Prescription of Disciplinary Authority for Public Treasury ServantsPrescripción de la potestad disciplinaria para servidores de la Hacienda Pública

**IV.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY (PRESCRIPCIÓN DE LA POTESTAD DISCIPLINARIA):** Having examined the appellant's grievances, it is deemed necessary to first address the issue of the statute of limitations (prescripción), since if it were found to be applicable, there would be no point in considering the other grounds of disagreement. The objection raised on this matter requires determining whether the applicable statute of limitations for exercising the employer entity's disciplinary power was the one-month period set forth in Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) or the special five-year period regulated by numeral 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República). The text of this latter provision, at the time of the investigated facts, is the one currently in force and expressly establishes: *“The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight legal framework (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores) shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—this being understood as an act requiring an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the superior officer or the official competent to initiate the respective proceeding. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding.*" From the highlighted text, it is clear that the extended period provided for in said provision applies when a public official commits infractions provided for in that specific law or in those contemplated in the superior control and oversight legal framework of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), as regulated in Articles 1 and 8 of the related Organic Law. The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic exercises control over the entities and bodies that make up the Public Treasury, without prejudice to the optional regulation it may exercise over other entities.

Now, in accordance with Article 8 of the same law, *“The Public Treasury shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to receive, administer, hold in custody, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds, and the legal, administrative, and financial rules related to the budget process, public procurement (contratación administrativa), internal and external control, and the liability of public officials.”* (Highlights are the drafter's). Pursuant to that article, the Public Treasury is constituted by two essential components: a) public funds (and everything related to their management) and b) the legal rules of an administrative and financial nature relating to the budget process, public procurement, control—both external and internal—and the liability of public servants in those matters.

The law defines what is to be understood by public funds and also by the superior control and oversight legal framework, which are the express terms contemplated in the related Article 71. Thus, under Art. 9, public funds are defined as all *“…resources, value, goods, and rights owned by the State, bodies, companies, or public entities.”* For its part, the following numeral 10 states: *“The superior control and oversight legal framework of the Public Treasury comprises the set of rules regulating the competence, structure, activity, relations, procedures, responsibilities, and sanctions derived from such oversight or necessary for it. This framework also comprises the rules regulating oversight over foreign entities and bodies and over private funds and activities, referred to in this Law, as its fundamental norm, within the constitutional framework.”* This control and oversight legal framework has as its primary purpose *“…to guarantee the legality and efficiency of internal controls and the management of public funds in the entities over which the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic has jurisdiction, in accordance with this Law”* (Article 11, idem). These last articles must be read in conjunction with the provisions of Article 8 cited above, which expressly includes as part of the control and oversight framework the regulations related to the budget process, public procurement, internal and external control, and the liability of public officials in these matters, which are undoubtedly norms aimed at ensuring the legality and efficiency not only of internal controls but also of the efficient and lawful management of public funds.

Thus, it is not just any fault committed by a public servant that triggers the application of Article 71, idem. Only faults committed by persons performing a public function in the exercise of those special powers (management of public funds) and that infringe either the regulations of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic or that control and oversight legal framework (regulations on the budget process, public procurement, internal and external control, responsibilities in this matter) give rise to an extension of the period for exercising disciplinary authority. In summary, the period for sanctioning actions or omissions contrary to those specific regulations, which could cause inefficient or illegal management of public funds, is longer than the generic period provided for in numeral 603 of the Labor Code, since in such cases, the five-year period contemplated in that particular rule must be applied, which undoubtedly seeks to protect a public interest of great importance, namely, the transparent management of public funds.

In the case under review, the appellant argues that within her functions as a servant of the IDA, she was not in charge of the administration of public funds. However, Article 1 of the Law Transforming the ITCO into the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, IDA), No. 6735 of March 29, 1982, states: *“The Institute of Lands and Settlement (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización, ITCO) is transformed into the Institute of Agrarian Development (IDA), as an autonomous institution of public law, with legal personality, its own patrimony, and administrative independence; Law No. 2825 of October 14, 1961, and its amendments, as well as any other conflicting law, are hereby deemed amended for such purposes.”* For the purposes of the matter under review, it must be considered that the plaintiff, as a legal advisor in said institution, was dismissed for not properly handling—as a member of the governing body—a nullity proceeding regarding the act of awarding a plot of land to the Ecotourism and Socio-educational Promotion Association of Grecia (Asociación Ecoturística y de Fomento Socieducativa de Grecia). The foregoing denotes that her functions included ensuring the correct administration and management of public assets that form part of the Public Treasury, as well as the public funds of the institution.

From the resolution opening the disciplinary proceeding and the charges made against the plaintiff, it is evident that the administrative investigation took place precisely because she incurred an omission in her duty of vigilance over all acts necessary to bring the record to the final decision of revoking the land award, which was vitiated by absolute nullity, a fault that generated a violation of norms of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets (Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos). (Folios 273-288 of the administrative file). Likewise, from the content of the statement of facts number DFOE-ED-RH-01/2007, the attribution of unjustified delays in said proceeding is inferred, which led to an unfounded delay in the restitution of the real property to the patrimony of the IDA, causing damage to the interests and purposes that institution must pursue. (Folios 2-16 and 697-722 of the administrative file). Thus, norms such as Articles 108; subsections b. and r. of numeral 110; and 113 of the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets were cited. The alleged acts were also subsumed under the faults contemplated in Article 110 of the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, which, in the invoked subsections, states: *“Acts generating administrative liability. In addition to those provided for in other laws and regulations specific to the employment relationship, the following shall be acts generating administrative liability, [...]: ... b) The omission, delay, negligence, or imprudence in the preservation and safeguarding of the assets or rights of the public patrimony, or the adoption of malicious actions against their protection, regardless of whether damage or injury has occurred. [...] r) Other conduct or omissions similar to the foregoing that result in the diminution, impairment, or detriment of the Financial Administration of the State or its institutions.”* The evident situations, on which the dismissal was ordered, fall within the factual assumptions contemplated in the transcribed article.

If the application of Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic occurs due to incurring in what both that law and those related to the superior control and oversight legal framework provide as an infraction, it must be concluded, without a doubt, that the applicable period is the five-year period provided for therein, insofar as the plaintiff violated precepts of the Internal Control Law (Ley de Control Interno) and, by her actions, also harmed the Law of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets. In the specific case, this superior control and oversight legal framework would also be related to the normative provisions that specifically regulate the proper functioning and administration of the public funds entrusted to the IDA, among which are the internal regulations of the institution, which are evidently violated by actions that imply an ill-advised disposition of the assets in the entity's charge.

Consequently, the lower court resolved appropriately in finding that the applicable rule regarding the statute of limitations for disciplinary authority is Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, not the general rule under Art. 603 of the Labor Code. According to subsection b) of the cited numeral 71, when dealing with acts that are not notorious, the five-year period runs from the date the report on the possible irregularity is made known to the hierarchy or to the person competent to order the start of the administrative proceeding. In this case, it has been held as proven that this communication took place on February 9, 2007 (folio 1 of the administrative file). In turn, the final resolution on the dismissal without employer liability was notified to the executive president of the IDA on December 4, 2008 (folios 871 to 872 of the administrative file), and the plaintiff was dismissed on February 17, 2009 (an undisputed fact), for which reason the peremptory period did not elapse. For the same reasons set forth, since the one-month term of Article 603 of the Labor Code is not applicable, no statute of limitations occurred between the dates of the last two mentioned events, as the plaintiff has suggested since the complaint. Hence, the appellant's objections on this matter are inadmissible.

**V.- ON THE NULLITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING:** The lower court considered that in the disciplinary proceeding brought against the plaintiff, no defect that would invalidate it had been observed. To this end, that body based its decision on the ruling made by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) when hearing a writ of amparo filed by her. Thus, in ruling number 4138, at 11:45 a.m. on February 26, 2010, the constitutional oversight body resolved: *“The appellant claims that at the office of the Human Resources Directorate of the Institute of Agrarian Development, they refused to receive her medical leave forms (boletas de incapacidad) that she presented on March 13, 2009, on the grounds that she was no longer an employee of the institution. She alleges that she was never notified of such a decision, which violates her right to due process. In this regard, the authorities of the IDA stated that indeed the appellant's medical leave forms were not received, given that since February 17, 2009, she is no longer an employee of the institution, by virtue of an order from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. Indeed, by resolution No. PA-78-2007 of October 18, 2007, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic ordered the dismissal of the appellant as an employee of the Institute of Agrarian Development, a resolution against which the corresponding appeals were filed and were ultimately rejected. The appellant states that she did not learn of her definitive dismissal until March 26, 2009; however, from the brief filing the appeal, as well as from the reading of the other amparo proceedings filed by the appellant, it is evident that she has at all times been aware of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic's order for her dismissal, a decision that has been the subject of several amparo actions that were subsequently rejected. Furthermore, there is on record the official letter PE-015-2009 of January 7, 2009, in which the Executive President of the IDA notified the appellant of her dismissal as an employee of the institution, in compliance with the order of the Comptroller entity of the Republic. However, despite the IDA's constant efforts, the aforementioned official letter could not be formally notified. In this regard, it is important to note that this Court has previously held that the fact that a public official's employment relationship is suspended by virtue of a legally approved sick leave does not have the power to weaken the Administration's authority to remove them from their position in accordance with the law, nor to suspend the effects of the pronouncements issued by the competent bodies in exercise of said authority, because to affirm the contrary would imply recognizing a limitation on that power that neither the Constitution nor the law establishes (see in this sense rulings 2003-03169 of 10:22 a.m. on April 25, 2003, and No. 2005-14031 of 10:19 a.m. on October 14, 2005). In any case, on March 13, when the appellant appeared to drop off her medical leave forms, it was explained to her that she no longer worked for the institution, such that at that moment she was also duly notified of this status, which is why, as there was no longer an employment relationship, the Administration was not obligated to receive and process the appellant's request. Now, regarding the alleged violation of due process, in a similar case, in ruling No. 2009-006534 of one thirty-eight p.m. on April 24, 2009, the Chamber considered, in the relevant part: ‘The petitioner sought protection of his right to due process because, in his opinion, he was irregularly dismissed, by virtue of the fact that no prior administrative proceeding was carried out involving the Institute’s Unit and Board of Labor Relations (...). It has been fully and suitably demonstrated that [Name1] was dismissed as recommended by the Legal Advisory and Management Division of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in administrative proceeding No. DAGJ-10-2007. In this particular regard, since the petitioner neither alleged nor proved in any way that any fundamental right was violated in that administrative proceeding, the Chamber rules out that the claimed infringement occurred.’ ... Finally, from the report rendered under oath by the authorities of the IDA, it is evident that within the final settlement corresponding to Ms. [Name2], the payments for the percentile and for the adjustment to the increase decreed by the Central Government, with an effective date of January 1, 2009, were included, which is why the petitioner is also incorrect in her claim alleging the non-payment of these items.”* (Emphasis supplied).

Consequently, that Chamber determined that no violation of due process existed in two fundamental aspects: the alleged lack of notification of the dismissal and the failure to involve the Board of Labor Relations (Junta de Relaciones Laborales). Note that the basis for the ruling took into account the knowledge of the sanction when it was issued by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the difficulty the IDA had in notifying the employee despite material efforts to do so, the possibility of dismissal even during a period of medical leave, and the evident knowledge on the part of the worker when she appeared to submit her medical leave forms. Subsequently, what was thus resolved by that body regarding a possible violation of due process from the perspective of constitutional guarantees has binding effects erga omnes, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

Nonetheless, this other Chamber also finds that from a legal standpoint, due process was not violated, since the plaintiff already knew beforehand of the disciplinary action brought against her and the sanction imposed by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. Thus, she had the opportunity to exercise her technical defense; so much so that she filed appeals for reversal and a subsidiary appeal against what was resolved (folios 726-731 of the administrative file), challenge mechanisms that were duly resolved by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic at the time (folios 732-757 of that same file). With respect to the omission of participation of the Board of Labor Relations, it must be taken into account that, regardless of whether the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) covered the plaintiff or not, the IDA merely proceeded to obey the order of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, and therefore was not required to follow any procedure because the dismissal had already been ordered pursuant to that entity's powers. Furthermore, the Constitutional Chamber, in the aforementioned ruling, noted that in an analogous case, a similar resolution had been adopted because the dismissal order originated from the comptroller entity. In summary, it is considered that no type of defenselessness (indefensión) was generated for the plaintiff, as she was also able to adequately exercise her rights from a legal perspective.

Regarding the objections related to the sanctioning power of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, it is pertinent to cite Article 68 of its Organic Law, which establishes: *“POWER TO ORDER AND RECOMMEND SANCTIONS. The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, without prejudice to other sanctions provided for by law, when in the exercise of its powers it determines that a servant of the passive subjects has committed infractions of the norms comprising the control and oversight framework contemplated in this Law or has caused harm to the Public Treasury, shall recommend to the competent administrative body or authority, through its binding technical criterion, the application of the corresponding sanction according to the merits of the case. The Office of the Comptroller shall create a file against the potential offender, guaranteeing them, at all times, due process and sufficient opportunity to be heard and to present a defense on their behalf. The competent authority of the required passive subject must comply, within the period established by the Office of the Comptroller, with the recommendation issued by it; unless, within a term of eight business days counted from the communication of the act, a duly reasoned and substantiated motion for review is filed by the superior officer of the required passive subject. In this case, and once said motion is resolved, it must comply, without delay, with the provisions of the final technical-legal pronouncement of the Office of the Comptroller, under penalty of incurring the crime of disobedience, without prejudice to the statute of limitations regime contemplated in this Law. The expiration of the period set by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic for the passive subject to impose the ordered sanction shall not, in itself, cause the servant's liability to prescribe or the right of the passive subject to impose said sanction to lapse, without prejudice to the statute of limitations regime contemplated in this Law. The right of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic to exercise, in the specific case, the power to recommend or order the application of sanctions shall prescribe within a term of two years counted from the initiation of the respective file. The initiation of the file shall be understood to occur with the order from the competent office of the Office of the Comptroller to begin the investigation of the case, in relation to specific servants.”* From the foregoing legal provision, it is inferred that this is an inherent power-duty of that entity's nature, and due to this, the exercise of the power to sanction the plaintiff is deemed lawful, as it does not violate any legal norm. It is also important to highlight that this specific provision has been the subject of analysis by the constitutional oversight body, and it has been determined that it is not contrary to the Law of the Constitution. Thus, the Constitutional Chamber, when resolving an action of unconstitutionality, resolved the following: *“ON THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC AS THE OVERSIGHT BODY OF THE PUBLIC TREASURY.- On various occasions, this Court has commented on the important function carried out by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic—a constitutional body attached to the Legislative Assembly in matters relating to the management of the public treasury—. Thus, it is based on the provisions of Articles 183 and 184 of the Political Constitution that it has been delegated the important function of superior, legal, and financial oversight of the management of the public treasury; this is thus a competence granted by constitutional mandate, which is why it has been indicated that it is a competence that the legislator cannot ignore, reduce, diminish, suppress, or attribute to other public bodies, but rather is obligated to recognize so as not to violate the constitutional norms and principles governing this matter. This is how these competences, although originating from the above-cited constitutional norms, are developed in laws, such as the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, Law of Creation of the Budgetary Authority, No. 6821, Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, No. 8131, Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, No. 8422, Law of Public Procurement, No. 7494. The oversight work of the public treasury empowers the Office of the Comptroller to exercise control in all areas concerning it, that is, in public procurement procedures, in the management of the budgets of the various decentralized entities, and of course, in the financial management that public officials perform with these resources (administration, custody, conservation, management, expenditure, and investment).”* (Ruling number 13,926, at 2:44 p.m. on September 20, 2006. In a similar sense, see also ruling number 6,611 of that chamber, at 2:50 p.m. on May 16, 2007). Thus, regarding this point of disagreement, the appealed judgment must also be affirmed.

Finally, it must be clarified that the objection related to an action of unconstitutionality filed against Article 72 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic—currently pending before the Constitutional Chamber—does not in any way affect the resolution of this other matter by the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda), insofar as what is being discussed there is the sanction of disqualification from holding public office in the administrative venue and the insufficiency in the determination of the concept of serious fault, circumstances that led this Chamber to issue the resolution at 11:28 a.m. on August 29, 2012—folio 486—because it was deemed that they were not related to the issues discussed here. In any case, through the brief at folios 482 to 484, the plaintiff herself stated that there is no direct relationship between that action of unconstitutionality and her particular case.

When the person committing the infraction is the head of the entity, the period will begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. It shall be deemed a serious infraction by the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure if he fails to initiate it in a timely manner or allows the offender's responsibility to prescribe, without justified cause. (Thus amended by subsection a) of Article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, Ley de Control Interno). (The bold text is not from the original). From the highlighted text, it is understood that the extended period provided for by said rule applies when the public official commits the infractions set forth in that specific law or those contemplated in the superior control and oversight framework (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores) of the Hacienda Pública, as regulated in Articles 1 and 8 of the related Organic Law. The Contraloría General de la República exercises control over the entities and bodies that make up the Hacienda Pública, without prejudice to the optional regulation it may deploy with respect to other entities. Now, in accordance with Article 8, ídem, “The Hacienda Pública shall consist of public funds (fondos públicos), the powers to receive, administer, hold in custody, preserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds, and the legal, administrative, and financial rules relating to the budget process, public procurement (contratación administrativa), internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials.” (The highlights are by the drafter). In conformity with said article, the Hacienda Pública is constituted by two essential components: a) public funds (and everything related to their management) and b) the administrative and financial legal rules relating to the budget process, public procurement, control –both external and internal– and the responsibility of public servants in these matters. The law is responsible for defining what is to be understood by public funds and also by superior control and oversight framework, which are the express terms contemplated by the related Article 71. Thus, Article 9 defines public funds as all those “…resources, securities, assets, and rights owned by the State, bodies, companies, or public entities.” The following Article 10, for its part, states: “The superior control and oversight framework of the Hacienda Pública comprises the set of rules that regulate the competence, structure, activity, relationships, procedures, responsibilities, and sanctions derived from or necessary for such oversight. This framework also comprises the rules that regulate the oversight of foreign entities and bodies and of private funds and activities, to which this Law refers as its fundamental rule, within the constitutional framework.” The primary purpose of this control and oversight framework is “…to guarantee the legality and efficiency of internal controls and the management of public funds in the entities over which the Contraloría General de la República has jurisdiction, in accordance with this Law” (Article 11, ídem). These latter articles must be read in conjunction with the provisions of the cited Article 8, which expressly includes as part of the control and oversight framework the regulations related to the budget process, public procurement, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials in these matters, which are undoubtedly rules that tend to ensure the legality and efficiency not only of internal controls but also the efficient and lawful management of public funds. Thus, it is not just any infraction committed by a public servant that gives rise to the application of Article 71, ídem. Only the infractions committed by persons performing a public function in the exercise of those special competences (management of public funds) and that violate either the regulations of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República or that superior control and oversight framework (rules on the budget process, public procurement, internal and external control, responsibilities in that matter) give rise to an extension of the period for exercising disciplinary power. In summary, the period for punishing actions or omissions contrary to those specific regulations, which may cause inefficient or illegal management of public funds, is longer than the generic one provided for in Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo, since in such cases the five-year period contemplated by that particular rule must be applied, which undoubtedly seeks to protect a public interest of great importance, which is the transparent management of public funds. In the case under analysis, the appellant maintains that, within her duties as a servant of the IDA, she was not in charge of the administration of public funds. Now, Article 1 of the Ley de Transformación del ITCO en Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA), No. 6735, of March 29, 1982, states: “The Instituto de Tierras y Colonización (ITCO) is transformed into the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA), as an autonomous institution of public law, with legal personality, its own assets, and administrative independence; Law No. 2825 of October 14, 1961, and its amendments, as well as any other law that opposes it, are deemed amended for such purposes.” For the purposes of the matter under analysis, it must be considered that the plaintiff, as a legal advisor in said institution, was dismissed for not adequately attending to –as a member of the directing body– a nullity proceeding regarding the act of awarding (adjudicación) a piece of land in favor of the Asociación Ecoturística y de Fomento Socieducativa de Grecia. The foregoing denotes that her duties included ensuring the correct administration and management of public assets that are part of the Hacienda Pública, as well as the public funds of the institution. From the resolution initiating the disciplinary proceeding and the imputation of charges against the plaintiff, it is clear that the administrative investigation took place precisely because she incurred in an omission of the duty of vigilance over all the acts necessary to bring the proceedings to the final decision of revoking the award of the parcel, as it was vitiated by absolute nullity, an infraction that generated violations of rules of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos. (Folios 273-288 of the administrative file). Likewise, from the content of the statement of facts number DFOE-ED-RH-01/2007, the attribution of unjustified delays in said proceeding is inferred, which led to an unfounded delay in the restitution of the property to the assets of the IDA, causing damage to the interests and purposes that institution must pursue. (Folios 2-16 and 697-722 of the administrative file). Thus, rules were cited such as Articles 108; subsections b. and r. of article 110; 113 of the Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos. The attributed facts were also subsumed under the infractions contemplated in Article 110 of the Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, which, in the invoked subsections, states: “Acts generating administrative responsibility. In addition to those provided for in other laws and regulations specific to the service relationship, the following […] shall be acts generating administrative responsibility: … b) The omission, delay, negligence, or imprudence in the preservation and safeguarding of assets or rights of the public domain or the adoption of willful actions against their protection, regardless of whether damage or injury has been consummated. […] r) Other conduct or omissions similar to the foregoing that result in diminution, affectation, or detriment to the Financial Administration of the State or its institutions.” The situations evidenced and on the basis of which the dismissal was ordered fall within the factual circumstances contemplated by the transcribed article. If the application of Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República occurs due to incurring in what both that law and those related to the superior control and oversight framework foresee as an infraction, it must be concluded, without a doubt, that the applicable period is the five years provided for therein, insofar as the plaintiff violated precepts of the Ley de Control Interno and by her conduct also injured the Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuesto Públicos. In the specific case, this superior control and oversight framework would also be related to the normative provisions that specifically regulate the proper functioning and administration of the public funds entrusted to the IDA, among which are the internal regulations of the institution, which are evidently violated by actions that involve a misguided disposition of the assets under the entity's charge. Consequently, the court resolved appropriately in considering that the applicable rule regarding the prescription of the disciplinary power is Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República and not the general rule contemplated in Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo. According to subsection b) of the cited Article 71, when dealing with facts that are not notorious, the five-year period will run from the date on which the report about the possible irregularity is brought to the attention of the hierarchy or the person competent to order the initiation of the administrative proceeding. In this case, it has been demonstrated that this communication took place on February 9, 2007 (folio 1 of the administrative file). In turn, the final resolution regarding the dismissal without employer liability was notified to the executive president of the IDA on December 4, 2008 (folios 871 to 872 of the administrative file) and the plaintiff was dismissed on February 17, 2009 (an undisputed fact), for which reason the peremptory period did not elapse. For the same reasons stated, as the one-month term of Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo is not applicable, no prescription whatsoever occurred between the dates of the last two mentioned events, as the plaintiff has suggested since the claim. Hence, the appellant's reproaches regarding this issue are not admissible.

V.- ON THE NULLITY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE: The court considered that no defect that would invalidate it was present in the disciplinary proceeding conducted against the plaintiff. To that end, that body relied on what was resolved by the Sala Constitucional when hearing an amparo appeal filed by her. Thus, in judgment number 4138, of 11:45 a.m. on February 26, 2010, the constitutional oversight body resolved: “The appellant claims that at the window of the Dirección de Recursos Humanos of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, they refused to receive her sick leave slips (boletas de incapacidad) that she presented on March 13, 2009, under the argument that she was no longer an employee of the institution. She accuses that she was never notified of such a decision, which violates her right to due process. In this regard, the IDA authorities stated that the appellant's sick leave slips were indeed not received given that since February 17, 2009, she is no longer an employee of the institution, by virtue of an order from the Contraloría General de la República. Indeed, through resolution No. PA-78-2007 of October 18, 2007, the Contraloría General de la República ordered the dismissal of the appellant as an employee of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, a resolution against which the corresponding appeals were filed, which were finally rejected. The appellant states that she did not learn of her definitive dismissal until March 26, 2009; however, from the brief filing the appeal, as well as from the reading of the other amparo proceedings initiated by the appellant, it is clear that at all times she has been aware of the Contraloría General de la República's provision ordering her dismissal, a decision that has been the subject of several amparo appeals that were subsequently rejected. On the other hand, official letter PE-015-2009 of January 7, 2009, is on record, in which the Executive President of the IDA notifies the appellant of her dismissal as an employee of the institution, in compliance with the order issued by the Comptroller body of the Republic. However, despite the IDA's constant attempts, the aforementioned official letter could not be served. In this regard, it is important to indicate that this Court has resolved in previous opportunities that the fact that the service relationship of a public official is suspended by virtue of a legally agreed sick leave (incapacidad para el trabajo) does not have the power to enervate the Administration's authority to separate him from his position in accordance with the law, nor to suspend the effects of the rulings issued by the competent bodies by virtue of the exercise of the cited authority, since affirming the contrary implies recognizing a limitation on that power that neither the Constitution nor the law establishes (see in this regard judgments 2003-03169 of 10:22 a.m. on April 25, 2003, and No. 2005-14031 of 10:19 a.m. on October 14, 2005). In any case, on March 13 itself, when the appellant appeared to leave her sick leave slips, it was explained to her that she no longer worked for the institution, and therefore, at that moment, she was also duly notified of such condition, reason why, since no employment relationship existed, the Administration was not obliged to receive and process the appellant's request. Now, regarding the alleged violation of due process, in a similar case, in judgment No. 2009-006534 of one thirty-eight p.m. on April twenty-four, two thousand nine, the Court considered, as relevant: 'The appellant sought protection of his right to due process since, in his opinion, he was irregularly dismissed by virtue of the fact that no prior administrative procedure was followed in which the Unidad and the Junta de Relaciones Laborales of the Institute participated (…). It is fully and suitably demonstrated that [Name1] was dismissed as recommended by the División de Asesoría y Gestión Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República in administrative procedure No. DAGJ-10-2007. In this particular, as the appellant neither alleged nor accredited in any way that any fundamental right was violated in that administrative procedure, the Court dismisses that the claimed infraction occurred.' … Finally, from the report rendered under the gravity of oath by the IDA authorities, it is understood that within the settlement corresponding to Mrs. [Name2], payments for percentage and for the adjustment to the increase decreed by the Central Government, effective January 1, 2009, were included, so the protected party is also not correct in her claim regarding the lack of payment of these items.” (Emphasis supplied). Consequently, that Court determined that there was no violation of due process in two fundamental aspects: the alleged lack of notification of the dismissal and the omission of intervention by the Junta de Relaciones Laborales. Note that as a basis for what was resolved, the following was taken into account: knowledge of the sanction when it was issued by the Contraloría General de la República, the difficulty of the IDA in notifying the employee despite material efforts to do so, the possibility of dismissing even during a period of sick leave, and the evident knowledge of the worker when she appeared to leave the sick leave slips. Thereafter, what was thus resolved by that body regarding a possible violation of due process from the perspective of constitutional guarantees has binding effects erga omnes in accordance with the provisions of Article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. However, this other Court also considers that from a legal standpoint, due process was not violated insofar as the plaintiff was already aware beforehand of the disciplinary cause pursued against her and the sanction imposed by the Contraloría General de la República. In this way, she had the opportunity to exercise her technical defense, so much so that she filed an appeal for reversal (revocatoria) and a subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio) against the resolution (folios 726-731 of the administrative file), means of challenge that were duly resolved by the Contraloría General de la República at the time (folios 732-757 of that same file). With respect to the omission to give participation to the Junta de Relaciones Laborales, it must be taken into account that, regardless of whether the collective bargaining agreement covered the plaintiff or not, the IDA only proceeded to comply with the order of the Contraloría General de la República, so it did not have to follow any procedure since the dismissal had already been ordered according to the powers of that entity. Furthermore, the Sala Constitucional, in the previously cited ruling, noted that in an analogous case, a similar resolution had been adopted because the dismissal order emanated from the Comptroller body. In summary, it is considered that no type of defenselessness was generated against the plaintiff, as she was also able to adequately exercise her rights from a legal perspective. Regarding the reproaches related to the sanctioning power of the Contraloría General de la República, it is appropriate to cite Article 68 of its Organic Law, which establishes: “POWER TO ORDER AND RECOMMEND SANCTIONS. The Contraloría General de la República, without prejudice to other sanctions provided by law, when in the exercise of its powers it determines that a servant of the passive subjects has committed infractions of the rules that make up the control and oversight framework contemplated in this Law or has caused injury to the Hacienda Pública, shall recommend to the competent administrative body or authority, through its technical criteria, which is binding, the application of the corresponding sanction according to the merits of the case. The Contraloría shall form a file against the eventual offender, guaranteeing, at all times, due process and sufficient opportunity for hearing and defense in their favor. The competent authority of the required passive subject must comply, within the period established by the Contraloría, with the recommendation issued by it; unless, within eight business days counting from the communication of the act, a review petition is filed, duly motivated and reasoned, by the head of the required passive subject. In this case, and once the indicated petition is resolved, it must comply, without delay, with the provisions of the final technical-legal ruling of the Contraloría, under penalty of incurring the crime of disobedience, without prejudice to the statute of limitations (prescripciones) system contemplated in this Law. The expiration of the period set by the Contraloría General de la República for the passive subject to impose the ordered sanction shall not, by itself, cause the servant's responsibility to prescribe or cause the passive subject's right to impose said sanction to lapse, without prejudice to the statute of limitations system contemplated in this Law. The right of the Contraloría General de la República to exercise, in the specific case, the power to recommend or order the application of sanctions shall prescribe within two years counting from the initiation of the respective file. The initiation of the file shall be understood with the order from the competent office of the Contraloría to begin the investigation of the case, in relation to specific servants.” From the preceding legal provision, it is inferred that it is an inherent power-duty of the nature of that entity and, due to this, the exercise of the power to sanction the plaintiff is deemed in accordance with the law, as it does not violate any legal rule. It is also important to highlight that this specific rule has been subject to analysis by the constitutional oversight body and it has been determined that it is not contrary to Constitutional Law. Thus, the Sala Constitucional, when resolving an action for unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), resolved the following: “ON THE CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA AS THE OVERSIGHT BODY OF THE HACIENDA PÚBLICA.- On various occasions, this Court has expressed itself regarding the important function performed by the Contraloría General de la República –a constitutional body attached to the Legislative Assembly regarding the management of the public treasury (hacienda pública)–. Thus, based on the provisions of Articles 183 and 184 of the Political Constitution, it has been delegated the important function of the superior, legal, and financial oversight of the management of the public treasury; so that it is a competence given by constitutional mandate, for which reason it has been indicated that it is a competence that the legislator cannot ignore, reduce, diminish, suppress, or attribute to other public bodies, but is obliged to recognize in order not to breach the constitutional rules and principles governing this matter. This is how these competences, even though they have their origin in the aforementioned constitutional norms, are developed in laws, such as the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, number 7428, the Ley de Creación de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, number 6821, the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, number 8131, the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública, number 8422, the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, number 7494. The oversight work of the public treasury empowers the Contraloría to exercise control in all the areas that concern it, that is, in public procurement procedures, in the management of the budgets of the various decentralized entities, and of course, in the financial management that public officials make of these resources (administration, custody, conservation, management, spending, and investment).” (Judgment number 13.926, of 14:44 on September 20, 2006. In a similar vein, also consult ruling number 6.611 of that court, of 14:50 on May 16, 2007). Thus, regarding this point of disagreement, the appealed decision must also be confirmed. Finally, it must be clarified that the reproach related to an action for unconstitutionality filed against Article 72 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República –currently in process before the Sala Constitucional– does not affect in any way the resolution of this other matter by the Sala Segunda, insofar as what is discussed in that action is the sanction of disqualification from holding public office in administrative proceedings and the insufficiency in the determination of the concept of serious infraction, circumstances that led this Chamber to issue the resolution of 11:28 on August 29, 2012 -folio 486- because they were deemed not to relate to the issues discussed here.

In any event, by means of the filing at folios 482 to 484 the plaintiff herself stated that there is no direct relationship between that action of unconstitutionality and her particular case.” </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html> Thus, in judgment number 4138, at 11:45 a.m. on February 26, 2010, the constitutional review body resolved: “The appellant claims that at the window of the Human Resources Directorate of the Institute of Agrarian Development they refused to accept her medical leave slips (boletas de incapacidad) that she presented on March 13, 2009, on the grounds that she was no longer an employee of the institution. She accuses that she was never informed of such a decision, which violates her right to due process (debido proceso). In this regard, the authorities of the IDA stated that the appellant’s medical leave slips were indeed not accepted given that since February 17, 2009, she is no longer an employee of the institution, by virtue of an order from the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). In effect, by resolution No. PA-78-2007 of October 18, 2007, the Comptroller General of the Republic ordered the dismissal of the appellant as an employee of the Institute of Agrarian Development, a resolution against which the corresponding appeals were filed, which were finally rejected. The appellant states that she did not have knowledge of her definitive dismissal until March 26, 2009; however, from the memorial filing the appeal, as well as from a reading of the other amparo proceedings initiated by the appellant, it is established that at all times she has had knowledge of the provision of the Comptroller General of the Republic ordering her dismissal, a decision that has been the subject of several amparo appeals that were subsequently rejected. It is recorded, on the other hand, in official letter PE-015-2009 of January 7, 2009, in which the Executive President of the IDA notifies the appellant of her dismissal as an employee of the institution, in compliance with what was ordered by the Comptroller entity of the Republic. However, despite the constant attempts of the IDA, the aforementioned official letter could not be served. In this regard, it is important to indicate that this Tribunal has resolved on previous occasions that the fact that the employment relationship of a public official is suspended by virtue of a legally agreed-upon work incapacity does not have the power to nullify the Administration's authority to separate them from their position in accordance with the law, nor to suspend the effects of the rulings issued by the competent bodies by virtue of the exercise of said authority, since affirming the contrary implies recognizing a limitation on that faculty that neither the Constitution nor the law establish (see in this sense judgments 2003-03169 at 10:22 hrs. on April 25, 2003 and No. 2005-14031 at 10:19 hrs. on October 14, 2005). In any case, on March 13 itself, when the appellant appeared to drop off her medical leave slips, it was explained to her that she no longer worked for the institution, so that at that moment she was also duly notified of such condition, which is why, as there was no employment relationship, the Administration was not obligated to receive and process the appellant’s request. Now, regarding the alleged violation of due process, in a similar case, in judgment No. 2009-006534 at thirteen hours and thirty-eight minutes on April twenty-fourth, two thousand nine, this Chamber considered in what is relevant: ‘The appellant sought protection of his right to due process since, in his opinion, he was dismissed irregularly, by virtue of the fact that a prior administrative proceeding was not followed in which the Unit and the Labor Relations Board of the Institute participated (…). It is fully and suitably demonstrated that [Name1] was dismissed as recommended by the Legal Advisory and Management Division of the Comptroller General of the Republic in administrative proceeding No. DAGJ-10-2007. On this particular point, as the appellant neither alleged nor demonstrated in any way that any fundamental right was violated in that administrative proceeding, this Chamber rules out that the alleged violation occurred.’ … Finally, from the report rendered under the gravity of oath by the authorities of the IDA, it is established that within the corresponding settlement for Mrs. [Name2], payments for the percentile (percentil) and for the adjustment to the increase decreed by the Central Government, effective as of January 1, 2009, were incorporated, which is why the protected party is also not correct in her claim when complaining about the lack of payment of these items.” (Emphasis added). Consequently, that Chamber determined that no violation of due process existed in two fundamental aspects: the alleged absence of notification of the dismissal and the omission of intervention by the Labor Relations Board. Note that as a basis for what was resolved, the following was taken into account: knowledge of the sanction when it was issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the difficulty of the IDA in notifying the employee despite the material efforts to do so, the possibility of dismissing even during a period of incapacity, and the evident knowledge of the worker when she appeared to drop off the incapacities. Therefore, what was thus resolved by that body regarding a possible violation of due process from the perspective of constitutional guarantees has binding effects erga omnes in accordance with the provisions of article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). However, this other Chamber also considers that from a legal standpoint due process was not violated insofar as the claimant already knew in advance of the disciplinary cause brought against her and the sanction imposed by the Comptroller General of the Republic. In such a manner, she had the opportunity to exercise her technical defense, so much so that she filed appeals for revocation (recursos de revocatoria) and a subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio) against what was resolved (pages 726-731 of the administrative file), means of challenge that were duly resolved by the Comptroller General of the Republic at the time (pages 732-757 of that same dossier). Regarding the omission to give participation to the Labor Relations Board, it must be taken into account that, regardless of whether the collective bargaining agreement covered the claimant or not, the IDA only proceeded to comply with the order of the Comptroller General of the Republic, so it did not have to follow any procedure since the dismissal had already been ordered according to the powers of that entity. Moreover, the Constitutional Chamber, in the previously cited ruling, pointed out that in an analogous case a similar resolution had been adopted because the dismissal order emanated from the comptroller entity. In summary, it is considered that no type of defenselessness was generated for the plaintiff, since she was also able to adequately exercise her rights from a legal perspective. Regarding the reproaches related to the sanctioning power of the Comptroller General of the Republic, it is worth citing article 68 of its Organic Law, which establishes: “POWER TO ORDER AND RECOMMEND SANCTIONS. The Comptroller General of the Republic, without prejudice to other sanctions provided for by law, when in the exercise of its powers it determines that a servant of the passive subjects has committed violations of the norms that make up the control and oversight framework contemplated in this Law or has caused harm to the Public Treasury, shall recommend to the competent administrative body or authority, through its technical opinion, which is binding (vinculante), the application of the corresponding sanction in accordance with the merits of the case. The Comptroller’s Office shall create a file (expediente) against the potential offender, guaranteeing them, at all times, due process and sufficient opportunity for a hearing and defense in their favor. The competent authority of the required passive subject must comply, within the period established by the Comptroller’s Office, with the recommendation issued by it; except that, within a term of eight business days counted from the notification of the act, a review request is filed, duly reasoned and substantiated, by the head of the required passive subject. In this case and once the indicated request is resolved, it must comply, without delay, with what is ordered in the final technical-legal pronouncement of the Comptroller’s Office, under penalty of incurring the crime of disobedience, without prejudice to the statute of limitations regime contemplated in this Law. The expiration of the period set by the Comptroller General of the Republic for the passive subject to impose the ordered sanction shall not, in itself, cause the responsibility of the servant to prescribe nor the right of the passive subject to impose said sanction to expire, without prejudice to the statute of limitations regime contemplated in this Law. The right of the Comptroller General of the Republic to exercise, in the specific case, the power to recommend or order the application of sanctions shall prescribe in a term of two years counted from the commencement of the respective file. The commencement of the file shall be understood with the order of the competent office of the Comptroller’s Office to begin the investigation of the case, in relation to certain servants.” From the foregoing legal provision, it is inferred that this is an inherent power-duty of the nature of that entity and, due to this, the exercise of the faculty to sanction the plaintiff is considered in accordance with the law, as it does not violate any legal norm. It is also important to highlight that this specific norm has been the subject of analysis by the constitutional review body and it has been determined that it is not contrary to Constitutional Law. Thus, the Constitutional Chamber, in resolving an unconstitutionality action, resolved the following: “ON THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC AS AN OVERSIGHT BODY OF THE PUBLIC TREASURY.- On various occasions this Tribunal has pronounced on the important function carried out by the Comptroller General of the Republic –a constitutional body attached to the Legislative Assembly in matters relating to the management of the public treasury–. Thus, it is based on the provisions of articles 183 and 184 of the Political Constitution that the important function of superior, legal, and financial oversight of the management of the public treasury has been delegated to it; such that it concerns a competence given by constitutional mandate, which is why it has been indicated that it is a competence that the legislator cannot ignore, reduce, diminish, suppress, or attribute to other public bodies, but rather is obligated to recognize so as not to breach the constitutional norms and principles that govern this matter. It is thus how these competences, even though they originate from the aforementioned constitutional norms, are developed in laws, such as the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, Law 7428, the Law Creating the Budgetary Authority, Law 6821, the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, Law 8131, the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in public function, Law 8422, the Law of Administrative Procurement, Law 7494. The oversight work of the public treasury empowers the Comptroller’s Office to exercise control in all areas that concern it, that is, in administrative procurement procedures, in the management of the budgets of the various decentralized entities, and of course, in the financial management that public officials make of these resources (administration, custody, conservation, handling, expenditure, and investment).” (Judgment number 13,926, at 14:44 hrs. on September 20, 2006. In a similar sense, also consult that chamber’s ruling number 6,611, at 14:50 hrs. on May 16, 2007). Thus, regarding this point of disagreement, the appealed judgment must also be confirmed. Finally, it must be clarified that the reproach related to an unconstitutionality action filed against article 72 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic –currently pending before the Constitutional Chamber– does not affect in any way the resolution of this other matter by the Second Chamber, insofar as what is being discussed in that action is the sanction of disqualification from holding public office in an administrative venue and the insufficiency in the determination of the concept of serious misconduct, circumstances that led this Chamber to issue the resolution at 11:28 a.m. on August 29, 2012 –folio 486– as it was considered that they were not related to the issues discussed here. In any case, through the document at folios 482 to 484, the plaintiff herself stated that there is no direct relationship between that unconstitutionality action and her particular case.”

“IV.- DE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN DE LA POTESTAD DISCIPLINARIA: Vistos los agravios de la recurrente, se estima necesario conocer primeramente lo relativo a la prescripción, pues en caso de resultar procedente, a nada conduciría conocer los demás motivos de disconformidad. El reproche planteado en cuanto a este tema exige determinar si el plazo de prescripción aplicable para el ejercicio del poder disciplinario del ente empleador era el de un mes que contempla el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo o el especial de cinco años que regula el numeral 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. El texto de esta última norma, al momento de los hechos investigados, es el que se encuentra vigente en la actualidad y, en forma expresa, establece: “La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: a) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho. b) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea notorio –entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad- la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo. La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo. Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo. Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar que la responsabilidad del infractor prescriba, sin causa justificada. (Así reformado por el inciso a) del artículo 45 de la Ley N° 8292 de 31 de julio del 2002, Ley de Control Interno)” . (La negrita no es del original). Del texto resaltado se extrae que el plazo ampliado que prevé dicha norma resulta de aplicación cuando el o la funcionaria pública incurren en las infracciones previstas en esa ley específica o bien en las que contempla el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores de la Hacienda Pública, según lo regulado en los artículos 1° y 8 de la Ley Orgánica relacionada. La Contraloría General de la República ejerce control sobre los entes y órganos que integran la Hacienda Pública, sin perjuicio de la regulación facultativa que puede desplegar respecto de otros entes. Ahora bien, de conformidad con el artículo 8 ídem “La Hacienda Pública estará constituida por los fondos públicos, las potestades para percibir, administrar, custodiar, conservar, manejar, gastar e invertir tales fondos y las normas jurídicas, administrativas y financieras, relativas al proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control interno y externo y la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos”. (Los destacados son de quien redacta). De conformidad con dicho numeral, la Hacienda Pública está constituida por dos componentes esenciales: a) los fondos públicos (y todo lo relacionado con su manejo) y b) las normas jurídicas de carácter administrativo y financiero relativas al proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control –tanto externo como interno- y la responsabilidad de las y los servidores públicos en esas materias. La ley se encarga de definir lo que ha de entenderse por fondos públicos y también por ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, que son los términos expresos que contempla el artículo 71 relacionado. Así, en el canon 9 se definen los fondos públicos como todos aquellos “…recursos, valores, bienes y derechos propiedad del Estado, de órganos, de empresas o de entes públicos”. El numeral 10 siguiente, por su parte, señala: “El ordenamiento de control y de fiscalización superiores de la Hacienda Pública comprende el conjunto de normas, que regulan la competencia, la estructura, la actividad, las relaciones, los procedimientos, las responsabilidades y las sanciones derivados de esa fiscalización o necesarios para esta. Este ordenamiento comprende también las normas que regulan la fiscalización sobre entes y órganos extranjeros y fondos y actividades privados, a los que se refiere esta Ley, como su norma fundamental, dentro del marco constitucional”. Ese ordenamiento de control y fiscalización tiene como finalidad primordial “…garantizar la legalidad y la eficiencia de los controles internos y del manejo de los fondos públicos en los entes sobre los cuales tiene jurisdicción la Contraloría General de la República, de conformidad con esta Ley” (artículo 11, ídem). Estos últimos numerales deben leerse en concordancia con lo estipulado en el artículo 8 citado, que expresamente incluye como parte del ordenamiento de control y fiscalización a la normativa relacionada con el proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control interno y externo y la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos en esas materias, que sin duda son normas que tienden a velar por la legalidad y la eficiencia no solo de los controles internos sino también por el manejo eficiente y apegado a la ley de los fondos públicos. Así, no es cualquier falta cometida por un servidor o servidora pública la que da lugar a la aplicación del artículo 71 ídem. Son únicamente las faltas cometidas por las personas que desempeñan una función pública en el ejercicio de esas especiales competencias (manejo de los fondos públicos) y que infrinjan, ya sea las regulaciones de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República o de ese ordenamiento de control y fiscalización (normativa sobre proceso presupuestario, contratación administrativa, control interno y externo, responsabilidades en esa materia) las que dan lugar a una ampliación del plazo para el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria. En resumen, el período para sancionar las acciones u omisiones contrarias a esas regulaciones específicas, que pueden ocasionar un manejo ineficiente o ilegal de los fondos públicos, es mayor que el genérico previsto en el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo, pues en tales supuestos debe aplicarse el de cinco años que contempla aquella norma particular, que sin duda busca tutelar un interés público de gran trascendencia, cual es el manejo transparente de los fondos públicos. En el caso bajo análisis, la recurrente sostiene que dentro de sus funciones como servidora del IDA no tenía a cargo la administración de fondos públicos. Ahora bien, el artículo 1 de la Ley de Transformación del ITCO en Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA), n.º 6735, de 29 de marzo de 1982, dice: “Transfórmase el Instituto de Tierras y Colonización (ITCO), en el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA), como una institución autónoma de derecho público, con personalidad jurídica, patrimonio propio e independencia administrativa; teniéndose por reformada, para tales efectos, la ley Nº 2825 del 14 de octubre de 1961 y sus reformas, así como cualquier otra ley que se le oponga” . Para los efectos del asunto bajo análisis, debe considerarse que la accionante como asesora legal en dicha institución fue despedida por no atender adecuadamente –como integrante del órgano director- un procedimiento de nulidad del acto de adjudicación de un terreno a favor de la Asociación Ecoturística y de Fomento Socieducativa de Grecia. Lo anterior denota que dentro de sus funciones se encontraba velar por la correcta administración y manejo de los bienes públicos que hacen parte de la Hacienda Pública, así como por los fondos públicos de la institución. De la resolución de apertura del procedimiento disciplinario e imputación de cargos realizado a la accionante se desprende que la investigación administrativa tuvo lugar precisamente por haber incurrido en una omisión del deber de vigilancia respecto de todos los actos necesarios para llevar los autos a la decisión final de la revocatoria de la adjudicación de la parcela, al estar viciada de nulidad absoluta, falta que generó violación a normas de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Ley General de la Administración Pública y Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos. (Folios 273-288 del legajo administrativo). Asimismo, del contenido de la relación de hechos número DFOE-ED-RH-01/2007 se infiere la atribución de atrasos injustificados en dicho procedimiento que conllevó a un retardo infundado en la restitución del inmueble al patrimonio del IDA, lo cual generó daños a los intereses y fines que debe perseguir esa institución. (Folios 2-16 y 697-722 del expediente administrativo). Así, se citaron normas como los artículos 108; incisos b. y r. del numeral 110; 113 de la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos. Los hechos endilgados también fueron subsumidos en las faltas contempladas en el artículo 110 de la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, que en los incisos invocados, señala: “Hechos generadores de responsabilidad administrativa. Además de los previstos en otras leyes y reglamentaciones propias de la relación de servicio, serán hechos generadores de responsabilidad administrativa, […], los mencionados a continuación: … b) La omisión, el retardo, la negligencia o la imprudencia en la preservación y salvaguarda de los bienes o derechos del patrimonio público o la adopción de acciones dolosas contra su protección, independientemente de que se haya consumado un daño o lesión. […] r) Otras conductas u omisiones similares a las anteriores que redunden en disminución, afectación o perjuicio de la Administración Financiera del Estado o sus instituciones”. Las situaciones evidenciadas y con base en las cuales se dispuso el despido se enmarcan en los supuestos de hecho que contempla el numeral trascrito. Si la aplicación del artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República se da por incurrir en lo que tanto esa ley como las relacionadas con el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores prevén como una infracción, debe concluirse, sin lugar a dudas, que el plazo aplicable es el de cinco años ahí previsto, en el tanto en que la demandante violentó, preceptos de la Ley de Control Interno y con su actuar también lesionó la Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuesto Públicos. En el caso concreto, este ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores estaría también relacionado con las disposiciones normativas que regulan concretamente el buen funcionamiento y la administración de los fondos públicos encomendados al IDA, dentro de las que se encuentran las regulaciones internas de la institución, las cuales, evidentemente, resultan vulneradas con acciones que impliquen una desacertada disposición de los bienes a cargo de la entidad. Por consiguiente, el tribunal resolvió apropiadamente al estimar que la norma aplicable en cuanto a la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria es el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República y no la general contemplada en el canon 603 del Código de Trabajo. Según el inciso b), del numeral 71 citado, cuando se trate de hechos que no son notorios, el plazo de cinco años correrá a partir de la fecha en que el informe acerca de la posible irregularidad es puesto en conocimiento de la jerarquía o de la persona competente para disponer el inicio del procedimiento administrativo. En este caso, se ha tenido por demostrado que esa comunicación tuvo lugar el 9 de febrero de 2007 (folio 1 del legajo administrativo). Por su parte, la resolución en firme sobre el despido sin responsabilidad patronal se le notificó al presidente ejecutivo del IDA el 4 de diciembre de 2008 (folios 871 a 872 del expediente administrativo) y a la actora se le despidió el 17 de febrero de 2009 (hecho no controvertido), razón por la cual el plazo perentorio no transcurrió. Por las mismas razones expuestas, al no ser aplicable el término de un mes del artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, no acaeció prescripción alguna entre las fechas de los últimos dos acontecimientos mencionados, como lo ha sugerido la accionante desde la demanda. De ahí que no sean de recibo los reproches de la recurrente en cuanto a este tema.

V.- SOBRE LA NULIDAD EN EL PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO: El tribunal consideró que en el proceso disciplinario seguido contra la actora no se había presenciado vicio alguno que lo invalidara. Para ello, ese órgano se basó en lo resuelto por la Sala Constitucional al conocer de un recurso de amparo interpuesto por ella. Así, en el fallo número 4138, de las 11:45 horas del 26 de febrero de 2010, el órgano contralor de constitucionalidad resolvió: “Reclama la recurrente que en la ventanilla de la Dirección de Recursos Humanos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario se negaron a recibirle sus boletas de incapacidad que presentó el 13 de marzo del 2009, bajo el argumento de que ya no era funcionaria de la institución. Acusa que nunca fue comunicada de tal decisión lo que violenta su derecho al debido proceso. Al respecto, las autoridades del IDA manifestaron que efectivamente a la recurrente no se le recibieron sus boletas de incapacidad dado que desde el 17 de febrero del 2009, ya no es funcionaria de la institución, en virtud de una orden de la Contraloría General de la República. En efecto, mediante resolución No. PA-78-2007 del 18 de octubre del 2007 la Contraloría General de la República ordenó el despido de la recurrente como funcionaria del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, resolución contra la que se interpusieron los recursos correspondientes, que finalmente fueron rechazados. La recurrente manifiesta que no tuvo conocimiento de su despido definitivo, sino hasta el 26 de marzo del 2009, sin embargo del memorial de interposición del recurso, como de la lectura de los demás procesos de amparo incoados por la recurrente, se tiene que en todo momento ha tenido conocimiento de la disposición de la Contraloría General de la República que ordena su despido, decisión que ha sido objeto de varios recursos de amparo que posteriormente fueron rechazados. Consta por otro lado, el oficio PE-015-2009 del 7 de enero del 2009, en el que el Presidente Ejecutivo del IDA comunica a la recurrente su despido como funcionaria de la institución, en atención a lo dispuesto por el ente Contralor de la República. Sin embargo, pese a los constantes intentos del IDA, el oficio en mención no pudo ser notificado. Al respecto, es importante indicar que este Tribunal ha resuelto en anteriores oportunidades que el hecho que la relación de servicio de un funcionario público esté suspendida en virtud de una incapacidad para el trabajo legalmente acordada, no tiene la virtud de enervar la potestad que tiene la Administración para separarlo del cargo conforme a la ley, ni la de suspender los efectos de los pronunciamientos dictados por los órganos competentes en virtud del ejercicio de la citada potestad, pues afirmar lo contrario implica reconocer una limitación a esa facultad que ni la Constitución, ni la ley establecen (ver en este sentido las sentencias 2003-03169 de las 10:22 hrs. del 25 de abril de 2003 y la Nº 2005-14031 de las 10:19 hrs. del 14 de octubre de 2005). En todo caso, el propio 13 de marzo, cuando la recurrente se presentó a dejar sus boletas de incapacidad se le explicó que ya no laboraba para la institución, por lo que en ese momento también quedó debidamente notificada de tal condición, razón por la que al no existir una relación laboral, la Administración no se encontraba obligada a recibir y tramitar la gestión de la recurrente. Ahora, respecto a la alegada violación al debido proceso, en un caso similar, en la sentencia No. 2009-006534 de las trece horas y treinta y ocho minutos del veinticuatro de abril del dos mil nueve, la Sala consideró en lo que interesa: ‘El recurrente demandó la tutela de su derecho al debido proceso pues, en su criterio, fue despedido, irregularmente, en virtud que no se siguió un procedimiento administrativo previo en que participara la Unidad y la Junta de Relaciones Laborales del Instituto (…). Se encuentra plena e idóneamente demostrado que [Nombre1]. fue despedido conforme lo recomendó la División de Asesoría y Gestión Jurídica de la Contraloría General de la República en el procedimiento administrativo Nº DAGJ-10-2007. En este particular, como el recurrente no alegó, ni acreditó de modo alguno que en ese procedimiento administrativo se haya vulnerado derecho fundamental alguno descarta la Sala que se haya producido la infracción reclamada’. … Finalmente, del informe rendido bajo gravedad de juramento por las autoridades del IDA, se tiene que dentro de la liquidación correspondiente a la señora [Nombre2]. se incorporaron los pagos por porcentil y por ajuste al aumento decretado por el Gobierno Central, con fecha de rige 1 de enero del 2009, por lo que tampoco lleva razón la amparada en su alegato al reclamar la falta de pago de estos extremos” . (Énfasis suplido). En consecuencia, esa Sala determinó que no existió violación al debido proceso en dos aspectos fundamentales: la presunta ausencia de notificación del despido y la omisión de intervención de la Junta de Relaciones Laborales. Nótese que como fundamento para lo resuelto se tomó en cuenta el conocimiento de la sanción cuando fue dictada por la Contraloría General de la República, la dificultad del IDA de notificar a la funcionaria a pesar de los esfuerzos materiales para ello, la posibilidad de despedir aun en periodo de incapacidad y el evidente conocimiento de la trabajadora al presentarse a dejar las incapacidades. Luego, lo así resuelto por ese órgano en cuanto a una posible vulneración del debido proceso desde la perspectiva de las garantías constitucionales, tiene efectos vinculantes erga omnes de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el numeral 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. No obstante, esta otra Sala también estima que desde el punto de vista legal no se violó el debido proceso en tanto la demandante ya conocía de antemano la causa disciplinaria seguida en su contra y la sanción impuesta por la Contraloría General de la República. De tal forma, tuvo la oportunidad de ejercer su defensa técnica, tan es así que interpuso los recursos de revocatoria y apelación en subsidio contra lo resuelto (folios 726-731 del expediente administrativo), medios de impugnación que fueron debidamente resueltos por la Contraloría General de la República en su momento (folios 732-757 de ese mismo legajo). En lo que respecta a la omisión de dar participación a la Junta de Relaciones Laborales, debe tomarse en cuenta que, independientemente de si la convención colectiva cubría o no a la demandante, el IDA solo procedió a acatar la orden de la Contraloría General de la República, por lo que no debía seguir procedimiento alguno por haberse ya dispuesto el despido según las facultades de aquella entidad. Además, la Sala Constitucional, en el voto antes citado, hizo ver que en un caso análogo se había adoptado una resolución similar por cuanto la orden de despido emanaba del ente contralor. En síntesis, se estima que no se generó ningún tipo de indefensión a la accionante, pues esta también pudo ejercer adecuadamente sus derechos desde la perspectiva legal. En lo tocante a los reproches relacionados con la facultad sancionadora de la Contraloría General de República, cabe citar el artículo 68 de su Ley Orgánica, el cual establece: “POTESTAD PARA ORDENAR Y RECOMENDAR SANCIONES. La Contraloría General de la República, sin perjuicio de otras sanciones previstas por ley, cuando en el ejercicio de sus potestades determine que un servidor de los sujetos pasivos ha cometido infracciones a las normas que integran el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización contemplado en esta Ley o ha provocado lesión a la Hacienda Pública, recomendará al órgano o autoridad administrativa competente, mediante su criterio técnico, que es vinculante, la aplicación de la sanción correspondiente de acuerdo con el mérito del caso. La Contraloría formará expediente contra el eventual infractor, garantizándole, en todo momento, un proceso debido y la oportunidad suficiente de audiencia y de defensa en su favor. La autoridad competente del sujeto pasivo requerido deberá cumplir, dentro del plazo que le establezca la Contraloría, con la recomendación impartida por esta; salvo que, dentro del término de ocho días hábiles contados a partir de la comunicación del acto, se interponga una gestión de revisión, debidamente motivada y razonada, por parte del jerarca del sujeto pasivo requerido. En este caso y una vez resuelta la gestión indicada, deberá cumplir, sin dilación, con lo dispuesto en el pronunciamiento técnico jurídico final de la Contraloría, so pena de incurrir en el delito de desobediencia, sin perjuicio del régimen de prescripciones contemplado en esta Ley. La expiración del plazo fijado por la Contraloría General de la República para que el sujeto pasivo imponga la sanción ordenada, no hará prescribir, por sí, la responsabilidad del servidor ni caducar el derecho del sujeto pasivo a imponer dicha sanción, sin perjuicio del régimen de prescripciones contemplado en esta Ley. El derecho de la Contraloría General de la República a ejercer, en el caso concreto, la potestad para recomendar u ordenar la aplicación de sanciones prescribirá en el término de dos años contados a partir de la iniciación del expediente respectivo. El inicio del expediente se entenderá con la orden de la oficina competente de la Contraloría para comenzar la investigación del caso, en relación con determinados servidores”. De la anterior disposición legal se infiere que se trata de una potestad-deber intrínseca a la naturaleza de ese ente y, debido a ello, el ejercicio de la facultad de sancionar a la actora se estima conforme a derecho, al no violar norma legal alguna. Es importante destacar también que esa concreta norma ha sido objeto de análisis por parte del órgano contralor de constitucionalidad y se ha determinado que no es contraria al Derecho de la Constitución. Así, la Sala Constitucional, al resolver una acción de inconstitucionalidad resolvió lo siguiente: “DE LA CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA COMO ÓRGANO FISCALIZADOR DE LA HACIENDA PÚBLICA.- En diversas ocasiones este Tribunal se ha manifestado en torno a la importante función que realiza la Contraloría General de la República –órgano constitucional adscrito a la Asamblea Legislativa en lo relativo al manejo de la hacienda pública–. Así, es con fundamento en lo dispuesto en los artículos 183 y 184 de la Constitución Política que se le ha delegado la importante función de la fiscalización superior, jurídica y financiera del manejo de la hacienda pública; de manera que se trata de una competencia dada por mandato constitucional, por lo que se ha indicado que se trata de una competencia que el legislador no puede desconocer, rebajar, disminuir, suprimir o atribuírsela a otros órganos públicos, sino que está en la obligación de reconocer a fin de no quebrantar las normas y principios constitucionales que rigen esta materia. Es así como estas competencias, aún cuando tienen su origen en las normas constitucionales supra-citadas, están desarrolladas en las leyes, tales como la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, número 7428, Ley de Creación de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, número 6821, Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, número 8131, Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública, número 8422, Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, número 7494. La labor de fiscalización de la hacienda pública faculta a la Contraloría a ejercer control en todos los ámbitos que le conciernen, esto es, en los procedimientos de la contratación administrativa, en el manejo de los presupuestos de las diversas entidades descentralizadas, y por supuesto, en la gestión financiera que los funcionarios públicos hacen de estos recursos (administración, custodia, conservación, manejo, gasto e inversión)”. (Sentencia número 13.926, de las 14:44 horas del 20 de setiembre de 2006. En un sentido similar, consúltese también el voto de esa sala número 6.611, de las 14:50 horas del 16 de mayo de 2007). Así, en cuanto a este punto de disconformidad, también debe confirmarse el fallo recurrido. Finalmente, debe aclararse que el reproche relacionado con una acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta contra el artículo 72 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República -actualmente en trámite en la Sala Constitucional-, no afecta en nada la resolución de este otro asunto por parte de la Sala Segunda, en tanto lo que en aquella se discute es la sanción de inhabilitación para ocupar cargos públicos en sede administrativa y la insuficiencia en la determinación del concepto de falta grave, circunstancias que llevaron a esta Cámara a emitir la resolución de las 11:28 horas del 29 de agosto de 2012 -folio 486- por estimarse que no se relacionaban con los temas aquí discutidos. En todo caso, mediante escrito de folios 482 a 484 la propia accionante manifestó que no existe relación directa entre esa acción de inconstitucionalidad y su caso particular.”