative decision, and likewise, it makes no difference to the Court whether the assault occurred outside or inside the institution; and even though in this case the assault occurs on public roads, this would not have been exempt from liability given that the civil claimant was within his working hours and changing vehicles was part of the dynamics of his work (not by his own decision, but by decision of his employer, which, whether written, verbal, or established by custom, the truth is that it existed and was so proven), this particular activity—specifically, this change of parking lot—creating a risky activity brought about by the Administration, which required its employees to change parking lots despite the risks of the area (a marginal urban area known for its high crime rates), the times at which it had to be done, the manner in which the transfer was made, and the problematic population attended, which undoubtedly generates a risk in the exercise of the profession—as Doctor A mentioned out loud at the close of the debate—; however, by virtue of the fact that the facts were not presented in this way in the civil claim for damages and the criterion of imputation was subjective liability and not objective liability (under Article 1048 of the Civil Code), it makes it impossible to admit the claim without violating the principle of congruence so often alluded to in this resolution. By virtue of all the foregoing, the factual framework alleged by the civil claimant was not proven, the criterion of imputation of subjective liability for culpa 'in vigilando' and 'in eligendo' was also not proven, and the causal link between the generating event alleged in the civil claim and the damage caused by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund was also not proven; hence, the right to compensation demanded by the civil claimant cannot be proven under this parameter, nor the amounts of his claim; consequently, the civil claim for damages filed is rejected in all its aspects, and the defense of lack of standing presented is upheld" (cf. folios 392 to 395, highlighting added). And this is so for three reasons: first, as already mentioned: when Article 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure refers to the legal nexus between the alleged facts and the accused person or specifies the "grounds on which the action is based," it does not require that a specific nomen iuris be identified, but rather the factual-explanatory basis of the nexus. Moreover, if defects are noted in this regard, it is the duty of the judicial body to prevent them (Article 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) in order to prevent the process from becoming an obstacle course of procedural hurdles, thereby preventing the constitutional principle of access to justice from becoming a reality. Second, the civil principle of congruence, with its derivatives, the prohibition of ultra and extra petita, refers to the fact that amounts higher than or different aspects from those requested cannot be awarded, which is not transgressed in this case since what was requested here was compensation for damages and losses consisting of the physical harm caused by the fracture, the material damage to glasses, clothing, a watch, and the vehicle, and moral damages (see civil action file at folios 12 and 13), and as for the amounts, if the claim is admissible, they must be established in the judgment, without exceeding those claimed by the party. That is, the amounts would not be exceeded, nor are the requested aspects changed if the claim is upheld; what would be modified, based on the appellant's own argument as will be seen, is the source of the extracontractual civil obligation (from subjective to objective) which, furthermore, has been rebutted as such by the defendant entity (see closing arguments in various remands), and therefore it cannot be claimed that any surprise was caused or that the right of defense was affected. Therefore, relying on the facts and arguments made, maintaining the type of items claimed and their amounts, even by modifying the legal name of the applicable doctrine, is not a defect in the judgment that affects due process and warrants its subsequent annulment, but rather the pure and simple application of the law by the Court, which is its essential obligation. Third, because even if the trial judges' argument were accepted, it turns out that in this case, the civil claimant did make an initial argument based on the Theory of Risk and objective civil liability (even if he did not call it that). Thus, at folio 2 of the civil claim for damages file, when justifying why the Costa Rican Social Security Fund was being sued, it was stated that it was because "it has not provided me with the necessary safety to perform my work; my life and my physical integrity were in danger because there is no security in my workplace and anyone can enter where I work and assault me in the Clinic's private parking lots," and later it is insisted, in various parts of the initial brief, that the security guards never appeared, and finally, it is indicated that the damages were caused "because there was no efficient security in the Costa Rican Social Security Fund's agents, to appoint sufficient security personnel to prevent patients, who are numerous in our Clinics where we work due to population density, from forcibly entering our offices demanding preferential treatment, and also because there is no security in our parking areas and other areas adjacent to the Clinic within our working hours, to prevent a mentally ill, bipolar, or aggressive patient, due to a situation he does not understand or comprehend, from seeking redress by harming the integrity..." (see folio 6). It is true that civil liability for culpa in eligendo or in vigilando is later alluded to, but the correct application of the law is the responsibility of the Court (iura novit curia), and it is sufficient that the general criterion of imputation (lack of adequate security) is alleged for the Court to classify it. Therefore, the legal issue to which this matter is constrained is to determine whether there is civil liability on the part of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund for the assault suffered by the doctor when attempting to enter the parking lot, without success because, he says, the doors were not opened promptly. That is all, without it being necessary to analyze—because the trial judgment already excluded it—whether there was indirect subjective civil liability or whether there was liability for the prior incident not reported to the Administration. And this is what must be addressed, but not before determining whether it can be done from this court or whether, due to the arguments mentioned and the omissions contained in the trial judgment, a new remand must be ordered. III.- This Chamber, with various judicial panels and even under the legal framework of the former cassation appeal, has considered it possible to directly resolve civil issues from this court, without ordering a remand. Thus, in unanimous vote number [Telf2], with the current judicial panel and citing majority votes number 2007-750 ([Name2], [Name3], and [Name4] with a dissenting vote by this judge) and number [Telf3] (Chinchilla, [Name2], and [Name5] with a dissenting vote by the last), it was stated: "There is no regulatory provision, at any level, that establishes the right to an appeal for the losing party in civil matters. The right to an appeal is established in international instruments, but solely in favor of the accused in a criminal case (...) In accordance with that idea, civil procedural legislation establishes the civil cassation appeal which (...) allows a party that has won a case in the first and second civil instances to ultimately lose it in the cassation court (Articles 592, 593 subparagraph 2, 595, and 610 subparagraph 2, all of the Code of Civil Procedure. The last article cited establishes, where relevant: 'When the appeal is based on a nullity for substantive reasons and is appropriate, the chamber shall quash the judgment and, in the same ruling, shall decide the case on the merits in accordance with the merits of the record, taking into account the defenses of the party adverse to the appellant that were omitted or overlooked in the lower court's decision...'). Although Article 124 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that 'From his involvement in the proceeding, the civilly liable third party shall enjoy all the powers granted to the accused for his defense, insofar as his civil interests are concerned,' it is true that this provision must be interpreted systematically with those already mentioned, and it cannot be inferred from it that the civilly liable third party has a right to an appeal regarding what was decided in any instance, but rather that he will have it in the manner established by law; that is, he will have the right to appeal on cassation what was decided by the trial court, but there is no further appeal against what was decided on cassation. So much so that it has been interpreted that, even though that provision exists, the civilly liable third party cannot claim a right to a public defender, cannot claim a right to abstain from testifying, cannot claim that he can act without legal representation, etc. (cf.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 3rd edition, San José, 2006, p. 246). Furthermore, an additional reason, of a constitutional nature, relates to the principles of speedy justice and judicial independence which could be violated, because if it were considered on cassation that the civil claim is admissible and a remand were ordered for the trial court to set the items and amounts to be paid, the lower court might disagree with that position, in which case it would have two possibilities: (i) to decide accordingly to the detriment of the party who was vindicated on cassation, which would represent a considerable delay for that party in the recognition of his claims and could entail a vicious circle ad infinitum, or (ii) to submit to the cassation court's approach, in which case its judicial independence would be sullied. Therefore (...) it is appropriate to proceed to hear the substantive elements and the evidentiary support of the claim..." If that was the case under the old denomination of criminal cassation, it is considered that it is even more so now, when that appeal has become one of appeal and, therefore, what is decided here is subject to challenge by the losing party before the cassation court, and it is the responsibility of that body to determine the greater or lesser openness that such challenge has in that instance. Thus, a ruling can be made from this court either upholding the civil claim, if admissible, or dismissing it, albeit on other grounds. IV.- Therefore, what must be determined is whether the defendant, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, bears any type of liability for not providing sufficient security to doctors in their workplaces, which leads to them being assaulted by third parties during their working hours. In principle, the State is financially liable to third parties for damages caused by its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning, except for three legal exceptions, including the victim's fault and the act of a third party. This general principle is established in Articles 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution and is set forth in Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration. On this subject, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated: "Due to the particularities inherent in the liability of the Public Administration, generated through its gradual evolution, as well as the objective nature it has attained, with a clear constitutional basis, it cannot be interpreted as an unrestricted and permanent duty to compensate, applicable always and for all hypotheses of injury. A regime of such a nature would be unheard of and materially unbearable for any State with limited financial resources. Therefore, imputation criteria have been used that, within said objectivity, somehow dimension that duty to indemnify originating from public conduct. Hence, it can be affirmed that the national regime of patrimonial liability of the Public Administration is an objectively moderate one, insofar as it does not renounce parameters or imputation criteria, especially concerning abnormality and unlawfulness, in which, in one way or another, it evaluates and qualifies the conduct of the public apparatus. These are broad and diverse criteria compared to those of willful misconduct and negligence traditionally used by common law, but which nonetheless become criteria of attribution that distance the institution from a mere automatic transfer of assets, without any assessment of the administrative conduct carried out. Thus, Article 190 of our General Law of Public Administration refers to 'legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning,' where legitimacy or its antithesis basically refers to the legal conduct of the Administration, while normal or abnormal points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented, among other things, by the service-providing activity attributed to the State as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the community. Note how Article 194 of the aforementioned law refers to 'lawful acts,' under the concept of legal activity, distinguishing them in the same provision from what it qualifies as 'normal functioning,' understood as material activity. In this way, abnormality refers to those administrative conducts that, in themselves, deviate from good administration (in accordance with the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subparagraph d., which includes, among other things, effectiveness and efficiency) or from the organization, technical rules, or the expertise and prudent conduct in carrying out its actions, with a harmful effect on the individual. This allows us to state that abnormality can manifest itself through malfunctioning; delayed functioning; or a total absence of functioning. Abnormality and unlawfulness must not, therefore, be adopted as equivalent concepts, not even regarding the hypothesis of that functioning which, being due or in conformity with the aforementioned rules, produces a harmful result, called by some doctrinal sector 'abnormal functioning by result,' because in such a case, what operates is liability for normal functioning with a harmful effect or result, which is compensable, of course, provided that the requirements expressly pre-established by the Legal System itself are met (see Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration). Nor should this 'abnormality' of functioning and the 'illegitimacy' thereof be confused with the generic and basic unlawfulness that is essential in all civil redress. Indeed, patrimonial liability arises from unlawfulness, which in turn constitutes its basis (derived sometimes from a positive norm, while in others, from the basic principle translated into the duty not to harm another), and which, for this particular matter, takes the form of the non-existence of the duty to bear the damage. Thus, if the victim does not have the duty to endure the injury (manifested as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, failing that, under certain circumstances, assume the reparative consequences of what it could not prevent, whether because it was unforeseeable or unavoidable. When such a duty to endure the injury does not exist, there is a breach of the duty of the individual's patrimonial indemnity, and to that extent, the injury caused to the victim's legal sphere must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, of mandatory redress. In this way, it can be affirmed that only the injury which, when confronted with the entirety of the Legal System, can be deemed as unlawful in its basis is compensable, insofar as the legal regime considers it unacceptable for the victim, regardless of the classification subsequently and necessarily attributed to the public conduct. To rule otherwise would be to affirm compensation for a harmful action against a detriment that the Legal System does not reproach and that, on the contrary, tolerates and consents to as normal and justified [...] That reiterated unlawfulness will always be present in the compensable damage, whether due to normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning. Be that as it may, these four imputation criteria used by the General Law of Public Administration in Article 190 must be considered as having constitutional backing and support, insofar as they concretize the transfer that the constitution-maker made to the ordinary legislator in Article 41 ('having recourse to the laws') and instrumentalize the effective judicial protection enshrined in the Constitution. And this being so, it must be concluded that such criteria apply to the patrimonial liability of all public authority, be it administrative, legislative, or judicial [...]" (cf. votes numbers 308-06 and 1273-07). This means that insofar as injury has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, whether action or omission, which the administered party does not have the duty to bear, the duty to compensate is imposed, by virtue of the principle of full reparation for damages that emerges from Article 41 of the Political Constitution, except for the aforementioned exceptions. Additionally, the Law on the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Protection No. 7472 of May 26, 2000, has provided for the regime of objective liability for risk even in the provision of services since, as provided in Article 9, it applies to all economic agents, except concessionaires of public services and state monopolies. Article 2 of the aforementioned law defines an economic agent as: "any natural person, de facto or de jure entity, public or private, participating in any form of economic activity, whether as a buyer, seller, offeror, or demander of goods or services." Therefore, said regime can be applied to the analysis of the issue before us, which occurs within the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, a public institution that provides a public service, not as a concessionaire or in a monopolistic manner. On this aspect, again the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote number 849-2011, has indicated: "Objective liability for risk in consumer matters. Before proceeding to the analysis of the specific case, it is appropriate to analyze the criteria outlined by this Chamber regarding objective liability in this matter. Regarding this topic, two main branches can be identified: a subjective one, which requires the concurrence and consequent demonstration of willful misconduct or negligence on the part of the author of the harmful act, and an objective one, which dispenses with such elements, placing the duty to repair as the central axis due to the mere existence of the damage. As an example of the foregoing, Article 35 of the Law on the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Protection (hereinafter LPCDEC) states that the merchant, producer, or service provider shall be liable for damages derived from the goods traded and the services provided, even when no negligence, imprudence, incompetence, or willful misconduct is detected in their actions. Likewise, the determining elements for the emergence of civil liability, whether subjective or objective, are cited: harmful conduct (which may be active or passive, legitimate or illegitimate), the existence of damage (that is, an injury to a legally protected right), a causal nexus that links the two previous elements, and in most cases, the verification of a criterion of attribution, which will depend on the specific legal regime. Regarding causality, it is necessary to indicate that this is a case-by-case assessment made by the judge in which, based on the facts, he or she determines the existence of a relationship between the claimed damage and the conduct carried out by the economic agent. Although there are various theories on the matter, the one that has been considered most consistent with the Costa Rican regime is that of adequate causality, according to which there is a link between damage and conduct when the former originates, if not necessarily, at least with a high probability according to the specific circumstances applicable to the matter, from the latter. (In this regard, see, among others, resolutions 467-F-2008 of 2:25 p.m. on July 4, 2008, 1008-F-2006 of 9:30 a.m. on December 21, 2006). At this point, it is important to clarify that the verification of exonerating causes (fault of the victim, an act of a third party, or force majeure) acts upon the causal nexus, ruling out that the conduct attributed to the defendant was the cause of the injury suffered. Regarding the different imputation criteria, for the purposes of this case, the theory of created risk is of interest, which was expressly included in the LPCDEC. The objective scheme adopted by the law, as well as the application of the aforementioned imputation criterion, emerge from a simple reading of the provision in question, which stipulates: 'The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond concurrently, and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks. /He is only released who demonstrates that he was not involved in the damage./ The legal representatives of commercial establishments or, as the case may be, the persons in charge of the business are responsible for their own acts or facts or those of their dependents or auxiliaries. Technicians and those in charge of production and control are jointly and severally liable, when appropriate, for violations of this Law to the consumer's detriment.' (bold added). From a detailed analysis of the provision just transcribed, a series of elements emerge that condition its application." "II [...] The present matter has as its factual background that a doctor of the Marcial Fallas Clinic was assaulted by a third party, who threw several stones at his car, damaging the windshield and the front of the vehicle, and hitting the victim in his left hand and knee, while he was moving said vehicle from one parking lot to another, both belonging to that institution, because he had to do so by virtue of administrative orders given that he had to work an extraordinary night shift. The aggressor, a third party unconnected to the Clinic, had had an argument minutes before with the civil plaintiff in a cubicle of the Clinic and was convicted as the perpetrator of the crimes of serious injuries and aggravated robbery, as a result of an abbreviated proceeding, with both said individual personally and the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social being ordered to pay, in the abstract, damages and losses (see proven facts and judgment on folios 188 to 199). The trial court's judgment was appealed in cassation (the means of challenge in force at that date) by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (folios 206 to 210) and the Chamber, with a composition different from the current one, through vote number 2010-999, upheld the challenge and partially annulled the judgment, only with respect to the order against the state entity, indicating that the decision lacked sufficient reasoning on the basis of attribution to said entity, which had opposed it. Given the ordered remand, a second judgment was issued, this time orally, on that point (see folios 215-216) in which the civil claim against the social security entity was dismissed, a decision once again appealed in cassation, this time by the representative of the civil plaintiff (see folios 297 to 302), which resulted in a second annulment, this time by vote number [Telf1], of this Chamber with a different composition. On that occasion, the annulment was because the trial court's decision did not contain the descriptive content of the evidence received orally. The third judgment, the one now being appealed, once again dismisses the civil action, now indicating that the legal relationship alleged by the civil plaintiff (indirect subjective civil liability for fault in eligiendo or in vigilando) did not exist, but rather that what existed was strict liability for risk, which was not argued by said party, therefore, in the opinion of the trial judges, it was not possible to grant it in the judgment, even though it was outlined as existing, because that would imply modifying the cause of action (causa petendi) affecting due process and the right to a defense. This Chamber disagrees with that conclusion. It is true that, as the trial judges analyzed, there is no subjective liability for fault in eligendo or in vigilando present in this case, no matter how much the appellant insists on classifying it as such, because it was not proven that the security personnel contracted for this purpose were unsuitable or were incorrectly supervised in their duties by the contracted state entity. Rather, it was taken as proven that the four guards existing at that date were all duly occupied in different parts of the building, performed their duties correctly, and that was not the cause of the event, and if there was any delay by them in coming out and opening the gate, it was probably due to the excess of functions they had and the few personnel to perform them. The appellant has probably confused the State's duty to safeguard the security of its personnel with the legal concept of "surveillance" but that is due to an error by her that does not have to distort legal concepts. In that sense, the trial court's judgment is correct, as it also is in the determination of the proven facts (similar to those of the first final judgment) and in the weighing of the evidence, indicating which it found credible and which it did not and taking it as proven that no obligation-creating relationship could arise from the prior event (of the defendant invading the doctor's private office, since this was not reported to the hospital's security). Where, in this Chamber's opinion, the trial court errs is in considering, first, that when the procedural legislation refers to the legal relationship between the alleged facts and the accused (article 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) or specifies the "grounds on which the action is based," this is referring to strict or specific legal classifications (nomen iura), without whose correct identification the principle of congruence is lost, which has been mentioned doctrinally in our environment but does not arise from the literal wording of the special articles contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, although it would be desirable for them to have been formulated differently, which is a discussion of what the law should be (lege ferenda) that cannot affect the parties in their effort to, adhering to the regulations, find protection for their specific claims. Thus, this Chamber does not share the trial judges' indication that: "Regarding the correct criterion of attribution that should have prevailed in this case, this Court considers that the criterion of attribution that should have been used by the civil plaintiff was that derived from a risky activity or a risk created by the administration itself, under a criterion of strict liability and not under a criterion of subjective liability, however, even though the Court may establish, after the evidence has been gathered during the adversarial process, that the correct criterion of attribution was another, this Authority cannot modify it because the factual framework established in the complaint was different and the criterion of attribution stated in the complaint was also another, and the Court would be wrong to vary this factual panorama because that would be detrimental to due process and the right to a defense of the counterparty, as well as openly violating the principle of congruence between the cause of action (causa petendi) (...) the judgment would be null due to the defects of ultra petita and extra petita (...) However, beyond the impossibility that this Court has of ruling in favor of the civil plaintiff given the incongruence that exists between the facts formulated by him in the civil action and the criterion of attribution that he expressed in it, this Chamber does want to make it clear that the change of parking lot that doctors had to make at the time of the event (including Doctor [Name1]) was derived from a decision of the Administration, likewise, for the Court it is irrelevant whether the assault occurred outside or inside the institution, given that although in this case the assault occurs on public roads, that would not have been a defense against liability given that the civil plaintiff was within his work hours and it was part of the dynamics of his work to change vehicles (not by his own decision, but by the decision of his employer, whether written, verbal, or established by custom, what is true in the case is that it existed and was accredited as such), deriving from this particular activity, specifically this change of parking lot, a risky activity brought about by the Administration, which required its employees to change parking lots despite the riskiness of the area (a marginal urban area known for its high crime rates), the hours in which it had to be done, the way in which the transfer was made, and the problematic population that is served, which undoubtedly generates a risk in the exercise of the profession -as Doctor A mentioned aloud at the close of the debate-; however, by virtue of the fact that the facts were not presented in this way in the complaint for the civil action for damages and the criterion of attribution was of subjective liability and not strict liability (under article 1048 of the Civil Code), it makes it impossible to admit the claim without violating the principle of congruence so many times alluded to in this resolution. By virtue of all the foregoing, the factual framework alluded to by the civil plaintiff was not accredited, nor was the criterion of attribution of subjective liability for fault 'in vigilando' and 'in eligendo' accredited, nor was the causal link between the generating event alluded to in the civil complaint and the damage caused by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social accredited, hence the right to the compensation sought by the civil plaintiff, nor the amounts of his claim, cannot be accredited under this parameter, and by reason of the foregoing, the civil action for damages filed is dismissed in all its aspects and it is appropriate to uphold the exception of lack of right presented" (cfr. folios 392 to 395, the highlighting is supplied). And this is so for three reasons: the first has already been anticipated: when numeral 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure refers to the legal relationship between the alleged facts and the accused person or specifies the "grounds on which the action is based," it does not require that a correct legal classification (nomen iuris) be identified but rather the factual-explanatory basis of the nexus. Moreover, if defects in this regard are noted, it is the duty of the judicial body to prevent them (article 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) in order to prevent the process from becoming an obstacle course of procedural hurdles, avoiding the realization of the constitutional principle of access to justice. Secondly, the civil principle of congruence, with its derivatives the prohibition of ultra and extra petita, refers to the fact that amounts higher than or aspects different from those requested cannot be awarded, which is not violated in this case since what has been requested here is compensation for damages and losses consisting of the physical harm generated by the fracture, the material damage to the glasses, clothing, watch, and vehicle, and the moral damage (see civil action file at folios 12 and 13) and, as for the amounts, if the claim is appropriate, they must be established in the judgment, without being able to exceed those liquidated by the party. That is to say, neither would the amounts be exceeded, nor are the requested aspects changed if the claim were to be upheld; what would be modified, based on the appellant's same argument as will be seen, would be the source of the non-contractual civil obligation (from subjective to objective) which, indeed, has been rebutted as such by the defendant entity (see closing arguments in various remands), so it cannot be claimed that any surprise was caused or the right to a defense was affected. Therefore, relying on the facts and arguments made, maintaining the type of items sought and their amounts, even though modifying the legal name of the institute to be used, is not a defect in the judgment that affects due process and warrants its subsequent annulment, but rather the pure and simple application of the law by the Court, which is its essential obligation. Thirdly because, even if the trial judges' argument were accepted, it turns out that in the present case the civil plaintiff did make an initial argument based on the Theory of Risk and strict liability (even if he did not name it as such). It is thus that on folio 2 of the civil action for damages file, when justifying why the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is being sued, it was stated that it was done because "it has not given me the proper security I need to carry out my work, my life and my integrity were in danger because at my workplace there is no security and anyone can enter where I work and assault me in the private parking lots of the Clinic" and then it is insisted, in various parts of the initial filing, that the security guards never appeared, to finally indicate that the damages were caused "because there was not efficient security in the officials under the authority of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, to appoint enough security members to prevent patients, who in our Clinics where we work are numerous due to the population density, from forcibly entering our offices demanding preferential treatment and likewise that there is no security in our parking areas and other areas annexed to the Clinic within our work hours, to prevent a mentally ill, bipolar, or aggressive patient, due to a situation he does not know or understand, from trying to take revenge by damaging the integrity..." (see folio 6). It is true that later there is reference to civil liability in eligendo or in vigilando, but the correct application of the law is the responsibility of the Court (iura novit curia), it being sufficient that the general criterion of attribution (lack of adequate security) is alleged for the Court to be the one that must classify it. Therefore, the legal point to which this matter is limited is to determine whether there is civil liability of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social for the assault suffered by the doctor when trying to enter the parking lot, without succeeding because, according to him, the doors were not opened promptly. That is all, without it being necessary to analyze, because the trial court's judgment already excluded it, whether there was indirect subjective civil liability or whether there was liability for the prior incident not reported to the Administration. And that is what must be addressed, but not before determining if it can be done from this court or if, due to the arguments referred to and the omissions that the trial court's judgment entails, a new remand must be ordered. III.- This Chamber, with various compositions and even under the legal framework of the former cassation appeal, has considered that it is possible to resolve civil matters directly from this court, without ordering remand. Thus, in unanimous vote number [Telf2], with the current composition and citing majority votes number 2007-750 ([Name2], [Name3], and [Name4] with a dissenting vote by this member) and number [Telf3] (Chinchilla, [Name2], and [Name5] with a dissenting vote by the latter) it was said: "There is no normative provision, of any rank, that establishes the right to an appeal for the losing party in civil matters. The right to an appeal is established in international instruments but only in favor of the accused with respect to a criminal case (...) Consistent with that idea is that the procedural civil legislation establishes the civil cassation appeal which (...) enables a party that has won a case in the first and second civil instance to lose it, definitively, in the cassation court (articles 592, 593 section 2, 595, and 610 section 2, all of the Code of Civil Procedure. The last cited article establishes, where relevant: 'When the appeal is based on a nullity for reasons of substance, and it is appropriate, the chamber shall quash the judgment, and in the same resolution shall rule on the merits of the case, in accordance with the merit of the record, attending to the defenses of the party opposing the appellant, omitted or pretermitted in the trial court's resolution...'). Although article 124 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that 'From his intervention in the proceeding, the civilly sued third party shall enjoy all the powers granted to the accused for his defense, as regards his civil interests,' it is true that said provision must be interpreted systematically with those already referred to, without it being able to be deduced from there that the civilly sued third party has a right to an appeal with respect to what was resolved in any instance but rather that he will have it but in the manner established in the legislation, that is, he will have the right to appeal in cassation what was resolved by the trial court but there is no further appeal against what was resolved in cassation. This is so much the case that it has been interpreted that, even though that provision exists, the civilly sued third party cannot claim a right to a public defender, cannot claim a right to abstain from testifying, cannot claim that he can act without legal representation, etc. (cfr.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Comented Criminal Procedure. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 3rd edition, San José, 2006, p. 246). Furthermore, an additional reason, of constitutional order, concerns the principles of prompt justice and judicial independence that could be violated because if it were considered in cassation that the civil claim is appropriate and a remand is ordered so that the trial court fixes the items and amounts to be paid, the lower court (a quo) might not agree with that position, in which case it would have two possibilities: (i) to rule accordingly to the detriment of the party whose claim was upheld in cassation, which would represent a considerable delay for the latter in the recognition of their claims and could imply a vicious circle ad infinitum or (ii) to submit to the cassation court's argument, in which case its judicial independence would be tarnished. Therefore (...) it is appropriate to proceed to examine the substantive requirements and the evidentiary basis for what is claimed..." If that was the case under the former denomination of criminal cassation, this Chamber considers that it is with even greater reason now, when that appeal became one of appeal and, therefore, what is decided here is susceptible to being challenged, by the losing party, before the cassation court, it being the responsibility of that body the greater or lesser openness that such challenge may have in that instance. This being the case, from this court a pronouncement can be made either upholding the civil claim, if appropriate, or dismissing it, although for other reasons. IV.- Therefore, what must be determined is whether the defendant entity, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, bears any type of liability for not providing sufficient security to doctors in their workplaces, which results in them being targets of assaults by third parties during their work hours. In principle, the State is financially liable to third parties for damages caused by its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning, except for three legal exceptions, among which are the fault of the victim and the act of a third party. This general principle is laid down in articles 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution and is contained in article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration. On this topic, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated: "Due to the particularities inherent to the liability of the Public Administration, generated through its gradual evolution, as well as the objective nature achieved, with a clear constitutional basis, it cannot be interpreted as an unrestricted and permanent duty to compensate, applicable always and for all hypotheses of injury. A regime of such nature would be unheard of and materially unbearable for any State with limited financial resources. That is why criteria of attribution have been used that in some way dimension, within said objectivity, that duty to indemnify originating from public conduct. Hence it can be stated that the national regime for the financial liability of the Public Administration is of an objectively moderate nature, insofar as it does not renounce parameters or criteria of attribution, especially concerning abnormality and unlawfulness, in which the conduct of the public apparatus is, in one way or another, evaluated and qualified.

These are broad and diverse criteria compared to those of malice (dolo) and fault (culpa) traditionally used by ordinary law, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">but this does not mean they fail to become attribution criteria that distance the institution from a mere automatic transfer of assets, without any assessment of the administrative conduct deployed.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> Thus, numeral 190 of our General Law of Public Administration refers to “legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning (funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal)”, from which legitimacy or its antithesis basically refers to the legal conduct of the Administration, while normal or abnormal points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented among others, by the service-provision activity attributed to the State, as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the community. Note how Article 194 of the indicated law refers to “licit acts (actos lícitos)”, under the conception of legal activity, distinguishing them in the same norm from what it qualifies as “normal functioning (funcionamiento normal)”, understood as material activity. In this way, abnormality refers to those administrative behaviors that, in themselves, depart from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 section d., which among other things includes efficacy and efficiency) or from the organization, technical rules, or the expertise and prudent conduct in the deployment of its actions, with a harmful effect on the person. This allows us to point out that abnormality can manifest itself through poor functioning; delayed functioning, or a total absence of functioning. Abnormality and illegality, therefore, should not be adopted as equivalent concepts, not even regarding the hypothesis of that functioning which, being due or in accordance with the aforementioned rules, produces a harmful result, termed by some doctrinal sector as “abnormal functioning by result (funcionamiento anormal por resultado)”, since in such a case, what operates is a liability for normal functioning with a harmful effect or result, compensable, of course, provided that the requirements expressly pre-established by the Legal System itself are met (see the same Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration). Nor should this “abnormality” of functioning and its “illegitimacy” be confused with the generic and basic unlawfulness (antijuricidad), essential in all civil reparation. Indeed, patrimonial liability arises from unlawfulness, which in turn constitutes its foundation (derived sometimes from a positive norm, while at other times, from the basic principle translated into the duty not to harm another), and which for this particular matter is concretized in the non-existence of that duty to bear the damage. Thus, if the victim has no duty to bear the injury (manifested as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances, assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent, whether because it was unforeseeable or unavoidable. When such a duty to bear the injury does not exist, the breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity of the person occurs, and to that extent, the injury caused in the victim’s legal sphere must be deemed unlawful (antijurídica), and therefore, of obligatory reparation. In this way, it can be affirmed that only the injury which, confronted with the entirety of the Legal System, can be deemed as unlawful at its base is compensable, insofar as the legal regime considers it unacceptable for the victim, independently of the classification that subsequently and necessarily is attributed to the public conduct. The opposite would be to affirm compensation for harmful action against a detriment that the Legal System does not reproach and that, on the contrary, tolerates and consents to as normal and justified […] That reiterated unlawfulness will always be present in compensable damage, whether from normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Be that as it may, those four attribution criteria used by the General Law of Public Administration in Article 190 must be deemed to have constitutional shelter and support,</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> insofar as they concretize the transfer that the constituent made in numeral 41 to the ordinary legislator (“occurring to the laws (ocurriendo a las leyes)”) and instrumentalize the effective judicial protection enshrined in the Constitution. And this being so, it must be concluded that such criteria apply to the patrimonial liability of all public authority, whether administrative, legislative, or jurisdictional […]” </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">(cf. votes numbers 308-06 and 1273-07)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">This means that </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">i</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">nsofar as an injury has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, whether active or omissive, which the administered party has no duty to bear, the duty of compensation is imposed, by virtue of the principle of integral reparation of damage that is derived from numeral 41 of the Political Constitution, save for the referenced exceptions. Additionally, the Law on the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Protection No. 7472 of May 26, 2000 has provided for the regime of objective liability for risk even in the provision of services since, as provided in its Article 9, it applies to all economic agents (agentes económicos), except for </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">concessionaires (concesionarios)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> of public services and state </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">monopolies (monopolios)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> Article 2 of the cited law defines economic agent as: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">“</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">any natural person, de facto or de jure entity,</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> public</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> or private, participating in any form of economic activity, as a buyer, seller, offeror, or demander of goods or </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">services (servicios)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">”. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">Therefore, said regime can be applied to the analysis of the issue at hand, which occurs in the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), a public institution that provides a public service, not as a concessionaire nor in a monopolistic manner. On this aspect, again the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote number 849-2011, has indicated: \"</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Objective liability for risk in consumer matters. Before entering into the analysis of the specific case, it is convenient to analyze the criteria outlined by this Chamber regarding objective liability in this matter. Regarding this topic, two major branches can be identified: a subjective one, in which the concurrence and consequent demonstration of malice (dolo) or fault (culpa) on the part of the author of the harmful act is required, and an objective one, which dispenses with such elements, placing the duty to repair as the central axis by the mere existence of the damage. As an example of the foregoing, numeral 35 of the Law on the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (hereinafter LPCDEC), states that the merchant, producer, or </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">service provider, shall be liable for damages arising</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> from the goods traded and </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">from the services provided, even when negligence, imprudence, lack of skill, or malice is not detected in their actions.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> Likewise, as determining elements for the emergence of civil liability, whether subjective or objective, the following are cited: harmful conduct (which can be active or passive, legitimate or illegitimate), the existence of damage (i.e., an injury to a protected legal right), a causal link (nexo de causalidad) connecting the two preceding elements, and in most cases, the verification of an attribution criterion, which will depend on the specific legal regime. Regarding causation, it is necessary to indicate that it is a case-by-case assessment made by the judge in which, based on the facts, the existence of a relationship between the claimed damage and the conduct deployed by the economic agent is determined. While there are various theories on the matter, the one considered most in accordance with the Costa Rican regime is that of adequate causation, according to which there is a link between damage and conduct when the former originates, if not necessarily, at least with a high probability according to the specific circumstances affecting the matter, from the latter. (In this sense, see, among others, resolutions 467-F-2008 of 14 hours 25 minutes of July 4, 2008, 1008-F-2006 of 9 hours 30 minutes of December 21, 2006). At this point, it is important to clarify that </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">the verification of exempting causes</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> (fault of the victim, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">an act of a third party</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> or force majeure), </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">acts upon the causal link, ruling out that the conduct attributed to the defendant was the producer of the injury suffered</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">. Regarding the different attribution criteria, for the purposes of this case, the theory of created risk (teoría del riesgo creado) is of interest, which was expressly included in the LPCDEC. The objective scheme that the law favors, as well as the application of the cited attribution criterion, are clear from a simple reading of the norm in question, which stipulates: “the producer, the provider, and the merchant must respond, concurrently, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">and independently of the existence of fault (culpa)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">or the service</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks. /</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Only one who proves they were unconnected to the damage is released.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">/The legal representatives of commercial establishments or, as the case may be, those in charge of the business are responsible for their own acts or deeds or for those of their dependents or assistants. Technicians, those in charge of preparation and control are jointly and severally liable, when appropriate, for violations of this Law to the detriment of the consumer.” (the bold is supplied). From the detailed analysis of the recently transcribed norm, a series of elements that condition its application are deduced. First, the use of this liability regime is contingent on certain qualifications being met. Thus, regarding the first, the producer, provider, or merchant may be a natural or legal person. Additionally, the injury must be caused to one who is situated in the legal relationship as a consumer, in the terms defined in the reference body of law and developed by this Chamber. It is required, then, that both parties form a consumer relationship, the object of which is the potential acquisition, enjoyment, or use of a good or service by the consumer. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(...)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> Likewise, from the precept under study, it follows, second, that the legislator established a series of attribution criteria based on which the objective liability regulated by this cardinal can be imputed, among which is the already cited theory of created risk. Thus, this serves as a factor to assign liability to the subjects referenced. In essence, said theory postulates that whoever creates, exercises, or benefits from a licit lucrative activity that presents potentially dangerous elements for others, must also bear its disadvantages (ubi emolumentum, ubi onus, which can be translated as where the emolument is, there is the burden). Two characteristics are deduced from the foregoing: on the one hand, that the risk comes from an exploitation activity; on the other, that by deriving from human activity, it excludes the so-called acts of nature. Concomitantly, it is important to make some clarifications regarding the risks apt to generate liability, since it does not arise automatically. Risk is an integral part of societal coexistence and the technological advances integrated into it. Thus, for the duty of reparation to arise, the risk associated with the activity must present a degree of abnormality, that is, it must exceed the margin of tolerance that is admissible according to the rules of experience, which must be analyzed, on a case-by-case basis, by the judge. Additionally, regarding the subject who becomes obligated by virtue of an activity considered dangerous, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">the attribution criterion is, precisely, the created risk, which presumes that the person to whom the damage is imputed must be in a position of dominion over it,</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> that is, they are the one who develops the activity or assumes the possible associated negative consequences, insofar as they receive a benefit from it. This may be direct, which can be identified, among others, with the income obtained as consideration, or indirect, when the advantageous situation occurs in a reflected form, which could be the case of alternate mechanisms aimed at attracting consumers, and consequently, result in an economic benefit for its offeror. It is important to mention that in any activity it is possible to find different degrees of risk, which must be managed by that subject who benefits from it, a circumstance that exerts a direct influence on the evidentiary duty incumbent upon them, since it is relevant for determining imputation in the specific case. The foregoing, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">coupled with the existence of exempting causes, demonstrates that the legislation under comment does not constitute an automatic transfer of assets</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> (See vote 300 of 11 hours 25 minutes of March 26, 2009).\" </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">(the emphasis is supplied). Therefore, in principle, force majeure, the act of a third party, and the fault of the victim, for what is relevant here, are grounds for exclusion of civil liability of the Public Administration. In the present matter, as reported by the civil plaintiff himself in his initial brief, on the day of the events </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">it was raining copiously </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">and that prevented the guards from noticing that he was arriving at the access gate and requesting entry, so they also could not realize the first part of the action (when the subject, unrelated to said institution, attacks him, damaging part of his belongings and the vehicle). Furthermore, the second part of the event occurs when the civil plaintiff himself exits, unnecessarily, the motor vehicle and said subject attacks his person, which was a sudden act that could not be neutralized even if there were a battalion of police at that door, since the civil plaintiff had already gotten out of the motor vehicle and could not advance it even if the gate were opened. Ergo, in both situations, the exception regime was present, which prevents the Administration from being held civilly liable, since the event arises from a third party (the defendant, who accepted the commission of the act and who has no link with the Administration) and, in addition, it was not proven that the Administration had breached any duty of vigilance over the security activity of the Clinic (as analyzed by the trial judges), so it follows, then, that the exception regime predominates over the rule and this means that the defendant institution should not be liable for the damages caused by the third party. For these and not the reasons given, the appeal must be rejected, maintaining the ruling intact.”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p> **II** […] The factual background of this case is that a physician at the Clínica Marcial Fallas was assaulted by a third party, who threw several rocks at his car, damaging the windshield and the front of the vehicle and striking the victim on his left hand and knee, while he was moving said vehicle from one parking lot to another, both belonging to that institution, because he was required to do so by virtue of administrative provisions given that he had to work an extraordinary night shift. The aggressor, a third party unrelated to the Clinic, had had an argument with the civil plaintiff minutes earlier in a cubicle at the Clinic and was convicted as the perpetrator of the crimes of grievous bodily harm (lesiones graves) and aggravated robbery, as a result of an abbreviated proceeding, with both said individual personally and the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social being ordered to pay, in the abstract, the damages (daños y perjuicios) (see proven facts and judgment at folios 188 to 199). The trial court judgment was appealed in cassation (the applicable form of challenge at that date) by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (folios 206 to 210), and the Tribunal, with a different panel than the current one, through vote number 2010-999, granted the challenge and partially annulled the judgment, only with respect to the finding against the state entity, indicating that the decision lacked sufficient reasoning regarding the basis for imputation to said entity, which had opposed it. Following the ordered remand, a second judgment was issued, this time orally, on that point (see folios 215-216) in which the civil claim against the social security entity was dismissed, a decision again appealed in cassation, this time by the civil plaintiff's legal representative (see folios 297 to 302), which resulted in a second nullification, this time by vote number [Telf1], of this Chamber with another panel. On that occasion, the nullification was due to the trial court decision not containing the descriptive content of the orally received evidence. The third judgment, the one now under appeal, again dismisses the civil action, now indicating that the legal link alleged by the civil plaintiff (indirect subjective civil liability for fault (culpa) in eligiendo or in vigilando) did not exist, but rather that what existed was strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) for risk, which was not argued by that party, and therefore, in the opinion of the trial judges, it was not possible to grant it in the judgment, even though it was outlined as existing, since this would imply modifying the cause of action (causa petendi) to the detriment of due process and the right of defense. This Chamber disagrees with that conclusion. It is true that, as the trial judges analyzed, no subjective liability for fault in eligiendo or in vigilando exists in this case, however much the appellant insists on characterizing it as such, because it was not proven that the security personnel hired for that purpose were unsuitable or incorrectly supervised in their functions by the contracted state entity. On the contrary, it was proven that the four guards existing at that time were all properly occupied in various parts of the building, were performing their duties correctly, and that this was not the cause of the event, and if there was any delay on their part in going out and opening the gate, it was probably due to the excessive duties they had and the insufficient personnel to perform them. The appellant has probably confused the State's duty to safeguard the security of its personnel with the legal concept of "vigilance," but that stems from an error on her part that does not have to distort the legal concepts. In this regard, the trial court judgment is correct, as it also is in the determination of the proven facts (similar to those of the first final judgment) and in the weighing of the evidence, indicating which evidence it deemed credible and which it did not, and finding it proven that no obligatory link could arise from the prior event (the defendant having invaded the physician's private office, since this was not reported to the hospital's security). Where, in this Chamber's opinion, the trial Tribunal errs is in considering, first, that when procedural legislation refers to the legal link between the alleged facts and the accused person (Article 112 of the Código Procesal Penal) or the grounds on which the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) is based, this is referring to strict or specific nomina iuris, without whose correctness the principle of congruence is lost, which has been mentioned doctrinally in our legal circles but does not arise from the literal wording of the special articles contained in the Código Procesal Penal, even though it may be desirable for them to have been formulated differently, which is a de lege ferenda discussion that cannot affect the parties in their effort to, by adhering to the regulations, find protection for their specific claims. Thus, this Chamber does not agree that the trial judges indicated that: "Regarding the correct basis for imputation that should have prevailed in this case, this Tribunal considers that the basis for imputation that should have been used by the civil plaintiff was that derived from a risky activity or from a risk created by the administration itself, under a criterion of strict liability and not under a criterion of subjective liability; however, even though the Tribunal may establish, after collecting evidence during the adversarial proceedings, that the correct basis for imputation was another, this Authority cannot modify it because the factual framework established in the complaint was different and the basis for imputation set forth in the complaint was also different, as the Tribunal would be wrong to vary this factual panorama because that would be detrimental to due process and the opposing party's right of defense, and would openly violate the principle of congruence between the cause of action (causa petendi) (...) the judgment would be nullified due to the defects of ultra petita and extra petita (...) However, beyond the impossibility this Tribunal has of ruling in favor of the civil plaintiff given the incongruence that exists based on the facts he formulated in the civil action and the basis for imputation he set forth therein, this Chamber does wish to make it clear that the change of parking that physicians had to make at the time of the event (including Doctor [Nombre1]) derived from a decision of the Administration; likewise, for the Tribunal, it is irrelevant whether the aggression occurred outside or inside the institution, given that, although in this case the aggression occurs on public roads, that would not have been an exemption from liability given that the civil plaintiff was within his work schedule and changing his vehicle was part of his work dynamic (not by his own decision, but by decision of his employer, whether written, verbal, or established by custom, the truth of the matter is that it existed and was thus proven), deriving from this particular activity—specifically this change of parking—a risky activity fostered by the Administration, which required its employees to change parking despite the risks of the area (a marginal urban area known for its high crime rates), the times at which it had to be done, the way the transfer was carried out, and the problematic population being served, which undoubtedly generates, in effect, a risk in the exercise of the profession—as mentioned by Doctor A verbally at the close of the debate—; however, by virtue of the fact that the facts were not thus set forth in the civil damages complaint and the basis for imputation was subjective liability and not strict liability (under Article 1048 of the Código Civil), it makes it impossible to admit the claim without violating the principle of congruence alluded to so many times in this resolution. By virtue of all the foregoing, the factual framework alleged by the civil plaintiff was not proven, nor was the basis for imputation of subjective liability for fault 'in vigilando' and 'in eligendo' proven, nor was the causal link between the generating event alleged in the civil complaint and the damage caused by the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social proven; hence, the right to compensation claimed by the civil plaintiff cannot be proven under this parameter, nor the amounts of his claim; therefore, the civil damages action filed is rejected in its entirety, and it is appropriate to uphold the defense of lack of right presented." (cfr. folios 392 to 395, emphasis added). And this is so for three reasons: the first has already been advanced: when Article 112 of the Código Procesal Penal refers to the legal link between the alleged facts and the accused person or specifies the "grounds on which the action is based," it does not require that a nomen iuris be correctly identified, but rather the factual-explanatory basis of the link. Furthermore, if defects are noted in this regard, it is the duty of the judicial body to correct them (Article 15 of the Código Procesal Penal) to prevent the process from becoming an obstacle course, thereby failing to realize the constitutional principle of access to justice. Secondly, the civil principle of congruence, with its derivatives—the prohibition of ultra and extra petita—refers to the fact that amounts higher than or matters different from those requested cannot be awarded, which was not transgressed in this case since what was requested here was compensation for damages consisting of the physical harm generated by the fracture, material damage to the glasses, clothing, watch, and vehicle, and moral damages (see the civil action file at folios 12 and 13), and, regarding the amounts, if the claim is admissible, they must be established in the judgment, without exceeding those itemized by the party. That is, neither would the amounts be exceeded, nor would the matters requested be changed if the claim were granted; what would be modified, based on the appellant's own argument as will be seen, would be the source of the non-contractual civil obligation (from subjective to strict), which, furthermore, has been refuted as such by the defendant entity (see closing arguments in various remands), so it also cannot be claimed that any surprise was caused or the right of defense affected. Therefore, relying on the facts and arguments made, maintaining the type of items claimed and their amounts, while modifying the legal name of the institute to be applied, is not a defect of the judgment that affects due process and warrants its subsequent nullification, but rather the pure and simple application of the law by the Tribunal, which is its essential obligation. Thirdly, because, even if the trial judges' argument were accepted, it happens that in the present case, the civil plaintiff did make an initial argument based on the Risk Theory (Teoría del Riesgo) and strict civil liability (even if he did not name it as such). It is thus that at folio 2 of the civil damages action file, when justifying why the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social was being sued, it was stated that it was being done because "it has not given me the necessary security I need to perform my work; my life and my physical integrity were in danger because there is no security in my workplace, and anyone can enter where I work and attack me in the private parking lots of the Clinic," and later, in various parts of the initial brief, it is insisted that the security guards never appeared, finally indicating that the damages were caused "because there was no efficient security among the officials under the authority of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social to appoint sufficient security members to prevent patients, who are numerous in the Clinics where we work due to population density, from forcibly entering our offices demanding preferential treatment and also because there is no security in our parking areas and other areas adjacent to the Clinic during our working hours, to prevent a mentally ill, bipolar, or aggressive patient, due to a situation they do not know or understand, from seeking retaliation by harming the integrity..." (see folio 6). It is true that reference is later made to civil liability in eligiendo or in vigilando, but the correct application of the law is the responsibility of the Tribunal (iura novit curia), it being sufficient that the general basis for imputation (lack of adequate security) is alleged for the Tribunal to be the one that must classify it. Therefore, the legal point to which this matter is confined is determining whether civil liability exists on the part of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social for the aggression suffered by the physician when attempting to enter the parking lot, without succeeding because, as he claims, the doors were not opened promptly. That is all, without it being necessary to analyze—because the trial court judgment already excluded it—whether there was indirect subjective civil liability or whether there was liability for the prior incident not reported to the Administration. And that is what must be addressed, but not before determining whether this can be done from this court or whether, due to the arguments referred to and the omissions contained in the trial court judgment, a new remand should be ordered.

**III.-** This Chamber, with various panels and even under the legal framework of the former cassation appeal, has considered it possible to directly resolve civil matters from this court, without ordering a remand. Thus, in the unanimous vote number [Telf2], with the current panel and citing majority votes number 2007-750 ([Nombre2], [Nombre3], and [Nombre4], with a dissenting vote by this judge) and number [Telf3] (Chinchilla, [Nombre2], and [Nombre5], with a dissenting vote by the latter), it was stated: "There is no normative provision, of any rank, that establishes the right to appeal for the losing party in civil matters. The right to appeal is established in international instruments, but only in favor of the accused regarding a criminal case (...) In consonance with that idea, civil procedural legislation establishes the civil cassation appeal, which (...) enables a party that has won a case in the first and second civil instance to lose it, definitively, in the cassation court (Articles 592, 593 subsection 2, 595, and 610 subsection 2, all of the Código Procesal Civil. The last cited article establishes, in relevant part: 'When the appeal is based on a nullity for reasons of substance, and it is admissible, the chamber shall quash the judgment, and in the same resolution shall rule on the case on the merits, according to the merits of the record, attending to the defenses of the opposing party to the appellant, omitted or pretermitted in the lower court's resolution...'). Although Article 124 of the Código Procesal Penal states that 'From his intervention in the proceeding, the civilly sued third party shall enjoy all the powers granted to the accused for his defense, concerning his civil interests,' the truth is that this provision must be interpreted systematically with those already referred to, and it cannot be deduced from it that the civilly sued third party has a right to appeal regarding what was resolved in any instance, but rather that he will have it in the manner established in the legislation; that is, he will have the right to appeal in cassation what was resolved by the trial court, but there is no subsequent appeal against what was resolved in cassation. So much so, that it has been interpreted that, although that provision exists, the civilly sued third party cannot claim a right to a public defender, cannot claim a right to abstain from testifying, cannot claim that he can act without legal representation, etc. (cfr.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier.

Commented criminal procedure. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 3rd edition, San José, 2006, p. 246). Furthermore, an additional reason, of a constitutional nature, concerns the principles of swift justice and judicial independence that could be violated because if it were held on cassation that the civil claim is admissible and a remand is ordered so that the trial court can set the items and amounts to be paid, the lower court (a quo) might not agree with said position, in which case it would have two possibilities: (i) to so order to the detriment of the party whose position was upheld in cassation, which for that party would represent a considerable delay in the recognition of their claims and could imply an ad infinitum vicious circle, or (ii) to submit to the cassation finding, in which case its judicial independence would be sullied. Therefore (...) it is appropriate to proceed to examine the substantive requirements and the evidentiary support of the claim..." If that was the case under the former designation of criminal cassation, it is considered that it is even more so now, when that remedy has become one of appeal and, therefore, what is decided here is susceptible to being challenged, by the losing party, before cassation, with the greater or lesser openness of such challenge in that instance being the responsibility of that body. As matters stand, a ruling can be made from this venue either upholding the civil claim, if admissible, or rejecting it, albeit on different grounds. IV.- Then, what must be determined is whether the defendant, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, bears any type of responsibility for not providing sufficient security to doctors in their workplaces, which results in them being subjected to aggression by third parties during their working hours. In principle, the State is patrimonially liable to third parties for damages caused by its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning, except for three legal exceptions, among which are the fault of the victim and the act of a third party (hecho de un tercero). This general principle is established by Articles 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution and is embodied in Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration. On this subject, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated: "Due to the particularities inherent to the liability of the Public Administration, generated through its gradual evolution, as well as the objective character attained, with clear constitutional foundation, it cannot be interpreted as an unrestricted and permanent duty to compensate, applicable always and for all hypotheses of injury. A regime of such a nature would be unprecedented and materially unbearable for any State with limited financial resources. For this reason, criteria of imputation have been resorted to which, in some way, dimension, within said objectivity, that duty to indemnify originated by public conduct. Hence, it can be stated that the national regime is one of patrimonial liability of the Public Administration of a moderately objective character, insofar as it does not renounce parameters or criteria of imputation, especially concerning abnormality and unlawfulness, in which, in one way or another, the conduct of the public apparatus is assessed and qualified. These are broad criteria, different from those of willful misconduct (dolo) and negligence (culpa) traditionally used by common law, but which, nonetheless, do not cease to become criteria of attribution that distance the institution from a mere automatic patrimonial transfer, without any assessment of the administrative conduct deployed. In this manner, Article 190 of our General Law of Public Administration refers to 'legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning,' where legitimacy or its antithesis refers basically to the legal conduct of the Administration, while normal or abnormal points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented, among others, by the service provision activity attributed to the State, as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the collective. Note how Article 194 of the indicated law refers to 'lawful acts (actos lícitos),' under the conception of legal activity, distinguishing them in the same norm from what it qualifies as 'normal functioning,' understood as material activity. In this way, abnormality pertains to those administrative conducts that, in themselves, deviate from good administration (in accordance with the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102, subparagraph d., which among other things includes efficacy and efficiency) or from organization, from technical rules, or from expertise and prudent conduct in the deployment of their actions, with harmful effect to the person. This allows pointing out that abnormality can manifest itself through malfunctioning; tardy functioning; or a total absence of functioning. Abnormality and unlawfulness should therefore not be adopted as equivalent concepts, not even regarding the hypothesis of that functioning which, being due or in accordance with the aforementioned rules, produces a harmful result, designated by some doctrinal sector as 'abnormal functioning by result,' because in such a case, what operates is a liability for normal functioning with harmful effect or result, indemnifiable, of course, provided that the requirements expressly pre-established by the Legal System itself are met (see the same Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration). Nor should this 'abnormality' of functioning and its 'illegitimacy' be confused with the generic and basic unlawfulness (antijuricidad), which is indispensable in all civil reparation. Indeed, patrimonial liability arises from unlawfulness, which in turn constitutes its foundation (derived sometimes from a positive norm, while at other times, from the basic principle translated into the duty not to harm another), and which for this particular matter is concretized in the non-existence of that duty to bear the damage. Thus, if there is no duty for the victim to bear the injury (manifested as the final ablative consequence of public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances, assume the reparatory consequences of that which it could not prevent, whether due to unpredictability or inevitability. When such a duty to bear the injury does not exist, the breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity of the person occurs, and to that extent, the injury caused in the legal sphere of the victim must be deemed as unlawful, and therefore, of obligatory reparation. In this way, it can be stated that only a lesion which, confronted with the entirety of the Legal System, can be deemed as unlawful in its basis, is indemnifiable, insofar as the legal regime considers it unacceptable for the victim, independently of the qualification, which subsequently and necessarily, is attributed to the public conduct. The contrary would be to affirm compensation for a harmful action in the face of a detriment that the Legal System does not reproach and that, on the contrary, tolerates and consents to as normal and justified […] That reiterated unlawfulness will always be present in the indemnifiable damage, whether due to normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning. Be that as it may, those four criteria of imputation used by the General Law of Public Administration in Article 190 must be deemed to have constitutional shelter and support, insofar as they materialize the transfer that the constitutional legislator made in Article 41 to the ordinary legislator ('having recourse to the laws') and instrumentalize the effective judicial protection enshrined in the Constitution. And that being so, it must be concluded that such criteria apply to the patrimonial liability of all public authority, be it administrative, legislative, or jurisdictional […]" (cf. votes numbers 308-06 and 1273-07). This means that insofar as an injury has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, whether active or omissive, which the administered party has no duty to bear, the duty of compensation is imposed, by virtue of the principle of integral reparation of damage that derives from Article 41 of the Political Constitution, except for the referenced exceptions. Additionally, the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Protection No. 7472 of May 26, 2000, has provided for the regime of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) for risk even in the provision of services since, as provided in its Article 9, it applies to all economic agents, except for public service concession holders (concesionarios) and state monopolies (monopolios). Article 2 of the cited law defines an economic agent as: "any natural person, de facto or de jure entity, public or private, participating in any form of economic activity, as a buyer, seller, offeror, or demandant of goods or services." Then, said regime can be applied to the analysis of the issue at hand, which occurs in the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, a public institution that provides a public service, not as a concession holder or in a monopolistic manner. On this aspect, again the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote number 849-2011, has indicated: "Strict liability for risk in consumer matters. Prior to entering the analysis of the specific case, it is convenient to analyze the criteria outlined by this Chamber, regarding strict liability in this matter. Regarding this topic, two main strands can be identified: a subjective one, in which the concurrence, and consequent demonstration, of willful misconduct (dolo) or negligence (culpa) on the part of the author of the harmful act is required; and an objective one, which dispenses with such elements, placing the duty to repair as the central axis for the mere existence of the damage. As an example of the above, Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (hereinafter LPCDEC), states that the merchant, producer, or service provider, shall be liable for the damages derived from the traded goods and from the services they provide, even when negligence, imprudence, lack of skill, or willful misconduct is not detected in their conduct. Likewise, as determining elements for the emergence of civil liability, whether subjective or objective, the following are cited: a harmful conduct (which can be active or passive, legitimate or illegitimate), the existence of damage (that is, an injury to a protected legal interest), a causal link connecting the two previous elements, and in the majority of cases, the verification of a criterion of attribution, which will depend on the specific legal regime. Regarding causality, it is necessary to indicate that it is a case-by-case assessment carried out by the judge in which, based on the facts, they determine the existence of a relationship between the claimed damage and the conduct deployed by the economic agent. Although there are various theories on the matter, the one considered most consistent with the Costa Rican regime is that of adequate causation, according to which there is a link between damage and conduct when the former originates, if not necessarily, at least with a high probability according to the specific circumstances that affect the matter, from the latter. (In this sense, see, among others, resolutions 467-F-2008 at 14 hours 25 minutes of July 4, 20085, 1008-F-2006 at 9 hours 30 minutes of December 21, 2006). On this point, it is important to clarify that the verification of exempting causes (fault of the victim, an act of a third party, or force majeure), acts upon the causal link, discarding that the conduct attributed to the defendant was the producer of the suffered injury. Regarding the different criteria of imputation, for the purposes of the present case, the theory of created risk is of interest, which was expressly included in the LPCDEC. The objective scheme for which the law opts, as well as the application of the cited criterion of imputation, are evident from a simple reading of the rule in question, which stipulates: 'the producer, the provider, and the merchant must respond, concurrently, and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or the service, by inadequate or insufficient information about them, or by their use and risks. /Only the one who demonstrates that they have been unrelated to the damage is released./The legal representatives of mercantile establishments or, as the case may be, those in charge of the business are responsible for their own acts or facts or for those of their dependents or auxiliaries. The technicians, those in charge of preparation and control, respond jointly and severally, when appropriate, for the violations of this Law to the detriment of the consumer.' (the bold is supplied). From the detailed analysis of the recently transcribed norm, a series of elements that condition its application can be inferred. In the first place, the use of this liability regime is contingent upon the concurrence of certain qualifications. Thus, regarding the first one, the producer, provider, or merchant, may be a natural or legal person. Additionally, the injury must be inflicted upon one who is placed in the legal relationship as a consumer, within the terms defined in the referenced legal body and developed by this Chamber. It is required, then, that both parties form part of a consumer relationship, the object of which is the potential acquisition, enjoyment, or use of a good or service by the consumer. (...) Likewise, from the precept under study it follows, in the second place, that the legislator set a series of criteria of attribution based on which the strict liability that this article regulates can be imputed, among which is the aforementioned theory of risk. Thus, this serves as a factor to assign liability to the subjects referred to. In essence, said theory postulates that whoever creates, exercises, or benefits from a lawful lucrative activity that presents potentially dangerous elements for others, must also bear its drawbacks (ubi emolumentum, ubi onus, which can be translated as where the emolument is, there is the burden). From the above, two characteristics are deduced: on one hand, that the risk comes from an exploitation activity; on the other, that deriving from human activity, it excludes so-called acts of nature. Concomitantly, it is important to make some precisions regarding the risks apt to generate liability, since it does not arise automatically. Risk forms an integral part of societal cohabitation and of the technological advances that are integrated into it. Thus, for the duty of reparation to arise, the risk associated with the activity must present a degree of abnormality, that is, it must exceed the margin of tolerance that is admissible according to the rules of experience, which must be analyzed, on a case-by-case basis, by the judge. Additionally, regarding the subject who becomes obligated by virtue of an activity considered dangerous, the criterion of imputation is, precisely, the created risk, which leads to the supposition that the person to whom the damage is imputed must be in a position of control (dominio) over it, that is, it is the one who develops the activity or assumes the possible associated negative consequences, insofar as they receive a benefit from it. This can be direct, which can be identified, among others, with the income obtained as consideration, or indirect, when the advantageous situation occurs reflectively, which could be the case of alternative mechanisms aimed at attracting consumers, and consequently, resulting in an economic benefit for its offeror. It is important to mention that in any activity, it is possible to find different degrees of risk, which must be managed by that subject who benefits from it, a circumstance that exerts a direct influence on the probative duty incumbent upon them, as it is relevant to determine imputation in the specific case. The foregoing, coupled with the existence of exempting causes, demonstrates that the legislation in question does not constitute an automatic patrimonial transfer (See vote 300 at 11 hours 25 minutes of March 26, 2009)." (the emphasis is supplied). Then, in principle, force majeure, the act of a third party, and the fault of the victim, for what is relevant here, are causes for exclusion of civil liability of the Public Administration. In the present matter, as reported by the civil plaintiff himself in his initial brief, on the day of the events it was raining copiously and that prevented the guards from noticing that he was arriving at the access gate and requesting entry, so they also could not realize the first part of the action (when the subject, unrelated to said institution, attacks him, damaging part of his belongings and the vehicle). Furthermore, the second part of the event occurs when the civil plaintiff himself gets out, unnecessarily, from the vehicle and said subject attacks his integrity, which was a sudden act that could not be neutralized even with a battalion of police at said gate, since the civil plaintiff had already gotten out of the vehicle and could not advance it even if the gate were opened for him. Ergo, in both situations, the exception regime that prevents the Administration from being held civilly liable applied because the event arises from a third party (the accused, who accepted the commission of the act and whom no link connects to the Administration) and, moreover, it was not proven that the Administration had breached any duty of supervision over the Clinic's security activity (as analyzed by the instance judges), therefore, it turns out that the exception regime prevails over the rule and this means that the defendant institution is not liable for the damages caused by the third party. For these and not the reasons given, the appeal must be rejected, leaving the decision intact."

“II […] El presente asunto tiene como referente fáctico el que un médico de la Clínica Marcial Fallas fue agredido por un tercero, quien lanzó varias piedras contra su automóvil dañándole el parabrisas y el frente del vehículo y golpeando al afectado en la mano y rodilla izquierdas, mientras trasladaba dicho automotor de un parqueo a otro, ambos de esa institución, por tener que hacerlo así en virtud de disposiciones administrativas dado que debía laborar un turno extraordinario por la noche. El agresor, un tercero ajeno a la Clínica, minutos antes había tenido una discusión con el actor civil en un cubículo de la Clínica y fue condenado como autor de los delitos de lesiones graves y robo agravado, producto de un proceso abreviado, condenándosele tanto a dicho sujeto a título personal como a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social al pago, en abstracto, de los daños y perjuicios (ver hechos probados y sentencia en folios 188 a 199). La sentencia de instancia fue recurrida en casación (medio impugnativo vigente a esa fecha) por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (folios 206 a 210) y el Tribunal, con una integración diversa a la actual, mediante voto número 2010-999, acogió la impugnación y anuló parcialmente la sentencia, solo en cuanto a la condena al ente estatal al indicarse que la decisión carecía de una fundamentación suficiente sobre el presupuesto de imputación a dicha entidad, quien se había opuesto. Ante el reenvío ordenado se emitió una segunda sentencia, esta vez oral, sobre tal extremo (ver folios 215-216) en que se declaró sin lugar la demanda civil contra la entidad de seguridad social, decisión nuevamente recurrida en casación, esta vez por la apoderada del actor civil (ver folios 297 a 302), lo que dio como resultado una segunda nulidad, esta vez con voto número [Telf1], de esta Cámara con otra integración. En esa oportunidad la nulidad obedeció a que la decisión de instancia no contenía el contenido descriptivo de la prueba recibida oralmente. La tercera sentencia, la ahora recurrida, nuevamente declara sin lugar la acción civil ahora indicando que el vínculo jurídico aducido por la parte actora civil (responsabilidad civil subjetiva indirecta por culpa in eligiendo o in vigilando) no existió, sino que lo que había era una responsabilidad objetiva por riesgo, que no fue esgrimida por dicha parte por lo que, en criterio de los jueces de instancia, no era posible concederla en sentencia, pese a que se esbozó como existente, pues ello implicaría modificar la causa petendi con afectación al debido proceso y al derecho de defensa. Esta Cámara discrepa de dicha conclusión. Es cierto que, tal y como lo analizaron los jueces y jueza de instancia, no se da en la especie, por más que la impugnante insista en calificarlo así, alguna responsabilidad subjetiva por culpa in eligiendo o in vigilando pues no se probó que el personal de seguridad contratado al efecto fuera inidóneo o fuera incorrecta supervisado en sus funciones por la entidad estatal contratada. Antes bien se tuvo por demostrado que los cuatro guardas existentes a esa fecha estaban todos debidamente ocupados en diversas partes de la edificación, desempeñaban correctamente sus cargos y no fue esa la causa del evento y si hubo algún atraso de ellos en salir y abrir el portón se debió, probablemente, al exceso de funciones que tenían y el poco personal para desempeñarlas. La recurrente probablemente haya confundido el deber de resguardar la seguridad del Estado hacia su personal con el concepto jurídico de "vigilancia" pero eso obedece a un error suyo que no tiene por qué trastorcar los conceptos jurídicos. En tal sentido la sentencia de instancia es correcta, como lo es, también, en la determinación de los hechos probados (similares a los de la primera sentencia firme) y en la ponderación de la prueba, señalando cuál le merecía credibilidad y cuál no y teniendo por demostrado que no podía surgir vínculo obligacional alguno por el hecho previo (de que el encartado invadiera el consultorio privado del médico, desde que esto no fue informado a la seguridad del nosocomio). En lo que, a criterio de esta Cámara, yerra el Tribunal de instancia es en considerar, primero, que cuando la legislación procesal alude a vínculo jurídico entre el hecho y el imputado (artículo 112 del Código Procesal Penal) o los motivos en los que se basa la acción civil resarcitoria, esto se esté refiriendo a nomen iura estrictos o concretos, sin cuyo acierto se pierda el principio de congruencia, lo cual ha sido mencionado doctrinalmente en nuestro medio pero no surge de la literalidad de los artículos especiales recogidos en el Código Procesal Penal, aunque sea deseable que hayan sido formulados de otra manera, lo que es una discusión de lege ferenda que no pueda afectar a las partes en su afán por, ciñéndose a la normativa, encontrar tutela a sus pretensiones concretas. Así, esta Cámara no comparte que los jueces de instancia hayan indicado que: "Sobre el correcto criterio de imputación que debió privar en este caso, estima este Tribunal que el criterio de imputación que debió emplearse por parte del actor civil era aquel derivado de una actividad riesgosa o de un riesgo creado por la propia administración, bajo un criterio de responsabilidad objetiva y no bajo un criterio de responsabilidad subjetiva, sin embargo aún y cuando el Tribunal pueda establecer luego de recabada la prueba durante el contradictorio que el criterio correcto de imputación era otro, no puede esta Autoridad modificar el mismo pues el marco fáctico establecido en la demanda era diverso y el criterio de imputación vertido en la demanda también era otro, siendo que mal haría el Tribunal con variar este panorama fáctico pues ello iría en detrimento del debido proceso y del derecho de defensa de la contraparte, así como lesionaría abiertamente el principio de congruencia entre la causa petendi (...) la sentencia quedaría nula por los vicios de ultrapetita y extrapetita (...) Sin embargo más allá de la imposibilidad que tiene este Tribunal de fallar a favor del señor actor civil dada la incongruencia que existe a partir de los hechos por él formulados en la acción civil y el criterio de imputación que plasmó en la misma, esta Cámara si quiere dejar en claro que el cambio de parqueo que debían hacer los médicos para la época del hecho (incluyendo el Doctor [Nombre1].) fue derivado de una decisión de la Administración, asimismo, para el Tribunal es indiferente que la agresión ocurriera afuera o dentro de la institución, siendo que pese a que en este caso la agresión ocurre en vía pública ello no hubiera sido eximente de responsabilidad dado que el actor civil estaba dentro de su horario de trabajo y era parte de la dinámica de su labor el cambiar de vehículo (no por decisión propia, sino por decisión de su patrón, la cual fuera escrita, verbal o instaurada por la costumbre, lo cierto del caso es que existía y así quedó acreditada), derivándose de esta actividad en particular, propiamente de este cambio de parqueo un actividad riesgosa propiciada por la Administración, la cual exigía a sus empleados el cambio de parqueo pese a lo riesgoso de la zona (área urbano marginal de la que se conoce sus altos índices de criminalidad), a los horarios en que debía hacerse, a la forma en que se hacía el traslado y a la población problemática que se atiende, lo cual sin duda genera en efecto un riesgo en el ejercicio de la profesión -tal y como lo mencionó el Doctor A a viva voz al cierre del debate-; sin embargo, en virtud de que los hechos no fueron así expuestos en la demanda de acción civil resarcitoria y el criterio de imputación fue de responsabilidad subjetiva y no de responsabilidad objetiva (al amparo del artículo 1048 del Código Civil), hace que no sea posible admitir el reclamo sin la violación al principio de congruencia tantas veces aludido en esta resolución. En virtud de todo lo anterior, no se acreditó el marco fáctico aludido por el actor civil, no se acreditó tampoco el criterio de imputación de responsabilidad subjetiva por culpa "in vigilando" e "in eligendo", así como tampoco se acreditó el nexo causal entre el hecho generador aludido en la demanda civil y el daño ocurrido por parte de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, de ahí que no puede entonces bajo este parámetro acreditarse el derecho al resarcimiento que demanda el actor civil, ni los montos de su pretensión, en razón de lo anterior se rechaza en todos sus extremos la acción civil resarcitoria interpuesta y resulta procedente acoger la excepción de falta de derecho presentada" (cfr. folios 392 a 395, el destacado es suplido). Y esto es así por tres razones: la primera, ya se adelantó: cuando el numeral 112 del Código Procesal Penal alude a vínculo jurídico entre los hechos alegados y la persona acusada o precisa los "motivos en los que la acción se base" no requiere que se acierte en un nomen iuris sino en la base fáctica-explicativa del nexo. Por lo demás, si se notan vicios al respecto es deber del órgano judicial prevenirlos (artículo 15 del Código Procesal Penal) a fin de evitar que el proceso se transforme en una carrera de obstáculos procesales evitándose hacerse realidad el principio constitucional de acceso a la justicia. En segundo lugar, el principio civil de congruencia, con sus derivados la prohibición de ultra y extra petita, a lo que aluden es a que no se puede dar montos superiores o extremos diferentes a los pedidos, lo que no se transgrede en la especie desde que aquí lo pedido ha sido una indemnización por daños y perjuicios consistentes en el daño físico generado con la fractura, el daño material a los lentes, ropa, reloj y al vehículo y el daño moral (ver legajo de acción civil en folios 12 y 13) y, en cuanto a los montos, de ser procedente el reclamo, deben establecerse en sentencia, sin que puedan superar los liquidados por la parte. Es decir, ni los montos se excederían, ni se cambian los extremos pedidos en caso de acogerse el reclamo; lo que se modificaría, a partir del mismo planteamiento del recurrente según se verá, sería la fuente de la obligación civil extracontractual (de subjetiva a objetiva) que, incluso, ha sido rebatida como tal por la entidad demandada (ver alegatos de conclusiones en diversos reenvíos), por lo que tampoco puede alegarse que se causara alguna sorpresa o se afecte el derecho de defensa. Por ello, basarse en los hechos y alegatos efectuados, manteniendo el tipo de rubros pretendidos y sus montos, aunque modificando el nombre jurídico del instituto a emplear, no es un vicio de la sentencia que afecte el debido proceso y amerite su ulterior nulidad, sino la aplicación pura y simple del derecho a cargo del Tribunal, lo que resulta ser su obligación esencial. En tercer lugar porque, aunque se aceptara el planteamiento de los jueces de instancia, resulta que en el presente caso la parte actora civil sí hizo un alegato inicial fundamentado en la Teoría del Riesgo y la responsabilidad civil objetiva (aunque no la denominara así). Es así como a folio 2 del legajo de acción civil resarcitoria, al justificarse por qué se demanda a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, se afirmó que se hacía porque "la misma no me ha dado la debida seguridad que necesito para desenvolverme en mi trabajo, mi vida y mi integridad estuvieron en peligro porque en mi lugar de trabajo no existe seguridad y cualquiera puede ingresar donde laboro y agredirme en los parqueos privados de la Clínica" y luego se insiste, en diversas partes del escrito inicial, que nunca aparecieron los guardas de seguridad para, finalmente, indicarse que los daños fueron provocados "por que no existía una seguridad eficiente en los funcionarios de poder de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, para nombrar suficientes miembros de seguridad para evitar que los pacientes, que en nuestras Clínicas donde laboramos son numerosos por la densidad de población, ingresen a la fuerza a nuestros consultorios en exigencias de trato preferencial y asimismo que no existe una seguridad en nuestras áreas de parqueo y otras anexas a la Clínica dentro de nuestro horario de labor, para evitar que un paciente enfermo mental, bipolar o agresivo, por una situación que no conoce o entienda, pretenda cobrarse dañando la integridad..." (ver folio 6). Es cierto que luego se alude a una responsabilidad civil in eligiendo o in vigilando, pero la correcta aplicación del derecho compete al Tribunal (iura novit curia) bastando que se alegue el criterio de imputación general (falta de adecuada seguridad) para que sea el Tribunal el que deba encasillarlo. Entonces, el punto jurídico al que se constriñe este asunto es en determinar si existe responsabilidad civil de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social por la agresión sufrida por el médico al intentar ingresar al parqueo, sin lograrlo porque, según dice, no se le abrieron con prontitud las puertas. Eso es todo, sin que deba analizarse, porque ya lo excluyó la sentencia de instancia, si hubo responsabilidad civil subjetiva indirecta o si había responsabilidad por el incidente previo no reportado a la Administración. Y a eso hay que avocarse, no sin antes determinar si puede hacerse desde esta sede o si, por los argumentos referidos y las omisiones que conlleva la sentencia de instancia, debe ordenarse un nuevo reenvío. III.- Esta Cámara, con diversas integraciones y aún bajo el marco jurídico del antiguo recurso de casación, ha considerado que es posible resolver directamente cuestiones civiles desde esta sede, sin ordenar el reenvío. Así, en el voto unánime número [Telf2], con la actual integración y citando los votos de mayoría número 2007-750 ([Nombre2], [Nombre3] y [Nombre4] con voto salvado de este) y número [Telf3] (Chinchilla, [Nombre2] y [Nombre5] con voto salvado del último) se dijo: "No hay ninguna disposición normativa, de ningún rango, que establezca el derecho del recurso para la parte perdidosa en materia civil. El derecho al recurso está establecido en instrumentos internacionales pero únicamente a favor del encartado respecto de una causa penal (...) En consonancia con esa idea es que la legislación procesal civil establece el recurso de casación civil que (...) posibilita que una parte que haya ganado en primera y segunda instancia civil un proceso, la pierda, en definitiva, en la sede de casación (artículos 592, 593 inciso 2, 595 y 610 inciso 2, todos del Código Procesal Civil. El último artículo citado establece, en lo conducente: "Cuando el recurso se funde en una nulidad por razones de fondo, y fuere procedente, la sala casará la sentencia, y en la misma resolución fallará el proceso en el fondo, de acuerdo con el mérito de los autos, atendiendo a las defensas de la parte contraria al recurrente, omitidas o preteridas en la resolución de grado..."). Si bien el artículo 124 del Código Procesal Penal señala que "Desde su intervención en el procedimiento, el tercero civilmente demandado gozará de todas las facultades concedidas al imputado para su defensa, en lo concerniente a sus intereses civiles" es lo cierto que dicha disposición debe ser interpretada en forma sistemática con las ya referidas, sin que pueda deducirse de allí que el tercero demandado civil tenga un derecho al recurso respecto a lo resuelto en cualquier instancia sino que lo tendrá pero de la forma establecida en la legislación, es decir, tendrá derecho de recurrir en casación lo resuelto por el tribunal de mérito pero no hay un ulterior recurso contra lo resuelto en casación. Tan es así que se ha interpretado que, aunque esa disposición existe, el tercero demandado civil no puede alegar un derecho a un defensor público, no puede alegar un derecho de abstención a declarar, no puede alegar que pueda actuar sin patrocinio letrado, etc. (cfr.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 3ª edición, San José, 2006, p. 246). Además, una razón adicional, de orden constitucional, atañe a los principios de justicia pronta e independencia judicial que podrían resultar conculcados pues si se estimara en casación que la demanda civil resulta procedente y se ordena el reenvío para que el tribunal de mérito fije los rubros y montos a pagar, el a quo podría no estar de acuerdo con dicha posición en cuyo caso tendría dos posibilidades: (i) disponerlo así en detrimento de la parte a quien se le dio la razón en casación lo que para ella representaría un atraso considerable en el reconocimiento de sus pretensiones y que podría implicar un círculo vicioso ad infinitum o (ii) someterse al planteamiento de casación, en cuyo caso su independencia judicial quedaría mancillada. Por ello (...) procede entrar a conocer los presupuestos de fondo y el sustento probatorio de lo reclamado..." Si eso era así bajo la antigua denominación de casación penal, se considera que con mayor razón lo es ahora, en que aquel recurso se convirtió en uno de apelación y, entonces, lo que aquí se decida es susceptible de ser impugnado, por la parte vencida, ante casación, siendo responsabilidad de ese órgano la mayor o menor apertura que tenga tal impugnación en dicha instancia. Así las cosas, desde esta sede puede hacerse pronunciamiento ya sea acogiendo la demanda civil, de ser procedente, o rechazándola, aunque por otros argumentos. IV.- Entonces, lo que debe determinarse es si a la parte demandada, la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, le cabe algún tipo de responsabilidad por no dar la suficiente seguridad a los médicos en sus centros de trabajo lo que genera que éstos sean objeto de agresiones por terceros en sus horas laborales. En tesis de principio el Estado es responsable patrimonialmente frente a terceros por los daños que ocasione su funcionamiento normal o anormal, legítimo o ilegítimo, salvo tres excepciones legales entre las que están la culpa de la víctima y el hecho de un tercero. Este principio general lo sientan los artículos 9, 11 y 41 de la Constitución Política y lo recoge el artículo 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Sobre este tema, La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha indicado: "Por las particularidades propias de la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública, generadas a través de su evolución gradual, así como el carácter objetivo alcanzado, con claro fundamento constitucional, no puede interpretarse como un deber resarcitorio, irrestricto y permanente, aplicable siempre y para todas las hipótesis de lesión. Sería inaudito un régimen de tal naturaleza y materialmente insoportable para cualquier Estado con recursos financieros limitados. Por ello se ha acudido a criterios de imputación que de alguna forma dimensionan, dentro de la objetividad dicha, ese deber indemnizatorio originado por la conducta pública. De allí que puede afirmarse que, el nacional, es un régimen de responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Pública de carácter objetivamente moderado, en tanto no renuncia a parámetros o criterios de imputación, sobre todo en lo tocante a la anormalidad e ilicitud, en la que de una u otra forma, valora y califica la conducta del aparato público. Se trata de criterios amplios y diversos a los de dolo y culpa que tradicionalmente utiliza el derecho común, pero que no por ello, dejan de convertirse en criterios de atribución que alejan el instituto de una mera transferencia patrimonial automática, sin valoración alguna de la conducta administrativa desplegada. De esta manera, el numeral 190 de nuestra Ley General de la Administración Pública refiere a “funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal”, de donde la legitimidad o su antítesis, hace referencia básicamente a las conductas jurídicas de la Administración, mientras que lo normal o anormal, apunta, ante todo (pero no en exclusiva), a la conducta material de la Administración, representada entre otras, por la actividad prestacional que se atribuye al Estado, como parte de la categoría social que también se le asigna en procura del bienestar general del colectivo. Nótese como el artículo 194 de la indicada ley, hace referencia a los “actos lícitos”, bajo la concepción de actividad jurídica, distinguiéndolos en la misma norma, de lo que califica como “funcionamiento normal", entendido como actividad material. De esta manera, la anormalidad atiende a aquellas conductas administrativas, que en sí mismas, se apartan de la buena administración (conforme al concepto utilizado por la propia Ley General en el artículo 102 inciso d., que entre otras cosas incluye la eficacia y la eficiencia) o de la organización, de las reglas técnicas o de la pericia y el prudente quehacer en el despliegue de sus actuaciones, con efecto lesivo para la persona. Esto permite señalar que la anormalidad puede manifestarse a través de un mal funcionamiento; un funcionamiento tardío, o una ausencia total de funcionamiento. Anormalidad e ilicitud, no deben por tanto adoptarse como conceptos equivalentes, ni siquiera en lo que corresponde a la hipótesis de aquel funcionamiento que siendo debido o conforme con las reglas antedichas, produce un resultado dañoso, denominado por algún sector doctrinal como “funcionamiento anormal por resultado”, pues en tal caso, lo que opera es una responsabilidad por funcionamiento normal con efecto o resultado lesivo, indemnizable, claro está, siempre que se cubran los requisitos preestablecidos expresamente por el propio Ordenamiento Jurídico (véase el mismo artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Tampoco debe confundirse esta “anormalidad” del funcionamiento y la “ilegitimidad” de éste, con la antijuricidad genérica y de base, imprescindible en toda reparación civil. En efecto, la responsabilidad patrimonial nace de la antijuricidad, que a su vez se constituye en su fundamento (derivado algunas veces de una norma positiva, mientras que en otras, del principio básico traducido en el deber de no dañar a otro), y que para esta materia particular se concreta en la inexistencia de ese deber para soportar el daño. Así las cosas, si no existe para la víctima el deber de sobrellevar la lesión (manifiesta como consecuencia final ablativa de la conducta pública), es porque la Administración debía evitarla, o, en caso contrario y bajo ciertas circunstancias, asumir las consecuencias reparadoras de aquella que no pudo impedir, bien por imprevisible, bien por inevitable. Cuando tal deber de sobrellevar la lesión no existe, se produce el incumpliendo al deber de indemnidad patrimonial de la persona, y en ese tanto, habrá que reputar la lesión causada en la esfera jurídica de la víctima, como antijurídica, y por ende, de obligada reparación. De esta manera, puede afirmarse que sólo es indemnizable la lesión que confrontada con la globalidad del Ordenamiento, pueda reputarse como antijurídica en su base, en tanto que el régimen jurídico la considera inaceptable para la víctima, con independencia de la calificación, que posterior y necesariamente, se atribuya a la conducta pública. Lo contrario sería afirmar la compensación por acción dañosa frente a un menoscabo que el Ordenamiento no reprocha y que, por el contrario, tolera y conciente como normal y justificado […] Esa reiterada antijuricidad estará siempre presente en el daño indemnizable, bien sea por funcionamiento normal o anormal, legítimo o ilegítimo. Sea como fuere, esos cuatro criterios de imputación que utiliza la Ley General de la Administración Pública en el artículo 190, han de reputarse de cobijo y respaldo constitucional, en tanto concretan la transferencia que el constituyente realizó en el numeral 41 al legislador ordinario (“ocurriendo a las leyes”) e instrumentalizan la tutela judicial efectiva que consagra la Constitución. Y siendo ello así, habrá de concluirse que tales criterios aplican para la responsabilidad patrimonial de toda autoridad pública, sea administrativa, legislativa o jurisdiccional […]” (cfr. votos números 308-06 y 1273-07). Eso significa que en tanto se haya sufrido una lesión como consecuencia de una conducta pública, sea esta activa u omisiva, que el administrado no tiene el deber de soportar, se impone el deber de resarcimiento, en virtud del principio de reparación integral del daño que se desprende del numeral 41 de la Constitución Política, salvo las excepciones referidas. Adicionalmente, la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Protección Efectiva del Consumidor No. 7472 del 26 de mayo de 2000 ha previsto el regimen de responsabilidad objetiva por riesgo aún en la prestación de servicios ya que, según lo dispone su artículo 9, la misma se aplica a todos los agentes económicos, excepto los concesionarios de servicios públicos y a los monopolios estatales. El artículo 2 de la citada ley define el agente económico como: “toda persona física, entidad de hecho o de derecho, pública o privada, partícipe de cualquier forma de actividad económica, como comprador, vendedor, oferente o demandante de bienes o servicios”. Entonces, dicho regimen puede ser aplicado al análisis del tema que nos ocupa, que se da en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, institución pública que da un servicio público, no en calidad de concesionaria ni de forma monopólica. Sobre este aspecto, nuevamente la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el voto número 849-2011, ha indicado: "Responsabilidad objetiva por riesgo en materia del consumidor. Previo a entrar al análisis del caso concreto, conviene analizar los criterios esbozados por esta Sala, en cuanto a la responsabilidad objetiva en esta materia. En cuanto a dicho tópico, se pueden ubicar dos grandes vertientes, una subjetiva, en la cual se requiere la concurrencia, y consecuente demostración, del dolo o culpa por parte del autor del hecho dañoso y otra objetiva, que prescinde de tales elementos, situando el deber de reparar como eje central por la sola existencia del daño. Como ejemplo de lo anterior, el numeral 35 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y de Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor (en lo sucesivo LPCDEC), refiere que el comerciante, productor o proveedor de servicios, responderá por los daños derivados de los bienes transados y de los servicios que preste, aún y cuando en su actuar no se detecte negligencia, imprudencia, impericia o dolo. Asimismo, como elementos determinantes para el surgimiento de la responsabilidad civil, sea esta subjetiva u objetiva, se citan: una conducta lesiva (la cual puede ser activa o pasiva, legítima o ilegítima), la existencia de un daño (es decir, una lesión a un bien jurídico tutelado), un nexo de causalidad que vincule los dos anteriores, y en la mayoría de los casos la verificación de un criterio de atribución, que dependerá del régimen legal específico. En cuanto a la causalidad, es menester indicar que se trata de una valoración casuística realizada por el juzgador en la cual, con base en los hechos, determina la existencia de relación entre el daño reclamado y la conducta desplegada por el agente económico. Si bien existen diversas teorías sobre la materia, la que se ha considerado más acorde con el régimen costarricense es la de causalidad adecuada, según la cual existe una vinculación entre daño y conducta cuando el primero se origine, si no necesariamente, al menos con una alta probabilidad según las circunstancias específicas que incidan en la materia, de la segunda. (En este sentido, pueden verse, entre otras, las resoluciones 467-F-2008 de las 14 horas 25 minutos del 4 de julio de 20085, 1008-F-2006 de las 9 horas 30 minutos del 21 de diciembre de 2006). En este punto, es importante aclarar que la comprobación de las causas eximentes (culpa de la víctima, de un hecho de tercero o la fuerza mayor), actúa sobre el nexo de causalidad, descartando que la conducta atribuida a la parte demandada fuera la productora de la lesión sufrida. En lo que se refiere a los distintos criterios de imputación, para los efectos del presente caso, interesa la teoría del riesgo creado, la cual fue incluida, en forma expresa, en la LPCDEC. El esquema objetivo por el que se decanta la ley, así como la aplicación del criterio de imputación citado, se desprenden de la simple lectura de la norma en cuestión, la cual estipula: “el productor, el proveedor y el comerciante deben responder, concurrentemente, e independientemente de la existencia de culpa, si el consumidor resulta perjudicado por razón del bien o el servicio, de informaciones inadecuadas o insuficientes sobre ellos o de su utilización y riesgos. /Sólo se libera quien demuestre que ha sido ajeno al daño./Los representantes legales de los establecimientos mercantiles o, en su caso, los encargados del negocio son responsables por los actos o los hechos propios o por los de sus dependientes o auxiliares. Los técnicos, los encargados de la elaboración y el control responden solidariamente, cuando así corresponda, por las violaciones a esta Ley en perjuicio del consumidor.” (la negrita es suplida). Del análisis detallado de la norma recién trascrita, se desprenden una serie de elementos que condicionan su aplicación. En primer lugar, el empleo de este régimen de responsabilidad se encuentra supeditada a que en ellos concurran determinadas calificaciones. Así, en cuanto al primero, el productor, proveedor o comerciante, podrá ser una persona física o jurídica. Adicionalmente, la lesión debe ser irrogada a quien se ubique en la relación jurídica como consumidor, en los términos definidos en el cuerpo legal de referencia y desarrollados por esta Sala. Se requiere, entonces, que ambas partes integren una relación de consumo, cuyo objeto sea la potencial adquisición, disfrute o utilización de un bien o servicio por parte del consumidor. (...) Asimismo, del precepto de estudio se desprende, en segundo lugar, que el legislador fijó una serie de criterios de atribución con base en los cuales se puede imputar la responsabilidad objetiva que regula este cardinal, dentro de los que se encuentra la ya citada teoría del riesgo. Así, este sirve como factor para endilgarle la responsabilidad a los sujetos a que se hace referencia. En esencia, dicha teoría postula que, quien crea, ejerza o se aprovecha de una actividad lucrativa lícita que presenta elementos potencialmente peligrosos para los demás, debe también soportar sus inconvenientes (ubi emolumentum, ubi onus, el cual puede ser traducido como donde está el emolumento, está la carga). De lo anterior se coligen dos características: por un lado, que el riesgo proviene de una actividad de explotación; por otro, que al derivar de la actividad humana, excluye los denominados hechos de la naturaleza. Concomitantemente, importa realizar algunas precisiones en cuanto a los riesgos aptos para generar responsabilidad, ya que aquella no surge en forma automática. El riesgo forma parte integral de la convivencia societaria y de los avances tecnológicos que se integran a esta. De tal forma, para que surja el deber de reparación, el riesgo asociado con la actividad debe presentar un grado de anormalidad, esto es, debe exceder el margen de tolerancia que resulta admisible de acuerdo a las reglas de la experiencia, lo cual debe ser analizado, de manera casuística, por el juez. Adicionalmente, en cuanto al sujeto que deviene obligado en virtud de una actividad considerada como peligrosa, el criterio de imputación es, precisamente, el riesgo creado, lo que hace suponer que la persona a quien se le imputa el daño debe estar en una posición de dominio respecto de aquel, es decir, es quien desarrolla la actividad o asume las posibles consecuencias negativas asociadas, en tanto recibe un beneficio de ello. Este puede ser directo, el cual es posible identificarlo, entre otros, con los ingresos obtenidos a título de contraprestación, o bien indirectos, cuando la situación de ventaja se da en forma refleja, que podría ser el caso de mecanismos alternos tendientes a atraer a los consumidores, y en consecuencia, deriven en un provecho económico para su oferente. Resulta importante mencionar que en cualquier actividad es dable encontrar distintos grados de riesgo, los cuales han de ser administrados por aquel sujeto quien se beneficia de esta, circunstancia que ejerce una influencia directa en el deber probatorio que le compete, ya que resulta relevante para determinar la imputación en el caso concreto. Lo anterior, aunado a la existencia de causales eximentes demuestra que la legislación en comentario no constituye una transferencia patrimonial automática (Véase voto 300 de las 11 horas 25 minutos del 26 de marzo de 2009)." (el destacado es suplido). Entonces, en principio, la fuerza mayor, el hecho de un tercero y la culpa de la víctima, para lo que aquí interesa, son causales de exclusión de responsabilidad civil de la Administración Pública. En el presente asunto, según lo informó el mismo actor civil en su escrito inicial, el día de los hechos llovía copiosamente y eso impedía que los guardas se percataran de que él iba llegando al portón de acceso y solicitara la entrada, por lo que tampoco pudieron darse cuenta de la primera parte de la acción (cuando el sujeto, ajeno a dicha institución, la emprende en su contra, dañándole parte de sus pertenencias y el vehículo). Además, la segunda parte del evento se da cuando el propio actor civil sale, sin necesidad, del automotor y dicho sujeto acomete contra su integridad, lo que fue un acto súbito, que no podía ser neutralizado ni siquiera contándose con un batallón de policías en dicha puerta, pues ya el actor civil había bajado del automotor y no lo podía avanzar aunque se le abriera el portón. Ergo, en ambas situaciones se dio el regimen de excepción que impide que se responsabilice civilmente a la Administración pues el evento surge de un tercero (el encartado, que aceptó la comisión del hecho y que no lo liga ningún vínculo con la Administración) y, además, no se probó que la Administración hubiera infringido ningún deber de vigilancia sobre la actividad de seguridad de la Clínica (según lo analizaron los jueces de instancia), por lo que resulta, entonces, que el regimen de excepción predomina sobre la regla y eso hace que la institución demandada no debe responder por los daños del tercero. Por estas y no las razones dadas, el recurso debe rechazarse, manteniéndose incólume lo resuelto.”