INVU Housing Award Contract — Application of Legitimate Reliance PrincipleContrato de adjudicación de vivienda del INVU — aplicación del principio de confianza legítima

IV.- Regarding the subject matter of the proceedings: From what has been expressed by the parties, both in their claims and arguments, the subject matter of this proceeding consists of determining the existence of nullity defects in the administrative conduct objected to by the plaintiff, as well as the existence of a contractual link between the latter and the sued entity. Additionally, it must be determined whether the existence of damages caused by any conduct or omission of any official of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo has been proven.

V.- Regarding the existence of a contractual link between the plaintiff and the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo: In its claim, the plaintiff states that he acquired apartment number G-21 in the El Corral condominium in 1991 for the sum of eight hundred seventy-six thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones, and that since that date, he asserts, it was placed in his possession and awarded by the selling entity. Based on the foregoing, he requests that it be declared that he is the owner of said apartment, located in Curridabat, and that the sued entity be ordered to proceed to title the aforementioned property in his name. The Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo denies the existence of any contractual link with Mr. Quintanilla Dávila and states that there is no award contract (contrato de adjudicación) with the plaintiff, and therefore he does not possess any right over the apartment that is the subject of the dispute. In this regard, this Court considers that to resolve this aspect of the claim, the following considerations must be made: The Organic Law of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, No. 1788 of August 24, 1954, establishes as the competence of said entity, the leasing of homes from its patrimony to families that lack adequate housing and the necessary means to obtain it. Additionally, Article 5 of said normative body establishes as a power of the same: ".....h) Lease, sell, exchange, encumber and administer the homes, community service centers that it acquires or builds, as well as the other assets of its property" and "....ñ) Enter into all contracts and carry out all administrative, civil, industrial or commercial acts that are convenient or necessary for the better fulfillment of its purposes..." Regarding the regulation of the relationship between the entity and the beneficiaries of its programs, Article 39 of said law states the following: "The types of house construction, their building, leasing, repair or sale and in general, the prohibitions, restrictive clauses, interest rates, amortization, conservation, insurance, terms and other details on economic organization, building, improvement, award (adjudicación) and definitive transfer, shall be determined in the Regulations that the Board of Directors issues for that purpose." As noted, the indicated norm leaves the aspects related to the regulation of the relationship to which the families that inhabit the Institution's housing solutions would be subject to the exercise of regulatory power. By reason of the foregoing, it was enacted by means of an executive decree, not autonomous, as the law had indicated, the Reglamento de Adjudicación de Vivienda, Decree No. 2 of January 13, 1955, which establishes, regarding what interests us, the following: "Article 6.—The homes may be awarded (adjudicadas) under titles of sale, rental, and rental-sale, at the discretion of the Board of Directors. In the sale award (adjudicación de venta), the Board of Directors may require an advance payment of the value of the home, as permitted by the type and quality of the house. By virtue of the rental-sale contract, the awardee (adjudicatario) who initially rents has the option to purchase the home, for the value established in the original agreement, during a maximum period of five years. The Board of Directors may establish minimum rental-sale periods, which will serve to test the awardee's interest in terms of permanence. Upon formalizing the sale, the Institute may determine the term to cancel the price, in accordance with the contracting party's income. The interest rate included in the rental fee shall also govern the sale operation. The tenant who allows the option period to lapse in vain may either acquire the home according to a reappraisal thereof, or continue as a lessee, but in this second case they must henceforth cover a rental fee equal to that which as a buyer would correspond to them according to the immediately following article. The Board of Directors shall in this case set the duration of the period and the conditions for renewing the lease." "Article 7.—The price of homes awarded (adjudicadas) in sale shall be determined by the Board of Directors, taking into consideration the cost price. The Board shall also determine the term for canceling said price and the interest rate that corresponds to each category and, based on both, the Financial Department shall calculate the corresponding monthly installments. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the awardee may make payments toward the debt or cancel it at any date, before its maturity." Complementarily, Article 9 of the norm provides that the beneficiary was obliged to sign a contract, in accordance with the following provisions: "Article 9.—The rental regime resulting from rental or rental-sale contracts shall be governed in all other respects by the provisions that are applicable to leasing in this Regulation and in the Regulation on Leasing in Multi-family Buildings. The houses shall be delivered to the acquirers, prior to an inspection thereof, and a contract must be signed containing: a) A declaration by the awardee that they enter into possession of the home, receiving it in good condition to their entire satisfaction, and that they accept the conditions of sale, restrictive clauses, grounds for eviction (desahucio), interest rate, maximum term and other modalities set by the law and this Regulation, or by express provision of the Board of Directors; b) The amortization system to which they subscribe, in accordance with the rules established in the following Article 10; c) A copy of the restrictive clauses and the grounds for eviction; and d) The obligation of the awardee to regularly pay the municipal services and taxes, as well as the fire and life insurance policy, to cover the established outstanding balances." Subsequently, the Reglamento para la Adjudicación de Viviendas de Interés Social, in force since January 20, 1995, provided in this regard as follows: "Article 10.—Those who have canceled twelve installments of the award contract (contrato de adjudicación), initially signed and whose operation is up to date, may request the corresponding property title before the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, in the Department of Asset Administration, constituting a first-degree mortgage on the property, submitting to the legal and regulatory provisions established by the Institute's Reglamento de Préstamos Hipotecarios." In accordance with the foregoing provisions, the indicated entity developed a series of housing projects, both vertical and horizontal, through which a housing solution was provided to different families, based on a contract, called an "award" contract. On the private nature of these contracts, the Full Court, acting as constitutional controller (unconstitutionality action against Article 48 of the Organic Law of the INVU), ruled in an extraordinary session on September 3, 1981, where it stated: "The relations between the tenants of the INVU and the leasing entity itself are of a leasing nature, like any others that exist between a tenant and a private individual. These relations are of the same nature due to the nature of the contract and the condition of one of the contracting parties; but it is clear that they are not absolutely equal... and they are not equal because in common lease contracts (to call them that), the lessor is a person acting for profit, while in the INVU contracts, the lessor is a public law entity, which was created for other purposes... However, although the institution does not act for profit, it is obvious that this circumstance does not change the nature of the contract or its essential characteristic of the parties being in opposing positions..., just as occurs in the generality of lease contracts between private individuals." Notwithstanding the foregoing, subsequently, through vote 784-96, supplemented by number 0075-I-96 at 8:30 a.m. on February 16, 1996, the Constitutional Chamber partially modified the previously decided matter and indicated the following: "The so-called 'housing award contracts' of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo are governed by the Organic Law of the INVU and the Reglamento de Adjudicación de Vivienda of said Institute. The first of these two regulatory bodies contains a norm, specifically Article 42, which was conceived within a Budgetary Norm of an Extraordinary Budget of the Republic. Said norm, as a product of the theory of causality, has its effect and echo in the Reglamento de Adjudicación de Vivienda of the INVU in the consulted numerals 16 and 17. While it is true that the regulatory power exercised by the Administration empowers it to issue executive and administrative provisions or regulations, said power is limited solely to everything that is expressly stated in the Law that deserves to be regulated and, insofar as its regulation is not prohibited by express legal reserve. ... it is argued by the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo that the award contracts signed between the INVU and the awardees constitute special contracts of the Administration, which are subject to the regulations and laws governing the matter and not to common legislation. Analyzing the award contract recorded in the judicial file that is the basis for this judicial consultation, one can observe highly important elements that can only be found in a perfect bilateral synallagmatic contract. Synallagmatic because at the time of its signing it generates obligations and rights for both contracting parties and, in addition, it is perfect, insofar as the parties agree on the thing and the price, and insofar as the 'traditio' operates with all the effects that it entails, that is, the entry into possession of the asset by the 'accipiens' or acquirer and the abandonment thereof by the transferor or 'tradens'. Let us remember, in this regard, that the 'tradition' of an asset represents the act by which a person places a thing in the power of another, that is, the delivery of the asset constitutes the material element of the transfer which, once carried out, institutes real rights in favor of the acquirer. It is the criterion of this Chamber, that in the case before us, the formalism established by Articles 455 et seq. and concordant of the Civil Code, regarding the public deed and its registration in the Property Registry as a means of constituting the property right, is not applicable because said thesis seeks to protect the effects that said transfer causes with respect to the rights of third parties and not of the acquirer or the transferor, and has an informative character. This Court considers that the award contract signed between the administered parties and the INVU, produces effects on the ownership of the property from the very moment of the signing of the document, even the 'traditio' operating and the abandonment by the transferor of that property into the hands of the acquirer (awardee), constituting a right to property in favor of the new owner that cannot be considered, as the Reglamento de Adjudicación does, as a simple expectation of a right. This Chamber considers that, as in any housing financing system, the INVU can establish the legally permitted mechanisms to exercise control over the awards it makes and institute the respective recovery procedures aimed at enforcing the Institution's rights regarding the recovery of the asset or the amount invested in the construction of the property, without having to act arbitrarily and injure with such action the fundamental rights established by our Magna Carta. Thus, an eviction (desahucio) of a property that is owned by someone who, with the right to property, inhabits it by virtue of a contract that granted them said concession, can never proceed. The specificity of the clauses contained in a contract may tend to the regulation of the transaction that in the private sphere may proceed with respect to the legal business being carried out, however, said clauses cannot constitute a violation of the rights of one of the contracting parties, imposing burdens that, in the Law of Ancient Rome, were called 'leonine' or abusive. In the case that concerns us, the rights acquired 'per se' by the administered party-awardee, by virtue of a perfect purchase-sale contract and that are protected and guarded by Constitutional norms, cannot be the object of abuse by regulatory provisions that do not limit themselves to regulating the relations between the administration and the administered party, but rather violate and overwhelm fundamental rights of individuals, moving away from the primary purpose pursued, in this specific case, by the organic law of the INVU, which is to facilitate access to decent housing for the country's development, and the safeguarding of the principles of dignity, equality and social justice." This position was maintained by Section I of the Administrative Litigation Court in vote number 00303-2000 at 3:00 p.m. on October 31, 2000, as follows: "It emerges with crystal clarity from the transcribed vote that the Constitutional Court indicated that the 'housing award contract' signed between the defendant entity and the 'awardee', constitutes a perfect purchase-sale contract from its signing, even the delivery of the asset operating, so that the full effects of the transfer of ownership operate not with the 'act of delivering the deed for the asset', but from the very signing of the award agreement, that is, it is with the signing thereof that the awardee or awardees acquire for all legal purposes the title or ownership over the property..." In accordance with the foregoing, it is noted that in the case of award contracts, we are in the presence of contractual links of a private nature exercised by the Administration, not subject to the exorbitant regulations and clauses characteristic of the administrative contracting regime. In this line of thought, it has been indicated with respect to its particularities that: "The characteristic that differentiates this type of contracts from administrative ones is the absence of a legal regime that is exorbitant from common Law, thus the so-called unilateral rescission, enforceability, the application and execution of fines, at the administrative venue, not being applicable." (Cassagne, Juan Carlos. Los contratos de la Administración Pública. Distintas categorías y regímenes jurídicos. Revista de Administración Pública. Madrid, No. 78, September-December 1975, p. 426). On the other hand, as noted from the drafting of the last two resolutions, these are based on the assumption of the system called "bare consent" (nudo consenso), through which real rights are transferred by the mere consent of the parties. This is expressly established by Article 480 of the Civil Code insofar as it provides: "The property of movable and immovable property is transferred with regard to the contracting parties, by the mere fact of the agreement having the purpose of transferring it, independently of its registration in the Registry and of the tradition." In the case of purchase-sale, the system is reflected in the provisions of numeral 1049 of the same normative body which provides: "The sale is perfect between the parties from the moment they agree on the thing and the price." However, the necessary tradition cannot be ignored, as an inherent part for the perfection of the contractual relationship. In this line of thought, Article 480 refers to it as follows: "Tradition takes place from the moment the owner delivers and the acquirer takes possession of the thing. When the person who is to receive the thing already has it in their power under another non-translative title, the mere consent of the parties implies tradition from the certain date on which it is recorded..." Consequently, tradition, or effective delivery of the asset and taking of possession by a buyer, is also synonymous with conformity regarding the object received as part of the legal business that had been concretized by the simple agreement between the parties. From the foregoing, it is concluded that registry inscription has as its primary purpose to basically guarantee the effectiveness of the contract with respect to third parties, by virtue of registry publicity, but it is not a condition of validity thereof. This Court considers that in light of what has been indicated, according to the described characteristics, not every award contract possesses the effects indicated in the citations mentioned ut supra, and thus a distinction must be made between three types of different legal relationships, namely: a) the award contract made for the subsequent sale of the property. In this first case, the payments made by the beneficiary are installments toward the debt. b) the pure and simple lease contract, where the payments made are the simple price of the lease, and c) the lease contract with the possibility of mutating to a sale. In which the payments are initially the rental price of the property and subsequently may become installments toward the price thereof. In the case of the first scenario a), the cited norms indicate that an advance payment of the value of the home may be required, and thus the value of its transfer will be agreed upon by the Board of Directors of the entity. In the case of the second scenario, b) the beneficiary has no interest in acquiring the property and only remains as a lessee. Additionally, to regulate this particular relationship, the Reglamento para el arriendo en edificios multifamiliares (Decree No. 20 of December 14, 1954) and the Reglamento para Arrendamientos, published in La Gaceta No. 30 of February 13, 1976, the latter approved by the Board of Directors of the entity, were also issued at the time. In the case of the third scenario c) the awardee who initially rents has the option to purchase the home, for the value established in the original agreement, during a maximum period of five years. If the tenant allows the option period to lapse, they may either acquire the home according to a reappraisal thereof or continue as a lessee. In this scenario, Chapter III, called "lease of homes with purchase option" (arrendamiento de viviendas con opción de compra), of the Reglamento para Arrendamientos also applies, as it provides that the tenant may acquire the leased home, paying the value of the property at the time of leasing it, establishing a mechanism for setting the fee to be paid as a result of its sale. In this order of ideas, it is noted that only in the first case could we refer to being in the presence of a formalization of a property transfer relationship with all its attributes, through the agreement on thing and price, in addition to the "traditio". The foregoing, with the understanding that said relationship is not, as this Court has already indicated, comparable to a pure and simple transfer of ownership contract, given that it is transferred over time and the formalization of the respective deed for the corresponding registry inscription is conditional. In the specific case under analysis, it is noted that although there is no proof of the existence of a formal award contract document, it is not possible to burden the plaintiff with the negative consequences of such a situation at the administrative venue, given that there is evidence in the case file of the commencement and development of a contractual link between the defendant entity and Mr. Quintanilla Dávila. In effect, this Court considers it proven that the plaintiff, between the years 1990, 1991, and 1992, made 9 payments to the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo for apartment No. G-21 of the El Corral condominium, and since that time he has been occupying said property and has made various payments to the Administrative Board of the El Corral Condominium for water fees, hallway electricity, maintenance, and other fees for the same. This Court considers that the foregoing demonstrates the existence of an agreement between the parties in this proceeding, aimed at the plaintiff occupying the aforementioned apartment and that, as such, generated in his favor a subjective right of good faith, which cannot be ignored, in accordance with the principle of legitimate reliance (principio de confianza legítima). In this order of ideas, it must be remembered that said principle is oriented toward the protection of the administered parties, so that the founded expectations in favor of their rights are not violated, expectations that were born on the basis of prolonged state actions or omissions over time, and expressly or tacitly consented to by the administration, whether regarding active or passive behaviors, legal regulation, or normative interpretation. This is a limit to administrative powers, linked to good faith and the interdict of arbitrariness in administrative conduct in ablative acts. In the specific situation of Mr. Quintanilla Dávila, it is evident that more than twenty years have elapsed of his possession of apartment G-21, without the defendant entity having made, during all those years, any formal or material manifestation against him, and thus, moreover, it determined in an inspection carried out by its officials, that he still inhabits the property (testimony of witness Dora Chacón Chinchilla), which in turn is ratified by witness Herbert Jiménez Araya. The issuance of receipts by the entity indicating acceptance of payment and clearly indicating the concept for which it received each sum, creates a legal situation favorable to the plaintiff, in accordance with the purposes of the creation of this jurisdiction (Art. 1 CPCA). The non-existence in the entity's electronic or documentary records, regarding information on the specific legal situation of the plaintiff, cannot turn against his rights, when rather there have been active and omissive conducts that consolidate the conviction of the existence of a particular legal relationship, born on the occasion of the objectives of the creation of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo. In this sense, precisely, it has been established doctrinally that as a consequence of the principle of legitimate reliance, the errors of the Public Administration only affect it, unless it was the citizen themselves who induced the authority into error and therefore, the administered parties who, being in good faith, acquired rights based on defective acts, are protected by the guarantee of private property, until such time as an eventual annulment or other action is issued through the corresponding legal channels. Therefore, the demonstration of the existence of documents that should appear in an administrative file, when there are sufficient elements of conviction that protect the administered party regarding their existence, is the burden of the Administration and it will be up to it to adopt the measures for their custody, conservation, management or replacement, given the existence of national legislation on the archiving of public documents that so imposes it. In this order of ideas, Article 41 of the Law of the National Archives System (Ley del Sistema Nacional de Archivos) states: "All institutions must have a central archive and the necessary management archives for the proper conservation and organization of their documents, which must be done, except for special regulations, in accordance with the provisions of this law, its regulations and the rules of the Administrative Board of the National Archive, the National Commission for the Selection and Elimination of Documents and the General Directorate of the National Archive." Thus, this Court considers that the absence of proof of the existence of an award contract is not sufficient reason to delegitimize the legal situation of the plaintiff regarding apartment G-21 and does not imply that his possession is precarious or that it does not deserve legal protection. The representative of the sued entity is not correct when she argues that the occupation of the property by the plaintiff is irregular, insofar as the apartment he occupies is located on a public domain asset, and thus the administration has the possibility of self-protection. For this Court, it is evident that the apartment that is the subject of this proceeding is not a public domain asset (bien demanial). In this sense, a distinction must be made between public domain assets of the Administration and private domain assets thereof. The former are unseizable, imprescriptible, and inalienable. The latter are within the commerce of men. Article 261 of the Civil Code provides: “Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those from which everyone can benefit because they are entrusted to public use. All other things are private and the object of particular property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in that case, as civil persons, do not differ from any other person.” In the case of the former, the Administration has exorbitant powers for their protection, and thus, in the case of the areas destined for housing by the INVU, we are in the presence of the private regime of the Administration, so the direct use of exorbitant powers that the Administration has to protect public assets has been expressly denied as a means of defense of the assets under consultation. It is evident that in these cases, said properties do not enjoy any singular public domain affectation, nor the attribute of inalienability, given that they are transferable by sale or award (adjudicación) to the beneficiaries. This Court considers the arguments of the representation of the sued entity to be contradictory, because while on one hand it invokes the need to sell the property in question at its current price, on the other it says it is public domain, and in this latter case, it could not be the object of sale by a simple administrative act. Thus, the existence of a contractual link between the INVU and the plaintiff has been considered proven, supported by the evidence provided in the case file. Said link, starting from the three scenarios indicated by this Court previously, must be considered as an award contract made for the subsequent sale of the property. The foregoing, insofar as the receipts issued by the INVU itself indicate that the plaintiff made the payment of the "premium" (prima) for the apartment, of "monthly installments" (mensualidades) and of "overdue installments" (cuotas atrasadas), which demonstrate, not the existence of a lease relationship, but of a sale thereof. By reason of the foregoing, this Court again considers that the fact that the deed has not been formalized in the twenty years of occupation of the property by Mr. Quintanilla Dávila cannot be turned against him, given that the regulations under analysis permitted it, not imposing any burden for the passage of time.

Note how only in the rent-sale scenario does Article 6 of the Regulations expressly indicate that "the lessee who allows the option period to expire in vain may either acquire the dwelling according to a reassessment," given that in the case of a pure and simple sale it only indicates the necessary setting of amounts and installments by the Board of Directors, but without providing that a new appraisal for the current price of a property is required, whose price was agreed upon more than twenty years ago. It is relevant to indicate that said regulation was the one in force at the time the contractual bond was perfected, and as it is an executive decree, it has not lost its effects for the particular case of the plaintiff, given that the subsequent Regulations for the Awarding of Social Interest Housing, in force since January 20, 1995, was approved by agreement of the INVU's Board of Directors, which could not repeal the former, as it is a norm of higher rank. By reason of the foregoing, the representation of the defendant is not correct when it alleges that the plaintiff's case must be governed by the Appraisal Regulations and Agreement Number 4450 of October 11, 1994, Article III, subsection 14-B of the entity, which grants them validity for six months for determining the value of goods or rights, since they apply to scenarios different from those of Mr. Quintanilla, who, as indicated, possesses a legal situation creating a subjective right in his favor, under a private contractual bond entered into with the INVU since 1991, founded on an executive decree, against which an autonomous regulation with scopes different from those that gave rise to the relationship subject to this resolution cannot be opposed. This Court deems it appropriate to uphold the claim established so that it is declared that the plaintiff has a right to be granted registered ownership of apartment G-21 of the El Corral Condominium, located in Curridabat, which must be recognized for purposes of granting the respective deed in his favor, by the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism, with the caveats to be indicated in this resolution.

V.- On the nullity of the challenged acts: The plaintiff requests that the nullity of the following acts be declared: a) official letter C-PPT-531-2011 b) Resolution GG-234-2011 of the General Management of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism c) agreement made by the INVU's Board of Directors, according to Article II, subsection 3), Points a), b), c), e) of the minutes of ordinary session No. 5884, of June 29, 2011, and communicated through official letter CJD-113-2011, of July 13, 2011. In this regard, it invokes the arguments analyzed in the preceding recital to substantiate defects in the grounds (motivación) and content of the acts. In this respect, having analyzed the indicated acts, based on the considerations previously made, this Court deems it appropriate to uphold this part of the claim, given that the indicated conducts start from the assumption of the non-existence of a contractual bond with the plaintiff, based on the non-existence of the award contract document. It must be taken into consideration, given the nature of the formal conducts challenged, that the formal action of the Public Administration, materialized in the adoption of administrative acts (understood as unilateral declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge issued in the exercise of the administrative function), must necessarily possess a series of material and formal elements to be fully valid and effective. As material or substantive elements, we have the competence of the subject issuing the act, the cause (motivo) giving rise to it—understood as the legal or factual antecedents or presuppositions of the administrative conduct—the content, that is, what the act itself provides (which must be lawful, possible, clear, proportional, and in accordance with the cause), and the public purpose pursued by its adoption. As formal elements, both the grounding (motivación) (foundation for what was decided) that substantiates the administrative conduct, its form of instrumentation, and the procedure adopted for its materialization are considered, in addition to the investiture of the body or official issuing the act. In the case of official letter C-PPT-531-2011 of May 4, 2011, it is noted that it indicates to the plaintiff that "... since there is no award contract between Mr. Quintanilla Dávila and the INVU, the payments made do not generate any right..." Consequently, and contradictorily—given that the same document indicated that he had no right and was not an awardee—it indicates to him that to formalize the purchase of the apartment, an appraisal must be carried out for its current price. In the same sense, Resolution GG-234-2011 of eleven o'clock on May 27, 2011, of the General Management of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism, indicated that "... there is no contractual relationship between this Institute and you, as there is no record of an award contract signed between the parties, therefore it does not generate any right for you over the apartment in question, given that the award contract is considered a title transferring ownership for the benefit of the awardee..." Said position was ratified by agreement of the INVU's Board of Directors, Article II, subsection 3), of the minutes of ordinary session No. 5884, of June 29, 2011, as it invokes identical considerations. As noted from the text of said acts, there exists a defect of absolute nullity in their grounding (motivación), insofar as they are founded on considerations contrary to law, starting, on the one hand, from the non-existence of the contractual bond that has been demonstrated in trial, based on the Administration's own conducts, and by imposing on Mr. Quintanilla Dávila the application of an appraisal not provided for in his particular legal relationship, as analyzed above. This Court deems that, as stated, the indicated acts are contrary to the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima) and the prohibition of arbitrariness, because in an unfounded manner and contrary to law and the circumstances inherent to the legal relationship, it denies the latter's existence, despite having elements of conviction at the administrative level regarding the existence of a prior contractual bond agreed upon since 1991. Furthermore, in the case under analysis, it is appropriate to apply the provisions of Article 137 of the General Public Administration Law, as it provides: "The behaviors and material activities of the Administration that have a univocal meaning and that are incompatible with a different intention shall serve to express the act, unless the nature or circumstance of the act requires an express declaration." Thus, it is appropriate to uphold the absolute nullity of the objected acts.

VI.- On the request for a declaration of administrative inertia: The plaintiff states in its claim that there is inertia on the part of the respondent entity. It does not specify concrete omissions of actions regarding what it deems administrative inertia, but from its reasoning it is inferred that they are linked to the non-existence in the institutional files of its award contract, which generated the grounds (motivación) of the challenged acts and which provided the basis for considering that he was not in compliance with the law. In this regard, based on the considerations made by this Tribunal, it is deemed that indeed, an administrative dysfunction is present due to the non-existence of documentary and computerized records regarding the specific legal situation of the plaintiff, despite the fact that other conducts have been deemed proven (issuance of receipts, acceptance of payments, tolerance of occupation of the property for more than twenty years) that demonstrate a prior contractual bond. In this sense, the witness offered by the respondent entity stated in her deposition that the plaintiff's situation was determined as a result of a study to locate what were called "project balances" of persons for whom the titling of their apartment had not been formalized, a task that would not be necessary if the entity had complete and updated information systems about the housing development where the plaintiff lives. As indicated, it has been deemed proven that in the respondent entity there is no registered account in the plaintiff's name for apartment G-21 of the Corral Condominium, nor an award contract, and there is only a provisional deposit in the amount of one hundred twenty-nine thousand five hundred seventy colones and another deposit for a down payment (prima) in the amount of one hundred ninety-eight thousand five hundred two colones. Notwithstanding the above and the proven fact of Mr. Quintanilla Dávila's long years of stay on the property, the entity responsible for the housing project never took action before him to determine his situation or adopt measures in this regard, nor did it keep documentary support that would serve as a basis for the adoption of an administrative conduct. On the contrary, it issued receipts in the plaintiff's name, received the money paid by him, and tolerated his stay for more than twenty years, only to later allege in a trial the illegitimacy of the possession and attempt to apply a collection mechanism that this Court has deemed foreign to the plaintiff's legal relationship. The absence of records regarding his situation and the non-existence of his award contract is precisely part of the reasons why the acts that have been deemed null in this resolution led to basing their grounds (motivación) on the presumed non-existence of a contractual bond and right assisting the plaintiff, which has been deemed by this Court as contrary to the administrative legal system. This Court has deemed proven an "inertia" of the Administration, manifested as an omission to act upon a legal duty imposed by the legal system, inasmuch as Article 15 of the General Internal Control Law imposes, as a necessary control activity of every public entity, the following: "The design and use of documents and records that contribute to the adequate notation of transactions and significant events carried out in the institution. The documents and records must be properly managed and maintained." In the same sense, Article 16 of the same regulatory body states: "Article 16. — Information systems. There must be information systems that allow the active administration to have institutional document management, understanding this as the set of activities carried out in order to control, store, and subsequently retrieve in an adequate manner the information produced or received in the organization, in the course of its activities, in order to prevent any deviation from the established objectives. Said document management must be closely related to information management, which must include corporate databases and other computer applications, which constitute important sources of recorded information." By reason of the foregoing, the existence of what the plaintiff calls administrative "inertia" can be determined, regarding the non-existence of the necessary records and documents for the determination and verification of his effective legal situation. The representation of the defendant is not correct when invoking the possibility of applying Article 157 of the General Public Administration Law, and indicating that the legal system enables it to rectify material and arithmetic errors. The foregoing, inasmuch as the norm does not empower the Administration to violate the principle of the intangibility of its own acts to the detriment of the Individual, nor is it an open possibility to be used with impunity by the Administration in the face of its omissions to act or administrative dysfunction. Consequently, this part of the claim must be upheld.

VII.- On the request for compensation for damages : The plaintiff requests compensation for damages caused and in the preliminary hearing specifies non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) for the sum of two million colones. However, notwithstanding the above, it does not specify or detail what the invoked damages consist of, nor does it determine what the referred non-pecuniary damage consists of. For this Court, despite the fact that non-pecuniary damage possesses a nature in re ipsa, the mere mention thereof is not sufficient to grant such part. In this sense, on the one hand, with respect to the proof of damage in general, the Civil Procedure Code in its Article 317 expressly states: "The burden of proof falls on: 1) The party who formulates a claim, regarding the assertions of the constitutive facts of its right. 2) The party who opposes a claim, regarding the assertions of impeditive, modifying, or extinguishing facts of the plaintiff's right." In the case of non-pecuniary damage, it has been indicated that it does not require direct proof, but rather certain criteria delimiting the Judge's discretion apply to it, which derive from its own legal nature and have been developed by national case law. Thus, as the first delimiting criterion, there are the general principles of law and equity, and furthermore, the presumptions of man inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis. Likewise, from various judicial resolutions and from judgment 413 of November 19, 2002, of the First Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court, Section I, other criteria are evident, namely: "III. By subjective non-pecuniary damage, doctrine has understood that condition affecting the emotional sphere of persons causing worry, suffering, anxiety, and other negative and harmful emotions, whose origin involves the unlawful acts caused by the claimant. By its nature, it is difficult to prove by ordinary means, so the judge may estimate it by examining the circumstances appearing in the file and applying their experience, the general principles of law, and those of rationality and proportionality." (Our emphasis) These latter criteria have been developed in a relevant manner to limit the possibility of recognizing exaggerated or disproportionate compensation. In this line of thought, the First Chamber has indicated: "It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, since these are inestimable assets, but rather about establishing monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism that law can resort to, in order to thus repair, at least in part, its offense. Under such a philosophy, it would be inappropriate to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems, because that would cause unjust enrichment of the offended party, through the immoral profit from one's own honor and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our environment with the rank of constitutional principles (see in this respect, the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber #1739-92 at 11:45 a.m. on July first and 3495-92 at 2:30 p.m. on November nineteenth, both of 1992). Applying them to situations like the present one, it is essential, when setting the obligations arising from compensatory legal situations, to consider the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or seriously unjust situations. In this sense, non-pecuniary damage, in cases like the one analyzed, could not give rise to millionaire compensation, as sought. That would open an inconvenient loophole, giving way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing the tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations causing it to fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber vote 141 at 3:00 p.m. on June 18, 1993, and No. 99 at 4:00 p.m. on September 20, 1995) (Our emphasis). The causality of the damage is another unavoidable criterion, insofar as the real cause thereof can determine the scope and limits of the compensatory estimation. On the other hand, always within the order of proportionality, reference is made to the "prudent appreciation of the Judge" regarding the damage and its compensation, as follows: "Therefore, the court must consider the appropriateness of the part under discussion, in this regard the First Chamber of the Supreme Court has stated: "VI. Although non-pecuniary damage—in relation to the matter in question—due to its nature, allows a wide margin of discretion to the judge regarding its determination, this must necessarily be observed within certain unavoidable parameters, for example, the former Court of Cassation, in judgment No. 114 at 4:00 p.m. on November 2, 1979, endorses the judges' prudent appreciation '...when it is possible for them to infer the damage based on circumstantial proof (prueba de indicios).' This Chamber, in its ruling No. 114-93, indicates that the aforementioned prudent judgment must take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity. Around such concepts, the Chamber, in a later pronouncement, reasons in the following terms: 'It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, since these are inestimable assets, but rather about establishing monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism that law can resort to, in order to thus repair, at least in part, its offense. Under such a philosophy, it would be inappropriate to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems, because that would cause unjust enrichment of the offended party, through the immoral profit from one's own honor and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our environment with the rank of constitutional principles (see in this respect, the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1739-92 at 11:45 a.m. on July 1 and No. 3495-92 at 2:30 p.m. on November 19, both of 1992). Applying them to situations like the present one, it is essential, when setting the obligations arising from compensatory legal situations, to consider the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or seriously unjust situations. In this sense, non-pecuniary damage, in cases like the one analyzed, could not give rise to millionaire compensation, as sought. That would open an inconvenient loophole, giving way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing the tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations causing it to fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber No. 41 at 3:00 p.m. on June 18, 1993). VII. Recapitulating, it can be said that the prudent judgment to be employed by the Judge in situations like the present one presupposes the observance of unavoidable parameters such as circumstantial proof, the circumstances inherent to the specific case, the general principles of law, equity, the position of the parties; the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. On these aspects, the interested party can and must offer proof where possible. Only in this way can a prudent judgment be reached. Outside such considerations, the discretionary determination runs the serious risk of incurring an excess of power that distorts or undermines what has been adjudicated. That is, the prudent appreciation of the judge, even having the occurrence of the generating event—as occurs in the instant case—(principle 'in re ipsa'), requires the considerations or parameters mentioned, regarding the damage, to, in accordance with them, establish the reason. In the event that there are no evaluative elements on the matter in the case file, the judge will have to act in accordance with such situation, adopting a conservative attitude in the determination, because failing to do so could involve an excess of power." Vote 00093-2000 of the Contentious-Administrative Court, Section II. On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that non-pecuniary damage does not escape the certainty that it must be a consequence of the administration's action or omission, just as the injured interest of the person invoking it must be certain. In the case under analysis, as has been said, it is not evident that the party claiming to have suffered the non-pecuniary damage has at least specified its scope and level of affectation and demonstrated at least through circumstantial proof that this effectively occurred in its internal sphere. The party does not state when the invoked non-pecuniary damage arises, nor does it specify the factual reason for which it makes its claim. Thus, for this Court it is not possible to grant non-pecuniary damage, applying the considerations made, if it is unaware of the concrete foundation on which the party bases its claim.

For the foregoing, this part of the claim must be rejected." IV.- Regarding the object of the proceeding: Based on what was expressed by the parties, both in their claims and arguments, the object of this proceeding consists of determining the existence of nullity defects in the administrative actions objected to by the plaintiff, as well as the existence of a contractual relationship (vínculo contractual) between the latter and the defendant entity. Additionally, it must be determined whether the existence of damages caused by some act or omission of an official of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo has been demonstrated.

V.- Regarding the existence of a contractual relationship (vínculo contractual) between the plaintiff and the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo: In his claim, the plaintiff indicates that he acquired apartment number G-21 in the El Corral condominium in 1991 for the sum of eight hundred seventy-six thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones, such that from that date, he states, he was placed in possession and it was awarded (adjudicado) by the selling entity. Based on the foregoing, he requests that it be declared that he is the owner of the indicated apartment, located in Curridabat, and that the defendant entity be ordered to proceed to title the indicated property in his name. The Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo rejects the existence of any contractual relationship (vínculo contractual) with Mr. Quintanilla Dávila and indicates that there is no award contract (contrato de adjudicación) with the plaintiff, so he does not possess any right over the apartment that is the object of the litigation. In this regard, this Tribunal considers that to resolve this aspect of the claim, the following considerations must be made: The Organic Law of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, No. 1788 of August 24, 1954, establishes as the competence of said entity, the renting of housing from its assets to families lacking adequate lodging and the necessary means of obtaining it. Additionally, Article 5 of said regulatory body provides as a power thereof: "... h) Rent, sell, exchange, encumber, and manage the housing and community service centers that it acquires or builds, as well as the other goods of its property" and "... ñ) Enter into all contracts and perform all administrative, civil, industrial, or commercial acts that are convenient or necessary for the better fulfillment of its purposes..." Regarding the specific regulation of the relationship between the entity and the beneficiaries of its programs, Article 39 of the indicated law expresses the following: "The types of house construction, their building, leasing, repair, or sale and, in general, the prohibitions, restrictive clauses, interest rates, amortization, conservation, insurance, terms, and other details regarding economic organization, building, improvement, award (adjudicación), and definitive transfer, shall be determined in the Regulations that the Board of Directors issues to that effect." As noted, the indicated norm leaves to the exercise of regulatory power the aspects pertaining to the regulation of the relationship in which the families habitating the Institution's housing solutions would find themselves subject. By reason of the foregoing, there was promulgated by means of an executive, non-autonomous regulation, just as the law had indicated, the Regulations for the Award of Housing (Reglamento de Adjudicación de Vivienda), Decree No. 2 of January 13, 1955, which establishes, in what is of interest to us, the following: "Article 6—The housing may be awarded (adjudicadas) under titles of sale, rental, and rent-to-own, at the discretion of the Board of Directors. In the sale award (adjudicación), the Board of Directors may require an advance payment on the value of the housing, as permitted by the type and quality of the house. By virtue of the rent-to-own contract, the awardee (adjudicatario) who initially rents has the option to purchase the housing, for the value established in the original agreement, within a maximum period of five years. The Board of Directors may establish minimum rent-to-own terms, which shall serve to test the awardee's (adjudicatario) interest regarding permanence. Upon formalizing the sale, the Institute may determine the term to cancel the price, in accordance with the contractor's income. The interest rate included in the rental installment shall also govern the sale operation. The tenant who allows the option period to elapse in vain may either purchase the housing according to a reappraisal thereof, or continue as a lessee, but in this second case, they shall henceforth cover a rental installment equal to that which would correspond to them as a buyer pursuant to the immediately following article. The Board of Directors shall set in this case the duration of the period and the conditions for renewing the lease." "Article 7—The price of the housing awarded (adjudicadas) in sale shall be determined by the Board of Directors, taking into consideration the cost price. The Board shall also determine the term for cancellation of said price and the interest rate corresponding to each category and, based on both, the Financial Department shall calculate the corresponding monthly installments. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the awardee (adjudicatario) may make payments toward the debt or cancel it on any date, before its maturity." In a complementary manner, Article 9 of the regulation provides that the beneficiary was obligated to sign a contract, in accordance with the following provisions: "Article 9—The rental regime resulting from lease or lease-purchase contracts shall be governed in all other respects by the provisions applicable to leasing in this Regulation and in the Regulation for Leasing in Multifamily Buildings. The houses shall be delivered to the acquirers, after prior inspection thereof, and a contract must be signed containing: a) A declaration by the awardee that they are entering into possession of the dwelling, receiving it in good condition to their entire satisfaction, and that they accept the conditions of sale, restrictive clauses, grounds for eviction (causales de desahucio), interest rate, maximum term, and other modalities established by law and this Regulation, or by express provision of the Board of Directors; b) The amortization system to which they subscribe, in accordance with the rules established in the following Article 10; c) A copy of the restrictive clauses and the grounds for eviction (causales de desahucio); and d) The obligation of the awardee to regularly pay municipal services and taxes, as well as the fire and life insurance policy, to cover the outstanding established balances." Subsequently, the Regulation for the Awarding of Social Interest Housing (Reglamento para la Adjudicación de Viviendas de Interés Social), in force since January 20, 1995, provided the following on this matter: "Article 10.—Those who have paid twelve installments of the award contract initially signed and whose operation is up to date may request the corresponding title deed from the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, in the Department of Asset Administration, constituting a first-degree mortgage on the property, submitting to the legal and regulatory provisions established by the Institute's Regulation on Mortgage Loans." In accordance with the foregoing provisions, the indicated entity developed a series of housing projects, both vertical and horizontal, through which a housing solution was provided to different families, based on a contract, called an "award (adjudicación)" contract. Regarding the private nature of these contracts, the Full Court (Corte Plena), acting as constitutional controller (action of unconstitutionality against Article 48 of the Organic Law of the INVU), ruled in an extraordinary session on September 3, 1981, stating: "The relationships between the INVU tenants and the leasing entity itself are of a leasehold nature, like any others that exist between a tenant and a private individual. These relationships are of the same kind due to the nature of the contract and the status of one of the contracting parties; but it is clear that they are not absolutely identical... and they are not identical because in common lease contracts (to call them that), the lessor is a person acting for profit, whereas in the INVU contracts, the lessor is a public law entity, which was created for other purposes...However, even though the institution does not act for profit, it is obvious that this circumstance does not alter the nature of the contract or its essential characteristic that the parties are in an opposing position..., as occurs in the generality of lease contracts between private individuals." Notwithstanding the foregoing, subsequently, through vote 784-96, supplemented by number 0075-I-96 at 8:30 a.m. on February 16, 1996, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) partially modified the previous ruling and stated: "The so-called 'housing award contracts' of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo are governed by the Organic Law of the INVU and the Housing Award Regulation of said Institute. The first of these two bodies of provisions contains a rule, specifically Article 42, which was conceived within a Budgetary Norm of an Extraordinary Budget of the Republic. Said norm, as a product of the theory of causality, has its effect and echo in the Housing Award Regulation of the INVU in the consulted numerals 16 and 17. While it is true that the regulatory power exercised by the Administration empowers it to issue executive and administrative provisions or regulations, this power is strictly limited to everything that is expressly enunciated in the Law that merits regulation, and insofar as its regulation is not prohibited by an express legal reserve. ... it is argued by the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo that the award contracts signed between the INVU and the awardees constitute special contracts of the Administration, which are subject to the regulations and laws governing the matter and not to common legislation. Analyzing the award contract contained in the judicial file that is the basis for this judicial consultation, highly important elements can be observed that can only be found in a perfect bilateral synallagmatic contract. Synallagmatic because, at the time of its signing, it generates obligations and rights for both contracting parties and, furthermore, it is perfect, insofar as the parties agree on the object and price, and insofar as the "traditio" operates with all the effects it entails, that is, the entry into possession of the property by the "accipiens" or acquirer and the abandonment of the same by the alienator or "tradens." Let us remember, in this regard, that the "tradition (tradición)" of a property represents the act by which one person places a thing in the power of another, that is, the delivery of the property constitutes the material element of the transfer which, once completed, institutes real rights (derechos reales) in favor of the acquirer. It is the criterion of this Chamber that, in the case before us, the formalism established by Article 455 and subsequent and concordant articles of the Civil Code, regarding the public deed and its registration in the Property Registry as a means of constituting the right of ownership, does not apply because said thesis seeks to protect the effects that said transfer may cause with respect to the rights of third parties and not those of the acquirer or the alienator; it has an informative character. This Court considers that the award contract signed between the administered parties and the INVU takes effect on the ownership of the real property from the very moment of signing the document, with even the "traditio" operating and the abandonment by the alienator of that real property into the hands of the acquirer (awardee), constituting a right to ownership in favor of the new owner that cannot be considered, as the Award Regulation does, as a simple expectation of a right. This Chamber considers that, as occurs in every housing financing system, the INVU may establish legally permitted mechanisms to exercise control over the awards it makes and institute the respective recovery procedures aimed at enforcing the rights of the Institution regarding the recovery of the property or the amount invested in its construction, without having to act arbitrarily and injure with such action the fundamental rights established by our Constitution. Thus, an eviction (desahucio) of a property that is owned by the person who, with the right to ownership, inhabits it by virtue of a contract that granted said concession can never proceed. The specificity of the clauses contained in a contract may tend to regulate the transaction that, in the private sphere, may proceed with respect to the legal transaction being performed; however, said clauses cannot constitute a violation of the rights of one of the contracting parties, imposing burdens that, in the Law of Ancient Rome, were called "leonine" or abusive. In the case at hand, the rights acquired 'per se' by the administered party-awardee, by virtue of a perfect sale-purchase contract and which are protected and safeguarded by Constitutional norms, cannot be subject to abuse by regulatory provisions that are not limited to regulating the relations between administration and administered party, but rather violate and trample on fundamental rights of private individuals, moving away from the primary purpose sought, in this specific case, by the organic law of the INVU, which is to facilitate access to decent housing for the country's development and the safeguarding of the principles of dignity, equality, and social justice." This position was maintained by Section I of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo) in vote number 00303-2000 at 3:00 p.m. on October 31, 2000, in the following manner: "It follows with crystal clarity from the transcribed vote that the Constitutional Court indicated that the 'housing award contract' signed between the defendant entity and the 'awardee' constitutes a perfect sale-purchase contract from its signing, even operating the delivery of the property, so that the full effects of the transfer of ownership (traspaso de dominio) operate not with the 'act of delivering the deed for the property,' but from the very signing of the award agreement; that is, it is with the signing of this that the awardee or awardees acquire, for all legal purposes, title or ownership (titularidad o dominio) over the real property..." In accordance with the foregoing, it is noted that in the case of award contracts, we are in the presence of contractual bonds of a private nature exercised by the Administration, not subject to the exorbitant regulations and clauses typical of the administrative contracting regime. In this vein, it has been indicated with respect to their particularities that "The characteristic that differentiates this type of contract from administrative ones is the absence of an exorbitant legal regime from Common Law, thus the so-called unilateral rescission, enforceability, application and execution of fines, in the administrative venue, do not proceed." (Cassagne, Juan Carlos. Los contratos de la Administración Pública. Distintas categorías y regímenes jurídicos. Revista de Administración Pública. Madrid, No. 78, September-December 1975, p. 426). Furthermore, as is noted from the drafting of the last two rulings, these are based on the premise of the system called "bare consensus," whereby real rights (derechos reales) are transferred by the mere consent of the parties. This is expressly established by Article 480 of the Civil Code insofar as it provides: "The ownership of personal and real property is transferred with respect to the contracting parties, by the mere act of the agreement whose object is to transfer it, independently of its registration in the Registry and of tradition (tradición)." In the case of a sale-purchase, the system is reflected in the provisions of numeral 1049 of the same body of law, which provides: "The sale is perfect between the parties from the moment they agree on the object and price." However, the necessary tradition (tradición), as an inherent part for the perfection of the contractual relationship, cannot be ignored. In this vein, Article 480 refers to it in the following manner: "Tradition (tradición) is carried out from the moment the owner delivers and the acquirer takes possession of the thing. When the person who is to receive the thing already has it in their power under another non-transferable title, the mere consent of the parties constitutes tradition (tradición) from the certain date on which it is recorded...." Consequently, tradition (tradición), or effective delivery of the property and taking of possession by a buyer, is also synonymous with conformity regarding the object received as part of the legal transaction that had been concretized by the simple agreement between the parties. From the foregoing, it is concluded that the registry inscription has as its primary purpose, basically, guaranteeing the efficacy of the contract with respect to third parties, by virtue of registry publicity, but it is not a condition of its validity. This Court considers that, in light of the foregoing, according to the characteristics described, not every award contract possesses the effects indicated in the citations mentioned ut supra, and thus, a distinction must be made between three different types of legal relationships, namely, a) the award contract executed for the subsequent sale of the property. In this first case, the payments made by the beneficiary are installments towards the debt. b) the pure and simple lease contract, where the payments made are simply the price of the lease, and c) the lease contract with the possibility of converting to a sale, where the payments initially are the price of the property's rent and subsequently may become installments towards its price. In the case of the first scenario a), the cited regulations indicate that an advance payment towards the value of the dwelling may be required, and thus, the transfer value thereof shall be agreed upon by the entity's Board of Directors. In the case of the second scenario, b), the beneficiary has no interest in acquiring the property and remains simply as a lessee. Additionally, to regulate this specific relationship, the Regulation for Leasing in Multifamily Buildings (Decree Number 20 of December 14, 1954) and the Regulation for Leases (Reglamento para Arrendamientos), published in La Gaceta No. 30 of February 13, 1976, the latter approved by the entity's Board of Directors, were also issued at the time. In the case of the third scenario, c), the awardee who initially leases has the option to purchase the dwelling, for the value established in the original agreement, within a maximum period of five years. If the tenant lets the option period expire, they may either acquire the dwelling according to a reassessment thereof or continue as a lessee. In this scenario, Chapter III, called "lease of dwellings with purchase option (arrendamiento de viviendas con opción de compra)," of the Regulation for Leases, also applies, as it provides that the tenant may acquire the leased dwelling, paying the value of the property at the time of leasing it, establishing a mechanism for setting the installment to be paid as a result of its sale. In this vein, it is noted that only in the first case could we state that we are in the presence of a formalization of a relationship of transfer of property with all its attributes, through the agreement on object and price, in addition to the "traditio." The foregoing, with the understanding that said relationship is not, as this Court has already indicated, comparable to a pure and simple transfer of ownership contract, given that it is spread over time and the formalization of the respective deed for the corresponding registry inscription is conditional. In the specific case under analysis, it is noted that while there is no proof of the existence of a formal document of an award contract, it is not possible to burden the plaintiff with the negative consequences of such a situation in the administrative venue, while the case file contains proof of the initiation and development of a contractual bond between the defendant entity and Mr. Quintanilla Dávila. Indeed, this Court finds it proven that the plaintiff, between the years 1990, 1991, and 1992, made 9 payments to the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo for the concept of apartment No. G-21 of the El Corral condominium, and thus, since that time he has been occupying said property and has made various payments to the Administrative Board of the El Corral Condominium for the concept of water fees, hallway lighting, maintenance, and others thereof. This body considers that the foregoing demonstrates the existence of an agreement between the parties in the present process, intended for the plaintiff to occupy the mentioned apartment and which, as such, generated in his favor a subjective right of good faith, which cannot be ignored, in accordance with the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima). In this vein, it must be remembered that said principle is oriented towards the protection of the administered parties, so that the well-founded expectations in favor of their rights, which arose based on prolonged state actions or omissions over time and consented to expressly or tacitly by the administration, whether through active or passive behaviors, legal regulation, or normative interpretation, are not violated. This is a limit on administrative powers, linked to good faith and the prohibition of arbitrariness in administrative conduct in ablative acts. In the specific situation of Mr. Quintanilla Dávila, it is evident that more than twenty years of possession have elapsed regarding apartment G-21, without the defendant entity having made any formal or material manifestation against him during all those years, and rather, it determined in an inspection carried out by its officials that he still inhabits the property (statement of witness Dora Chacón Chinchilla), which in turn is ratified by witness Herbert Jiménez Araya. The issuance of receipts by the entity indicating acceptance of payment and clearly indicating the concept for which each sum was received creates a favorable legal situation for the plaintiff, consistent with the purposes for which this jurisdiction was created (art. 1 CPCA). The non-existence in the entity's electronic or documentary records of information regarding the specific legal situation of the plaintiff cannot turn against his rights when, rather, there have been active and passive conducts that consolidate the conviction regarding the existence of a particular legal relationship, born from the objectives for which the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo was created. In this sense, indeed, it has been established doctrinally that as a consequence of the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima), the errors of the Public Administration only affect it, unless it was the citizen themselves who induced the authority to error, and therefore, the administered parties who, acting in good faith, acquired rights from defective acts, are protected by the guarantee of private property, until an eventual nullity or other action is issued through the corresponding legal channels. Therefore, the demonstration of the existence of documents that should appear in an administrative file, when there are sufficient elements of conviction that protect the administered party regarding their existence, is a burden of the Administration, and it will be up to the Administration to adopt the measures for their custody, conservation, management, or replacement, given the existence of national legislation on the archiving of public documents that so requires. In this vein, Article 41 of the Law of the National Archives System (Ley del Sistema Nacional de Archivos) states: "All institutions must have a central archive and the management archives necessary for the proper conservation and organization of their documents, which they must do, unless there is a special regulation, in accordance with the provisions of this law, its regulations, and the rules of the Administrative Board of the National Archive, the National Commission for Selection and Elimination of Documents, and the General Directorate of the National Archive." Thus, this Tribunal considers that the absence of proof of the existence of an award contract is not sufficient reason to delegitimize the plaintiff's legal situation regarding apartment G-21, nor does it imply that his possession is precarious or that it does not merit legal protection. The representative of the defendant entity is incorrect when she argues that the occupation of the property by the plaintiff is irregular, in that the apartment he occupies is located on a public domain property (bien de dominio público), and therefore, the administration has the possibility of self-protection (autotutela). For this Tribunal, it is evident that the apartment subject to this proceeding is not a public domain asset. In this sense, a distinction must be made between public domain property of the Administration and private domain property thereof. The former are non-seizable, imprescriptible, and inalienable. The latter are within the commerce of men. Article 261 of the Civil Code provides: "Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those of which everyone can benefit by being given over to public use. All other things are private and objects of particular property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in this case, as civil persons, do not differ from any other person." In the case of the former, the Administration has exorbitant powers for their protection, and thus, in the case of areas destined for INVU housing, we are in the presence of the private regime of the Administration, so the direct use of exorbitant powers that the Administration has to protect public property has been expressly denied as a means of defense of the property subject to consultation. It is evident that in these cases, said properties do not enjoy any singular public domain designation, nor the attribute of inalienability, given that they are transferable by sale or award to the beneficiaries. This body finds the arguments of the representation of the defendant entity contradictory, as while on one hand it invokes the need to sell the property in question at its current price, on the other it says it is a public domain asset, in which case, under this latter scenario, it could not be the object of sale through a simple administrative act. Consequently, the existence of a contractual bond between the INVU and the plaintiff has been deemed proven under the protection of the evidence provided in the case file. Said bond, based on the three scenarios indicated by this Tribunal previously, must be considered as an award contract executed for the subsequent sale of the property. The foregoing, insofar as the receipts issued by the INVU itself indicate that the plaintiff made payment of the "premium (prima)" of the apartment, of "monthly installments (mensualidades)", and of "overdue installments (cuotas atrasadas)", which evidence not the existence of a lease relationship, but rather the sale thereof. By reason of the foregoing, this Tribunal again considers that the fact that the deed was not formalized during the twenty years of occupancy of the property by Mr. Quintanilla Dávila cannot be reversed against him, since the regulatory framework under analysis permitted it, imposing no burden for the passage of time. Note how only in the scenario of lease-purchase does Article 6 of the Regulation expressly indicate that "the tenant who lets the Option period expire in vain may either acquire the dwelling according to a reassessment," whereas in the case of a pure and simple sale, it only indicates the necessary fixing of amounts and installments by the Board of Directors, but without providing that a new appraisal is required for the current price of a property whose price was agreed upon more than twenty years ago. It is relevant to indicate that said regulation was the one in force at the time the contractual bond was perfected, and thus, being an executive decree, it has not lost its effects for the particular case of the plaintiff, given that the subsequent Regulation for the Awarding of Social Interest Housing (Reglamento para la Adjudicación de Viviendas de Interés Social), in force since January 20, 1995, was approved by agreement of the INVU's Board of Directors, and thus, the latter could not repeal the former, as it is a norm of superior rank. By reason of the foregoing, the representation of the defendant party is incorrect when it alleges that the Appraisal Regulation (Reglamento de Avalúos) and Agreement Number 4450 of October 11, 1994, Article III, subsection 14-B of the entity, which grants them validity for six months for determining the value of the goods or rights, should apply to the plaintiff's case, as they are applicable to scenarios different from that of Mr. Quintanilla, who, as has been indicated, possesses a legal situation creating a subjective right in his favor, under the protection of a private contractual bond entered into with the INVU, since 1991, founded on an executive decree, against which an autonomous regulation of different scope from that which originated the relationship subject to this resolution cannot be opposed. This Tribunal considers it appropriate to grant the claim established with the purpose of declaring that the plaintiff has a right to be granted registry ownership (propiedad registral) over apartment G-21 of the El Corral Condominium, located in Curridabat, which must be recognized for the purpose of granting the respective deed in his favor by the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, with the exceptions that will be indicated in this resolution.

**V.- On the nullity of the challenged acts**: The plaintiff party requests that the nullity of the following acts be declared: a) official letter C-PPT-531-2011 b) Resolution GG-234-2011 of the General Management of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo c) agreement adopted by the Board of Directors of the INVU, according to Article II, subsection 3), Points a), b), c), e) of the minutes of ordinary session No. 5884, of June 29, 2011, and communicated through official letter CJD-113-2011, of July 13, 2011. In this sense, it invokes the arguments analyzed in the preceding recital to substantiate defects in the motivation and content of the acts. In this regard, having analyzed the indicated acts, based on the considerations made previously, this Tribunal considers it appropriate to grant this aspect of the lawsuit, given that the indicated conducts start from the premise of the non-existence of a contractual bond with the plaintiff, based on the non-existence of the award contract document. It must be taken into consideration, given the nature of the formal conducts objected to, that the formal action of the Public Administration, when materialized in the adoption of administrative acts (understood as the unilateral declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge issued in the exercise of the administrative function), must necessarily possess a series of material and formal elements for it to be fully valid and effective.

As material or substantial elements, we have the competence of the subject issuing the act, the motive giving rise to it (understood as the legal or factual antecedents or presuppositions of the administrative conduct), the content, that is, what the act itself provides (which must be lawful, possible, clear, proportional, and consistent with the motive), and the public purpose pursued with its adoption. As formal elements, both the reasoning (statement of grounds for the decision) underpinning the administrative conduct and its form of documentation are considered, as well as the procedure adopted for its materialization, in addition to the investiture of the body or official issuing the act. In the case of official communication C-PPT-531-2011 of May 4, 2011, it is noted that it informs the plaintiff that "... *since no award contract exists between Mr. Quintanilla Dávila and INVU, the payments made do not generate any right.*" Consequently, and contradictorily—given that the same document stated he had no right and was not the awardee—he is told that to formalize the purchase of the apartment, an appraisal must be performed at its current price. In the same vein, resolution GG-234-2011 of eleven o'clock on May 27, 2011, from the General Management of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, stated that "...*no contractual relationship exists between this Institute and you, as there is no record of an award contract signed between the parties, and therefore it does not generate any right for you over the apartment in question, given that the award contract is considered a deed transferring ownership for the benefit of the awardee.*" This position was ratified by agreement of the Board of Directors of INVU, Article II, subsection 3), of the minutes of ordinary session N. 5884, of June 29, 2011, as it invokes identical considerations. As can be seen from the text of those acts, there is a defect of absolute nullity in their reasoning, as they are based on considerations contrary to law, starting, on the one hand, from the non-existence of the contractual link that has been proven in court, based on the Administration's own conduct, and by imposing on Mr. Quintanilla Dávila the application of an appraisal not provided for his particular legal relationship, as analyzed above. This Court considers that, as stated, the indicated acts are contrary to the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima) and the prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de arbitrariedad), since, groundlessly and contrary to the law and the specific circumstances of the legal relationship, they deny its existence, despite having evidence in the administrative venue of the existence of a prior contractual link agreed upon since 1991. Moreover, in the case under analysis, it is appropriate to apply the provisions of Article 137 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which provides: "*The material behaviors and activities of the Administration that have a univocal meaning and are incompatible with a different intent shall serve to express the act, unless the nature or circumstance of the latter requires an express manifestation.*" Thus, it is appropriate to uphold the absolute nullity of the objected acts.

**VI.- On the request for a declaration of administrative inertia (inercia administrativa):** The plaintiff indicates in his complaint that there is inertia on the part of the defendant entity. He does not specify concrete omissions of actions with respect to what he considers administrative inertia, but from his reasoning it is inferred that they are linked to the non-existence in the institutional archives of his award contract, which generated the reasoning for the contested acts and served as the basis for considering that he was not in compliance with the law. In this regard, based on the considerations made by this Court, it is deemed that indeed, there is an administrative dysfunction due to the non-existence of documentary and computer records regarding the specific legal situation of the plaintiff, even though other conducts have been proven (issuance of receipts, acceptance of payments, tolerance of occupation of the property for more than twenty years) that demonstrate a prior contractual link. In this sense, the witness offered by the defendant entity stated in her deposition that the plaintiff's situation was determined as a result of a study to locate what were called "*project balances (saldos de proyectos)*" of persons who had not had the titling of their apartment formalized, a task that would not be necessary if the entity had complete and updated information systems on the housing development where the plaintiff resides. As indicated, it has been proven that in the defendant entity there is no account registered in the name of the plaintiff for apartment G-21 of Condominio Corral, nor an award contract, and there is only one provisional deposit in the amount of one hundred twenty-nine thousand five hundred seventy colones and another deposit for the down payment (prima) in the amount of one hundred ninety-eight thousand five hundred two colones. Notwithstanding the above and the proven fact of Mr. Quintanilla Dávila's long years of permanence in the property, the entity responsible for the housing project never took action before him to determine his situation or adopt measures in this regard, nor kept documentary support that would serve as a basis for adopting an administrative conduct. On the contrary, it issued receipts in the plaintiff's name, received the monies paid by him, and tolerated his permanence for more than twenty years, only to later allege in court the illegitimacy of his possession and attempt to apply a collection mechanism, which this Court has deemed foreign to the plaintiff's legal relationship. The absence of records on his situation and the non-existence of his award contract is precisely part of the reasons why the acts that have been deemed null in this resolution led to basing their reasoning on the alleged non-existence of a contractual link and right assisting the plaintiff, which has been considered by this Court as contrary to the administrative legal system. This Court finds proven an "inertia" of the Administration, translated into an omission to perform a legal duty imposed by the legal system, in that Article 15 of the General Internal Control Law (Ley General de Control Interno) imposes, as a necessary control activity for every public entity, the following: "*The design and use of documents and records that assist in the appropriate annotation of transactions and significant events carried out in the institution. Documents and records must be administered and maintained appropriately.*" In the same sense, Article 16 of the same normative body states: "*Article 16.—Information Systems (Sistemas de información). There must be information systems that allow the active administration to have institutional document management, understood as the set of activities carried out for the purpose of controlling, storing, and subsequently adequately retrieving the information produced or received in the organization, in the development of its activities, in order to prevent any deviation from the objectives set. Such document management must be closely related to information management, which must include corporate databases and other computer applications, which constitute important sources of recorded information.*" By reason of the foregoing, it can be determined that what the plaintiff calls administrative "inertia" exists with respect to the non-existence of the records and documents necessary for determining and verifying his effective legal situation. The representation of the defendant party is incorrect in invoking the possibility of applying Article 157 of the General Public Administration Law and indicating that the legal system allows it to rectify material and arithmetic errors. This is because the rule does not empower the Administration to violate the principle of the irrevocability of its own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios) to the detriment of the administered party, nor is it an open possibility to be employed with impunity by the Administration for its omissions of action or administrative dysfunction. Therefore, this aspect of the complaint must be upheld.

**VII.- On the request for compensation for damages (indemnización de daños y perjuicios):** The plaintiff requests compensation for damages caused and, in a preliminary hearing, specifies non-material damage (daño moral) in the amount of two million colones. However, he does not specify or detail what the invoked damages consist of, nor does he determine what the referred non-material damage consists of. For this Court, despite the fact that non-material damage possesses an *in re ipsa* nature, the mere mention of it is not sufficient to grant such an aspect. In this sense, on the one hand, with respect to the proof of damage in general, the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) in its Article 317 expressly states: "*The burden of proof falls upon: 1) Whoever formulates a claim, regarding the affirmations of the facts constituting his right. 2) Whoever opposes a claim, regarding the affirmations of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right.*" In the case of non-material damage, it has been indicated that it does not require direct proof, but that certain criteria apply to it that define the discretion of the Judge and derive from its own legal nature and have been developed by national jurisprudence. Thus, as a first delimiting criterion are the general principles of law and equity, and also, human presumptions inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis. Likewise, from various judicial resolutions and from ruling 413 of November 19, 2002, of Section I of the Contentious-Administrative Court (Sección I), other criteria are evidenced, namely: "*III. By subjective non-material damage, the doctrine has understood that affection that impacts the emotional sphere of persons causing worry, suffering, anxiety, and other negative and harmful emotions, whose origin is the illicit acts caused by the petitioner. By their nature, they are difficult to prove by ordinary means, so the judge may estimate it by examining the circumstances that appear in the file and applying his experience, the general principles of law, and those of rationality and proportionality. (Emphasis is ours)*" These latter criteria have been developed significantly to limit the possibility of awarding exaggerated or disproportionate compensation. In this vein, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) has indicated: "*It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, as these are priceless goods, but about setting a monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism law can resort to, in order to repair, at least in part, the offense. It would not fit within such a philosophy to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems, because this would produce the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profiting from one's own honor and dignity. Within the fundamental principles of law are found those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our legal environment as having the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) #1739-92 of 11:45 hours on July first and 3495-92 of 14:30 hours on November nineteenth, both of 1992). Applying them to situations such as the present one, it is indispensable, when setting the obligations arising in indemnity legal situations, to attend to the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, non-material damage, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to million-dollar compensation, as claimed. This would open an inconvenient loophole, to give way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjust enrichment that, far from repairing the tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations causing it to fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber, vote 141 of 15:00 hrs. of June 18, 1993, and No. 99 of 16 hours of September 20, 1995) (Emphasis is ours).*" The causality of the damage is another unavoidable criterion, as the real cause of the damage can determine the scope and limits of the compensatory estimate. On the other hand, always within the order of proportionality, there is mention of the "prudent appreciation of the Judge" of the damage and its compensation, in the following manner: "*Therefore, the tribunal must consider the admissibility of the aspect under comment, to which effect the First Chamber of the Supreme Court has stated: 'VI. Although non-material damage—in relation to the matter in question—due to its nature, allows a wide margin of discretion to the judge regarding its determination, this must necessarily be observed within certain unavoidable parameters, for example, the former Chamber of Cassation, in ruling No. 114 of 16 hours of November 2, 1979, endorses the prudent appreciation of the judges ...when they are permitted to infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence. This Chamber, in its ruling No. 114-93, indicates that the prudent discretion referred to must take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity. Around such concepts, the Chamber, in a later pronouncement, reasons in the following terms: 'It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, as these are priceless goods, but about setting a monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism law can resort to, in order to repair, at least in part, the offense. It would not fit within such a philosophy to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems, because this would produce the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profiting from one's own honor and dignity. Within the fundamental principles of law are found those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our legal environment as having the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1739-92 of 11:45 hours on July 1 and No. 3495-92 of 14:30 hours on November 19, both of 1992). Applying them to situations such as the present one, it is indispensable, when setting the obligations arising in indemnity legal situations, to attend to the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, non-material damage, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to million-dollar compensation, as claimed. This would open an inconvenient loophole, to give way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjust enrichment that, far from repairing the tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations causing it to fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber No. 41 of 15:00 of June 18, 1993). VII. Recapitulating, it follows that the prudent discretion to be employed by the Judge in situations such as the present one requires observance of ineludible parameters such as circumstantial evidence, the specific circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, equity, the position of the parties; the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The interested party can and must offer proof on these aspects where possible. Only thus can a prudent discretion be arrived at. Outside of such considerations, discretionary determination runs the serious risk of incurring an excess of power that distorts or misrepresents what has been adjudicated. That is, the prudent appreciation of the judge, even when the occurrence of the generating event is present—as occurs in the instant case—(*in re ipsa* principle), requires the commented considerations or parameters regarding the damage, in order to establish the amount in accordance with them. In the event that there are no elements of judgment on the matter in the record, the judge must act in consonance with such a situation by adopting a conservative attitude in the determination, for failure to do so could incur an excess of power.'" Vote 00093-2000 of the Contentious-Administrative Court, Section II. Moreover, it must not be overlooked that non-material damage does not escape the certainty that it must be a consequence of the action or omission of the administration, just as the injured interest of the person invoking it must be certain. In the case under analysis, as stated, it is not evident that the party claiming to have suffered non-material damage has at least specified its scope and level of impact or demonstrated, at least with circumstantial evidence, that this actually occurred in his internal sphere. The party does not state when the invoked non-material damage arose, nor does he specify the factual basis for his claim. Thus, for this Court, it is not possible to grant non-material damage, applying the considerations made, if the specific basis on which the party bases his claim is unknown. Therefore, this aspect of the complaint must be rejected.

I.Background: The plaintiff, in his action, stated that since 1997 he maintains a credit agreement with the INVU for the construction of housing, through a loan, for the amount of ¢13,225,000.00 (thirteen million two hundred twenty-five thousand colones), under the modality of adjudication of an existing housing unit, for which he has been paying monthly installments. He claims that despite the time elapsed and having fulfilled the agreed payments, the INVU refuses to formalize the respective deed, thereby breaching the agreement and forcing him to continue making a monthly payment of ¢152,000.00 (one hundred fifty-two thousand colones). He argues that the INVU has breached the principle of legitimate confidence (principio de confianza legítima), in accordance with the provisions of Article 137 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, by creating expectations that it has refused to fulfill. He further notes that only minor construction details remain in the condominium, and in 2005 the INVU itself authorized him to occupy the property tied to the corresponding file. The plaintiff also indicates that the defendant's actions create significant legal uncertainty and proven economic damages, in addition to moral damages (daño moral). He adds that the INVU has not provided the requested information regarding the process of completing the condominium and the formalization of deeds, and that the construction file is lost. Finally, he requests that the INVU be ordered to grant the respective deed, as well as to pay moral damages based on the principle of legitimate confidence. He requests the imposition of costs and legal interest. The defendant INVU, for its part, answered the lawsuit in the negative and argued the exceptions of lack of right and lack of causation (falta de derecho y falta de causal), generic exceptions for lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva), the generic exception of lack of interest (falta de interés), and the generic exception sine actione agit, and requests that the lawsuit be dismissed in all its extremes, with the imposition of costs. The defendant bases its defense on the fact that the alleged adjudication contract (contrato de adjudicación) has not been proven, as it is not even registered in its archives. II. The judge of first instance, in judgment No. 00099-2010, handed down at 4:30 p.m. on February 23, 2010, declared the lawsuit partially with merit regarding the claim for material damages (daño material). It ordered the INVU to pay the sum of ¢23,000,000.00 (twenty-three million colones). The claim for moral damages was dismissed. Said judgment was appealed by both parties, and the plaintiff's appeal was granted on the basis of adherence. The INVU, in its statement of grievances, alluded to an error of law and fact regarding the grounds of the judgment. It reproaches that the adjudication contract was considered accredited based on a series of documents and evidence, when in reality there is no contract whatsoever. It alleges that the judgment does not consider its argument regarding the difference between administrative contracts, which require certain formal requirements, and the contract of sale (contrato de compraventa), which at the time represented the "adjudication contract" used by INVU for the transfer of properties in urban developments, which are subject to the Ley Orgánica del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo INVU and its regulations. It states that the invalidity of the alleged contract that the actor claims has not been proven is obvious, according to the evidence of the case file, and that contrary to what the judgment states, it was never demonstrated that the INVU's omission had caused the severe moral damages alleged, and furthermore, the causal link (nexo de causalidad) between the omission and the plaintiff's family situation was never fully established. The plaintiff, in his appeal, claims the injustice caused by the denial of the claim for moral damages, arguing that the INVU breached its duty. III. The jurisdictional body, in this instance, after a comprehensive review of the case file, considers that the appeal filed by the defendant must be partially upheld, while those formulated by the plaintiff must be dismissed, as will be explained in the following reasoning. IV. Regarding the nature of the "housing adjudication contract" (contrato de adjudicación de vivienda): For a proper resolution of the matter, the Chamber deems it pertinent to refer, first of all, to the nature of the so-called "housing adjudication contract," which has been used by the INVU in its housing plans. This is relevant because the plaintiff's action is based on the existence of a contractual relationship of this nature. The INVU originally promoted the construction of low-cost housing (vivienda de interés social) through the capital provided by the State, for the benefit of low-income families. However, over the years, the modalities developed until they were classified into three specific categories: a) "Own savings system" (sistema de ahorro propio): this is the old system of savings banks, which takes the form of a savings account for housing through a mutual savings and loan association, which prior to Law No. 7052 was only INVU, but later, it was possible for other authorized mutual savings and loan associations to participate in this modality. In this system, the interested party must save a certain amount of money for a specific period to become a beneficiary of a loan (préstamo) intended for the construction of their housing; b) "Article 5 system" (sistema artículo 5): regulated in Article 5 of Law No. 1788, Organic Law of INVU, of August 24, 1954, which consists of granting loans with the Institute's own resources, intended for low-income families. Article 5 establishes: "The Institute's own resources, as well as those coming from loans that it may obtain, in accordance with the provisions of Article 39, will be used mainly for the construction of low-cost housing, granting loans for this purpose to individuals and public and private entities that guarantee the Institute's investment. Exceptionally and when the Executive Branch so authorizes, the Institute may allocate its resources to the construction of buildings for industrial, commercial, or service-related purposes, in accordance with urban development plans. Financing with its own resources will be subject to the Regulation issued by the Institute's Board of Directors." c) "Article 59 system" (sistema artículo 59): the system initially regulated in Law No. 7052 of November 13, 1986 (which added an Article 59 to the Organic Law of INVU), called the "Savings, Credit, and Subsidy System for Low-Cost Housing," whose function is to promote housing solutions, through long-term loans and subsidies (subsidios), better known as "family housing bonds" (bonos familiares de vivienda). This system allowed an effective boost to the national housing stock. The monetary resources serving as the basis for this system come from the financial management through the entities authorized by the National Financial System for Housing (Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda), to which the family housing bonds are subsequently applied. Currently, Law No. 7052 was repealed by the Ley del Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda y creación del BANHVI, of November 27, 2000. In the judgment No. 4654-2003, of 8:45 a.m. on May 16, 2003, of the Constitutional Chamber, it was indicated: "... it is a decentralized institution, which manages its own budget, whose purpose is established in the Organic Law creating it and in Law No. 7052, and which can be summarized as directing the programs and activities related to the development and construction of low-cost housing, for which it must guarantee efficiency in the allocation of resources, and ensure that they reach the families that need them most, which means that it is its obligation to act efficiently to achieve its purpose. And as part of the obligations imposed by the legislation governing it, is that of investing efficiently in the programs for the construction or acquisition of housing for low-income families, so that its actions must be governed by principles of reasonableness and efficiency, among others, to fulfill its purpose, for which the Board of Directors, in accordance with the powers established in Article 10, subsection d), of its Organic Law, may dictate the rules for the granting of rights to housing units, without these being incompatible with those established by the regulations issued by the Executive Branch, regarding the Savings, Credit, and Subsidy System for Low-Cost Housing, of November 13, 1986, and its reforms, currently Law No. 7052, of November 13, 1986. (...) In this regard, it is important to note that the Institute, as the executing entity of the policy for the construction of low-cost housing, in the fulfillment of its purposes, is empowered to regulate and dictate the necessary provisions for tenders, and granting construction contracts, provision of services, among others, and based on that power, to regulate the mechanism for awarding or granting rights to housing units resulting from its plans, as well as to implement measures, that on a case-by-case basis, allow the entity to fulfill its purpose efficiently..." (in this regard, the Chamber has resolved similar issues, as referenced in section V). Now, based on the systems mentioned above, substantive and instrumental regulations were created, among which the following are listed for the purposes of this matter: first, the "Reglamento para la Adjudicación de Vivienda del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo," of January 13, 1955 (Executive Decree No. 2) and then the "Reglamento de Operaciones del Sistema de Ahorro y Préstamo del INVU," of May 25, 1999. The "savings and loan system" (sistema de ahorro y préstamo) specifically includes three modalities: "construction on own land" (construcción en lote propio); "adjudication of an existing housing unit" (adjudicación de vivienda existente); and "purchase of land" (compra de terreno). The "housing adjudication contracts" (contratos de adjudicación de vivienda), subject matter of this claim, are private contracts (contratos privados) of sale of property (compraventa de inmueble). The adjudication of housing is analyzed in the Reglamento para la Adjudicación de Vivienda. Article 6 states: "The conditions under which the properties built by the Institute are awarded will be set out in the respective contracts." Article 7: "Those awarded must pay the Institute the total value of the property, paying the respective legally stipulated taxes. When the awardee receives the dwelling to occupy it, they may not refuse to sign the respective contract of sale (contrato de compraventa), under penalty of eviction and loss of the amounts paid." Article 9: "The Institute will grant the awardee a period of three months, counted from the occupancy of the awarded dwelling, for them to present before a Notary Public of their choice, the respective deed (escritura de compraventa), which must be drafted on paper provided by the Institute. If the awardee fails to present the deed within the indicated period, the Institute may, without further procedure, annul the adjudication, in which case the awardee will lose the amounts paid. For the purpose of the deed, the value of the construction will be distributed between the value of the building and the proportional value of the land. In the deed, the Institute will be represented by the Chairman of the Board of Directors." Article 10: "In the deed, the Institute will retain a first mortgage (primera hipoteca) on the sold property and any improvements that are subsequently made to it, as security for the recovery of the balance of the price, accrued interest, legal costs, and damages. This first mortgage will also serve as security for any other loan that the Institute has granted or grants in the future to the awardee. The purchaser must pay the expenses of appraisal and deed, in addition to any other expenses demanded by the transaction of sale." Legal literature has analyzed this contractual figure: "The State, to meet its housing needs for its agencies and institutions, acquires in the market onerous contracts for the execution of works (obra pública) that entail the construction and other branches of engineering related to human habitation. In the legal system, there is a special procedure that entities such as the INVU must follow, called housing adjudication" (Cabanellas de Torres, "Diccionario Jurídico Elemental," Ed. Eliasta, 1998, p. 21). "The adjudicatory phase constitutes the moment in which, through the mechanism determined to that effect, the specific relationship is established between the beneficiary and the property to which they have a right. The formalization of the sale contract (contrato de venta) in a public deed must appear as a condition of the adjudication and for the transfer of ownership. In other cases, there are merely preparatory acts for the subsequent sale, such as the reservation of the dwelling, which is the unilateral promise of the builder or developer through which the future acquisition is announced and the intention to formalize the definitive business at a given time is anticipated" (Gil Rodríguez, Jacinto, "Compraventa de vivienda y protección del consumidor," Ed. Constitución y Leyes, Madrid, No. 78, September-December 1975, p. 426).

**“IV.-** **<u>Subject matter of the proceeding</u>:** Based on the statements of the parties, both in their claims and arguments, the subject matter of this proceeding consists of determining the existence of nullity defects in the administrative actions challenged by the plaintiff, as well as the existence of a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the sued entity. Additionally, it must be determined whether the existence of damages caused by any act or omission of any official of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo has been proven.

V.- **On the existence of a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo**: In his complaint, the plaintiff states that he acquired apartment number G-21 in the El Corral condominium in 1991 for the sum of eight hundred seventy-six thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones, and that from that date, he asserts, it was placed in his possession and awarded by the selling entity. Based on the foregoing, he requests that he be declared the owner of the indicated apartment, located in Curridabat, and that the defendant entity be ordered to title the indicated property in his name. The Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo denies the existence of any contractual relationship with Mr. Quintanilla Dávila and indicates that there is no award contract with the plaintiff, and therefore he has no right whatsoever over the apartment that is the subject of the litigation. In this regard, this Court considers that to resolve this aspect of the complaint, the following considerations must be made: The Organic Law of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, No. 1788 of August 24, 1954, establishes as a competence of said entity the leasing of homes from its assets to families that lack adequate housing and the means to obtain it. Additionally, Article 5 of said regulatory body provides as a power thereof: "....h) Lease, sell, exchange, encumber, and administer the homes, community service centers that it acquires or builds, as well as other property owned by it" and "...ñ) Enter into all contracts and perform all administrative, civil, industrial, or commercial acts that are convenient or necessary for the better fulfillment of its purposes..." With respect to the specific regulation of the relationship between the entity and the beneficiaries of its programs, Article 39 of the indicated law states the following: "The types of house construction, their building, leasing, repair, or sale and, in general, the prohibitions, restrictive clauses, interest rates, amortization, conservation, insurance, terms, and other details regarding economic organization, construction, improvement, award (adjudicación), and definitive transfer, shall be determined in the Regulations issued for this purpose by the Board of Directors." As noted, the indicated norm leaves aspects related to the regulation of the relationship to which families living in the Institution's housing solutions would be subject to the exercise of regulatory power. For this reason, the Housing Award Regulation (Reglamento de Adjudicación de Vivienda), Executive Decree No. 2 of January 13, 1955, was promulgated as an executive, non-autonomous regulation, just as the law had indicated, which establishes, in what concerns us, the following: "Article 6—Housing may be awarded under the titles of sale, rental, and rent-to-own, at the discretion of the Board of Directors. In the sale award, the Board of Directors may require a down payment on the value of the home, as permitted by the type and quality of the house. By virtue of the rent-to-own contract, the awardee who initially rents enjoys an option to purchase the home, for the value established in the original agreement, for a maximum term of five years. The Board of Directors may establish minimum rent-to-own terms, which will serve to test the awardee's interest in terms of permanence. When formalizing the sale, the Institute may determine the term for paying the price, in accordance with the contracting party's income. The interest rate included in the rental installment shall also apply to the sale transaction. The tenant who allows the option period to expire in vain may either acquire the home according to a reappraisal thereof, or continue as a tenant, but in this second case, they must henceforth pay a rental installment equal to that which would correspond to them as a buyer according to the immediately following article. The Board of Directors shall fix in this case the duration of the period and the conditions for renewing the rental." "Article 7—The price of housing awarded for sale shall be determined by the Board of Directors, taking into consideration the cost price. The Board shall also determine the term for paying said price and the interest rate corresponding to each category, and, based on both, the Financial Department shall calculate the corresponding monthly installments. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the awardee may make payments toward the debt or cancel it at any time before its maturity." In a complementary manner, Article 9 of the norm provides that the beneficiary was obligated to sign a contract, in accordance with the following provisions: "Article 9—The tenancy regime resulting from rental or rent-to-own contracts shall otherwise be governed by the provisions applicable to leasing in this Regulation and in the Regulation for Leasing in Multifamily Buildings (Reglamento de Arriendo en Edificios Multifamiliares). The houses shall be delivered to the acquirers, after a prior review thereof, and a contract must be signed containing: a) Declaration by the awardee that they are entering into possession of the home, receiving it in good condition to their entire satisfaction, and that they accept the conditions of sale, restrictive clauses, grounds for eviction (desahucio), interest rate, maximum term, and other modalities established by law and this Regulation, or by express provision of the Board of Directors; b) The amortization system chosen, in accordance with the rules established in Article 10 below; c) A copy of the restrictive clauses and the grounds for eviction: and d) The awardee's obligation to regularly pay the municipal services and taxes, as well as the fire insurance policy and life insurance, to cover the established outstanding balances." Subsequently, the Regulation for the Award of Social Interest Housing (Reglamento para la Adjudicación de Viviendas de Interés Social), in force since January 20, 1995, provided the following in this regard: "Article 10.—Those who have paid twelve installments of the initially signed award contract and whose operation is up to date may request the corresponding title deed (título de propiedad) before the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, in the Property Management Department, constituting a first-degree mortgage on the property, submitting to the legal and regulatory provisions established by the Institute's Regulation on Mortgage Loans." In accordance with the foregoing provisions, the indicated entity developed a series of housing projects, both vertical and horizontal, through which a housing solution was provided to different families, based on a contract, called an "award (adjudicación)" contract. On the private nature of these contracts, the Full Court, acting as constitutional controller (a claim of unconstitutionality against Article 48 of the Organic Law of the INVU), ruled in an extraordinary session on September 3, 1981, stating: "The relations between the INVU tenants and the leasing entity itself are of a tenancy nature, like any others existing between a tenant and a private individual. These relations are of the same nature due to the nature of the contract and the condition of one of the contracting parties; but it is clear that they are not absolutely the same...and they are not the same because in ordinary lease contracts (so to speak), the lessor is a person acting for profit, while in the INVU contracts the lessor is a public law entity, which was created for other purposes...However, although the institution does not act for profit, it is obvious that this circumstance does not change the nature of the contract or its essential characteristic of the parties being in opposing positions..., just as occurs in most lease contracts between private individuals." Notwithstanding the foregoing, subsequently, through Vote 784-96, added to by Number 0075-I-96 of 8:30 a.m. on February 16, 1996, the Constitutional Chamber partially modified the previously decided matter and stated the following: "The misnamed 'award contracts (contratos de adjudicación de vivienda)' of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo are governed by the Organic Law of the INVU and the Housing Award Regulation of said Institute. The first of these two regulatory bodies contains a norm, specifically Article 42, which was conceived within a Budgetary Norm of an Extraordinary Budget of the Republic. Said norm, as a product of the theory of causality, has its effect and echo in the Housing Award Regulation of the INVU in the consulted numerals 16 and 17. While it is true that the regulatory power exercised by the Administration empowers it to issue executive and administrative provisions or regulations, said power is circumscribed solely to everything expressly enunciated in the Law that merits regulation, and insofar as its regulation is not prohibited by express legal reservation. ... it is argued by the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo that the award contracts signed between the INVU and the awardees constitute special contracts of the Administration, which are subject to the regulations and laws governing the matter and not to common legislation. Analyzing the award contract contained in the judicial case file serving as the basis for this judicial consultation, highly important elements can be observed that can only be found in a perfect bilateral synallagmatic contract. Synallagmatic because at the time of its signing it generates obligations and rights for both contracting parties and, furthermore, it is perfect, insofar as the parties agree on the object and price, and insofar as the 'traditio' operates with all the effects it entails, namely the entry into possession of the property by the 'accipiens' or acquirer and the abandonment thereof by the seller or 'tradens'. Let us remember, in this regard, that the 'tradition' of a property represents the act by which one person places a thing in the power of another, that is, the delivery of the property constitutes the material element of the transfer which, once completed, institutes rights in rem in favor of the acquirer. It is this Chamber's criterion that in the case at hand, the formalism established by Article 455 and following and concordant articles of the Civil Code regarding public deed and its registration in the Property Registry as a means of constituting property rights does not apply because said thesis attempts to safeguard the effects that said transfer may cause regarding the rights of third parties and not of the acquirer or the seller; it has an informative character. This Court considers that the award contract signed between the administered parties and the INVU produces effects on the ownership of the property from the very moment the document is signed, with even the 'traditio' and the abandonment by the seller of that property into the hands of the acquirer (awardee) operating, constituting a right to property in favor of the new owner that cannot be considered, as the Award Regulation does, as a simple expectation of right. This Chamber considers that, just as operates in every housing financing system, the INVU may establish legally permitted mechanisms to exercise control over the awards it makes and institute the respective recovery procedures aimed at enforcing the Institution's rights regarding the recovery of the property or the amount invested in its construction, without having to act arbitrarily and thereby injure the fundamental rights established by our Magna Carta. Thus, an eviction (desahucio) can never proceed for a property that is owned by whoever, with a right to the property, inhabits it by virtue of a contract that granted said concession. The specificity of the clauses contained in a contract may tend toward the regulation of the transaction that may proceed in the private sphere regarding the legal business being carried out; however, said clauses cannot constitute a violation of the rights of one of the contracting parties, imposing burdens that, in the Law of Ancient Rome, were called 'leonine' or abusive. In the case that interests us, the rights acquired 'per se' by the administered party-awardee, by virtue of a perfect sale-purchase contract and which are protected and safeguarded by Constitutional norms, cannot be subject to abuse by regulatory provisions that are not limited to regulating the relations between administration and administered party, but rather violate and trample fundamental rights of individuals, straying from the primary purpose pursued, in this specific case, by the organic law of the INVU, which is to facilitate access to decent housing for the country's development, and the safeguarding of the principles of dignity, equality, and social justice." This position was maintained by Section I of the Administrative Litigation Court in Vote Number 00303-2000 of 3:00 p.m. on October 31, 2000, as follows: "It is deduced with crystal clarity from the transcribed vote, that the Constitutional Court indicated that the 'housing award contract' signed between the defendant entity and the 'awardee' constitutes a perfect sale-purchase contract from its signing onward, with even the delivery of the property operating, so that the full effects of the transfer of ownership operate not with the 'act of delivering the deed to the property', but from the very signing of the award agreement, meaning that it is with the signing thereof that the awardee or awardees acquire, for all legal purposes, the title or ownership of the property..." In accordance with the foregoing, it is noted that in the case of award contracts, we are in the presence of contractual relationships of a private nature exercised by the Administration, not subject to the exorbitant regulations and clauses characteristic of the administrative contracting regime. In this line of thought, it has been indicated regarding their particularities that "The characteristic that differentiates this type of contract from administrative contracts is the absence of an exorbitant legal regime from Common Law, thus the so-called unilateral rescission, enforceability, and the application and execution of fines, in the administrative venue, do not proceed." (Cassagne, Juan Carlos. Los contratos de la Administración Pública. Distintas categorías y regímenes jurídicos. Revista de Administración Pública. Madrid, No. 78, September-December 1975, p. 426). On the other hand, as noted from the wording of the last two resolutions, these start from the assumption of the system called 'bare consensus (nudo consenso)', whereby rights in rem are transferred by the mere consent of the parties. This is expressly established by Article 480 of the Civil Code insofar as it provides: "The ownership of movable and immovable property is transferred in relation to the contracting parties, by the sole fact of the agreement whose purpose is to transfer it, independently of its registration in the Registry and of the tradition." In the case of a sale-purchase, the system is reflected in what is provided in numeral 1049 of the same regulatory body, which provides: "The sale is perfect between the parties from the moment they agree on the object and price." Nevertheless, the necessary tradition cannot be ignored, as an inherent part for the perfection of the contractual relationship. In this line of thought, Article 480 refers to it in the following manner: "Tradition is carried out from the moment the owner delivers and the acquirer takes possession of the thing. When the person who is to receive the thing already has it in their power under another non-transferring title, the mere consent of the parties implies tradition from the certain date on which it is recorded...." Consequently, the tradition, or effective delivery of the property and taking of possession by a buyer, is a synonym, moreover, for conformity with the object received as part of the legal business that had been made concrete with the simple agreement between the parties. From the foregoing, it is concluded that the main purpose of registry inscription is basically to guarantee the efficacy of the contract with respect to third parties, by virtue of registry publicity, but it is not a condition for its validity. This Court considers that, in light of what has been indicated, according to the described characteristics, not every award contract possesses the effects indicated in the citations mentioned above, and thus a distinction must be made between three different types of legal relationships, namely, a) the award contract executed for the subsequent sale of the property. In this first case, the payments made by the beneficiary are payments toward the debt. b) the pure and simple lease contract, where the payments made are simply the rental price, and c) the lease contract with the possibility of converting to a sale. Where the payments are initially the rental price for the property and subsequently may become payments toward its price. In the case of the first scenario a), the cited norms indicate that a down payment on the value of the home may be required, meaning that the transfer value thereof will be agreed upon by the entity's Board of Directors. In the case of the second scenario, b) the beneficiary has no interest in acquiring the property and merely remains as a tenant. Additionally, to regulate this particular relationship, the Regulation for Leasing in Multifamily Buildings (Decreto número 20 of December 14, 1954) and the Regulation for Leases (Reglamento para Arrendamientos), published in La Gaceta No. 30 of February 13, 1976, the latter approved by the entity's Board of Directors, were also issued in their time. In the case of the third scenario c) the awardee who initially rents has the option to purchase the home, for the value established in the original agreement, for a maximum term of five years. If the tenant allows the option period to expire, they may either acquire the home according to a reappraisal thereof or continue as a tenant. In this scenario, Chapter III, called "leasing of homes with an option to purchase", of the Regulation for Leases also applies, insofar as it provides that the tenant may acquire the leased home by paying the value of the property at the time of leasing it, establishing a mechanism for setting the installment to be paid as a result of its sale. In this line of thought, it is noted that only in the first case could we refer to being in the presence of a formalization of a relationship for the transfer of property with all its attributes, through the agreement on the object and price, in addition to the "traditio". The foregoing, on the understanding that said relationship is not, as this Court has already indicated, comparable to a pure and simple transfer-of-ownership contract, given that it extends over time and the formalization of the respective deed for the corresponding registry inscription is conditioned. In the specific case under analysis, it is noted that although there is no proof of the existence of a formal award contract document, it is not possible to burden the plaintiff with the negative consequences of such a situation in the administrative venue, given that the case file contains proof regarding the initiation and development of a contractual relationship between the defendant entity and Mr. Quintanilla Dávila. Indeed, this Court holds as proven that the plaintiff, during the years 1990, 1991, and 1992, made 9 payments to the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo for the concept of apartment No. G-21 in the El Corral condominium, and that since that time he has been occupying said property and has made various payments to the Administrative Board of the El Corral Condominium for the concept of water charges, hallway lighting, maintenance, and other charges for the same. This Court considers that the foregoing demonstrates the existence of an agreement between the parties in this proceeding, aimed at the plaintiff occupying the mentioned apartment and that, as such, generated in his favor a subjective right in good faith, which cannot be disregarded, in accordance with the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima). In this line of thought, it must be remembered that said principle is oriented toward the protection of the administered parties, so that well-founded expectations in favor of their rights are not violated, expectations that arose based on prolonged state actions or omissions over time, and consented to expressly or tacitly by the administration, whether involving active or passive behaviors, legal regulation, or normative interpretation. This is a limit on administrative powers, linked to good faith and the prohibition of arbitrariness in administrative conduct in ablative acts. In the specific situation of Mr. Quintanilla Dávila, it is evident that more than twenty years of his possession of apartment G-21 have elapsed, without the defendant entity having made, during all those years, any formal or material statement against him, and it being the case that, rather, it determined in an inspection carried out by its officials that he still inhabits the property (declaration of witness Dora Chacón Chinchilla), which in turn is ratified by witness Herbert Jiménez Araya. The issuance of receipts by the entity indicating acceptance of payment and clearly indicating the concept for which it received each sum creates a legal situation favorable to the plaintiff, in accordance with the purposes for the creation of this jurisdiction (Art. 1 CPCA). The non-existence in the electronic or documentary records of the entity of information regarding the specific legal situation of the plaintiff cannot turn against his rights, when there have instead been active and omissive conducts that consolidate the conviction regarding the existence of a particular legal relationship, born on the occasion of the objectives for the creation of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo. In this sense, precisely, it has been established doctrinally that as a consequence of the principle of legitimate expectations, the errors of the public administration only affect it, unless it was the citizen themself who induced the authority to error, and therefore, the administered parties who, acting in good faith, acquired rights from flawed acts are protected by the guarantee of private property, until such time as an eventual nullity or other action is decreed through the corresponding legal channels. For the foregoing reason, the demonstration of the existence of documents that should be contained in an administrative file, when there are sufficient elements of conviction to support the administered party's claim regarding their existence, is the burden of the Administration, and it shall be responsible for adopting measures for their custody, conservation, management, or replacement, given the existence of national legislation on the archiving of public documents that so imposes. In this line of thought, Article 41 of the National Archive System Law (Ley del Sistema Nacional de Archivos) indicates: "All institutions must have a central archive and the necessary management archives for the proper conservation and organization of their documents, which must be done, unless there is special regulation, in accordance with the provisions of this law, its regulations, and the norms of the Administrative Board of the National Archive, the National Commission for the Selection and Elimination of Documents, and the General Directorate of the National Archive." It is thus that this Court considers that the absence of proof of the existence of an award contract is not sufficient reason to delegitimize the legal situation of the plaintiff with respect to apartment G-21, and it does not imply that his possession is precarious or that it does not merit legal protection. The representative of the defendant entity is not correct when she argues that the occupation of the property by the plaintiff is irregular, given that the apartment he occupies is located on a public domain (dominio público) property, meaning the administration has the possibility of self-help (autotutela). To this Court, it is evident that the apartment that is the subject of this proceeding is not a public domain asset. In this sense, a distinction must be made between property in the public domain of the Administration and property in its private domain. The former are unseizable, imprescriptible, and inalienable. The latter are within the commerce of men. Article 261 of the Civil Code provides: "Public things are those which, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those from which everyone may benefit by being delivered to public use. All other things are private and subject to particular ownership, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who for this purpose, as civil persons, do not differ from any other person." In the case of the former, the Administration has exorbitant powers for their protection, meaning that in the case of the areas destined for INVU housing, we are in the presence of the private regime of the Administration, whereby the direct use of exorbitant powers available to the Administration to protect public property has been expressly denied as a means of defense for the properties subject to consultation. It is evident that in these cases, said properties do not enjoy any singular public domain designation, nor the attribute of inalienability, given that they are transferable by sale or award to the beneficiaries. This Court considers the arguments of the representation of the defendant entity contradictory, because while on the one hand it invokes the need to sell the property in question at its current price, on the other hand it says it is public domain, whereby in this last scenario, it could not be subject to sale by a simple administrative act. Thus, the existence of a contractual relationship between the INVU and the plaintiff has been held as proven, sheltered by the evidence provided in the case file. Said relationship, based on the three scenarios indicated by this Court earlier, must be considered an award contract executed for the subsequent sale of the property. The foregoing, insofar as the receipts issued by the INVU itself indicate that the plaintiff paid the "down payment (prima)" for the apartment, "monthly installments (mensualidades)" and "overdue installments (cuotas atrasadas)", which evidence not the existence of a lease relationship, but rather a sale of the same. For this reason, this Court again considers that the fact that the deed was not formalized during the twenty years of occupancy of the property by Mr. Quintanilla Dávila cannot turn against him, insofar as the analyzed regulation permitted it, not imposing any burden for the passage of time.

Note how only in the rent-to-buy case does Article 6 of the Regulation expressly state that "t*he tenant who allows the option period to lapse in vain may, alternatively, acquire the dwelling according to a reappraisal*," whereas in the case of an outright sale, it only indicates the necessary setting of amounts and installments by the Board of Directors, but without providing that a new appraisal at the current price of a property is required, whose price was agreed upon more than twenty years ago. It is relevant to indicate that said regulation was the one in force at the time the contractual relationship was perfected, and thus, being an executive decree, it has not lost its effects for the plaintiff's particular case, given that the subsequent Regulation for the Adjudication of Social Housing, in force since January 20, 1995, was approved by agreement of the INVU Board of Directors, and therefore it could not derogate the former, as the latter is a higher-ranking norm. By reason of the foregoing, the representation of the defendant party is not correct when it alleges that the plaintiff's case must be governed by the Appraisal Regulation and agreement Number 4450 of October 11, 1994, Article III, subsection 14-B of the entity, which grants these appraisals a validity of six months for determining the value of goods or rights, as these are applicable to situations different from those of Mr. Quintanilla, who, as has been indicated, has a legal situation creating a subjective right in his favor, under the protection of a private contractual relationship entered into with INVU since 1991, based on an executive decree, against which an autonomous regulation with scopes different from those that originated the relationship subject to this resolution cannot be opposed. This Court considers that it is appropriate to grant the claim established so that it is declared that the plaintiff has a right to be granted registered ownership of apartment G-21 of the El Corral Condominium, located in Curridabat, which must be recognized for the purpose of granting the respective deed in his favor, by the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism, with the caveats that will be indicated in this resolution.

**V.- *On the nullity of the challenged acts***: The plaintiff requests that the nullity of the following acts be declared: a) official letter C-PPT-531-2011; b) Resolution GG-234-2011 of the General Management of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism; c) agreement taken by the Board of Directors of INVU, according to Article II, subsection 3), Points a), b), c), e) of the minutes of ordinary session No. 5884, of June 29, 2011, and communicated through official letter CJD-113-2011, of July 13, 2011. In this sense, it invokes the arguments analyzed in the preceding Considerando to substantiate defects in the reasoning and content of the acts. In this regard, once the indicated acts have been analyzed, based on the considerations made previously, this Court considers it appropriate to grant this part of the claim, given that the indicated conduct is based on the assumption of the non-existence of a contractual relationship with the plaintiff, founded on the non-existence of the adjudication contract document. It must be taken into consideration, given the nature of the formal conduct challenged, that the formal action of the Public Administration materializes in the adoption of administrative acts, (understood as unilateral declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge issued in the exercise of the administrative function), it must necessarily possess a series of material and formal elements for it to be fully valid and effective. As material or substantial elements, we have the competence of the subject issuing the act, the motive that gives rise to it— (understood as the legal or factual antecedents or presuppositions of the administrative conduct), the content, that is, what the act itself provides (which must be lawful, possible, clear, proportional, and consistent with the motive), and the public purpose pursued with its adoption. As formal elements, both the reasoning (foundation of what was decided) that substantiates the administrative conduct, its form of instrumentation, and the procedure adopted for its materialization are considered, in addition to the investiture of the body or official issuing the act. In the case of official letter C-PPT-531-2011 of May 4, 2011, it is noted that it indicates to the plaintiff that ".*.. in the absence of an adjudication contract between Mr. Quintanilla Dávila and INVU, the payments made do not generate any right...*" Consequently, and in a contradictory manner—given that the same document indicated that he had no right whatsoever and was not an awardee—it indicates that to formalize the purchase of the apartment, an appraisal must be carried out at its current price. In the same sense, resolution GG-234-2011 of eleven o'clock on May 27, 2011, of the General Management of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism, indicated that "...* no contractual relationship exists between this Institute and you, as there is no record of an adjudication contract signed between the parties, therefore it generates no right for you over the apartment in question, given that the adjudication contract is considered a deed of transfer of ownership in favor of the awardee...*" This position was ratified by agreement of the Board of Directors of INVU, Article II, subsection 3), of the minutes of ordinary session No. 5884, of June 29, 2011, insofar as it invokes identical considerations. As can be seen from the text of said acts, there is a defect of absolute nullity in their reasoning, insofar as they are founded on considerations contrary to law, by starting, on the one hand, from the non-existence of the contractual relationship that has been proven in the proceedings, based on the Administration's own conduct, and by imposing on Mr. Quintanilla Dávila the application of an appraisal not provided for his particular legal relationship, as has been analyzed *ut supra*. This Court considers that, as stated, the indicated acts are contrary to the principle of legitimate expectation and the prohibition of arbitrariness, since, in an unfounded manner and contrary to law and the own circumstances of the legal relationship, it denies the existence thereof, despite having elements of conviction in the administrative venue regarding the existence of a prior contractual relationship agreed upon since 1991. Moreover, in the case under analysis, it is appropriate to apply the provisions of Article 137 of the General Law of Public Administration, which provides: "*The material behaviors and activities of the Administration that have a univocal meaning and are incompatible with a different will, shall serve to express the act, unless the nature or circumstance thereof requires express manifestation*". Thus, it is appropriate to grant the absolute nullity of the challenged acts.

**VI.- *On the request for a declaration of administrative inertia***: The plaintiff indicates in his complaint that there is inertia on the part of the defendant entity. He does not specify omissions of specific actions regarding what he considers administrative inertia, but from his reasoning, it is inferred that they are linked to the non-existence of his adjudication contract in the institutional archives, which generated the reasoning of the challenged acts and provided the basis for considering him not to be in good standing. In this regard, based on the considerations made by this Court, it is considered that there is, in effect, an administrative dysfunction due to the non-existence of documentary and computer records regarding the specific legal situation of the plaintiff, despite the fact that other conduct has been deemed proven (issuance of receipts, acceptance of payments, tolerance of the occupation of the property for more than twenty years) that demonstrates a prior contractual relationship. In this sense, the witness offered by the defendant entity stated in her deposition that the plaintiff's situation was determined on the occasion of a study to locate what were called "*project balances*" of persons for whom the titling of their apartment had not been formalized, a task that would not be necessary if the entity had complete and updated information systems on the housing development where the plaintiff lives. As has been indicated, it has been deemed proven that in the defendant entity there exists no account registered in the plaintiff's name for apartment G-21 of the El Corral Condominium, nor an adjudication contract, and there is only a provisional deposit in the sum of one hundred twenty-nine thousand five hundred seventy colones and another deposit for a down payment in the sum of one hundred ninety-eight thousand five hundred two colones. Notwithstanding the foregoing and the proven fact of Mr. Quintanilla Dávila's long years of permanence in the property, the entity responsible for the housing project never made any approach to him to determine his situation or adopt measures in this regard, nor did it keep documentary backup that could serve as a basis for the adoption of administrative conduct. On the contrary, it issued receipts in the plaintiff's name, received the monies paid by him, and tolerated his permanence for more than twenty years, to then allege in a lawsuit the illegitimacy of the possession and attempt to apply a collection mechanism, which this Court has deemed foreign to the plaintiff's legal relationship. The absence of records on his situation and the non-existence of his adjudication contract are precisely part of the reasons why the acts that have been deemed null in this resolution led to basing their reasoning on the presumed non-existence of a contractual relationship and right assisting the plaintiff, which has been considered by this Court as contrary to the administrative legal order. This Court deems proven an "inertia" of the Administration, translated into an omission to act on a legal duty imposed by the legal order, insofar as Article 15 of the General Law of Internal Control imposes, as a necessary control activity of every public entity, the following: "*The design and use of documents and records that assist in the adequate annotation of transactions and significant events carried out in the institution. The documents and records must be appropriately managed and maintained.*" In the same sense, Article 16 of the same regulatory body states: "*Article 16.—**Information Systems**. There must be information systems that allow the active administration to have institutional document management, understood as the set of activities carried out in order to control, store, and subsequently recover adequately the information produced or received in the organization, in the development of its activities, in order to prevent any deviation in the established objectives. Said document management must be closely related to information management, which must include corporate databases and other computer applications, which constitute important sources of recorded information*". By reason of the foregoing, the existence of what the plaintiff calls administrative "*inertia*" can be determined, with respect to the non-existence of the registrations and documents necessary for the determination and verification of his effective legal situation. The representation of the defendant party is not correct in invoking the possibility of applying Article 157 of the General Law of Public Administration, and indicating that the legal order enables it to rectify material and arithmetic errors. The foregoing, insofar as the norm does not empower the Administration to violate the principle of intangibility of its own acts to the detriment of the Administrated party, nor is it an open possibility to be employed with impunity by the Administration in the face of its omissions to act or administrative dysfunction. Consequently, this part of the claim must be granted.

**VII.- *On the claim for damages and losses***: The plaintiff requests compensation for damages and losses caused and, in the preliminary hearing, specifies a non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) in the sum of two million colones. However, notwithstanding the foregoing, he does not specify or detail what the invoked damages consist of, nor does he determine what the referred non-pecuniary damage consists of. For this Court, despite non-pecuniary damage having an *in re ipsa* nature, the mere mention thereof is not sufficient to grant such a claim. In this sense, on the one hand, with respect to the proof of damage in general, the Civil Procedure Code in its Article 317 expressly states: "* The burden of proof lies: 1) On whoever formulates a claim, regarding the affirmations of the facts constitutive of his right. 2) On whoever opposes a claim, regarding the affirmations of facts impeding, modifying, or extinguishing the plaintiff's right.* ". In the case of non-pecuniary damage, it has been indicated that it does not require direct proof, but rather certain criteria are applicable to it that delimit the Judge's discretionary power and derive from its own legal nature, which have been developed by national case law. Thus, as a first delimiting criterion are the general principles of law and equity, and furthermore, the presumptions of man inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis. Likewise, from various judicial rulings and from judgment 413 of November 19, 2002, of the First Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court, Section I, other criteria are evidenced, namely: "*III. By subjective non-pecuniary damage, legal doctrine has understood that affection impacting the emotional sphere of persons causing worry, suffering, anxiety, and other negative and harmful emotions, whose origin is the illicit acts caused by the plaintiff. By its nature, it is difficult to prove by ordinary means, so the judge may estimate it by examining the circumstances appearing in the file and applying **his experience**, the general principles of law, and those of **rationality and proportionality**.*" (Our emphasis) These latter criteria have been developed in a relevant manner to limit the possibility of recognizing exaggerated or disproportionate compensation. In this vein, the First Chamber has pointed out: "* **It is not, therefore, a question of quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, as these are priceless goods, but of setting a monetary compensation for their injury**, the only mechanism available to the law, to thus repair, at least in part, the offense. **It would not be appropriate under such a philosophy, to establish exorbitant compensation, as occurs in other legal systems,** for this would produce the unjust enrichment of the aggrieved, through immoral profit from one's own honor** ** and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law**, ** are those of reasonableness and proportionality** **, which have been recognized in our context with the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber #1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on the first of July and 3495-92 of 2:30 p.m. on the nineteenth of November, both of 1992). Applying them to situations such as the present, it is indispensable, when setting the obligations arising from compensatory legal situations, to attend to the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the restitution, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In such a sense, non-pecuniary damage, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to million-dollar compensation, as sought. This would open an inconvenient loophole** **, giving way to disproportionate claims which, on the pretext of protecting the individual's subjective sphere, would lead to unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing sullied dignity, would undermine its foundations causing it to fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber, vote 141 of 3:00 p.m. on June 18, 1993, and No. 99 of 4:00 p.m. on September 20, 1995) (Our emphasis).* The causation of damage is another inescapable criterion, insofar as the real cause thereof can determine the scope and limits of the compensatory estimate. Moreover, always within the order of proportionality, mention is made of the "prudent assessment by the Judge" of the damage and its restitution, in the following manner: "*Therefore, the court must consider the appropriateness of the claim under comment; in this effect, the 1st Chamber of the Supreme Court has stated: " VI. While non-pecuniary damage - in relation to the subject at hand - due to its nature, allows a wide margin of discretion to the judge in its setting, this must necessarily be observed within certain unavoidable parameters, for example, the old Court of Cassation, in judgment No. 114 of 4:00 p.m. on November 2, 1979, endorses the prudent assessment of the judges '...when they may infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence. This Chamber, in its ruling No. 114-93, indicates that the prudent judgment alluded to must take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity. Around such concepts, the Chamber, in a later pronouncement, reasons in the following terms: "It is not, therefore, a question of quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, as these are priceless goods, but of setting a monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism available to the law, to thus repair, at least in part, the offense. It would not be appropriate under such a philosophy, to establish exorbitant compensations, as occurs in other legal systems, for this would produce the unjust enrichment of the aggrieved, through immoral profit from one's own honor and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law, are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our context with the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on July 1 and No. 3495-92 of 2:30 p.m. on November 19, both of 1992). Applying them to situations such as the present, it is indispensable, when setting the obligations arising from compensatory legal situations, to attend to the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the restitution, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In such a sense, non-pecuniary damage, in cases such as the one analyzed, could not give rise to million-dollar compensations, as sought. This would open an inconvenient loophole, giving way to disproportionate claims which, on the pretext of protecting the individual's subjective sphere, would lead to unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing sullied dignity, would undermine its foundations causing it to fall into eminently economic values (First Chamber No. 41 of 3:00 p.m. on June 18, 1993). VII. Recapitulating, the prudent judgment to be employed by the Judge in situations such as the present, presupposes the observance of inescapable parameters such as circumstantial evidence, the own circumstances of the specific case, the general principles of law, equity, the position of the parties; the nature, object, and purpose of the restitution, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. On such points, the interested party can and must offer proof as much as possible. Only thus can a prudent judgment be arrived at. Outside of such considerations, discretionary setting runs the serious risk of incurring an excess of power that distorts or misrepresents what was decided. That is, the prudent assessment of the judge, even when the generating event has occurred - as occurs in the species - (principle "in re ipsa"), requires the considerations or parameters commented on, regarding the damage, in order to establish the amount according to them. In the event that elements of judgment on the matter are not present in the records, the judge will have to act in consonance with such a situation, adopting a conservative attitude in the setting, for not doing so could incur an excess of power."* Vote 00093-2000 of the Contentious-Administrative Court, Section II. Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that non-pecuniary damage does not escape the certainty that it must be a consequence of the administration's action or omission, just as the harmed interest of the person invoking it must be certain. In the case under analysis, as has been stated, it is not evident that the party alleging to have suffered non-pecuniary damage has at least specified its scope and level of impact, nor demonstrated at least with indications that it effectively occurred in their internal sphere. The party does not express when the invoked non-pecuniary damage arose, nor does it specify the factual grounds upon which it makes its claim. Thus, for this Court it is not possible to grant non-pecuniary damage, applying the considerations made, if the specific foundation on which the party bases its claim is unknown. Therefore, this part of the claim must be rejected.

“IV.- Del objeto del proceso: De lo expresado por las partes, tanto en sus pretensiones como argumentos, el objeto del presente proceso estriba en determinar la existencia de vicios de nulidad en las conductas administrativas objetadas por la parte actora, así como la existencia de un vínculo contractual entre ésta y el ende demandado. Adicionalmente se debe determinar si se ha demostrado la existencia de daños ocasionados con motivo de alguna conducta u omisión de algún funcionario del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo.

V.- Sobre la existencia de un vínculo contractual entre el actor y el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo: En su demanda, la parte actora indica que adquirió el apartamento número G-21 en el condominio El Corral en el año 1991 por la suma de ochocientos setenta y seis mil novecientos cincuenta y seis colones, siendo así que desde esa fecha, manifiesta, le fue puesto en posesión y adjudicado por el ente vendedor. Con base en lo anterior, solicita se declare que él es el propietario del indicado apartamento, localizado en Curridabat y que se ordene al ente accionado se proceda a titular a su nombre el indicado inmueble. El Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo rechaza la existencia de cualquier vínculo contractual con el señor Quintanilla Dávila e indica que no existe contrato de adjudicación con el actor, por lo que él no posee derecho alguno sobre el apartamento objeto de la litis. Al respecto, estima este Tribunal que para resolver este aspecto de la demanda deben realizarse las siguientes consideraciones: La Ley Orgánica del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, n.° 1788 de 24 de agosto de 1954, establece como competencia de dicho ente, el arrendar viviendas de su patrimonio a las familias que carezcan de alojamiento adecuado y los medios de obtención necesarios. De manera adicional, el articulo 5 de dicho cuerpo normativo dispone como facultad del mismo: ".....h) Arrendar, vender, permutar, gravar y administrar las viviendas, centros de servicio comunal que adquiera o construya, así como los demás bienes de su propiedad" y "....ñ) Celebrar todos los contratos y realizar todos los actos administrativos, civiles, industriales o comerciales que sean convenientes o necesarios para el mejor cumplimiento de sus fines..." Con respecto a la regulación propia de la relación entre el ente y los beneficiarios de sus programas, el artículo 39 de la indica ley, expresa lo siguiente:"Los tipos de construcción de casas, su edificación, arrendamiento, reparación o venta y en general, las prohibiciones, cláusulas restrictivas, cuotas de interés, amortización, conservación, seguros, plazos y demás detalles sobre organización económica, edificación, mejoramiento, adjudicación y traspaso definitivo, se determinarán en los Reglamentos que al efecto dicte la Junta Directiva". Como se advierte la indicada norma deja al ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria los aspectos atinentes a la regulación de la relación en que se encontrarían sujetas las familias que habiten las soluciones habitacionales de la Institución. En razón de lo anterior, se promulgó mediante reglamento ejecutivo, no autónomo, tal y como había indicado la ley, el Reglamento de Adjudicación de Vivienda, Decreto Nº 2 del 13 de enero de 1955, el cual establece , en lo que nos interesa, lo siguiente: "Articulo 6°—Las viviendas podrán ser adjudicadas a títulos de venta, de alquiler y de alquiler-venta, a juicio de la Junta Directiva. En la adjudicación de venta, la Junta Directiva podrá exigir un adelanto al pago del valor de la vivienda, según lo permita el tipo y calidad de la casa. En virtud del contrato de alquiler-venta, el adjudicatario que inicialmente alquila goza de opción para comprar la vivienda, por el valor establecido en el convenio original, durante un plazo máximo de cinco años. La Junta Directiva podrá establecer plazos mínimos de alquiler-venta, los cuales servirán para someter a prueba el interés del adjudicatario en cuanto a permanencia. Al formalizar la venta el Instituto podrá determinar el plazo para cancelar el precio, de acuerdo con los ingresos del contratante. El tipo de interés incluido en la cuota de arrendamiento regirá asimismo para la operación de venta. El inquilino que dejase transcurrir en vano el plazo de la Opción puede bien adquirir la vivienda conforme a un reavalúo de la misma, bien continuar como arrendatario, pero en este segundo caso deberá cubrir en adelante una cuota de arrendamiento igual a la que como comprador le correspondería conforme al articulo inmediato siguiente. La Junta Directiva fijará en este caso la duración del período y las condiciones para renovar el alquiler". "Artículo 7°—El precio de las viviendas adjudicadas en venta será determinado por la Junta Directiva, tomando en consideración el precio de costo. Determinará también la Junta el plazo de cancelación de dicho precio y el tipo de interés que corresponda a cada categoría y, con base en uno y otro, el Departamento Financiero calculará las cuotas mensuales que correspondan. No obstante lo anterior, el adjudicatario podrá hacer abonos a la deuda o cancelarla en cualquier fecha, antes de su vencimiento". De manera complementaria, el artículo 9 de la norma prevee que el beneficiario estaba obligado a la suscripción de un contrato, de conformidad con las siguientes disposiciones: "Articulo 9°—El régimen de locación resultante de contratos de alquiler o de alquiler-venta, se regirá en lo demás por las disposiciones que son aplicables al arrendamiento en este Reglamento y en el de Arriendo en Edificios Multifamiliares. Las casas se entregarán a los adquirentes, previa revisión de las mismas, debiéndose firmar un contrato que contenga: a) Declaración del adjudicatario de que entra a poseer la vivienda, recibiéndola en buen estado a su entera satisfacción, y de que acepta las condiciones de venta, cláusulas restrictivas, causales de desahucio, tipo de interés, plazo máximo y demás modalidades fijadas por la ley y este Reglamento, o por disposición expresa de la Junta Directiva; b) El sistema de amortización al que se acoge, de conformidad con las normas establecidas en el articulo 10 siguiente; c) Copia de las cláusulas restrictivas y de las causales de desahucio: y d) Obligación de pagar el adjudicatario regularmente los servicios e impuestos municipales, lo mismo que la póliza de seguro contra incendio, y de vida, para cubrir los saldos pendientes que se establezcan". Con posterioridad, el Reglamento para la Adjudicación de Viviendas de Interés Social, vigente desde el 20 de enero de 1995, dispuso al respecto lo siguiente: "Artículo 10.—Quienes hayan cancelado doce cuotas del contrato de adjudicación, inicialmente suscrito y se encuentre su operación a! día. pueden solicitar el correspondiente titulo de propiedad ante el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, en el Departamento de Administración de Bienes, constituyendo hipoteca de primer grado sobre la propiedad, sometiéndose a las disposiciones legales y reglamentarias establecidas por el Reglamento de Préstamos Hipotecarios del Instituto". De conformidad con las anteriores disposiciones, el indicado ente desarrolló una serie de proyectos habitacionales, tanto verticales como horizontales, mediante los cuales se dotaba de una solución de vivienda a diferentes familias, con base en un contrato, denominado de "adjudicación". Sobre la naturaleza privada de estos contratos, se pronunció la Corte Plena, actuando como contralor constitucional (acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el artículo 48 de la Ley Orgánica del INVU), en sesión extraordinaria del 3 de setiembre de 1981, donde expresó: "Las relaciones entre los inquilinos del INVU y la propia entidad arrendante, son de carácter arrendaticio, como cualesquiera otras que existan entre un inquilino y un particular. Son de la misma índole esas relaciones por la naturaleza del contrato y por la condición de uno de los contratantes; pero es claro que no son absolutamente iguales...y no son iguales porque en los contratos de arrendamiento común (por llamarlos así), figura como arrendante una persona que actúa con ánimo de lucro, mientras que en los contratos del INVU el arrendante es una entidad de derecho público, que fue creada con otros fines...Sin embargo, aunque la institución no actúe con fines lucrativos, es obvio que esa circunstancia no hace variar la índole del contrato ni su característica esencial de hallarse las partes en una posición contrapuesta..., al igual como ocurre en la generalidad de los contratos de arrendamiento entre los particulares" No obstante lo anterior, con posterioridad, mediante voto 784-96, adicionado por el número 0075-I-96 de las 8:30 horas del 16 de febrero de 1996, la Sala Constitucional, modificó parcialmente lo resuelto anteriormente y señaló lo siguiente: "Los mal denominados ‘contratos de adjudicación de vivienda’ del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo se encuentran regidos por la Ley Orgánica del INVU y el Reglamento de Adjudicación de Vivienda de dicho Instituto. El primero de estos dos cuerpos dispositivos, contiene una norma, concretamente el artículo 42, que fue concebido dentro de una Norma Presupuestaria de un Presupuesto Extraordinario de la República. Dicha norma, como producto de la teoría de la causalidad, tiene su efecto y eco en el Reglamento de Adjudicación de Vivienda del INVU en los numerales 16 y 17 consultados. Si bien es cierto que la potestad reglamentaria ejercida por la Administración faculta a la misma a fin de emitir disposiciones o reglamentos ejecutivos y administrativos, dicha potestad se circunscribe únicamente a todo aquello que esté expresamente enunciado en la Ley que merece ser regulada y, en tanto y cuanto no se encuentre prohibida su regulación por reserva de ley expresa. ... se argumenta por parte del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo que, los contratos de adjudicación firmados entre el INVU y los adjudicatarios, constituyen contratos especiales de la Administración, los cuales están sujetos a los reglamentos y leyes que rijan la materia y no a la legislación común. Analizando el contrato de adjudicación que consta en el expediente judicial base para la presente consulta judicial, se pueden observar elementos importantísimos que sólo se pueden encontrar en un contrato bilateral sinalagmático perfecto. Sinalagmático por cuanto al momento de la firma del mismo genera obligaciones y derechos a ambas partes contratantes y, además, es perfecto, en tanto y cuanto las partes se ponen de acuerdo en cosa y precio, y en cuanto opera la "traditio" con todos los efectos que la misma conlleva, sea la entrada en posesión del bien por parte del "accipiens" o adquirente y el abandono del mismo por parte del enajenante o "tradens". Recordemos, al efecto, que la "tradición" de un bien representa el acto mediante el cual una persona pone en poder de otra una cosa, o sea, que la entrega del bien se constituye en el elemento material de la transmisión la cual, una vez realizada, instituye derechos reales en favor del adquirente. Es criterio de esta Sala, que en el caso que nos ocupa el formalismo establecido por los artículos 455 siguientes y concordantes del Código Civil, respecto a la escritura pública y su inscripción en el Registro de la Propiedad como medio de constitución del derecho de propiedad, no procede por cuanto dicha tesis trata de resguardar los efectos que dicha transmisión ocasione respecto a los derechos de terceros y no del adquirente o del enajenante, tiene un carácter informativo. Considera este Tribunal que, el contrato de adjudicación firmado entre los administrados y el INVU, surte efectos sobre la titularidad en la propiedad del inmueble desde el mismo momento de la suscripción del documento, operando incluso la "traditio" y el abandono por parte del enajenante de ese inmueble en manos del adquirente (adjudicatario), constituyendo un derecho a la propiedad en favor del nuevo propietario que no se puede considerar, como sí lo hace el Reglamento de Adjudicación, como una simple expectativa de derecho. Considera esta Sala que, al igual que se opera en todo sistema de financiamiento de vivienda, el INVU puede establecer los mecanismos legalmente permitidos para ejercer un control sobre las adjudicaciones que realice e instituír los respectivos procedimientos de recuperación tendientes a hacer efectivos los derechos de la Institución en cuanto a la recuperación del bien o del monto invertido en la construcción del inmueble, sin tener que actuar arbitrariamente y lesionar con dicha actuación los derechos fundamentales que establece nuestra Carta Magna. Así las cosas, nunca puede proceder un desahucio de un inmueble que es propiedad de quien, con derecho a la propiedad, lo habita en virtud de un contrato que le concedió dicha concesión. La especificidad de las cláusulas que consten en un contrato, pueden tender a la regulación de la transacción que en el ámbito privado pueda proceder respecto al negocio jurídico que se esté realizando, sin embargo dichas cláusulas no pueden constituirse en una violación a los derechos de una de las partes contratantes, imponiendo cargas que, en el Derecho de la Antigua Roma, eran llamadas "leoninas" o abusivas. En el caso que nos interesa, los derechos adquiridos "per se" por parte del administrado-adjudicatario, en virtud de un contrato de compra venta perfecto y, que se encuentran protegidos y tutelados por normas Constitucionales, no pueden ser objeto de atropello por disposiciones reglamentarias que no se limitan a regular las relaciones entre administración y administrado, sino que violentan y atropellan derechos fundamentales de los particulares, alejándose del fin primordial que perseguía, en este caso concreto, la ley orgánica del INVU, el cual es facilitar el acceso a vivienda digna para el desarrollo del país, y el resguardo de los principios de dignidad, igualdad y justicia social" Dicha posición fue mantenida por la Sección I del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo en voto número 00303-2000 de 3:00 de 31 de octubre del 2000, de la siguiente manera: "Se desprende con meridiana claridad del voto transcrito, que el Tribunal Constitucional señaló, que el “contrato de adjudicación de vivienda” rubricado entre el ente demandado y el “adjudicatario”, constituye un contrato de compra venta perfecto desde su rúbrica, operando incluso la entrega del bien, de manera que los efectos plenos del traspaso de dominio operan no con el “acto de entregar la escritura sobre el bien”, sino desde la firma misma del convenio de adjudicación, es decir es con la firma de éste que el adjudicatario o adjudicatarios adquieren para todo efecto legal la titularidad o dominio sobre el inmueble..". De conformidad con lo anterior, se advierte que en el caso de los contratos de adjudicación, estamos en presencia de vínculos contractuales de naturaleza privada ejercida por la Administración, no sometidos a las regulaciones y cláusulas exhorbitantes propias del régimen de contratación administrativa. En este orden de ideas, se ha indicado con respecto a sus particularidades que "La característica que diferencia este tipo de contratos de los administrativos es la ausencia de un régimen jurídico exorbitante (sic) de Derecho común, no procediendo de esta manera la llamada rescisión unilateral, la ejecutoriedad, la aplicación y ejecución de multas, en sede administrativa". (Cassagne, Juan Carlos. Los contratos de la Administración Pública. Distintas categorías y regímenes jurídicos. Revista de Administración Pública. Madrid, Nº 78, setiembre- diciembre de 1975, p .426). Por otra parte, como se advierte de la redacción de las dos últimas resoluciones, en éstas se parte del supuesto del sistema denominado de "nudo consenso", mediante el que, los derechos reales se transmiten con el mero consentimiento de las partes. Así lo establece expresamente el artículo 480 del Código Civil en tanto dispone "La propiedad de muebles e inmuebles se trasmite con relación a las partes contratantes, por el solo hecho del convenio que tenga por objeto transmitirla, independientemente de su inscripción en el Registro y de la tradición" En el caso de la compra venta el sistema se refleja en lo dispuesto en el numeral 1049 del mismo cuerpo normativo que dispone.: "La venta es perfecta entre las partes desde que convienen en cosa y precio". No obstante, no puede obviarse la necesaria tradición, como parte inherente para el perfeccionamiento de la relación contractual. En este orden de ideas, el artículo 480 hace referencia a la misma de la siguiente manera: "La tradición se realiza desde el momento en que el dueño hace entrega y el adquirente toma posesión de la cosa. Cuando el que ha de recibir la cosa la tiene ya en su poder por otro título no traslativo, el mero consentimiento de las partes importa tradición desde la fecha cierta en que se haga constar....". En consecuencia, la tradición, o entrega efectiva del bien y toma de posesión por parte de un comprador, es sinónimo, además, de conformidad en el objeto que recibe como parte del negocio jurídico que se había concretizado con el simple acuerdo entre las partes. De lo anterior se concluye que la inscripción registral tiene como fin principal, básicamente garantizar la eficacia del contrato, respecto de terceros, en virtud de la publicidad registral, mas no es condición de validez del mismo. Este Tribunal estima que en orden a lo indicado, según las características descritas, no todo contrato de adjudicación posee los efectos indicados en las citas señaladas ut supra, siendo así que debe distinguirse entre tres tipos de relaciones jurídicas diferentes, a saber, a) el contrato de adjudicación realizado para la venta posterior del inmueble. En este primer caso los pagos que realice el beneficiario son abonos a la deuda. b) el contrato de arrendamiento puro y simple, en donde los pagos realizados es el simple precio del arrendamiento, y c) el contrato de arrendamiento con la posibilidad a mutar a venta. En donde los pagos inicialmente son el precio del alquiler del inmueble y con posterioridad pueden llegar a ser abonos al precio del mismo. En el caso del primer supuesto a), las normas de cita indican que se podrá exigir un adelanto al pago del valor de la vivienda, siendo así que el valor del traslado de ésta será acordado por la Junta Directiva del ente. En el caso del segundo supuesto, b) el beneficiario no posee interés en adquirir el inmueble y sólo se mantiene como arrendatario. De manera adicional, para regular esta relación en particular, también se emitió en su momento el Reglamento para el arriendo en edificios multifamiliares (decreto número 20 de 14 de diciembre de 1954) y el Reglamento para Arrendamientos, publicado en La Gaceta N. 30 de 13 de febrero de 1976, este último aprobado por la Junta Directiva del ente. En el caso del tercer supuesto c) el adjudicatario que inicialmente alquila posee la opción para comprar la vivienda, por el valor establecido en el convenio original, durante un plazo máximo de cinco años. Si el inquilino deja transcurrir el plazo de la opción, puede bien adquirir la vivienda conforme a un reavalúo de la misma o continuar como arrendatario. En este supuesto, aplica también, el capítulo III, denominado "arrendamiento de viviendas con opción de compra", del Reglamento para Arrendamientos, en tanto dispone que el inquilino podrá adquirir la vivienda arrendada, pagando el valor del inmueble al momento de arrendarla, estableciendo un mecanismo de fijación de la cuota a pagar como producto de su venta. En este orden de ideas, se advierte que sólo en el primer caso podríamos referir que estamos en presencia de una formalización de una relación de traslado de la propiedad con todos sus atributos, mediante el acuerdo de cosa y precio, además de la "traditio". Lo anterior, en el entendido de que dicha relación, no es, como ya indicó este Tribunal , equiparable a un contrato traslativo de dominio puro y simple, dado que se traslada en el tiempo y se condiciona la formalización de la respectiva escritura para la correspondiente inscripción registral. En el caso concreto de análisis se advierte que si bien no existe prueba de la existencia de un documento formal de contrato de adjudicación, no es posible cargar al actor con las consecuencias negativa de tal situación en sede administrativa, en tanto que en autos consta prueba sobre el inicio y desarrollo de un vínculo contractual entre el ente demandado y el señor Quintanilla Dávila. En efecto, este Tribunal tiene por demostrado que el actor entre los años 1990, 1991 y 1992 realizó 9 pagos al Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo por concepto del apartamento N. G-21 del condominio El Corral, siendo así que desde esa época ha venido ocupando dicho inmueble y ha realizado diferentes pagos a la Junta Administrativa del Condominio El Corral por concepto de cuotas de agua, luz del pasillo, mantenimiento y otros del mismo. Este colegio estima que lo anterior demuestra la existencia de un acuerdo entre las partes en el presente proceso, tendiente a que el actor ocupara el apartamento en mención y que como tal le generó a su favor un derecho subjetivo de buena fe, que no puede ser obviado, de conformidad con el principio de confianza legítima. En este orden de ideas, debe recordarse que dicho principio se encuentra orientado a la protección de los administrados, a fin de que no sean vulneradas las acciones u omisiones estatales prolongadas en el tiempo, y consentidas expresa o tácitamente por la administración ya sea que se trate de comportamientos activos o pasivos, regulación legal o interpretación normativa. Es este un límite a las potestades administrativas, vinculado a la buena fe y a la interdicción de la arbitrariedad en la conducta administrativa en los actos ablatorios. En la situación concreta del señor Quintanilla Dávila se evidencia que han transcurrido más de veinte años de posesión del mismo respecto del apartamento G-21, sin que el ente demandado haya hecho, durante todos esos años, manifestación formal o material alguna en su contra, y siendo así que, más bien, determinó en inspección realizada por sus funcionarios, que él aún habita el inmueble (declaración de la testigo Dora Chacón Chinchilla), lo cual a su vez es ratificado por el testigo Herbert Jiménez Araya. La emisión de recibos por parte del ente indicando aceptación de pago e indicando claramente el concepto por el cual recibía cada suma, crean una situación jurídica favorable al actor, acorde con los propósitos de creación de esta jurisdicción (art. 1 CPCA). La no existencia en los registros electrónicos o documentales del ente, respecto de información sobre la situación jurídica concreta del actor, no pueden devenir en contra de sus derechos, cuando más bien ha existido conductas activas y omisivas que consolidan la convicción sobre la existencia de una relación jurídica particular, nacida con motivo de los objetivos de creación del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo. En este sentido, precisamente, doctrinariamente se ha establecido que como consecuencia del principio de confianza legítima, los errores de la Administración Pública sólo la afectan a ella, a menos que haya sido el propio ciudadano el que indujo al error a la autoridad y por ende, los administrados que, estando de buena fe, adquirieron derechos a partir de actos viciados, se encuentran protegidos por la garantía de la propiedad privada, hasta tanto no se dicte una eventual nulidad u otra acción por las vías legales correspondientes. Por lo anterior, la demostración de la existencia de documentos que deberían constar en un amparan al administrado sobre su existencia, es carga de la Administración y corresponderá a ella adoptar las medidas para su custodia, conservación, gestión o reposición, dada la existencia de legislación nacional sobre el archivo de documentos públicos que así lo impone. En este orden de ideas, el artículo 41 de la Ley del Sistema Nacional de Archivos, indica: "Todas las instituciones deberán contar con un archivo central y con los archivos de gestión necesarios para la debida conservación y organización de sus documentos, lo que deberá hacer, salvo normativa especial, de acuerdo con las disposiciones de esta ley, su reglamento y las normas de la Junta Administrativa del Archivo Nacional, de la Comisión Nacional de Selección y Eliminación de Documentos y de la Dirección General del Archivo Nacional". Es así como estima este Tribunal que la ausencia de demostración de existencia de un contrato de adjudicación, no es motivo suficiente como para deslegitimar la situación jurídica del actor respecto del apartamento G-21 y no implica que su posesión sea precaria o que no merezca tutela jurídica. No lleva la razón la representante del ente accionado cuando argumenta que la ocupación del inmueble por parte del actor es irregular, en tanto que el apartamento que ocupa está ubicado en un bien de dominio público, siendo así que la administración cuenta con la posibilidad de autotutela. Para este Tribunal es evidente que el apartamento objeto del presente proceso no es un bien demanial. En este sentido, debe distinguirse entre bienes de dominio público de la Administración y bienes de dominio privado de la misma. Los primeros son inembargables, imprescriptibles e inalienables. Los segundos se encuentran dentro del comercio de los hombres. El artículo 261 del Código Civil dispone: “Son cosas públicas las que, por ley, están destinadas de un modo permanente a cualquier servicio de utilidad general, y aquellas de que todos pueden aprovecharse por estar entregadas al uso público. Todas las demás cosas son privadas y objeto de propiedad particular, aunque pertenezcan al Estado a los Municipios, quienes para el caso, como personas civiles, no se diferencian de cualquier otra persona ”. En el caso de los primeros, la Administración cuenta con potestades exorbitantes para su tutela, siendo así que en el caso de la áreas destinadas a vivienda del INVU, estamos en presencia del régimen privado de la Administración, por lo que el uso directo de potestades exorbitantes con que cuenta la Administración para tutelar los bienes públicos, ha sido expresamente negado como medio de defensa de los bienes objeto de consulta. Es evidente que en estos casos, dichos inmuebles no gozan de ninguna afectación demanial singular, ni del atributo de inalienabilidad, dado que son transmisibles por venta o adjudicación a los beneficiarios. Estima este colegio contradictorios los argumentos de la representación del ente accionado, pues mientras por una parte invoca la necesidad de venta del inmueble en cuestión a precio actual, por otra dice que es demanial, con lo que en este último supuesto, no podría ser objeto de venta mediante simple acto administrativo. Así las cosas se ha tenido por demostrada la existencia de un vínculo contractual entre el INVU y el actor al amparo de las pruebas aportadas a los autos. Dicho vínculo, partiendo de los tres supuestos indicados por este Tribunal anteriormente, debe ser considerado como un contrato de adjudicación realizado para la venta posterior del inmueble. Lo anterior, en tanto que los recibos emanados por el propio INVU indican que el actor realizó el pago de la "prima" del apartamento, de "mensualidades" y de "cuotas atrasadas", que evidencian, no la existencia de una relación de arrendamiento, sino de venta del mismo. En razón de lo anterior, nuevamente estima este Tribunal que el hecho de que no se haya formalizado la escritura en los veinte años de ocupación del inmueble por parte del Señor Quintanilla Dávila, no puede revertirse en su contra, en tanto que la normativa de análisis, lo permitía, no imponiendo ninguna carga por el transcurso del tiempo. Nótese como sólo en el supuesto del alquiler-venta el artículo 6 del Reglamento indica expresamente que "el inquilino que dejase transcurrir en vano el plazo de la Opción puede bien adquirir la vivienda conforme a un reavalúo", habida cuenta en el caso de venta pura y simple sólo indica la necesaria fijación de montos y cuotas por la Junta Directiva, pero sin prever que se requiera un nuevo avalúo por el precio actual de un inmueble, cuyo precio fue pactado hace ya más de veinte años. Es de relevancia indicar que dicha normativa era la vigente en el momento en que se perfeccionó el vínculo contractual, siendo así que al ser un decreto ejecutivo, no ha perdido sus efectos para el caso particular del actor, dado que el posterior Reglamento para la Adjudicación de Viviendas de Interés Social, vigente desde el 20 de enero de 1995, fue aprobado por acuerdo de Junta Directiva del INVU, con lo cual no podría éste derogar a aquel, por ser norma de superior rango. En razón de lo anterior, no lleva razón la representación de la parte demandada cuando alega que al caso del actor debe aplicarse el Reglamento de Avalúos y del acuerdo Número 4450 de 11 de octubre de 1994, artículo III, inciso 14-B del ente, que le otorga vigencia a los mismos por seis meses para la determinación del valor de los bienes o derechos, en tanto que son de aplicación a supuestos diferentes a los del señor Quintanilla, el cual como se ha indicado, posee una situación jurídica creadora de un derecho subjetivo a su favor, al amparo de un vínculo contractual privado realizado con el INVU, desde 1991, fundado en un decreto ejecutivo, contra el cual no se puede oponer un reglamento autónomo de alcances diferentes a los originaron la relación objeto de la presente resolución. Estima este Tribunal que procede acoger la pretensión establecida con el fin de que se declare que el actor posee un derecho a que se le otorgue la propiedad registral sobre el apartamento G-21 del Condominio El Corral, localizado en Curridabat, que deberá ser reconocido para efectos de otorgar la respectiva escritura a su favor, por el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, con las salvedades que se indicarán en la presente resolución.

V.- Sobre la nulidad de los actos impugnados: La parte actora solicita se declare la nulidad de los siguientes actos: a) oficio C-PPT-531-2011 b) Resolución GG-234-2011 de la Gerencia General del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo c) acuerdo tomado por la Junta Directiva del INVU, según artículo II, inciso 3), Puntos a), b), c), e) del acta de la sesión ordinaria N. 5884, del 29 de junio del 2011 y comunicado por medio del oficio CJD-113-2011, del 13 de julio del 2011. En este sentido, invoca los argumentos analizados en el considerando anterior para fundamentar vicios en la motivación y contenido de los actos. Al respecto, una vez analizados los actos indicados, con base en las consideraciones realizadas anteriormente, estima este Tribunal procedente acoger este extremo de la demanda, habida cuenta que las indicadas conductas parten del supuesto de la inexistencia de un vínculo contractual con el actor, fundadas en la inexistencia del documento del contrato de adjudicación. Debe tomarse en consideración, dada la naturaleza de las conductas formales objetadas, que la actuación formal de la Administración Pública al materializa rse en la adopción de actos administrativos, ( entendidos éstos como las declaraciones unilaterales de voluntad, juicio o conocimiento que se emiten en ejercicio de la función administrativa ), debe poseer necesariamente una serie de elementos materiales y formales para que sea plenamente válida y eficaz. Como elementos materiales o sustanciales, tenemos la competencia del sujeto que emite el acto, el motivo que le da origen-, (entendido éste como los antecedentes o presupuestos jurídicos o fácticos de la conducta administrativa), el contenido o sea lo que en sí dispone el acto (el cual deberá ser lícito, posible, claro, proporcional y acorde al motivo) y el fin público perseguido con su adopción. Como elementos formales, se considera tanto la motivación (fundamentación de lo decidido) que fundamenta la conducta administrativa, su forma de instrumentación, como el procedimiento adoptado para su materialización , además de la investidura del órgano o servidor que emite el acto. En el caso del oficio C-PPT-531-2011 de 4 de mayo de 2011, se advierte que éste le indica al actor que "... al no existir contrato de adjudicación entre el señor Quintanilla Dávila y el INVU, los pagos efectuados no generan derecho alguno.." Por consiguiente, y de manera contradictoria - dado que en el mismo documento indicó que él no tenía derecho alguno y no era adjudicataria- se le indica que para formalizar la compra del apartamento deberá realizarse un avalúo por el precio actual del mismo. En el mismo sentido, la resolución GG-234-2011 de once horas de 27 de mayo de 2011 de la Gerencia General del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, indicó que "... no existe relación contractual entre este Instituto y usted, al no constar contrato de adjudicación suscrito entre las partes, por lo que no le genera a usted derecho alguno sobre el apartamento en cuestión, en vista que el contrato de adjudicación se considera título traslativo de dominio en beneficio del adjudicatario.." Dicha posición fue ratificada mediante acuerdo de la Junta Directiva del INVU, artículo II, inciso 3), del acta de la sesión ordinaria N. 5884, del 29 de junio del 2011, en tanto invoca idénticas consideraciones. Como se advierte del texto de dichos actos, existe un vicio de nulidad absoluta en la motivación de los mismos, en tanto que se encuentran fundamentados en consideraciones contrarias a derecho, al partir, por una parte de la inexistencia del vínculo contractual que ha sido demostrado en juicio, con base en las propias conductas de la Administración y al imponer al señor Quintanilla Dávila la aplicación de un avalúo no previsto para su particular relación jurídica, tal y como se ha analizado ut supra. Estima este Tribunal que tal y como se ha dicho, los actos indicados son contrarios al principio de confianza legítima y de interdicción de arbitrariedad, por cuanto de manera infundada y contraria al derecho y las circunstancias propias de la relación jurídica, niega la existencia de ésta, a pesar de contar con elementos de convicción en sede administrativa, sobre la existencia de un vínculo contractual previo pactado desde 1991. A mayor abundamiento, en el caso de análisis, es procedente aplicar lo dispuesto en el artículo 137 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en tanto dispone: "Los comportamientos y actividades materiales de la Administración que tengan un sentido unívoco y que sean incompatibles con una voluntad diversa, servirán para expresar el acto, salvo que la naturaleza o circunstancia de éste exijan manifestación expresa". Así las cosas, procede acoger la nulidad absoluta de los actos objetados.

VI.- Sobre la solicitud de declaratoria de inercia administrativa: La parte actora indica en su demanda que hay inercia por parte del ente demandado. No concreta omisiones de actuaciones en concreto con respecto a lo que estima inercia administrativa, mas de sus razonamientos se infiere que están vinculados con la no existencia en los archivos institucionales de su contrato de adjudicación, lo cual generó la motivación de los actos impugnados y que dio base para estimar que él no se encontraba a derecho. Al respecto, con fundamento en las consideraciones realizadas por este Tribunal se estima que en efecto, se presenta una disfunción administrativa con motivo de la no existencia de registros documentales e informáticos respecto de la situación jurídica concreta del actor, a pesar de que se han tenido por demostradas otras conductas (emisión de recibos, aceptación de pagos, tolerancia en la ocupación del inmueble por más de veinte años) que demuestran un vínculo contractual previo. En este sentido, la testigo ofrecida por el ente demandado, manifestó en su deposición que la situación del actor se determinó con motivo de un estudio para ubicar lo que se llamó "saldos de proyectos" de personas a quienes no se les había formalizado la titulación de su apartamento, labor que no sería necesario realizar si el ente contara con sistemas de información completos y actualizados sobre el desarrollo habitacional en donde habita el actor. Como se ha indicado, se ha tenido por demostrado que en el ente accionado no existe una cuenta registrada a nombre del actor por concepto del apartamento G-21 del Condominio Corral, ni contrato de adjudicación, y solamente consta un depósito provisional por la suma de ciento veintinueve mil quinientos setenta colones y otro depósito por concepto de prima por la suma de ciento noventa y ocho mil quinientos dos colones. No obstante lo anterior y del hecho comprobado de los largos años de permanencia del señor Quintanilla Dávila en el inmueble, el ente responsable del proyecto habitacional nunca realizó gestión ante él para determinar su situación o adoptar medidas al respecto, ni guardó respaldo documental que le sirviera de fundamento para la adopción de una conducta administrativa. Por el contrario, emitió recibos a nombre del actor, recibió los dineros pagados por él y toleró su permanencia por más de veinte años, para luego alegar en un juicio la ilegitimidad de la posesión y pretender aplicar un mecanismo de cobro, que este Tribunal ha tenido por extraño a la relación jurídica del actor. La ausencia de registros sobre la situación de éste y la inexistencia de su contrato de adjudicación, es precisamente parte de las razones por las cuales, los actos que se han tenido como nulos en la presente resolución, llevaron a basar su motivación en la presunta inexistencia de un vínculo contractual y de derecho que le asista al actor, lo cual ha sido estimado por este Tribunal, como contrario al ordenamiento jurídico administrativo. Este Tribunal tiene por demostrada una "inercia" de la Administración, traducida en omisión de actuación de un deber legal impuesto por el ordenamiento jurídico, en tanto que el artículos 15 de la Ley General de Control Interno, impone, como una necesaria actividad de control de todo ente público, lo siguiente: "El diseño y uso de documentos y registros que coadyuven en la anotación adecuada de las transacciones y los hechos significativos que se realicen en la institución. Los documentos y registros deberán ser administrados y mantenidos apropiadamente." En el mismo sentido, el artículo 16 del mismo cuerpo normativo señala: "Artículo 16.—Sistemas de información. Deberá contarse con sistemas de información que permitan a la administración activa tener una gestión documental institucional, entendiendo esta como el conjunto de actividades realizadas con el fin de controlar, almacenar y, posteriormente, recuperar de modo adecuado la información producida o recibida en la organización, en el desarrollo de sus actividades, con el fin de prevenir cualquier desvío en los objetivos trazados. Dicha gestión documental deberá estar estrechamente relacionada con la gestión de la información, en la que deberán contemplarse las bases de datos corporativas y las demás aplicaciones informáticas, las cuales se constituyen en importantes fuentes de la información registrada". En razón de lo anterior, se puede determinar la existencia de lo que el actor llama "inercia" administrativa, con respecto a la inexistencia de los registros y documentos necesarios para la determinación y comprobación de su efectiva situación jurídica. No lleva razón la representación de la parte demandada, al invocar la posibilidad de aplicación del artículo 157 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, e indicar que el ordenamiento le posibilita rectificar errores materiales y aritméticos. Lo anterior, en tanto que la norma no faculta a la Administración a violentar el principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios en demérito del Administrado, ni es una posibilidad abierta para ser empleada de manera impune por la Administración ante sus omisiones de actuación o disfunción administrativa. Por consiguiente, debe acogerse este extremo de la demanda.

VII.- Sobre la solicitud de indemnización de daños y perjuicios: La parte actora pide se le indemnicen daños y perjuicios irrogados y en audiencia preliminar concreta un daño moral por la suma de dos millones de colones. No obstante, lo anterior, no precisa ni concreta en que consisten los daños invocados, ni determina en qué consiste el referido daño moral. Para este Tribunal, a pesar de que el daño moral posee una naturaleza in re ipsa, la simple mención del mismo, no es suficiente como para conceder tal extremo. En este sentido, por una parte, con respecto a la prueba del daño en general, el Código Procesal Civil en su Artículo 317 expresamente señala: " La carga de la prueba incumbe: 1) A quien formule una pretensión, respecto a las afirmaciones de los hechos constitutivos de su derecho. 2) A quien se oponga a una pretensión, en cuanto a las afirmaciones de hechos impeditivos, modificativos o extintivos del derecho del actor. " . En el caso del daño moral, se ha indicado que el mismo no requiere una prueba directa, sino que le es aplicable determinados criterios que delimitan la discrecionalidad del Juzgador y que desprenden de su propia naturaleza jurídica y que han sido desarrollados por la jurisprudencia nacional. Así, como primer criterio delimitador están los principios generales del derecho y la equidad, y además, las presunciones del hombre inferidas de los elementos circunstanciales del caso de análisis. Asimismo de diversas resoluciones judiciales y de la sentencia 413 de 19 de noviembre de 2002 de la Sección Primera del Tribunal Contencioso Adm. Sección I, se evidencian otros criterios, a saber: "III. Por daño moral subjetivo, ha entendido la doctrina aquella afección que incide sobre la esfera emocional de las personas causando preocupación, sufrimiento, ansiedad y otras emociones negativas y perjudiciales, cuyo origen sea los actos ilícitos provocados por el accionante. Por su naturaleza, son difíciles de probar por los medio ordinarios, por lo que puede el juzgador estimarlo con examen de las circunstancias que consten en el derecho y los de racionalidad y proporcionalidad. " (El destacado es nuestro) Estos últimos criterios han sido desarrollados de manera relevante para limitar la posibilidad de reconocimiento de indemnizaciones exageradas o desproporcionadas. En este orden de ideas, la Sala Primera ha señalado: " No se trata, entonces, de cuantificar el valor de la honra y dignidad de un sujeto, pues estos son bienes inapreciables, sino de fijar una compensación monetaria a su lesión , único mecanismo del cual puede echar mano el derecho, para así reparar, al menos en parte su ofensa. No cabría dentro de tal filosofía, establecer indemnizaciones exorbitantes, como sucede en otros sistemas jurídicos, pues ello produciría el enriquecimiento injusto del ofendido, mediante el lucro inmoral con la honra y dignidad propias. Dentro de los principios fundamentales del derecho, hállanse los de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad , a los cuales se les ha reconocido en nuestro medio el rango de principios constitucionales (ver al respecto, las resoluciones de la Sala Constitucional #1739 - 92 de las 11:45 horas del primero de julio y 3495-92 del las 14:30 horas del diecinueve de noviembre, ambas de 1992). Aplicándolos a situaciones como la presente, resulta indispensable, al fijar las obligaciones nacidas en situaciones jurídicas indemnizatorias, atender la posición de las partes y la naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento, sin llegar a crear situaciones absurdas, dañinas o gravemente injustas. En tal sentido, el daño moral, en casos como el analizado, no podría dar lugar a indemnizaciones millonarias, como la pretendida. Ello abriría un portillo inconveniente , para dar paso a pretensiones desproporcionadas las cuales, so pretexto de tutelar el ámbito subjetivo del individuo, conducirían a un enriquecimiento injustificado que lejos de reparar la dignidad mancillada, socavaría sus fundamentos haciéndola caer en valores eminentemente económicos (Sala Primera voto 141 de 15:00 hrs. del 18 de junio de 1993 y No. 99 de 16 horas de 20 de setiembre de 1995) (El destacado es nuestro). La causalidad del daño es otro criterio de naturaleza insoslayable, en tanto que la causa real de éste puede determinar los alcances y límites de la estimación reparadora. Por otra parte, siempre dentro del orden de la proporcionalidad, se habla de la "prudente apreciación del Juez" del daño y su resarcimiento, de la siguiente manera: "Por lo anterior, el tribunal debe considerar la procedencia del extremo en comentario, al efecto la Sala 1º. de la Corte Suprema ha dicho: " VI. Si bien el daño moral -en relación con el tema en cuestión- debido a su naturaleza, permite un amplio margen de discrecionalidad al juzgador en cuanto a su fijación, éste debe observarse necesariamente dentro de ciertos parámetros insoslayables, por ejemplo, la antigua Sala de Casación, en sentencia Nº 114 de las 16 hrs. del 2 de noviembre de 1979 avala la prudente apreciación de los jueces "...cuando les es dable inferir el daño con fundamento en la prueba de indicios. Esta Sala, en su fallo Nº 114-93 señala que el prudente arbitrio aludido, ha de tener en consideración las circunstancias del caso, los principios generales del derecho y la equidad. Alrededor de tales conceptos, la Sala, en un pronunciamiento posterior razona en los siguientes términos: "No se trata, entonces, de cuantificar el valor de la honra y dignidad de un sujeto, pues estos son bienes inapreciables, sino de fijar una compensación monetaria a su lesión, único mecanismo del cual puede echar mano el derecho, para así reparar, al menos en parte su ofensa. No cabría dentro de tal filosofía, establecer indemnizaciones exorbitantes, como sucede en otros sistemas jurídicos, pues ello produciría el enriquecimiento injusto del ofendido, mediante el lucro inmoral con la honra y dignidad propias. Dentro de los principios fundamentales del derecho, hállanse los de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, a los cuales se les ha reconocido en nuestro medio el rango de principios constitucionales (ver al respecto, las resoluciones de la Sala Constitucional Nº 1739-92 de 11,45 horas del 1 de julio y Nº 3495-92 de 14,30 hrs. del 19 de noviembre, ambas de 1992). Aplicándolos a situaciones como la presente, resulta indispensable, al fijar las obligaciones nacidas en situaciones jurídicas indemnizatorias, atender la posición de las partes y la naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento, sin llegar a crear situaciones absurdas, dañinas o gravemente injustas. En tal sentido, el daño moral, en casos como el analizado, no podría dar lugar a indemnizaciones millonarias, como la pretendida. ello abriría un portillo inconveniente, para dar paso a pretensiones desproporcionadas las cuales, so pretexto de tutelar el ámbito subjetivo del individuo, conducirían a un enriquecimiento injustificado que lejos de reparar la dignidad mancillada, socavaría sus fundamentos haciéndola caer en valores eminentemente económicos (Sala Primera Nº 41 de 15,00 de 18 de junio de 1993). VII. Recapitulando, se tiene que el prudente arbitrio a emplear por el Juzgador en situaciones como la presente, supone la observancia de parámetros ineludibles como la prueba indiciaria, las circunstancias propias del caso concreto, los principios generales del derecho, la equidad, la posición de las partes; la naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento y los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Sobre tales extremos puede y debe la parte interesada ofrecer prueba en lo posible. Solo así puede arribarse a un prudente arbitrio. Al margen de tales consideraciones la fijación discrecional corre el grave riesgo de incurrir en un exceso de poder que desfigure o desvirtúe lo ejecutoriado. Sea, la prudente apreciación del juez, aún contando con la realización del hecho generador -cual ocurre en la especie- (principio "in re ipsa"), precisa de las consideraciones o parámetros comentados, en torno al daño, para, con arreglo a ellos establecer el motivo. En el evento de que no militaren en autos elementos de juicio sobre el particular, tendrá el juzgador que actuar en consonancia con tal situación adoptando una actitud conservadora en la fijación, pues de no hacerlo así podría incidir en exceso de poder." Voto 00093-2000 del Tribunal Contencioso Adm. Sección II. Por otra parte, no debe obviarse que el daño moral no escapa de la certeza con relación a que éste debe ser consecuencia de la actuación u omisión de la administración, así como debe ser cierto el interés lesionado de la persona que lo invoca. En el caso de análisis, como se ha dicho, no se evidencia que la parte que alega haber sufrido el daño moral, haya al menos precisado sus alcances y nivel de afectación y demuestre al menos con indicios, que este efectivamente se presentó en su fuero interno. No expresa la parte cuando surge el daño moral invocado, ni concreta el motivo de hecho por el cual hace su reclamo. Así las cosas, para este Tribunal no es posible conceder un daño moral, aplicando las consideraciones realizadas, si desconoce el fundamento concreto en que se basa la parte para su pretensión. Por lo anterior, debe ser rechazado este extremo de la demanda.”