Joint liability of the merchant for contaminated seedResponsabilidad solidaria del comerciante por semilla contaminada

IV.The crux of what the appellant alleges lies in its understanding that the company SA MR, S.A. should have been brought into the lawsuit, as it was the one that sold its represented party the tomato seed of the “DANSON 112” variety. This Chamber, after a careful analysis, reaches the same conclusion as the second-instance judges: in light of the claims asserted and the applicable regulations, it was not necessary to join that company to the litigation, for two reasons set forth below. First, as noted in the second section of this ruling, the plaintiffs filed this proceeding against the Agricultural Center so that it be condemned in judgment, fundamentally, to pay the damages caused because the seeds sold to them, of the “DANSON 112” variety, were not suitable for tomato production. it is evident that there is no reason whatsoever, since that plea does not affect it, to bring the corporation Semillas y Agroespecialidades MR into the proceeding.

V.Second, and perhaps more relevantly, this Chamber agrees with both the lower court and the appellate court in that the regulations contained in Law No. 7472 of January 25, 1996, Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Protection (hereinafter Consumer Protection Law), are applicable to this proceeding, as provided in numeral 31 of that body of law, given that the co-plaintiffs have the status of consumers and the defendant that of merchant. Regarding the former, Law No. 6289 of December 4, 1978, Law of the National Seed Office, creates that agency, attached to the MAG, for the promotion, protection, improvement, control, and use of superior quality seeds, for the purpose of encouraging their use. Its specific purpose is the promotion and organization of the production and use of superior quality seeds. In accordance with Article 16 of that regulation, it is governed by a Board of Directors composed of five members of a specialized technical level; which, according to numeral 20 subsection b), has the authority to “Issue technical standards to promote, improve, and protect seed production, and to encourage the use of those of better quality, in accordance with the provisions of chapter three of this Law.” Within that competence framework, in session No. 546, held on January 24, 2005, agreement 2, article 4, it issued the so-called “Regulation for the import, export, and commercialization of seeds,” which, in article two, specifies the concept of seed consumer, stating: “For the purposes of this Regulation, the following shall be understood as: […] Seed Consumer or User: Any natural person or de facto or de jure entity that, as the final recipient, acquires or uses seeds as inputs to integrate them into the processes of production, transformation, or commercialization of vegetables.” This regulation, which is special in the matter of seeds, is eloquent in considering anyone who acquires or uses seeds as inputs to integrate them into the processes of production, transformation, or commercialization of vegetables, as the final recipient of that finished product. Therefore, it is also complementary to the provisions set forth in the Consumer Protection Law, specifically, regarding what must be understood as a consumer. This is because, it is reiterated, anyone who acquires or uses seeds as inputs to integrate them into the process of production, transformation, or commercialization of vegetables is considered the final recipient of the good; a characteristic that, in light of what is provided in numeral two of Law No. 7472, is what determines the status of consumer, by indicating that a consumer is “Any natural person or de facto or de jure entity that, as the final recipient, acquires, enjoys, or uses the goods or services, or else, receives information or proposals for them.” Corollary, the plaintiffs, having acquired the seed of the tomato species “DANSON 112” from the Cantonal Agricultural Center, as an input to integrate it into the process of production, transformation, and commercialization of that vegetable – not for its distribution – have the status of final recipients (since it involves an act of production and both Consumer Law and Agrarian Law have a shared purpose: to protect or safeguard the weaker party in contractual relationships), and therefore, of consumers of that finished good: the seed of the tomato species “DANSON 112”. For its part, the Agricultural Center meets the necessary characteristics to be considered a merchant, despite not ordinarily distributing the “DANSON 112” seed variety. In this regard, the aforesaid article two of the Consumer Protection Law states that a merchant or provider is “Any natural person, de facto or de jure entity, private or public, which, in its own name or on behalf of another, is habitually engaged in offering, distributing, selling, leasing, granting the use or enjoyment of goods, or providing services, without this necessarily being its main activity. / For the purposes of this Law, the producer, as a provider of goods, is also obligated to the consumer to respect their rights and legitimate interests.” Likewise, Article 10 subsection d) of Law No. 4521, amended by Law No. 7932 of October 28, 1999, Law Creating the Cantonal Agricultural Centers, provides that “The assets of the agricultural centers shall be composed of the following resources: / […] d) The funds from the sales of their goods and the compensation for their services.” According to the document visible on folio three, it is determined that the defendant is engaged, among other things, in the distribution or sale of agricultural goods; commercializing seeds for tomato production. Now then, although, as stated, the “DANSON 112” variety was not ordinarily distributed by the Center, the truth is that, as was duly accredited, it provided or sold it to the co-plaintiffs. In this sense, in the proven facts marked with numbers 3, 4, and 5, shared by the Court and not challenged by the appellant, it is stated: “3) Without specifying the date, but approximately in October 2006, plaintiff O requested [sic] the administrator of the Valverde Vega Agricultural Center to obtain for him the tomato seed of the DANSON 112 variety. Said variety is not distributed by the referred Agricultural Center, but its Administrator undertook to obtain it. […] 4) On October 30, 2006, the Agricultural Center acquired from the company SA MR, S.A., five packets of the referred seed variety, each packet with one thousand seeds. Each packet was invoiced for the sum of 40,715 colones, for a total of 203,575 colones. […] 5) On November 7, the Agricultural Center invoiced plaintiff O for three packets of one thousand seeds each, of the referred DANSON 112 variety, which it sold for the sum of 45,600 colones; after subtracting the discount and adding the sales tax, it totals 132,696 colones. […]” (Underlining supplied). The other two packets of the “DANSON 112” seed the Center sold to Mr. W who, in his statement on folio 359, regarding matters of interest, stated: “[…] I cultivated a tomato plantation of the DANSON 112 species. I bought the seed at the Sarchí Agricultural Center, there they told me they had some leftover [sic] envelopes of DANSON 112 and that they were not expensive, so I bought them. The gentleman who sold it [sic] to me is named A, I don’t know the surname. I bought two envelopes, each of one thousand seeds. […] I bought the DANSON 112 seed at the beginning of 2007 and a few days later I sowed it, I harvested tomato in 2007. […]” According to the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Center, by being habitually engaged in offering, distributing, and selling, among other goods, seeds, has the category of merchant, even if it did not ordinarily distribute the “DANSON 112” variety. In this sense, it is reiterated, the truth is that it obtained and sold it, not only to the co-plaintiffs, but also to Mr. W. Within this line of thought, since the Consumer Protection Law is applicable to this proceeding, the provision contained in its Article 35 is actionable, which provides: “Liability regime. / The producer, the provider, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks. / Only one who demonstrates that he was unrelated to the damage is released. / The legal representatives of commercial establishments or, as the case may be, the managers of the business are responsible for their own acts or events or for those of their dependents or auxiliaries. The technicians, those in charge of production, and the controller respond jointly and severally, when applicable, for violations of this Law to the detriment of the consumer.” (Underlining supplied). As the Court rightly pointed out, from that norm it is determined that, before the consumer, any of the subjects intervening in the production chain of the good or service (producer, provider, and merchant) respond concurrently or jointly and severally, and independently of the existence of fault. Consequently, it was sufficient for the plaintiffs to bring the Center to trial, as the merchant. There was no need, therefore, to sue another person – natural or legal. Ergo, there is no necessary passive joinder of parties with the company Semillas y Agroespecialidades MR; for which reason the rejection of the grievance under study is required.

VI.In the second charge, the appellant argues that witnesses L and B – evidence offered by the plaintiffs – stated that they did not know the “DANSON 112” tomato variety. Likewise, that the content of the reports was prepared with the information provided by Mr. O. Therefore, it affirms, it cannot be determined that the seed in the packets that appear in the case file, and which are supposedly those sold by its represented party, is the one that was sown and that contained the Clavibacter michiganensis bacterium. This is because, it notes, it was never demonstrated that the destroyed plants were of the “DANSON 112” variety. If one takes into consideration that the packets provided as evidence, it adds, indicate that each one contains 1000 seeds, but it was demonstrated, according to the testimony of phytopathologist José Luis Villalobos, that the germination power is approximately 80%, plus the loss from transplanting and the percentage that does not manage to be harvested, a decisive conclusion is reached: the affected sowing could not have been 3000 plants, which leads to determining that, in the plaintiffs' tomato field, there inexorably existed seeds or plants of another variety or from other envelopes. Therefore, it indicates, it is not possible that, according to the reports of the MAG, 3000 plants were destroyed, nor to obtain them from the three questioned seed packets, which are supposedly those purchased from its principal. On the other hand, it affirms, witness J, also proposed by the plaintiffs, indicated that the seed germinated in the nursery of H, where there was no division with other seeds that were there, and, later, they transported them about two kilometers, before sowing them outdoors. So, it wonders, how was it determined that it was the seed that contained the bacterium, since it was not ruled out that it was due to contamination in the water used for irrigation, nor that it was in the nursery where they germinated them, due to transport, or by the other tomato fields?, all of which removes its principal from the attributed fault.

VII.In light of the manner in which this present ground of disagreement is presented, it is necessary to point out that this Chamber, in judgment No. 505 of 8:45 a.m. on April 14, 2011, citing other precedents, stated: “[…] among the characteristics of the cassation appeal in agrarian matters is that it must be technically ordered. The reproaches to the judgment must be enumerated and structured, and their lack of legality must be substantiated. The appellant has the duty to explain, in a clear and precise manner, the reasons on which it bases its petition. It must combat, in a systematic manner, the legal grounds of the appealed judgment. It is only exempted from expressly indicating the violated legal norms, or the type of infraction committed. In relation, see, among many others, judgment number 892 of 9:00 a.m. on November 25, 2005.” (Decision 596-f-06 of 2:55 p.m. on August 30, 2006). Therefore, even though the appeal in agrarian matters is governed by the Labor Code, and has been considered as a rogatory third instance, this does not exempt the appellant party from the duty to express, in a clear and precise manner, the aspects of the second instance judgment it is challenging, explaining in any case what the alleged errors consist of”. No. 300 of 10:00 a.m. on April 25, 2008.” (Underlining supplied). In accordance with the foregoing, although no special formalities are required in the agrarian cassation appeal, it does not mean it is completely informal, since the objections to the ruling must be technically structured. Thus, the objections to the legal grounds of the appealed judgment must be presented with clarity and precision; the only thing from which it is exempt is indicating the violated provisions of the legal system or the type of infraction committed.

VIII.The grievance raised by the appellant alludes to three aspects: 1) it cannot be determined that the seed sold to the plaintiffs is the one that was sown, 2) there could not have been 3000 plants of the “DANSON 112” species in the plantation, and 3) it was not determined, with exactitude, that the seed acquired by the plaintiffs contained the Clavibacter michiganensis bacterium, since it was not ruled out that the plantation was contaminated by the water used for irrigation, in the nursery where they germinated them, due to transport, or by the other tomato fields. In the three points, the appellant limits itself to reproducing, in essence, what was argued in the appeal, without challenging the grounds of the appellate court's judgment. In this regard, the Court endorsed the list of proven facts from the trial court's judgment. In those marked with numbers 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 it is stated: “5) On November 7, the Agricultural Center invoiced plaintiff O for three packets of one thousand seeds each, of the referred DANSON 112 variety, which it sold for the sum of 45,600 colones; after subtracting the discount and adding the sales tax, it totals 132,696 colones (cash invoice on folio 3). 6) O took said seeds to the nursery of his brother H, located about two kilometers from the plaintiff's farm. In said nursery, the seeds were sown, until they germinated and the seedlings were taken to the farm about 25 days later (statement of O on folio 318, testimony of L folio 326 and Jeris Martínez on folio 361). 7) The tomato plants germinated from the 3000 seeds of the DANSON 112 variety were sown in an area of the plaintiff's farm of 2500 square meters, that is 0.25 hectares. On the rest of the farm, the coffee was maintained (confession of O on folio 318, confession of M on folio 319, testimony of B on folio 326). 8) Approximately two and a half months after the tomato plants were sown on the plaintiff's farm, they begin to show wilting of leaves and stems (testimony of B on folio 325, L on folio 326, digital photographs). 9) At the request of the plaintiffs, officials from the M.A.G. appeared at the farm on March 2, 2007, and took some samples, which they sent to the laboratory. The results show that the plants are contaminated with the Cliavibacter [sic] michiganensis bacterium (reports on folios 9, 10, and 14, laboratory reports on folios 6 and 7, testimony of J on folio 357). 10) Days later, on March 12, 2007, officials from the regional office of the M.A.G. appeared again and destroyed 150 tomato plants, which showed abnormal signs (testimony of U on folio 323, L on folio 326 and B on folio 325, destruction report on folio 9). 11) Once the laboratory results were obtained, the Head of the State Phytosanitary Service ordered, through administrative resolution DVCP-02-07 of March 20, 2007, the total destruction of the crop and the disqualification of the land for five years for the sowing of tomatoes and other host crops, such as chili pepper (documentary on folios 17-19, testimony of E on folio 354). 12) On March 22, 2007, officials from the M.A.G. appeared at the plaintiffs' farm and proceeded to the destruction of the crop, a task which required several days, since they first dried the plants and [sic] then proceeded to bury the entire plantation in holes (destruction reports on folio 14, testimony of U on folio 323, B on folio 325 and L on folio 326). 13) According to the laboratory report, the bacterium that affected the plaintiffs' tomato field, the only known case in the country, originated in the DANSON 112 seed (laboratory report on folios 6 and 7).” (Underlining supplied). Regarding the first argument, that it cannot be determined that the seed sold to the plaintiffs was the one sown on the plaintiff's property, such a situation was duly accredited from the account of proven facts 5, 6, and 7. However, the appellant does not properly challenge them, especially the last one, whose factual support is the statements of the plaintiffs and of witness B. The appellant refers only to the witness, but without alleging an improper assessment of his testimony. It omits any reference to whether that situation can be inferred from the depositions of Mr. O and Mrs. M, or why the judges should not have found them credible. That deficiency means this Chamber is prevented from analyzing what is recorded there. Regarding the argument that it was not determined that the seed acquired by the plaintiffs was contaminated with the bacterium, contrary to what was argued, and as noted, in proven fact preceded by number 13, that situation is expressly referred to, its factual support being the laboratory report on folios 6 and 7. However, the appellant did not challenge it, nor the evidence on which it is based. Consequently, this Chamber cannot refer to it. As for the other criticized aspect: that there could not have been 3000 plants of the “DANSON 112” species in the plantation. The appellate court, based on the factual framework previously outlined, in considerando VI of the questioned judgment, downplayed that data, that is, the number of plants sown or destroyed of the “DANSON 112” species, since what matters, under the Consumer Protection Law, is that it was accredited that the plaintiffs, as consumers, were harmed by the acquired good or service. In this sense it stated: “VI. In order to justify exempting S from liability, its representative, the current appellant, argues that there was no type of commercial relationship in this case, since as witness A stated, 'it was only a favor done for the plaintiffs, sufficient for my represented party to be excluded from the lawsuit.' (folio 401). The truth is that, regardless of the form of negotiation used by the defendant, when the Cantonal Agricultural Center proceeded to 'offer' and 'distribute' that seed, as established in cited Article 2, describing who the 'merchant or provider' is, it assumed liability for the damages it generated thereby, without being able to excuse itself under the argument that what it did was a favor, since assistance to agrarian producing persons is a constitutive duty. Likewise, the alleged absence of proof in this proceeding establishing the fault of its represented party is also not considered an exemption from liability in this case. First of all, Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Protection expressly provides […] With such regulation, a new case of strict liability is regulated, which exists simply by the risk created, not by the fault or malice of the damaging agent, this being the one that has the burden of proof to accredit its absence of liability. In this regard, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in decision 646 of 4:45 p.m. on August 22, 2001, stated […] Hence, in relation to the cited strict liability regime, the producer, the provider, and the merchant are concurrently and independently responsible regardless of the existence of fault, only releasing themselves if [sic] it proves it is or has been unrelated to the event, that is, a reversal of the burden of proof is generated in this case. Therefore, the appellant's arguments according to which it tries to prove that its represented party did not act with fault at the time of the sale of the product lack relevance. […] The appellant makes a recount of the number of plants that are indicated to have been damaged -3000- to arrive at the conclusion that it is impossible that it corresponded to that total because, although the sale would have been of three packets of danson 112 seed with 1000 units each, it is expected that approximately 80% germinate plus the loss from transport and the percentage that does not manage to be harvested, suggesting that other seeds were possibly introduced. The truth is that, regardless of the total number of tomato plants, it was possible to accredit that the plaintiff party acquired from the defendant the specialized danson 112 tomato seed for sowing, and that this cultivation process materialized, with the plants being affected by the Clavibacter Michiganensis bacterium (folio 256), popularly known as “bacterial canker” or “bacterial cancer”, generating a quarantine by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, according to the Expert Report (folio 259).” (Underlining supplied). However, as indicated, the appellant, in this present grievance, only reproduces the horizontal appeal, without noting what was affirmed by the Court. It does not prove the existence of any of the grounds for justification that would negate the liability of its represented party, in accordance with what is indicated in the second paragraph of Article 35 of the Consumer Law when it prescribes that “Only one who demonstrates that he was unrelated to the damage is released.”

IX.In any case, it must be noted that the appellate court, in the indicated considerando of its judgment, asserted another reason to establish the liability of the Agricultural Center: “[…] Note that on the contrary, the defendant's liability is even greater if one takes into account that according to the Expert Report: 'Based on the report of the national (sic) seed (sic) office (sic) official letter ONS 080-2007 DE where it is certified that in its records no variety named Danson 112 is presented and that as of the date 16-3-2007 and up to two years after 2005 no imports of this variety are presented. Therefore, since said variety does not appear in the official records and the ONS being in charge of the (sic) processing (sic) of seeds according to the seed (sic) law (sic) 6289, it is taken as a fact that the national authorities do not know how said seed arrived (sic) at the cantonal (sic) agricultural (sic) Center of Sarchi (sic) and from there (sic) to the (sic) farm and referenced (sic) plantation.' (folio 260). The Agricultural Center must respond for this absence of distribution permits for that seed and, furthermore, for the liability generated to the persons who acquire such seeds. The defendant cannot transfer to the seed acquirer its own non-observance in complying with the regulations that require its distribution permits and, with them, the quality controls for the seeds. In this regard, the representative of the Agricultural Center when answering the lawsuit expressly stated, 'It is true that the purchase of that seed was invoiced, with the clarification that my represented party does not distribute that seed variety, it was obtained specifically at the request of Mr. O.' (folio 73), accepting not only the supply of the seed to the defendant party, but also, not having permits for the distribution of such seeds, which was not a limitation for arranging its distribution without permits, by the representatives of the defendant Agricultural Center, obviating the due quality control of the seeds that Law 6289 of the National Seed Office requires of the National Seed Office, as provided in Article 8 subsection e) of that regulation, as well as numeral 11 of the Regulation for the Import, Export, and Commercialization of Seeds.-“ (Underlining supplied). However, the appellant does not challenge that other cause of liability of its principal, so, by remaining unscathed, a situation of futile cassation is configured. By virtue of the reasons set forth, the rejection of this present ground of disagreement is required.

X.In the third grievance, the appellant affirms that the judgments violated opinion C-180-200 of August 9, 2000, from the Office of the Attorney General, which it transcribes regarding matters of its interest. For the purposes of being able to apply the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Protection, it argues, that opinion is of mandatory compliance, according to what is set forth in Article 2 of Law No. 6815, Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General, which it reproduces. In accordance with the existing evidence, the plaintiffs do not hold the status of consumers, since they are not in the condition of industrialist or artisan, nor do they use the “DANSON 112” seed for final private consumption, given that they were clear that the product of the seed was to receive economic earnings. Therefore, it indicates, they also assume the status of merchants, jointly with its represented party, not consumers, because according to the arguments of the thesis set forth in the judgment, if the plaintiffs are consumers, so would its principal be, which entails the exclusion of the liability sought to be attributed to it.

XI.First, it is necessary to indicate, as the second-instance judges rightly pointed out in section V of the contested judgment, and differently from what the appellant affirmed, the opinions and pronouncements of the Office of the Attorney General constitute administrative jurisprudence of mandatory compliance only for the Public Administration, not for jurisdictional bodies, according to what is prescribed in Article 2 of Law No. 6815 of September 27, 1982, Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General. Second, once again, the appellant limits itself to reproducing the arguments outlined in the appeal, without linking its statement to what was decided by the Court. In this sense, on folio 444, it states: “[…] So things being, according to the existing evidence, we have that the plaintiffs do not hold the status of consumers, as they are not in the condition of industrialist or artisan, nor do they use the Danson 112 seed for final private consumption, since the plaintiffs are clear that the Danson 112 seed product was to receive economic earnings, consequently they also assume the status of merchants jointly with my represented party, not consumers.” However, the Court, to determine the status of consumers of the plaintiffs, in the indicated considerando, regarding matters of interest, stated: “When acquiring seeds for sowing, the person engaged in agrarian productive activity becomes a consumer of that product, therefore, holds standing to claim liability, since it is a finished product or an essential input to finally integrate it into the agrarian production process.

Although this activity aims to generate new products, it begins with the acquisition of the seed, which is itself a finished product in another production chain. Hence, the Court does not share the restricted opinion set forth by the appellant to justify the absence of active standing in this case. Nevertheless, it is reiterated, the appellant does not question the findings of the Ad quem, the legal basis of the judgment, which is why this constitutes a case of futile cassation, mandating, therefore, the dismissal of the objection in question. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is necessary to reiterate that, in accordance with the findings in considerando V of this judgment, this Chamber agrees with the Court's opinion, in the sense that the plaintiffs, in their relationship with the Centro Agrícola, are consumers. Furthermore, the appellant did not challenge the argument of the Ad quem, regarding that his principal's liability is also configured by the legal impossibility it had to distribute the "DANSON 112" seed, which, as noted, constitutes a case of futile cassation.

XII.In the fourth challenge, the appellant points out that the plaintiffs' claim for damages and losses cannot be directed against his principal, as it does not engage in seed production, which is proven by the envelope containing them. They were brought to his principal's establishment at the plaintiffs' request. Therefore, he asserts, liability could only arise if it had been determined that the seeds were those carrying the bacterium. Consequently, he considers that the contested judgment, by omitting the evidence of the expert report from the MAG, as well as the testimonies of Messrs. Y, O, and A, both last named G, insofar as the contamination of the plants with the bacterium Clavibacter michiganensis could come from water, wind, human activity, handling in nurseries, transport, and interrelation with other crops, based on the argument that this is not a disputed fact, causes a procedural imbalance against his principal, as this situation is the genesis of the matter. This, he adds, in relation to the testimony of W, who categorically, spontaneously, and sincerely said that he had cultivated seeds from the same batch as those planted by the plaintiffs and his production was not affected. In that sense, he notes, see the witness statement, where it is indicated that the plaintiffs irrigated the tomato field with river water, through a hose, and the only contamination control in the water was a sheet to prevent soil from passing through, and that there were more tomato fields nearby, which implies that assuming under those conditions that the seed was the exclusive source of contamination is contrary to the cited rules.

XIII.As indicated in considerando V of this judgment, the Centro Agrícola Cantonal has the condition of a merchant, pursuant to the provisions of article 2 of Law no. 7472. It was also indicated in that section that this legislation is applicable to this proceeding, as provided by numeral 31, since the plaintiffs hold the status of consumers. Therefore, the provision in numeral 35 of the same law is applicable, which indicates that all participants in the production chain (producer, supplier, and merchant) are liable to the consumer concurrently or jointly and severally, and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service. Ergo, the defendant has passive standing to answer for the damages and losses claimed in this lite. It would only be exempted from that liability if it proves that it was unrelated to the damage, which it did not. On the other hand, it must be indicated, firstly, in accordance with what was stated by the second instance judges in section VI of the contested judgment, what constitutes an undisputed fact is the damage to the plants, not what the appellant states in his appeal. Secondly, as indicated in considerando VIII of this ruling, contrary to what is alleged by the appellant, the judges of both instances, in proven fact no. 13, accredited, based on laboratory reports, that the bacterium that affected the plaintiffs' tomato crop originated from the "DANSON 112" seed, which was distributed to them by the defendant. However, such circumstance was not challenged by the appellant, a reason for which, this being a case of futile cassation, the dismissal of the grievance under study is mandated. In any case, it must be noted that the Court, in considerando VI of the contested judgment, considered that the defendant did not prove that it was unrelated to the damage, in order to exonerate itself from liability, since "The arguments presented about other possible causes of contamination mentioned by the witnesses O, Y, and A – water, wind, human activity, handling in nurseries, transport, and interrelation with other crops - do not allow one to presume that one of the causes of liability is not the presence of the bacterium in the seed, as these are agents that are always present in agricultural production processes.", which was also not questioned by the appellant.

300 of 10 hours on April 25, 2008." (The underlined text is supplied). According to the foregoing, although the agrarian cassation appeal does not require special formalities, this does not mean it is completely informal, as the objections to the judgment must be structured in a technical manner. Thus, the objections to the legal grounds of the appealed judgment must be stated clearly and precisely; it is only exempt from specifying the provisions of the legal system violated or the type of infraction committed.

**VIII.** The grievance raised by the appellant refers to three aspects: 1) it cannot be determined that the seed sold to the plaintiffs is the one that was sown, 2) there could not have been 3000 plants of the "DANSON 112" species in the plantation and 3) it was not determined with exactitude that the seed acquired by the plaintiffs contained the Clavibacter michiganensis bacteria, since it was not ruled out that the plantation was contaminated by the water used for irrigation, in the nursery where they germinated, by transport, or by the other tomato fields. On all three points, the appellant merely reproduces, in essence, what was argued in the appeal, without challenging the grounds of the Ad quem's judgment. In this regard, the Court endorsed the list of proven facts from the trial court's judgment. Those marked with numbers 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 state: "***5)** On November 7, the Agricultural Center invoiced plaintiff O for three packages of one thousand seeds each, of the aforementioned DANSON 112 variety, which it sold for the sum of 45,600 colones; after subtracting the discount and adding the sales tax, the total is 132,696 colones (cash invoice on folio 3). **6)** O took said seeds to the nursery of his brother H, located about two kilometers from the plaintiff's farm. In said nursery, the seeds were sown until they germinated, and the seedlings were taken to the farm approximately 25 days later (statement of O on folio 318, testimony of L on folio 326 and Jeris Martínez on folio 361). **7)** *The tomato plants germinated from the 3000 seeds of the DANSON 112 variety were planted in an area of the plaintiff's farm measuring 2500 square meters, that is, 0.25 hectares.* The rest of the farm was kept for coffee (confession of O on folio 318, confession of M on folio 319, testimony of B on folio 326). **8)** Approximately two and a half months after the tomato plants were planted on the plaintiff's farm, they begin to show wilting of leaves and stems (testimony of B on folio 325, L on folio 326, digital photographs). **9)** At the request of the plaintiffs, officials from the M.A.G. appeared at the farm on March 2, 2007, and took some samples, which they sent to the laboratory. The results show that the plants are contaminated with the Cliavibacter [sic] michiganensis bacteria (reports on folios 9, 10, and 14, laboratory reports on folios 6 and 7, testimony of J on folio 357). **10)** Days later, on March 12, 2007, officials from the regional office of the M.A.G. appeared again and destroyed 150 tomato plants, which showed abnormal signs (testimony of U on folio 323, L on folio 326, and B on folio 325, destruction report on folio 9). **11)** Once the laboratory results were obtained, the Head of the State Phytosanitary Service ordered, through administrative resolution DVCP-02-07 of March 20, 2007, the total destruction of the crop and the disablement of the land for five years for the planting of tomatoes and other host crops, such as chili peppers (documentary on folios 17-19, testimony of E on folio 354). **12)** On March 22, 2007, officials from the M.A.G. appeared at the plaintiffs' farm and proceeded to destroy the crop, a task which required several days, as they first dried the plants and then proceeded to bury the entire plantation in holes (destruction reports on folio 14, testimony of U on folio 323, B on folio 325, and L on folio 326). **13)** *According to the laboratory report, the bacteria that affected the plaintiffs' tomato field, the only known case in the country, originated in the DANSON 112 seed* (laboratory report on folios 6 and 7)." (The underlined text is supplied). Regarding the first allegation, that it cannot be determined that the seed sold to the plaintiffs was the one sown on the plaintiff's property, this situation was duly accredited by the relationship of proven facts 5, 6, and 7. However, the appellant does not properly question them, especially the last one, whose factual support consists of the statements of the plaintiffs and witness B. The appellant only alludes to the witness, but without alleging an improper assessment of his testimony. He omits any reference as to whether this situation can be inferred from the depositions of Mr. O and Mrs. M, or why the judges should not have believed them. This deficiency means that this Chamber is barred from analyzing what was recorded there. Regarding the argument that it was not determined that the seed acquired by the plaintiffs was contaminated with the bacteria, contrary to what was argued, and as noted, the proven fact preceded by number 13 expressly refers to that situation, its factual support being the laboratory report on folios 6 and 7. However, the appellant did not question it, nor the evidence on which it is based. Consequently, this Chamber cannot refer to it. As for the other censured aspect: that there could not have been 3000 plants of the "DANSON 112" species in the plantation, the Ad quem, based on the factual framework outlined above, in considerando VI of the questioned judgment, downplayed the importance of that fact, that is, the number of plants of the "DANSON 112" species sown or destroyed, since what matters, under the Consumer Protection Law, is that it was proven that the plaintiffs, as consumers, were affected by the good or service acquired. In this sense, it stated: "***VI.** In order to justify exonerating S from liability, his representative, the current appellant, argues that there was no commercial relationship whatsoever in this case, since, as witness A stated, 'it was just a favor done for the plaintiffs, sufficient for my represented party to be excluded from the lawsuit' (folio 401). The truth is that, regardless of the form of negotiation used by the defendant, when the Cantonal Agricultural Center proceeded to 'offer' and 'distribute' that seed, as established by cited article 2, when describing who a 'merchant or provider' is, it assumed responsibility for the damages generated thereby, and cannot excuse itself under the argument that what it did was a favor, since assistance to agricultural producers is a constitutional duty. Likewise, the alleged lack of evidence in this proceeding establishing the fault of his represented party is also not considered an exemption from liability in this case. First, article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer expressly provides [...] With such regulation, a new assumption of strict liability is regulated, which exists simply because of the risk created, not because of the fault or intent of the damaging agent, with the latter having the burden of proof to prove its lack of responsibility. In this regard, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in vote 646 of 4:45 p.m. on August 22, 2001, indicated [...] Hence, in relation to the cited strict liability regime, the producer, the supplier, and the merchant are all concurrently and independently liable, regardless of fault, only being freed if they prove they are or have been unrelated to the event, i.e., a reversal of the burden of proof is generated in this case. Therefore, the appellant's arguments by which he tries to prove that his represented party did not act with fault at the time of the sale of the product are irrelevant. [...] The appellant provides an accounting of the number of plants indicated as damaged – 3000 – to arrive at the conclusion that it is impossible for it to correspond to that total because, even if the sale had been of three packages of danson 112 seed with 1000 units each, it is expected that approximately 80% germinate, plus loss during transport and the percentage that fails to be harvested, suggesting that other seeds were possibly introduced. *The truth is that, regardless of the total number of tomato plants, it was possible to prove that the plaintiff acquired the specialized danson 112 tomato seed from the defendant for planting, and that this cultivation process materialized, with the plants being affected by the Clavibacter Michiganensis bacteria* (folio 256), popularly known as "bacterial canker," generating a quarantine by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, according to the Expert Report (folio 259)." (The underlined text is supplied). However, as indicated, the appellant, in this grievance, only reproduces the horizontal appeal, without noticing what was stated by the Court. He does not prove the existence of any of the justifications that would negate the liability of his represented party, in accordance with what is indicated in the second paragraph of article 35 of the Consumer Law, which prescribes that "*Only he who demonstrates that he was unrelated to the damage is freed*." **IX.** In any case, it must be noted that the Ad quem, in the aforementioned considerando of its judgment, put forth another reason for establishing the liability of the Agricultural Center: "[…] *Note that, on the contrary, the defendant's responsibility is even greater if one takes into account that, according to the Expert Report: 'Based on the report of the national seed office, official communication ONS 080-2007 DE, which certifies that no variety called Danson 112 appears in its records and that as of March 16, 2007, and up to two years prior, 2005, there are no imports of this variety. Therefore, since said variety does not appear in the official records and the ONS being in charge of seed processing according to Seed Law 6289, it is taken as a fact that the national authorities do not know how said seed arrived at the Cantonal Agricultural Center of Sarchi and from there to the referenced farms and plantation.' (folio 260). *The Agricultural Center must answer for this absence of distribution permits for that seed and, furthermore, for the liability generated to the persons who acquire such seed.* *The defendant cannot transfer to the seed acquirer its own failure to comply with the regulations that require distribution permits for these and, with them, the quality controls of the seed.* *In this regard, the representative of the Agricultural Center, when answering the lawsuit, expressly stated, 'It is true that the purchase of that seed was invoiced, with the clarification that my represented party does not distribute that variety of seed; it was obtained specifically at the request of Mr. O.' (folio 73), accepting not only the supply of the seed to the plaintiffs, but also, not having permits for the distribution of such seeds, which was not a limitation to arrange its distribution without permits by the representatives of the defendant Agricultural Center, obviating the due quality control of the seeds that Law 6289 of the National Seed Office requires of the National Seed Office, as provided in article 8, subsection e) of that regulation, as well as numeral 11 of the Regulation for the Import, Export and Marketing of Seeds.-*" (The underlined text is supplied). However, the appellant does not challenge that other cause of liability for his principal, so, by remaining intact, a scenario of pointless cassation is configured. By virtue of the reasons given, the rejection of this ground of disagreement is warranted.

**X.** In the **third** grievance, the appellant affirms that the judgments breached opinion C-180-200 of August 9, 2000, from the Procuraduría General de la República, which he transcribes in the part of interest. For the purposes of being able to apply the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer, he argues, that opinion is of mandatory compliance, according to what is set forth in article 2 of Law no. 6815, Organic Law of the Procuraduría General de la República, which he reproduces. According to the existing evidence, the plaintiffs do not hold the status of consumers, since they are not in the condition of industrialist or artisan, nor did they use the "DANSON 112" seed for final private consumption, as they were clear that the product of the seed was to receive economic profits. Therefore, he indicates, they also assume the condition of merchants, jointly with his represented party, not that of consumers, because according to the arguments of the thesis set forth in the judgment, if the plaintiffs are consumers, so would be his principal, which entails the exclusion of the liability they intend to attribute.

**XI.** First, it is necessary to indicate, as the second-instance judges rightly pointed out in section V of the challenged judgment, and contrary to what the appellant affirms, the opinions and pronouncements of the Procuraduría General de la República constitute administrative jurisprudence of mandatory compliance only for the Public Administration, not for jurisdictional bodies, according to the provisions of article 2 of Law no. 6815 of September 27, 1982, Organic Law of the Procuraduría General de la República. Secondly, the appellant again merely reproduces the arguments outlined in the appeal, without linking his statement to what was resolved by the Court. In this sense, on folio 444, he states: "[…] *Thus, according to the existing evidence, the plaintiffs do not hold the status of consumers, since they are not in the condition of industrialist or artisan, nor did they use the Danson 112 seed for final private consumption, as the plaintiffs are clear that the Danson 112 seed product was to receive economic profits; consequently, they also assume the condition of merchants, jointly with my represented party, not that of consumers.*" However, the Court, to determine the plaintiffs' status as consumers, in the indicated considerando, in the relevant part, stated: "*When acquiring seeds for planting, a person engaged in agricultural productive activity becomes a consumer of that product; therefore, they have standing to sue for liability, as it is a finished product or an essential input to finally integrate it into the agricultural production process. While this activity aims to generate new products, it begins with the acquisition of the seed, which is itself a finished product in another productive chain. Hence, the Court does not share the restricted criterion expressed by the appellant to justify the lack of standing to sue in this case.*-" However, it is insisted, the appellant does not question what the Ad quem indicated, the legal foundation of the judgment, which is why we are facing a scenario of pointless cassation, thus requiring the rejection of the substantive censure. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is necessary to insist that, in accordance with what was noted in considerando V of this judgment, this Chamber agrees with the Court's criterion, in the sense that the plaintiffs, in their relationship with the Agricultural Center, are consumers. Furthermore, the appellant did not challenge the Ad quem's argument that his principal's liability is also configured by the legal impossibility it had to distribute the "DANSON 112" seed, which, as noted, constitutes a scenario of pointless cassation.

**XII.** In the **fourth** censure, the appellant points out that the plaintiffs' claim for compensation for damages and losses cannot be directed against his represented party, since it is not engaged in seed production, which is proven by the envelope that contained them. They were brought to his principal's establishment at the request of the plaintiffs. Therefore, he affirms, liability could only arise if it had been determined that the seeds were the ones carrying the bacteria. Consequently, he estimates, the questioned judgment, by disregarding the expert report from the MAG, as well as the testimonies of Messrs. Y, O, and A, both G., regarding the fact that the contamination of the plants with the Clavibacter michiganensis bacteria could come from water, wind, human activity, handling in nurseries, transport, and interrelation with other crops, based on the argument that it is not a contested fact, causes a procedural imbalance against his represented party, since this situation is the genesis of the matter. This, he adds, in relation to the testimony of W, who categorically, spontaneously, and sincerely, stated that he had cultivated seeds from the same ones the plaintiffs planted and his production was not affected. In that sense, he notes, see the testimony, where it is indicated that the plaintiffs irrigated the tomato field with river water through a hose and the only contamination control in the water was a sheet to prevent the earth from passing, and that there were other tomato fields nearby, which implies that assuming under those conditions that the seed was exclusively the source of contamination is contrary to the cited rules.

**XIII.** As indicated in considerando V of this judgment, the Cantonal Agricultural Center has the status of merchant, according to the provisions of article 2 of Law no.

7472. It was also indicated in that section that this legislation is applicable to this proceeding, as stated in article 31, since the plaintiffs possess the status of consumers. Therefore, the provisions of article 35 of the same law are actionable, which states that all participants in the production chain (producer, supplier, and merchant) are liable to the consumer concurrently or jointly and severally, regardless of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or the service. Ergo, the defendant has passive standing to answer for the damages claimed in this litigation. He would only be exempted from that liability if he demonstrates that he was not involved in the damage, which he did not do. On the other hand, it must be stated, first, in accordance with what was indicated by the second-instance judges in section VI of the challenged judgment, that an undisputed fact is the damage to the plants, not what the appellant claims in his cassation appeal. Secondly, as indicated in Considerando VIII of this ruling, contrary to what the appellant alleges, the judges of both instances, in proven fact number 13, certified, based on the laboratory reports, that the bacteria that affected the plaintiffs' tomato crop originated in the "DANSON 112" seed, which was distributed to them by the defendant. However, this circumstance was not contested by the appellant, and for this reason, as this constitutes a case of useless cassation, the dismissal of the grievance under study is required. In any case, it must be noted that the Chamber, in Considerando VI of the questioned judgment, considered that the defendant did not demonstrate that he was not involved in the damage, in order to exonerate himself from liability, since "*The arguments presented regarding other possible causes of contamination mentioned by witnesses O, Y, and A – water, wind, human activity, handling in nurseries, transport, and interrelation with other crops – do not allow one to presume that one of the causes of liability is not the presence of the bacteria in the seed, as these are agents that are always present in agricultural production processes.*", which was also not questioned by the appellant.

[…]” Accordingly, there is no doubt that the Center, by habitually engaging in offering, distributing, and selling, among other goods, seeds, has the category of merchant, even if it did not ordinarily distribute the “DANSON 112” variety. In this regard, it is reiterated, the fact is that it obtained and sold it, not only to the co-plaintiffs, but also to Mr. W. Along this line of reasoning, since the Consumer Protection Law is applicable to this proceeding, the provision contained in its Article 35 is actionable, which states: “Liability Regime. / The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or the service, of inadequate or insufficient information about them, or of their use and risks. / Only one who demonstrates that they were unrelated to the damage is released from liability. / The legal representatives of commercial establishments or, as the case may be, the managers of the business are responsible for their own acts or facts or for those of their dependents or auxiliaries. The technicians, those in charge of production, and controllers are jointly and severally liable, where appropriate, for violations of this Law to the detriment of the consumer.” (The underlining is supplied). As the Tribunal correctly noted, that norm establishes that, with respect to the consumer, any of the intervening subjects in the good or service’s production chain (producer, supplier, and merchant) respond concurrently or jointly and severally, and independently of the existence of fault. Consequently, it was sufficient for the plaintiffs to bring the Center to trial as a merchant. There was no need, therefore, to sue another person – natural or legal. Ergo, a necessary passive joinder of parties does not exist with the company Semillas y Agroespecialidades MR; for this reason, the rejection of the grievance under study is required.

**VI.** In the **second** charge, the appellant argues that witnesses L and B – evidence offered by the plaintiffs – indicated that they did not know the tomato variety “DANSON 112”. Likewise, that the content of the records was prepared with information provided by Mr. O. Then, it affirms, it cannot be determined that the seed in the packages contained in the case file, and supposedly sold by its represented party, is the one that was planted and contained the *Clavibacter michiganensis* bacteria. This is because, it notes, it was never demonstrated that the destroyed plants were of the “DANSON 112” variety. If it is taken into consideration that the packages submitted as evidence, it adds, indicate that each contains 1000 seeds, but it was demonstrated, according to the testimony of the phytopathologist José Luis Villalobos, that the germination rate is approximately 80%, plus the loss from transplanting and the percentage that fails to harvest, a determinative conclusion is reached: the affected planting could not have been 3000 plants, which leads to the determination that, in the plaintiffs’ tomato plantation, there inexorably existed seeds or plants of another variety or from other envelopes. Therefore, it indicates, it is not possible that 3000 plants were destroyed, according to the MAG records, nor to obtain them from the three questioned packages of seeds, supposedly purchased from its principal. On the other hand, it affirms, witness J, also proposed by the plaintiffs, indicated that the seed germinated in the nursery of H, where there was no separation with other seeds that were there, and then they were transported about two kilometers before being planted in the open field. Thus, it asks, how was it determined that it was the seed that contained the bacteria, since it was not ruled out that it was due to contamination in the water used for irrigation, nor that it was in the nursery where they germinated them, by the transfer, or by the other tomato plantations? – all of which removes its principal from the imputed fault.

**VII.** In view of the manner in which this ground of disagreement is presented, it is necessary to point out that this Chamber, in ruling no. 505 of 8:45 a.m. on April 14, 2011, citing other precedents, stated: “[…] among the characteristics of the cassation appeal in agrarian matters is that it must be technically structured. The reproaches to the judgment must be listed and structured, and their lack of legality must be substantiated. The appellant has the duty to explain, in a clear and precise manner, the reasons on which they base their action. They must systematically combat the legal foundations of the appealed judgment. They are only exempted from expressly indicating the violated legal norms or the type of infraction committed. For reference, see, among many others, ruling number 892 of 9:00 a.m. on November 25, 2005.” (Voto 596-f-06 of 2:55 p.m. on August 30, 2006). Thus, despite the fact that the appeal in agrarian matters is governed by the Labor Code and has been considered a third instance requested by the parties, this does not exempt the appellant party from the duty of expressing, in a clear and precise manner, the aspects of the second-instance judgment it combats, explaining in any case what the alleged errors consist of.” No. 300 of 10:00 a.m. on April 25, 2008. (The underlining is supplied). According to the foregoing, although no special formalities are required in the agrarian cassation appeal, it does not mean that it is completely informal, since the objections to the judgment must be technically structured. Thus, the objections to the legal foundations of the appealed judgment must be presented with clarity and precision; the only thing from which it is exempt is indicating the violated provisions of the legal system or the type of infraction committed.

**VIII.** The grievance raised by the appellant of cassation alludes to three aspects: 1) it cannot be determined that the seed sold to the plaintiffs is the one that was planted, 2) there could not have been 3000 plants of the “DANSON 112” species in the plantation, and 3) it was not determined with exactitude that the seed acquired by the plaintiffs contained the *Clavibacter michiganensis* bacteria, since it was not ruled out that the plantation was contaminated by the water used for irrigation, in the nursery where they germinated them, by the transfer, or by the other tomato plantations. On the three points, the appellant limits itself to essentially reproducing what was alleged in the appeal, without combating the foundations of the *Ad quem* judgment. In this regard, the Tribunal endorsed the list of proven facts from the lower court’s judgment. In those marked with numbers 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, it is indicated: “**5)** On November 7, the Agricultural Center invoiced plaintiff O for three packages of one thousand seeds each, of the referred variety DANSON 112, which it sold for the sum of 45,600 colones; discount subtracted and sales tax added gives a total of 132,696 colones (cash invoice on folio 3). **6)** O took said seeds to the nursery of his brother H, located about two kilometers from the female plaintiff’s farm. In said nursery, the seeds were planted until they germinated, and the seedlings were taken to the farm about 25 days later (statement of O on folio 318, testimony of L on folio 326 and Jeris Martínez on folio 361). **7)** The tomato plants germinated from the 3000 seeds of the DANSON 112 variety were planted in an area of the female plaintiff’s farm of 2500 square meters, that is, 0.25 hectare. In the rest of the farm, coffee was maintained (confession of O on folio 318, confession of M on folio 319, testimony of B on folio 326). **8)** Approximately two and a half months after the tomato plants were planted on the female plaintiff’s farm, they began to show wilting of leaves and stems (testimony of B on folio 325, L on folio 326, digital photographs). **9)** At the request of the plaintiffs, officials from the M.A.G. appeared at the farm on March 2, 2007, and took some samples, which they sent to the laboratory. The results show that the plants are contaminated with the bacteria *Cliavibacter* [sic] *michiganensis* (records on folios 9, 10, and 14, laboratory reports on folios 6 and 7, testimony of J on folio 357). **10)** Days later, on March 12, 2007, officials from the regional office of the M.A.G. appeared again and destroyed 150 tomato plants, which showed abnormal signs (testimony of U on folio 323, L on folio 326, and B on folio 325, destruction record on folio 9). **11)** Once the laboratory results were obtained, the Head of the State Phytosanitary Service ordered, by administrative resolution DVCP-02-07 of March 20, 2007, the total destruction of the crop and the disqualification of the land for five years for the planting of tomatoes and other host crops, such as chili pepper (documentary evidence on folios 17-19, testimony of E on folio 354). **12)** On March 22, 2007, officials from the M.A.G. appeared at the plaintiffs’ farm and proceeded to destroy the crop, a task which required several days, since they first dried the plants and [sic] then proceeded to bury the entire plantation in holes (destruction records on folio 14, testimony of U on folio 323, B on folio 325, and L on folio 326). **13)** According to the laboratory expert opinion, the bacteria that affected the plaintiffs’ tomato plantation, the only known case in the country, originated in the DANSON 112 seed (laboratory report on folios 6 and 7).” (The underlining is supplied). Regarding the first allegation, that it cannot be determined that the seed sold to the plaintiffs was the one that was planted on the female plaintiff’s property, such a situation was duly accredited from the relationship of demonstrated facts 5, 6, and 7. However, the appellant of cassation does not properly question them, especially the last one, whose factual support consists of the statements of the plaintiffs and the testimony of witness B. The appellant only alludes to the witness, but without alleging an improper assessment of his testimony. It omits any reference as to whether that situation can be inferred from the depositions of Mr. O and Mrs. M, or why the judging authorities should not have given them credence. This deficiency leads to this Chamber being prohibited from analyzing what is recorded there. Regarding the argument that it was not determined that the seed acquired by the plaintiffs was contaminated with the bacteria, contrary to what was argued, and as was noted, in the demonstrated fact preceded by number 13, that situation is expressly alluded to, its factual support being the laboratory report on folios 6 and 7. However, the appellant of cassation did not question it, nor the evidence on which it is based. Consequently, this Chamber cannot refer to it. As for the other reproached aspect: that there could not have been 3000 plants of the “DANSON 112” species in the plantation. The *Ad quem*, based on the factual framework outlined above, in Considerando VI of the questioned judgment, minimized the importance of that fact, that is, the number of plants planted or destroyed of the “DANSON 112” species, since what matters, under the protection of the Consumer Protection Law, is that it was accredited that the plaintiffs, as consumers, were affected by the good or service acquired. In this sense, it stated: “**VI.** In order to justify exonerating S from liability, its representative, the current appellant, argues that no type of commercial relationship took place in this case, since as stated by witness A, ‘it was just a favor done for the plaintiffs, sufficient for my represented party to be excluded from the lawsuit.’ (folio 401). The fact is that, regardless of the form of negotiation used by the defendant, when the Cantonal Agricultural Center proceeded to ‘offer’ and ‘distribute’ that seed, as established by Article 2 cited, in describing who the ‘merchant or supplier’ is, it assumed responsibility for the damages that it generated thereby, without being able to excuse itself under the argument that what it did was a favor, since assistance to agricultural producing persons is a constitutional duty. Likewise, the alleged absence of proof in this proceeding that establishes its represented party’s fault is not considered an exemption from liability in this case. In the first place, Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer expressly provides […] With such regulation, a new case of strict liability is regulated, which exists simply by the created risk, not by the fault or intent of the harmful agent, with the latter having the burden of proof to demonstrate its absence of liability. In this regard, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in Voto 646 of 4:45 p.m. on August 22, 2001, stated […] Hence, regarding the cited strict liability regime, both the producing person and the supplying person and the merchant are liable concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, being released only [sic] proves that they are or have been unrelated to the act, that is, a reversal of the burden of proof is generated in this case. Therefore, the arguments of the appellant by which it tries to prove that its represented party did not act with fault at the time of the product’s sale lack relevance. […] The appellant makes a relation of the number of plants indicated to have been damaged – 3000 – to arrive at the conclusion that it is impossible for it to correspond to that total because, even if the sale had been of three packages of danson 112 seed with 1000 units each, it is expected that approximately 80% germinates, plus the loss from transport and the percentage that fails to harvest, suggesting that other seeds were possibly introduced. The fact is that, regardless of the total number of tomato plants, it was possible to prove that the plaintiff party acquired the specialized tomato seed danson 112 from the defendant for planting, and that this cultivation process materialized, with the plants being affected by the *Clavibacter Michiganensis* bacteria (folio 256), popularly known as “bacterial canker” or “bacterial cancer”, generating quarantine by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, according to the Expert Report (folio 259).” (The underlining is supplied). However, as was indicated, the appellant of cassation, in the present grievance, only reproduces the horizontal appeal, without addressing what was affirmed by the Tribunal. It does not prove the existence of any of the justification grounds that would nullify the liability of its represented party, in accordance with what is indicated in the second paragraph of Article 35 of the Consumer Law when it prescribes that “Only one who demonstrates that they were unrelated to the damage is released from liability.” **IX.** In any case, it must be noted that the *Ad quem*, in the referenced considerando of its judgment, raised another reason to establish the liability of the Agricultural Center: “[…] Note that, on the contrary, the defendant’s liability is even greater if it is considered that, according to the Expert Report: ‘Based on the report of the national seed office (sic) official letter ONS 080-2007 FROM where it is certified that in its records no variety called Danson 112 is presented and that as of the date 3-16-2007 and up to two years later 2005 no imports of this variety are presented. Therefore, with said variety not appearing in the official records and with the ONS being responsible for the (sic) procedure (sic) of seeds according to the seed (sic) law (sic) 6289, it is taken as a fact that the national authorities do not know how said seed arrived at the (sic) Cantonal Agricultural (sic) Center of Sarchi (sic) and from there (sic) to the (sic) farm and referenced (sic) plantation.’ (folio 260). The Agricultural Center must respond for this absence of distribution permits for that seed and, furthermore, for the liability generated to the persons who acquire such seeds. The defendant cannot transfer to the seed acquirer its non-observance in complying with the regulations that require distribution permits for these, and with them, the quality controls of the seeds. In this regard, the representative of the Agricultural Center, when answering the lawsuit, expressly indicated ‘It is true that the purchase of that seed was invoiced, with the clarification that my represented party does not distribute that variety of seed; it was obtained specifically at the request of Mr. O.’ (folio 73), thereby accepting not only the supply of the seed to the defendant party, but also not having permits for the distribution of such seeds, which was not a limitation to arrange their distribution without permits, by the representatives of the defendant Agricultural Center, thus bypassing the due quality control of the seeds that Law 6289 and the National Seed Office require of the National Seed Office, as provided by Article 8, subsection e) of that regulation, as well as numeral 11 of the Regulation for the Import, Export, and Commercialization of Seeds.–“ (The underlining is supplied). However, the appellant of cassation does not challenge that other cause of liability of its principal, and therefore, as it remains unchallenged, a situation of futile cassation is configured. By virtue of the reasons stated, the rejection of this ground of disagreement is required.

**X.** In the **third** grievance, the appellant of cassation affirms that the judgments violated opinion C-180-200 of August 9, 2000, from the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, which it transcribes to the extent of its interest. For the purpose of being able to apply the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer, it argues, that opinion is of mandatory compliance, according to what is stated in Article 2 of Law no. 6815, the Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, which it reproduces.

In accordance with the existing evidence, the plaintiffs do not hold the status of consumers, as they are not in the condition of industrialist or artisan, nor do they use the seed “DANSON 112” for final private consumption, since they were clear that the product of the seed was to obtain economic profits. Therefore, it indicates, they also assume the condition of merchants, jointly with their represented party, not of consumers, because according to the arguments of the thesis set forth in the judgment, if the plaintiffs are consumers, so would be their principal, which entails the exclusion of the liability that is sought to be attributed to them.

**XI.** Firstly, it is necessary to indicate, as the second-instance judges rightly pointed out in section V of the appealed judgment, and different from what was stated by the appellant on cassation, the opinions and pronouncements of the Procuraduría General de la República constitute administrative jurisprudence of mandatory compliance only for the Administración Pública, not for jurisdictional bodies, according to the provisions of Article 2 of Law No. 6815 of September 27, 1982, Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República. Secondly, once again, the appellant limits himself to reproducing the arguments outlined in the appeal, without linking his statement to what was decided by the Tribunal. In this regard, at folio 444, he points out: “[…] *Thus, according to the existing evidence, we have that the plaintiffs do not hold the status of consumers, as they are not in the condition of industrialist or artisan, nor do they use the Danson 112 seed for final private consumption, since the plaintiffs are clear that the Danson 112 seed product was to obtain economic profits, consequently they also assume the condition of merchants jointly with my represented party, not of consumers.*” However, the Tribunal, in order to determine the consumer status of the plaintiffs, in the indicated recital, in the relevant part, pointed out: “*By acquiring seeds for planting, the person engaged in agricultural productive activity becomes a consumer of that product, therefore, holds standing to claim liability, as it is a finished product or an essential input to finally integrate it into the agricultural production process. Although this activity has the purpose of generating new products, it begins with the acquisition of the seed, which is in turn a finished product in another production chain. Hence, the Tribunal does not share the restricted criterion raised by the appellant to justify the absence of standing in this case.-*“ However, it is insisted, the appellant on cassation does not challenge what was indicated by the Ad quem, the legal foundation of the judgment, for which reason this constitutes a case of futile cassation, thus imposing the rejection of the objection on its merits. Without prejudice to the foregoing, it is necessary to insist that, in accordance with what was noted in Recital V of this judgment, this Chamber agrees with the Tribunal’s criterion, in the sense that the plaintiffs, in their relationship with the Centro Agrícola, are consumers. Moreover, the appellant on cassation did not challenge the Ad quem’s argument, regarding the fact that the liability of his principal is also configured by the legal impossibility he had to distribute the seed “DANSON 112”, which, as was noted, constitutes a case of futile cassation.

**XII.** In the **fourth** objection, the appellant indicates that the plaintiffs’ claim for compensation for damages cannot be directed against his represented party, as he is not engaged in the production of seeds, which is proven by the envelope that contained them. They were brought to the establishment of his principal at the plaintiffs’ request. Therefore, he affirms, the liability could only arise in the case that it had been determined that the seeds were the ones carrying the bacteria. Consequently, he considers, the contested judgment, by omitting the evidence of the expert report from the MAG, as well as the testimonies of Messrs. Y, O and A, both G, regarding that the contamination of the plants with the bacteria Clavibacter michiganensis could come from water, wind, human activity, handling in nurseries, transport, and interrelation with other crops, based on the argument that it is not a controversial fact, causes a procedural imbalance against his represented party, as this situation is the genesis of the matter. This, he adds, in relation to the testimony of W, who categorically, spontaneously, and sincerely said that he had cultivated seeds of the same ones that the plaintiffs planted and his production was not affected. In that sense, he notes, see the testimonial evidence, where it is indicated that the plaintiffs irrigated the tomato field with river water, through a hose, and the only contamination control in the water was a sheet to prevent the earth from passing, and that there were more tomato fields nearby, which implies that, assuming under these conditions that the seed was exclusively the source of contamination, is contrary to the cited rules.

**XIII.** As indicated in Recital V of this judgment, the Centro Agrícola Cantonal has the status of merchant, according to the provisions of Article 2 of Law No. 7472. It was also indicated in that section that said legislation is applicable to this process, as pointed out by section 31, since the plaintiffs hold the quality of consumers. Therefore, the provisions of section 35 ibidem are actionable, where it is indicated that all participants in the production chain (producer, supplier, and merchant) are liable to the consumer concurrently or jointly and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service. Ergo, the defendant has passive standing to answer for the damages claimed in this lite. He would only be exempted from this liability if he demonstrates that he has been unrelated to the damage, which he did not do. On the other hand, it must be indicated, first, in accordance with what was pointed out by the second-instance judges in section VI of the appealed judgment, what constitutes an incontrovertible fact is the damage to the plants, not what the appellant on cassation points out in his appeal. Secondly, as indicated in Recital VIII of this ruling, different from what was alleged by the appellant, the judges of both instances, in the proven fact preceded by number 13, certified, based on the laboratory reports, that the bacteria that affected the tomato crops of the plaintiffs originated in the seed “DANSON 112”, which was distributed to them by the defendant. However, this circumstance was not challenged by the appellant, for which reason, as this constitutes a case of futile cassation, the rejection of the grievance under study is imposed. In any case, it must be pointed out that the Tribunal, in Recital VI of the contested judgment, considered that the defendant party did not demonstrate that it was unrelated to the damage, in order to exonerate itself from liability, because “*The arguments raised about other possible causes of contamination mentioned by witnesses O, Y, and A –water, wind, human activity, handling in nurseries, transport, and interrelation with other crops– do not allow presuming that one of the causes of liability is not the presence of the bacteria in the seed, since these are agents that are always present in agricultural production processes.*”, which was also not questioned by the appellant on cassation.

¨IV. El meollo de lo alegado por el casacionista estriba en que, a su entender, debió traerse a juicio a la empresa SA MR, S.A., al ser ella quien le vendió a su representada la semilla de tomate de la variedad “DANSON 112”. Esta Sala, luego de un análisis cuidadoso, llega a la misma conclusión que los juzgadores de segunda instancia: a la luz de las pretensiones esgrimidas y de la normativa aplicable, no resultaba necesario integrar la litis con dicha compañía, por dos razones que se exponen de seguido. En primer lugar, conforme se apuntó en el apartado segundo de este fallo, los actores formularon este proceso en contra del Centro Agrícola a fin de que en sentencia se le condenara, fundamentalmente, al pago de los daños y perjuicios infligidos debido a que las semillas que les vendieron, de la variedad “DANSON 112” no resultaron idóneas para la producción de tomate. es evidente que no existe razón alguna, pues no le afecta ese ruego, para traer al proceso a la sociedad anónima Semillas y Agroespecialidades MR.

V.En segundo término, y quizá el más relevante, esta Cámara concuerda tanto con el A quo como con el Ad quem, en el sentido de que a este proceso le es aplicable la normativa contenida en la Ley no. 7472 del 25 de enero de 1996, Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor (en adelante Ley de Defensa del Consumidor), conforme lo dispone el numeral 31 de ese cuerpo normativo, ya que los coactores ostentan la condición de consumidores y el demandado de comerciante. En torno a los primeros, la Ley no. 6289 del 4 de diciembre de 1978, Ley de la Oficina Nacional de Semillas, crea ese órgano, adscrito al MAG, para la promoción, protección, mejoramiento, control y uso de semillas de calidad superior, a efectos de fomentar su uso. Su finalidad específica es la promoción y organización de la producción y uso de semillas de calidad superior. De conformidad con el artículo 16 de esa normativa, está regida por una Junta Directiva compuesta por cinco miembros de un nivel técnico especializado; la cual, de acuerdo con el numeral 20 inciso b), tiene competencia para “Dictar normas técnicas para promover, mejorar y proteger la producción de semillas, y para fomentar el uso de las de mejor calidad, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el capítulo tercero de esta Ley.” Dentro de ese marco competencial, en sesión no. 546, celebrada el 24 de enero de 2005, acuerdo 2, artículo 4, emitió el denominado “Reglamento para la importación, exportación y comercialización de semillas”, el cual, en el artículo segundo, precisa el concepto de consumidor de semillas, al indicar: “Para los efectos de este Reglamento se entenderá por: […] Consumidor o Usuario de semillas: Toda persona física o entidad de hecho o de derecho, que como destinatario final adquiere o utiliza semillas como insumos para integrarlos en los procesos de producción, transformación o comercialización de vegetales.” Esta normativa, que es especial en materia de semillas, es elocuente al considerar, a quien adquiera o utilice semillas como insumos para integrarlos en los procesos de producción, transformación o comercialización de vegetales, como destinatario final de ese producto terminado. Por ende, también es complementaria de las disposiciones previstas en la Ley de Protección al Consumidor, específicamente, en lo que debe entenderse como consumidor. Esto por cuanto, se insiste, quien adquiera o utilice semillas como insumos para integrarlos al proceso de producción, transformación o comercialización de vegetales, es considerado como destinatario final del bien; característica que, a la luz de lo dispuesto en el numeral segundo de la Ley no. 7472, es la que determina la condición de consumidor, al indicarse que lo es “Toda persona física o entidad de hecho o de derecho, que, como destinatario final, adquiere, disfruta o utiliza los bienes o los servicios, o bien, recibe información o propuestas para ello.” Corolario, los actores, al haber adquirido la semilla de la especie de tomate “DANSON 112” del Centro Agrícola Cantonal, como insumo para integrarlo en el proceso de producción, transformación y comercialización de ese vegetal –no para su distribución-, tienen la condición de destinatarios finales (ya que se trata de un acto de producción y tanto el Derecho del Consumidor como el Derecho Agrario tienen un fin compartido: proteger o tutelar a la parte débil de las relaciones contractuales), y por lo tanto, de consumidores de ese bien terminado: la semilla de la especie de tomate “DANSON 112”. Por su parte, el Centro Agrícola reúne las características necesarias para ser considerado como comerciante, a pesar de que no distribuía ordinariamente la variedad de semilla “DANSON 112”. Al respecto, el señalado artículo segundo de la Ley de Protección al Consumidor indica que comerciante o proveedor es “Toda persona física, entidad de hecho o de derecho, privada o pública que, en nombre propio o por cuenta ajena, se dedica en forma habitual a ofrecer, distribuir, vender, arrendar, conceder el uso o el disfrute de bienes o a prestar servicios, sin que necesariamente esta sea su actividad principal. / Para los efectos de esta Ley, el productor, como proveedor de bienes, también está obligado con el consumidor, a respetarle sus derechos e intereses legítimos.” Asimismo, el artículo 10 inciso d) de la Ley no. 4521, reformada por la no. 7932 del 28 de octubre de 1999, Ley de Creación de los Centros Agrícolas Cantonales, dispone que “El patrimonio de los centros agrícolas estará compuesto por los siguientes recursos: / […] d) Los fondos por las ventas de sus bienes y las retribuciones de sus servicios.” De acuerdo con el documento visible a folio tres, se determina que el demandado se dedica, entre otras cosas, a la distribución o venta de bienes agropecuarios; comercializando las semillas para la producción de tomates. Ahora bien, aunque, como se indicó, la variedad “DANSON 112” no era distribuida de manera ordinaria por el Centro, lo cierto es que, como fue debidamente acreditado, se la proveyó o vendió a los co-actores. En este sentido, en los hechos probados marcados con los números 3, 4 y 5, compartidos por el Tribunal y no cuestionados por el casacionista, se indica: “3) Sin precisar la fecha, pero aproximadamente en octubre del año 2006, el actor O solicitó [sic] al administrador del Centro Agrícola de Valverde Vega le consiguiera la semilla de tomate de la variedad DANSON 112. Dicha variedad no es distribuida por el referido Centro Agrícola, pero su Administrador se comprometió a conseguirla. […] 4) En fecha 30 de octubre del 2006, el Centro Agrícola adquirió de la empresa SA MR, S.A., cinco paquetes de la referida variedad de semilla, cada paquete con mil semillas. Cada paquete se facturó en la suma de 40.715 colones, para un total de 203.575 colones. […] 5) En fecha 7 de noviembre, el Centro Agrícola facturó al actor O tres paquetes de mil semillas cada una, de la referida variedad DANSON 112, los cuales vendió en la suma de 45.600 colones; restado el descuento y sumado el impuesto de ventas da una total de 132.696 colones. […]” (Lo subrayado es suplido). Los otros dos paquetes de la semilla “DANSON 112” el Centro se los vendió al señor W quien, en su declaración a folio 359, en lo de interés manifestó: “[…] Yo cultivé una plantación de tomate de la especie DANSON 112. Yo compré la semilla en el Centro Agrícola de Sarchí, allí me dijeron que les habían quedados [sic] unos sobres de DANSON 112 y que no salían caros, por lo cual yo los compré. El señor que me lo [sic] vendió se llama A, no sé el apellido. Compré dos sobres, cada uno de mil semillas. […] La semilla DANSON 112 la compré empezando el año 2007 y a los días la sembré, coseché tomate den el 2007. […]” De acuerdo a lo anterior, no existe duda de que el Centro, al dedicarse en forma habitual a ofrecer, distribuir y vender, entre otros bienes, semillas, tiene la categoría de comerciante, aunque la variedad “DANSON 112” no la distribuyera ordinariamente. En este sentido, se insiste, lo cierto es que la consiguió y vendió, no solo a los co-actores, sino también al señor W. Dentro de esta línea de pensamiento, al ser aplicable a este proceso la Ley de Protección al Consumidor, es actuable la disposición contenida en su artículo 35, el cual dispone: “Régimen de responsabilidad. / El productor, el proveedor y el comerciante deben responder concurrente e independientemente de la existencia de culpa, si el consumidor resulta perjudicado por razón del bien o el servicio, de informaciones inadecuadas o insuficientes sobre ellos o de su utilización y riesgos. / Sólo se libera quien demuestre que ha sido ajeno al daño. / Los representantes legales de los establecimientos mercantiles o, en su caso, los encargados del negocio son responsables por los actos o los hechos propios o por los de sus dependientes o auxiliares. Los técnicos, los encargados de la elaboración y el control responden solidariamente, cuando así corresponda, por las violaciones a esta Ley en perjuicio del consumidor.” (Lo subrayado es suplido). Como bien lo señaló el Tribunal, de esa norma se determina que, ante el consumidor, responden de manera concurrente o solidaria, e independientemente de la existencia de culpa, cualquiera de los sujetos intervinientes en la cadena de producción del bien o servicio (productor, proveedor y comerciante). Consecuentemente, a los actores les bastaba con traer a juicio al Centro, como comerciante. No había necesidad, por lo tanto, de demandar a otra persona –física o jurídica-. Ergo, no existe un litis consorcio pasivo necesario con la sociedad Semillas y Agroespecialidades MR; motivo por el cual se impone el rechazo del agravio en estudio.

VI.En el segundo cargo, arguye el recurrente que los testigos L y B–prueba ofrecida por los actores- señalaron que no conocían la variedad de tomate “DANSON 112”. Asimismo, que el contenido de las actas se elaboró con la información brindada por don O. Entonces, afirma, no se puede determinar que la semilla de los paquetes que constan en el se sembró y que contenía la bacteria Clavibacter michiganensis. Esto porque, anota, en ningún momento quedó demostrado que las matas destruidas fueran de la variedad “DANSON 112”. Si se toma en consideración que los paquetes aportados como prueba, agrega, indican que cada uno contiene 1000 semillas, pero se demostró, según el testimonio del fitopatólogo José Luis Villalobos, que el poder de germinación es de aproximadamente 80%, más la pérdida por el transplante y el porcentaje que no logra cosechar, se tiene una conclusión determinante: la siembra afectada no pudo haber sido de 3000 mil matas, lo que conlleva a determinar que, en el tomatal de los actores existieron, inexorablemente, semillas o matas de otra variedad o de otros sobres. Por ende, indica, no es posible que se destruyeran, según las actas del MAG, 3000 matas, ni obtenerlas de los tres paquetes de semillas cuestionadas, que se supone fueron las compradas a su poderdante. Por otro lado, afirma, el testigo J, también propuesto por los actores, indicó que la semilla germinó en el vivero de H, donde no mediaba división con otras semillas que ahí estaban y, luego, las transportaron como dos kilómetros, antes de sembrarlas a cielo abierto. Entonces, se pregunta ¿cómo se determinó que era la semilla la que contenía la bacteria, ya que no se descartó que fuese por contaminación en el agua utilizada para el riego, tampoco que fuese en el vivero donde las germinaron, por el traslado, o por los otros tomatales?, todo lo cual sustrae a su mandante de la culpa imputada.

VII.En atención a la forma cómo se plantea el presente motivo de disconformidad, es menester señalar que esta Sala, en la sentencia no. 505 de las 8 horas 45 minutos del 14 de abril de 2011, citando otros precedentes, señaló: “[…] dentro de las características del recurso de casación en materia agraria está la de que debe ordenarse técnicamente. Se han de enumerar y estructurar los reproches a la sentencia y fundamentar su falta de juridicidad. El recurrente tiene el deber de explicar, de manera clara y precisa, las razones en las cuales sustenta su gestión. Ha de combatir, de modo sistemático, los fundamentos jurídicos de la sentencia recurrida. Sólo se le exime de señalar, en forma expresa, las normas jurídicas violadas, o el tipo de infracción cometida. En relación, véase, entre muchas otras, la sentencia número 892 de las 9 horas del 25 de noviembre del 2005.” (Voto 596-f-06 de las 14 horas 55 minutos del 30 de agosto del 2006). Entonces, pese a que el recurso en materia agraria se rige por el Código de Trabajo, y se ha considerado como tercera instancia rogada, ello no exime a la parte recurrente del deber de expresar de manera clara y precisa los aspectos de la sentencia de segunda instancia que combate, explicando en todo caso en qué consisten los yerros alegados”. No. 300 de 10 horas del 25 de abril de 2008.” (Lo subrayado es suplido). Acorde a lo expuesto, aunque en el recurso de casación agrario no se exigen formalidades especiales, no significa que sea por completo informal, ya que los reparos al fallo deben estructurarse de modo técnico. Así, habrá de exponerse, con claridad y precisión, las objeciones a los fundamentos jurídicos de la sentencia recurrida; lo único de lo que está exento es de señalar las disposiciones del ordenamiento jurídico conculcadas o el tipo de infracción cometida.

VIII.El agravio planteado por el casacionista alude a tres aspectos: 1) no se puede determinar que la semilla vendida a los actores es la que se sembró, 2) en la plantación no pudieron existir 3000 plantas de la especie “DANSON 112” y 3) no se determinó, con exactitud, que la semilla adquirida por los demandantes contuviera la bacteria Clavibacter michiganensis, pues no se descartó que la plantación se contaminara por el agua utilizada para el riego, en el vivero donde las germinaron, por el traslado o por los otros tomatales. En los tres puntos el recurrente se limita a reproducir, en esencia, lo aducido en el recurso de apelación, sin combatir los fundamentos de la sentencia del Ad quem. Al respecto, el Tribunal avaló el elenco de hechos probados de la sentencia del Juzgado. En los marcados con los números 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 y 13 se indica: “5) En fecha 7 de noviembre, el Centro Agrícola facturó al actor O tres paquetes de mil semillas cada una, de la referida variedad DANSON 112, los cuales vendió en la suma de 45.600 colones; restado descuento y sumado el impuesto de ventas da un total de 132.696 colones (factura de contado de folio 3). 6) O llevó dichas semillas al vivero de su hermano H, situado a unos dos kilómetros de la finca de la actora. En dicho vivero, se sembraron las semillas, hasta que germinaron y fueron llevadas las plántulas a la finca unos 25 días después (declaración de O a folio 318, testimonial de L folio 326 y Jeris Martínez a folio 361). 7) Las plantas de tomate germinadas de las 3000 semillas de la variedad DANSON 112, se sembraron en un área de la finca de la actora de 2500 metros cuadrados, sea 0.25 hectárea. En el resto de la finca, se mantuvo el café (confesional de O a folio 318, confesional de M a folio 319, testimonial de B a folio 326). 8) Aproximadamente dos meses y medio después de sembradas las plantas de tomate en la finca de la actora, empiezan a mostrar marchitamiento de hojas y tallos (testimonial de B a folio 325, L a folio 326, fotografías digitales). 9) A solicitud de los actores, funcionarios del M.A.G. se apersonaron a la finca en fecha 2 de marzo de 2007 y tomaron algunas muestras, las cuales envían al laboratorio. Los resultados muestran que las plantas están contaminadas con la bacteria Cliavibacter [sic] michiganensis (actas a folios 9, 10 y 14, reportes de laboratorio a folios 6 y 7, testimonial de J a folio 357). 10) Días después, en fecha 12 de marzo del 2007, nuevamente se presentaron funcionarios de la oficina regional del M.A.G. y destruyeron 150 plantas de tomate, las cuales mostraban signos anormales (testimonial de U a folio 323, L a folio 326 y B a folio 325, acta de destrucción a folio 9). 11) Una vez obtenidos los resultados de laboratorio, la Jefa del Servicio Fitosanitario del Estado ordenó mediante resolución administrativa DVCP-02-07 de 20 de marzo del 2007, la destrucción total del cultivo y la inhabilitación del terreno por cinco años para la siembra de tomate y otros cultivos hospederos, tales como chile (documental a folios 17-19, testimonial de E a folio 354). 12) En fecha 22 de marzo del 2007, funcionarios del M.A.G. se presentaron a la finca de los actores y procedieron al a destrucción del cultivo, labor en la cual requieren varios días, ya que primero secaron las plantas cy [sic] luego procedieron a enterrar en huecos toda la plantación (actas de destrucción a folio 14, testimonial de U a folio 323, B a folio 325 y L a folio 326). 13) Según el dictamen de laboratorio, la bacteria que afectó el tomatal de los actores, único caso conocido en el país, se originó en la semilla DANSON 112 (reporte de laboratorio a folios 6 y 7).” (Lo subrayado es suplido). Tocante al primer alegato, de que no puede determinarse que la semilla vendida a los actores fue la que se sembró en la propiedad de la actora, tal situación quedó debidamente acreditada de la relación de los hechos demostrados 5, 6 y 7. Empero, el casacionista no los cuestiona debidamente, en especial el último, cuyo sustento fáctico son las declaraciones de los actores y del testigo B. El recurrente alude solo al testigo, pero sin alegar una indebida valoración de su testimonio. Omite toda referencia a si de las deposiciones de don O y doña M puede desprenderse esa situación, o el porqué no debieron merecerle fe a los juzgadores. Esa falencia conlleva a que esta Sala esté vedada para analizar lo ahí consignado. Respecto al argumento de que no se determinó que la semilla adquirida por los actores estuviera contaminada con la bacteria, distinto a lo argumentado, y como se anotó, en el hecho demostrado antecedido con el número 13, de manera expresa se alude a esa situación, siendo su sustento fáctico el reporte de laboratorio de folios 6 y 7. No obstante, el casacionista no lo cuestionó, tampoco la probanza en que se fundamenta. Consecuentemente, esta Cámara no puede referirse a él. En cuanto al otro aspecto recriminado: que en la plantación no pudieron existir 3000 plantas de la especie “DANSON 112”. El Ad quem, con sustento en el cuadro fáctico antes reseñado, en el considerando VI de la sentencia cuestionada, le restó importancia a ese dato, es decir, al número de plantas sembradas o destruidas de la especie “DANSON 112”, pues lo que interesa, al amparo de la Ley de Protección al Consumidor, es que se acreditó que los actores, como consumidores, resultaron afectados por el bien o servicio adquirido. En este sentido señaló: “VI. A fin de justificar exonerar de responsabilidad al S, su representante, el ahora recurrente, argumenta que no medió en este caso ningún tipo de relación comercial, pues conforme lo señaló el testigo A, "fue solo un favor que se le realizó a los actores, suficiente para que sea excluida mi representada de la demanda." (folio 401). Lo cierto es que, independientemente de la forma de negociación utilizada por la demandada, al proceder el Centro Agrícola Cantonal a "ofrecer" y "distribuir" esa semilla, conforme lo establece el artículo 2 citado, al describir quien es el "comerciante o proveedor", asumió la responsabilidad de los daños que con ello generara, sin que pueda excusarse bajo el argumento de que lo que hizo fue un favor, pues es un deber constitutivo la asistencia a las personas productoras agrarias. De igual forma, tampoco se considera es una eximente de responsabilidad en este caso la pretendida ausencia de prueba en este proceso que establezca la culpa de su representada. En primer orden, el artículo 35 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor dispone expresamente […] Con tal normativa se regula un nuevo supuesto de responsabilidad objetiva, la cual existe simplemente por el riesgo creado, no por la culpa o el dolo del agente dañoso, siendo éste el que tiene la carga de la prueba para acreditar su ausencia de responsabilidad. Al respecto, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en voto 646 de las 16 horas 45 minutos del 22 de agosto de 2001, señaló […] De ahí, con relación al régimen de responsabilidad objetiva citado, tanto la persona productora como la proveedora y la comerciante son responsables concurrente e independientemente de la existencia de la culpa, liberándose sólo su [sic] demuestra que es o ha sido ajeno al hecho, es decir, se genera en este caso una inversión de la carga de la prueba. Por ende, carecen de relevancia los argumentos del recurrente conforme a los cuales trata de acreditar que su representada no actuó con culpa al momento de la venta del producto. […] El recurrente hace una relación de la cantidad de plantas que se indican fueron dañadas -3000- para arribar a la conclusión de que es imposible que correspondiera a esa totalidad debido a que, aunque la venta hubiera sido de tres paquetes se semilla danson 112 con 1000 unidades cada uno, lo esperado es que germine aproximadamente el 80% más la pérdida por el transporte y el porcentaje que no logra cosechar, sugiriendo que posiblemente se introdujeron otras semillas. Lo cierto, es que, independientemente de la suma total de plantas de tomate, se logró acreditar que la parte demandante adquirió de la demandada la semilla de tomate especializada danson 112 para la siembra, y que este proceso de cultivo se materializó, resultando afectadas las plantas con la bacteria Clavibacter Michiganensis (folio 256), conocida popularmente como “chancro bacteriano” o “cáncer bacteriano”, generadora de cuarentena del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, según el Informe Pericial (folio 259).” (Lo subrayado es suplido). Empero, como se indicó, el casacionista, en el presente agravio, solo reproduce el recurso horizontal, sin reparar en lo afirmado por el Tribunal. No acredita la existencia de alguna de las causales de justificación que enervarían la responsabilidad de su representado, acorde con lo señalado en el párrafo segundo del artículo 35 de la Ley del Consumidor al preceptuar que “Sólo se libera quien demuestre que ha sido ajeno al daño”.

IX.En todo caso, debe indicarse que el Ad quem, en el considerando indicado de su sentencia, esgrimió otro motivo para establecer la responsabilidad del Centro Agrícola: “[…] Nótese que por el contrario, la responsabilidad de la demandada es aún mayor si se toma en cuenta que de acuerdo al Informe Pericial: "En base al informe de la oficina (sic) nacional (sic) de semillas (sic) oficio ONS 080-2007 DE donde se certifica que en sus registros no se presenta ninguna variedad denominada Danson 112 y que a la fecha 16-3-2007 y hasta dos años posteriores 2005 no se presentan importaciones de esta variedad. Por lo cual en no apareciendo dicha variedad en los registros oficiales y siendo la ONS la encargada de el (sic) tramite (sic) de semillas según la ley (sic) de semillas (sic) 6289 se da por un hecho que las autoridades nacionales no conocen la forma como llego (sic) dicha semilla al centro (sic) agrícola (sic) Cantonal de Sarchi (sic) y de hay (sic) a las (sic) finca y plantación refernciada (sic)." (folio 260). El Centro Agrícola debe responder por esta ausencia de permisos de distribución de esa semilla y además, por la responsabilidad generada a las personas que adquieran tales semillas. La demandada no puede trasladar al adquirente de semillas, la inobservancia suya en el cumplimiento de la normativa que le exige los permisos de distribución de éstas y con ellos, los controles de calidad de las semillas. Al respecto, el representante del Centro Agrícola al contestar la demanda indicó expresamente "Es cierto que se le facturó la compra de esa semilla, con la aclaración que mi representada, no distribuye esa variedad de semilla, se consiguió específicamente por solicitud de don O." (folio 73), aceptando no sólo el suministro de la semilla a la parte demandada, sino también, no tener permisos para distribución de tales semillas, lo cual no fue limitante para disponer su distribución sin permisos, por parte de los representantes del Centro Agrícola demandado, obviando el debido control de calidad de las semillas que la Ley 6289 de la Oficina Nacional de Semillas exige a la Oficina Nacional de Semillas, conforme lo dispone el artículo 8 inciso e) de esa normativa, así como el numeral 11 del Reglamento para la Importación, Exportación y Comercialización de Semillas.-“ (Lo subrayado es suplido). Sin embargo, el casacionista no impugna esa otra causa de responsabilidad de su poderdante, por lo que, al mantenerse incólume, se configura un supuesto de casación inútil. En mérito de las razones expuestas, se impone el rechazo del presente motivo de disconformidad.

X.En el tercer agravio, afirma el casacionista que las sentencias quebrantaron el dictamen C-180-200 del 9 de agosto de 2000 de la Procuraduría General de la República, el cual transcribe en lo de su interés. Para los efectos de poder aplicar la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, argumenta, ese dictamen es de acatamiento obligatorio, según lo expuesto en el artículo 2 de la Ley no. 6815, Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, el cual reproduce. De conformidad con la prueba existente, los actores no ostentan el carácter de consumidores, al no estarse en la condición de industrial o artesano, ni utilizar la semilla “DANSON 112” para consumo privado final, ya que fueron claros en que el producto de la semilla era para percibir ganancias económicas. Por lo tanto, indica, ellos asumen también la condición de comerciantes, conjuntamente con su representada, no de consumidores, porque según los argumentos de la tesis expuesta en la sentencia, si los demandantes son consumidores, igual lo sería su poderdante, lo que conlleva la exclusión de la responsabilidad que se le pretende atribuir.

XI.En primer lugar, es menester indicar, como bien lo señalaron los juzgadores de segunda instancia en el apartado V de la sentencia impugnada, y distinto a lo afirmado por el casacionista, los dictámenes y pronunciamientos de la Procuraduría General de la República configuran jurisprudencia administrativa de acatamiento obligatorio únicamente para la Administración Pública, no para los órganos jurisdiccionales, según lo preceptuado en el artículo 2 de la Ley no. 6815 del 27 de setiembre de 1982, Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República. En segundo lugar, de nuevo, el recurrente se limita a reproducir los argumentos esbozados en el recurso de apelación, sin engarzar su dicho a lo resuelto por el Tribunal. En este sentido, a folio 444, señala: “[…] Así las cosas, según la prueba existente, tenemos que los actores no ostentan el carácter de consumidores, al no estarse en la condición de industrial o artesano, ni utilizar la semilla Danson 112, para consumo privado final, ya que son claros los actores que el producto semilla Danson 112, era para percibir ganancias económicas, consecuentemente ellos asumen también la condición de comerciantes conjuntamente con mi representada, no de consumidores.” Sin embargo, el Tribunal, para determinar la condición de consumidores de los demandantes, en el indicado considerando, en lo de interés, señaló: “Al adquirir semillas para la siembra, la persona que se dedica a la actividad productiva agraria se convierte en consumidora de ese producto, por ende, ostenta legitimación activa para reclamar responsabilidad, al tratarse de un producto terminado o un insumo esencial para integrarlo finalmente en el proceso de producción agraria. Si bien esta actividad tiene como fin generar nuevos productos, inicia con la adquisición de la semilla, la cual es a su vez un producto terminado en otra cadena productiva. De ahí, no comparte el Tribunal el criterio restringido en este caso.-“ Empero, se insiste, el casacionista no cuestiona lo indicado por el Ad quem, el fundamento jurídico de la sentencia, razón por la cual se está ante un supuesto de casación inútil, imponiéndose, por ende, el rechazo del reparo de mérito. Sin perjuicio de lo anterior, precisa insistir en que, de acuerdo con lo apuntado en el considerando V de esta sentencia, esta Sala concuerda con el criterio del Tribunal, en el sentido de que los actores, en su relación con el Centro Agrícola, son consumidores. Además, el casacionista no combatió el argumento del Ad quem, en cuanto a que la responsabilidad de su poderdante también se configura por la imposibilidad legal que tenía para distribuir la semilla “DANSON 112”, lo cual, como se apuntó, configura un supuesto de casación inútil.

XII.En la cuarta censura, señala el recurrente que la pretensión de los actores, para el resarcimiento de los daños y perjuicios, no puede ser dirigida contra su representado, al no dedicarse a la producción de semillas, lo que se comprueba con el sobre que las contenía. Fueron traídas al establecimiento de su poderdante por solicitud de los actores. Entonces, afirma, la responsabilidad podía surgir solo en el caso que se hubiere determinado que las semillas eran las que portaban la bacteria. En consecuencia, estima, la sentencia cuestionada, al preterir la prueba del informe pericial del MAG, así como de los testimonios de los señores Y, O y A, ambos G, en cuanto a que la contaminación de las plantas con la bacteria Clavibacter michiganensis, pudiese provenir del agua, viento, actividad humana, manipulación en viveros, transporte e interrelación con otros cultivos, con base en el argumento que no es un hecho controvertido, ocasiona un desequilibrio procesal en contra de su representada, al ser esta situación la génesis del asunto. Esto, agrega, en relación con el testimonio de W, quien categóricamente, en forma espontánea y sincera dijo que él había cultivado semillas de las mismas que sembraron los demandantes y su producción no resultó afectada. En ese sentido, anota, véase la testimonial, donde se indica que los actores regaban el tomatal con agua del río, a través de una manguera y, el único control de contaminación en el agua era una sábana para que no pasara la tierra y que habían más tomatales cerca, lo que implica que, asumir en esas condiciones que la semilla era exclusivamente fuente de contaminación, resulta contrario a las citadas reglas.

XIII.Como se indicó en el considerando V de esta sentencia, el Centro Agrícola Cantonal tiene la condición de comerciante, según lo dispone el artículo 2 de la Ley no. 7472. También se indicó en ese apartado que a este proceso le resulta aplicable esa legislación, según lo señala el numeral 31, ya que los actores revisten la cualidad de consumidores. Por ende, es actuable lo preceptuado en el numeral 35 ibídem, donde se indica que todos los participantes de la cadena de producción (productor, proveedor y comerciante) responden ante el consumidor de manera concurrente o solidaria e independientemente de la existencia de culpa, si resulta perjudicado por razón del bien o del servicio. Ergo, el demandado está legitimado pasivamente para responder de los daños y perjuicios reclamados en esta lite. Solo se le eximiría de esa responsabilidad si demuestra que ha sido ajeno al daño, lo cual no hizo. Por otro lado, debe indicarse, en primer lugar, acorde con lo señalado por las juzgadoras de segunda instancia en el apartado VI de la sentencia impugnada, lo que constituye un hecho incontrovertido es el daño en las plantas, no lo que señala el casacionista en su recurso. En segundo término, como se indicó en el considerando VIII de este fallo, distinto a lo alegado por el recurrente, los juzgadores de ambas instancias, en el hecho probado antecedido con el número 13, acreditaron, con base en los reportes de laboratorio, la bacteria que afectó el sembradío de tomate de los actores se originó en la semilla “DANSON 112”, la cual les fue distribuida por el demandado. Empero, tal circunstancia no fue combatida por el recurrente, razón por la cual, al estarse ante un supuesto de casación inútil, se impone el rechazo del agravio en estudio. En todo caso, debe señalarse que el Tribunal, en el considerando VI de la sentencia cuestionada, estimó que la parte demandada no demostró que fuese ajena al daño, a fin de exonerarse de responsabilidad, pues “Los argumentos expuestos acerca de otras posibles causas de contaminación mencionadas por los testigos O, Y y A –agua, viento, actividad humana, manipulación en viveros, transporte e interrelación con otros cultivos- no permiten presumir que una de las causas de responsabilidad no lo sea la presencia de la bacteria en la semilla, pues se trata de agentes que siempre están presentes en los proceso productivos agrarios.”, lo cual tampoco fue cuestionado por el casacionista.¨