Severance for CCSS deputy manager upon early terminationIndemnización a subgerente de la CCSS por terminación anticipada

**III.- ON THE CLAIM FOR RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO PAYMENT OF THE EXCLUSIVE DEDICATION SUPPLEMENTARY SALARY (SOBRESUELDO POR DEDICACIÓN EXCLUSIVA):** Before evaluating the grievances expressed against the amounts recognized as compensation (indemnización), for the early termination of the plaintiff's fixed-term appointment (nombramiento a plazo fijo) to the position of Deputy Manager of Operations (Subgerente de Operaciones) in the defendant entity, it must be determined whether his claim for recognition of the right to receive the salary differences generated by the non-payment of the items corresponding to exclusive dedication and professional career is admissible, since if payment of these items is granted, the salary basis that must eventually be used for calculating the referred compensation could vary. Specifically regarding the exclusive dedication supplementary salary, the appellant argues that his client was entitled to receive that item, by virtue of having met the requirements defined for that purpose in Article 3 of Executive Decree No. 23669-H, in force at the time this lawsuit was filed. That regulation, in its original version (published in the official gazette La Gaceta No. 197 of October 18, 1994), established in its Article 4 that: "The executive presidents, managers and deputy managers of public institutions and companies and the Directors and Deputy Directors of attached institutions, by the mere fact of occupying their positions, shall be entitled to recognition of said economic compensation (payment for exclusive dedication), without the need to meet the requirements referred to in Article 3. / The same recognition and under the same conditions shall be granted to ministers, vice-ministers, and chief officers, by the mere fact of occupying those positions and for positions excluded from the Civil Service Regime (Régimen de Servicio Civil)." Subsequently, through Executive Decree No. 28415 of January 17, 2000, published in La Gaceta No. 18 of January 26, 2000, [Name1], the following phrase was repealed from the first paragraph of that article: "The executive presidents, managers and deputy managers of public institutions and companies and". Within the recitals (considerandos) of that decree it was explained that: "1st—That in accordance with Law No. 6821, the Budget Authority (Autoridad Presupuestaria) is the body tasked with issuing the directives and guidelines for budget and salary policy for the entire public sector, and ensuring their compliance. / 2nd—That Executive Decree No. 23669-H, published in 'La Gaceta' No. 197 of October 18, 1994, issued the regulation 'Rules for the Application of Exclusive Dedication for Public Institutions and Companies, covered by the scope of the Budget Authority'. / 3rd—That Article 4 of the cited decree, in the first paragraph, establishes that the executive presidents, managers and deputy managers of public entities, by the mere fact of occupying said positions, are entitled to recognition of exclusive dedication. / 4th—That in agreement No. 5711, taken by the Budget Authority in extraordinary session No. 13-99 on December 23, 1999, said Commission determined a single amount for the concept of monthly salary, for the executive presidents, managers and deputy managers of public entities covered by its scope. / 5th—That for compliance with the cited agreement, as indicated and approved within it by the Budget Authority, it is necessary to exclude the positions of executive presidents, managers and deputy managers from the application of Decree No. 23669-H" (our emphasis). Thus, it is clear to this Chamber that the Executive Branch's intention with the repeal, in the regulatory provision, of the article establishing the right to exclusive dedication pay for executive presidents, managers, and deputy managers of public institutions and companies, was to ensure that those occupying such positions did not receive that supplementary salary, by virtue of the fact that the salary policy dictated by the Budget Authority was to migrate those positions (by introducing the necessary legal and regulatory reforms) to a single-salary model encompassing that type of salary supplements. This being the case, given that the normative precept establishing the mandatory payment of exclusive dedication to persons working in any managerial capacity for the Public Administration was eliminated from the legal system prior to and even before the plaintiff was appointed to the position of Deputy Manager of Operations of the CCSS, the appropriate course is to confirm the appealed ruling insofar as it denied this requested item.

**IV.- THE PROFESSIONAL CAREER SALARY INCENTIVE (INCENTIVO SALARIAL POR CARRERA PROFESIONAL):** The appellant is equally dissatisfied with the decision, insofar as his claim for recognition of salary differences for the non-payment of the professional career supplementary salary is denied. The lower court dismissed his claim, arguing that since 1999, by virtue of final agreement number 5711 taken by the Budget Authority in extraordinary session No. 13-99 held on December 13 of that year, and communicated to the executive presidency of the CCSS via official letter No. STAP-002-2000 of January 4, 2000 (see folios 93 to 95 of the case file), a policy was established defining that officials in managerial positions within the Public Administration, had to switch to earning a single salary, given the consideration, by that entity, that the criterion of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) was binding (without citing the respective ruling or opinion), according to which: those holding such positions cannot "receive benefits arising from arbitration awards, collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas), or other instruments recognized for the rest of the employees." The foregoing led to legal reforms being introduced in some legal instruments that defined the right of the managerial class to receive certain supplementary salaries (as occurred with the availability item, as seen in the preceding recital (considerando)). However, not all legal reforms took effect immediately, and it cannot be understood that the directives issued by the Budget Authority at that time, in accordance with its enabling law (No. 6821 of October 19, 1982, repealed in its entirety by Law No. 8131 of September 18, 2001), had the power to nullify provisions of general scope, such as executive decrees, as established by Article 6 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Specifically, regarding the professional career incentive, it was regulated, at the time the plaintiff held the position of Deputy Manager of Operations of the CCSS (from May 23, 2002, to December 16, 2005, as inferred from official letter No. UGRH-0826-06 dated May 30, 2006, visible at folios 54 through 55), by Executive Decree No. 24105-H of December 23, 1994, which in its first article established: "Denominate 'professional career', as the economic incentive applicable to professional-level officials, working in decentralized institutions and public companies covered by the scope of the Budget Authority; and also to those occupying managerial, higher auditing, attached managerial, and trust positions; granted based on their postgraduate academic degrees beyond the university bachelor's degree, training received, training imparted, professional experience in State institutions, professional work experience in the national and international Public Service, professional experience in international organizations, teaching experience in university or para-university level educational institutions, and completed publications." Even though, after the repeal of that regulation, through Executive Decree No. 33048 of February 17, 2006, the managerial class of the Administration was excluded from the possibility of earning that supplementary salary (Article 28), in accordance with the policy initiated years prior by the Budget Authority, this new regulation cannot affect rights acquired prior to its enactment, under the protection of that other regulatory provision (Executive Decree No. 24105-H). This latter legal precept established a "points" system, in accordance with the academic merits accumulated by each public servant, in areas directly related to the tasks performed in service of the Administration, in their work position. In the case of Mr. I, as inferred from the certification visible at folios 133 to 136, issued by the Human Resources Management Unit of the CCSS, upon holding the position of Deputy Manager of Operations, he had a total of 18 professional career points recognized by the defendant entity, without being granted, during that period, under the assumption of any valid justification, the salary compensation defined by regulation; beyond the (incorrect) argument that he was not covered by the subjective scope of application of the decree. Therefore, as established by Article 40 of the cited regulatory provision, he must be recognized the salary differences generated between May 23, 2002, and December 14, 2005, in accordance with the value assigned to each professional career point, for the unpaid periods, by the General Directorate of Civil Service (Dirección General de Servicio Civil), as we establish in the following table: [...]

**V.- REGARDING THE SALARY IN KIND (SALARIO EN ESPECIE):** The plaintiff party is likewise aggrieved by the denial of recognition of the nature of salary in kind for the enjoyment of the benefits of a chauffeur, discretionary-use vehicle, cell phone, and beeper, during the period he held the position of Deputy Manager of Operations of the CCSS. He claims that Article 166 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) establishes the salary nature of those goods, and consequently, the differences generated in the items of seniority bonuses (anualidades), year-end bonuses (aguinaldos), vacation pay, school salary (salario escolar) "and any other salary item paid without taking into account the unrecognized items" must be recognized. In accordance with the provisions of the first article of the Constitutive Law of the CCSS (Ley Constitutiva de la CCSS): "(…) The Caja (CCSS) is an autonomous institution entrusted with the governance and administration of social security. The funds and reserves of these securities may not be transferred or used for purposes other than those that motivated their creation. The latter is expressly prohibited. Except for matters relating to public employment and salaries, the Caja is not subject to, nor may it be subject to, orders, instructions, circulars, or directives emanating from the Executive Branch or the Budget Authority, regarding the governance and administration of said securities, their funds, or reserves." Therefore, the CCSS, in salary matters, is subject to the general regulatory framework governing the rest of the Public Sector, and consequently, to what the Law of Salaries of the Public Administration (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) regulates regarding salary in kind, which in its Article 9 provides: "Except for amounts that, for the concept of 'zonaje' (location allowance), must be recognized to certain public servants, in accordance with the Regulation that the Executive Branch will issue for that purpose, the additional benefits or supplies that in some cases are granted, such as those covering lodging expenses, food, vehicles, uniforms, etc., shall not have the character of salary in kind, since such expenses shall only be granted when the needs of the service so require, likewise the sums paid for per diem or travel expenses." (Emphasis is by the drafter). This being so, in accordance with this regulation, the benefits enjoyed by the plaintiff during the period he held the deputy manager position could not be considered as salary, unless a public law provision so recognized. It must be taken into account, as this Chamber's jurisprudence has reiterated, that in accordance with the provisions of Articles 190 and 191 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), statutory public employment relationships are governed by rules and principles different from those prevailing in private labor law, for the sake of guaranteeing the efficiency of the state apparatus and the achievement of the public purposes that inspire it. Under that rationale, a special provision within public employment law, such as the cited Article 9 of the Law of Salaries, cannot be set aside, to instead apply a general provision such as Article 166 of the Labor Code. Therefore, the appropriate course is to confirm the appealed judgment insofar as it denied the nature of salary in kind to the benefits of a chauffeur, discretionary-use vehicle, cell phone, and beeper.

[...]

**VII.- CONCERNING THE FIXED-TERM OR TIME-DEFINED CONTRACT (CONTRATO A PLAZO O POR TIEMPO DETERMINADO) IN GENERAL:** The main object of this dispute has been to define the financial consequences for the CCSS of the decision adopted by its Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) to remove the plaintiff from the position of Deputy Manager of Operations and transfer him to the permanent position he held for that entity, as management advisor. Due to the relationship with the claims, we will make some clarifications on the topic of the time-defined work contract in general, as well as its application in public employment relationships, such as that which Mr. I maintained with the CCSS at the time this lawsuit was filed. Within employment relationships (governed by common labor law or administrative law), the indefinite-term contracting modality is imposed as the general rule, in order to give greater fullness to the content of Article 56 of the Political Constitution, which grants the right to work the status of a fundamental human right. As an exception, when the law so provides, or the nature of the contracted services unmistakably requires it, the parties may agree on fixed-duration employment contracts, provided this contractual form is not used with the purpose of defrauding mandatory labor regulations, or is more favorable to the worker. On this matter, in ruling No. 666 of this Chamber, delivered at 9:05 a.m. on August 13, 2008, it was stated: "In this type of labor contracting, employer and worker set the time of its termination, from the very date of its beginning, or it may be subject to the conclusion of certain tasks; it may also occur that, in the public sector, the term of the labor relationship is legally established. Cabanellas classifies the following as fixed-term employment contracts: a) those in which the parties, by mutual agreement, set a specific end date; b) when the term depends on an unavoidable event; c) in the case of a task perfectly specified; d) when it involves obtaining a result, once it is obtained or desisted from; e) if the nature of the work implies a duration fixed de facto and in advance; and, f) when the services are remunerated on a lump-sum basis. He likewise indicates that, by agreement, the parties may expressly, implicitly, or tacitly extend the validity of contracts; without this necessarily meaning that the contract becomes an indefinite-term one, and notes that it is not the contracts that should be considered time-defined or indefinite, but rather the essence and nature of the service itself. In this regard, he points out that '... in fixed-term contracts, and only in these, tacit renewal is admitted. By virtue thereof, two situations may arise: a) the fixed-term contract becomes an indefinite-term one; b) it is renewed for a new period, but the contract subsists as a fixed-term one'. (CABANELLAS DE TORRES, Guillermo. Compendio de Derecho Laboral, Volume I, Buenos Aires, Editorial Heliasta, S.R.L., third edition, 1992, pp. 601-602). In our labor law, the time-defined contract is regulated by Articles 26, 27, and 31 of the Labor Code, and in accordance with that regulation, this type of contract may be agreed upon only if the nature of the services so requires. It is established that it cannot be stipulated for more than one year, to the detriment of the worker; but, in the case of services requiring special technical preparation, its duration may validly reach up to five years. Furthermore, the possibility that the fixed-term contract may be renewed expressly, implicitly, and even tacitly is regulated, and if the causes that gave rise to it and the work matter subsist upon expiration of the term, the contract shall be considered an indefinite-term one, insofar as it benefits the worker, provided the nature of the respective work is permanent. For its part, Article 31 of the same code establishes the potential compensation that arise for the parties in the event of a possible early and illegitimate breach of the contract. Those provisions aim to prevent an indefinite-term contract from being fraudulently disguised—to the worker's detriment—as a time-defined contract—renewed over time—in order to avoid the legal consequences that the breach of that other contract might entail for the employer." **VIII.- THE FIXED-TERM CONTRACT, BY LEGAL PROVISION, IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS:** Specifically, referring to employment relationships governed by public law, if no special regulation exists on the matter, the provisions contained in the Labor Code, regarding the fixed-term or time-defined contract, shall be applicable in a supplementary manner. Therefore, the general rule that also prevails in this other type of work relationship is to establish service relationships for an indefinite term; however, in consideration of the needs of the public service, the enactment of special legislation authorizing the conclusion of time-defined contracts between the Public Administration (understood in the broad sense) and certain employees holding specific positions that, due to their special nature, warrant the imposition of a fixed date for their cessation has been deemed valid. Thus, in the same ruling 666-2008 cited above, it was noted in relation to this issue that: "(…)The Constitutional Chamber, whose rulings are binding erga omnes, as provided in Article 13 of the law regulating its jurisdiction, has established the possibility that, in the Public Sector, time-defined contracts may be validly agreed upon. In this regard, it has indicated that the premise, raised to the effect that the contract is for an indefinite term when the nature of the functions is permanent, because the causes that gave rise to it and the work matter subsist, can legally be displaced, in the case of relationships of a public nature, when the setting of a determined term derives from the law; since time-defined contracts in the Public Sector cannot be considered proscribed; and because such cases constitute exceptions to the special regime contemplated in the Constitution. In that sense, that Chamber has made it clear that Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution contemplate, in a broad sense, a special service regime for the Public or State Sector, based on the fundamental principles of specialty for the public servant, the requirement of proven suitability for the appointment, and the guarantee of job stability, in order to achieve the greatest possible efficiency in the administration; while also granting, especially the second cited numeral, a series of public rights, which were only enunciated by the constituent power; leaving it to the legislator the task of regulating and specifying them, based on the primary norm, in the derived legislation. Although the constituent power opted for a single legal body to regulate public service and develop the minimum guarantees contemplated in the Magna Carta (hence the indication that 'A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and the public servants...'), the legislator decided that the content of the respective law should not be general, but rather by sectors; thus, not only the Civil Service Statute (which was the first and applicable to the employees of the Executive Branch) was issued, but also a series of other regulations, all aimed at regulating service provision, in the other branches of government and in the institutions of the Public Sector; but, the basic principles of the regime cover all State employees, both from the central administration and the decentralized administration. However, the same Article 192 of the Magna Carta left open the possibility for such a created special regime to be subject to exceptions, since important factors such as the method of selecting officials, specialized skills or training, the functions of certain positions, which in many cases are of total trust, make the application of public labor regimes impossible for certain officials in higher ranks of the administration. For them, the Political Constitution itself contemplated cases of officials subject to free selection and removal (Article 140, subsection 1). Thus, for example, in special laws, the Presidents of Autonomous Institutions and a series of other officials, generally appointed for fixed terms, have been excluded, whose relationship is not typically labor-related, but rather one of direction or collaboration; or, whose relationships are essentially of trust, which obliges granting greater freedom for their appointment and removal, regardless of the permanent nature of the respective function. In this way, if the position has some special characteristic that justifies it, the exception is valid (…)". In the specific case of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, Article 15 of its Constitutive Law provides: "Article 15.- The Board of Directors, upon the proposal of the Executive President, shall designate three Divisional Managers: one administrative, one medical, and one financial, who shall be responsible for the administration in their respective fields of competence, which shall be determined by the Board of Directors. They shall serve six years in their positions and may be indefinitely re-elected./ They shall be irremovable during the period of their commission, except if, in the judgment of the Board of Directors, they fail to fulfill their duties or if any legal liability of a criminal, civil, or administrative nature is declared against them./ To hold the position of Divisional Manager, it is necessary to meet the same requirements demanded to be a member of the Board of Directors. The Divisional Managers shall be subject to the same restrictions and prohibitions as the members of the Board of Directors, as well as to the same grounds for cessation in the performance of their duties./ The Board of Directors may create and define other divisions with their respective manager, when it deems convenient, in accordance with the needs of the institution. (Thus amended by Article 3 of Law No. 6914 of November 28, 1983)." This provision must necessarily be related, as they are complementary, to the provisions of Articles 4 and 6 of Law No. 4646 of October 20, 1970, and its amendments, which respectively provide: "Article 4.- The Boards of Directors of the National Production Council (Consejo Nacional de Producción), National Institute of Housing and Urban Development (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo), Costa Rican Institute of Electricity (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad), Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización), National Service of Aqueducts and Sewers (Servicio Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados), Costa Rican Social Security Fund, Costa Rican Tourism Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Turismo), National Training Institute* (Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje), Costa Rican Institute of Pacific Ports (Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico), Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica), National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), Institute of Municipal Development and Advisory (Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal), and Joint Institute of Social Assistance (Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social), shall be composed as follows: (*See Article 26 of Law No. 6868 of May, 1983). / 1) Executive President of recognized experience and knowledge in the field of activities of the corresponding institution, appointed by the Governing Council (Consejo de Gobierno), whose management shall be governed by the following rules: / a) He shall be the highest-ranking official for governance purposes of the institution and shall be fundamentally responsible for ensuring that the decisions taken by the Board are executed, as well as coordinating the actions of the entity he chairs with those of other State institutions. Likewise, he shall assume the other functions that by law are reserved for the Chairman of the Board of Directors, as well as others assigned to him by the Board itself; / b) He shall be a full-time and exclusive dedication official; consequently, he may not hold any other public office, nor practice liberal professions;/ c) He may be freely removed by the Governing Council, in which case he shall be entitled to the labor compensation that corresponds to him for the time served in the position./ For the determination of that compensation, the rules set by Articles 28 and 29 of the Labor Code shall be followed, with the limitations regarding the amount determined by that set of articles./ 2) Six persons of broad knowledge or recognized experience in the field of activities of the corresponding institution, or with a professional degree recognized by the State, appointed by the Governing Council. / In the Boards of Directors of institutions whose organic law does not establish representation of the Executive Branch, the seven members of the Board shall be appointed by the Governing Council, with the same requirements as indicated in the preceding subsection./ (Thus amended by Article 3 of Law No. 5507 of April 19, 1974)." "Article 6.-The managers and sub-managers of the institutions cited in Article 4 of this law shall be appointed for periods of six years and may be re-elected. Their appointments, as well as their re-election, shall require no less than four favorable votes from the directors of the respective Board." Consequently, the appointment of the managers and deputy managers of the defendant entity must be made for a fixed term of six years, at the end of which they are not entitled to receive any compensation due to their cessation in that position. However, when the termination of the relationship occurs early (without just cause attributable to the employee), that conduct shall entail liability for the Administration under the terms of Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration. That provision literally states: "(…)1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal, operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party (…)". For its part, Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute (applicable supplementarily in the employment relationships of the CCSS in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of the Labor Relations Regulations (Normativa de Relaciones Laborales) of the Caja), establishes the possibility of "terminating the employment contracts of the employees, upon prior payment of the benefits that might correspond to them pursuant to Article 37, subsection f) of this law (…)", when a cause for termination of the employment contract is established based on the Law (Article 15 of the Constitutive Law of the CCSS in relation to Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute, for the case of its managers and deputy managers). Now then, the compensations provided for by Article 37, subsection f) of the Civil Service Statute are those corresponding to the termination of indefinite-term employment relationships, and as there is no regulation in that legal body establishing the compensations applicable for the cessation of a fixed-term contract, in a supplementary manner, Article 31 of the Labor Code must be applied, which establishes the compensation regime operative in cases of early termination, before the expiration of the term, in time-defined employment contracts.

**IX.- OF THE INDEMNIFICATION CORRESPONDING FOR EARLY TERMINATION OF THE APPOINTMENT IN THIS SPECIFIC CASE [...].** Regarding this specific point, the Chamber considers in principle that the appellant would be correct. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 18 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), applicable supplementarily in this matter by mandate of Article 452 of the Labor Code, it is the economic estimate made in the lawsuit that limits the pecuniary claims of the parties; therefore, the sum of thirty million five hundred forty-three thousand two hundred eighteen colones corresponds to the maximum that could be recognized for the plaintiff in a judgment for that concept. Now then, with his grievances, the plaintiff seeks that, based on the average total salary earned in the last six months he held the deputy manager position, the compensation under Article 31, second paragraph, ibid, be calculated for a total of 184 days of salary.

The claim formulated by the appellant in those terms, in the opinion of this Chamber, is not tenable. In the view of this jurisdictional body, Article 31, second paragraph, regulates a situation that, although somewhat comparable to the one experienced by the plaintiff (such that the rule may provide a parameter for establishing the quantification of the compensation applicable in the specific case), is not identical, since that legal provision applies in situations where the employment relationship for a defined term ends early. In this specific case, what occurred is that the plaintiff was separated—prior to the expiration of the originally agreed-upon term—from the position of sub-manager, due to an institutional reorganization, but immediately after, without interruption, he took up his permanent (propiedad) position within the CCSS, as a management advisor, seeing, however, his salary significantly reduced. The Chamber considers, applying rules of justice and equity, that the appropriate course is for this fixed compensation to be calculated based on the salary reduction suffered by the worker and not considering the total salary he received in the position of Sub-Manager of Operations. [...].

X.- REGARDING THE ORDER TO PAY DAMAGES (DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS): Finally, the appellant is dissatisfied with the sum of two million colones, recognized by the previous instances as damages (daños y perjuicios). In support of his grievance, he argues that the rule does not establish the ease with which the injured party can find new employment as the only parameter for setting that compensation, but also considers whether that new job is equivalent, which was not the case for him, since although he immediately moved to his permanent position upon being dismissed from the position of Sub-Manager of Operations of the CCSS, this meant a detriment of approximately three-quarters of his salary. Additionally, he indicates that in this new position he did not enjoy a vehicle, driver, or cell phone, his status diminished, and he was forced to transfer his children from private educational centers to public institutions. He therefore considers that the amount recognized does not correspond to the magnitude of the damage suffered. This Chamber, in its jurisprudential precedents, has provided some parameters that must be considered when granting the damages (daños y perjuicios) prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 31 of the Labor Code, in accordance with that rule. In that sense, in Voto 221 of 9:00 a.m. on October 8, 1993, it was stated: "III.- Article 31 of the Labor Code regulates matters pertaining to one of the forms of abnormal termination of fixed-term contracts and contracts for a specific work. The first paragraph literally states: 'In fixed-term contracts and contracts for a specific work, either party may terminate them, without just cause, before the arrival of the term or the conclusion of the work, paying the other party the concrete damages (daños y perjuicios) demonstrated, in relation to the duration of the contract, the importance of the function performed, and the difficulty the worker has in securing an equivalent position or employment..., all at the discretion of the Labor Courts.' Two essential aspects must be unavoidably accredited for the compensation referred to in that provision to proceed: a) the existence of the damages (daños y perjuicios); and, b) the relationship of those damages (daños y perjuicios) to the term of the contract, all of which must be adjusted, at the discretion of the courts, to the importance of the function performed and the difficulty of the worker in securing an equivalent position or employment. The cited rule establishes that the burden of proof for the damages (daños y perjuicios) falls on the worker, which could not be otherwise, because this party is the one in the employment relationship who has suffered the patrimonial detriment, and is therefore the only one actually in a position to do so." For its part, in Voto No. 202 of 10:00 a.m. on October 25, 1991, it was indicated: "III.- In the case at hand, the Trial Court set the compensation for damages (daños y perjuicios) [for breach of a fixed-term labor contract], at one month's salary, based on 'repeated jurisprudence.' On the other hand, the Superior Court confirmed that setting and, in that understanding, part of the appellant's allegations aim to vary that quantum. Given that no additional reasons were given on appeal beyond those of the lower court for setting the damages (daños y perjuicios) at a single monthly salary, the Chamber agrees with the Trial Court's ruling, that this compensation in favor of the worker is necessary, because the payment of one day's salary for every six days worked does not exclude it; on the contrary, they complement each other. In the second place, that recognition seeks to mitigate the economic and social effects that the cessation of employment causes within the wage-earner's family unit, but not to recognize the entirety of the non-worked periods. However, for setting the amount, two essential aspects are involved, subject to proof: a) demonstration of the damages (daños y perjuicios); and, b) the relationship of those damages (daños y perjuicios) to the term of the contract, the importance of the function performed, and the difficulty of the worker in securing an equivalent position or employment. In the case file, only the duration of the contract and the unpaid period have been accredited, as well as the functions performed by the plaintiff and his academic and professional background, also the nature of the work in which he was employed, but not the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused, nor the difficulty the plaintiff may have encountered in securing new employment, consistent with his professional category. In that understanding, with the burden of proof resting on the plaintiff, by imperative of Article 31 of the Code on the Matter, the demonstration by him of the two last-mentioned aspects was essential, which, not forming part of the debate and, especially, of the appeal in relation to the evidence aggregated in the file, make it impossible to grant the worker's claims." Based on the foregoing, we must reaffirm that the compensation contemplated in Article 31 of the Labor Code—composed of a fixed sum established based on the fraction of the fixed-term contract executed and the originally agreed duration, and a variable sum, which is more responsive to the particularities of each specific case— seeks full reparation (resarcimiento integral), so that both compensations (the fixed and the variable) constitute a single one for the purpose of achieving compensation adequate to the circumstances accredited in the case file. In this specific case, in attention to the particularities inherent in the appointment of the plaintiff to the position of Sub-Manager of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social—having been appointed (by legal provision) for a term of six years, and his contract having ended when more than fifty percent of the term had elapsed—the proportional amount recognized as fixed compensation exceeds six months' salary, together with the two million colones granted as damages (daños y perjuicios) pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 31 idem, they sum to more than seven months of the salary that the worker proportionally stopped earning upon moving to occupy his permanent position (plaza en propiedad), an amount that the Chamber deems adequate to compensate the plaintiff for the damages caused by the early conclusion of the contract; especially since, beyond that single circumstance, the plaintiff offered no proof regarding the harmful circumstances he claimed to have suffered upon being dismissed from the position of sub-manager. Therefore, it is appropriate to confirm the appealed judgment insofar as it recognized for the plaintiff, as damages (daños y perjuicios), the exact sum of two million colones." It is established that it may not be stipulated for more than one year, to the detriment of the worker; but that, in the case of services requiring special technical preparation, its duration may validly reach up to five years. Likewise, the possibility is regulated that the fixed-term contract may be extended expressly, implicitly, and even tacitly, and if, upon expiration of the term, the causes that gave rise to it and the subject matter of the work subsist, the contract shall be deemed one for an indefinite term, insofar as it benefits the worker, provided the nature of the respective tasks is permanent. For its part, Article 31 of the same code establishes the potential indemnities that arise for the parties in the event of a possible early and illegitimate termination of the contract. These rules seek to prevent an indefinite-term contract from being fraudulently disguised—to the worker's detriment—as a defined-term contract—extended over time—to avoid the legal consequences that the termination of that other contract may entail for the employing party.

**VIII.- THE FIXED-TERM CONTRACT, BY LEGAL PROVISION, IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS:** Specifically, referring to employment relationships governed by public law, in the absence of a special rule to that effect, the regulations contained in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) regarding the fixed-term or defined-term contract shall apply supplementally. Thus, the general rule that also prevails in this other type of employment relationship is that of establishing service relationships for an indefinite term; however, in consideration of the needs of the public service, the enactment of special regulations authorizing the conclusion of defined-term contracts between the Public Administration (understood in a broad sense) and certain public servants holding positions that, due to their special nature, warrant the imposition of a certain date for their cessation, has been deemed valid. Thus, in the same Voto 666-2008 cited above, it was indicated regarding this issue that: "(…) The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), whose resolutions are binding erga omnes, as provided in Article 13 of the law regulating its jurisdiction, has established the possibility that, in the Public Sector, fixed-term contracts may be validly agreed upon. In this regard, it has indicated that the premise, set forth in the sense that the contract is for an indefinite term when the nature of the duties is permanent because the causes that gave rise to it and the subject matter of the work subsist, may legally be displaced, in the case of public-sector relationships, when the setting of a determined term derives from the law; since fixed-term contracts in the Public Sector cannot be considered proscribed; and because such cases constitute exceptions to the special regime contemplated in the Constitution. In that sense, this Chamber has made it clear that Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution contemplate, in a broad sense, a special service regime for the Public or State Sector, based on the fundamental principles of specialty for the public servant, the requirement of proven suitability for appointment, and the guarantee of stability in the position, in order to achieve the greatest possible efficiency in the administration; while also granting, especially the second cited article, a series of public rights, which were only enunciated by the constitutional legislator; leaving to the legislator the task of regulating and specifying them, starting from the primary norm, in derived legislation. Although the constitutional legislator opted for a single legal body to regulate public service and develop the minimum guarantees contemplated in the Magna Carta (which is why it was indicated that 'A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants...'), the legislator decided that the content of the respective law should not be general, but rather by sectors; thus issuing not only the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) (which was the first and applicable to the servants of the Executive Branch), but also another series of regulations, all aimed at regulating the provision of services in the other branches of the State and in the institutions of the Public Sector; but the basic principles of the regime cover all servants of the State, both from the central administration and the decentralized one. However, Article 192 of the Magna Carta itself left open the possibility that such a created special regime could be subject to exceptions, since important factors such as the method of selecting officials, specialized skills or training, the duties of certain positions—which in many cases are of total trust—prevent the application of public labor regimes to certain high-ranking officials of the administration. For them, the Political Constitution itself contemplated cases of officials freely appointed and removable (Article 140, subsection 1). Thus, for example, in special laws, the Presidents of the Autonomous Institutions and a series of other officials, generally appointed for a fixed term, have been excluded, whose relationship is not typically laboral, but rather one of management or collaboration; or else, whose relationships are essentially of trust, which requires granting greater freedom for their appointment and removal, regardless of the permanent nature of the respective function. In this way, if the position has some special characteristic that justifies it, the exception is valid (…)”.

In the specific case of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, Article 15 of its Constitutive Law provides: “Article 15.- The Board of Directors (Junta Directiva), upon the proposal of the Executive President, shall designate three Division managers (gerentes de División): one administrative, one medical, and one financial, who shall be in charge of the administration in their respective fields of competence, which shall be determined by the Board of Directors. They shall serve six years in their positions and may be indefinitely reelected./ They shall be irremovable during the period of their assignment, except if, in the judgment of the Board of Directors, they fail to fulfill their duties or if some legal responsibility of a criminal, civil, or administrative nature is declared against them./ To hold the position of Division manager, it is necessary to meet the same requirements demanded for being a member of the Board of Directors. The Division managers shall be subject to the same restrictions and prohibitions as the members of the Board of Directors, as well as to their grounds for cessation in the performance of their duties./ The Board of Directors may create and define other divisions with their respective manager, when it deems it convenient, in accordance with the needs of the institution. (As amended by Article 3 of Law No. 6914 of November 28, 1983).” This rule must necessarily be related, as they are complementary, to the provisions of Articles 4 and 6 of Law No. 4646 of October 20, 1970, and its amendments, which respectively provide: “Article 4.- The Boards of Directors of the Consejo Nacional de Producción, Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, Instituto de Tierras y Colonización, Servicio Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje*, Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica, Instituto Nacional de Seguros, Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal, and Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, shall be composed as follows: (*See Article 26 of Law No. 6868 of May 1983). / 1) An Executive President of recognized experience and knowledge in the field of activities of the corresponding institution, appointed by the Government Council (Consejo de Gobierno), whose term shall be governed by the following rules: / a) He/She shall be the highest-ranking official for purposes of governing the institution and shall be fundamentally responsible for ensuring that the decisions adopted by the Board are executed, as well as for coordinating the action of the entity whose Board he/she presides over with that of other State institutions. Likewise, he/she shall assume the other duties reserved by law to the President of the Board of Directors, as well as those assigned by the Board itself; / b) He/She shall be a full-time official with exclusive dedication; consequently, he/she may not hold any other public office nor practice liberal professions; / c) He/She may be freely removed by the Government Council, in which case he/she shall be entitled to the labor indemnity corresponding to the time served in the position./ For the determination of this indemnity, the rules set forth in Articles 28 and 29 of the Labor Code shall be followed, with the limitations regarding the amount that said articles determine./ 2) Six persons of broad knowledge or recognized experience in the field of activities of the corresponding institution, or with a professional degree recognized by the State, appointed by the Government Council. / In the Boards of Directors of institutions whose organic law does not establish representation of the Executive Branch, the seven members of the Board shall be appointed by the Government Council, with the same requirements as indicated in the preceding subsection./ (As amended by Article 3 of Law No. 5507 of April 19, 1974). “Article 6.- The managers (gerentes) and sub-managers (subgerentes) of the institutions cited in Article 4 of this law shall be appointed for periods of six years and may be reelected. Their appointments, as well as their reelection, shall require no less than four favorable votes from the directors of the respective Board.” Consequently, the appointment of the managers and sub-managers of the respondent entity must be made for a determined term of six years, upon the expiration of which, they are not entitled to receive any indemnity due to the cessation of that position. However, when the termination of the employment bond occurs prematurely (without just cause attributable to the worker), such conduct shall entail liability for the Administration under the terms of Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). That provision literally states: “(…)1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party (…)”.

For its part, Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) (of supplemental application in the employment relationships of the CCSS in accordance with Article 3 of the Labor Relations Regulations of the Caja), establishes the possibility of “terminating the employment contracts of servants, upon prior payment of the benefits that may correspond to them according to Article 37, subsection f) of this law (…)”, when a cause for termination of the employment contract is established based on the Law (Article 15 of the Constitutive Law of the CCSS in relation to Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute, for the case of its managers and sub-managers). However, the indemnities provided for by Article 37, subsection f) of the Civil Service Statute are those corresponding to the termination of indefinite-term employment relationships, so since there is no regulation in that regulatory body establishing the compensations corresponding to the cessation of a fixed-term contract, Article 31 of the Labor Code shall be applied supplementally, which establishes the indemnity regime that operates in cases of termination before the expiration of the term in fixed-term employment contracts.

**IX.- OF THE INDEMNITY CORRESPONDING FOR EARLY TERMINATION OF THE APPOINTMENT IN THE SPECIFIC CASE** […]. Regarding this specific point, as a matter of principle, this Chamber considers that the appellant is correct. In accordance with Article 18 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), of supplemental application in this matter by mandate of Article 452 of the Labor Code, it is the economic estimation made in the complaint that limits the pecuniary claims of the parties, so the sum of thirty million five hundred forty-three thousand two hundred eighteen colones represents the maximum that could be awarded to the plaintiff in the judgment for that concept. Now, with his grievances, the plaintiff seeks that, based on the total average salary earned in the last six months in which he held the position of sub-manager, the indemnity of Article 31, second paragraph, idem, be calculated for a total of 184 days of salary. The claim formulated by the appellant in those terms, in the opinion of this Chamber, is not acceptable. In the judgment of this jurisdictional body, Article 31, second paragraph, regulates a situation that, although somewhat comparable to that experienced by the plaintiff (such that the rule may provide a parameter for establishing the quantification of the indemnity that proceeds in the specific case), is not identical, since that legal provision applies in cases where the fixed-term employment relationship ends early. In the specific case, what occurred is that the plaintiff was separated—before the expiration of the originally agreed term—from the position of sub-manager, due to an institutional reorganization, but immediately thereafter, without any interruption in service, he assumed his permanently-held position within the CCSS as a management advisor, albeit with a significantly reduced salary. This Chamber considers, applying rules of justice and equity, that the appropriate course is for that fixed indemnity to be calculated based on the salary reduction suffered by the worker, and not considering the total salary he earned in the position of Sub-Manager of Operations. […].

**X.- ON THE ORDER TO PAY DAMAGES (DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS):** Finally, the appellant disagrees with the sum of two million colones awarded by the lower instances as damages (daños y perjuicios). In support of his grievance, he argues that the rule does not establish the ease with which the injured party may find new employment as the sole parameter for setting this indemnity, but also considers that such new employment be equivalent, which did not occur in his case, since although he immediately moved to his permanently-held position upon being dismissed from the post of Sub-Manager of Operations of the CCSS, this meant a reduction of approximately three-quarters of his salary. Additionally, he indicates that in this new position he did not have a vehicle, driver, or cell phone, his status decreased, and he was forced to transfer his children from private educational centers to public institutions. Therefore, he considers that the amount awarded does not correspond to the magnitude of the damage suffered. This Chamber, in its jurisprudential precedents, has provided some parameters that must be considered when awarding the damages (daños y perjuicios) prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 31 of the Labor Code, in accordance with the provisions of that rule. In this regard, in Voto 221 of 9:00 a.m. on October 8, 1993, it was stated: "III.- Article 31 of the Labor Code regulates matters pertaining to one of the forms of abnormal termination of fixed-term and specific-work contracts. The first paragraph literally states: 'In fixed-term and specific-work contracts, each of the parties may terminate them, without just cause, before the advent of the term or the conclusion of the work, paying the other the specific damages (daños y perjuicios) demonstrated, in relation to the duration of the contract, the importance of the function performed, and the difficulty the worker may have in securing an equivalent position or employment..., all at the discretion of the Labor Courts.' Two are the essential aspects that must unavoidably be proven for the indemnity referred to in that provision to proceed: a) the existence of the damages (daños y perjuicios); and, b) the relationship of those damages (daños y perjuicios) with the term of the contract, all of which must be adapted, at the courts' discretion, to the importance of the function performed and the difficulty of the worker in securing an equivalent position or employment. The cited rule establishes that the burden of proof for the damages (daños y perjuicios) rests on the worker, which cannot be otherwise, because he is the party to the employment relationship who has suffered the pecuniary loss, and therefore is the only one in a real position to do so." For its part, in Voto No. 202 of 10:00 a.m. on October 25, 1991, it was indicated: "III.- In the present case, the Trial Court set the indemnity for damages (daños y perjuicios) [for termination of a fixed-term employment contract] at one month's salary, based on 'reiterated jurisprudence.' On the other hand, the Superior Court confirmed that setting, and accordingly, part of the appellant's allegations seek to vary that quantum. Given that on Appeal no additional reasons were given beyond those of the a quo for setting the damages (daños y perjuicios) at a single monthly salary, this Chamber agrees with the Trial Court's ruling that this indemnity in favor of the worker is necessary, because the payment of one day's salary for every six worked does not exclude it; on the contrary, they are complementary. Secondly, that award seeks to mitigate the economic and social effects that the employment termination causes in the wage-earner's family nucleus, but not to recognize the entirety of the unworked periods. However, for setting the amount, two essential aspects are involved, subject to proof: a) demonstration of the damages (daños y perjuicios); and, b) relationship of those damages (daños y perjuicios) with the term of the contract, importance of the function performed, and difficulty of the worker in securing an equivalent position or employment. In the record, only the duration of the contract and the unfulfilled period have been proven, as well as the functions performed by the plaintiff and his academic and professional background, also the nature of the work on which he labored, but not the damages (daños y perjuicios) incurred, nor the difficulty the plaintiff may have encountered in securing new employment commensurate with his professional category. In this sense, since the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, as mandated by Article 31 of the Labor Code, it was essential for him to demonstrate the two latter-mentioned aspects, which, since they do not form part of the scope of the debate and, especially, of the appeal in relation to the evidence added to the record, make it impossible to grant the worker's claims." Based on the foregoing, we must reaffirm that the indemnity contemplated in Article 31 of the Labor Code—composed of a fixed sum established based on the fraction of the fixed-term contract executed and the originally agreed duration, and a variable one, which is more responsive to the particularities of each specific case—seeks integral compensation, so that both indemnities (the fixed and the variable) form a single one for purposes of achieving an indemnity adequate to the circumstances evidenced in the case file. In the specific case, in consideration of the particular characteristics of the plaintiff's appointment to the position of Sub-Manager of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social—having been appointed (by legal provision) for a term of six years, and his contract having ended when more than fifty percent of the term had been fulfilled—the proportional amount recognized as the fixed indemnity exceeds six months' salary, which, together with the two million colones awarded as damages (daños y perjuicios) pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 31 idem, totals more than seven months of the salary that the worker proportionally ceased to earn upon moving to his permanently-held position, an amount that this Chamber deems adequate to compensate the plaintiff for the damages caused by the early conclusion of the contract; especially since, beyond that sole circumstance, the plaintiff brought no evidence regarding the harmful circumstances he claimed to have suffered upon being dismissed from the position of sub-manager.

Accordingly, the proper course is to confirm the appealed judgment insofar as it awarded the plaintiff, as damages (daños y perjuicios), the sum of exactly two million colones.” </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span></p></div></body></html> The funds and reserves of these insurance schemes may not be transferred or used for purposes other than those that motivated their creation. The latter is expressly prohibited. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Except for matters relating to public employment and salaries, the Caja is not subject, nor may it be subject, to orders, instructions, circulars, or directives emanating from the Executive Branch or the Budgetary Authority</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">, regarding the governance and administration of said insurance schemes, their funds, or reserves."</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> Thus, the CCSS, regarding salaries, is subject to the general regulatory framework governing the rest of the Public Sector, and consequently, to what the Public Administration Salaries Law regulates regarding payment in kind (salario en especie), which in its Article 9 provides: "</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Except for the sums that, as 'zonaje,' must be granted to certain public servants, pursuant to the Regulation that the Executive Branch shall issue for such purpose, the additional benefits or supplies that in some cases are granted, such as those covering expenses for lodging, food, vehicles, uniforms, etc., shall not have the character of payment in kind (salario en especie)</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">, since such expenses shall only be granted when the needs of the service so require, as well as the sums paid for per diem or travel expenses." </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">(The highlighting is by the drafter). Thus, in accordance with these regulations, the benefits that the plaintiff enjoyed during the period he held the position of deputy manager could not be considered as salary, unless a public law norm so recognized. It must be taken into account, as the jurisprudence of this Chamber has reiterated, that pursuant to Articles 190 and 191 of the Political Constitution, statutory public employment (empleo público) relationships are governed by norms and principles distinct from those prevailing in private labor law, in order to guarantee the efficiency of the state apparatus and the achievement of the public purposes that inspire it. Under this understanding, a special norm within public service law, such as the cited Article 9 of the Salaries Law, could not be disregarded, and in its place, a general precept such as Article 166 of the Labor Code applied. Thus, the appropriate course is to uphold the appealed judgment insofar as it denied the character of payment in kind (salario en especie) to the benefits of a driver, a discretionary-use vehicle, a cell phone, and a beeper. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">[…]</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">VII.- CONCERNING FIXED-TERM OR DEFINITE-TERM CONTRACTS IN GENERAL: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">The main object of this litigation has been to define the financial consequences for the CCSS of the decision adopted by its Board of Directors to remove the plaintiff from the position of Deputy Manager of Operations and transfer him to the permanent position he held with that entity, as a management advisor. Due to its relationship with the claims, we will make some clarifications regarding the topic of the definite-term employment contract (contrato de trabajo por tiempo definido) in general, as well as its application in public employment (empleo público) relationships, such as the one Mr. I maintained with the CCSS at the time of filing this lawsuit. Within employment relationships (whether governed by common labor law or administrative law), the modality of indefinite-term contracting is imposed as the general rule, in consideration of giving greater fullness to the content of Article 56 of the Political Constitution, which grants the right to work the status of a fundamental human right. As an exception, when the law so provides, or the nature of the contracted services undoubtedly requires it, the parties may agree to employment contracts (contratos de trabajo) of a definite duration, provided that this contractual form is not used for the purpose of defrauding mandatory labor norms, or proves more favorable to the worker. On this matter, in vote (voto) no. 666 of this Chamber at 9:05 a.m. on August 13, 2008, it was stated: "</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">In this modality of labor contracting, employer and worker fix the moment of its termination, from the very date of its start, or it may be</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> subject to the conclusion of certain tasks; it may also occur that in the</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> public sector, the term of the employment relationship is legally established. Cabanellas classifies the following as fixed-term employment contracts: a) those in which the parties, by mutual agreement, set a specific termination date; b) when the term depends on an inevitable event; c) in the case of a perfectly specified task; d) when the goal is to obtain a result, once it is obtained or is abandoned; e) if a duration fixed in fact and beforehand emerges from the nature of the work; and, f) when the services are remunerated on a lump-sum basis. He likewise indicates that, by agreement, the parties may expressly, implicitly, or tacitly extend the validity of the contracts; without this necessarily meaning that the contract becomes an indefinite-term one, and indicates that it is not the contracts that should be considered definite or indefinite term, but the very essence and nature of the service.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> In this regard, he notes that \"... in definite-term contracts, and only in these, tacit extension is admitted. By virtue of the same, two situations can arise: a) that the definite-term contract becomes an indefinite-term contract; b) that it is extended for a new period, but the definite-term contract persists.\" (CABANELLAS DE TORRES, Guillermo. </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">Compendium of Labor Law</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">, Volume I, Buenos Aires, Editorial Heliasta, S.R.L., third edition, 1992, pp. 601-602). In our labor system, the definite-term contract is regulated by Articles 26, 27, and 31 of the Labor Code, and in accordance with those regulations, this type of contract may only be agreed upon if the nature of the services so requires. It is established that it cannot be stipulated for more than one year, to the detriment of the worker; but that, in the case of services requiring special technical preparation, its duration may validly reach up to five years.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> Likewise, the possibility is regulated that the fixed-term contract may be extended expressly, implicitly, and even tacitly, and,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> if at the expiration of the term the causes that gave rise to it and the subject matter of the work subsist, the contract shall be deemed an indefinite-term one, insofar as it benefits the worker, provided that the nature of the respective tasks is permanent.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> For its part, Article 31 of the same code establishes the eventual indemnities arising for the parties in the event of a possible early and illegitimate termination of the contract. These norms seek to prevent an indefinite-term contract from being fraudulently disguised—to the worker's detriment—as a definite-term contract—extended over time—to avoid the legal consequences that the termination of that other contract might entail for the employing party."</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> .</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">VIII.- THE DEFINITE-TERM CONTRACT, BY LEGAL PROVISION, IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">Specifically, referring to employment relationships governed by public law, in the absence of a special norm on the matter, the regulations contained in the Labor Code regarding the fixed-term or definite-term contract shall apply supplementarily. Thus, the general rule that also prevails in this other type of employment relationship is to establish service relationships for an indefinite term; however, in consideration of the needs of the public service, the enactment of special regulations has been considered valid, authorizing the signing of definite-term contracts between the Public Administration (understood in a broad sense) and certain employees who occupy certain positions that, due to their special nature, warrant</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> the imposition of a certain date for their cessation.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> Thus, in the same vote (voto) 666-2008 cited above, it was indicated regarding this topic that: \"(…)</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">The Constitutional Chamber, whose resolutions are binding erga omnes, pursuant to Article 13 of the law regulating its jurisdiction, has established the possibility that, in the Public Sector, definite-term contracts may be validly agreed upon.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> In this regard, it has pointed out that the premise, raised in the sense that the contract is for an indefinite term when the nature of the functions is permanent, because the causes that gave rise to it and the subject matter of the work subsist, may legally be displaced, in the case of relationships of a public nature, when the setting of a specific term derives from the law; because definite-term contracts in the Public Sector cannot be deemed proscribed; and because such cases constitute exceptions to the special regime contemplated in the Constitution.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> In this sense, that Chamber has made clear that Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution contemplate, in a broad sense, a special service regime for the Public or state Sector, based on the fundamental principles of specialty for the public servant, the requirement of proven suitability for the appointment, and the guarantee of stability in the position, in order to achieve the greatest possible efficiency in the administration; while they grant, especially the second cited numeral, a series of public rights, which were only enunciated by the constituent power; leaving the legislator the task of regulating and specifying them, from the primary norm, in derived legislation. Although the constituent power opted for a single legal body to regulate the public service and develop the minimum guarantees contemplated in the Magna Carta (that is why it was indicated that \"A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants...\"), the legislator decided that the content of the respective law should not be general, but rather by sectors; thus, not only the Civil Service Statute was issued (which was the first and applicable to the servants of the Executive Branch), but also another series of norms, all aimed at regulating the provision of services in the other branches of the State and in the institutions of the Public Sector; but the basic principles of the regime cover all State servants, both from the central administration and the decentralized one.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> Nevertheless, the same Article 192 of the Magna Carta left open the possibility that such a created special regime could be subject to exceptions,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> since important factors</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> such as the method of selecting officials, specialized skills or training, and the functions of certain positions, which in many cases are of total trust,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> make it impossible to apply the</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> public labor regimes to certain higher-ranking officials of the administration.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> For them, the Political Constitution itself contemplated cases of officials of free selection and removal (Article 140, subsection 1).</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> Thus, for example in special laws, the Presidents of Autonomous Institutions and a series of other officials, generally appointed for a fixed term, have been excluded, whose relationship is not typically labor-related but rather one of direction or collaboration; or, whose relationships are essentially of trust, which obliges granting greater freedom for their appointment and removal, regardless of the permanent nature of the respective function. In this way, if the position has some special characteristic that justifies it, the exception is valid </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">\"</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">.&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> In the specific case of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), Article 15 of its Constitutive Law provides: "</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Article 15.- The Board of Directors, at the proposal of the Executive President, shall appoint three Division managers: one administrative, one medical, and one financial, who shall be in charge of the administration in their respective fields of competence, which shall be determined by the Board of Directors. They shall serve for six years in their positions and may be indefinitely reelected./ They shall be unremovable during the period of their commission, except when, in the judgment of the Board of Directors, they fail to fulfill their functions or if any criminal, civil, or administrative legal liability is declared against them./ To hold the position of Division manager, it is necessary to meet the same requirements demanded for being a member of the Board of Directors. The Division managers shall be subject to the same restrictions and prohibitions as the members of the Board of Directors, as well as to their cases of cessation in the performance of their positions./</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> The Board of Directors may create and define other divisions with their respective manager, when it deems it convenient, in accordance with the needs of the institution. (Thus amended by Article 3 of Law No. 6914 of November 28, 1983)\".</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">This norm must necessarily be related, as they are complementary, to the provisions of Articles 4 and 6 of Law No. 4646 of October 20, 1970 and its amendments, which respectively provide: "</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Article 4.- The Boards of Directors of the National Production Council, National Institute of Housing and Urbanism, Costa Rican Electricity Institute, Institute of Lands and Colonization, National Water and Sewer Service, Costa Rican Social Security Fund, Costa Rican Tourism Institute, National Learning Institute*, Costa Rican Institute of Pacific Ports, Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope, National Insurance Institute, Institute of Municipal Development and Advisory, and Joint Institute of Social Assistance, shall be composed as follows: (*See Article 26 of Law No. 6868 of</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> May 1983). / 1) An Executive President of recognized experience and knowledge in the field of activities of the corresponding institution, appointed by the Government Council, whose management shall be governed by the following norms: / a) Shall be the highest-ranking official for governance purposes of the institution and shall be fundamentally responsible for ensuring that the decisions taken by the Board are executed, as well as coordinating the action of the entity whose Board he chairs, with that of the other State institutions. Likewise, he shall assume the other functions that by law are reserved for the Chairman of the Board of Directors as well as others assigned by the Board itself; /</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> b) Shall be a full-time and exclusive dedication official; consequently, he may not hold any other public office, nor practice liberal professions;/ c) May be freely removed by the Government Council, in which case he shall be entitled to the labor indemnity corresponding for the time served in the position./ For the determination of this indemnity, the rules established by Articles 28 and 29 of the Labor Code shall be followed, with the limitations regarding the amount determined by those articles./ 2) Six persons of broad knowledge or recognized experience in the field of activities of the corresponding institution, or with a professional degree recognized by the State, appointed by the Government Council. / In the Boards of Directors of institutions whose organic law does not establish representation of the Executive Branch, the seven members of the Board shall be appointed by the Government Council, with the same requirements indicated in the preceding subsection./ (Thus amended by Article 3 of Law No. 5507 of April 19, 1974). \"Article 6.-The managers and deputy managers of the institutions cited in Article 4 of this law shall be appointed for periods of six years and may be reelected. Their appointments, as well as their reelection, shall require no fewer than four favorable votes from the directors of the respective Board\". </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">Consequently, the appointment of the managers and deputy managers of the defendant entity must be made for a definite term of six years, at the end of which, they have no right to receive any indemnity due to the cessation in that position. However, when the termination of the relationship occurs early (without just cause attributable to the worker), that conduct shall entail liability for the Administration under the terms of Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration. That norm literally provides: "</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">(…)1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except in cases of force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">\".</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">For its part, Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute (of supplementary application in the employment relations of the CCSS in accordance with the provisions of Article 3</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> of the Caja's Labor Relations Regulations), establishes the possibility of \"</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">terminating the employment contracts of the servants, upon prior payment of the benefits that may correspond to them pursuant to Article 37, subsection f) of this law </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">(…)\"</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">when a cause for termination of the employment contract is established based on the Law (Article 15 of the Constitutive Law of the CCSS in relation to Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute, for the case of its managers and deputy managers). Now, the indemnities provided for by numeral 37, subsection f) of the Civil Service Statute are those corresponding to the termination of indefinite-term employment relationships, so since there is no regulation in that normative body establishing the compensation corresponding for the cessation of a fixed-term contract, supplementarily, Article 31 of the Labor Code must be applied, which establishes the indemnity regime that operates in cases of termination, before the expiration of the term, in definite-term employment contracts.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">IX.- CONCERNING THE INDEMNITY CORRESPONDING FOR EARLY TERMINATION OF THE APPOINTMENT IN THE SPECIFIC CASE </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">[…].</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> Regarding this specific point, as a matter of principle, the Chamber considers that the appellant would be correct. Pursuant to Article 18 of the Civil Procedure Code, of supplementary application in this matter by mandate of numeral 452 of the Labor Code, it is the economic estimate made in the lawsuit that limits the pecuniary claims of the parties,</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> so the sum of thirty million five hundred forty-three thousand two hundred eighteen colones corresponds to the maximum that could be awarded to the plaintiff in a judgment for that concept.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> Now, with his grievances, the plaintiff seeks that, based on the total average salary earned in the last six months he held the position of deputy manager, the indemnity of Article 31, second paragraph, idem, be calculated for a total of 184 days of salary. The claim formulated by the appellant in those terms, in the Chamber's opinion, is not admissible. In the judgment of this jurisdictional body, Article 31, second paragraph, regulates a situation that, although somewhat similar to that experienced by the plaintiff (so the norm can provide a parameter for establishing the quantification of the indemnity applicable in the specific case), is not identical, since that legal provision applies in cases where the definite-term employment relationship ends early. In the specific case, what happened was that the plaintiff was separated—before the expiration of the originally agreed term—from the deputy manager position due to an institutional reorganization, but immediately thereafter, without interruption, he moved to his permanent position within the CCSS as a management advisor, seeing, however, his salary significantly reduced. The Chamber considers, applying rules of justice and equity, that the appropriate course is for that fixed indemnity to be calculated based on the salary reduction suffered by the worker, and not considering the total salary he received in the position of Deputy Manager of Operations. […]. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">X.- ON THE RULING TO PAY DAMAGES AND LOSSES (DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS): </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">Finally, the appellant disagrees with the sum of two million colones, awarded by the lower instances, as damages and losses (daños y perjuicios). He argues in support of his grievance that the norm does not establish, as the sole parameter for setting that indemnity, the ease with which the injured party may find new employment, but also considers that said new work be equivalent, which in his case did not occur, since although he immediately moved to his permanent position upon being dismissed from the post of Deputy Manager of Operations of the CCSS, this meant a downgrade of approximately three-quarters of his salary. Additionally, he indicates that in this new position he did not enjoy a vehicle, driver, and cell phone, his status diminished, and he was forced to transfer his children from private educational centers to public institutions. Therefore, he considers that the awarded amount does not match the magnitude of the damage suffered. This Chamber, in its jurisprudential precedents, has provided some parameters that must be considered when awarding the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) established in the first paragraph of Article 31 of the Labor Code, in accordance with what is regulated in that norm.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> In this sense, in vote (voto) 221 at 9:00 a.m. on October 8, 1993, it was stated: \"</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">III.- Numeral 31 of the Labor Code regulates matters concerning one of the forms of abnormal termination of fixed-term and specific-work contracts. The first paragraph literally states: \"In fixed-term and specific-work contracts, each of the parties may terminate them, without just cause, before the arrival of the term or the conclusion of the work, paying the other the concrete damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) they demonstrate, in relation to the duration of the contract, the importance of the function performed, and the difficulty the worker has in finding an equivalent position or employment..., all at the judgment of the Labor Courts.\" There are two essential aspects that must inevitably be proven for the indemnity referred to in that provision to proceed: a) the existence of the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios); and, b) the relationship of those damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) with the term of the contract, all of which must be adapted, at the judgment of the courts, to the importance of the function performed and the difficulty of the worker in finding an equivalent position or employment.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> </span> The cited rule establishes that the burden of proof for damages (daños y perjuicios) lies with the worker, which could not be otherwise, because the worker is the party in the employment relationship that has suffered the financial detriment, and therefore is the only one in a real position to do so". For its part, in vote no. 202 of 10:00 a.m. on October 25, 1991, it was stated: "III.—In this case, the Trial Court set the compensation for damages [for breach of a fixed-term employment contract] at one month's salary, in accordance with 'settled case law.' The Superior Court, on the other hand, upheld that determination and, in that regard, part of the appellant's allegations seek to vary that quantum. Given that on appeal no additional reasons were given beyond those of the lower court (a quo) to set the damages at a single monthly salary, this Chamber agrees with the Trial Court's ruling that such compensation in favor of the worker is necessary, because payment of one day's salary for every six days worked does not exclude it; on the contrary, they complement each other. Secondly, such compensation seeks to mitigate the economic and social effects caused by the termination of employment on the wage-earner's family unit, but does not recognize the entirety of the periods not worked. However, for the determination of the amount, two essential aspects subject to proof are at issue: a) demonstration of the damages; and b) the relationship between those damages and the term of the contract, the importance of the position held, and the difficulty the worker faces in securing an equivalent position or employment. In the case file, only the duration of the contract and the unfulfilled period have been established, as well as the duties performed by the plaintiff and his academic and professional background, and also the nature of the project on which he was working, but not the damages incurred or the difficulty the plaintiff may have encountered in obtaining new employment commensurate with his professional standing. In view of this, since the burden of proof lies with the claimant, by mandate of Article 31 of the relevant Code, it was essential that he demonstrate the two latter aspects mentioned, which, since they were not part of the scope of the debate and, especially, of the appeal regarding the evidence contained in the case file, make it impossible to grant the worker's claims." Based on the foregoing, we must reaffirm that the compensation provided for in Article 31 of the Labor Code—consisting of a fixed sum established based on the portion of the fixed-term contract performed and the originally agreed duration, and a variable sum, which depends more on the specific circumstances of each case—seeks comprehensive reparation, and therefore both components (fixed and variable) form a single whole for the purpose of achieving compensation appropriate to the circumstances established in the case file. In the specific case, considering the particular characteristics of the plaintiff's appointment to the position of Deputy Manager of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social)—having been appointed (by statutory provision) for a six-year term, and his contract having ended when more than fifty percent of the term had been completed—the proportional amount recognized as fixed compensation exceeds six months' salary, and together with the two million colones granted as damages pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 31 ibid., this totals more than seven months of the salary the worker proportionally ceased to receive upon taking up his permanent position, an amount that this Chamber deems adequate to compensate the plaintiff for the damages caused by the early termination of the contract; especially since, beyond that single circumstance, the plaintiff provided no evidence of the harmful circumstances he claimed to have suffered upon being dismissed from the position of deputy manager. Consequently, the appropriate course is to uphold the appealed judgment insofar as it recognized in favor of the plaintiff, as damages, the sum of exactly two million colones."

“III.- SOBRE EL RECLAMO PARA EL RECONOCIMIENTO DEL DERECHO AL PAGO DEL SOBRESUELDO POR DEDICACIÓN EXCLUSIVA: De previo a valorar los agravios expresados en contra de los montos reconocidos a título de indemnización, por concepto de la terminación anticipada del nombramiento a plazo fijo del actor, en el puesto de Subgerente de Operaciones en la entidad demandada, deberá definirse si resulta procedente su reclamo para que se le reconozca el derecho a percibir las diferencias salariales generadas por el no pago de los rubros correspondientes a dedicación exclusiva y carrera profesional, ya que de otorgarse el pago de tales extremos, la base salarial que eventualmente deba emplearse para el cálculo de las indemnizaciones referidas, podría variar. Concretamente en cuanto al sobresueldo por dedicación exclusiva, el recurrente aduce que a su representado le correspondía el derecho a devengar ese rubro, en virtud de que cumplía con los requisitos definidos para ese fin en el artículo 3 del Decreto Ejecutivo n° 23669-H, vigente al momento de interponer la presente demanda. Esa norma, en su versión original (publicada en el diario oficial La Gaceta n° 197 del 18 de octubre de 1994), establecía en su artículo 4 que: “Los presidentes ejecutivos, gerentes y subgerentes de instituciones y empresas públicas y los Directores y Subdirectores de las instituciones adscritas, por el sólo hecho de ocupar sus puestos, tendrán derecho al reconocimiento de dicha compensación económica (pago por dedicación exclusiva), sin necesidad de llenar los requisitos a que se refiere el artículo 3º. / El mismo reconocimiento y en las mismas condiciones se hará a los ministros, viceministros y oficiales mayores, por el sólo hecho de ocupar esos puestos y por puestos excluidos del Régimen de Servicio Civil”. Posteriormente, mediante Decreto Ejecutivo n° 28415 de 17 de enero de 2000, publicado en La Gaceta n° 18 de 26 de enero de 2000, [Nombre1] , se derogó del primer párrafo de ese artículo la siguiente frase: "Los presidentes ejecutivos, gerentes y subgerentes de las instituciones y empresas públicas y”. Dentro de los considerandos de ese decreto se explicó que: “1º—Que de conformidad con la ley Nº 6821, La Autoridad Presupuestaria es el órgano encargado de emitir las directrices y lineamientos de política presupuestaria y salarial para todo el sector público, así como velar por su cumplimiento. / 2º—Que el Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 23669-H, publicado en "La Gaceta" Nº 197 del 18 de octubre de 1994, se emitió el reglamento "Normas para la Aplicación de la Dedicación Exclusiva para las Instituciones y Empresas Publicas, cubiertas por el ámbito de la Autoridad Presupuestaria". / 3º—Que el artículo 4º del decreto citado, en el primer párrafo establece que los presidentes ejecutivos, gerentes y subgerentes de las entidades públicas por el solo hecho de ocupar dichos puestos, tienen derecho al reconocimiento de la dedicación exclusiva. /4º—Que en el acuerdo Nº 5711, tomado por la Autoridad Presupuestaria en la sesión extraordinaria Nº 13-99 del 23 de diciembre 1999, dicha Comisión determinó un único monto por concepto de salario mensual, para los presidentes ejecutivos, los gerentes y subgerentes de las entidades públicas cubiertas por su ámbito. / 5º—Que para el cumplimiento del acuerdo citado, tal como lo indicó y aprobó en el mismo la Autoridad Presupuestaria, es necesario excluir a los puestos de presidentes ejecutivos, gerentes y subgerentes de la aplicación del decreto Nº 23669-H” (lo destacado es nuestro). De modo que resulta diáfano para la Sala, el hecho de que la intención del Poder Ejecutivo con la derogación, en la norma reglamentaria, del artículo que establecía el derecho al pago de dedicación exclusiva para los presidentes ejecutivos, gerentes y subgerentes de las instituciones y empresas públicas, era garantizar que las personas que ocuparan esos cargos no devengaran ese sobresueldo, en virtud de que la política salarial dictada por la Autoridad Presupuestaria, era migrar a esos puestos (introduciendo las reformas legales y reglamentarias necesarias) a un modelo de salario único que englobara ese tipo de complementos salariales. Así las cosas, al haberse suprimido del ordenamiento jurídico el precepto normativo que establecía la obligatoriedad del pago de la dedicación exclusiva a las personas que laboraran en alguna categoría gerencial para la Administración Pública, de previo e incluso a que el actor fuere nombrado en la plaza de Subgerente de Operaciones de la CCSS, lo procedente es confirmar el fallo recurrido en cuanto denegó este extremo petitorio.

IV.- DEL INCENTIVO SALARIAL POR CARRERA PROFESIONAL: Se muestra igualmente inconforme el recurrente con lo resuelto, en cuanto se le deniegan su reclamo para el reconocimiento de diferencias salariales por el no pago del sobresueldo por carrera profesional. El tribunal desestimó su pretensión aduciendo que desde el año 1999, en virtud de acuerdo firme número 5711 tomado por la Autoridad Presupuestaria en sesión extraordinaria n° 13-99 celebrada el 13 de diciembre de ese año, y comunicado a la presidencia ejecutiva de la CCSS mediante oficio n° STAP-002-2000 de 4 de enero de 2000 (ver folios 93 al 95 del expediente), se estableció una política que definió que los funcionarios en puestos gerenciales dentro de la Administración Pública, debían pasar a devengar un salario único, al considerarse, por parte de esa entidad, como vinculante el criterio de la Sala Constitucional y la Procuraduría General de la República (sin citar la sentencia o el dictamen respectivo), según el cual: quienes ocupen esos cargos no pueden “percibir beneficios provenientes de laudos, convenciones colectivas u otros instrumentos reconocidos al resto de los servidores”. Lo anterior provocó que se introdujeran reformas legales en algunos instrumentos jurídicos que definían el derecho de la clase gerencial a percibir ciertos sobresueldos (tal y como ocurrió con el rubro de disponibilidad según vimos en el considerando anterior). Sin embargo, todas las reformas legales no operaron de inmediato, sin que pueda entenderse que las directrices emanadas de la Autoridad Presupuestaria en aquel momento, conforme a su ley de creación (n° 6821 de 19 de octubre de 1982, derogada en su totalidad por la ley n° 8131 de 18 de septiembre de 2001), tenían la atribución de dejar sin efecto normas de alcance general, como lo son los decretos ejecutivos, según lo establece el artículo 6 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Concretamente, lo que respecta al incentivo por carrera profesional, se regulaba, para el momento en que el actor ocupó el cargo de Subgerente de Operaciones de la CCSS (del 23 de mayo de 2002 al 16 de diciembre de 2005, según se desprende de oficio n° UGRH-0826-06 de fecha 30 de mayo de 2006 visible a folios 54 al 55), mediante el Decreto Ejecutivo n° 24105-H del 23 de diciembre de 1994, el cual en su artículo primero establecía: “Denominase "carrera profesional", al incentivo económico aplicable a los funcionarios de nivel profesional, que trabajan en las instituciones descentralizadas y empresas públicas cubiertas por el ámbito de la Autoridad Presupuestaria; y además a aquellos que ocupan puestos gerenciales, de fiscalización superior, gerenciales adscritos y de confianza; concedido con base en sus grados académicos postgrados adicionales al bachillerato universitario, capacitación recibida, capacitación impartida, experiencia profesional en instituciones del Estado, experiencia laboral de carácter profesional en el Servicio Público nacional e internacional, experiencia profesional en organismos internacionales, experiencia docente en instituciones de enseñanza de nivel universitario o parauniversitario y publicaciones realizadas”. Si bien, tras la derogatoria de esa norma, mediante Decreto Ejecutivo n° 33048 de 17 de febrero de 2006, se excluyó a la clase gerencial de la Administración de la posibilidad de devengar ese sobresueldo (artículo 28), en concordancia a la política iniciada años atrás por la Autoridad Presupuestaria, esta nueva norma no puede venir a afectar derechos adquiridos previo a su promulgación, al amparo de aquella otra disposición reglamentaria (el Decreto Ejecutivo n° 24105-H). Este último precepto legal, establecía un sistema de “puntos”, en atención a los méritos académicos acumulados por cada persona servidora pública, en ámbitos relacionados directamente con las tareas ejecutadas al servicio de la Administración, en su puesto de trabajo. En el caso del señor I, según se infiere de la certificación visible a folios 133 al 136, emitida por la Unidad de Gestión de Recursos Humanos de la CCSS, al momento de ocupar el cargo de Subgerente de Operaciones, contaba con un total de 18 puntos de carrera profesional reconocidos por la entidad accionada, sin que se le otorgara durante ese lapso, bajo el supuesto de alguna justificación válida, la contraprestación salarial definida reglamentariamente; más allá del argumento (incorrecto) de que no se encontraba cubierto por el ámbito subjetivo de aplicación del decreto. De modo que, conforme lo establece el artículo 40 de la citada norma reglamentaria, deberá reconocérsele las diferencias salariales generadas entre el 23 de mayo de 2002 y el 14 de diciembre de 2005, de conformidad con el valor asignado a cada punto de carrera profesional, para los períodos insolutos, por parte de la Dirección General de Servicio Civil, tal y como lo establecemos en el siguiente cuadro: […]

V.- RESPECTO EL SALARIO EN ESPECIE: Igualmente se muestra agraviada la parte actora, con la denegatoria del reconocimiento del carácter de salario en especie, del disfrute de los beneficios de chofer, vehículo de uso discrecional, teléfono celular y beeper, durante el período en que ocupó el cargo de Subgerente de Operaciones de la CCSS. Alega que el artículo 166 del Código de Trabajo establece el carácter salarial de esos bienes, y en consecuencia deben reconocérsele las diferencias generadas en los rubros de anualidades, aguinaldos, vacaciones, salario escolar “y cualquier otro rubro salarial pagado sin tomar en cuenta los extremos no reconocidos”. De conformidad con lo normado en el artículo primero de la Ley Constitutiva de la CCSS: “(…) La Caja es una institución autónoma a la cual le corresponde el gobierno y la administración de los seguros sociales. Los fondos y las reservas de estos seguros no podrán ser transferidos ni empleados en finalidades distintas de las que motivaron su creación. Esto último se prohíbe expresamente. Excepto la materia relativa a empleo público y salarios, la Caja no está sometida ni podrá estarlo a órdenes, instrucciones, circulares ni directrices emanadas del Poder Ejecutivo o la Autoridad Presupuestaria, en materia de gobierno y administración de dichos seguros, sus fondos ni reservas". De modo que la CCSS, en materia de salarios, está sometida al marco normativo general que rige para el resto del Sector Público, y en consecuencia, a lo que regula respecto al salario en especie la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, que en su artículo 9 dispone: “Salvo las sumas que por concepto de "zonaje" deban reconocerse a determinados servidores públicos, conforme al Reglamento que con tal fin dictará el Poder Ejecutivo, las prestaciones o suministros adicionales que en algunos casos se otorgaren, tales como las que cubran gastos de alojamiento, alimentación, vehículos, uniformes, etc., no tendrán el carácter de salario en especie, ya que tales gastos sólo se otorgarán cuando las necesidades del servicio así lo requieran, lo mismo que las sumas que fueren pagadas por concepto de viáticos o gastos de viaje”. (Lo destacado es de quien redacta). Así las cosas, de conformidad con esta normativa, los beneficios de los que gozó el actor durante el período que ocupó el cargo de subgerente, no podrían reputarse como salario, salvo que una norma de derecho público así lo reconociera. Debe tomarse en cuenta, como lo ha reiterado la jurisprudencia de esta Sala, que conforme lo dispuesto por los artículos 190 y 191 de la Constitución Política, las relaciones de empleo público de carácter estatutario, están regidas por normas y principios distintos a los que imperan en el derecho laboral privado, en aras de garantizar la eficiencia del aparato estatal y la consecución de los fines públicos que lo inspiran. Bajo esa inteligencia, no podría desaplicarse una norma especial dentro del derecho de la función pública, como lo es el citado artículo 9 de la Ley de Salarios, y en su lugar aplicar un precepto de carácter general como el artículo 166 del Código de Trabajo. Así las cosas, lo procedente es confirmar la sentencia recurrida en cuanto negó el carácter de salario en especie a los beneficios de chofer, vehículo de uso discrecional, teléfono celular y beeper.

[…]

VII.- ACERCA DEL CONTRATO A PLAZO O POR TIEMPO DETERMINADO EN GENERAL: El objeto principal de esta litis, ha sido definir las consecuencias patrimoniales que tiene para la CCSS, la decisión que adoptó su Junta Directiva de remover del cargo de Subgerente de Operaciones al actor y trasladarlo a la plaza en propiedad que ocupaba para esa entidad, como asesor de gerencia. Por la relación que guarda con las pretensiones, haremos algunas precisiones en torno al tema del contrato de trabajo por tiempo definido en general, así como respecto de su aplicación en las relaciones de empleo público, como la que mantenía al momento de interposición de la presente demanda el señor I con la CCSS. Dentro de las relaciones de trabajo (regidas por el derecho laboral común o por el administrativo), se impone la modalidad de contratación por tiempo indefinido como la regla general, en atención a brindarle mayor plenitud al contenido del artículo 56 de la Constitución Política, que le otorga el derecho al trabajo rango de derecho humano fundamental. Como excepción, cuando la ley así lo disponga, o indudablemente la naturaleza de los servicios contratados lo exijan, las partes pueden pactar contratos de trabajo de duración determinada, siempre que esta forma contractual no sea empleada con la finalidad de defraudar normas laborales imperativas, o resulte más favorable para la persona trabajadora. Sobre el particular, en el voto de esta Sala n° 666 de las 9:05 horas del 13 de agosto de 2008, se dijo: “En esta modalidad de contratación laboral, patrono y trabajador, fijan el momento de su término, desde la fecha misma de su inicio, o puede estar sometido a la conclusión de determinadas tareas; puede ocurrir también que en el sector público, el término de la relación laboral esté establecido legalmente. Cabanellas cataloga, como contratos de trabajo a término, los siguientes: a) aquellos en que las partes, de común acuerdo, fijan un plazo concreto de finalización; b) cuando el término depende de un acontecimiento inevitable; c) tratándose de una tarea perfectamente concretada; d) cuando se trata de obtener un resultado, una vez que se obtiene el mismo o se desiste de él; e) si de la naturaleza del trabajo se desprende una duración fijada de hecho y de antemano; y, f) cuando los servicios se remuneran en un tanto alzado. Asimismo indica que, por acuerdo, las partes pueden prorrogar expresa, implícita, o tácitamente, la validez de los contratos; sin que ello signifique, necesariamente, que el contrato se convierte en uno a tiempo indefinido e indica que no son los contratos los que deben considerarse a tiempo determinado o indefinido, sino la esencia y la naturaleza propias de la prestación. Al respecto, señala que “... en los contratos a plazo determinado, y sólo en estos, se admite la prórroga tácita. En virtud de la misma, pueden producirse dos situaciones: a) que el contrato a plazo determinado se convierta en uno a plazo indeterminado; b) que se prorrogue por un nuevo período, pero subsistiendo el contrato a plazo determinado”. (CABANELLAS DE TORRES, Guillermo. Compendio de Derecho Laboral, Tomo I, Buenos Aires, Editorial Heliasta, S.R.L., tercera edición, 1.992, pp. 601-602). En nuestro ordenamiento laboral, el contrato por tiempo determinado, está regulado por los artículos 26, 27 y 31 del Código de Trabajo, y de conformidad con esa normativa, este tipo de contratación puede pactarse, únicamente, si la naturaleza de las prestaciones así lo requiere. Se establece que no puede estipularse por más de un año, en perjuicio del trabajador; pero que, tratándose de servicios que requieran una preparación técnica especial, su duración puede, válidamente, alcanzar hasta los cinco años. Asimismo, se regula la posibilidad de que el contrato por tiempo fijo se prorrogue expresa, implícita y hasta tácitamente y, si vencido el término subsisten las causas que le dieron origen y la materia de trabajo, el contrato se tendrá por uno a tiempo indefinido, en cuanto beneficie al trabajador, siempre que la naturaleza de las respectivas labores sea de permanencia. Por su parte, el artículo 31 del mismo código, establece las eventuales indemnizaciones que surgen para las partes, ante un posible rompimiento anticipado e ilegítimo del contrato. Esas normas pretenden evitar que un contrato a plazo indeterminado sea disfrazado fraudulentamente -para el trabajador- como un contrato por tiempo definido -prorrogado en el tiempo-, para evitar las consecuencias legales que la ruptura de ese otro contrato pueda significar para la parte empleadora” .

VIII.- EL CONTRATO POR TIEMPO DETERMINADO, POR DISPOSICIÓN LEGAL, EN LAS RELACIONES DE EMPLEO PÚBLICO: Concretamente, refiriéndonos a las relaciones de empleo regidas por el derecho público, de no existir norma especial al efecto, las regulaciones contenidas en el Código de Trabajo, respecto del contrato a plazo fijo o por tiempo determinado, resultarán aplicables de manera supletoria. De modo que, la regla general que impera también en este otro tipo de relación de trabajo, es la de establecer relaciones de servicio por tiempo indefinido; sin embargo, en atención a las necesidades del servicio público, se ha considerado válida la promulgación de normativa especial que autorice la suscripción de contratos por tiempo definido entre la Administración Pública (entendida en sentido amplio) y algunas personas servidoras que ocupen ciertos cargos que por su especial naturaleza ameriten la imposición de una fecha cierta para su cese. Así, en el mismo voto 666-2008 antes citado, se indicó en relación a este tema que: “(…)La Sala Constitucional, cuyas resoluciones son vinculantes erga omnes, según lo previsto en el artículo 13 de la ley reguladora de su jurisdicción, ha dejado establecida la posibilidad de que, en el Sector Público, se pacten válidamente contratos por tiempo determinado. A ese tenor, ha señalado que aquella premisa, planteada en el sentido de que el contrato es por tiempo indefinido cuando la naturaleza de las funciones sea permanente, porque subsisten las causas que le dieron origen y la materia de trabajo, puede jurídicamente verse desplazada, tratándose de relaciones de naturaleza pública, cuando la fijación de un determinado plazo derive de la ley; pues no pueden estimarse proscritos los contratos por tiempo determinado en el Sector Público; y porque tales supuestos, constituyen excepciones al régimen especial, contemplado en la Constitución. En ese sentido, ha dejado claro esa Sala, que los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política contemplan, en sentido amplio, un régimen especial de servicio para el Sector Público o estatal, basado en los principios fundamentales de especialidad para el servidor público, el requisito de idoneidad comprobada para el nombramiento y la garantía de estabilidad en el puesto, con el fin de lograr la mayor eficiencia posible, en la administración; a la vez que otorgan, en especial el segundo numeral citado, una serie de derechos públicos, que sólo fueron enunciados por el constituyente; dejándole al legislador la tarea de regularlos y de especificarlos, a partir de la norma primaria, en la legislación derivada. Aunque el constituyente optó porque fuera un único cuerpo legal el que regulara el servicio público y desarrollara las garantías mínimas contempladas en la Carta Magna (por eso se indicó que “Un estatuto de servicio civil regulará las relaciones entre el Estado y los servidores públicos...”), el legislador decidió que el contenido de la respectiva ley no fuera general, sino por sectores; emitiéndose, entonces, no sólo el Estatuto del Servicio Civil (que fue el primero y aplicable a los servidores del Poder Ejecutivo), sino también otra serie de normas, tendientes todas a regular la prestación de servicios, en los otros poderes del Estado y en las instituciones del Sector Público; pero, los principios básicos del régimen, cubren a todos los servidores del Estado, tanto de la administración central, como de la descentralizada. No obstante, el mismo artículo 192 de la Carta Magna, dejó abierta la posibilidad de que tal régimen especial creado, fuera objeto de excepciones, ya que factores importantes como la forma de escogencia de los funcionarios, habilidades o capacitación especializada, las funciones de determinados cargos, que en muchos casos son de total confianza, imposibilitan la aplicación de los regímenes laborales públicos a ciertos funcionarios de rangos mayores de la administración. Para ellos, la misma Constitución Política contempló supuestos de funcionarios de libre escogencia y remoción (artículo 140, inciso 1). Así, por ejemplo en leyes especiales, han quedado excluidos los Presidentes de las Instituciones Autónomas y una serie de otros funcionarios, nombrados por lo general a plazo fijo, cuya relación no es típicamente laboral, sino más bien de dirección o colaboración; o bien, cuyas relaciones son esencialmente de confianza, lo que obliga a otorgar mayor libertad para su nombramiento y remoción, con independencia de la naturaleza permanente de la respectiva función. De esa manera, si el cargo tiene alguna característica especial que lo justifique, la excepción es válida (…)”. En el caso concreto de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, el artículo 15 de su Ley Constitutiva dispone: “Artículo 15.- La Junta Directiva, a propuesta del Presidente Ejecutivo, designará tres gerentes de División: uno administrativo, uno médico y otro financiero, quienes tendrán a su cargo la administración en sus respectivos campos de competencia, la cual será determinada por la Junta Directiva. Durarán seis años en sus cargos y podrán ser reelegidos indefinidamente./ Serán inamovibles durante el período de su cometido, salvo que, a juicio de la Junta Directiva, no cumplan con sus funciones o que se declare contra ellos alguna responsabilidad legal de índole penal, civil o administrativa./ Para ocupar el cargo de gerente de División es necesario reunir los mismos requisitos que se exigen para ser miembro de la Junta Directiva. Los gerentes de División estarán sujetos a las mismas restricciones y prohibiciones de los miembros de la Junta Directiva, los mismo que a sus casos de cesación en el desempeño de sus cargos./ La Junta Directiva podrá crear y definir otras divisiones con su respectivo gerente, cuando lo considere conveniente, de acuerdo con las necesidades de la institución. (Así reformado por el artículo 3º de la Ley Nº 6914 de 28 de noviembre de 1983)”. Esta norma debe relacionarse, necesariamente por ser complementarias, con lo dispuesto en los artículos 4 y 6 de la Ley n° 4646 del 20 de octubre de 1970 y sus reformas, que por su orden disponen: “Artículo 4º.- Las Juntas Directivas del Consejo Nacional de Producción, Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, Instituto de Tierras y Colonización, Servicio Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje*, Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica, Instituto Nacional de Seguros, Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal e Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, estarán integradas de la siguiente manera: (*Ver artículo 26 de la Ley No. 6868 de de mayo de 1983). / 1) Presidente Ejecutivo de reconocida experiencia y conocimientos en el campo de las actividades de la correspondiente institución, designado por el Consejo de Gobierno cuya gestión se regirá por las siguientes normas: / a) Será el funcionario de mayor jerarquía para efectos de gobierno de la institución y le corresponderá fundamentalmente velar porque las decisiones tomadas por la Junta se ejecuten, así como coordinar la acción de la entidad cuya Junta preside, con la de las demás instituciones del Estado. Asimismo, asumirá las demás funciones que por ley le están reservadas al Presidente de la Junta Directiva así como las otras que le asigne la propia Junta; / b) Será un funcionario de tiempo completo y de dedicación exclusiva; consecuentemente, no podrá desempeñar ningún otro cargo público, ni ejercer profesiones liberales;/ c) Podrá ser removido libremente por el Consejo de Gobierno, en cuyo caso tendrá derecho a la indemnización laboral que le corresponda por el tiempo servido en el cargo./ Para la determinación de esa indemnización, se seguirán las reglas que fijan los artículos 28 y 29 del Código de Trabajo, con las limitaciones en cuanto al monto que ese articulado determina./ 2) Seis personas de amplios conocimientos o de reconocida experiencia en el campo de actividades de la correspondiente institución, o con título profesional reconocido por el Estado, de nombramiento del Consejo de Gobierno. / En las Juntas Directivas de instituciones cuya ley orgánica no establece la representación del Poder Ejecutivo, los siete miembros de la Junta serán nombrados por el Consejo de Gobierno, con iguales requisitos a los señalados en el inciso anterior./ (Así reformado por el artículo 3º de la Ley Nº 5507 de 19 de abril de 1974). “Artículo 6º.-Los gerentes y subgerentes de las instituciones citadas en el artículo 4º de esta ley serán nombrados para períodos de seis años y podrán ser reelectos. Sus nombramientos, así como su reelección, requerirán no menos de cuatro votos favorables de los directores de la Junta respectiva”. En consecuencia, el nombramiento de los gerentes y subgerentes de la entidad demandada, debe efectuarse por un plazo determinado de seis años, a cuyo término, no les asiste derecho a percibir indemnización alguna con motivo del cese en ese cargo. Sin embargo, cuando la finalización del vínculo se produzca de forma anticipada (sin que exista justa causa imputable a la persona trabajadora), esa conducta le acarreará responsabilidad a la Administración en los términos del artículo 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Esa norma literalmente dispone: “(…)1. La Administración responderá por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero (…)”. Por su parte el artículo 47 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil (de aplicación supletoria en las relaciones de empleo de la CCSS de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 3 de la Normativa de Relaciones Laborales de la Caja), establece la posibilidad de “dar por concluidos los contratos de trabajo de los servidores, previo pago de las prestaciones que pudieren corresponderles conforme al artículo 37, inciso f) de esta ley (…)”, cuando con base a la Ley se establezca una causa de terminación del contrato de trabajo (artículo 15 de la Ley Constitutiva de la CCSS en relación con el 47 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, para el caso de sus gerentes y subgerentes). Ahora bien, las indemnizaciones previstas por el numeral 37 inciso f) del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, son las que corresponden a la terminación de las relaciones de empleo por tiempo indefinido, por lo que al no existir en ese cuerpo normativo una regulación que establezca las compensaciones que correspondan por el cese del contrato a plazo fijo, de manera supletoria, deberá aplicarse el artículo 31 del Código de Trabajo, que establece el régimen indemnizatorio que opera en los supuestos del rompimiento, antes del vencimiento del plazo, en los contratos de trabajo por tiempo determinado.

IX.- DE LA INDEMNIZACIÓN QUE CORRESPONDE POR TERMINACIÓN ANTICIPADA DEL NOMBRAMIENTO EN EL CASO CONCRETO […]. En cuanto a este punto concreto, en tesis de principio considera la Sala que llevaría razón el recurrente. Conforme lo dispuesto por el artículo 18 del Código Procesal Civil, de aplicación supletoria en la especie por mandato del numeral 452 del Código de Trabajo, es la estimación económica que se haga en la demanda, la que limita las pretensiones pecuniarias de las partes, por lo que la suma de treinta millones quinientos cuarenta y tres mil doscientos dieciocho colones, corresponde el máximo que podría reconocérsele al actor en sentencia por ese concepto. Ahora bien, con sus agravios el actor pretende que con base al salario promedio total, devengado en los últimos seis meses en que ocupó el cargo de subgerente, se le calcule la indemnización del artículo 31 párrafo segundo ídem, por un total de 184 días de salario. La pretensión formulada por el recurrente en esos términos, a criterio de la Sala, no resulta atendible. A juicio de este órgano jurisdiccional, el artículo 31 párrafo segundo regula una situación, que aunque asimilable en alguna medida a la vivida por el actor (por lo que la norma puede brindar un parámetro para establecer la cuantificación de la indemnización que procede en el caso concreto), no es idéntica, ya que esa disposición legal aplica en los supuestos en los que finaliza anticipadamente la relación laboral por tiempo definido. En el caso concreto, lo que ocurrió es que al actor se le separó –antes del vencimiento del plazo originalmente pactado– del cargo de subgerente, con motivo de una reorganización institucional, pero inmediatamente después, sin solución de continuidad, pasó a ocupar su plaza en propiedad dentro de la CCSS, como asesor de gerencia, viendo eso sí disminuido significativamente su salario. Considera la Sala, aplicando reglas de justicia y equidad, que lo procedente es que esa indemnización fija se calcule con base en la disminución salarial sufrida por el trabajador y no considerando el salario total que percibió en el cargo de Subgerente de Operaciones. […].

X.- SOBRE LA CONDENATORIA AL PAGO DE DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS: Por último, se muestra disconforme el recurrente con la suma de dos millones de colones, reconocida por las instancias precedentes, a título de daños y perjuicios. Argumenta en sustento de su agravio, que la norma no establece como único parámetro para fijar esa indemnización, la facilidad que tenga la parte perjudicada para colocarse en un nuevo empleo, sino que también considera, que ese nuevo trabajo sea equivalente, lo que en su caso no ocurrió, pues si bien pasó inmediatamente a su plaza en propiedad al ser cesado del puesto de Subgerente de Operaciones de la CCSS, ello le significó una desmejora de aproximadamente tres cuartas partes de su salario. Adicionalmente, indica, en esa nueva plaza no gozó de vehículo, chofer, y teléfono celular, su estatus disminuyó y se vio obligado a trasladar a sus hijos de centros de enseñanza privada a instituciones públicas. Por lo que considera que el monto reconocido no se adecua a la magnitud del daño sufrido. Esta Sala, en sus precedentes jurisprudenciales, ha brindado algunos parámetros que se deben considerar a la hora de otorgar los daños y perjuicios preceptuados en el párrafo primero del ordinal 31 del Código de Trabajo, de conformidad con lo reglado en esa norma. En tal sentido, en el voto 221 de las 9:00 horas del 8 de octubre de 1993, se dijo: "III.- El numeral 31 del Código de Trabajo regula lo atinente a una de las formas de terminación anormal de los contratos a tiempo fijo y para obra determinada. El párrafo primero expresa textualmente: "En los contratos a tiempo fijo y para obra determinada, cada una de las partes puede ponerles término, sin justa causa, antes del advenimiento del plazo o de la conclusión de la obra, pagando a la otra los daños y perjuicios concretos que demuestre, en relación con el tiempo de duración del contrato, con la importancia de la función desempeñada y con la dificultad que el trabajador tenga para procurarse cargo o empleo equivalente..., todo a juicio de los Tribunales de Trabajo.". Dos son los aspectos esenciales, que deben ineludiblemente acreditarse, para que proceda la indemnización a que se refiere esa disposición: a) la existencia de los daños y perjuicios; y, b) la relación de esos daños y perjuicios con el plazo del contrato, todo lo cual debe adecuarse, a juicio de los tribunales, a la importancia de la función desempeñada y a la dificultad del trabajador para procurarse un cargo o empleo equivalente. La norma citada establece que, la carga de la prueba de los daños y perjuicios es del trabajador, lo que no puede ser de otra manera, porque éste es la parte de la relación laboral que ha sufrido el menoscabo patrimonial, por lo que es el único que está en posibilidades reales de hacerlo". Por su parte, en el voto n° 202 de las 10 horas del 25 de octubre de 1991, es indicó: "III.-En la especie, el Juzgado fijó la indemnización por daños y perjuicios [por rompimiento de contrato laboral por tiempo determinado], en un mes de salario, atendiendo a "la reiterada jurisprudencia". Por otro lado, el Tribunal Superior, confirmó tal fijación y, en ese entendido, parte de las alegaciones del recurrente, tienden a variar ese quántum. Dado que en Alzada no se dieron razones adicionales a las del a quo para fijar los daños y perjuicios en un único salario mensual, coincide la Sala con el fallo del Juzgado, que esa indemnización a favor del trabajador es necesaria, porque el pago de un día de salario, por cada seis laborados, no la excluye, al contrario, se complementan. En segundo lugar, ese reconocimiento busca atenuar los efectos económicos y sociales que provoca el cese laboral en el núcleo familiar del asalariado, pero no reconocer la totalidad de los períodos no laborados. Sin embargo, para la fijación del monto están de por medio dos aspectos esenciales, sujetos a prueba: a) demostración de los daños y perjuicios; y, b) relación de esos daños y perjuicios con el plazo del contrato, importancia de la función desempeñada y dificultad del trabajador para procurarse un cargo o empleo equivalente. En los autos, únicamente ha quedado acreditada la duración del contrato y el período insoluto, así como las funciones desempeñadas por el actor y sus trayectorias académica y profesional, también la naturaleza de la obra en la que laboraba, pero no los daños y perjuicios irrogados, ni la dificultad con que se ha podido encontrar el demandante, a fin de procurarse un nuevo empleo, acorde con su categoría profesional. En ese entendido, corriendo la carga de la prueba sobre el accionante, por imperativo del numeral 31 del Código de la Materia, resultaba imprescindible la demostración, por él, de los dos últimos aspectos aludidos, los cuales, al no formar parte del marco del debate y, especialmente, del recurso en relación con la probanza que corre agregada en autos, tornan imposible acceder a las pretensiones del trabajador". Con base en lo anterior, debemos reafirmar que la indemnización contemplada en el numeral 31 del Código de Trabajo -compuesta por una suma fija establecida con base a la fracción del contrato por tiempo determinado ejecutada y la duración originalmente pactada, y una variable, que atiende más a las particularidades de cada caso concreto-, pretende un resarcimiento integral, por lo que ambas indemnizaciones (la fija y la variable), conforman una sola para efectos de lograr una indemnización adecuada a las circunstancias que se acrediten en el expediente. En el caso concreto, en atención a las particularidades propias del nombramiento del actor en el cargo de Subgerente de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, -al ser nombrado (por disposición legal) por el plazo de seis años, y haber finalizado su contrato cuando llevaba más del cincuenta por ciento del plazo cumplido-, el monto proporcional reconocido por indemnización fija, supera los seis meses de salario, aunado a los dos millones de colones otorgados a título de daños y perjuicios conforme al párrafo primero del artículo 31 ídem, suman más de siete meses del salario que proporcionalmente dejó de devengar el trabajador al pasar a ocupar su plaza en propiedad, monto que la Sala estima adecuado para resarcir al demandante por los daños provocados con la conclusión anticipada del contrato; máxime que más allá de esa sola circunstancia, el accionante no trajo ninguna prueba sobre las circunstancias perjudiciales que adujo sufrir al ser cesado del cargo de subgerente. Así las cosas, lo procedente es confirmar la sentencia recurrida en cuanto le reconoció al actor, a título de daños y perjuicios, la suma de dos millones de colones exactos.”