Dismissal for bank restructuring without justifying technical studyDespido por reestructuración bancaria sin estudio técnico justificativo

III.- The dismissal of the plaintiff was justified on the basis of an organizational restructuring process (proceso de reestructuración organizacional) carried out by Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago, approved—as indicated by the defendant in its answer—by the Board of Directors of the banking entity in session n° 7878/05, article 1 of August 18, 2005 (complaint, answer, folios 110 and 111). For that reason, before analyzing the appellant’s arguments, it is necessary to revisit what this Chamber has repeatedly stated regarding dismissals based on an organizational restructuring process such as the one at issue in this matter. Thus, through ruling 1019 of 9:35 a.m. on July 9, 2010, it was indicated: “…As a fundamental principle of the public employment regime, Constitutional numeral 192 instituted the so-called ‘right to employment stability,’ which has been conceived as the right of the public servant to keep his or her position and to lose it only in the event of incurring one of the grounds for dismissal established by labor legislation or when a forced reduction of services becomes necessary due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization of the service. Regarding bank servants, Article 41, subsection 6), of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional expressly recognizes for them the minimum benefits contemplated in the labor laws and the Civil Service of the Republic, which results in the application in their favor of the rights contemplated by the Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Article 43 of that statute establishes the removal of servants covered by that regulation only when they incur the grounds contemplated in Article 81 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and 41, subsection d), of that law, or in acts that imply a serious infraction of that regulation, its regulations, or the respective internal labor regulations. That law also contemplates the possibility of removal in those cases in which a forced reduction of services becomes necessary due to an absolute lack of funds; or to achieve a more efficient and economical reorganization, provided that said reorganization affects at least 60% of the employees of the respective unit. From the foregoing, it follows that since employment stability is a guarantee for the bank employee, the specific cases of service reorganization in which that right is curtailed must be evaluated with absolute objectivity and in adherence to legality. The legal procedures established for that purpose must be respected, as well as the rights of the servants directly or indirectly involved, such that both the new organizational forms proposed, the criteria for determining which positions are maintained within the body or entity and their conditions, as well as the proposal regarding the officials who are to be removed or transferred, are matters that must be established based on technically supported studies that certify the prevailing need for the proposed measure for the effective realization of a public purpose associated with a better provision of the service for the clear benefit of the user-administered or to resolve a deficit economic situation of the entity, since otherwise, a dangerous loophole to arbitrariness would be opened, so that it is the will of the head of the entity—or of those in charge of executing the changes—that determines those aspects, even without any foundation or using improper mechanisms or discriminatory criteria. In this matter, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has recognized the constitutionality of restructuring processes in the Public Administration, in the following terms: ‘Right to work and employment stability. In a public employment relationship, the projection of the right to work protected by Constitutional Article 56 contains as one of its postulates in favor of the worker that of stability in the position. Indeed, it cannot be denied that this is what allows the servant to access a series of social and economic benefits that enable his or her academic and labor advancement, providing the necessary security for his or her personal development and that of the family nucleus that depends on him or her, which truly actualizes the meaning of the right to work as an individual guarantee and obligation to society, in the expression used by the constitutional text. It is for this reason that servants may only be removed by way of exception, in the event of a justified cause for dismissal, or in the case of a forced reduction of services, one of the cases precisely being the restructuring processes to which an institution may be subjected, the latter also being in line with the principles derived from Article 192 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). Now then, subjection to a legitimate modernization process, which guarantees the optimal use of public funds and the highest efficiency in the provision of the services entrusted to an institution, is, of course, a legitimate reason to execute organizational changes which, in most cases, inevitably entail the suppression of certain positions. But precisely because it is an exception to the constitutional guarantee of stability for the worker, its application by the administration must be executed with absolute objectivity, transparency, and seriousness, and hence the requirement for qualified technical studies that can validate the decision-making, based on a coherent and effective model. Under this line of reasoning, this Chamber admits that if the new structure cannot accommodate the relocation of an official, since the substantive functions he or she was performing disappear, as they are suppressed in response to efficiency and modernization criteria, his or her termination is legitimate in accordance with the commented constitutional provision’ (emphasis not from the original) (ruling of the Constitutional Chamber n° 4951-2000 of 4:37 p.m. on June 27, 2000). On the same topic, that Chamber also indicated: ‘As the Chamber has indicated in reiterated pronouncements, Article 192 of the Political Constitution empowers the Public Administration to order the restructuring of the various units that compose it, in order to achieve better performance and organization thereof, for which it may order not only the elimination and reclassification of positions, but also the transfer of officials. The authorization provided by the legal system to dispense with the services of a public official due to restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, is dispensable in the current structure and also of impossible integration into the new institutional organization. Thus, the State may implement its power to forcibly transfer or dismiss its officials for reasons of reorganization, provided that it is based on the real need—duly verified—to improve the public service and respects the procedure established for that purpose. In any case, and to make effective the protection of the rights of the administered, the constitutional jurisdiction for freedom is empowered to review whether the figure of restructuring is used to conceal dismissals carried out for reasons alien to merely organizational ones. This with the objective of preventing the need for reorganization and modernization of the State from serving to exempt the Administration from its elementary obligation to always act in respect of the rights and freedoms that the Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho) recognizes to individuals’ (underlining is by the drafter) (rulings of the Constitutional Chamber n°s 1846, of 2:57 p.m. on February 29; 2496, of 5:39 p.m. on March 21; 4951, of 4:37 p.m. on June 27, and 5783, of 4:01 p.m. on July 11, all of the year 2000). Equally, that Chamber has expressed that: ‘Having clarified the scope of the power of review of the judgments of this Chamber, we proceed to assess whether in the specific case the facts discussed were correctly appreciated at the time of issuing the sentence. The judgment dismissing the appeal rests on the fact that the reorganization that originated the questioned dismissal was subjected to the procedure established for that purpose (studies conducted by a specialized consulting firm and approval of the process by the National Board of Directors of the Bank), such that the dismissal was aimed at achieving a better organization of services, also fulfilling the requirement that this Chamber has already indicated as indispensable for cases in which the Administration relies on the postulates of Constitutional Article 192, which is that the position considered in itself is not only dispensable in the current structure, but is of impossible integration into the proposed institutional organization, so that the only viable solution for the Administration is the dismissal of the person occupying the position and exercising the correlative functions, which disappear entirely in the new modernized structure. Thus, the entire foundation of the judgment in question rests precisely on the effective disappearance of the activities performed by the appellant, relying for this on the technical opinions that are contained in the case file’ (ruling n° 1244 of 12:58 p.m. on February 9, 2001). Dismissals occurring by virtue of the approval of a restructuring process are thus framed within what in doctrine is known as objective dismissals, the main characteristic of which is that they obey a unilateral decision of the employer, linked to a need of the company, supported by reports or expert opinions that so determine and not on the mere subjectivity of a particular head of unit. In the words of Cruz Villalón, these are ‘…situations in which the worker’s provision of service does not provide the employer with the productive interest necessary for the purpose of his or her business activity…’ (Cruz Villalón, Jesús. ‘Compendio de Derecho del Trabajo’. 2nd ed. Editorial Tecnos. Madrid. Year 2009. Pg. 401). Applying the foregoing to the sphere of public employment, we would say that dismissal based on objective causes is appropriate when the official does not contribute to the attainment of the public purpose in question. Specifically, Spanish doctrine identifies five grounds for objective dismissal, which are the following: ‘a) ineptitude of the worker known or supervening after his or her effective placement in the company; b) maladjustment of the worker to the technical modifications implemented in his or her job position; c) amortization of job positions for economic, technical, organizational, or production reasons… d) due to absences from work, even if justified, but intermittent, and e) due to insufficiency of budgetary allocation.’ [Nombre1] , Manuel Carlos; and, [Nombre2] , Manuel. ‘Derecho del Trabajo’. 17th ed. Editorial Universitaria Ramón Areces. Madrid. Year: 2009. Pg. 767). Of the grounds enumerated, Constitutional Article 192 and the Estatuto del Servicio Civil specifically encompass ground ‘c)’ and ground ‘e)’, with reorganization or restructuring processes in public law entities corresponding precisely to an ‘economic, technical, organizational, or production’ cause for termination of the employment relationship. This type of cause—economic—‘constitutes grounds for termination when the amortization of positions contributes to overcoming the difficulties that impede the proper functioning of the company, whether due to its competitive position in the market or due to demand requirements, through a better organization of resources. In summary, it is the relationship of reasonable proportionality between the number of workers whose contracts are terminated (and whose positions are amortized) and the causes invoked, and such weighting with an exclusive purpose: to reasonably contribute to improving the situation and making the business project viable (in its entirety or in the sphere in which amortization is considered necessary…), in which the volume of work decreases or is going to decrease, and, additionally, the functions entrusted to the worker disappear or may be performed by others.’ Specifically, in public employment relationships, where stability in the position appears constitutionally protected, it is required that, indisputably, between the purpose proposed by the administration and the elimination of positions, there exists a causal link accredited—appropriately—by means of the technical studies that so determine….” IV.- In the first of the grievances, the representative of the defendant bank insists that the position held by the plaintiff was not protected by the principle of stability, since as of February 21, 2005, that is, six months before the breaking of the employment relationship, the position she held had been excluded from the bank’s collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), and she was considered a confidential employee (empleada de confianza) in accordance with Article 143 of the Labor Code and, for that reason, subject to free removal. However, upon review of the case file, it was fully demonstrated that the plaintiff began working for the defendant on July 19, 1999. At that moment, the III Amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by the defendant bank and the UNECA Union was in force, from which it follows, from its Article 1, that the plaintiff, being a worker, was covered by this collective instrument (folios 3-19). But before the breaking of the employment relationship, specifically, as of February 21, 2005 (folio 35), the IV Amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the bank and the aforementioned Union was homologated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, in which, in its Article 1, it excluded from the coverage of this collective instrument, among other positions, the Area Directors and Directoras, a position held by the plaintiff at the time of termination, as she served as Director of General Services. However, this exclusion, contained in the new collective agreement, does not have, in the specific case, the legal force to consider her a confidential employee subject to free removal, as argued by the appellant, because, as explained, when she began working for the defendant bank on July 19, 1999, the III Amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by the defendant bank and the UNECA Union was in force, from which it follows, according to Articles 1 and 37, that she was covered by this collective instrument. The first of these provided: ‘This Convention regulates the labor relations between Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago and its workers of the Central Offices, Branches, Agencies, and other Dependencies, without prejudice to more favorable rules that may be enacted in the future…’. For its part, numeral 37 established: ‘…All persons who enter to provide services as workers of the Bank, with the exception of officials appointed by the Board of Directors, such as the General Manager and Deputy Managers, the Auditor and Deputy Auditor, must have successfully passed the approved technical selection process until acquiring the condition of eligible. To fill vacant positions, the Personnel Administration will send a shortlist of three candidates to the corresponding Heads, and they, from this shortlist, will recommend to the General Manager or General Auditors, as appropriate, the suitable person or persons. It will be they who ultimately make the corresponding appointments. The Bank undertakes to guarantee, respect, and stimulate the banking career and employment stability in accordance with what is regulated in this Convention, as well as the promotions of the employees who work in the Institution, in harmony with what is established in Article 188 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional…’ (folio 13). On the other hand, it must be taken into account that, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 54 and 55 of the Labor Code and in another of higher rank, Article 62 of the Political Constitution, the stipulations contained in a collective bargaining agreement have the force of professional law for the parties that signed it and for those persons who, at the time of its entry into force, work for the company or in the profession it regulates, whether or not they are unionized, as well as for those who are hired in the future, while it is in force. That principle implies, basically, that, at least, in the legal relationship between the servants and the employing entity, who are linked by an agreement of that class, its rules constitute the primary source of labor rights and duties. It is not, of course, a matter of the repeal of ordinary legislation due to the collective pact, as the former remains fully valid and effective (numeral 129 of the Political Constitution). What occurs is, undoubtedly, its inapplicability to the specific case, because the special regulation of the collective bargaining agreement is binding for it. The rules of a legal transaction of this nature have, then, an exceptional rigor and impose themselves on their recipients as rules of public order, making it impossible for them to be singularly repealed. Of course, for such a consequence to occur, it is required that its content has been elaborated respecting legal limits. Thus, a collective agreement cannot nullify rules of an imperative or prohibitive nature, among them those classified as of public order, nor could it be opposable if it was agreed upon without the participation of those who, by law, should have expressed their assent (see, on the subject, ruling 108, of 9:40 a.m. on March 12, 2003). As explained, if the plaintiff began working for the defendant bank on July 19, 1999, she was covered by Article 1 and 37 of the III Amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by the defendant bank and the UNECA Union (folios 3-19), but also by the ‘right to employment stability,’ a fundamental principle of the public employment regime, established in constitutional numeral 192, which is the right of public servants to keep their position; and to lose it only in the event of incurring one of the grounds for dismissal established by labor legislation, or when a forced reduction of services becomes necessary due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization of the service. Regarding bank servants, as in the case before us, this right is reaffirmed by Article 41, subsection 6) of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, which expressly recognizes for them the minimum benefits contemplated in the labor laws and the Civil Service of the Republic, which results in the application in their favor of the rights contemplated by the Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Article 43 of that statute reiterates the principle that the removal of those working under the coverage of that regulation may occur only when they incur the grounds contemplated in Article 81 of the Labor Code and in Article 41, subsection d), of that law; or in acts that imply a serious infraction of that regulation, its regulations, or the respective internal labor regulations. That law also contemplates the possibility of removal in those cases in which a forced reduction of services becomes necessary due to an absolute lack of funds; or to achieve a more efficient and economical reorganization thereof, provided that said reorganization affects at least sixty percent of the employees of the respective unit. In the same sense, the Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República n° 7107, of November 4, 1988, published in La Gaceta n° 222 of November 22, 1988, transitory annex 3 of the articles of the Sistema Bancario Nacional, Article 188, expresses:

‘Each State bank shall have a roster (escalafón) in which the banking career is guaranteed to its officials, as well as their irremovability and their promotions in such a way that the right to advance in said institutions is assured, from the lowest level up to being able to occupy the most elevated positions, based on merit.

Any modification carried out by the banks to adapt their regular rosters to the prevailing conditions at the time shall not affect in any way the employees who entered previously….’ From the foregoing, it follows that since employment stability is a constitutional guarantee for those who work in the public sector—and particularly for bank officials—the specific cases of service reorganization in which that right is curtailed must be evaluated in a restrictive manner, in accordance with the specific assumptions in which the exception is authorized. In which case, when dealing with a restructuring as in the present matter, it must be accompanied by the necessary technical studies that justify the dismissal decision, otherwise, it cannot affect the rights acquired by the employees who already have stability in their position, as was the case with the plaintiff, who held a permanent appointment (nombrada en propiedad) at the time of the termination of her position (folio 2), a condition she had attained long before the IV amendment to the collective bargaining agreement entered into force. The statement that Ms. [Nombre2] was appointed based on a competitive evaluation of credentials (concurso de antecedentes) must be maintained, as there is no evidence in the case file that accredits the contrary, much less that she had been appointed discretionally or that she performed functions without supervision or oversight, typical conditions of a confidential employee; none of this was demonstrated. Moreover, Ms. C., head of human resources of the bank, stated the following: [Nombre2] ‘…. joined the bank on July 19, 1999, began working as Area Director, at that time in Research and Development, then her departure occurred on August 22, 2005, due to administrative restructuring (…) At the time the plaintiff was there, there was a procedure to attain that position. This was through the publication of the interim competition…’ (folios 196 verso and 197 front). Finally, it is necessary to point out that the criteria issued by the Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República) are not binding on the courts of justice, because judges are only subject to the Political Constitution, and for that reason, the grievance that the matter must be resolved in light of what was expressed in the mentioned opinions is also not receivable.

V.- ON THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS: As indicated, the termination of the plaintiff was justified on the existence of the restructuring process taking place in the defendant bank. The only evidence contained in the case file related to the realization of that process consists of the official communication of September 19, 2005, addressed to Mr. G. Q., General Manager at the time, through which he was informed that the Administration had been empowered to indemnify all the officials who would be terminated on the occasion of the mentioned process (folio 109). In addition, the official communication of the following August 26, in which, among other points, Mr. G. Q. was informed of the approval of the bank’s strategic plan and the new organizational structure of the institution (folios 110 and 111). Lastly, the document titled ‘Anexo 5, organization,’ in which it is explained that the bank, after the restructuring, would save one billion three hundred million colones in personnel costs including social charges (folios 113-117). On this point, it must first be clarified that it is not that the appellate body incurred in the defects of ultra petita and extra petita by considering that the technical studies to demonstrate the reasons and justifications that grounded the plaintiff’s dismissal were not provided to the case file. On the contrary, as indicated in this judgment, the authorization provided by the legal system to dispense with the services of a public official due to restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, must be ‘dispensable’ in the proposed structure and also of impossible integration into the new institutional organization. However, to make use of this power —to forcibly transfer or dismiss its officials for reasons of reorganization— the defendant bank was obligated to base its action on a real need —duly verified— to improve the public service and respecting the procedure established for that purpose, which in this case would be by means of a technical opinion (dictamen técnico) in which the impossible integration of the plaintiff was concluded, considering the position held by her in the new institutional organization, such that the only viable solution for the administration was to dismiss her, because the functions she performed would disappear entirely in the new modernized structure. This technical study is missing, because the bank, which had the obligation to provide it to support its conduct as explained, did not do so. In this sense, as indicated, the servants of the Public Administration are protected by employment stability, and for that reason, it is not possible to admit that, under the pretext of a reorganization process, workers are dismissed without the technical studies that justify the disappearance of the position, and the impossibility of relocating the worker in another position within the organization, because through that means a dangerous loophole to arbitrariness and insecurity would be opened. In this sense, Article 47 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil, when referring to dismissal due to reorganization, indicates that when dispensing with servants, criteria such as efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, aptitudes, and other conditions resulting from the evaluation of services shall be considered, which, in the event that certain positions are eliminated and at the same time positions are created in the same category, obligated the employer to prove that the plaintiff did not possess the aptitude and new requirements to remain in one of the new positions, which does not appear in the case file, nor was it demonstrated that it was not possible to place her in an equivalent position. According to the documentary evidence received, as well as the testimonial evidence presented, the position held by Ms. [Nombre2] did not in fact disappear. Let us see. When the plaintiff was dismissed, she permanently held the position of Director of General Services and had under her charge the Department of Security (surveillance, investigations, alarms, CCTV, and administration of the contract for outsourced surveillance services), Department of Procurement (acquisition of goods and services, tenders, supply warehouse), Transportation Unit, Physical Maintenance of the Bank’s facilities (administration of the contract for outsourced cleaning services), Department of Administration of Realizable Assets (administration, custody, and sale of assets awarded to the Bank), and Central Archive Unit (administration and custody of all documentation generated by the Bank in its different units and of commercial documentation \"credit files, checks, and negotiable instruments), administration of internal and external courier services (see second fact of the complaint and its answer). Now then, according to the new restructuring, the Directorate of General Services was renamed Institutional Support, with the Department of Security, Procurement and Tenders, Transportation, Maintenance of Awarded Assets, and Institutional Archive remaining under its charge and dependency, adding a Department called General Services (folios 116, 117, and 119). This was confirmed by the witness [Nombre3], who expressed: […]. According to this evidence, if the position held by the plaintiff did not disappear, but rather, in response to the defendant bank’s own needs, was maintained within the institutional organizational chart, even if its name was changed, and if there is no technical study that justifies the dismissal of the plaintiff, applying criteria of efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, aptitudes, and other conditions related to the position, the termination of employment of Ms. L. must be considered an absolutely arbitrary and illegal dismissal, and for that reason, this Chamber considers that the appellate body did not incur an inadequate assessment of the probative elements provided to the case file, and therefore, the decision must be affirmed.

VI.- ON BACK PAY (SALARIOS CAÍDOS): The appellant opposes the award for back pay, because it considers it disproportionate and violative of the principle of reasonableness, taking into account the duration of the years of this process.

It notes that this Chamber has limited such payment to four years, when there is unjust enrichment, and that in any event, the plaintiff has not been inactive during all these years, but rather has worked in the Public Administration, so the recognition of salaries while she remained employed would be illegal in accordance with Article 17 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública). Although the bank's legal representative opposes the recognition of payment for back pay (salarios caídos) from the dismissal, as indicated by the appellate body, upon detailed review of the case file, this Chamber does not find that the plaintiff has undertaken actions to delay the normal course of the proceedings, and therefore, this request is not appropriate because the plaintiff suffered the consequences of an illegal act from the date it occurred, and her actions to defend her rights have been continuous. Now, according to the document on folio 278 front, the plaintiff worked for the Ministry of Governance and Police (Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía) during April and May of 2006 and for the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) in January and February of 2007, such that, in application of numeral 17 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), which prohibits simultaneously holding more than one salaried position in the organs and entities of the Public Administration, from the amounts recognized to the plaintiff for back pay (salarios caídos), no amount should be paid for that concept for the months of April-May 2006 and January-February 2007, given that during this period she received a salary charged to the public treasury. Finally, from the amounts paid to the plaintiff, the employer-employee contributions (cuotas obrero-patronales) not reported to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) from the date of the plaintiff's dismissal until her effective reinstatement must be deducted, for which purpose the respective referral of the judgment to the Inspection Department of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Departamento de Inspección de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) is ordered.” was appointed based on a competitive evaluation of qualifications (concurso de antecedentes) must stand, since there is no evidence in the case file to prove the contrary, much less that she had been appointed at the discretion of the employer or that she performed her duties without supervision or oversight, typical conditions of a confidential employee (empleado o empleada de confianza); none of this was demonstrated. In fact, Ms. C., the bank's human resources manager, stated the following [Name2]“…</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">. she joined the bank on July 19, 1999, she started working as an Area Director, at that time in Research and Development, then her departure occurred on</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> August 22, 2005, due to an administrative restructuring </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">(…) At the time the plaintiff was there, there was a procedure to attain that position. This was through the publication of an interim competition (concurso interino)…” </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">(folios 196 verso and 197 front).</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> Finally, it is necessary to point out that the opinions issued by the Procuraduría General de la República are not binding on the courts of justice, since judges are only subject to the Political Constitution, and therefore, the grievance that the matter must be resolved in light of what was stated in the mentioned opinions is also unacceptable.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">V.- REGARDING THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS: </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">As indicated, the termination of the plaintiff was justified by the existence of the restructuring process taking place at the defendant bank. The only evidence in the record related to the implementation of that process consists of official communication of September 19, 2005, addressed to Mr. G. Q., the General Manager at the time, by which he was informed that the Administration had been authorized to compensate all employees who would be terminated as a result of the mentioned process (folio 109). Also, the official communication of August 26 following, in which, among other points, Mr. G. Q. was informed of the approval of the bank's strategic plan and the new organizational structure of the institution (folios 110 and 111). Finally, the document titled “Anexo 5, organización”, which explains that after the restructuring, the bank would save one billion three hundred million colones in personnel expenses, including social charges (folios 113-117). On this point, it must first be clarified that it is not that the appellate body incurred in the defects of ultra petita and extra petita by considering that the technical studies to demonstrate the reasons and justifications that underpinned the plaintiff's dismissal were not submitted to the record. On the contrary, as stated in this ruling, the authorization provided by the legal system to dispense with the services of a public employee for reasons of restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, is “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">dispensable</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">” in the proposed structure and also impossible to integrate into the new institutional organization. However, to exercise this power – to forcibly transfer or dismiss its employees for reasons of reorganization – the defendant bank was obligated to base its action on a real need – duly verified – to improve the public service and to respect the procedure established for that purpose, which in this case, would be by means of a technical opinion (dictamen técnico) concluding that the integration of the plaintiff, considering the position she held, into the new institutional organization was impossible, such that the only viable solution for the administration was to dismiss her, because the functions she exercised would entirely disappear in the new modernized structure. This technical study is notably absent, as the bank, which had the obligation to provide it to support its actions as explained, did not do so. In this regard, as indicated, Public Administration employees are protected by employment stability (estabilidad en el empleo), and for this reason, it is not possible to admit that, under the pretext of a reorganization process, they dismiss workers without the technical studies justifying the disappearance of the position and the impossibility of relocating the employee to another position within the organization, because that would open a dangerous loophole to arbitrariness and insecurity.

In this regard, Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil), when referring to dismissal due to reorganization, indicates that when dispensing with employees, criteria such as efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, skills, and other conditions resulting from the evaluation of services shall be considered. This means, in the event that certain positions were eliminated and at the same time positions were created in the same category, it was required to prove that the plaintiff did not possess the aptitude and new requirements to remain in one of the new positions, which is not in the record, just as it was not demonstrated that it was not possible to place her in an equivalent position.

According to the documentary evidence received, as well as the testimonial evidence taken, the position held by Mrs. [Name2] did not actually disappear. Let us examine. When the plaintiff was dismissed, she permanently held the position of Director of General Services (Directora de Servicios Generales) and was in charge of the Security Department (surveillance, investigations, alarms, CCTV, and administration of the outsourced surveillance services contract), the Procurement Department (acquisition of goods and services, bidding processes, supply warehouse), the Transportation Unit, physical maintenance of the Bank's facilities (administration of the outsourced cleaning services contract), the Department of Administration of Marketable Assets (administration, custody, and sale of assets awarded to the Bank), and the Central Archive Unit (administration and custody of all documentation generated by the Bank in its different departments and of commercial documentation "credit files, checks, and securities"), and administration of internal and external courier services (see second fact of the complaint and its reply). Now, according to the new restructuring, the Directorate of General Services was renamed **Institutional Support**, with the Security Department, Procurement and Bidding, Transportation, Maintenance of Awarded Assets, and Institutional Archive remaining under its charge and supervision, and a Department called General Services being added (folios 116, 117, and 119). This was confirmed by the witness **[Name3].** who stated: […]. According to this evidence, if the position held by the plaintiff did not disappear, but rather, in response to the needs of the defendant bank, it was maintained within the institutional organizational chart, even though its name was changed, and if there is no technical study justifying the plaintiff's dismissal, considering criteria of efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, skills, and other conditions related to the position, the termination of employment of Mrs. L. must be considered an absolutely arbitrary and illegal dismissal, and therefore, this Chamber considers that the appellate body did not improperly assess the evidentiary elements submitted to the record, and thus, the resolution must be upheld.

**VI.- REGARDING BACK PAY (SALARIOS CAÍDOS):** The appellant opposes the award for back pay (salarios caídos), considering it disproportionate and in violation of the principle of reasonableness, considering the duration of the years of this process. It points out that this Chamber has limited that payment to four years when there is unjust enrichment, and that in any case, the plaintiff has not been inactive all these years but has worked in the Public Administration, so recognizing back pay while she remained employed would be illegal according to Article 17 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública). Although the bank's legal representative opposes the recognition of back pay from the time of dismissal, as the appellate body indicated, having carefully reviewed the case file, this Chamber does not find that the plaintiff filed procedures to delay the normal progress of the case, and therefore, this request is not admissible because the plaintiff suffered the consequences of an illegal act from the date it occurred, and her actions to defend her rights have been continuous. However, according to the document at folio 278 front, the plaintiff worked for the Ministry of Government and Police (Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía) during April and May of 2006 and for the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) in January and February of 2007, so in application of numeral 17 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, which prohibits simultaneously holding more than one salaried position in the organs and entities of the Public Administration, from the amounts recognized to the plaintiff for back pay, no amount should be paid for that concept for the months of April-May 2006 and January-February 2007, since during this period she received a salary charged to the public treasury.

Finally, from the amounts paid to the plaintiff, the worker-employer contributions not reported to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) from the date of the plaintiff's dismissal until her effective reinstatement must be deducted, for which purpose the respective referral of this ruling to the Inspection Department of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund is ordered.” Indeed, it cannot be denied that this is what allows the public servant to access a series of social and economic benefits that enable their academic and professional advancement, providing them with the security necessary for their personal development and that of the family unit that depends on them, which truly gives effect to the meaning of the right to work as an individual guarantee and an obligation to society, in the expression used by the constitutional text. It is for this reason that public servants can only be removed by way of exception, upon a justified cause for dismissal, or in the case of a forced reduction of services, one of the cases being precisely the restructuring processes to which an institution may be subjected, the latter also being in accordance with the principles derived from Article 192 of the Political Constitution. Now then, subjection to a legitimate modernization process, which guarantees the optimal use of public funds and the highest efficiency in the provision of the services entrusted to an institution, is, of course, a legitimate reason to execute organizational changes that, in the majority of cases, unavoidably entail the elimination of certain positions.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> But precisely because it is an exception to the constitutional guarantee of stability for the worker, its application by the administration must be executed with absolute objectivity, transparency, and seriousness, and hence the requirement for qualified technical studies that can validate the decision-making, based on a coherent and effective model. Under this line of reasoning, this Chamber admits that if the new structure cannot accommodate the relocation of an official, since the substantive functions they had been performing disappear, because they are eliminated in consideration of efficiency and modernization criteria, their dismissal under the commented constitutional provision is legitimate"</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> (the highlighting is not from the original) (ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. 4951-2000 of 4:37 p.m. on June 27,</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> 2000). On the same topic, that Chamber also indicated: "As the Chamber has indicated in repeated pronouncements, Article 192 of the Political Constitution empowers the Public Administration to order the restructuring of the various dependencies that comprise it, in order to achieve better performance and organization of the same, for which it may order</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> not only the elimination and reclassification of positions, but also the transfer of officials. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">The authorization that the legal system provides to dispense with the services of a public official due to restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, is dispensable in the current structure and, moreover, impossible to integrate into the new institutional organization. Thus, the State may implement its power to forcibly transfer or dismiss its officials for reasons of reorganization, provided that this is based on the real need—duly proven—to improve the public service and respects the procedure established for this purpose.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">In any case, and to make effective the protection of the rights of the administered, the constitutional jurisdiction of liberty is legitimized to review whether the figure of restructuring is used to cover up dismissals carried out for reasons foreign to purely organizational ones.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">This with the objective of preventing the need for reorganization and modernization of the State from serving to exempt the Administration from its elementary obligation to always act in respect of the rights and freedoms that the Social State of Law recognizes to individuals</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">"</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> (the underlining is the drafter's) (rulings of the Constitutional Chamber Nos. 1846, of 2:57 p.m. on February 29; 2496, of 5:39 p.m. on March 21; 4951, of 4:37 p.m. on June 27; and 5783, of 4:01 p.m. on July 11, all of the year 2000).</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> Likewise, that Chamber has expressed that: "Having clarified the scope of the power of review of this Chamber's judgments, it is appropriate to assess whether in the specific case the disputed facts were correctly appreciated at the time of issuing the sentence. The judgment dismissing the appeal is based on the fact that the reorganization that caused the questioned dismissal was subjected to the procedure established for this purpose (studies carried out by a specialized consulting firm and approval of the process by the National Board of Directors of the Bank), so the dismissal aimed to achieve a better organization of services, also complying with the requirement that this Chamber has already indicated as indispensable for cases in which the Administration bases itself on the postulates of Article 192 of the Constitution, which is that the position considered in itself is not only dispensable in the current structure, but is also impossible to integrate into the proposed institutional organization, so the only viable solution for the Administration is the dismissal of whoever occupies the position and exercises the correlative functions, which disappear entirely in the new modernized structure. Thus, the entire basis of the judgment in question rests precisely on the effective disappearance of the activities performed by the appellant, affirming this based on the technical reports that appear in the case file" (ruling No. 1244 of 12:58 p.m. on February 9, 2001). The dismissals occurring by virtue of the approval of a restructuring process are thus framed within what in doctrine is known as objective dismissals, whose main characteristic is that they respond to a unilateral decision of the employer, linked to a need of the company, supported by reports or expert opinions that so determine and not on the mere subjectivity of a particular superior. In the words of Cruz Villalón, these are "...situations in which the worker's performance does not provide the employer</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> the productive interest necessary for the object of their business activity..." (Cruz Villalón, Jesús. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">"Compendio de Derecho del Trabajo</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">"</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> 2nd ed. Editorial Tecnos. Madrid. Year 2009. Pg. 401). Taking the above to the sphere of public employment, we would say that dismissal based on objective causes is appropriate when the official does not contribute to the achievement of the public purpose in question. Specifically, the Spanish doctrine identifies five causes for objective dismissal, which are the following: "a) known or supervening ineptitude of the worker after their effective placement in the company; b) maladjustment of the worker to the technical modifications operated in their job position; c) amortization of job positions due to economic, technical, organizational, or production causes… d) due to absences from work, even if justified, but intermittent; and e) due to insufficiency of budgetary allocation". [Nombre1], Manuel Carlos; and, [Nombre2]</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">, Manuel. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">"Derecho del Trabajo</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">".</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> 17th ed. Editorial Universitaria Ramón Areces. Madrid. Year: 2009. Pg. 767). Of the enumerated causes, Article 192 of the Constitution and the Civil Service Statute specifically include "c)" and "e)", with reorganization or restructuring processes in public law entities corresponding precisely to an "economic, technical, organizational, or production" cause</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> for termination of the employment relationship. These types of causes—economic—"are grounds for termination when the amortization of positions contributes to overcoming the difficulties that impede the good functioning of the company, whether due to its competitive position in the market or due to demand requirements, through a better organization of resources. In summary, it is the relationship of reasonable proportionality between the number of workers whose contracts are terminated (and whose positions are amortized) and the causes invoked, and such weighting with a sole purpose: to reasonably contribute to improving the situation and making the business project viable (as a whole or in the area where amortization is deemed necessary…), in which the volume of work decreases or will decrease and, furthermore, the functions entrusted to the worker disappear or can be performed by others."</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> Specifically, in public employment relationships, where stability in the position appears constitutionally protected, it is required that, undoubtedly, a duly accredited causal link exists between the purpose proposed by the administration and the elimination of positions—appropriately—through the technical studies that so determine...".</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">IV.- </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">Regarding the first of the grievances, the representative of the defendant bank insists that the position held by the plaintiff was not protected by the principle of stability, since as of February 21, 2005, that is, six months before the termination of the employment relationship, the position she held had been excluded from the bank's collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), her being considered a trust employee (empleada de confianza) in accordance with Article 143 of the Labor Code and, therefore, freely removable. However, upon reviewing the case file, it was fully demonstrated that the plaintiff began working for the defendant on July 19, 1999. At that time, the III Amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by the defendant bank and the UNECA Union was in force, from which it is inferred, from its Article 1, that the plaintiff, being a worker, was covered by this collective instrument (folios 3-19), but before the termination of the employment relationship, specifically, as of February 21, 2005 (folio 35), the IV Amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the bank and the cited Union was approved (homologated) by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, in which its Article 1 excluded from the coverage of this collective instrument, among other positions, Area Directors, the position held by the plaintiff at the time of dismissal, since she served as Director of General Services. However, this exclusion, contained in the new collective bargaining agreement, does not have, in the specific case, the legal force to consider her a trust employee of free removal, as argued by the appellant, because, as explained, when she began working for the defendant bank on July 19, 1999, the III Amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by the defendant bank and the UNECA Union was in force, from which it is inferred, according to Articles 1 and 37, that she was covered by this collective instrument. The first of these provided: "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">The present Convention regulates the labor relations between the Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago and its workers of the Central Offices, Branches, Agencies, and other Dependencies, without prejudice to more favorable rules that may be issued in the future…". </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">For its part, numeral 37 established: "…</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">All persons who enter to provide services as workers of the Bank, with the exception of officials appointed by the Board of Directors, such as the Manager and Assistant Managers, the Auditor and Assistant Director, must have successfully passed the technical selection process approved until acquiring the condition of eligible. To fill vacant positions, the Personnel Administration will submit a shortlist of three candidates to the corresponding Heads and these, from this shortlist, will recommend to the General Manager or General Auditor, as appropriate, the suitable person or persons. It will be they who definitively make the corresponding appointments. The Bank commits to guarantee, respect, and stimulate the banking career and labor stability as regulated in this Convention, as well as the promotions of employees who work in the Institution, in harmony with the provisions of Article 188 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System…" </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">(folio 13). On the other hand, it must be taken into account that, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 54 and 55 of the Labor Code and a higher-ranking one, Article 62 of the Political Constitution, the stipulations contained in a collective bargaining agreement have the force of professional law for the parties that signed it and for those persons who, at the time of its entry into force, work for the company or in the profession it regulates, whether or not they are unionized, as well as for those who are hired in the future, while it is in force. That principle basically implies that, at least, in the legal relationship between the servants and the employer entity, who are bound by an agreement of that class, its rules constitute the primary source of labor rights and duties.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> It is not, of course, a matter of the repeal of ordinary legislation due to the collective agreement, since that remains fully valid and effective (numeral 129 of the Political Constitution). What occurs is, without a doubt, its inapplicability to the specific case, since the special regulation of the collective bargaining agreement is binding for this case.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> The rules of a legal transaction of this nature have, then, an exceptional rigor and are imposed on their addressees as rules of public order, making their singular derogation impossible for them.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> Of course, for such a consequence to occur, it is required that its content has been elaborated respecting the legal limits.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> Thus, a collective bargaining agreement cannot nullify rules of an imperative or prohibitive nature, including those classified as public order, nor could it be enforceable if it was agreed without the participation of those who, by law, should have expressed their consent (see, on the subject, ruling 108, of 9:40 a.m. on March 12, 2003). As explained, if the plaintiff began working for the defendant bank on July 19, 1999, she was covered by Articles 1 and 37 of the III Amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by the defendant bank and the UNECA Union (folios 3-19), but also, by the "right to employment stability," a fundamental principle of the public employment regime, established in Constitutional numeral 192, which is the right of public servants to keep their position; and to lose it only in the event of incurring one of the causes for dismissal established by labor legislation, or when a forced reduction of services is necessary due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization of the service.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">Regarding bank servants, as in the case at hand, this right is reaffirmed by Article 41, subsection 6) of the Organic Law of the National Banking System, which expressly recognizes to them the minimum benefits contemplated in the labor laws and Civil Service laws of the Republic, which results in the application in their favor of the rights contemplated by the Civil Service Statute. Article 43 of that statute reiterates the principle that the removal of those who work covered by that regulation may occur only when they incur the causes contemplated in Article 81 of the Labor Code and in Article 41, subsection d), of that law; or in acts that imply a serious infraction of such regulation, its regulations, or the respective internal labor regulations. Said law also contemplates the possibility of removal in those cases where </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">the forced reduction of services</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> is necessary due to absolute lack of funds; </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">or to achieve a more efficient and economical reorganization of the same,</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> provided that said reorganization affects at least sixty percent of the employees of the respective dependency. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">In the same sense, the Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> No. 7107, of November 4, 1988, published in La Gaceta No. 222 of November 22, 1988, transitory annex 3 of the articles of the National Banking System, Article 188, states: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:2.85pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">"</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Each State bank must have a roster in which the banking career is guaranteed to its officials, as well as their </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">immovability</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> and their promotions in such a way that they are ensured the right to ascend in said institutions from the lowest scale to being able to occupy the highest positions, based on merits. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:2.85pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Any modification carried out by the banks to adapt their regular rosters to the prevailing conditions at the time </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">will not affect in any way the employees who entered previously</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">…</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">".</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:2.85pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">From the foregoing, it follows that since labor stability is a constitutional guarantee for those who work in the public sector and particularly for bank officials, the specific cases of reorganization of services in which that right is curtailed must be assessed restrictively, in accordance with the specific assumptions in which the exception is authorized, in which case, dealing with a restructuring as in the present matter, it must be accompanied by the necessary technical studies that justify the dismissal decision; otherwise, it may not affect the acquired rights of the employees who already have stability in their position, as was the case with the plaintiff, who held a permanent appointment at the time of the elimination of her position (folio 2), a condition she had accessed long before the IV amendment to the collective bargaining agreement came into force. The assertion that Ms. [Nombre2]. was appointed based on a competitive examination of credentials must be upheld, since there is no evidence in the file to prove the contrary, much less that she had been appointed discretionally or that she performed functions without supervision or without oversight, typical conditions of a trust employee; none of this was demonstrated, even Ms. C., the bank's head of human resources, stated the following [Nombre2]"…</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">. joined the bank on July 19, 1999, began working as an Area Director, at that time in Research and Development, then her departure occurred on</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> August 22, 2005, due to administrative restructuring </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">(…) At the time the plaintiff was there, there was a procedure to attain that position. This was through the publication of the interim competitive examination…" </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">(folios 196 verso and 197 recto).</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> Finally, it is necessary to point out that the opinions issued by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) are not binding on the courts of justice, since the judges are only subject to the Political Constitution, and therefore, the grievance that it must be resolved in light of what was stated in the mentioned legal opinions is also not admissible.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">V.- REGARDING THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS: </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">As indicated, the plaintiff's dismissal was justified by the existence of the restructuring process taking place at the defendant bank. The only evidence in the case file related to the realization of that process consists of the official letter of September 19, 2005, addressed to Mr. G. Q., then General Manager, by which he was informed that the Administration had</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> been empowered to indemnify all the officials who would be dismissed on the occasion of the mentioned process (folio 109). Furthermore, the official letter of August 26 following, in which, among other points, Mr. G. Q. was informed of the approval of the bank's strategic plan and the new organizational structure of the institution (folios 110 and 111). Finally, the document titled "Anexo 1, organización", in which it is explained</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> that the bank, after the restructuring, would save one billion three hundred million colones in personnel expenses including social charges (folios 113-117). On this point, it must first be clarified</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> that it is not that the appellate body incurred in the defects of ultra petita and extra petita by considering that the technical studies were not provided in the case file to demonstrate the reasons and justifications that supported the plaintiff's dismissal. On the contrary, as indicated in this judgment, the authorization that the legal system provides to dispense with the services of a public official due to restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, is "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">dispensable</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" in the proposed structure and, moreover, impossible to integrate into the new institutional organization, but to make use of this power—to forcibly transfer or dismiss its officials for reasons of reorganization—the defendant bank was obligated to base itself on a real need—duly proven—to improve the public service and respect the procedure established for this purpose, which in this case would be through a technical report concluding the impossibility of integrating the plaintiff considering the position she occupied, into the</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> new institutional organization, so that the only viable solution for the administration was</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> to dismiss her, since the functions she performed would disappear entirely in the new modernized structure. This technical study is absent, as the bank, which had the obligation to provide it to support its actions as explained, did not do so. In this sense, as indicated,</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> the servants of the Public Administration are covered by employment stability, and therefore, it is not possible to admit that, under the pretext of a reorganization process, workers are dismissed without the technical studies that justify the disappearance of the position and the impossibility of relocating the worker to another position within the organization, because through that means a dangerous loophole for arbitrariness and insecurity would be opened.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">In this sense, Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute, when referring to dismissal due to reorganization, indicates that when dispensing with the servants, criteria such as efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, aptitudes, and other conditions resulting from the evaluation of services shall be considered, which, in the event that certain positions are eliminated and at the same time positions in the same category are created, obligated proving that the plaintiff did not possess the aptitude and new requirements to remain in one of the new positions, which is not recorded in the case file, just as it was not demonstrated that it was not possible to place her in an equivalent position.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">According to the documentary evidence received, as well as the testimonial evidence given, the position held by Ms. [Nombre2]. did not actually disappear. Let us see.Indeed, it cannot be denied that this is what allows the public servant to access a series of social and economic benefits that enable their academic and professional advancement, providing them with the security necessary for their personal development and that of the family unit that depends on them, which truly gives effect to the meaning of the right to work as an individual guarantee and an obligation to society, in the expression used by the constitutional text. It is for this reason that public servants can only be removed by way of exception, upon a justified cause for dismissal, or in the case of a forced reduction of services, one of the cases being precisely the restructuring processes to which an institution may be subjected, the latter also being in accordance with the principles derived from Article 192 of the Political Constitution. Now then, subjection to a legitimate modernization process, which guarantees the optimal use of public funds and the highest efficiency in the provision of the services entrusted to an institution, is, of course, a legitimate reason to execute organizational changes that, in the majority of cases, unavoidably entail the elimination of certain positions. But precisely because it is an exception to the constitutional guarantee of stability for the worker, its application by the administration must be executed with absolute objectivity, transparency, and seriousness, and hence the requirement for qualified technical studies that can validate the decision-making, based on a coherent and effective model. Under this line of reasoning, this Chamber admits that if the new structure cannot accommodate the relocation of an official, since the substantive functions they had been performing disappear, because they are eliminated in consideration of efficiency and modernization criteria, their dismissal under the commented constitutional provision is legitimate" (the highlighting is not from the original) (ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. 4951-2000 of 4:37 p.m. on June 27, 2000). On the same topic, that Chamber also indicated: "As the Chamber has indicated in repeated pronouncements, Article 192 of the Political Constitution empowers the Public Administration to order the restructuring of the various dependencies that comprise it, in order to achieve better performance and organization of the same, for which it may order not only the elimination and reclassification of positions, but also the transfer of officials. The authorization that the legal system provides to dispense with the services of a public official due to restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, is dispensable in the current structure and, moreover, impossible to integrate into the new institutional organization. Thus, the State may implement its power to forcibly transfer or dismiss its officials for reasons of reorganization, provided that this is based on the real need—duly proven—to improve the public service and respects the procedure established for this purpose. In any case, and to make effective the protection of the rights of the administered, the constitutional jurisdiction of liberty is legitimized to review whether the figure of restructuring is used to cover up dismissals carried out for reasons foreign to purely organizational ones. This with the objective of preventing the need for reorganization and modernization of the State from serving to exempt the Administration from its elementary obligation to always act in respect of the rights and freedoms that the Social State of Law recognizes to individuals" (the underlining is the drafter's) (rulings of the Constitutional Chamber Nos. 1846, of 2:57 p.m. on February 29; 2496, of 5:39 p.m. on March 21; 4951, of 4:37 p.m. on June 27; and 5783, of 4:01 p.m. on July 11, all of the year 2000). Likewise, that Chamber has expressed that: "Having clarified the scope of the power of review of this Chamber's judgments, it is appropriate to assess whether in the specific case the disputed facts were correctly appreciated at the time of issuing the sentence. The judgment dismissing the appeal is based on the fact that the reorganization that caused the questioned dismissal was subjected to the procedure established for this purpose (studies carried out by a specialized consulting firm and approval of the process by the National Board of Directors of the Bank), so the dismissal aimed to achieve a better organization of services, also complying with the requirement that this Chamber has already indicated as indispensable for cases in which the Administration bases itself on the postulates of Article 192 of the Constitution, which is that the position considered in itself is not only dispensable in the current structure, but is also impossible to integrate into the proposed institutional organization, so the only viable solution for the Administration is the dismissal of whoever occupies the position and exercises the correlative functions, which disappear entirely in the new modernized structure. Thus, the entire basis of the judgment in question rests precisely on the effective disappearance of the activities performed by the appellant, affirming this based on the technical reports that appear in the case file" (ruling No. 1244 of 12:58 p.m. on February 9, 2001). The dismissals occurring by virtue of the approval of a restructuring process are thus framed within what in doctrine is known as objective dismissals, whose main characteristic is that they respond to a unilateral decision of the employer, linked to a need of the company, supported by reports or expert opinions that so determine and not on the mere subjectivity of a particular superior. In the words of Cruz Villalón, these are "...situations in which the worker's performance does not provide the employer the productive interest necessary for the object of their business activity..." (Cruz Villalón, Jesús. "Compendio de Derecho del Trabajo". 2nd ed. Editorial Tecnos. Madrid. Year 2009. Pg. 401). Taking the above to the sphere of public employment, we would say that dismissal based on objective causes is appropriate when the official does not contribute to the achievement of the public purpose in question. Specifically, the Spanish doctrine identifies five causes for objective dismissal, which are the following: "a) known or supervening ineptitude of the worker after their effective placement in the company; b) maladjustment of the worker to the technical modifications operated in their job position; c) amortization of job positions due to economic, technical, organizational, or production causes… d) due to absences from work, even if justified, but intermittent; and e) due to insufficiency of budgetary allocation". [Nombre1], Manuel Carlos; and, [Nombre2] , Manuel. "Derecho del Trabajo". 17th ed. Editorial Universitaria Ramón Areces. Madrid. Year: 2009. Pg. 767). Of the enumerated causes, Article 192 of the Constitution and the Civil Service Statute specifically include "c)" and "e)", with reorganization or restructuring processes in public law entities corresponding precisely to an "economic, technical, organizational, or production" cause for termination of the employment relationship. These types of causes—economic—"are grounds for termination when the amortization of positions contributes to overcoming the difficulties that impede the good functioning of the company, whether due to its competitive position in the market or due to demand requirements, through a better organization of resources. In summary, it is the relationship of reasonable proportionality between the number of workers whose contracts are terminated (and whose positions are amortized) and the causes invoked, and such weighting with a sole purpose: to reasonably contribute to improving the situation and making the business project viable (as a whole or in the area where amortization is deemed necessary…), in which the volume of work decreases or will decrease and, furthermore, the functions entrusted to the worker disappear or can be performed by others." Specifically, in public employment relationships, where stability in the position appears constitutionally protected, it is required that, undoubtedly, a duly accredited causal link exists between the purpose proposed by the administration and the elimination of positions—appropriately—through the technical studies that so determine...".

IV.- Regarding the first of the grievances, the representative of the defendant bank insists that the position held by the plaintiff was not protected by the principle of stability, since as of February 21, 2005, that is, six months before the termination of the employment relationship, the position she held had been excluded from the bank's collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), her being considered a trust employee (empleada de confianza) in accordance with Article 143 of the Labor Code and, therefore, freely removable. However, upon reviewing the case file, it was fully demonstrated that the plaintiff began working for the defendant on July 19, 1999. At that time, the III Amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by the defendant bank and the UNECA Union was in force, from which it is inferred, from its Article 1, that the plaintiff, being a worker, was covered by this collective instrument (folios 3-19), but before the termination of the employment relationship, specifically, as of February 21, 2005 (folio 35), the IV Amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the bank and the cited Union was approved by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, in which its Article 1 excluded from the coverage of this collective instrument, among other positions, Area Directors, the position held by the plaintiff at the time of dismissal, since she served as Director of General Services. However, this exclusion, contained in the new collective bargaining agreement, does not have, in the specific case, the legal force to consider her a trust employee of free removal, as argued by the appellant, because, as explained, when she began working for the defendant bank on July 19, 1999, the III Amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by the defendant bank and the UNECA Union was in force, from which it is inferred, according to Articles 1 and 37, that she was covered by this collective instrument. The first of these provided: "The present Convention regulates the labor relations between the Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago and its workers of the Central Offices, Branches, Agencies, and other Dependencies, without prejudice to more favorable rules that may be issued in the future…". For its part, numeral 37 established: "…All persons who enter to provide services as workers of the Bank, with the exception of officials appointed by the Board of Directors, such as the Manager and Assistant Managers, the Auditor and Assistant Director, must have successfully passed the technical selection process approved until acquiring the condition of eligible. To fill vacant positions, the Personnel Administration will submit a shortlist of three candidates to the corresponding Heads and these, from this shortlist, will recommend to the General Manager or General Auditor, as appropriate, the suitable person or persons. It will be they who definitively make the corresponding appointments. The Bank commits to guarantee, respect, and stimulate the banking career and labor stability as regulated in this Convention, as well as the promotions of employees who work in the Institution, in harmony with the provisions of Article 188 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System…" (folio 13). On the other hand, it must be taken into account that, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 54 and 55 of the Labor Code and a higher-ranking one, Article 62 of the Political Constitution, the stipulations contained in a collective bargaining agreement have the force of professional law for the parties that signed it and for those persons who, at the time of its entry into force, work for the company or in the profession it regulates, whether or not they are unionized, as well as for those who are hired in the future, while it is in force. That principle basically implies that, at least, in the legal relationship between the servants and the employer entity, who are bound by an agreement of that class, its rules constitute the primary source of labor rights and duties. It is not, of course, a matter of the repeal of ordinary legislation due to the collective agreement, since that remains fully valid and effective (numeral 129 of the Political Constitution). What occurs is, without a doubt, its inapplicability to the specific case, since the special regulation of the collective bargaining agreement is binding for this case. The rules of a legal transaction of this nature have, then, an exceptional rigor and are imposed on their addressees as rules of public order, making their singular derogation impossible for them. Of course, for such a consequence to occur, it is required that its content has been elaborated respecting the legal limits. Thus, a collective bargaining agreement cannot nullify rules of an imperative or prohibitive nature, including those classified as public order, nor could it be enforceable if it was agreed without the participation of those who, by law, should have expressed their consent (see, on the subject, ruling 108, of 9:40 a.m. on March 12, 2003). As explained, if the plaintiff began working for the defendant bank on July 19, 1999, she was covered by Articles 1 and 37 of the III Amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by the defendant bank and the UNECA Union (folios 3-19), but also, by the "right to employment stability," a fundamental principle of the public employment regime, established in Constitutional numeral 192, which is the right of public servants to keep their position; and to lose it only in the event of incurring one of the causes for dismissal established by labor legislation, or when a forced reduction of services is necessary due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization of the service. Regarding bank servants, as in the case at hand, this right is reaffirmed by Article 41, subsection 6) of the Organic Law of the National Banking System, which expressly recognizes to them the minimum benefits contemplated in the labor laws and Civil Service laws of the Republic, which results in the application in their favor of the rights contemplated by the Civil Service Statute. Article 43 of that statute reiterates the principle that the removal of those who work covered by that regulation may occur only when they incur the causes contemplated in Article 81 of the Labor Code and in Article 41, subsection d), of that law; or in acts that imply a serious infraction of such regulation, its regulations, or the respective internal labor regulations. Said law also contemplates the possibility of removal in those cases where the forced reduction of services is necessary due to absolute lack of funds; or to achieve a more efficient and economical reorganization of the same, provided that said reorganization affects at least sixty percent of the employees of the respective dependency. In the same sense, the Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República No. 7107, of November 4, 1988, published in La Gaceta No. 222 of November 22, 1988, transitory annex 3 of the articles of the National Banking System, Article 188, states: "Each State bank must have a roster in which the banking career is guaranteed to its officials, as well as their immovability and their promotions in such a way that they are ensured the right to ascend in said institutions from the lowest scale to being able to occupy the highest positions, based on merits. Any modification carried out by the banks to adapt their regular rosters to the prevailing conditions at the time will not affect in any way the employees who entered previously…". From the foregoing, it follows that since labor stability is a constitutional guarantee for those who work in the public sector and particularly for bank officials, the specific cases of reorganization of services in which that right is curtailed must be assessed restrictively, in accordance with the specific assumptions in which the exception is authorized, in which case, dealing with a restructuring as in the present matter, it must be accompanied by the necessary technical studies that justify the dismissal decision; otherwise, it may not affect the acquired rights of the employees who already have stability in their position, as was the case with the plaintiff, who held a permanent appointment at the time of the elimination of her position (folio 2), a condition she had accessed long before the IV amendment to the collective bargaining agreement came into force. The assertion that Ms. [Nombre2]. was appointed based on a competitive examination of credentials must be upheld, since there is no evidence in the file to prove the contrary, much less that she had been appointed discretionally or that she performed functions without supervision or without oversight, typical conditions of a trust employee; none of this was demonstrated, even Ms. C., the bank's head of human resources, stated the following [Nombre2]"…. joined the bank on July 19, 1999, began working as an Area Director, at that time in Research and Development, then her departure occurred on August 22, 2005, due to administrative restructuring (…) At the time the plaintiff was there, there was a procedure to attain that position. This was through the publication of the interim competitive examination…" (folios 196 verso and 197 recto). Finally, it is necessary to point out that the opinions issued by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) are not binding on the courts of justice, since the judges are only subject to the Political Constitution, and therefore, the grievance that it must be resolved in light of what was stated in the mentioned legal opinions is also not admissible.

V.- REGARDING THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS: As indicated, the plaintiff's dismissal was justified by the existence of the restructuring process taking place at the defendant bank. The only evidence in the case file related to the realization of that process consists of the official letter of September 19, 2005, addressed to Mr. G. Q., then General Manager, by which he was informed that the Administration had been empowered to indemnify all the officials who would be dismissed on the occasion of the mentioned process (folio 109). Furthermore, the official letter of August 26 following, in which, among other points, Mr. G. Q. was informed of the approval of the bank's strategic plan and the new organizational structure of the institution (folios 110 and 111). Finally, the document titled "Anexo 1, organización", in which it is explained that the bank, after the restructuring, would save one billion three hundred million colones in personnel expenses including social charges (folios 113-117). On this point, it must first be clarified that it is not that the appellate body incurred in the defects of ultra petita and extra petita by considering that the technical studies were not provided in the case file to demonstrate the reasons and justifications that supported the plaintiff's dismissal. On the contrary, as indicated in this judgment, the authorization that the legal system provides to dispense with the services of a public official due to restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, is "dispensable" in the proposed structure and, moreover, impossible to integrate into the new institutional organization, but to make use of this power—to forcibly transfer or dismiss its officials for reasons of reorganization—the defendant bank was obligated to base itself on a real need—duly proven—to improve the public service and respect the procedure established for this purpose, which in this case would be through a technical report concluding the impossibility of integrating the plaintiff considering the position she occupied, into the new institutional organization, so that the only viable solution for the administration was to dismiss her, since the functions she performed would disappear entirely in the new modernized structure. This technical study is absent, as the bank, which had the obligation to provide it to support its actions as explained, did not do so. In this sense, as indicated, the servants of the Public Administration are covered by employment stability, and therefore, it is not possible to admit that, under the pretext of a reorganization process, workers are dismissed without the technical studies that justify the disappearance of the position and the impossibility of relocating the worker to another position within the organization, because through that means a dangerous loophole for arbitrariness and insecurity would be opened. In this sense, Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute, when referring to dismissal due to reorganization, indicates that when dispensing with the servants, criteria such as efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, aptitudes, and other conditions resulting from the evaluation of services shall be considered, which, in the event that certain positions are eliminated and at the same time positions in the same category are created, obligated proving that the plaintiff did not possess the aptitude and new requirements to remain in one of the new positions, which is not recorded in the case file, just as it was not demonstrated that it was not possible to place her in an equivalent position. According to the documentary evidence received, as well as the testimonial evidence given, the position held by Ms. [Nombre2]. did not actually disappear. Let us see.

At the time the plaintiff was dismissed, she held the position of Director of General Services as a permanent appointee and had under her charge the Security Department (surveillance, investigations, alarms, CCTV, and administration of the outsourced surveillance services contract), the Procurement Department (acquisition of goods and services, bidding processes, supply warehouse), the Transportation Unit, physical maintenance of the Bank's facilities (administration of the outsourced cleaning services contract), the Department of Administration of Realizable Assets (administration, custody, and sale of assets awarded by the Bank), and the Central Archive Unit (administration and custody of all documentation generated by the Bank in its various units and of commercial documentation "credit files, checks, and negotiable instruments"), as well as administration of internal and external courier services (see second proven fact of the complaint and its response). That said, according to the new restructuring, the Directorate of General Services was renamed **Institutional Support**, such that under its charge and dependency fell the Security Department, Procurement and Bidding, Transportation, Maintenance of Awarded Assets, and Institutional Archive, with the addition of a department called General Services (folios 116, 117, and 119). This was confirmed by witness **[Nombre3]**, who stated: […]. In accordance with this evidence, if the position held by the plaintiff did not disappear, but rather, in response to the defendant bank's own needs, was retained within the institutional organizational chart, even under a new name, and if there is no technical study justifying the plaintiff's dismissal based on criteria of efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, aptitude, and other conditions related to the position, the termination of Ms. L.'s employment must be deemed an absolutely arbitrary and illegal dismissal, and therefore, this Chamber considers that the appellate body did not err in its assessment of the evidentiary elements submitted to the case file, and the decision must consequently be upheld.

**VI.- ON BACK PAY (SALARIOS CAÍDOS):** The appellant objects to the award of back pay (salarios caídos), arguing that it is disproportionate and violates the principle of reasonableness, considering the length of this proceeding in years. It points out that this Chamber has limited such payment to four years when there is unjust enrichment and that, in any case, the plaintiff has not been inactive all these years, but has worked in the Public Administration, and therefore, awarding wages while she remained employed would be illegal under Article 17 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service. Although the bank's attorney objects to the award of back pay (salarios caídos) from the time of dismissal, as the appellate body indicated, upon carefully reviewing the case file, this Chamber does not find that the plaintiff took actions to delay the normal course of the proceeding, and therefore, this request is not proper because the plaintiff suffered the consequences of an illegal act from the date it occurred, and her actions to defend her rights have been continuous. That said, according to the document on folio 278 front, the plaintiff worked for the Ministry of Governance and Police during April and May of 2006 and for the Judicial Branch in January and February of 2007, such that, in application of Article 17 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, which prohibits simultaneously holding more than one salaried position in the organs and entities of the Public Administration, from the amounts awarded to the plaintiff for back pay (salarios caídos), no amount shall be paid for that concept for the months of April-May 2006 and January-February 2007, given that during this period she received a salary charged to the public treasury. Finally, from the amounts paid to the plaintiff, the employer-employee contributions not reported to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) from the date of the plaintiff's dismissal until her effective reinstatement must be deducted, for which purpose the respective referral of the judgment to the Inspection Department of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) is ordered."

“III.- El despido de la demandante fue justificado en un proceso de reestructuración organizacional llevado a cabo por Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago, aprobado -según indica el demandado en su contestación- por la Junta Directiva de la entidad bancaria en la sesión n° 7878/05, artículo 1° del 18 de agosto de 2005 (demanda, contestación, folios 110 y 111). Es por eso que, previo analizar los argumentos del recurrente, es necesario retomar lo que esta Sala de manera reiterada, ha dicho sobre los despidos fundamentados en un proceso de reestructuración organizacional como el discutido en este asunto. Así mediante fallo 1019 de las 9:35 horas del 9 de julio de 2010, se indicó: “…Como principio fundamental del régimen de empleo público, el numeral 192 constitucional instituyó el denominado “derecho a la estabilidad en el empleo”, el cual ha sido concebido como el derecho del servidor público a conservar su puesto y de perderlo sólo en caso de incurrir en alguna de las causales de despido establecidas por la legislación de trabajo o cuando resulte necesaria una reducción forzosa de servicios por falta de fondos o para lograr una mejor organización del servicio. Respecto de los servidores bancarios, el artículo 41, inciso 6), de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, expresamente les reconoce, los beneficios mínimos contemplados en las leyes de trabajo y de Servicio Civil de la República, lo que redunda en la aplicación en su favor de los derechos contemplados por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil. El artículo 43 de ese estatuto, establece la remoción de los servidores amparados por esa normativa, únicamente cuando incurrieren en las causales contempladas en el artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo y 41, inciso d), de esa ley, o en actos que impliquen infracción grave de tal normativa, de sus reglamentos, o de los reglamentos interiores de trabajo respectivos. También contempla dicha ley, la posibilidad de remoción en aquellos casos en que resulte necesaria la reducción forzosa de servicios por falta absoluta de fondos; o para conseguir una reorganización más eficaz y económica, siempre que esa reorganización afecte por lo menos al 60% de los empleados de la respectiva dependencia. De lo anterior resulta que al ser la estabilidad laboral una garantía para el funcionario bancario, los casos específicos de reorganización de servicios en los que se cercene ese derecho, deben ser valorados con absoluta objetividad y apegados a la legalidad. Los procedimientos legales establecidos al efecto deben respetarse y también los derechos de los servidores directa o indirectamente involucrados, de manera que tanto las nuevas formas organizativas propuestas, los criterios para determinar cuáles plazas se mantienen dentro del órgano o entidad y sus condiciones, así como la propuesta sobre los funcionarios que habrán de ser removidos o trasladados, son asuntos que deben establecerse con base a los estudios técnicamente sustentados que acrediten la necesidad imperante de la medida propuesta para la efectiva concreción de un fin público asociado a una mejor prestación del servicio en claro beneficio del usuario-administrado o para solventar una deficitaria situación económica de la entidad, pues de lo contrario, se estaría abriendo un peligroso portillo a la arbitrariedad, para que sea la voluntad del jerarca -o de los encargados de ejecutar los cambios- la que disponga esos aspectos, aún sin ninguna fundamentación o utilizando mecanismos indebidos o criterios discriminatorios. En esta materia, la Sala Constitucional ha reconocido la constitucionalidad de los procesos de reestructuración en la Administración Pública, en los siguientes términos: “Derecho al trabajo y estabilidad en el empleo. En una relación de empleo público, la proyección del derecho al trabajo protegido por el artículo 56 constitucional contiene como uno de sus postulados a favor del trabajador el de la estabilidad en el puesto. En efecto, no puede desconocerse que ello es lo que permite al servidor acceder a una serie de beneficios sociales y económicos que posibilitan su superación académica y laboral, proporcionándole la seguridad necesaria para su desarrollo personal y del núcleo familiar que de él depende, lo que efectiviza realmente el sentido del derecho al trabajo como garantía individual y obligación con la sociedad, en la expresión utilizada por el texto constitucional. Es por ello que los servidores sólo pueden ser removidos por vía de excepción, ante una causal de despido justificado, o en el caso de reducción forzosa de servicios, siendo uno de los casos precisamente los procesos de reestructuración a que puede someterse una institución, encontrándose esto último, además, en consonancia con los principios que se derivan del artículo 192 de la Constitución Política. Ahora bien, el sometimiento a un proceso legítimo de modernización, que garantice la óptima utilización de los fondos públicos y la más alta eficiencia en la prestación de los servicios encomendados a una institución, es, desde luego, un motivo legítimo para ejecutar cambios organizacionales que, en la mayoría de los casos, irremediablemente conllevan la supresión de determinadas plazas. Pero justamente por ser una excepción a la garantía constitucional de estabilidad para el trabajador, su aplicación por parte de la administración debe ser ejecutada con absoluta objetividad, transparencia y seriedad, y de ahí la exigencia de estudios técnicos calificados que puedan validar la toma de decisiones, con base en un modelo coherente y efectivo. Bajo este orden de ideas, esta Sala admite que si la nueva estructura no puede dar cabida a la reubicación de un funcionario, toda vez que las funciones sustantivas que venía desempeñando desaparecen, por suprimirse en atención a criterios de eficiencia y modernización, es legítimo su cese con apego a la disposición constitucional comentada” (lo destacado no es del original) (voto de la Sala Constitucional n° 4951-2000 de las 16:37 horas del 27 de junio de 2000). Sobre el mismo tema esa Sala también indicó: “Como lo ha indicado la Sala en reiterados pronunciamientos, el artículo 192 de la Constitución Política faculta a la Administración Pública para disponer la reestructuración de las diversas dependencias que la componen, con el fin de alcanzar un mejor desempeño y organización de las mismas, para lo cual podrá ordenar no sólo la eliminación y recalificación de plazas, sino el traslado de los funcionarios. La autorización que brinda el ordenamiento para prescindir de los servicios de un funcionario público por motivo de reestructuración implica necesariamente que el puesto, considerado en sí mismo, sea dispensable en la estructura vigente y además de imposible integración en la nueva organización institucional. De manera que el Estado podrá poner en práctica su facultad de trasladar o despedir forzosamente a sus funcionarios por razones de reorganización, siempre y cuando ésta se fundamente en la necesidad real -debidamente comprobada- de mejorar el servicio público y respete el procedimiento establecido a tal efecto. En todo caso, y para hacer efectiva la tutela de los derechos de los administrados, la jurisdicción constitucional de libertad está legitimada para revisar si la figura de la reestructuración es utilizada para encubrir despidos que se realizan por motivos ajenos a los meramente organizacionales. Esto con el objetivo de evitar que la necesidad de reorganización y modernización del Estado sirva para eximir a la Administración de su elemental obligación de actuar siempre en respeto de los derechos y libertades que el Estado Social de Derecho reconoce a los individuos” (el subrayado es del redactor) (votos de la Sala Constitucional n°s 1846, de las 14:57 horas del 29 de febrero; 2496, de las 17:39 horas del 21 de marzo; 4951, de las 16:37 horas del 27 de junio y 5783, de las 16:01 horas del 11 de julio todas del año 2000). Igualmente ha expresado esa Sala que: “Teniendo claros los alcances de la potestad de revisión de los fallos de esta Sala, procede entrar a valorar si en el caso concreto se apreciaron correctamente los hechos discutidos al momento de dictar sentencia. El fallo desestimatorio del recurso se apoya en el hecho de que la reorganización que originó el despido cuestionado fue sometida al procedimiento establecido al efecto (estudios realizados por firma consultora especializada y aprobación del proceso por parte de la Junta Directiva Nacional del Banco), de manera que la destitución tenía como fin lograr una mejor organización de los servicios, cumpliendo además con el requisito que ya ha señalado esta Sala como indispensable para los casos en que la Administración se fundamenta en los postulados del artículo 192 constitucional, cual es que el puesto considerado en sí mismo no sólo sea dispensable en la estructura vigente, sino que es de imposible integración en la organización institucional propuesta, de modo que la única solución viable para la Administración es el despido de quien ocupa la plaza y ejerce las correlativas funciones, que desaparecen del todo en la nueva estructura modernizada. De manera que todo el fundamento del fallo en cuestión se asienta precisamente en la efectiva desaparición de las actividades desempeñadas por el recurrente, afirmándose para ello en los dictámenes técnicos que constan en autos” (voto n° 1244 de las 12:58 horas del 9 de febrero de 2001). Se enmarcan, de este modo, los despidos acaecidos en virtud de la aprobación de un proceso de reestructuración, dentro de lo que en doctrina se conoce como despidos objetivos, cuya principal característica es que obedecen a una decisión unilateral del empleador, vinculada a una necesidad de la empresa, sustentada en informes o pericias que así lo determinen y no en la sola subjetividad de una jefatura en particular. En palabras de Cruz Villalón se trata de “…situaciones en las que la prestación del trabajador no aporta al empleador el interés productivo necesario al objeto de su actividad empresarial…” (Cruz Villalón, Jesús. “Compendio de Derecho del Trabajo”. 2da ed. Editorial Tecnos. Madrid. Año 2009. Pág. 401). Llevado lo anterior al ámbito de empleo público, diríamos, que resulta procedente el despido fundado en causas objetivas, cuando no aporta el funcionario, a la consecución del fin público del que se trate. Concretamente la doctrina española identifica cinco causales de despido objetivas que son las siguientes: “a) ineptitud del trabajador conocida o sobrevenida con posterioridad a su colocación efectiva en la empresa; b) inadaptación del trabajador a las modificaciones técnicas operadas en su puesto de trabajo; c) amortización de puestos de trabajo por causas económicas, técnicas, organizativas o de producción… d) por faltas de asistencia al trabajo, aún justificadas, pero intermitentes y e) por insuficiencia de consignación presupuestaria”. [Nombre1] , Manuel Carlos; y, [Nombre2] , Manuel. “Derecho del Trabajo”. 17° ed. Editorial Universitaria Ramón Areces. Madrid. Año: 2009. Pág. 767). De las causales enumeradas, el artículo 192 constitucional y el Estatuto del Servicio Civil, recogen –concretamente- la “c)” y la “e)”, correspondiendo los procesos de reorganización o reestructuración en las entidades de derecho público, precisamente una causa “económica, técnica, organizativa o de producción”, de terminación de la relación de trabajo. Este tipo de causas –económicas- “son fundamento extintivo cuando la amortización de puestos contribuya a superar las dificultades que impiden el buen funcionamiento de la empresa, ya sea por su posición competitiva en el mercado, ya por exigencia de la demanda, a través de una mejor organización de los recursos. En resumen, es la relación de la proporcionalidad razonable entre el número de trabajadores cuyos contratos se extinguen (y cuyos puestos se amortizan) y las causas que se invocan y tal ponderación con un exclusivo fin: contribuir razonablemente a mejorar la situación y hacer viable el proyecto empresarial (en su conjunto o en el ámbito en que se considere necesaria la amortización…), en el que disminuye o va a disminuir el volumen de trabajo y, además, las funciones encomendadas al trabajador desaparecen o pueden hacerlas otros”. Concretamente, en las relaciones de empleo público, donde la estabilidad en el cargo aparece resguardada constitucionalmente, se requiere que, indubitablemente, entre el fin propuesto por la administración y la eliminación de plazas, exista un nexo de causalidad acreditado –apropiadamente- mediante los estudios técnicos que así lo determinen…”.

IV.- En el primero de los agravios, el apoderado del banco accionado, insiste en que el cargo ocupado por la actora, no estaba protegido por el principio de estabilidad, toda vez que desde el 21 de febrero de 2005, es decir, seis meses antes del rompimiento de la relación laboral, el cargo que ocupaba, había sido excluido de la convención colectiva del banco, siendo considerada como una empleada de confianza de conformidad con el artículo 143 del Código de Trabajo y por eso, de libre remoción. Sin embargo, revisado los autos, quedó plenamente demostrado que la actora empezó a laborar para la demandada desde el 19 de julio de 1999. Para ese momento, regía la III Reforma a la Convención Colectiva suscrita por el banco demandado y el Sindicato UNECA, de donde se desprende, de su artículo 1 que la actora, por ser trabajadora estaba amparada a este instrumento colectivo (folios 3-19), pero antes del rompimiento de la relación laboral, concretamente, desde 21 de febrero de 2005 (folio 35) se homologó por parte del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social la IV Reforma a la Convención Colectiva entre el banco y el Sindicato citado, en la que en su artículo 1, excluyó del amparo de este instrumento colectivo, entre otros cargos, a los Directores y Directoras de Área, puesto que ocupaba la actora al momento del cese, pues fungía como Directora del Servicios Generales. No obstante, esta exclusión, contenida en el nuevo convenio colectivo, no tiene, en el caso específico, la fuerza legal para considerarla una empleada de confianza de libre remoción, tal y como lo argumenta el recurrente, pues como se explicó cuando ésta inició labores para el banco demandado, el 19 de julio de 1999, se encontraba vigente la III Reforma a la Convención Colectiva suscrita por el banco demandado y el Sindicato UNECA, de donde se desprende, según los artículo 1 y 37 que estaba amparada por este instrumento colectivo. El primero de estos disponía: “La presente Convención regula las relaciones de trabajo entre el Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago y sus trabajadores de las Oficinas Centrales, Sucursales, Agencias y otras Dependencias, sin perjuicios de normas más favorables que en el futuro se dicten…”. Por su lado, el numeral 37 establecía: “…Todas las personas que ingresen a prestar servicios como trabajadores del Banco, a excepción de los funcionarios de nombramiento de la Junta Directiva, tales como el Gerente y Subgerentes, el Auditor y Subdirector, deben haber superado favorablemente el proceso de selección técnica aprobada hasta adquirir la condición de elegible. Para llenar las plazas vacantes, la Administración de Personal remitirá una terna a los Jefes que corresponda y éstos, de esta terna, recomendarán al Gerente o Auditor Generales, según proceda, la persona o personas idóneas. Serán ellos quienes en definitiva harán los nombramientos correspondientes. El Banco se compromete a garantizar, respetar y estimular la carrera bancaria y la estabilidad laboral conforme a lo regulado en esta Convención, así como los ascensos de los empleados que laboren en la Institución, en armonía con lo establecido en el artículo 188 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional…” (folio 13). Por otro lado, debe tomarse en cuenta que, al tenor de lo dispuesto en los artículos 54 y 55 del Código de Trabajo y en otro de mayor rango, el 62 de la Constitución Política, las estipulaciones contenidas en una convención colectiva, tienen fuerza de ley profesional para las partes que la suscribieron y para aquellas personas que, en el momento de su entrada en vigor, trabajen para la empresa o en la profesión que regula, estén o no sindicalizadas, así como para las que sean contratadas en el futuro, mientras esté vigente. Ese principio implica, básicamente, que, al menos, en la relación jurídica entre los y las servidoras y la entidad patronal, que se encuentran vinculados o vinculadas por un acuerdo de esa clase, sus normas constituyen la fuente primigenia de los derechos y de los deberes laborales. No se trata, claro está, de la derogatoria de la legislación ordinaria, por causa del pacto colectivo, pues aquella sigue siendo plenamente válida y eficaz (numeral 129 de la Constitución Política). Lo que se produce es, sin duda, su inaplicabilidad al caso concreto, por cuanto resulta vinculante, para éste, la regulación especial de la convención colectiva. Las normas de un negocio jurídico de esta índole tienen, entonces, un rigor excepcional y se imponen, a sus destinatarios, como reglas de orden público, siendo imposible, para ellos, su derogación singular. Por supuesto, para que tal consecuencia se produzca, se requiere que su contenido haya sido elaborado respetando los límites legales. Así, un convenio colectivo no puede dejar sin efecto normas de carácter imperativo o prohibitivo, entre ellas las calificadas como de orden público, ni podría ser oponible si se ha pactado sin la participación de quienes, por ley, debieron haber manifestado su asentimiento (ver, sobre el tema, el voto 108, de 9:40 horas del 12 de marzo de 2003). Como se explicó, si la actora inició labores para el banco demandado el 19 de julio de 1999, estaba amparada por el artículo 1° y 37 de la III Reforma a la Convención Colectiva suscrita por el banco demandado y el Sindicato UNECA (folios 3-19), pero además, por el “derecho a la estabilidad en el empleo”, principio fundamental del régimen de empleo público, establecido en el numeral 192 constitucional, que es el derecho de los servidores y de las servidoras públicas a conservar su puesto; y perderlo sólo en caso de incurrir en alguna de las causales de despido establecidas por la legislación de trabajo, o bien, cuando resulte necesaria una reducción forzosa de servicios por falta de fondos o para lograr una mejor organización del servicio. Respecto de los servidores bancarios, como en el caso que nos ocupa, este derecho lo reafirma el artículo 41 inciso 6) de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, que expresamente les reconoce los beneficios mínimos contemplados en las leyes de trabajo y de Servicio Civil de la República, lo que redunda en la aplicación en su favor de los derechos contemplados por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil. El artículo 43 de ese estatuto reitera el principio de que la remoción de quienes laboran amparados por esa normativa podrá darse únicamente cuando incurrieren en las causales contempladas en el artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo y en el 41, inciso d), de esa ley; o en actos que impliquen infracción grave de tal normativa, de sus reglamentos, o de los reglamentos interiores de trabajo respectivos. También contempla dicha ley, la posibilidad de remoción en aquellos casos en que resulte necesaria la reducción forzosa de servicios por falta absoluta de fondos; o para conseguir una más eficaz y económica reorganización de los mismos, siempre que esa reorganización afecte por lo menos al sesenta por ciento de los empleados de la respectiva dependencia. En el mismo sentido la Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República n° 7107, de 4 de noviembre de 1988, publicada en La Gaceta n° 222 del 22 de noviembre de 1988, transitorio anexo 3 de los artículos del Sistema Bancario Nacional, artículo 188, expresa:

“Cada banco del Estado deberá tener un escalafón en el que se les garantice la carrera bancaria a sus funcionarios, así como su inamovilidad y sus ascensos en forma tal que se les asegura el derecho de ascender en dichas instituciones desde la escala inferior hasta poder ocupar las posiciones más elevadas, con base en méritos.

Cualquier modificación que lleven a cabo los bancos para adecuar sus escalafones regulares a las condiciones imperantes en el momento, no afectará en forma alguna a los empleados que ingresaron con anterioridad…”.

De lo anterior resulta que al ser la estabilidad laboral, una garantía constitucional para quienes laboran en el sector público y particularmente para los y las funcionarias bancarias, los casos específicos de reorganización de servicios en los que se cercene ese derecho deben ser valorados en forma restrictiva, conforme con los supuestos específicos en los que se autoriza la excepción, en cuyo caso, tratándose de una reestructuración como en el presente asunto, debe acompañarse con los estudios técnicos necesarios que justifique la decisión despido, pues de lo contrario, no podrá afectar los derechos adquiridos por los empleados y empleadas que ya tienen estabilidad en su puesto, tal y como sucedía en el caso de la actora, quien estaba nombrada en propiedad al momento del cese de su puesto (folio 2) condición a la que había accedido mucho antes de que entrara en vigencia la IV reforma a la convención colectiva. La afirmación de que doña [Nombre2]. fue nombrada con base en un concurso de antecedentes debe mantenerse, pues en el expediente no hay ninguna prueba que acredite lo contrario, mucho menos que había sido nombrada discrecionalmente o que cumplía funciones, sin supervisión o sin fiscalización, condiciones típicas de un empleado o empleada de confianza, nada de esto, se demostró, inclusive la señora C., jefa de recursos humanos del banco manifestó lo siguiente [Nombre2]“…. ingresó al banco el 19 de julio de 1999, ingresó a trabajar como directora de Área, en ese momento en Investigación y Desarrollo, luego su salida se da el 22 de agosto del 2005, por reestructuración administrativa (…) En el momento en que estaba la actora había un procedimiento para alcanzar ese puesto. Esto era a través de la publicación del concurso interino…” (folios 196 vuelto y 197 frente). Finalmente, es necesario señalar que los criterios emitidos por la Procuraduría General de la República no son vinculantes para los tribunales de justicia, pues los jueces y juezas sólo están sometidos a la Constitución Política, y por eso, el agravio de que debe resolverse a la luz de lo externando en los dictámenes mencionados, tampoco es de recibo.

V.- SOBRE EL PROCESO DE REESTRUCTURACIÓN: Tal y como se indicó, la cesación de la accionante se justificó en la existencia del proceso de reestructuración que se daba en el banco demandado. La única prueba que consta en autos relacionada con la concreción de ese proceso consiste en el oficio del 19 de setiembre de 2005, dirigido al señor G. Q., Gerente General de entonces, mediante el cual se le comunicó que la Administración había sido facultada para indemnizar a todos y todas las funcionarias que serían cesadas con ocasión del proceso mencionado (folio 109). Además, el oficio del 26 de agosto siguiente, en el que se informó entre otros puntos al señor G. Q., la aprobación del plan estratégico del banco y la nueva estructura organizativa de la institución (folios 110 y 111). Por último, el documento titulado “Anexo 5, organización”, en el que se explica que el banco luego de la reestructuración, se ahorraría en gastos de personal con cargas sociales, mil trescientos millones de colones (folios 113-117). En este punto, debe aclararse primero, que no es que el órgano de alzada haya incurrido en los vicios de ultra petita y extra petita, al considerar que a los autos no se aportaron los estudios técnicos para demostrar las razones y justificaciones que fundamentaron el despido de la actora. Por el contrario, tal y como se indicó en este fallo, la autorización que brinda el ordenamiento para prescindir de los servicios de un funcionario público o una funcionaria pública por motivo de reestructuración, implica necesariamente que el puesto, considerado en sí mismo, sea “dispensable” en la estructura propuesta y además de imposible integración en la nueva organización institucional, pero para hacer uso de esta facultad - trasladar o despedir forzosamente a sus funcionarios o funcionarias por razones de reorganización- el banco demandado obligatoriamente debió fundamentarse en una necesidad real -debidamente comprobada- de mejorar el servicio público y respetando el procedimiento establecido a tal efecto, que en este caso, sería por medio de un dictamen técnico en el que se concluyera la imposible integración de la actora considerando el puesto por ella ocupado, en la nueva organización institucional, de modo que la única solución viable para la administración era despedirla, pues las funciones que ejercía desaparecerían del todo en la nueva estructura modernizada. Este estudio técnico se echa de menos, pues el banco quien tenía la obligación de aportarlo para fundamentar su actuar según lo explicado, no lo hizo. En este sentido, tal y como se indicó, los servidores y servidoras de la Administración Pública están amparados y amparadas por la estabilidad en el empleo, y por eso, no es posible admitir que, so pretexto de un proceso de reorganización, despidan trabajadores y trabajadoras sin los estudios técnicos que justifiquen la desaparición del puesto, y la imposibilidad de reubicar al trabajador o trabajadora en otro cargo dentro de la organización, porque por ese medio se abriría un peligroso portillo a la arbitrariedad y a la inseguridad. En este sentido el artículo 47 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, al referirse al despido por reorganización, señala que al prescindir de los servidores y servidoras, se atenderán criterios tales como eficiencia, antigüedad, carácter, conducta, aptitudes y demás condiciones que resulten de la calificación de los servicios, lo cual en el supuesto en que se eliminen ciertas plazas y al mismo tiempo se crean plazas en la misma categoría, obligaba a acreditar que la actora no poseía la aptitud y requisitos nuevos para permanecer en una de las nuevas plazas, lo cual no consta en autos, como tampoco se demostró que no fuera posible ubicarla en alguna plaza equivalente. De acuerdo con la prueba documental recibida, así como la testimonial evacuada, el puesto ocupado por la señora [Nombre2]. en realidad no desapareció. Veamos. Cuando la actora fue despedida, ocupaba en propiedad el puesto de Directora de Servicios Generales y tenía bajo su cargo, el Departamento de Seguridad (vigilancia, investigaciones, alarmas, CCTV y administración del contrato por servicios de vigilancia outsourcing), Departamento de Proveeduría (adquisición de bienes y servicios, licitaciones, almacén de suministros), Unidad de Transportes, Mantenimiento físico de las instalaciones del Banco (administración del contrato de servicios de limpieza outsourcing), Departamento de Administración de bienes realizables (administración, custodia y venta de bienes adjudicados por el Banco) y Unidad de Archivo Central (administración y custodia de toda la documentación generada por el Banco en sus diferentes dependencias y de documentación comercial "expedientes de crédito, cheques y títulos valores) administración de los servicios de mensajería interna y externa (ver hecho segundo de la demanda y su contestación). Ahora bien, según la nueva reestructuración, la Dirección de Servicios Generales pasó a llamarse Apoyo Institucional, siendo que bajo su cargo y dependencia, quedaron adscritas el Departamento de Seguridad, Proveduría y Licitaciones, Transportes, Mantenimiento de Bienes Adjudicados y Archivo Institucional, agregándose un Departamento denominado de Servicios Generales (folios 116, 117 y 119). Esto fue confirmado por la testigo [Nombre3]. . quien expresó: […]. De acuerdo con estas pruebas, si el puesto ocupado por la actora no desapareció, sino que en atención a las necesidades propias del banco accionado, se mantuvo dentro del organigrama institucional, aunque se le cambiara de nombre, y si no hay ningún estudio técnico que justifique el despido de la actora, atendiendo criterios de eficiencia, antigüedad, carácter, conducta, aptitudes y otras condiciones relacionadas con el puesto, el cese de labores de la señora L. debe tenerse como un despido absolutamente arbitrario e ilegal y por eso, considera la Sala que, el órgano de alzada, no incurrió en una inadecuada valoración de los elementos probatorios aportados a los autos, debiendo por eso, dictarse confirmatoria de lo resuelto.

VI.- SOBRE LOS SALARIOS CAÍDOS: Se opone el recurrente a la condenatoria por concepto de salarios caídos, pues considera que es desproporcional y violatoria al principio de razonabilidad, tomando en cuenta la duración de los años de este proceso. Señala que esta Sala ha limitado ese pago a cuatro años, cuando hay un enriquecimiento sin causa y que en todo caso, la actora, no ha estado inactiva en todos estos años, sino que, ha laborado en la Administración Pública, por lo que el reconocimiento de salarios mientras se mantuvo empleada, sería ilegal de conformidad con el artículo 17 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública. Aunque el apoderado del banco se opone al reconocimiento del pago por salarios caídos desde el despido, tal y como lo indicó el órgano de alzada, revisado con detalle el expediente, no se encuentra esta Sala, que la accionante haya presentado gestiones para atrasar el trámite normal del proceso y por eso, esta solicitud no resulta procedente por cuanto la actora sufrió las consecuencias de un acto ilegal desde la fecha en que este ocurrió, y sus acciones para defender sus derechos han sido continuas. Ahora bien, según el documento de folio 278 frente, la actora laboró para el Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía durante abril y mayo de 2006 y para el Poder Judicial en enero y febrero de 2007, de manera tal que, en aplicación del numeral 17 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, que prohíbe desempeñar, simultáneamente, en los órganos y las entidades de la Administración Pública, más de un cargo remunerado salarialmente, de los montos que se reconozcan a la accionante por concepto de salarios caídos, no deberá cancelarse ningún monto por ese concepto por los meses de abril-mayo de 2006 y enero-febrero de 2007, toda vez que durante este periodo recibió un salario a cargado del erario público. Finalmente, de los montos que se paguen a la accionante, deberá deducirse las cuotas obrero-patronales no reportadas a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social desde la fecha del despido de la actora hasta su efectiva reinstalación, para lo cual se ordena la respectiva remisión del fallo al Departamento de Inspección de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.”