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Res. 00126-2012 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV · 29/11/2012
OutcomeResultado
The existence of a contractual award-for-sale relationship between INVU and the plaintiff is declared, and the execution of a deed is ordered; the contested administrative acts are annulled and administrative inertia is found; the claim for moral damages is denied.Se declara la existencia del vínculo contractual de adjudicación para venta entre el INVU y el actor, ordenándose otorgar escritura; se anulan los actos administrativos impugnados y se acoge la declaratoria de inercia administrativa; se rechaza la indemnización por daño moral.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Court, Section IV, ruled on a claim by a citizen who had occupied an INVU apartment since 1991, making payments without a written contract or formal deed. The INVU denied any contractual relationship and sought to apply a current appraisal to the property. Based on the principle of legitimate reliance and evidence of payments and long-term possession, the Court found that a sale award contract existed, effective from the taking of possession and payment of the premium. It annulled the administrative acts denying the relationship and found administrative inertia due to lack of records. It ordered the INVU to grant the property deed without a new appraisal. The claim for moral damages was dismissed for lack of proof.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV analiza la demanda de un ciudadano que ocupaba un apartamento del INVU desde 1991, habiendo realizado pagos sin que se hubiera formalizado un contrato escrito ni la escritura correspondiente. El INVU negaba la existencia del vínculo contractual y pretendía aplicar un avalúo actualizado al inmueble. El Tribunal, basándose en el principio de confianza legítima y en la prueba de pagos y posesión prolongada, determinó que existió un contrato de adjudicación para venta, cuyos efectos se produjeron desde la toma de posesión y el pago de la prima. Declaró la nulidad de los actos administrativos que negaban el vínculo y la inercia administrativa por la falta de registros, y ordenó al INVU otorgar la escritura de propiedad, sin imponer un nuevo avalúo. Se rechazó la pretensión de daño moral por falta de prueba.
Key excerptExtracto clave
It follows that the main purpose of registration is essentially to ensure the effectiveness of the contract vis-à-vis third parties through public notice, but it is not a condition of its validity. This Court considers that, as indicated and according to the described characteristics, not every award contract has the effects stated above, and a distinction must be made between three different types of legal relationships: a) the award contract made for the subsequent sale of the property. In this first case, the payments made by the beneficiary are payments toward the debt. b) the pure and simple lease contract, where the payments made are simply the rental price, and c) the lease contract with the possibility of converting to a sale. Here the initial payments are the rental price of the property and may later become payments toward its price. In the first scenario a), the cited rules indicate that an advance on the payment of the property's value may be required, and the transfer price shall be agreed by the entity's Board of Directors. [...] In the specific case under analysis, although there is no formal written award contract, it is not possible to burden the plaintiff with the negative consequences of such situation at the administrative level, given that the record contains evidence of the beginning and development of a contractual relationship between the defendant entity and Mr. Quintanilla Dávila.De lo anterior se concluye que la inscripción registral tiene como fin principal, básicamente garantizar la eficacia del contrato, respecto de terceros, en virtud de la publicidad registral, mas no es condición de validez del mismo. Este Tribunal estima que en orden a lo indicado, según las características descritas, no todo contrato de adjudicación posee los efectos indicados en las citas señaladas ut supra, siendo así que debe distinguirse entre tres tipos de relaciones jurídicas diferentes, a saber, a) el contrato de adjudicación realizado para la venta posterior del inmueble. En este primer caso los pagos que realice el beneficiario son abonos a la deuda. b) el contrato de arrendamiento puro y simple, en donde los pagos realizados es el simple precio del arrendamiento, y c) el contrato de arrendamiento con la posibilidad a mutar a venta. En donde los pagos inicialmente son el precio del alquiler del inmueble y con posterioridad pueden llegar a ser abonos al precio del mismo. En el caso del primer supuesto a), las normas de cita indican que se podrá exigir un adelanto al pago del valor de la vivienda, siendo así que el valor del traslado de ésta será acordado por la Junta Directiva del ente. [...] En el caso concreto de análisis se advierte que si bien no existe prueba de la existencia de un documento formal de contrato de adjudicación, no es posible cargar al actor con las consecuencias negativa de tal situación en sede administrativa, en tanto que en autos consta prueba sobre el inicio y desarrollo de un vínculo contractual entre el ente demandado y el señor Quintanilla Dávila.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Este Tribunal estima que la ausencia de demostración de existencia de un contrato de adjudicación, no es motivo suficiente como para deslegitimar la situación jurídica del actor respecto del apartamento G-21 y no implica que su posesión sea precaria o que no merezca tutela jurídica."
"This Court considers that the failure to prove the existence of an award contract is not sufficient reason to delegitimize the plaintiff's legal situation regarding apartment G-21, nor does it mean that his possession is precarious or undeserving of legal protection."
Considerando V
"Este Tribunal estima que la ausencia de demostración de existencia de un contrato de adjudicación, no es motivo suficiente como para deslegitimar la situación jurídica del actor respecto del apartamento G-21 y no implica que su posesión sea precaria o que no merezca tutela jurídica."
Considerando V
"La emisión de recibos por parte del ente indicando aceptación de pago e indicando claramente el concepto por el cual recibía cada suma, crean una situación jurídica favorable al actor, acorde con los propósitos de creación de esta jurisdicción."
"The issuance of receipts by the entity indicating acceptance of payment and clearly stating the purpose for which each sum was received creates a legal situation favorable to the plaintiff, in accordance with the purposes of the creation of this jurisdiction."
Considerando V
"La emisión de recibos por parte del ente indicando aceptación de pago e indicando claramente el concepto por el cual recibía cada suma, crean una situación jurídica favorable al actor, acorde con los propósitos de creación de esta jurisdicción."
Considerando V
"Los actos indicados son contrarios al principio de confianza legítima y de interdicción de arbitrariedad, por cuanto de manera infundada y contraria al derecho y las circunstancias propias de la relación jurídica, niega la existencia de ésta."
"The indicated acts are contrary to the principle of legitimate reliance and the prohibition of arbitrariness, because without justification and contrary to the law and the specific circumstances of the legal relationship, they deny its existence."
Considerando sobre nulidad
"Los actos indicados son contrarios al principio de confianza legítima y de interdicción de arbitrariedad, por cuanto de manera infundada y contraria al derecho y las circunstancias propias de la relación jurídica, niega la existencia de ésta."
Considerando sobre nulidad
Full documentDocumento completo
IV.Regarding the subject matter of the proceedings: From what has been expressed by the parties, both in their claims and arguments, the subject matter of this proceeding consists of determining the existence of nullity defects in the administrative conduct objected to by the plaintiff, as well as the existence of a contractual link between the latter and the sued entity. Additionally, it must be determined whether the existence of damages caused by any conduct or omission of any official of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo has been proven.
Regarding the existence of a contractual link between the plaintiff and the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo: In its claim, the plaintiff states that he acquired apartment number G-21 in the El Corral condominium in 1991 for the sum of eight hundred seventy-six thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones, and that since that date, he asserts, it was placed in his possession and awarded by the selling entity. Based on the foregoing, he requests that it be declared that he is the owner of said apartment, located in Curridabat, and that the sued entity be ordered to proceed to title the aforementioned property in his name. The Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo denies the existence of any contractual link with Mr. Quintanilla Dávila and states that there is no award contract (contrato de adjudicación) with the plaintiff, and therefore he does not possess any right over the apartment that is the subject of the dispute.
In this regard, this Court considers that to resolve this aspect of the claim, the following considerations must be made: The Organic Law of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, No. 1788 of August 24, 1954, establishes as the competence of said entity, the leasing of homes from its patrimony to families that lack adequate housing and the necessary means to obtain it. Additionally, Article 5 of said normative body establishes as a power of the same: ".....h) Lease, sell, exchange, encumber and administer the homes, community service centers that it acquires or builds, as well as the other assets of its property" and "....ñ) Enter into all contracts and carry out all administrative, civil, industrial or commercial acts that are convenient or necessary for the better fulfillment of its purposes..." Regarding the regulation of the relationship between the entity and the beneficiaries of its programs, Article 39 of said law states the following: "The types of house construction, their building, leasing, repair or sale and in general, the prohibitions, restrictive clauses, interest rates, amortization, conservation, insurance, terms and other details on economic organization, building, improvement, award (adjudicación) and definitive transfer, shall be determined in the Regulations that the Board of Directors issues for that purpose." As noted, the indicated norm leaves the aspects related to the regulation of the relationship to which the families that inhabit the Institution's housing solutions would be subject to the exercise of regulatory power.
By reason of the foregoing, it was enacted by means of an executive decree, not autonomous, as the law had indicated, the Reglamento de Adjudicación de Vivienda, Decree No. 2 of January 13, 1955, which establishes, regarding what interests us, the following: "Article 6.—The homes may be awarded (adjudicadas) under titles of sale, rental, and rental-sale, at the discretion of the Board of Directors. In the sale award (adjudicación de venta), the Board of Directors may require an advance payment of the value of the home, as permitted by the type and quality of the house. By virtue of the rental-sale contract, the awardee (adjudicatario) who initially rents has the option to purchase the home, for the value established in the original agreement, during a maximum period of five years. The Board of Directors may establish minimum rental-sale periods, which will serve to test the awardee's interest in terms of permanence.
Upon formalizing the sale, the Institute may determine the term to cancel the price, in accordance with the contracting party's income. The interest rate included in the rental fee shall also govern the sale operation. The tenant who allows the option period to lapse in vain may either acquire the home according to a reappraisal thereof, or continue as a lessee, but in this second case they must henceforth cover a rental fee equal to that which as a buyer would correspond to them according to the immediately following article. The Board of Directors shall in this case set the duration of the period and the conditions for renewing the lease." "Article 7.—The price of homes awarded (adjudicadas) in sale shall be determined by the Board of Directors, taking into consideration the cost price. The Board shall also determine the term for canceling said price and the interest rate that corresponds to each category and, based on both, the Financial Department shall calculate the corresponding monthly installments.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the awardee may make payments toward the debt or cancel it at any date, before its maturity." Complementarily, Article 9 of the norm provides that the beneficiary was obliged to sign a contract, in accordance with the following provisions: "Article 9.—The rental regime resulting from rental or rental-sale contracts shall be governed in all other respects by the provisions that are applicable to leasing in this Regulation and in the Regulation on Leasing in Multi-family Buildings. The houses shall be delivered to the acquirers, prior to an inspection thereof, and a contract must be signed containing:
Note how only in the rent-sale scenario does Article 6 of the Regulations expressly indicate that "the lessee who allows the option period to expire in vain may either acquire the dwelling according to a reassessment," given that in the case of a pure and simple sale it only indicates the necessary setting of amounts and installments by the Board of Directors, but without providing that a new appraisal for the current price of a property is required, whose price was agreed upon more than twenty years ago. It is relevant to indicate that said regulation was the one in force at the time the contractual bond was perfected, and as it is an executive decree, it has not lost its effects for the particular case of the plaintiff, given that the subsequent Regulations for the Awarding of Social Interest Housing, in force since January 20, 1995, was approved by agreement of the INVU's Board of Directors, which could not repeal the former, as it is a norm of higher rank.
By reason of the foregoing, the representation of the defendant is not correct when it alleges that the plaintiff's case must be governed by the Appraisal Regulations and Agreement Number 4450 of October 11, 1994, Article III, subsection 14-B of the entity, which grants them validity for six months for determining the value of goods or rights, since they apply to scenarios different from those of Mr. Quintanilla, who, as indicated, possesses a legal situation creating a subjective right in his favor, under a private contractual bond entered into with the INVU since 1991, founded on an executive decree, against which an autonomous regulation with scopes different from those that gave rise to the relationship subject to this resolution cannot be opposed. This Court deems it appropriate to uphold the claim established so that it is declared that the plaintiff has a right to be granted registered ownership of apartment G-21 of the El Corral Condominium, located in Curridabat, which must be recognized for purposes of granting the respective deed in his favor, by the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism, with the caveats to be indicated in this resolution.
V.On the nullity of the challenged acts: The plaintiff requests that the nullity of the following acts be declared: a) official letter C-PPT-531-2011 b) Resolution GG-234-2011 of the General Management of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism c) agreement made by the INVU's Board of Directors, according to Article II, subsection 3), Points a), b), c), e) of the minutes of ordinary session No. 5884, of June 29, 2011, and communicated through official letter CJD-113-2011, of July 13, 2011. In this regard, it invokes the arguments analyzed in the preceding recital to substantiate defects in the grounds (motivación) and content of the acts. In this respect, having analyzed the indicated acts, based on the considerations previously made, this Court deems it appropriate to uphold this part of the claim, given that the indicated conducts start from the assumption of the non-existence of a contractual bond with the plaintiff, based on the non-existence of the award contract document.
It must be taken into consideration, given the nature of the formal conducts challenged, that the formal action of the Public Administration, materialized in the adoption of administrative acts (understood as unilateral declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge issued in the exercise of the administrative function), must necessarily possess a series of material and formal elements to be fully valid and effective. As material or substantive elements, we have the competence of the subject issuing the act, the cause (motivo) giving rise to it—understood as the legal or factual antecedents or presuppositions of the administrative conduct—the content, that is, what the act itself provides (which must be lawful, possible, clear, proportional, and in accordance with the cause), and the public purpose pursued by its adoption. As formal elements, both the grounding (motivación) (foundation for what was decided) that substantiates the administrative conduct, its form of instrumentation, and the procedure adopted for its materialization are considered, in addition to the investiture of the body or official issuing the act.
In the case of official letter C-PPT-531-2011 of May 4, 2011, it is noted that it indicates to the plaintiff that "... since there is no award contract between Mr. Quintanilla Dávila and the INVU, the payments made do not generate any right..." Consequently, and contradictorily—given that the same document indicated that he had no right and was not an awardee—it indicates to him that to formalize the purchase of the apartment, an appraisal must be carried out for its current price. In the same sense, Resolution GG-234-2011 of eleven o'clock on May 27, 2011, of the General Management of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism, indicated that "... there is no contractual relationship between this Institute and you, as there is no record of an award contract signed between the parties, therefore it does not generate any right for you over the apartment in question, given that the award contract is considered a title transferring ownership for the benefit of the awardee..." Said position was ratified by agreement of the INVU's Board of Directors, Article II, subsection 3), of the minutes of ordinary session No. 5884, of June 29, 2011, as it invokes identical considerations.
As noted from the text of said acts, there exists a defect of absolute nullity in their grounding (motivación), insofar as they are founded on considerations contrary to law, starting, on the one hand, from the non-existence of the contractual bond that has been demonstrated in trial, based on the Administration's own conducts, and by imposing on Mr. Quintanilla Dávila the application of an appraisal not provided for in his particular legal relationship, as analyzed above. This Court deems that, as stated, the indicated acts are contrary to the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima) and the prohibition of arbitrariness, because in an unfounded manner and contrary to law and the circumstances inherent to the legal relationship, it denies the latter's existence, despite having elements of conviction at the administrative level regarding the existence of a prior contractual bond agreed upon since 1991.
Furthermore, in the case under analysis, it is appropriate to apply the provisions of Article 137 of the General Public Administration Law, as it provides: "The behaviors and material activities of the Administration that have a univocal meaning and that are incompatible with a different intention shall serve to express the act, unless the nature or circumstance of the act requires an express declaration." Thus, it is appropriate to uphold the absolute nullity of the objected acts.
VI.On the request for a declaration of administrative inertia: The plaintiff states in its claim that there is inertia on the part of the respondent entity. It does not specify concrete omissions of actions regarding what it deems administrative inertia, but from its reasoning it is inferred that they are linked to the non-existence in the institutional files of its award contract, which generated the grounds (motivación) of the challenged acts and which provided the basis for considering that he was not in compliance with the law. In this regard, based on the considerations made by this Tribunal, it is deemed that indeed, an administrative dysfunction is present due to the non-existence of documentary and computerized records regarding the specific legal situation of the plaintiff, despite the fact that other conducts have been deemed proven (issuance of receipts, acceptance of payments, tolerance of occupation of the property for more than twenty years) that demonstrate a prior contractual bond.
In this sense, the witness offered by the respondent entity stated in her deposition that the plaintiff's situation was determined as a result of a study to locate what were called "project balances" of persons for whom the titling of their apartment had not been formalized, a task that would not be necessary if the entity had complete and updated information systems about the housing development where the plaintiff lives. As indicated, it has been deemed proven that in the respondent entity there is no registered account in the plaintiff's name for apartment G-21 of the Corral Condominium, nor an award contract, and there is only a provisional deposit in the amount of one hundred twenty-nine thousand five hundred seventy colones and another deposit for a down payment (prima) in the amount of one hundred ninety-eight thousand five hundred two colones. Notwithstanding the above and the proven fact of Mr.
Quintanilla Dávila's long years of stay on the property, the entity responsible for the housing project never took action before him to determine his situation or adopt measures in this regard, nor did it keep documentary support that would serve as a basis for the adoption of an administrative conduct. On the contrary, it issued receipts in the plaintiff's name, received the money paid by him, and tolerated his stay for more than twenty years, only to later allege in a trial the illegitimacy of the possession and attempt to apply a collection mechanism that this Court has deemed foreign to the plaintiff's legal relationship. The absence of records regarding his situation and the non-existence of his award contract is precisely part of the reasons why the acts that have been deemed null in this resolution led to basing their grounds (motivación) on the presumed non-existence of a contractual bond and right assisting the plaintiff, which has been deemed by this Court as contrary to the administrative legal system.
This Court has deemed proven an "inertia" of the Administration, manifested as an omission to act upon a legal duty imposed by the legal system, inasmuch as Article 15 of the General Internal Control Law imposes, as a necessary control activity of every public entity, the following: "The design and use of documents and records that contribute to the adequate notation of transactions and significant events carried out in the institution. The documents and records must be properly managed and maintained." In the same sense, Article 16 of the same regulatory body states: "Article 16. — Information systems. There must be information systems that allow the active administration to have institutional document management, understanding this as the set of activities carried out in order to control, store, and subsequently retrieve in an adequate manner the information produced or received in the organization, in the course of its activities, in order to prevent any deviation from the established objectives.
Said document management must be closely related to information management, which must include corporate databases and other computer applications, which constitute important sources of recorded information." By reason of the foregoing, the existence of what the plaintiff calls administrative "inertia" can be determined, regarding the non-existence of the necessary records and documents for the determination and verification of his effective legal situation. The representation of the defendant is not correct when invoking the possibility of applying Article 157 of the General Public Administration Law, and indicating that the legal system enables it to rectify material and arithmetic errors. The foregoing, inasmuch as the norm does not empower the Administration to violate the principle of the intangibility of its own acts to the detriment of the Individual, nor is it an open possibility to be used with impunity by the Administration in the face of its omissions to act or administrative dysfunction. Consequently, this part of the claim must be upheld.
VII.On the request for compensation for damages : The plaintiff requests compensation for damages caused and in the preliminary hearing specifies non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) for the sum of two million colones. However, notwithstanding the above, it does not specify or detail what the invoked damages consist of, nor does it determine what the referred non-pecuniary damage consists of. For this Court, despite the fact that non-pecuniary damage possesses a nature in re ipsa, the mere mention thereof is not sufficient to grant such part. In this sense, on the one hand, with respect to the proof of damage in general, the Civil Procedure Code in its Article 317 expressly states: "The burden of proof falls on: 1) The party who formulates a claim, regarding the assertions of the constitutive facts of its right. 2) The party who opposes a claim, regarding the assertions of impeditive, modifying, or extinguishing facts of the plaintiff's right." In the case of non-pecuniary damage, it has been indicated that it does not require direct proof, but rather certain criteria delimiting the Judge's discretion apply to it, which derive from its own legal nature and have been developed by national case law.
Thus, as the first delimiting criterion, there are the general principles of law and equity, and furthermore, the presumptions of man inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis. Likewise, from various judicial resolutions and from judgment 413 of November 19, 2002, of the First Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court, Section I, other criteria are evident, namely: "III. By subjective non-pecuniary damage, doctrine has understood that condition affecting the emotional sphere of persons causing worry, suffering, anxiety, and other negative and harmful emotions, whose origin involves the unlawful acts caused by the claimant. By its nature, it is difficult to prove by ordinary means, so the judge may estimate it by examining the circumstances appearing in the file and applying their experience, the general principles of law, and those of rationality and proportionality." (Our emphasis) These latter criteria have been developed in a relevant manner to limit the possibility of recognizing exaggerated or disproportionate compensation.
In this line of thought, the First Chamber has indicated: "It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, since these are inestimable assets, but rather about establishing monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism that law can resort to, in order to thus repair, at least in part, its offense. Under such a philosophy, it would be inappropriate to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems, because that would cause unjust enrichment of the offended party, through the immoral profit from one's own honor and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our environment with the rank of constitutional principles (see in this respect, the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber #1739-92 at 11:45 a.m. on July first and 3495-92 at 2:30 p.m. on November nineteenth, both of 1992).
Applying them to situations like the present one, it is essential, when setting the obligations arising from compensatory legal situations, to consider the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or seriously unjust situations. In this sense, non-pecuniary damage, in cases like the one analyzed, could not give rise to millionaire compensation, as sought. That would open an inconvenient loophole, giving way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing the tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations causing it to fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber vote 141 at 3:00 p.m. on June 18, 1993, and No. 99 at 4:00 p.m. on September 20, 1995) (Our emphasis). The causality of the damage is another unavoidable criterion, insofar as the real cause thereof can determine the scope and limits of the compensatory estimation.
On the other hand, always within the order of proportionality, reference is made to the "prudent appreciation of the Judge" regarding the damage and its compensation, as follows: "Therefore, the court must consider the appropriateness of the part under discussion, in this regard the First Chamber of the Supreme Court has stated: "VI. Although non-pecuniary damage—in relation to the matter in question—due to its nature, allows a wide margin of discretion to the judge regarding its determination, this must necessarily be observed within certain unavoidable parameters, for example, the former Court of Cassation, in judgment No. 114 at 4:00 p.m. on November 2, 1979, endorses the judges' prudent appreciation '...when it is possible for them to infer the damage based on circumstantial proof (prueba de indicios).' This Chamber, in its ruling No. 114-93, indicates that the aforementioned prudent judgment must take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity.
Around such concepts, the Chamber, in a later pronouncement, reasons in the following terms: 'It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, since these are inestimable assets, but rather about establishing monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism that law can resort to, in order to thus repair, at least in part, its offense. Under such a philosophy, it would be inappropriate to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems, because that would cause unjust enrichment of the offended party, through the immoral profit from one's own honor and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our environment with the rank of constitutional principles (see in this respect, the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1739-92 at 11:45 a.m. on July 1 and No. 3495-92 at 2:30 p.m. on November 19, both of 1992).
Applying them to situations like the present one, it is essential, when setting the obligations arising from compensatory legal situations, to consider the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or seriously unjust situations. In this sense, non-pecuniary damage, in cases like the one analyzed, could not give rise to millionaire compensation, as sought. That would open an inconvenient loophole, giving way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing the tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations causing it to fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber No. 41 at 3:00 p.m. on June 18, 1993). VII. Recapitulating, it can be said that the prudent judgment to be employed by the Judge in situations like the present one presupposes the observance of unavoidable parameters such as circumstantial proof, the circumstances inherent to the specific case, the general principles of law, equity, the position of the parties; the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.
On these aspects, the interested party can and must offer proof where possible. Only in this way can a prudent judgment be reached. Outside such considerations, the discretionary determination runs the serious risk of incurring an excess of power that distorts or undermines what has been adjudicated. That is, the prudent appreciation of the judge, even having the occurrence of the generating event—as occurs in the instant case—(principle 'in re ipsa'), requires the considerations or parameters mentioned, regarding the damage, to, in accordance with them, establish the reason. In the event that there are no evaluative elements on the matter in the case file, the judge will have to act in accordance with such situation, adopting a conservative attitude in the determination, because failing to do so could involve an excess of power." Vote 00093-2000 of the Contentious-Administrative Court, Section II.
On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that non-pecuniary damage does not escape the certainty that it must be a consequence of the administration's action or omission, just as the injured interest of the person invoking it must be certain. In the case under analysis, as has been said, it is not evident that the party claiming to have suffered the non-pecuniary damage has at least specified its scope and level of affectation and demonstrated at least through circumstantial proof that this effectively occurred in its internal sphere. The party does not state when the invoked non-pecuniary damage arises, nor does it specify the factual reason for which it makes its claim. Thus, for this Court it is not possible to grant non-pecuniary damage, applying the considerations made, if it is unaware of the concrete foundation on which the party bases its claim.
For the foregoing, this part of the claim must be rejected."
IV.Regarding the object of the proceeding: Based on what was expressed by the parties, both in their claims and arguments, the object of this proceeding consists of determining the existence of nullity defects in the administrative actions objected to by the plaintiff, as well as the existence of a contractual relationship (vínculo contractual) between the latter and the defendant entity. Additionally, it must be determined whether the existence of damages caused by some act or omission of an official of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo has been demonstrated.
V.Regarding the existence of a contractual relationship (vínculo contractual) between the plaintiff and the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo: In his claim, the plaintiff indicates that he acquired apartment number G-21 in the El Corral condominium in 1991 for the sum of eight hundred seventy-six thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones, such that from that date, he states, he was placed in possession and it was awarded (adjudicado) by the selling entity. Based on the foregoing, he requests that it be declared that he is the owner of the indicated apartment, located in Curridabat, and that the defendant entity be ordered to proceed to title the indicated property in his name. The Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo rejects the existence of any contractual relationship (vínculo contractual) with Mr. Quintanilla Dávila and indicates that there is no award contract (contrato de adjudicación) with the plaintiff, so he does not possess any right over the apartment that is the object of the litigation.
In this regard, this Tribunal considers that to resolve this aspect of the claim, the following considerations must be made: The Organic Law of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, No. 1788 of August 24, 1954, establishes as the competence of said entity, the renting of housing from its assets to families lacking adequate lodging and the necessary means of obtaining it. Additionally, Article 5 of said regulatory body provides as a power thereof: "... h) Rent, sell, exchange, encumber, and manage the housing and community service centers that it acquires or builds, as well as the other goods of its property" and "... ñ) Enter into all contracts and perform all administrative, civil, industrial, or commercial acts that are convenient or necessary for the better fulfillment of its purposes..." Regarding the specific regulation of the relationship between the entity and the beneficiaries of its programs, Article 39 of the indicated law expresses the following: "The types of house construction, their building, leasing, repair, or sale and, in general, the prohibitions, restrictive clauses, interest rates, amortization, conservation, insurance, terms, and other details regarding economic organization, building, improvement, award (adjudicación), and definitive transfer, shall be determined in the Regulations that the Board of Directors issues to that effect." As noted, the indicated norm leaves to the exercise of regulatory power the aspects pertaining to the regulation of the relationship in which the families habitating the Institution's housing solutions would find themselves subject.
By reason of the foregoing, there was promulgated by means of an executive, non-autonomous regulation, just as the law had indicated, the Regulations for the Award of Housing (Reglamento de Adjudicación de Vivienda), Decree No. 2 of January 13, 1955, which establishes, in what is of interest to us, the following: "Article 6—The housing may be awarded (adjudicadas) under titles of sale, rental, and rent-to-own, at the discretion of the Board of Directors. In the sale award (adjudicación), the Board of Directors may require an advance payment on the value of the housing, as permitted by the type and quality of the house. By virtue of the rent-to-own contract, the awardee (adjudicatario) who initially rents has the option to purchase the housing, for the value established in the original agreement, within a maximum period of five years. The Board of Directors may establish minimum rent-to-own terms, which shall serve to test the awardee's (adjudicatario) interest regarding permanence.
Upon formalizing the sale, the Institute may determine the term to cancel the price, in accordance with the contractor's income. The interest rate included in the rental installment shall also govern the sale operation. The tenant who allows the option period to elapse in vain may either purchase the housing according to a reappraisal thereof, or continue as a lessee, but in this second case, they shall henceforth cover a rental installment equal to that which would correspond to them as a buyer pursuant to the immediately following article. The Board of Directors shall set in this case the duration of the period and the conditions for renewing the lease." "Article 7—The price of the housing awarded (adjudicadas) in sale shall be determined by the Board of Directors, taking into consideration the cost price. The Board shall also determine the term for cancellation of said price and the interest rate corresponding to each category and, based on both, the Financial Department shall calculate the corresponding monthly installments. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the awardee (adjudicatario) may make payments toward the debt or cancel it on any date, before its maturity."
In a complementary manner, Article 9 of the regulation provides that the beneficiary was obligated to sign a contract, in accordance with the following provisions: "Article 9—The rental regime resulting from lease or lease-purchase contracts shall be governed in all other respects by the provisions applicable to leasing in this Regulation and in the Regulation for Leasing in Multifamily Buildings. The houses shall be delivered to the acquirers, after prior inspection thereof, and a contract must be signed containing:
V.On the nullity of the challenged acts: The plaintiff party requests that the nullity of the following acts be declared: a) official letter C-PPT-531-2011 b) Resolution GG-234-2011 of the General Management of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo c) agreement adopted by the Board of Directors of the INVU, according to Article II, subsection 3), Points a), b), c), e) of the minutes of ordinary session No. 5884, of June 29, 2011, and communicated through official letter CJD-113-2011, of July 13, 2011. In this sense, it invokes the arguments analyzed in the preceding recital to substantiate defects in the motivation and content of the acts. In this regard, having analyzed the indicated acts, based on the considerations made previously, this Tribunal considers it appropriate to grant this aspect of the lawsuit, given that the indicated conducts start from the premise of the non-existence of a contractual bond with the plaintiff, based on the non-existence of the award contract document.
It must be taken into consideration, given the nature of the formal conducts objected to, that the formal action of the Public Administration, when materialized in the adoption of administrative acts (understood as the unilateral declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge issued in the exercise of the administrative function), must necessarily possess a series of material and formal elements for it to be fully valid and effective.
As material or substantial elements, we have the competence of the subject issuing the act, the motive giving rise to it (understood as the legal or factual antecedents or presuppositions of the administrative conduct), the content, that is, what the act itself provides (which must be lawful, possible, clear, proportional, and consistent with the motive), and the public purpose pursued with its adoption. As formal elements, both the reasoning (statement of grounds for the decision) underpinning the administrative conduct and its form of documentation are considered, as well as the procedure adopted for its materialization, in addition to the investiture of the body or official issuing the act. In the case of official communication C-PPT-531-2011 of May 4, 2011, it is noted that it informs the plaintiff that "... *since no award contract exists between Mr. Quintanilla Dávila and INVU, the payments made do not generate any right.*" Consequently, and contradictorily—given that the same document stated he had no right and was not the awardee—he is told that to formalize the purchase of the apartment, an appraisal must be performed at its current price.
In the same vein, resolution GG-234-2011 of eleven o'clock on May 27, 2011, from the General Management of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, stated that "...*no contractual relationship exists between this Institute and you, as there is no record of an award contract signed between the parties, and therefore it does not generate any right for you over the apartment in question, given that the award contract is considered a deed transferring ownership for the benefit of the awardee.*" This position was ratified by agreement of the Board of Directors of INVU, Article II, subsection 3), of the minutes of ordinary session N. 5884, of June 29, 2011, as it invokes identical considerations. As can be seen from the text of those acts, there is a defect of absolute nullity in their reasoning, as they are based on considerations contrary to law, starting, on the one hand, from the non-existence of the contractual link that has been proven in court, based on the Administration's own conduct, and by imposing on Mr.
Quintanilla Dávila the application of an appraisal not provided for his particular legal relationship, as analyzed above. This Court considers that, as stated, the indicated acts are contrary to the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima) and the prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de arbitrariedad), since, groundlessly and contrary to the law and the specific circumstances of the legal relationship, they deny its existence, despite having evidence in the administrative venue of the existence of a prior contractual link agreed upon since 1991. Moreover, in the case under analysis, it is appropriate to apply the provisions of Article 137 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which provides: "*The material behaviors and activities of the Administration that have a univocal meaning and are incompatible with a different intent shall serve to express the act, unless the nature or circumstance of the latter requires an express manifestation.*" Thus, it is appropriate to uphold the absolute nullity of the objected acts.
VI.On the request for a declaration of administrative inertia (inercia administrativa): The plaintiff indicates in his complaint that there is inertia on the part of the defendant entity. He does not specify concrete omissions of actions with respect to what he considers administrative inertia, but from his reasoning it is inferred that they are linked to the non-existence in the institutional archives of his award contract, which generated the reasoning for the contested acts and served as the basis for considering that he was not in compliance with the law. In this regard, based on the considerations made by this Court, it is deemed that indeed, there is an administrative dysfunction due to the non-existence of documentary and computer records regarding the specific legal situation of the plaintiff, even though other conducts have been proven (issuance of receipts, acceptance of payments, tolerance of occupation of the property for more than twenty years) that demonstrate a prior contractual link.
In this sense, the witness offered by the defendant entity stated in her deposition that the plaintiff's situation was determined as a result of a study to locate what were called "*project balances (saldos de proyectos)*" of persons who had not had the titling of their apartment formalized, a task that would not be necessary if the entity had complete and updated information systems on the housing development where the plaintiff resides. As indicated, it has been proven that in the defendant entity there is no account registered in the name of the plaintiff for apartment G-21 of Condominio Corral, nor an award contract, and there is only one provisional deposit in the amount of one hundred twenty-nine thousand five hundred seventy colones and another deposit for the down payment (prima) in the amount of one hundred ninety-eight thousand five hundred two colones. Notwithstanding the above and the proven fact of Mr.
Quintanilla Dávila's long years of permanence in the property, the entity responsible for the housing project never took action before him to determine his situation or adopt measures in this regard, nor kept documentary support that would serve as a basis for adopting an administrative conduct. On the contrary, it issued receipts in the plaintiff's name, received the monies paid by him, and tolerated his permanence for more than twenty years, only to later allege in court the illegitimacy of his possession and attempt to apply a collection mechanism, which this Court has deemed foreign to the plaintiff's legal relationship. The absence of records on his situation and the non-existence of his award contract is precisely part of the reasons why the acts that have been deemed null in this resolution led to basing their reasoning on the alleged non-existence of a contractual link and right assisting the plaintiff, which has been considered by this Court as contrary to the administrative legal system.
This Court finds proven an "inertia" of the Administration, translated into an omission to perform a legal duty imposed by the legal system, in that Article 15 of the General Internal Control Law (Ley General de Control Interno) imposes, as a necessary control activity for every public entity, the following: "*The design and use of documents and records that assist in the appropriate annotation of transactions and significant events carried out in the institution. Documents and records must be administered and maintained appropriately.*" In the same sense, Article 16 of the same normative body states: "*Article 16.—Information Systems (Sistemas de información). There must be information systems that allow the active administration to have institutional document management, understood as the set of activities carried out for the purpose of controlling, storing, and subsequently adequately retrieving the information produced or received in the organization, in the development of its activities, in order to prevent any deviation from the objectives set.
Such document management must be closely related to information management, which must include corporate databases and other computer applications, which constitute important sources of recorded information.*" By reason of the foregoing, it can be determined that what the plaintiff calls administrative "inertia" exists with respect to the non-existence of the records and documents necessary for determining and verifying his effective legal situation. The representation of the defendant party is incorrect in invoking the possibility of applying Article 157 of the General Public Administration Law and indicating that the legal system allows it to rectify material and arithmetic errors. This is because the rule does not empower the Administration to violate the principle of the irrevocability of its own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios) to the detriment of the administered party, nor is it an open possibility to be employed with impunity by the Administration for its omissions of action or administrative dysfunction. Therefore, this aspect of the complaint must be upheld.
VII.On the request for compensation for damages (indemnización de daños y perjuicios): The plaintiff requests compensation for damages caused and, in a preliminary hearing, specifies non-material damage (daño moral) in the amount of two million colones. However, he does not specify or detail what the invoked damages consist of, nor does he determine what the referred non-material damage consists of. For this Court, despite the fact that non-material damage possesses an *in re ipsa* nature, the mere mention of it is not sufficient to grant such an aspect. In this sense, on the one hand, with respect to the proof of damage in general, the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) in its Article 317 expressly states: "*The burden of proof falls upon: 1) Whoever formulates a claim, regarding the affirmations of the facts constituting his right. 2) Whoever opposes a claim, regarding the affirmations of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right.*" In the case of non-material damage, it has been indicated that it does not require direct proof, but that certain criteria apply to it that define the discretion of the Judge and derive from its own legal nature and have been developed by national jurisprudence.
Thus, as a first delimiting criterion are the general principles of law and equity, and also, human presumptions inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis. Likewise, from various judicial resolutions and from ruling 413 of November 19, 2002, of Section I of the Contentious-Administrative Court (Sección I), other criteria are evidenced, namely: "*III. By subjective non-material damage, the doctrine has understood that affection that impacts the emotional sphere of persons causing worry, suffering, anxiety, and other negative and harmful emotions, whose origin is the illicit acts caused by the petitioner. By their nature, they are difficult to prove by ordinary means, so the judge may estimate it by examining the circumstances that appear in the file and applying his experience, the general principles of law, and those of rationality and proportionality. (Emphasis is ours)*" These latter criteria have been developed significantly to limit the possibility of awarding exaggerated or disproportionate compensation.
In this vein, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) has indicated: "*It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, as these are priceless goods, but about setting a monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism law can resort to, in order to repair, at least in part, the offense. It would not fit within such a philosophy to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems, because this would produce the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profiting from one's own honor and dignity. Within the fundamental principles of law are found those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our legal environment as having the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) #1739-92 of 11:45 hours on July first and 3495-92 of 14:30 hours on November nineteenth, both of 1992).
Applying them to situations such as the present one, it is indispensable, when setting the obligations arising in indemnity legal situations, to attend to the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, non-material damage, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to million-dollar compensation, as claimed. This would open an inconvenient loophole, to give way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjust enrichment that, far from repairing the tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations causing it to fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber, vote 141 of 15:00 hrs. of June 18, 1993, and No. 99 of 16 hours of September 20, 1995) (Emphasis is ours).*" The causality of the damage is another unavoidable criterion, as the real cause of the damage can determine the scope and limits of the compensatory estimate.
On the other hand, always within the order of proportionality, there is mention of the "prudent appreciation of the Judge" of the damage and its compensation, in the following manner: "*Therefore, the tribunal must consider the admissibility of the aspect under comment, to which effect the First Chamber of the Supreme Court has stated: 'VI. Although non-material damage—in relation to the matter in question—due to its nature, allows a wide margin of discretion to the judge regarding its determination, this must necessarily be observed within certain unavoidable parameters, for example, the former Chamber of Cassation, in ruling No. 114 of 16 hours of November 2, 1979, endorses the prudent appreciation of the judges ...when they are permitted to infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence. This Chamber, in its ruling No. 114-93, indicates that the prudent discretion referred to must take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity.
Around such concepts, the Chamber, in a later pronouncement, reasons in the following terms: 'It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, as these are priceless goods, but about setting a monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism law can resort to, in order to repair, at least in part, the offense. It would not fit within such a philosophy to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems, because this would produce the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profiting from one's own honor and dignity. Within the fundamental principles of law are found those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our legal environment as having the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1739-92 of 11:45 hours on July 1 and No. 3495-92 of 14:30 hours on November 19, both of 1992).
Applying them to situations such as the present one, it is indispensable, when setting the obligations arising in indemnity legal situations, to attend to the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, non-material damage, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to million-dollar compensation, as claimed. This would open an inconvenient loophole, to give way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjust enrichment that, far from repairing the tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations causing it to fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber No. 41 of 15:00 of June 18, 1993). VII. Recapitulating, it follows that the prudent discretion to be employed by the Judge in situations such as the present one requires observance of ineludible parameters such as circumstantial evidence, the specific circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, equity, the position of the parties; the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.
The interested party can and must offer proof on these aspects where possible. Only thus can a prudent discretion be arrived at. Outside of such considerations, discretionary determination runs the serious risk of incurring an excess of power that distorts or misrepresents what has been adjudicated. That is, the prudent appreciation of the judge, even when the occurrence of the generating event is present—as occurs in the instant case—(*in re ipsa* principle), requires the commented considerations or parameters regarding the damage, in order to establish the amount in accordance with them. In the event that there are no elements of judgment on the matter in the record, the judge must act in consonance with such a situation by adopting a conservative attitude in the determination, for failure to do so could incur an excess of power.'" Vote 00093-2000 of the Contentious-Administrative Court, Section II.
Moreover, it must not be overlooked that non-material damage does not escape the certainty that it must be a consequence of the action or omission of the administration, just as the injured interest of the person invoking it must be certain. In the case under analysis, as stated, it is not evident that the party claiming to have suffered non-material damage has at least specified its scope and level of impact or demonstrated, at least with circumstantial evidence, that this actually occurred in his internal sphere. The party does not state when the invoked non-material damage arose, nor does he specify the factual basis for his claim. Thus, for this Court, it is not possible to grant non-material damage, applying the considerations made, if the specific basis on which the party bases his claim is unknown. Therefore, this aspect of the complaint must be rejected.
I.Background: The plaintiff, in his action, stated that since 1997 he maintains a credit agreement with the INVU for the construction of housing, through a loan, for the amount of ¢13,225,000.00 (thirteen million two hundred twenty-five thousand colones), under the modality of adjudication of an existing housing unit, for which he has been paying monthly installments. He claims that despite the time elapsed and having fulfilled the agreed payments, the INVU refuses to formalize the respective deed, thereby breaching the agreement and forcing him to continue making a monthly payment of ¢152,000.00 (one hundred fifty-two thousand colones). He argues that the INVU has breached the principle of legitimate confidence (principio de confianza legítima), in accordance with the provisions of Article 137 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, by creating expectations that it has refused to fulfill.
He further notes that only minor construction details remain in the condominium, and in 2005 the INVU itself authorized him to occupy the property tied to the corresponding file. The plaintiff also indicates that the defendant's actions create significant legal uncertainty and proven economic damages, in addition to moral damages (daño moral). He adds that the INVU has not provided the requested information regarding the process of completing the condominium and the formalization of deeds, and that the construction file is lost. Finally, he requests that the INVU be ordered to grant the respective deed, as well as to pay moral damages based on the principle of legitimate confidence. He requests the imposition of costs and legal interest. The defendant INVU, for its part, answered the lawsuit in the negative and argued the exceptions of lack of right and lack of causation (falta de derecho y falta de causal), generic exceptions for lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva), the generic exception of lack of interest (falta de interés), and the generic exception sine actione agit, and requests that the lawsuit be dismissed in all its extremes, with the imposition of costs.
The defendant bases its defense on the fact that the alleged adjudication contract (contrato de adjudicación) has not been proven, as it is not even registered in its archives. II. The judge of first instance, in judgment No. 00099-2010, handed down at 4:30 p.m. on February 23, 2010, declared the lawsuit partially with merit regarding the claim for material damages (daño material). It ordered the INVU to pay the sum of ¢23,000,000.00 (twenty-three million colones). The claim for moral damages was dismissed. Said judgment was appealed by both parties, and the plaintiff's appeal was granted on the basis of adherence. The INVU, in its statement of grievances, alluded to an error of law and fact regarding the grounds of the judgment. It reproaches that the adjudication contract was considered accredited based on a series of documents and evidence, when in reality there is no contract whatsoever.
It alleges that the judgment does not consider its argument regarding the difference between administrative contracts, which require certain formal requirements, and the contract of sale (contrato de compraventa), which at the time represented the "adjudication contract" used by INVU for the transfer of properties in urban developments, which are subject to the Ley Orgánica del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo INVU and its regulations. It states that the invalidity of the alleged contract that the actor claims has not been proven is obvious, according to the evidence of the case file, and that contrary to what the judgment states, it was never demonstrated that the INVU's omission had caused the severe moral damages alleged, and furthermore, the causal link (nexo de causalidad) between the omission and the plaintiff's family situation was never fully established. The plaintiff, in his appeal, claims the injustice caused by the denial of the claim for moral damages, arguing that the INVU breached its duty.
III. The jurisdictional body, in this instance, after a comprehensive review of the case file, considers that the appeal filed by the defendant must be partially upheld, while those formulated by the plaintiff must be dismissed, as will be explained in the following reasoning. IV. Regarding the nature of the "housing adjudication contract" (contrato de adjudicación de vivienda): For a proper resolution of the matter, the Chamber deems it pertinent to refer, first of all, to the nature of the so-called "housing adjudication contract," which has been used by the INVU in its housing plans. This is relevant because the plaintiff's action is based on the existence of a contractual relationship of this nature. The INVU originally promoted the construction of low-cost housing (vivienda de interés social) through the capital provided by the State, for the benefit of low-income families. However, over the years, the modalities developed until they were classified into three specific categories: a) "Own savings system" (sistema de ahorro propio): this is the old system of savings banks, which takes the form of a savings account for housing through a mutual savings and loan association, which prior to Law No. 7052 was only INVU, but later, it was possible for other authorized mutual savings and loan associations to participate in this modality.
In this system, the interested party must save a certain amount of money for a specific period to become a beneficiary of a loan (préstamo) intended for the construction of their housing; b) "Article 5 system" (sistema artículo 5): regulated in Article 5 of Law No. 1788, Organic Law of INVU, of August 24, 1954, which consists of granting loans with the Institute's own resources, intended for low-income families. Article 5 establishes: "The Institute's own resources, as well as those coming from loans that it may obtain, in accordance with the provisions of Article 39, will be used mainly for the construction of low-cost housing, granting loans for this purpose to individuals and public and private entities that guarantee the Institute's investment. Exceptionally and when the Executive Branch so authorizes, the Institute may allocate its resources to the construction of buildings for industrial, commercial, or service-related purposes, in accordance with urban development plans.
Financing with its own resources will be subject to the Regulation issued by the Institute's Board of Directors." c) "Article 59 system" (sistema artículo 59): the system initially regulated in Law No. 7052 of November 13, 1986 (which added an Article 59 to the Organic Law of INVU), called the "Savings, Credit, and Subsidy System for Low-Cost Housing," whose function is to promote housing solutions, through long-term loans and subsidies (subsidios), better known as "family housing bonds" (bonos familiares de vivienda). This system allowed an effective boost to the national housing stock. The monetary resources serving as the basis for this system come from the financial management through the entities authorized by the National Financial System for Housing (Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda), to which the family housing bonds are subsequently applied. Currently, Law No. 7052 was repealed by the Ley del Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda y creación del BANHVI, of November 27, 2000.
In the judgment No. 4654-2003, of 8:45 a.m. on May 16, 2003, of the Constitutional Chamber, it was indicated: "... it is a decentralized institution, which manages its own budget, whose purpose is established in the Organic Law creating it and in Law No. 7052, and which can be summarized as directing the programs and activities related to the development and construction of low-cost housing, for which it must guarantee efficiency in the allocation of resources, and ensure that they reach the families that need them most, which means that it is its obligation to act efficiently to achieve its purpose. And as part of the obligations imposed by the legislation governing it, is that of investing efficiently in the programs for the construction or acquisition of housing for low-income families, so that its actions must be governed by principles of reasonableness and efficiency, among others, to fulfill its purpose, for which the Board of Directors, in accordance with the powers established in Article 10, subsection d), of its Organic Law, may dictate the rules for the granting of rights to housing units, without these being incompatible with those established by the regulations issued by the Executive Branch, regarding the Savings, Credit, and Subsidy System for Low-Cost Housing, of November 13, 1986, and its reforms, currently Law No. 7052, of November 13, 1986.
(...) In this regard, it is important to note that the Institute, as the executing entity of the policy for the construction of low-cost housing, in the fulfillment of its purposes, is empowered to regulate and dictate the necessary provisions for tenders, and granting construction contracts, provision of services, among others, and based on that power, to regulate the mechanism for awarding or granting rights to housing units resulting from its plans, as well as to implement measures, that on a case-by-case basis, allow the entity to fulfill its purpose efficiently..." (in this regard, the Chamber has resolved similar issues, as referenced in section V). Now, based on the systems mentioned above, substantive and instrumental regulations were created, among which the following are listed for the purposes of this matter: first, the "Reglamento para la Adjudicación de Vivienda del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo," of January 13, 1955 (Executive Decree No. 2) and then the "Reglamento de Operaciones del Sistema de Ahorro y Préstamo del INVU," of May 25, 1999.
The "savings and loan system" (sistema de ahorro y préstamo) specifically includes three modalities: "construction on own land" (construcción en lote propio); "adjudication of an existing housing unit" (adjudicación de vivienda existente); and "purchase of land" (compra de terreno). The "housing adjudication contracts" (contratos de adjudicación de vivienda), subject matter of this claim, are private contracts (contratos privados) of sale of property (compraventa de inmueble). The adjudication of housing is analyzed in the Reglamento para la Adjudicación de Vivienda. Article 6 states: "The conditions under which the properties built by the Institute are awarded will be set out in the respective contracts." Article 7: "Those awarded must pay the Institute the total value of the property, paying the respective legally stipulated taxes. When the awardee receives the dwelling to occupy it, they may not refuse to sign the respective contract of sale (contrato de compraventa), under penalty of eviction and loss of the amounts paid." Article 9: "The Institute will grant the awardee a period of three months, counted from the occupancy of the awarded dwelling, for them to present before a Notary Public of their choice, the respective deed (escritura de compraventa), which must be drafted on paper provided by the Institute.
If the awardee fails to present the deed within the indicated period, the Institute may, without further procedure, annul the adjudication, in which case the awardee will lose the amounts paid. For the purpose of the deed, the value of the construction will be distributed between the value of the building and the proportional value of the land. In the deed, the Institute will be represented by the Chairman of the Board of Directors." Article 10: "In the deed, the Institute will retain a first mortgage (primera hipoteca) on the sold property and any improvements that are subsequently made to it, as security for the recovery of the balance of the price, accrued interest, legal costs, and damages. This first mortgage will also serve as security for any other loan that the Institute has granted or grants in the future to the awardee. The purchaser must pay the expenses of appraisal and deed, in addition to any other expenses demanded by the transaction of sale." Legal literature has analyzed this contractual figure: "The State, to meet its housing needs for its agencies and institutions, acquires in the market onerous contracts for the execution of works (obra pública) that entail the construction and other branches of engineering related to human habitation.
In the legal system, there is a special procedure that entities such as the INVU must follow, called housing adjudication" (Cabanellas de Torres, "Diccionario Jurídico Elemental," Ed. Eliasta, 1998, p. 21). "The adjudicatory phase constitutes the moment in which, through the mechanism determined to that effect, the specific relationship is established between the beneficiary and the property to which they have a right. The formalization of the sale contract (contrato de venta) in a public deed must appear as a condition of the adjudication and for the transfer of ownership. In other cases, there are merely preparatory acts for the subsequent sale, such as the reservation of the dwelling, which is the unilateral promise of the builder or developer through which the future acquisition is announced and the intention to formalize the definitive business at a given time is anticipated" (Gil Rodríguez, Jacinto, "Compraventa de vivienda y protección del consumidor," Ed. Constitución y Leyes, Madrid, No. 78, September-December 1975, p. 426).
“IV.- <u>Subject matter of the proceeding</u>: Based on the statements of the parties, both in their claims and arguments, the subject matter of this proceeding consists of determining the existence of nullity defects in the administrative actions challenged by the plaintiff, as well as the existence of a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the sued entity. Additionally, it must be determined whether the existence of damages caused by any act or omission of any official of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo has been proven.
On the existence of a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo: In his complaint, the plaintiff states that he acquired apartment number G-21 in the El Corral condominium in 1991 for the sum of eight hundred seventy-six thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones, and that from that date, he asserts, it was placed in his possession and awarded by the selling entity. Based on the foregoing, he requests that he be declared the owner of the indicated apartment, located in Curridabat, and that the defendant entity be ordered to title the indicated property in his name. The Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo denies the existence of any contractual relationship with Mr. Quintanilla Dávila and indicates that there is no award contract with the plaintiff, and therefore he has no right whatsoever over the apartment that is the subject of the litigation.
In this regard, this Court considers that to resolve this aspect of the complaint, the following considerations must be made: The Organic Law of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, No. 1788 of August 24, 1954, establishes as a competence of said entity the leasing of homes from its assets to families that lack adequate housing and the means to obtain it. Additionally, Article 5 of said regulatory body provides as a power thereof: "....h) Lease, sell, exchange, encumber, and administer the homes, community service centers that it acquires or builds, as well as other property owned by it" and "...ñ) Enter into all contracts and perform all administrative, civil, industrial, or commercial acts that are convenient or necessary for the better fulfillment of its purposes..." With respect to the specific regulation of the relationship between the entity and the beneficiaries of its programs, Article 39 of the indicated law states the following: "The types of house construction, their building, leasing, repair, or sale and, in general, the prohibitions, restrictive clauses, interest rates, amortization, conservation, insurance, terms, and other details regarding economic organization, construction, improvement, award (adjudicación), and definitive transfer, shall be determined in the Regulations issued for this purpose by the Board of Directors." As noted, the indicated norm leaves aspects related to the regulation of the relationship to which families living in the Institution's housing solutions would be subject to the exercise of regulatory power.
For this reason, the Housing Award Regulation (Reglamento de Adjudicación de Vivienda), Executive Decree No. 2 of January 13, 1955, was promulgated as an executive, non-autonomous regulation, just as the law had indicated, which establishes, in what concerns us, the following: "Article 6—Housing may be awarded under the titles of sale, rental, and rent-to-own, at the discretion of the Board of Directors. In the sale award, the Board of Directors may require a down payment on the value of the home, as permitted by the type and quality of the house. By virtue of the rent-to-own contract, the awardee who initially rents enjoys an option to purchase the home, for the value established in the original agreement, for a maximum term of five years. The Board of Directors may establish minimum rent-to-own terms, which will serve to test the awardee's interest in terms of permanence. When formalizing the sale, the Institute may determine the term for paying the price, in accordance with the contracting party's income.
The interest rate included in the rental installment shall also apply to the sale transaction. The tenant who allows the option period to expire in vain may either acquire the home according to a reappraisal thereof, or continue as a tenant, but in this second case, they must henceforth pay a rental installment equal to that which would correspond to them as a buyer according to the immediately following article. The Board of Directors shall fix in this case the duration of the period and the conditions for renewing the rental." "Article 7—The price of housing awarded for sale shall be determined by the Board of Directors, taking into consideration the cost price. The Board shall also determine the term for paying said price and the interest rate corresponding to each category, and, based on both, the Financial Department shall calculate the corresponding monthly installments. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the awardee may make payments toward the debt or cancel it at any time before its maturity." In a complementary manner, Article 9 of the norm provides that the beneficiary was obligated to sign a contract, in accordance with the following provisions: "Article 9—The tenancy regime resulting from rental or rent-to-own contracts shall otherwise be governed by the provisions applicable to leasing in this Regulation and in the Regulation for Leasing in Multifamily Buildings (Reglamento de Arriendo en Edificios Multifamiliares). The houses shall be delivered to the acquirers, after a prior review thereof, and a contract must be signed containing:
Note how only in the rent-to-buy case does Article 6 of the Regulation expressly state that "t*he tenant who allows the option period to lapse in vain may, alternatively, acquire the dwelling according to a reappraisal*," whereas in the case of an outright sale, it only indicates the necessary setting of amounts and installments by the Board of Directors, but without providing that a new appraisal at the current price of a property is required, whose price was agreed upon more than twenty years ago. It is relevant to indicate that said regulation was the one in force at the time the contractual relationship was perfected, and thus, being an executive decree, it has not lost its effects for the plaintiff's particular case, given that the subsequent Regulation for the Adjudication of Social Housing, in force since January 20, 1995, was approved by agreement of the INVU Board of Directors, and therefore it could not derogate the former, as the latter is a higher-ranking norm.
By reason of the foregoing, the representation of the defendant party is not correct when it alleges that the plaintiff's case must be governed by the Appraisal Regulation and agreement Number 4450 of October 11, 1994, Article III, subsection 14-B of the entity, which grants these appraisals a validity of six months for determining the value of goods or rights, as these are applicable to situations different from those of Mr. Quintanilla, who, as has been indicated, has a legal situation creating a subjective right in his favor, under the protection of a private contractual relationship entered into with INVU since 1991, based on an executive decree, against which an autonomous regulation with scopes different from those that originated the relationship subject to this resolution cannot be opposed. This Court considers that it is appropriate to grant the claim established so that it is declared that the plaintiff has a right to be granted registered ownership of apartment G-21 of the El Corral Condominium, located in Curridabat, which must be recognized for the purpose of granting the respective deed in his favor, by the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism, with the caveats that will be indicated in this resolution.
V.- *On the nullity of the challenged acts*: The plaintiff requests that the nullity of the following acts be declared:
VI.- *On the request for a declaration of administrative inertia*: The plaintiff indicates in his complaint that there is inertia on the part of the defendant entity. He does not specify omissions of specific actions regarding what he considers administrative inertia, but from his reasoning, it is inferred that they are linked to the non-existence of his adjudication contract in the institutional archives, which generated the reasoning of the challenged acts and provided the basis for considering him not to be in good standing. In this regard, based on the considerations made by this Court, it is considered that there is, in effect, an administrative dysfunction due to the non-existence of documentary and computer records regarding the specific legal situation of the plaintiff, despite the fact that other conduct has been deemed proven (issuance of receipts, acceptance of payments, tolerance of the occupation of the property for more than twenty years) that demonstrates a prior contractual relationship.
In this sense, the witness offered by the defendant entity stated in her deposition that the plaintiff's situation was determined on the occasion of a study to locate what were called "*project balances*" of persons for whom the titling of their apartment had not been formalized, a task that would not be necessary if the entity had complete and updated information systems on the housing development where the plaintiff lives. As has been indicated, it has been deemed proven that in the defendant entity there exists no account registered in the plaintiff's name for apartment G-21 of the El Corral Condominium, nor an adjudication contract, and there is only a provisional deposit in the sum of one hundred twenty-nine thousand five hundred seventy colones and another deposit for a down payment in the sum of one hundred ninety-eight thousand five hundred two colones. Notwithstanding the foregoing and the proven fact of Mr.
Quintanilla Dávila's long years of permanence in the property, the entity responsible for the housing project never made any approach to him to determine his situation or adopt measures in this regard, nor did it keep documentary backup that could serve as a basis for the adoption of administrative conduct. On the contrary, it issued receipts in the plaintiff's name, received the monies paid by him, and tolerated his permanence for more than twenty years, to then allege in a lawsuit the illegitimacy of the possession and attempt to apply a collection mechanism, which this Court has deemed foreign to the plaintiff's legal relationship. The absence of records on his situation and the non-existence of his adjudication contract are precisely part of the reasons why the acts that have been deemed null in this resolution led to basing their reasoning on the presumed non-existence of a contractual relationship and right assisting the plaintiff, which has been considered by this Court as contrary to the administrative legal order.
This Court deems proven an "inertia" of the Administration, translated into an omission to act on a legal duty imposed by the legal order, insofar as Article 15 of the General Law of Internal Control imposes, as a necessary control activity of every public entity, the following: "*The design and use of documents and records that assist in the adequate annotation of transactions and significant events carried out in the institution. The documents and records must be appropriately managed and maintained.*" In the same sense, Article 16 of the same regulatory body states: "*Article 16.—Information Systems. There must be information systems that allow the active administration to have institutional document management, understood as the set of activities carried out in order to control, store, and subsequently recover adequately the information produced or received in the organization, in the development of its activities, in order to prevent any deviation in the established objectives.
Said document management must be closely related to information management, which must include corporate databases and other computer applications, which constitute important sources of recorded information*". By reason of the foregoing, the existence of what the plaintiff calls administrative "*inertia*" can be determined, with respect to the non-existence of the registrations and documents necessary for the determination and verification of his effective legal situation. The representation of the defendant party is not correct in invoking the possibility of applying Article 157 of the General Law of Public Administration, and indicating that the legal order enables it to rectify material and arithmetic errors. The foregoing, insofar as the norm does not empower the Administration to violate the principle of intangibility of its own acts to the detriment of the Administrated party, nor is it an open possibility to be employed with impunity by the Administration in the face of its omissions to act or administrative dysfunction. Consequently, this part of the claim must be granted.
VII.- *On the claim for damages and losses*: The plaintiff requests compensation for damages and losses caused and, in the preliminary hearing, specifies a non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) in the sum of two million colones. However, notwithstanding the foregoing, he does not specify or detail what the invoked damages consist of, nor does he determine what the referred non-pecuniary damage consists of. For this Court, despite non-pecuniary damage having an *in re ipsa* nature, the mere mention thereof is not sufficient to grant such a claim. In this sense, on the one hand, with respect to the proof of damage in general, the Civil Procedure Code in its Article 317 expressly states: "* The burden of proof lies: 1) On whoever formulates a claim, regarding the affirmations of the facts constitutive of his right. 2) On whoever opposes a claim, regarding the affirmations of facts impeding, modifying, or extinguishing the plaintiff's right.* ".
In the case of non-pecuniary damage, it has been indicated that it does not require direct proof, but rather certain criteria are applicable to it that delimit the Judge's discretionary power and derive from its own legal nature, which have been developed by national case law. Thus, as a first delimiting criterion are the general principles of law and equity, and furthermore, the presumptions of man inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis. Likewise, from various judicial rulings and from judgment 413 of November 19, 2002, of the First Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court, Section I, other criteria are evidenced, namely: "*III. By subjective non-pecuniary damage, legal doctrine has understood that affection impacting the emotional sphere of persons causing worry, suffering, anxiety, and other negative and harmful emotions, whose origin is the illicit acts caused by the plaintiff.
By its nature, it is difficult to prove by ordinary means, so the judge may estimate it by examining the circumstances appearing in the file and applying his experience, the general principles of law, and those of rationality and proportionality.*" (Our emphasis) These latter criteria have been developed in a relevant manner to limit the possibility of recognizing exaggerated or disproportionate compensation. In this vein, the First Chamber has pointed out: "* It is not, therefore, a question of quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, as these are priceless goods, but of setting a monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism available to the law, to thus repair, at least in part, the offense. It would not be appropriate under such a philosophy, to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems, for this would produce the unjust enrichment of the aggrieved, through immoral profit from one's own honor and dignity.
Among the fundamental principles of law, are those of reasonableness and proportionality , which have been recognized in our context with the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber #1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on the first of July and 3495-92 of 2:30 p.m. on the nineteenth of November, both of 1992). Applying them to situations such as the present, it is indispensable, when setting the obligations arising from compensatory legal situations, to attend to the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the restitution, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In such a sense, non-pecuniary damage, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to million-dollar compensation, as sought. This would open an inconvenient loophole , giving way to disproportionate claims which, on the pretext of protecting the individual's subjective sphere, would lead to unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing sullied dignity, would undermine its foundations causing it to fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber, vote 141 of 3:00 p.m. on June 18, 1993, and No. 99 of 4:00 p.m. on September 20, 1995) (Our emphasis).* The causation of damage is another inescapable criterion, insofar as the real cause thereof can determine the scope and limits of the compensatory estimate.
Moreover, always within the order of proportionality, mention is made of the "prudent assessment by the Judge" of the damage and its restitution, in the following manner: "*Therefore, the court must consider the appropriateness of the claim under comment; in this effect, the 1st Chamber of the Supreme Court has stated: " VI. While non-pecuniary damage - in relation to the subject at hand - due to its nature, allows a wide margin of discretion to the judge in its setting, this must necessarily be observed within certain unavoidable parameters, for example, the old Court of Cassation, in judgment No. 114 of 4:00 p.m. on November 2, 1979, endorses the prudent assessment of the judges '...when they may infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence. This Chamber, in its ruling No. 114-93, indicates that the prudent judgment alluded to must take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity.
Around such concepts, the Chamber, in a later pronouncement, reasons in the following terms: "It is not, therefore, a question of quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, as these are priceless goods, but of setting a monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism available to the law, to thus repair, at least in part, the offense. It would not be appropriate under such a philosophy, to establish exorbitant compensations, as occurs in other legal systems, for this would produce the unjust enrichment of the aggrieved, through immoral profit from one's own honor and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law, are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our context with the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on July 1 and No. 3495-92 of 2:30 p.m. on November 19, both of 1992).
Applying them to situations such as the present, it is indispensable, when setting the obligations arising from compensatory legal situations, to attend to the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the restitution, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In such a sense, non-pecuniary damage, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to million-dollar compensations, as sought. This would open an inconvenient loophole, giving way to disproportionate claims which, on the pretext of protecting the individual's subjective sphere, would lead to unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing sullied dignity, would undermine its foundations causing it to fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber No. 41 of 3:00 p.m. on June 18, 1993). VII. Recapitulating, the prudent judgment to be employed by the Judge in situations such as the present, presupposes the observance of inescapable parameters such as circumstantial evidence, the own circumstances of the specific case, the general principles of law, equity, the position of the parties; the nature, object, and purpose of the restitution, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.
On such points, the interested party can and must offer proof as much as possible. Only thus can a prudent judgment be arrived at. Outside of such considerations, discretionary setting runs the serious risk of incurring an excess of power that distorts or misrepresents what was decided. That is, the prudent assessment of the judge, even when the generating event has occurred - as occurs in the species - (principle "in re ipsa"), requires the considerations or parameters commented on, regarding the damage, in order to establish the amount according to them. In the event that elements of judgment on the matter are not present in the records, the judge will have to act in consonance with such a situation, adopting a conservative attitude in the setting, for not doing so could incur an excess of power."* Vote 00093-2000 of the Contentious-Administrative Court, Section II. Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that non-pecuniary damage does not escape the certainty that it must be a consequence of the administration's action or omission, just as the harmed interest of the person invoking it must be certain.
In the case under analysis, as has been stated, it is not evident that the party alleging to have suffered non-pecuniary damage has at least specified its scope and level of impact, nor demonstrated at least with indications that it effectively occurred in their internal sphere. The party does not express when the invoked non-pecuniary damage arose, nor does it specify the factual grounds upon which it makes its claim. Thus, for this Court it is not possible to grant non-pecuniary damage, applying the considerations made, if the specific foundation on which the party bases its claim is unknown. Therefore, this part of the claim must be rejected.
“IV.- Del objeto del proceso: De lo expresado por las partes, tanto en sus pretensiones como argumentos, el objeto del presente proceso estriba en determinar la existencia de vicios de nulidad en las conductas administrativas objetadas por la parte actora, así como la existencia de un vínculo contractual entre ésta y el ende demandado. Adicionalmente se debe determinar si se ha demostrado la existencia de daños ocasionados con motivo de alguna conducta u omisión de algún funcionario del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo.
Sobre la existencia de un vínculo contractual entre el actor y el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo: En su demanda, la parte actora indica que adquirió el apartamento número G-21 en el condominio El Corral en el año 1991 por la suma de ochocientos setenta y seis mil novecientos cincuenta y seis colones, siendo así que desde esa fecha, manifiesta, le fue puesto en posesión y adjudicado por el ente vendedor. Con base en lo anterior, solicita se declare que él es el propietario del indicado apartamento, localizado en Curridabat y que se ordene al ente accionado se proceda a titular a su nombre el indicado inmueble. El Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo rechaza la existencia de cualquier vínculo contractual con el señor Quintanilla Dávila e indica que no existe contrato de adjudicación con el actor, por lo que él no posee derecho alguno sobre el apartamento objeto de la litis.
Al respecto, estima este Tribunal que para resolver este aspecto de la demanda deben realizarse las siguientes consideraciones: La Ley Orgánica del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, n.° 1788 de 24 de agosto de 1954, establece como competencia de dicho ente, el arrendar viviendas de su patrimonio a las familias que carezcan de alojamiento adecuado y los medios de obtención necesarios. De manera adicional, el articulo 5 de dicho cuerpo normativo dispone como facultad del mismo: ".....h) Arrendar, vender, permutar, gravar y administrar las viviendas, centros de servicio comunal que adquiera o construya, así como los demás bienes de su propiedad" y "....ñ) Celebrar todos los contratos y realizar todos los actos administrativos, civiles, industriales o comerciales que sean convenientes o necesarios para el mejor cumplimiento de sus fines..." Con respecto a la regulación propia de la relación entre el ente y los beneficiarios de sus programas, el artículo 39 de la indica ley, expresa lo siguiente:"Los tipos de construcción de casas, su edificación, arrendamiento, reparación o venta y en general, las prohibiciones, cláusulas restrictivas, cuotas de interés, amortización, conservación, seguros, plazos y demás detalles sobre organización económica, edificación, mejoramiento, adjudicación y traspaso definitivo, se determinarán en los Reglamentos que al efecto dicte la Junta Directiva".
Como se advierte la indicada norma deja al ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria los aspectos atinentes a la regulación de la relación en que se encontrarían sujetas las familias que habiten las soluciones habitacionales de la Institución. En razón de lo anterior, se promulgó mediante reglamento ejecutivo, no autónomo, tal y como había indicado la ley, el Reglamento de Adjudicación de Vivienda, Decreto Nº 2 del 13 de enero de 1955, el cual establece , en lo que nos interesa, lo siguiente: "Articulo 6°—Las viviendas podrán ser adjudicadas a títulos de venta, de alquiler y de alquiler-venta, a juicio de la Junta Directiva. En la adjudicación de venta, la Junta Directiva podrá exigir un adelanto al pago del valor de la vivienda, según lo permita el tipo y calidad de la casa. En virtud del contrato de alquiler-venta, el adjudicatario que inicialmente alquila goza de opción para comprar la vivienda, por el valor establecido en el convenio original, durante un plazo máximo de cinco años.
La Junta Directiva podrá establecer plazos mínimos de alquiler-venta, los cuales servirán para someter a prueba el interés del adjudicatario en cuanto a permanencia. Al formalizar la venta el Instituto podrá determinar el plazo para cancelar el precio, de acuerdo con los ingresos del contratante. El tipo de interés incluido en la cuota de arrendamiento regirá asimismo para la operación de venta. El inquilino que dejase transcurrir en vano el plazo de la Opción puede bien adquirir la vivienda conforme a un reavalúo de la misma, bien continuar como arrendatario, pero en este segundo caso deberá cubrir en adelante una cuota de arrendamiento igual a la que como comprador le correspondería conforme al articulo inmediato siguiente. La Junta Directiva fijará en este caso la duración del período y las condiciones para renovar el alquiler". "Artículo 7°—El precio de las viviendas adjudicadas en venta será determinado por la Junta Directiva, tomando en consideración el precio de costo.
Determinará también la Junta el plazo de cancelación de dicho precio y el tipo de interés que corresponda a cada categoría y, con base en uno y otro, el Departamento Financiero calculará las cuotas mensuales que correspondan. No obstante lo anterior, el adjudicatario podrá hacer abonos a la deuda o cancelarla en cualquier fecha, antes de su vencimiento". De manera complementaria, el artículo 9 de la norma prevee que el beneficiario estaba obligado a la suscripción de un contrato, de conformidad con las siguientes disposiciones: "Articulo 9°—El régimen de locación resultante de contratos de alquiler o de alquiler-venta, se regirá en lo demás por las disposiciones que son aplicables al arrendamiento en este Reglamento y en el de Arriendo en Edificios Multifamiliares. Las casas se entregarán a los adquirentes, previa revisión de las mismas, debiéndose firmar un contrato que contenga:
V.Sobre la nulidad de los actos impugnados: La parte actora solicita se declare la nulidad de los siguientes actos: a) oficio C-PPT-531-2011 b) Resolución GG-234-2011 de la Gerencia General del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo c) acuerdo tomado por la Junta Directiva del INVU, según artículo II, inciso 3), Puntos a), b), c), e) del acta de la sesión ordinaria N. 5884, del 29 de junio del 2011 y comunicado por medio del oficio CJD-113-2011, del 13 de julio del 2011. En este sentido, invoca los argumentos analizados en el considerando anterior para fundamentar vicios en la motivación y contenido de los actos. Al respecto, una vez analizados los actos indicados, con base en las consideraciones realizadas anteriormente, estima este Tribunal procedente acoger este extremo de la demanda, habida cuenta que las indicadas conductas parten del supuesto de la inexistencia de un vínculo contractual con el actor, fundadas en la inexistencia del documento del contrato de adjudicación.
Debe tomarse en consideración, dada la naturaleza de las conductas formales objetadas, que la actuación formal de la Administración Pública al materializa rse en la adopción de actos administrativos, ( entendidos éstos como las declaraciones unilaterales de voluntad, juicio o conocimiento que se emiten en ejercicio de la función administrativa ), debe poseer necesariamente una serie de elementos materiales y formales para que sea plenamente válida y eficaz. Como elementos materiales o sustanciales, tenemos la competencia del sujeto que emite el acto, el motivo que le da origen-, (entendido éste como los antecedentes o presupuestos jurídicos o fácticos de la conducta administrativa), el contenido o sea lo que en sí dispone el acto (el cual deberá ser lícito, posible, claro, proporcional y acorde al motivo) y el fin público perseguido con su adopción. Como elementos formales, se considera tanto la motivación (fundamentación de lo decidido) que fundamenta la conducta administrativa, su forma de instrumentación, como el procedimiento adoptado para su materialización , además de la investidura del órgano o servidor que emite el acto.
En el caso del oficio C-PPT-531-2011 de 4 de mayo de 2011, se advierte que éste le indica al actor que "... al no existir contrato de adjudicación entre el señor Quintanilla Dávila y el INVU, los pagos efectuados no generan derecho alguno.." Por consiguiente, y de manera contradictoria - dado que en el mismo documento indicó que él no tenía derecho alguno y no era adjudicataria- se le indica que para formalizar la compra del apartamento deberá realizarse un avalúo por el precio actual del mismo. En el mismo sentido, la resolución GG-234-2011 de once horas de 27 de mayo de 2011 de la Gerencia General del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, indicó que "... no existe relación contractual entre este Instituto y usted, al no constar contrato de adjudicación suscrito entre las partes, por lo que no le genera a usted derecho alguno sobre el apartamento en cuestión, en vista que el contrato de adjudicación se considera título traslativo de dominio en beneficio del adjudicatario.." Dicha posición fue ratificada mediante acuerdo de la Junta Directiva del INVU, artículo II, inciso 3), del acta de la sesión ordinaria N. 5884, del 29 de junio del 2011, en tanto invoca idénticas consideraciones.
Como se advierte del texto de dichos actos, existe un vicio de nulidad absoluta en la motivación de los mismos, en tanto que se encuentran fundamentados en consideraciones contrarias a derecho, al partir, por una parte de la inexistencia del vínculo contractual que ha sido demostrado en juicio, con base en las propias conductas de la Administración y al imponer al señor Quintanilla Dávila la aplicación de un avalúo no previsto para su particular relación jurídica, tal y como se ha analizado ut supra. Estima este Tribunal que tal y como se ha dicho, los actos indicados son contrarios al principio de confianza legítima y de interdicción de arbitrariedad, por cuanto de manera infundada y contraria al derecho y las circunstancias propias de la relación jurídica, niega la existencia de ésta, a pesar de contar con elementos de convicción en sede administrativa, sobre la existencia de un vínculo contractual previo pactado desde 1991.
A mayor abundamiento, en el caso de análisis, es procedente aplicar lo dispuesto en el artículo 137 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en tanto dispone: "Los comportamientos y actividades materiales de la Administración que tengan un sentido unívoco y que sean incompatibles con una voluntad diversa, servirán para expresar el acto, salvo que la naturaleza o circunstancia de éste exijan manifestación expresa". Así las cosas, procede acoger la nulidad absoluta de los actos objetados.
VI.Sobre la solicitud de declaratoria de inercia administrativa: La parte actora indica en su demanda que hay inercia por parte del ente demandado. No concreta omisiones de actuaciones en concreto con respecto a lo que estima inercia administrativa, mas de sus razonamientos se infiere que están vinculados con la no existencia en los archivos institucionales de su contrato de adjudicación, lo cual generó la motivación de los actos impugnados y que dio base para estimar que él no se encontraba a derecho. Al respecto, con fundamento en las consideraciones realizadas por este Tribunal se estima que en efecto, se presenta una disfunción administrativa con motivo de la no existencia de registros documentales e informáticos respecto de la situación jurídica concreta del actor, a pesar de que se han tenido por demostradas otras conductas (emisión de recibos, aceptación de pagos, tolerancia en la ocupación del inmueble por más de veinte años) que demuestran un vínculo contractual previo.
En este sentido, la testigo ofrecida por el ente demandado, manifestó en su deposición que la situación del actor se determinó con motivo de un estudio para ubicar lo que se llamó "saldos de proyectos" de personas a quienes no se les había formalizado la titulación de su apartamento, labor que no sería necesario realizar si el ente contara con sistemas de información completos y actualizados sobre el desarrollo habitacional en donde habita el actor. Como se ha indicado, se ha tenido por demostrado que en el ente accionado no existe una cuenta registrada a nombre del actor por concepto del apartamento G-21 del Condominio Corral, ni contrato de adjudicación, y solamente consta un depósito provisional por la suma de ciento veintinueve mil quinientos setenta colones y otro depósito por concepto de prima por la suma de ciento noventa y ocho mil quinientos dos colones. No obstante lo anterior y del hecho comprobado de los largos años de permanencia del señor Quintanilla Dávila en el inmueble, el ente responsable del proyecto habitacional nunca realizó gestión ante él para determinar su situación o adoptar medidas al respecto, ni guardó respaldo documental que le sirviera de fundamento para la adopción de una conducta administrativa.
Por el contrario, emitió recibos a nombre del actor, recibió los dineros pagados por él y toleró su permanencia por más de veinte años, para luego alegar en un juicio la ilegitimidad de la posesión y pretender aplicar un mecanismo de cobro, que este Tribunal ha tenido por extraño a la relación jurídica del actor. La ausencia de registros sobre la situación de éste y la inexistencia de su contrato de adjudicación, es precisamente parte de las razones por las cuales, los actos que se han tenido como nulos en la presente resolución, llevaron a basar su motivación en la presunta inexistencia de un vínculo contractual y de derecho que le asista al actor, lo cual ha sido estimado por este Tribunal, como contrario al ordenamiento jurídico administrativo. Este Tribunal tiene por demostrada una "inercia" de la Administración, traducida en omisión de actuación de un deber legal impuesto por el ordenamiento jurídico, en tanto que el artículos 15 de la Ley General de Control Interno, impone, como una necesaria actividad de control de todo ente público, lo siguiente: "El diseño y uso de documentos y registros que coadyuven en la anotación adecuada de las transacciones y los hechos significativos que se realicen en la institución.
Los documentos y registros deberán ser administrados y mantenidos apropiadamente." En el mismo sentido, el artículo 16 del mismo cuerpo normativo señala: "Artículo 16.—Sistemas de información. Deberá contarse con sistemas de información que permitan a la administración activa tener una gestión documental institucional, entendiendo esta como el conjunto de actividades realizadas con el fin de controlar, almacenar y, posteriormente, recuperar de modo adecuado la información producida o recibida en la organización, en el desarrollo de sus actividades, con el fin de prevenir cualquier desvío en los objetivos trazados. Dicha gestión documental deberá estar estrechamente relacionada con la gestión de la información, en la que deberán contemplarse las bases de datos corporativas y las demás aplicaciones informáticas, las cuales se constituyen en importantes fuentes de la información registrada".
En razón de lo anterior, se puede determinar la existencia de lo que el actor llama "inercia" administrativa, con respecto a la inexistencia de los registros y documentos necesarios para la determinación y comprobación de su efectiva situación jurídica. No lleva razón la representación de la parte demandada, al invocar la posibilidad de aplicación del artículo 157 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, e indicar que el ordenamiento le posibilita rectificar errores materiales y aritméticos. Lo anterior, en tanto que la norma no faculta a la Administración a violentar el principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios en demérito del Administrado, ni es una posibilidad abierta para ser empleada de manera impune por la Administración ante sus omisiones de actuación o disfunción administrativa. Por consiguiente, debe acogerse este extremo de la demanda.
VII.Sobre la solicitud de indemnización de daños y perjuicios: La parte actora pide se le indemnicen daños y perjuicios irrogados y en audiencia preliminar concreta un daño moral por la suma de dos millones de colones. No obstante, lo anterior, no precisa ni concreta en que consisten los daños invocados, ni determina en qué consiste el referido daño moral. Para este Tribunal, a pesar de que el daño moral posee una naturaleza in re ipsa, la simple mención del mismo, no es suficiente como para conceder tal extremo. En este sentido, por una parte, con respecto a la prueba del daño en general, el Código Procesal Civil en su Artículo 317 expresamente señala: " La carga de la prueba incumbe: 1) A quien formule una pretensión, respecto a las afirmaciones de los hechos constitutivos de su derecho. 2) A quien se oponga a una pretensión, en cuanto a las afirmaciones de hechos impeditivos, modificativos o extintivos del derecho del actor.
" . En el caso del daño moral, se ha indicado que el mismo no requiere una prueba directa, sino que le es aplicable determinados criterios que delimitan la discrecionalidad del Juzgador y que desprenden de su propia naturaleza jurídica y que han sido desarrollados por la jurisprudencia nacional. Así, como primer criterio delimitador están los principios generales del derecho y la equidad, y además, las presunciones del hombre inferidas de los elementos circunstanciales del caso de análisis. Asimismo de diversas resoluciones judiciales y de la sentencia 413 de 19 de noviembre de 2002 de la Sección Primera del Tribunal Contencioso Adm. Sección I, se evidencian otros criterios, a saber: "III. Por daño moral subjetivo, ha entendido la doctrina aquella afección que incide sobre la esfera emocional de las personas causando preocupación, sufrimiento, ansiedad y otras emociones negativas y perjudiciales, cuyo origen sea los actos ilícitos provocados por el accionante.
Por su naturaleza, son difíciles de probar por los medio ordinarios, por lo que puede el juzgador estimarlo con examen de las circunstancias que consten en el expediente y aplicado su experiencia, los principios generales de derecho y los de racionalidad y proporcionalidad. " (El destacado es nuestro) Estos últimos criterios han sido desarrollados de manera relevante para limitar la posibilidad de reconocimiento de indemnizaciones exageradas o desproporcionadas. En este orden de ideas, la Sala Primera ha señalado: " No se trata, entonces, de cuantificar el valor de la honra y dignidad de un sujeto, pues estos son bienes inapreciables, sino de fijar una compensación monetaria a su lesión , único mecanismo del cual puede echar mano el derecho, para así reparar, al menos en parte su ofensa. No cabría dentro de tal filosofía, establecer indemnizaciones exorbitantes, como sucede en otros sistemas jurídicos, pues ello produciría el enriquecimiento injusto del ofendido, mediante el lucro inmoral con la honra y dignidad propias.
Dentro de los principios fundamentales del derecho, hállanse los de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad , a los cuales se les ha reconocido en nuestro medio el rango de principios constitucionales (ver al respecto, las resoluciones de la Sala Constitucional #1739 - 92 de las 11:45 horas del primero de julio y 3495-92 del las 14:30 horas del diecinueve de noviembre, ambas de 1992). Aplicándolos a situaciones como la presente, resulta indispensable, al fijar las obligaciones nacidas en situaciones jurídicas indemnizatorias, atender la posición de las partes y la naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento, sin llegar a crear situaciones absurdas, dañinas o gravemente injustas. En tal sentido, el daño moral, en casos como el analizado, no podría dar lugar a indemnizaciones millonarias, como la pretendida. Ello abriría un portillo inconveniente , para dar paso a pretensiones desproporcionadas las cuales, so pretexto de tutelar el ámbito subjetivo del individuo, conducirían a un enriquecimiento injustificado que lejos de reparar la dignidad mancillada, socavaría sus fundamentos haciéndola caer en valores eminentemente económicos (Sala Primera voto 141 de 15:00 hrs. del 18 de junio de 1993 y No. 99 de 16 horas de 20 de setiembre de 1995) (El destacado es nuestro).
La causalidad del daño es otro criterio de naturaleza insoslayable, en tanto que la causa real de éste puede determinar los alcances y límites de la estimación reparadora. Por otra parte, siempre dentro del orden de la proporcionalidad, se habla de la "prudente apreciación del Juez" del daño y su resarcimiento, de la siguiente manera: "Por lo anterior, el tribunal debe considerar la procedencia del extremo en comentario, al efecto la Sala 1º. de la Corte Suprema ha dicho: " VI. Si bien el daño moral -en relación con el tema en cuestión- debido a su naturaleza, permite un amplio margen de discrecionalidad al juzgador en cuanto a su fijación, éste debe observarse necesariamente dentro de ciertos parámetros insoslayables, por ejemplo, la antigua Sala de Casación, en sentencia Nº 114 de las 16 hrs. del 2 de noviembre de 1979 avala la prudente apreciación de los jueces "...cuando les es dable inferir el daño con fundamento en la prueba de indicios.
Esta Sala, en su fallo Nº 114-93 señala que el prudente arbitrio aludido, ha de tener en consideración las circunstancias del caso, los principios generales del derecho y la equidad. Alrededor de tales conceptos, la Sala, en un pronunciamiento posterior razona en los siguientes términos: "No se trata, entonces, de cuantificar el valor de la honra y dignidad de un sujeto, pues estos son bienes inapreciables, sino de fijar una compensación monetaria a su lesión, único mecanismo del cual puede echar mano el derecho, para así reparar, al menos en parte su ofensa. No cabría dentro de tal filosofía, establecer indemnizaciones exorbitantes, como sucede en otros sistemas jurídicos, pues ello produciría el enriquecimiento injusto del ofendido, mediante el lucro inmoral con la honra y dignidad propias. Dentro de los principios fundamentales del derecho, hállanse los de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, a los cuales se les ha reconocido en nuestro medio el rango de principios constitucionales (ver al respecto, las resoluciones de la Sala Constitucional Nº 1739-92 de 11,45 horas del 1 de julio y Nº 3495-92 de 14,30 hrs. del 19 de noviembre, ambas de 1992).
Aplicándolos a situaciones como la presente, resulta indispensable, al fijar las obligaciones nacidas en situaciones jurídicas indemnizatorias, atender la posición de las partes y la naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento, sin llegar a crear situaciones absurdas, dañinas o gravemente injustas. En tal sentido, el daño moral, en casos como el analizado, no podría dar lugar a indemnizaciones millonarias, como la pretendida. ello abriría un portillo inconveniente, para dar paso a pretensiones desproporcionadas las cuales, so pretexto de tutelar el ámbito subjetivo del individuo, conducirían a un enriquecimiento injustificado que lejos de reparar la dignidad mancillada, socavaría sus fundamentos haciéndola caer en valores eminentemente económicos (Sala Primera Nº 41 de 15,00 de 18 de junio de 1993). VII. Recapitulando, se tiene que el prudente arbitrio a emplear por el Juzgador en situaciones como la presente, supone la observancia de parámetros ineludibles como la prueba indiciaria, las circunstancias propias del caso concreto, los principios generales del derecho, la equidad, la posición de las partes; la naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento y los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.
Sobre tales extremos puede y debe la parte interesada ofrecer prueba en lo posible. Solo así puede arribarse a un prudente arbitrio. Al margen de tales consideraciones la fijación discrecional corre el grave riesgo de incurrir en un exceso de poder que desfigure o desvirtúe lo ejecutoriado. Sea, la prudente apreciación del juez, aún contando con la realización del hecho generador -cual ocurre en la especie- (principio "in re ipsa"), precisa de las consideraciones o parámetros comentados, en torno al daño, para, con arreglo a ellos establecer el motivo. En el evento de que no militaren en autos elementos de juicio sobre el particular, tendrá el juzgador que actuar en consonancia con tal situación adoptando una actitud conservadora en la fijación, pues de no hacerlo así podría incidir en exceso de poder." Voto 00093-2000 del Tribunal Contencioso Adm. Sección II. Por otra parte, no debe obviarse que el daño moral no escapa de la certeza con relación a que éste debe ser consecuencia de la actuación u omisión de la administración, así como debe ser cierto el interés lesionado de la persona que lo invoca.
En el caso de análisis, como se ha dicho, no se evidencia que la parte que alega haber sufrido el daño moral, haya al menos precisado sus alcances y nivel de afectación y demuestre al menos con indicios, que este efectivamente se presentó en su fuero interno. No expresa la parte cuando surge el daño moral invocado, ni concreta el motivo de hecho por el cual hace su reclamo. Así las cosas, para este Tribunal no es posible conceder un daño moral, aplicando las consideraciones realizadas, si desconoce el fundamento concreto en que se basa la parte para su pretensión. Por lo anterior, debe ser rechazado este extremo de la demanda.”
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