Setting curator fees in a truncated judicial administration proceedingFijación de honorarios del curador en administración por intervención judicial truncada

III.Before analyzing the merits of the decision, it is essential to clarify the nature of what was sought by the person who acted temporarily as curator (curador) in this insolvency proceeding and the procedural route that was used for this purpose. First, in the now-repealed proceeding of Administration by Judicial Intervention (Administración por intervención judicial), the curator (curador) was constituted as an organ of the proceeding, which was responsible, as an auxiliary of the jurisdictional organ, among other functions, for administering the debtor’s estate and assuming its representation (article 714 of the Civil Procedure Code, according to its original now-repealed text). Given the absence of a specific regulation governing his powers in the precautionary procedure, the rules pertaining to the function of the curator (curador) for bankruptcy and civil creditors’ insolvency proceedings had to be applied, mutatis mutandis. From the foregoing, it is extracted with absolute clarity that no contractual bond whatsoever exists between the curator (curador) and the debtor. Moreover, the curator (curador) has the duty to be absolutely impartial in the exercise of his functions, safeguarding the interests of the debtor and the body of creditors equally. As no contractual bond exists between them, and being an auxiliary organ of the justice system, appointed by the court itself respecting the respective administrative rules regarding the strict rotation that must be followed among those listed as possible curators (curadores) before the Executive Directorate of the Judicial Branch, his fees must not be claimed by means of the so-called privileged incidental proceeding provided for in article 236 of the Civil Procedure Code. This article applies to relationships of professional services freely contracted by private individuals with their lawyers, judicial agents, and attorneys-in-fact. It is true that the curator (curador) was competent in powers of representation and administration, along with many other obligations of a procedural nature, but that did not convert his situation into a liberal professional relationship. Therefore, the cited article 236 is not applicable, in any of the provisions contained within it. The request for fee-setting must not be presented as an incidental claim, nor must “claims” of another nature be submitted to judicial decision, such as declaring in a general and abstract manner that he fulfilled his function “in a precise, diligent, and timely manner with strict adherence to the legal system.” In these cases, it is sufficient that the curator (curador), like any other auxiliary of the justice system, requests that the setting of his fees be proceeded with. It is not necessary, in these cases, to even grant a hearing to the parties in the proceeding regarding his management; rather, once the request is filed, it is sufficient to resolve what is appropriate according to law. The decision may be appealed, but prior to that, a hearing does not have to be granted to either the debtor or the creditors of a proceeding. Said action, which is not an incidental proceeding, must be processed in the main case file and not in a separate dossier. Therefore, the former curator (curador) erred by formulating his claim via the privileged incidental route, which is not applicable to the setting of his fees, and the Court also erred by giving it the incidental processing, in a separate dossier, even going so far as to issue an incidental judgment when in these cases the setting of fees by means of a duly reasoned order is sufficient. This caused the parties to err regarding the nature of the decision issued and the means of challenging it. Indeed, if the setting must be done by means of a simple order, it must be appealed within a three-day period, expressing, at the time of appealing, the grounds upon which the objecting party bases its position. None of the appellants expressed the grounds for their disagreement upon appealing, as they were guided by the manner in which the proceeding had been conducted and considered it to be a judgment. Furthermore, being a simple setting of fees for a jurisdictional auxiliary, the decision is not governed, as to the remedies, by the provisions of article 236. We are, then, faced neither with a privileged incidental proceeding nor with a judgment. Therefore, despite the error in the processing, which obviously creates no procedural right, from now on, the action for setting the fees of the curator (curador) will be correctly directed, as a simple fee-setting action for a jurisdictional auxiliary.

IV.From the analysis made above, it is clear that the setting of fees for a curator (curador), as well as for any other auxiliary of an insolvency proceeding, such as, for example, the intervenor, the experts, and the inventory notaries, is not processed via the incidental route. It follows that we are not faced with a claim in the strict sense, but rather with a simple request for the setting of fees, which could even be made without the interested party even expressing the sum at which they estimate they should be set. Moreover, the setting of fees for auxiliaries of the justice system, according to the prevailing doctrine in insolvency matters, could even be done ex officio, in accordance with the principle of procedural impulse that has particular emphasis in this type of proceeding. Therefore, once the nature of what is being decided has been clarified, the Court does not consider on this occasion that there is nullity in what was decided in the first instance, supposedly because an express pronouncement was not made on all the points that were eventually “claimed” in the petition of the incidental proceeding filed. It is sufficient, given the true nature of the action filed, as now analyzed carefully in this decision, to set the fees in the manner in which they were set. In any case, if the petitioner considered that not all the points of what he sought had been resolved, he could have requested an addendum to the decision, which at that time had the formality of a judgment. By not doing so, no claim of nullity regarding the decision made in the first instance can be entertained.

V.According to what has been indicated so far, the arguments made by Mr. Calixto Chaves Zamora regarding the route used must also be rejected. In reality, if the fee-setting action for an auxiliary jurisdictional organ such as the curator (curador) should not be processed via the incidental route, no defenselessness has been caused by granting a hearing and following such processing. Greater procedural guarantees were provided than those legally necessary in these cases. Now, as it is not an incidental proceeding and the provisions of article 236 of the Civil Procedure Code do not apply here, no annual statute of limitations period is in force for the curator (curador) to make his setting request, with which the claim made to that effect by Mr. Chaves is not proper.

VI.For the setting of the curator’s (curador) fees, in this particular case, only what he did during the time he served as such must be considered. It was established that his curatorship extended from the moment he accepted the position until, by final order, the ruling that had improperly admitted the request for administration by judicial intervention was revoked. That is, his function was carried out from August twenty-third, 1994, until the finality of the resolution rendered at eight o'clock on October twenty-fourth, 1994 (see, in this regard, what was decided by this Court and Division in resolution No. 260 at nine hours thirty-five minutes on August eleventh, 1998). The proceeding, therefore, did not complete the stages of production and payment to creditors, so it is not possible to apply the tariff that would correspondingly apply to the curator (curador) in this type of matter, according to the terms alleged in this instance by the curator (curador). Attorney Pacheco Carranza is familiar with the case law that has been established in cases such as the present one. Even, when referring to the decisions that this Court and Division have issued in this regard, he argued, at folio 26 of this dossier, the following: “The case law cited by the defendant-incidental in support of his thesis of prudential setting is, with the respect its origin merits, a blunder, which cannot escape the mind of a zealous and studious Judge.” This Court does not consider that we are faced with an error or inadvertence in holding—after a careful study of the point regarding other situations in which the applicable regulations had to be interpreted and applied—that when nothing has been produced within an administration by judicial intervention proceeding, the corresponding fees for the curator (curador) cannot be set following the tariff established by the respective decree, and the amount of the fees must then be determined prudentially. In this regard, it is appropriate to transcribe here the criterion maintained and now reaffirmed by this Court and Division, contained in resolution No. 148 at 9:05 hours on April 26, 2000, in which it was stated:

“Once the existence of the professional services relationship between the incidental party and the promoter of this proceeding is verified, the manner in which his attorney’s fees must be calculated must be analyzed, as the grievances of the appellants precisely touch upon this aspect. Executive Decree No. 20307-J, published in La Gaceta No. 64 of April 4, 1991, applicable to the sub lite, establishes in its article 23, in what is of interest, the following:

‘Article 23.- Creditors’ Insolvency Proceedings and Bankruptcies. In creditors’ insolvency proceedings, bankruptcies, and related or related proceedings, attorney’s fees are regulated as follows: a) Administration by judicial intervention and preventive arrangement: The attorney’s fees of the curator (curador) shall be equal to those of the curator (curador) of the insolvency or bankruptcy proceeding [sic]. (5% of the real asset pursuant to articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commercial Code).

• b)Legal Advice. For legal advice and, where applicable, the petition for bankruptcy, administration by judicial intervention, or preventive arrangement, the attorney’s fees shall be one third of the bankruptcy curator’s (curador) fees. [...]’ The cited provisions have brought, in the case of administration by judicial intervention, problems of interpretation and application. The Executive Decree starts from an assimilation of liquidation proceedings, such as civil creditors’ insolvency and bankruptcy, with that of administration by intervention. In point a) cited, it is indicated that the fees of the curator (curador), a figure that existed in the original legislation of this institution, should be set in the same manner as for this subject in bankruptcy or insolvency, but then, in parentheses, mention is made of 5% of the real asset, in accordance with articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commercial Code. The reference, in the first place, to 5% of the real asset, and then the citation of the indicated substantive provisions, generates a contradiction that must be highlighted. The cited article 926, in what is of interest, states:

‘Article 926: The curator (curador) shall earn, as fees, five percent of the amount effectively produced by the assets of the insolvency proceeding ...’ For its part, article 883 of the Commercial Code provides:

‘Article 883.- The curator (curador) shall earn, as fees, five percent of the amount effectively produced by the insolvency proceeding. Upon approving the distributive account or accounts, the court shall separate five percent from each distribution and shall reserve it for delivery to the curator (curador), as soon as the order approving the distribution and payment of corresponding fees becomes final...’ (again, the emphasis is ours). As can be noted, in both cases the 5% corresponding to the curator (curador) must be calculated according to the sums effectively produced by the insolvency proceeding. In the case of liquidation proceedings, this refers to the sums that are actually liquidated and paid to the creditors. It is not 5% of the original asset of the bankrupt, but rather 5% of the amounts that his assets actually produce, with which the debts must be met, to the extent possible. That is why, in bankruptcy, with each payment, whether total or partial, the 5% of the curator (curador) must be separated, to immediately pay his fees. Administration by intervention, on the contrary, is not a liquidation proceeding. It is a legal institution that seeks to save a company from a recoverable crisis. During its development, it is sought that, from the internal forces of the company, the indispensable resources to solve that temporary crisis are obtained. It does not seek to liquidate its estate to pay its creditors according to the legally established priorities and the principle of ‘par conditio creditorum’. The manner in which the interests of creditors are sought to be protected is by maintaining the unity of the company and its productivity, generating the essential income to meet the debts. Therefore, the concept of ‘real asset’, in these cases, is not, as Attorney Biolley seems to understand it, the gross amount of the company's accounting assets at the time of filing the application for administration by intervention. If that were the case, firstly, liabilities would be set aside to liquidate the fees considering only the company's assets. Secondly, the express reference that said subsection makes to the cited articles 926 and 883 would be ignored. Furthermore, it would lead to immediately severing 1.66% of the equity of a company that is in a difficult economic and financial situation, without having even begun to satisfy the interests of all the creditors. The Court concludes, according to the cited precepts, that the 5% that would correspond to the curator (curador) of an administration by intervention must be calculated taking into account what the company effectively produces during the proceeding and what is actually paid to the creditors subject to it. This has been the understanding of this Court and Division, in resolution No. 202 at nine hours thirty minutes on August five, nineteen ninety-seven. In this resolution, the following was also indicated:

‘In the case under examination, a phase of payments was not reached. At least, it was not credited in the record that this had occurred. In matters like this, the five percent of the curator (curador) must be calculated on the payments made and not on the amount produced by the insolvency proceeding, given that—it is reiterated—these are not liquidation proceedings, but rather—to express it more graphically—they are for the “salvaging” of the company. Hence, it is not a matter of determining only what the insolvency proceeding produces, but what it produces, and as a consequence of that production, what the company pays. It is therefore not possible, in this specific case, to apply the percentage indicated by article 23 paragraph a) of the referred decree to set the fees of the curator (curador). There is no other alternative than to apply, by analogy, article 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, which in its 3rd paragraph, allows that amount to be determined prudentially and with criteria of equity.’ Upon remitting paragraph b) of article 23 of the Decree to the manner in which the curator’s (curador) fees must be calculated, to set those corresponding to the lawyer advising the promoter, we encounter the same difficulties indicated. In accordance with the normative hierarchy, a regulatory provision cannot derogate or modify a legislative text. In the present matter, the phrase of the decree establishing “(5% of the real asset pursuant to articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commercial Code)”, cannot have a meaning different from that of the higher-ranking provisions to which it refers. The indicated percentage, then, refers to what the insolvency proceeding has effectively produced for the benefit of the body of creditors, in this case, the administration by judicial intervention. In this proceeding, a phase of payments to the creditors subject to its outcome has not been reached. The record does not show that the credit verification process had even concluded, let alone that partial settlement had occurred during the administration. The participation of Attorney Biolley Riotte, as attorney-in-fact of the promoter and directing lawyer, lasted until the confirmation of the initial order of the proceeding. As indicated, since no payments were made to the creditors prior to the initiation of the proceeding, it is not possible to apply the 5% parameter to which Attorney Biolley has referred. Much less can it be interpreted that the 5% from which one must start is the value of the assets at the time the administration was filed, regardless of the fruits it ultimately yields for the body of creditors, especially when the participation of the applicant's lawyer concluded in the initial phase of the salvaging process. There is no other alternative, under these circumstances, than to apply by analogy article 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, which in its 3rd paragraph, allows that amount to be determined prudentially and with criteria of equity, taking into account, in these cases, the interests of the lawyer, the company under administration itself, and the body of creditors.’ By virtue of an appeal for cassation filed against the cited ruling, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice also proceeded to study and decide the point, concurring with what was established by this Court and Division. In this regard, in its Voto 189 at 9:30 hours on March 28, 2001, it stated: ‘ VI ... The Civil Procedure Code, in the regulations of the institution of “Administration by Judicial Intervention” (articles 709 and following) did not contain any rule regarding how to set the fees of the Curator (Curador), as it does now, after the cited reform, in its numeral 722 (Remuneration of the Intervenor – the latter name with which that of “Curator” was replaced) – and neither did it contain rules for the debtor's attorney. Therefore, in principle, as indicated in the appeal, one should start from the general rule of the cited article 233, which refers to the tariff established in accordance with the procedure set forth in the Organic Law of the Bar Association, and arrive at article 23 of the aforementioned Tariff, which literally and in what is of interest reads:

‘Article 23. Creditors’ insolvency proceedings and bankruptcies. In creditors’ insolvency proceedings, bankruptcies, and related or related proceedings, attorney’s fees are regulated as follows: a) Administration by judicial intervention and preventive arrangement: the attorney’s fees of the curator (curador) shall be equal to those of the insolvency or bankruptcy proceeding (5% of the real asset pursuant to articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commercial Code).

• b)Legal advice: For legal advice and, where applicable, the petition for bankruptcy, administration by judicial intervention, or preventive arrangement, the attorney’s fees shall be one third of the bankruptcy curator’s (curador) fees. c) ...’.

VII.- Also decided by the Court is an aspect not appealed before this Body, which is that in the administration proceeding of Lachner y Sáenz S. A., the conclusion of the phase of verification of creditors has not been reached and it is not recorded that they have been settled to any extent. VIII.- Positing things in a literal manner, the solution to the question seems, at first glance, simple, since according to the mentioned rules, what would have to be done is purely and simply to calculate the fees of the Curator (Curador) based on the “real asset,” as if it were the Curator (Curador) of a bankruptcy, in accordance with articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commercial Code, and, subsequently, establish those of the debtor’s lawyer at one third. Since the provision refers to bankruptcy proceedings, civil insolvency, administration by judicial intervention, and preventive arrangement, such a thing may be possible, in principle, in some of its scenarios; but it cannot be so in that of administration by judicial intervention. If one considers the nature of that pre-insolvency proceeding and its particularities, it is easy to realize that the Regulatory norm, by also including it in that form of calculation, was conceived on the inaccuracy of equating it with absolute liquidation (civil insolvency and bankruptcy), because, looking at the particularities of one and the other in general terms and, particularly, at the situation of the proceeding of Lachner y Sáenz S. A., the truth is that, as the Court considered, there are obstacles that prevent the application of article 23, paragraph b), in the manner that the incidental party has intended and still intends at this venue. IX.- In effect, the process of Administration by Judicial Intervention seeks the salvaging of a company that finds itself in a superable economic crisis, through economic, financial, or organizational measures, as a remedy that allows the ailment to be overcome. Although the proceeding is of an insolvency nature, insofar as the universal participation of creditors is allowed, with special effects regarding them that facilitate the salvaging, it is not provided for a liquidation of the estate, and it is not even possible to speak, a priori, apart from the general objective of salvaging, of specific expected economic results, since everything will depend on the fate of the proceeding, including the possibility of whether the requested protection measure is admitted or not. In contrast, the bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, which is indicated as the basis for calculation, seeks as a result, in the normal solution, the realization of the asset and its distribution among the creditors. This realization is produced through the seizure of the assets, their valuation, and sale. Consequently, when articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commercial Code refer the basis for calculating the fees of the Curator (Curador) of the bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding to the “amount effectively produced by the insolvency proceeding,” they are alluding, without any doubt, not to the accounting value of the assets, nor even to the expert appraisal value, but to what results from their realization, i.e., their sale, because that is what produces the estate's assets, and that result may be lower than, equal to, or higher than the expert appraisal, which simply serves as a basis for the sale, whether public or private (articles 876, paragraph j, of the Commercial Code and 781 of the Civil Procedure Code). It must be assumed that the application of articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commercial Code takes place when the insolvency proceeding reaches the phase of realization and payment of creditors, since it could happen that the proceeding does not reach that stage and the situation is reversed by means of a revocation of the ruling that declared the opening, even at a stage of the proceeding in which there has been seizure, management, and administration of the estate by the Curator (Curador). In a scenario like that, where the sale of the assets to determine how much the asset effectively produces will no longer be possible, the fees of the Curator (Curador) cannot be set based on the system of said norms. X.- Thus, if numeral 23, transcribed above, makes an express and, therefore, unequivocal reference to the system of the cited articles 926 and 883, according to which fees must be set, as already stated, on the basis of the real value of the debtor’s assets, resulting from their liquidation (effective product of the asset), its application presupposes an economic result that can be verified, by virtue of the realization of the debtor’s estate assets. This is possible and expected in bankruptcy and civil insolvency proceedings and, eventually, in a preventive concordat proceeding, depending on if its content implies a liquidation of the estate, as usually occurs in an abandonment agreement, through which the transfer of a universal estate is proposed in exchange for the extinction of the total of its obligations. But it is not possible, at least not as a normal result, in the scenario of administration by judicial intervention, due to its purpose. This impossibility raises the question about the solution that must be given. The thesis put forward by Attorney Biolley — which is understood to be argued since it is not possible to speak of a sum that is the product of the liquidation of the company's assets — is, as stated, that the value in the books of the assets, i.e., the accounting value, must be understood, and that five percent must be applied to it. The Court, for its part, concluded as already referenced, in the sense that the calculation of the respective fees must be made “on what the company effectively produces during the proceeding and what is actually paid to the creditors subject to it.” In harmony with this, it resolved not to accept the position of the claimant and, starting from the fact that it is not possible, according to the state and result of the proceeding at the time of issuing its pronouncement, to establish a product of the asset in those terms that would allow the norm to be applied, the proper course is to resort, by analogy, to article 232 of the Civil Procedure Code and make the setting prudentially. This position is criticized in the appeal because in a precedent of the Court itself cited in the ruling, a criterion is mentioned that is considered different (fees must be calculated “on the payments made and not on the amount produced by the insolvency proceeding” in both versions) seems oriented toward the proceeding’s purpose of conserving the asset through a controlled or intervened administration, where total or partial payments of liabilities may be possible as a consequence of the management of the asset or the effects of the procedure and not necessarily of its realization or sale. Without delving deeper into the point, as it is not necessary, the Chamber shares the Court’s refusal to take the accounting value of the assets as the basis for calculation, for the truth is that it cannot be taken as a substitute for the value suggested by the legislator in said provisions, because, if this must be understood as the real and true value, as part of the result of an activity (realization), i.e., what an asset effectively produces, that other value must be understood as discarded, since, in view of its formal nature, it can be far from reality and even contrary to the very ends of the proceeding. From that perspective, exclusively, the Chamber is of the opinion that numeral 23, paragraph b) of the Regulation was not breached, for, according to what has been explained, attending to the higher-ranking legal provisions that must be taken as determinative of the content of the regulatory norm, the “real asset” cannot be taken as that accounting value, in order to set, based on it, the fees at the sum sought by the appellant. XI.- Nor does the Chamber consider that the Court, by setting Attorney Biolley's fees prudentially based on what is provided in article 232, third paragraph, of the Civil Procedure Code, in the face of the impossibility, which was considered verified for the specific case, of applying the norm of the Tariff in its true intended content, according to what has been explained, incurred any error. The cited article 232 states, in the entirety of its paragraphs, ‘Article 232.- Fee and expense tariff. The Full Court shall establish a tariff for the fees and expenses of executors, notifiers, attendance witnesses, and experts, and for the payment of any other essential diligences that are not charged to officials by reason of their office. The courts shall adhere to this tariff, which will be reviewed and updated periodically, when conducting the assessments required by this article and the preceding ones.

The Judge has the obligation to regulate any fees or payments for work that this Code or special laws do not determine; the regulation shall preferably be made in advance, prudentially, with an equity criterion (criterio de equidad).

The party that must bear the payment shall have the right to complain directly to the Judicial Inspectorate (Inspección Judicial), against excessive assessments and against unnecessary charges. The Inspectorate must review them with the power to moderate what it deems incorrect, without prejudice to applying the appropriate disciplinary measures. If the entire content of that rule is taken into account, it is clear that it establishes regulations applicable to the fees and expenses of executors, witnesses of assistance and experts and any other indispensable proceedings that are not the responsibility of officials by virtue of their office, and not to attorney fees. The foregoing is reaffirmed, because the Code immediately establishes a series of rules to regulate that other aspect, among which it is worth highlighting the provisions of article 233, which states:

Article 233. Attorney fees, general rule. Attorney fees shall be fixed based on the fee schedule established through the procedure set forth in the Organic Law of the Bar Association (Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Abogados). However, such understanding cannot be taken as a basis to say that the Ad quem violated them, by improper application, since it resorted to it analogously given the impossibility of applying that other regulatory provision because its prerequisite for application was not met in the specific case. In any event, what that provision embodies is the application of the principle of equity in the solution of cases not determined in the legal system, and that principle is a source of law for interpreting, integrating, and delimiting the field of application of the written legal system, in all those cases where the rules cannot be explained and applied by themselves in relation to a specific case (articles 7 of the General Law of Public Administration and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch); such that, if in the specific case a product of the asset or one in the terms provided in the regulatory article cannot be established—which is the relevant aspect—that would allow the fixing to be made according to its own postulation, and since the theories of Lic. Biolley Riotte are also inadmissible, the path of prudential fixing, according to equity, is not objectionable in the terms raised in the appeal. Consequently, none of the other violations invoked in the appeal have been incurred either. It cannot be said that the Court disobeyed the provisions of article 233 of the Procedural Code, nor that it made improper use of the hierarchy of applicable rules, because what it did was interpret them in accordance with the particular facts of the specific case and, in the opinion of this Chamber, it proceeded correctly. There are no legally valid reasons, in this Court's view, to modify the stated criterion, much less to use as a parameter the sum that was presumably intended to be readjusted, in order to try to force the application of a table to a situation that is not its own. Moreover, doing so would seek to apply the table to the presumed liabilities of Mr. Chaves, when the decree refers to the real asset. Therefore, the fixing of the emoluments of Lic. Pacheco Carranza must be done prudentially, because this proceeding did not advance as an administration by judicial intervention (administración por intervención judicial) since the initial writ was revoked.

VII.As indicated, the fees of the curator (curador) must be fixed prudentially, for his activity during the period in which he served as such. What he did after having legally ceased in that position cannot be taken into account for this purpose. If the promoter of the administration by judicial intervention considers that after having ceased in his position as curator, Mr. Pacheco Carranza acted improperly or irregularly, he can channel his claim through the corresponding means, but this does not influence the fixing of the fees for the work he performed when he was curator, nor is it now appropriate, for the purposes at hand, to analyze and assess his conduct. Therefore, what occurred in the executory processes that Mr. Chaves says were filed by Lic. Pacheco cannot be taken into account for the purposes of fixing fees. Both appealing parties disagree as to the amount fixed in the first instance. Mr. Chaves considers it excessive and the former curator requests that they be fixed at one hundred fifty-one thousand two hundred fifty dollars. In the first place, the fixing must be done in colones, since the service of the auxiliary of justice was rendered in our country. It has no relevance, to determine the currency in which the fees must be established, whether the debts of the promoter were in dollars or another foreign currency. Moreover, analyzing the performance of Lic. Carranza, as described in the first considering of the appealed resolution that has been upheld in this instance, and the economic significance of the administration request filed, as well as the amount of the securities and assets that the curator safeguarded during his management, the Court considers that the amount fixed by the judge must be maintained."

202 of nine hours thirty minutes on August fifth, nineteen ninety-seven. In this resolution, it was also indicated as follows:

In the case under review, a payment phase was never reached. At least, it was not proven in the record that this had occurred. In matters such as this, the curator's five percent must be calculated on the payments that are actually made and not on the amount produced by the insolvency proceeding, since—it bears repeating—these are not liquidation proceedings, but rather—to put it more graphically—are for the salvage (salvamento) of the company. Hence, it is not a matter of determining only what the insolvency proceeding produces, but what it produces, and as a consequence of that production, what the company pays. It is therefore not possible, in this specific case, to apply the percentage indicated by Article 23 subsection a) of the cited decree to set the curator's emoluments. There is no alternative but to apply, by analogy, section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) which, in its paragraph 3°, allows this amount to be determined prudentially and with equitable criteria.

When subsection b) of Article 23 of the Decree refers to the method for calculating the curator's fees, in order to set those corresponding to the lawyer advising the petitioner, we encounter the same difficulties noted. According to the normative hierarchy, a regulatory provision cannot repeal or modify a legislative text. In the present matter, the phrase in the decree establishing "(5% on the real assets (activo real) in accordance with Articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commercial Code)", cannot have a meaning different from that of the higher-ranking provisions to which it refers. The indicated percentage, then, refers to what the proceeding has effectively produced for the benefit of the body of creditors, in this case, the administration by judicial intervention (administración por intervención judicial). In this process, a stage of payments to the creditors subject to its outcome has not been reached. The record does not show that the credit verification process has even been concluded, much less that they have been partially settled during the administration. The participation of Licenciado Biolley Riotte, as attorney-in-fact for the petitioner and lead counsel, only lasted until the confirmation of the initial order of the process. As indicated, since no payments were made to creditors predating the initiation of the process, it is not possible to apply the 5% parameter to which Licenciado Biolley has referred. Even less can it be interpreted that the 5% base should be calculated on the value of the assets at the time of filing the administration, regardless of the fruits that it ultimately yields for the body of creditors, especially when the participation of the petitioner's lawyer concluded in the initial phase of the salvage (salvamento) process. In these circumstances, there is no alternative but to apply by analogy section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), which in its paragraph 3°, allows that amount to be determined prudentially and with equitable criteria, taking into account, in these cases, the interests of the lawyer, the administered company itself, and the body of creditors.

By virtue of a cassation appeal filed against the cited ruling, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice also proceeded to study and decide the point, concurring with what was established by this Tribunal and Section. In this regard, in its vote No. 189 of 9:30 hours on March 28, 2001, it indicated:

VI ... The Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), in the regulations of the institute of "Administration by Judicial Intervention" (Administración por Intervención Judicial) (Articles 709 and following) did not contain any rule on how to set the Curator's fees, as it does now, after the cited reform, in its numeral 722 (Remuneration of the Intervenor (Interventor)—this latter name substituting that of "Curator" (Curador))—and neither those of the debtor's lawyer. Then, in principle, as indicated in the appeal, one should start from the general rule of the cited Article 233, which refers to the fee schedule established in accordance with the procedure indicated in the Organic Law of the Bar Association (Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Abogados), and arrive at Article 23 of the aforementioned Fee Schedule (Arancel), which literally, and in what is relevant, reads:

Article 23. Creditor insolvency proceedings (Concurso de acreedores) and bankruptcies. In creditor insolvency proceedings (concursos de acreedores), bankruptcies and related or connected processes, lawyers' fees are regulated as follows: a) Administration by judicial intervention (Administración por intervención judicial) and preventive composition agreement (convenio preventivo): the curator's lawyer's fees shall be equal to those of the insolvency proceeding or bankruptcy (5% on the real assets (activo real) in accordance with Articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commercial Code). b) Advisory services: For advisory services and, where appropriate, the petition for bankruptcy, administration by judicial intervention (administración por intervención judicial) or preventive composition agreement (convenio preventivo), the lawyer's fees shall be one-third of those of the bankruptcy curator. c) ...

VII.- The Tribunal has also resolved an aspect not contested before this Body, which is that in the administration process of Lachner y Sáenz S. A., the conclusion of the creditor verification phase has not been reached, and there is no record that they have been settled to any extent.

VIII.- Considering things in a literal manner, the solution to the question seems, at first glance, simple, because according to the aforementioned norms, what would have to be done is purely and simply to calculate the Curator's fees based on the "real assets" (activo real), as if dealing with the Curator of a bankruptcy, in accordance with Articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commercial Code, and then, establish those of the debtor's lawyer at one-third. As the provision refers to bankruptcy proceedings, civil insolvency proceedings (concurso civil), administration by judicial intervention (administración por intervención judicial), and preventive composition agreement (convenio preventivo), such a thing may be possible, in principle, in some of its scenarios; but it cannot be so in that of administration by judicial intervention. If one considers the nature of that pre-insolvency process and its particularities, it is easy to realize that the Regulatory norm, by also including it in that form of calculation, was conceived on the inaccuracy of equating it with that of absolute liquidation (civil insolvency (concurso civil) and bankruptcy), because, looking at the particularities of one and the other in general terms and, particularly, in the situation of the process of Lachner y Sáenz S. A., the truth is that, as the Tribunal estimated, there are obstacles that prevent the application of Article 23, subsection b), in the manner that the incident petitioner has intended and still intends in this venue. IX.- Indeed, the process of Administration by Judicial Intervention seeks the salvage (salvamento) of the company that is in a surmountable economic crisis, through economic, financial, or organizational measures, as a remedy that allows the ailment to be overcome. While the process is of an insolvency (concursal) nature, insofar as the universal participation of creditors is permitted, with special effects regarding them that facilitate the salvage (salvamento), it is not designed for a liquidation of the estate, and it is not even possible to speak, a priori, apart from the general objective of salvage (salvamento), of specific expected economic results, because everything will depend on the outcome of the process, including the possibility of whether or not the requested protective measure is admitted. In contrast, the bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding (concurso), which is indicated as the basis for calculation, seeks as a result, in the normal solution, the realization of the assets and their distribution among the creditors. This realization occurs through the dispossession of the goods, their valuation, and sale. Consequently, when Articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commercial Code refer the basis for calculating the fees of the Bankruptcy or Insolvency Curator to the "amount that the proceeding effectively produces," they are alluding, without any doubt, not to the book value of the goods, nor even to the expert appraisal value, but to what results from their realization, that is, from their sale, because that is what the estate asset produces, and that result may be less than, equal to, or greater than the expert appraisal, which simply serves as a basis for the sale, public or private (Article 876, subsection j, of the Commercial Code and 781 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil)). It must be assumed that the application of Articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commercial Code takes place when the insolvency (concursal) process reaches the phase of realization and payment of creditors, because it could happen that the process does not reach that stage and that the situation is reversed through a revocation of the ruling that declared the opening, even at a stage of the process in which there has been dispossession, management, and administration of the estate by the Curator. In a scenario like that, in which the sale of the goods will no longer be possible to know how much the asset effectively produces, the Curator's fees cannot be set based on the system of said norms. X.- Thus, if numeral 23, transcribed above, makes an express and, therefore, unequivocal reference to the system of cited Articles 926 and 883, according to which fees must be set, as already stated, on the basis of the real value of the debtor's goods, resulting from their liquidation (effective product of the asset), its application presupposes an economic result that can be verified, by virtue of the realization of the assets of the debtor's estate. This is possible and expected thus in bankruptcy and civil insolvency proceedings (concurso civil) and, eventually, in a preventive composition proceeding (concordato preventivo), depending on whether its content implies a patrimonial liquidation, as usually happens in the abandonment agreement (convenio de abandono), through which the surrender of a universal estate is proposed in exchange for the extinction of the total of their obligations. But not, at least as a normal result, in the scenario of administration by judicial intervention, due to its purpose. This impossibility raises the question about the solution that must be given. The thesis presented by Lic. Biolley, -which is understood to be argued since one cannot speak of a sum that is the product of the liquidation of the company's assets- is, as stated, that it should be understood as the book value of the assets, that is, the accounting value, and that five percent must be applied to it. The Tribunal, for its part, concluded as already referenced, in the sense that the calculation of the respective fees must be made on what the company effectively produces during the process and, furthermore, actually comes to be paid to the creditors subject to it. In harmony with this, it resolved not to accept the position of the incident petitioner and, based on the fact that it is not possible, according to the state and result of the process at the time of issuing its ruling, to establish a product of the asset in those terms, which would allow the application of the rule, the appropriate course is to resort, by analogy, to Article 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) and make the determination prudentially. That position is criticized in the appeal because in a precedent of the Tribunal itself cited in the ruling, a criterion is mentioned that is considered different (fees must be calculated "on the payments that are made and not on the amount produced by the proceeding" in both versions) seems to be oriented towards the purpose of the process of preserving the asset through a controlled or intervened administration, where total or partial payments of liabilities may be possible as a consequence of the management of the asset or the effects of the procedure and not necessarily from its realization or sale. Without delving deeper into the point, as it is not necessary, the Chamber shares the Tribunal's refusal to take the book value of the goods as the basis for calculation, because the truth is that it cannot be taken as a substitute for the value suggested by the legislator in said provisions, because, if the latter must be understood as the real and true value, as part of the result of an activity (realization), that is, what an asset effectively produces, that other value must be considered discarded, given that in view of its formal nature, it may turn out to be far from reality and even contrary to the very purposes of the process. From that perspective, exclusively, the Chamber is of the opinion that numeral 23, subsection b) of the Fee Schedule was not violated, because according to what has been explained, attending to the legal provisions of higher rank that must be taken as determinative of the content of the regulatory norm, the "real assets" (activo real) cannot be taken as that accounting value, to fix, based on it, the fees in the sum sought by the appellant. XI.- Nor does the Chamber consider that the Tribunal, by setting Lic. Biolley's fees prudentially based on the provisions of Article 232, third paragraph, of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), in the face of the impossibility, which was taken as verified for the specific case, of applying the Fee Schedule (Arancel) norm in its true intended content, as was explained. Article 232 cited, in its entirety, says: Article 232.- Fee and expenses schedule. The Full Court shall establish a schedule for the fees and expenses of executors, notifiers, assistance witnesses, and experts, and for the payment of any other essential proceedings that are not the responsibility of officials by virtue of their office.

The courts shall conform to this schedule, which shall be periodically reviewed and updated, when carrying out the determinations referred to in this article and the preceding ones. The Judge has the obligation to determine any fee or payment for work that this Code or special laws do not determine; the determination shall preferentially be made in an anticipatory manner, prudentially, with equitable criteria.

The party that must bear the payment shall have the right to complain directly to the Judicial Inspectorate against excessive assessments and unnecessary charges. The Inspectorate must review them with the power to moderate what in its view is incorrect, without prejudice to applying timely disciplinary measures. If one considers the total content of that norm, it is clear that what it establishes are regulations applicable to the fees and expenses of executors, assistance witnesses, and experts and any other essential proceedings that are not the responsibility of officials by virtue of their office, and not to lawyers' fees. The foregoing is reaffirmed, because the Code subsequently establishes a series of rules to regulate that other aspect, among which it is worth highlighting what is provided by numeral 233, which states:

Article 233. Lawyers' fees, general rule. Lawyers' fees shall be set based on the schedule established through the procedure provided for in the Organic Law of the Bar Association (Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Abogados).

However, such an interpretation cannot be taken as a basis to say that the Ad quem violated them, through improper application, because it resorted to it analogously in the face of the impossibility of applying that other regulatory provision since its prerequisite for application did not occur in the specific case. In any case, what that provision captures is the application of the principle of equity in the solution of those cases not determined in the legal system, and that principle is a source of law for interpreting, integrating, and delimiting the field of application of the written legal system, in all those cases in which the norms cannot be explained and applied by themselves in relation to a specific case (Articles 7 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and 5° of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial)); in such a way that, if in the specific case a product of the asset or in the terms provided for in the regulatory article cannot be established -an aspect which is the relevant one-, which allows the determination to be made according to its own postulate, and as Lic. Biolley Riotte's thesis is also not appropriate, the path of prudential determination, in accordance with equity, is not subject to criticism in the terms raised in the appeal. Consequently, none of the other violations invoked in the appeal have been incurred either. It cannot be said that the Tribunal disregarded the provisions of Article 233 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nor that it misused the hierarchy of the applicable norms, because what it did was to interpret them in accordance with the specific factual particularities of the case, and in the opinion of the Chamber, it proceeded correctly. In this Tribunal's concept, there are no legally valid reasons to modify the expressed criterion, much less to use as a parameter the sum that was presumably intended to be readjusted, in order to try to force the application of a table to a situation that is not its own. Furthermore, doing so would intend to apply the table to the presumed liabilities of Mr. Chaves, when the decree refers to the real assets (activo real). Therefore, the determination of Licenciado Pacheco Carranza's emoluments must be made prudentially, because this process did not advance as an administration by judicial intervention (administración por intervención judicial) since the initial order was revoked.

VII.As indicated, the curator's fees must be set prudentially, for their activity during the period in which they served as such. What was done after legally ceasing in that position cannot be taken into account for this purpose. If the promoter of the administration by judicial intervention (administración por intervención judicial) considers that after having ceased in his position as curator, Mr. Pacheco Carranza acted in an undue or irregular manner, he can channel his claim through the corresponding avenue, but that does not influence the setting of fees for the work he performed when he was curator, nor is it now appropriate, for the purposes of interest, to analyze and evaluate his conduct. Therefore, what occurred in the enforcement proceedings that Mr. Chaves says were filed by Licenciado Pacheco cannot be taken into account for the purposes of setting fees. Both appealing parties express disagreement regarding the amount set in the first instance. Mr. Chaves considers it excessive and the former curator requests that they be set at one hundred fifty-one thousand two hundred fifty dollars.

First, the setting must be made in colones, since the service as an auxiliary of justice was provided in our country. It is not relevant, in determining the currency in which the fees must be established, whether the promoter's debts were in dollars or another foreign currency. On the other hand, analyzing the actions of Mr. Carranza, as described in the first recital of the appealed decision which has been upheld in this instance, and the economic significance of the administration request filed, as well as the amount of the securities and assets that the curator (curador) held in custody during his tenure, the Court considers that the amount set by the judge should be upheld.

The purpose is not to liquidate its assets to pay its creditors according to the legally established privileges and the principle of "par conditio creditorum." The way in which their interests are sought to be protected is by maintaining the unity of the company, its productivity, generating the indispensable income to meet its debts. Thus, the concept of "real asset (activo real)," in these cases, is not, as attorney Biolley seems to understand it, the gross amount of the company's accounting assets at the time of filing the petition for administration by judicial intervention (administración por intervención). If that were the case, firstly, the debts would be disregarded in order to liquidate the fees, taking into account only the company's assets. Secondly, the express reference made by that subsection to the cited articles 926 and 883 would be overlooked. Furthermore, it would lead to the immediate severance of 1.66% of the assets of a company that is in a difficult economic and financial situation, without even having begun to satisfy the interests of all the creditors. The Court concludes, according to the cited precepts, that the 5% that would correspond to the receiver (curador) of an administration by judicial intervention must be calculated taking into account what the company actually produces during the process and, additionally, what is actually paid to the creditors subject to it. This has been understood by this Court and Section, in resolution No. 202 of nine hours thirty minutes on August fifth, nineteen ninety-seven. In this resolution, it was further indicated: "In the case under examination, a payment phase was not reached. At least it was not attested in the case file that this had occurred. In matters such as this, the receiver's five percent must be calculated on the payments that are made and not on the amount that the insolvency proceeding (concurso) produces, because—it bears repeating—these are not liquidation processes, but—to put it more graphically—are processes for the 'salvage (salvamento)' of the company. Hence, this is not a matter of determining only what the proceeding produces, but what it produces, and as a consequence of that production, what the company pays. It is therefore not possible to apply in this specific case the percentage indicated by Article 23, subsection a) of the referenced decree to fix the receiver's emoluments. There is no other alternative but to apply, by analogy, Article 232 of the Civil Procedure Code which, in its 3rd paragraph, allows that amount to be determined prudentially and with criteria of equity." When subsection b) of Article 23 of the Decree refers to the manner in which the receiver's fees are to be calculated, to fix those corresponding to the lawyer advising the petitioner (promotora), we encounter the same difficulties noted. According to the normative hierarchy, a regulatory provision cannot abrogate or modify a legislative text. In the present matter, the phrase of the decree establishing "(5% over the real asset in accordance with articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commerce Code)," cannot have a meaning different from the higher-ranking provisions to which it refers. The indicated percentage, then, refers to what the insolvency proceeding has actually produced for the benefit of the body of creditors, in this case, the administration by judicial intervention. In this process, a phase of payments to the creditors subject to its outcome has not been reached. It is not evidenced in the case file that the credit verification process had even been concluded, much less that they had been partially paid during the administration. The participation of attorney Biolley Riotte, as legal representative of the petitioner and lead counsel, extended only to the confirmation of the initial order commencing the process. As indicated, since no payments were made to creditors prior to the establishment of the process, it is not possible to apply the 5% parameter to which attorney Biolley has made reference. Much less can it be interpreted that the 5% from which one must start is based on the value of the assets at the time of filing the administration petition, regardless of the fruits that the administration ultimately yields for the body of creditors, especially when the participation of the petitioner's lawyer concluded in the initial phase of the salvage process. There is no other alternative, in these circumstances, but to apply by analogy Article 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, which, in its 3rd paragraph, allows that amount to be determined prudentially and with criteria of equity, taking into account, in these cases, the interests of the lawyer, the administered company itself, and the body of creditors." By virtue of a cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed against the cited ruling, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice also proceeded to study and decide the point, concurring with what was established by this Court and Section. In this regard, in its vote (voto) No. 189 of 9:30 hours on March 28, 2001, it indicated: "VI ... The Civil Procedure Code, in the regulations of the institution of 'Administration by Judicial Intervention (Administración por Intervención Judicial)' (Articles 709 and following) did not contain any rule regarding how to fix the Receiver's fees, as it does now, after the cited reform, in its numeral 722 (Remuneration of the Intervenor (Interventor)—the latter name substituted that of 'Receiver (Curador)')—nor those of the debtor's lawyer either. Therefore, in principle, as indicated in the appeal, one should start from the general rule of cited Article 233, which refers to the fee schedule established in accordance with the procedure indicated in the Organic Law of the Bar Association, and arrive at Article 23 of the aforementioned Fee Schedule (Arancel), which literally and in the pertinent part reads: 'Article 23. Creditors' meeting and bankruptcies. In creditors' meetings (concursos de acreedores), bankruptcies, and related or affiliated processes, lawyers' fees are regulated as follows: a) Administration by judicial intervention and preventive agreement (convenio preventivo): the fees of the receiver's lawyer shall be equal to those of the insolvency proceeding or bankruptcies (5% over the real asset in accordance with articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commerce Code). b) Advisory services: For advisory services and, where applicable, the petition for bankruptcy, administration by judicial intervention, or preventive agreement, the lawyer's fees shall be one third of the receiver in bankruptcy. c) ...'. VII.- The Court also resolved an aspect not challenged before this Body, which is that in the administration process of Lachner y Sáenz S. A., the conclusion of the creditor verification phase has not been reached, and it is not evidenced that they have been paid to any extent. VIII.- Framing the matter literally, the solution to the question seems, at first glance, simple, because according to the mentioned norms, what would have to be done is purely and simply to calculate the Receiver's fees based on the 'real asset,' as if it were the Receiver in a bankruptcy, in accordance with Articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commerce Code and, then, establish those of the debtor's lawyer at one third. As the provision refers to bankruptcy processes, civil insolvency proceedings, administration by judicial intervention, and preventive agreements, such a thing may be possible, in principle, in some of its scenarios; but it cannot be so in that of the administration by judicial intervention. If one takes into account the nature of that pre-insolvency process (proceso preconcursal) and its particularities, it is easy to realize that the Regulatory norm, by also including it in that form of calculation, was conceived upon the inaccuracy of equating it with absolute liquidation (civil insolvency proceeding and bankruptcy), because, looking at the particularities of one and the other in general terms and, particularly, at the situation of the Lachner y Sáenz S. A. process, the truth is that, as the Court held, there are obstacles that prevent the application of Article 23, subsection b), in the manner that the claimant (incidentista) has sought and still seeks in this venue. IX.- In effect, the process of Administration by Judicial Intervention seeks the salvage of the company that finds itself in a superable economic crisis, through economic, financial, or organizational measures, as a remedy that allows it to overcome the ailment. Although the process is of an insolvency nature (naturaleza concursal), to the extent that it allows the universal participation of creditors, with special effects concerning them that facilitate the salvage, it is not provided for the liquidation of assets, and it is not even possible to speak, a priori, apart from the general objective of salvage, of specific expected economic results, because everything will depend on the fate of the process, including the possibility of whether or not the requested protective measure is admitted. By contrast, the bankruptcy or civil insolvency process, which is indicated as the calculation basis, seeks as a result, in its normal solution, the realization of the assets and their distribution among the creditors. This realization is produced through the divestment (desapoderamiento) of the goods, their valuation, and sale. Consequently, when Articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commerce Code refer the calculation basis of the fees of the Receiver in bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding to the 'amount that the proceeding effectively produces,' they are alluding, without any doubt, not to the book value of the goods, nor even to the expert appraisal value, but to what results from their realization, that is, from their sale, because that is what the asset base produces, and that result may be lower than, equal to, or higher than the expert appraisal, which merely serves as a basis for the sale, whether public or private (Articles 876, subsection j, of the Commerce Code and 781 of the Civil Procedure Code). It must be assumed that the application of Articles 926 of the Civil Code and 883 of the Commerce Code takes place when the insolvency process reaches the phase of realization and payment of creditors, as it could happen that the process does not reach that stage and that the situation is reversed through a revocation of the ruling that declared the opening, even at a stage of the process in which there has been divestment, management, and administration of the assets by the Receiver. In a scenario such as that, in which the sale of the goods to know how much the assets effectively produce will no longer be possible, the Receiver's fees cannot be fixed based on the system of said norms. X.- This being the case, if numeral 23, transcribed above, makes an express and, therefore, unequivocal reference to the system of cited Articles 926 and 883, according to which the fees must be fixed, as already said, on the basis of the real value of the debtor's goods, resulting from their liquidation (effective product of the assets), its application presupposes an economic result that can be verified, by virtue of the realization of the debtor's asset base. This is possible and thus expected in bankruptcy and civil insolvency processes and, eventually, in a preventive composition proceeding (concordato preventivo), depending on whether its content implies an asset liquidation, as usually happens in the abandonment agreement (convenio de abandono), through which the transfer of a universal asset base is proposed in exchange for the extinction of all its obligations. But it is not possible, at least not as a normal result, in the scenario of administration by judicial intervention, because of its purpose. This impossibility raises the question about the solution that must be given. The thesis put forth by Mr. Biolley—which is understood to be argued since one cannot speak of a sum that is the product of the liquidation of the company's assets—is, as stated, that 'real asset' should be understood as the book value of the assets, i.e., the accounting value, and that the five percent must be applied to it. The Court, for its part, concluded as already referenced, in the sense that the calculation of the respective fees must be made 'on what the company effectively produces during the process and, additionally, what is paid to the creditors subject to it.' In harmony with this, it resolved not to accept the position of the claimant and, proceeding from the basis that it is not possible, according to the state and result of the process at the time of issuing its pronouncement, to establish a product of the assets in said terms, that allows the norm to be applied, the proper course is to resort, by analogy, to Article 232 of the Civil Procedure Code and make the determination prudentially. This position is criticized in the appeal because in a precedent of the Court itself cited in the ruling, a criterion is mentioned that is considered different (the fees must be calculated 'on the payments that are made and not on the amount that the proceeding produces' in both versions) seems to be oriented towards the process's purpose of conserving the assets through a controlled or intervened administration, where total or partial payments of liabilities may be possible as a consequence of the management of the assets or the effects of the procedure, and not necessarily of their realization or sale. Without delving into the point, as it is not necessary, the Chamber shares the Court's refusal to take the book value of the goods as a calculation basis, as the truth is that it cannot be taken as a substitute for the value suggested by the legislator in said provisions, because, if the latter must be understood as the real and true value, as part of the result of an activity (realization), that is, what the assets effectively produce, that other value must be considered ruled out, because in view of its formal nature, it can be removed from reality and even contrary to the very purposes of the process. From that perspective exclusively, the Chamber is of the opinion that numeral 23, subsection b) of the Regulations was not violated, because according to what has been explained, attending to the higher-ranking legal provisions that must be taken as determinants of the content of the regulatory norm, the 'real asset' cannot be taken as that accounting value, to fix, based on it, the fees in the sum sought by the appellant. XI.- Nor does the Chamber consider that the Court, by fixing the fees of Mr. Biolley prudentially based on the provisions of Article 232, third paragraph, of the Civil Procedure Code, in the face of the impossibility, which was held to be verified for the specific case, of applying the norm of the Fee Schedule in its true intended content, as has been explained. Article 232 cited, in the entirety of its paragraphs, states: 'Article 232.- Fee schedule for fees and costs. The Full Court (Corte Plena) shall establish a fee schedule for the fees and costs of executors, notifiers, witnessing experts, and expert witnesses, and for the payment of any other indispensable proceedings that are not the duty of officials by virtue of their office. To this fee schedule, which shall be periodically reviewed and updated, the courts shall adhere when conducting the assessments that this article and the preceding ones recommend. The Judge has the obligation to assess any fee or payment for work that this Code or special laws do not determine; the assessment shall preferably be made in advance, prudentially, with criteria of equity. The party that must bear the payment shall have the right to complain directly to the Judicial Inspection, against excessive assessments and against unnecessary charges. The Inspection must review them with the authority to moderate what in its opinion is not correct, without prejudice to being able to apply the appropriate disciplinary measures.' If the total content of that norm is taken into account, it is clear that what it establishes are regulations applicable to the fees and costs of executors, witnessing experts, and expert witnesses, and any other indispensable proceedings not charged to officials by virtue of their office, and not to lawyers' fees. The foregoing is reaffirmed because the Code, immediately thereafter, establishes a series of rules to regulate that other aspect, within which it is worth highlighting the provisions of numeral 233, which states: 'Article 233. Lawyers' Fees, general rule. Lawyers' fees shall be fixed based on the fee schedule that is established through the procedure set forth in the Organic Law of the Bar Association.' However, such interpretation cannot be taken as a basis to say that the Ad quem violated them, through improper application, because it resorted to it analogously in the face of the impossibility of applying that other regulatory provision because its prerequisite for application in the specific case did not occur. In any case, what that provision embodies is the application of the principle of equity in the solution of those cases not determined in the legal system, and that principle is a source of law for interpreting, integrating, and delimiting the field of application of the written legal system, in all those cases in which the norms cannot be explained and applied by themselves in relation to a specific case (Articles 7 of the General Law of Public Administration and 5° of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch); in such a way that, if in the specific case a product of the assets cannot be established in the terms foreseen in the regulatory article—which is the relevant aspect—that allows making the determination in accordance with its own postulate, and as the thesis of Mr. Biolley Riotte is also not appropriate, the path of prudential determination, in accordance with equity, is not subject to criticism in the terms raised in the appeal. Consequently, none of the other violations invoked in the appeal have been incurred. It cannot be said that the Court disregarded the provisions of Article 233 of the Civil Procedure Code, nor that it made improper use of the hierarchy of the applicable norms, because what it did was interpret them in accordance with the factual particularities of the specific case and, in the Chamber's opinion, it proceeded correctly. There are no legally valid reasons in the opinion of this Court to modify the stated criterion, much less to use as a parameter the sum that was supposedly intended to be readjusted, to try to force the application of a table to a situation that is not its own. Moreover, by doing so, one would be attempting to apply the table to the alleged liabilities of Mr. Chaves, when the decree refers to the real asset. Therefore, the fixing of the emoluments of attorney Pacheco Carranza must be done prudentially, as this process did not advance as an administration by judicial intervention since the initial order was revoked.

VII.As indicated, the receiver's fees must be fixed prudentially, for his activity during the period in which he served as such. What he may have done after having legally ceased in that position cannot be taken into account for this purpose. If the petitioner (promotor) of the administration by intervention considers that after having ceased in his position as receiver, Mr. Pacheco Carranza acted in an improper or irregular manner, he may channel his claim through the corresponding avenue, but that does not influence the fixing of the fees for the labor he performed when he was receiver, nor is it appropriate now, for the purposes at hand, to analyze and evaluate his conduct. Therefore, what occurred in the enforcement proceedings (procesos ejecutivos) that Mr. Chaves claims were filed by attorney Pacheco cannot be taken into account for the purposes of fixing fees. Both appealing parties show disagreement regarding the amount fixed in the first instance. Mr. Chaves considers it excessive, and the former receiver requests they be fixed at one hundred fifty-one thousand two hundred fifty dollars.

First, the setting must be made in colones, since the service as an auxiliary of justice was rendered in our country. The currency of the promoter's debts—whether in dollars or another foreign currency—has no relevance in determining the currency in which the fees should be established. Furthermore, analyzing the performance of Licenciado Carranza, as described in the first considering clause (considerando primero) of the appealed decision which has been upheld at this level, and the economic significance of the administration request filed, as well as the amount of the assets and property guarded by the curator (curador) during their tenure, the Court considers that the amount set by the judge must be upheld."</span><span style="mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Arial Unicode MS&quot;"><o:p> </o:p> </span></p> </body> </html>

" III. Previo al análisis del fondo de lo resuelto, resulta indispensable aclarar la naturaleza de lo pretendido por quien figuró transitoriamente como curador en este proceso concursal y la vía procesal que se ha utilizado para ello. En primer lugar, en el ahora derogado proceso de Administración por intervención judicial, el curador se constituía en un órgano del proceso, al cual le correspondía, como auxiliar del órgano jurisdiccional, entre otras funciones, las de administrar el patrimonio del concursado y asumir su representación (artículo 714 del Código Procesal Civil, según su texto original ahora derogado). Ante la ausencia de una normativa específica que regulara sus atribuciones en el procedimiento precautelar, debían aplicarse, mutatis mutandi, las normas atinentes a la función del curador para la quiebra y el concurso civil de acreedores. De lo dicho se extrae, con meridiana claridad, que entre el curador y el concursado no existe de manera alguna un vínculo contractual. Es más, el curador tiene el deber de ser absolutamente imparcial en el ejercicio de sus funciones, tutelando los intereses del concursado y la masa de acreedores de igual manera. Al no existir un vínculo contractual entre ellos, y tratándose de un órgano auxiliar de la justicia, nombrado por el propio juzgado respetando las normas administrativas respectivas en cuanto al turno riguroso que debe seguirse entre los que figuran como posibles curadores ante la Dirección Ejecutiva del Poder Judicial, sus honorarios no deben ser reclamados por medio del denominado incidente privilegiado previsto por el artículo 236 del Código Procesal Civil. Este artículo se aplica a las relaciones de servicios profesionales libremente contratados por los particulares con sus abogados, mandatarios judiciales y apoderados. Es cierto que al curador le competían facultades de representación y de administración, junto a muchas otras obligaciones de naturaleza procesal, pero ello no convertía su situación en una relación liberal profesional. Por ello, no resulta aplicable el artículo 236 citado, en ninguna de las disposiciones en él contenidas. No debe presentarse la solicitud de fijación de honorarios como una demanda incidental, no deben someterse a decisión judicial ²pretensiones² de otra naturaleza, tales como declarar en forma general y abstracta que él cumplió en "forma precisa, diligente y oportuna con estricto apego al ordenamiento jurídico" su función. En estos casos, basta con que el curador, como cualquier otro auxiliar de la justicia, solicite se proceda a la fijación de sus emolumentos. No es necesario, en estos casos, siquiera dar audiencia a las partes del proceso sobre su gestión, sino que una vez presentada basta con que se resuelva lo que proceda conforme a derecho. Lo decidido puede ser apelado, pero antes de ello no se tiene que dar audiencia ni al concursado ni a los acreedores de un proceso. Dicha gestión, que no es un incidente, debe tramitarse en el expediente principal y no en legajo separado. Por ello, erró el señor ex curador al formular su pretensión por la vía incidental privilegiada, que no es aplicable a la fijación de sus honorarios, y también lo hizo el Juzgado al darle el trámite incidental, en legajo separado, llegando incluso a dictar una sentencia incidental cuando en estos casos basta con la fijación de los honorarios mediante un auto debidamente razonado. Ello hizo incurrir en error a las partes en cuanto a la naturaleza de la resolución dictada y la forma de impugnarla. En efecto, si la fijación debe hacerse por medio de un simple auto, debe recurrirse de ella en el término de tres días inconforme. Ninguno de los apelantes expresó los motivos de su inconformidad al apelar, pues se guiaron por la forma en que se había actuado y estimaron que se trataba de una sentencia. Además, tratándose de una simple fijación de honorarios de un auxiliar jurisdiccional, lo resuelto no se rige, en cuanto a los medios de impugnación, por lo dispuesto por el artículo 236. No estamos, entonces, ni frente a un incidente privilegiado ni tampoco ante una sentencia. Por ello, pese al error en cuanto a la tramitación, que obviamente no crea ningún derecho procesal, de ahora en adelante se encauzará correctamente la gestión para la fijación de los honorarios del curador, como una simple gestión de fijación de honorarios de un auxiliar jurisdiccional. IV. Del análisis hecho anteriormente, queda claro que la fijación de honorarios de curador, así como la de cualquier otro auxiliar de un proceso concursal, como serían por ejemplo el interventor, los peritos y los notarios inventariadores, no se tramita por la vía incidental. De ello resulta que no estamos frente a una demanda en sentido estricto, sino frente a una simple solicitud de fijación de emolumentos, la cual podría hacerse inclusive sin que el interesado exprese siquiera la suma en la cual estima que deben fijarse. Es más, la fijación de los honorarios de los auxiliares de justicia, según la doctrina prevaleciente en materia concursal, podría hacerse inclusive de manera oficiosa, según el principio de impulso procesal que tiene particular acentuación en este tipo de procesos. Por ello, una vez aclarada la naturaleza de lo que se está resolviendo, no estima en esta ocasión el Tribunal que exista nulidad en lo resuelto en primera instancia, supuestamente por no hacerse pronunciamiento expreso sobre todos los puntos que eventualmente fueron "pretendidos" en la petitoria del incidente planteado. Basta, dada la naturaleza verdadera de la gestión planteada, según lo analizado ahora con detenimiento en esta resolución, con fijar los honorarios en la forma en que se hizo. En todo caso, si el peticionario consideraba que no se habían resuelto todos los puntos de lo que pretendía, pudo haber solicitado la adición de lo resuelto, que en ese momento tenía la formalidad de una sentencia. Al no hacerlo, no cabe atender reclamo alguno de nulidad de lo resuelto en primera instancia. "V. Según lo indicado hasta ahora, deben rechazarse también los alegatos hechos por el señor Calixto Chaves Zamora, en cuanto a la vía utilizada. En realidad, si la gestión de fijación de honorarios de un órgano auxiliar jurisdiccional como lo es el curador no debe tramitarse por la vía incidental, no se ha causado indefensión alguna al haberse dado audiencia de ella y seguido dicho trámite. Se dieron mayores garantías procesales de las legalmente necesarias en estos casos. Ahora bien, no tratándose de un incidente y al no tener cabida aquí lo dispuesto por el artículo 236 del Código Procesal Civil, no rige ningún plazo de caducidad anual para que el curador efectúe su solicitud de fijación, con lo cual no resulta procedente la invocación que al efecto efectuó el señor Chaves. VI. Para la fijación de los honorarios de curador, debe atenderse en este caso en particular únicamente lo que él realizó durante el tiempo en el cual fungió como tal. Quedó establecido que su curatela se extendió desde el momento en el cual aceptó el cargo, hasta cuando, por resolución firme, se revocó la resolución que había admitido impropiamente la solicitud de administración por intervención judicial. Sea, su función se desarrolló desde el veintitrés de agosto de 1994 hasta la firmeza de la resolución de las ocho horas del veinticuatro de octubre de 1994 (ver, al respecto, lo resuelto por este Tribunal y Sección en la resolución No. 260 de las nueve horas treinta y cinco minutos del once de agosto de 1998). El proceso, por ende, no cumplió las etapas de producción y pago a acreedores, por lo que no es posible aplicar la tarifa que reglamentariamente correspondería al curador en este tipo de asuntos, según los términos alegados en esta instancia por el señor curador. El licenciado Pacheco Carranza conoce la jurisprudencia que se ha sentado en casos como el presente. Inclusive, al referirse a las resoluciones que este Tribunal y Sección ha dictado al respecto, argumentó, a folio 26 de este legajo, lo siguiente: "La jurisprudencia que cita el incidentado en abono a su tesis de fijación prudencial, es, con el respeto que su procedencia amerita, un gazapo, que no puede escapar a la mente del Juez acusioso (sic) y estudioso.". Este Tribunal no estima que estemos frente a un yerro o inadvertencia al sostener - luego de un acucioso estudio del punto ante otras situaciones en las cuales se ha tenido que interpretar y aplicar la normativa que ahora interesa - , que cuando no se ha producido nada dentro de un proceso de administración por intervención judicial, los honorarios correspondientes al curador no pueden fijarse siguiendo la tarifa establecida por el decreto respectivo, debiéndose entonces determinar el monto de los honorarios de manera prudencial. Al respecto, cabe transcribir aquí el criterio que mantiene y reafirma ahora este Tribunal y Sección, contenido en la resolución No. 148 de las 9:05 horas del 26 de abril del 2000, en la cual se dijo: ²Una vez verificada la existencia de la relación de servicios profesionales entre el incidentista y la promotora de este proceso, debe analizarse la forma en la cual han de ser liquidados sus honorarios de abogado, pues los agravios de los apelantes tocan precisamente con este aspecto. El Decreto Ejecutivo N° 20307-J, publicado en La Gaceta N° 64 del 4 de abril de 1991, aplicable al sub lite, establece en su artículo 23, en lo que interesa, lo siguiente: "Artículo 23.- Concurso de acreedores y quiebras. En concursos de acreedores, quiebras y procesos afines o relacionados con aquellos, los honorarios de abogado se regulan así: a) Administración por intervención judicial y convenio preventivo: Los honorarios de abogado del curador serán iguales a los del curador del concurso o quie­bra. (5% sobre el activo real conforme con los artícu­los 926 del Código Civil y 883 del Código de Comer­cio). b) Asesoramiento. Por asesoramiento y en su caso la petición de quiebra, administración por intervención judicial o convenio preventivo, los honorarios de abogado serán de una tercera parte del curador de la quiebra. [...]² Las citadas disposiciones han traído, en el caso de la administración por intervención judicial, problemas de interpretación y aplicación. El Decreto Ejecutivo parte de una asimilación de los procesos liquidatorios, como el concurso civil de acreedores y la quiebra, con el de administración por intervención. En el punto a) citado, se indica que los honorarios del curador, figura que existía en la legislación original de este instituto, debían fijarse de igual manera que para este sujeto en la quiebra o la insolvencia, pero luego, entre paréntesis, se habla del 5% del activo real, conforme a los artículos 926 del Código Civil y 883 del Código de Comercio. El referirse, en primer término, al 5% del activo real, para luego citar las disposiciones sustantivas indicadas, genera una contradicción que debe resaltarse. El artículo 926 citado, en lo que interesa, dice: ²Artículo 926: El curador ganará por concepto de honorarios el cinco por ciento sobre la cantidad que efectivamente produzca el activo del concurso...² Por su parte, el 883 del Código de Comercio, dispone: ²Artículo 883.- El curador ganará por concepto de honorarios el cinco por ciento de la cantidad que efectivamente produzca el concurso. Al aprobar la cuenta o cuentas distributivas, el juzgado separará un cinco por ciento de cada distribución, y la reservará para entregarla al curador, tan pronto como quede firme el auto en el que se aprueben la distribución y el pago de honorarios corres­pondientes..." (nuevamente, lo evidenciado es nuestro). Como puede notarse, en ambos casos el 5% que corresponde al curador ha de calcularse según las sumas que efectivamente produzca el concurso. Tratándose de procesos liquidatorios, se trata de las sumas que lleguen a liquidarse y pagarse efectivamente a los acreedores. No se trata del 5% del activo original del fallido, sino del 5% sobre las cantidades que en efecto lleguen a producir sus bienes, con las cuales ha de hacerse frente, hasta donde alcance, a las acreencias. Es por eso que en la quiebra en cada pago, total o parcial, ha de separarse el 5% del curador, para cancelar inmediatamente sus emolumentos. La administración por intervención, por el contrario, no es un proceso liquidatorio. Se trata de un instituto jurídico que pretende salvar de una crisis recuperable a una empresa. Durante su desarrollo, se busca que de las fuerzas internas de la empresa, se obtengan los recursos indispensables para solucionar esa crisis temporal. No se busca liquidar su patrimonio para pagar, según los privilegios legalmente establecidos y el principio "par conditio creditorum", a sus acreedores. La forma en la cual se busca tutelar los intereses de ellos es manteniendo la unidad de la empresa, su productivi­dad, generando los ingresos indispensables para hacer frente a las deudas. De tal forma, el concepto de ²activo real², en estos casos, no es, como parece entender el licenciado Biolley, el monto bruto de los activos contables de la empresa al momento de establecer la solicitud de administración por interven­ción. De ser así, en primer lugar, se estarían dejando de lado las acreen­cias, para liquidar los honorarios tomando en cuenta solo el activo de la empresa. En segundo lugar, se estaría obviando la referencia expresa que hace dicho acápite a los citados artículos 926 y 883. Además, conllevaría a cercenar, desde un inicio, un 1,66 % del patrimonio de la empresa que se encuentra en una situación económica y financiera difícil, sin que siquiera se hubiera comenzado a satisfacer los intereses de todos los acreedores. El Tribunal concluye, según los preceptos citados, que el 5% que correspondería al curador de una administración por intervención, debe calcularse tomando en cuenta lo que efectivamente produzca la empresa durante el proceso y además llegue a pagarse a los acreedores sujetos a éste. Así lo ha entendido este Tribunal y Sección, en la resolución No. 202 de las nueve horas treinta minutos del cinco de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y siete. En esta resolución, se indicó, además, lo siguiente: ²En el caso bajo examen no se llegó a una fase de pagos. Al menos en autos no fue acreditado que así hubiese ocurrido. En asuntos como este el cinco por ciento del curador se debe calcular sobre los pagos que se efectúen y no sobre la cantidad que produz­ca el concurso, por cuanto -se reitera- estos no son procesos de liquidación, sino -para expresarlo de manera más gráfica- son de ²salvamento² de la empresa. De ahí que no se trata de determinar únicamente lo que produzca el concurso, sino lo que produzca, y como consecuencia de esa producción, pague la empresa. No es posible entonces aplicar en este caso concreto, el porcentaje señalado por el artículo 23 inciso a) del referido decreto para fijar los emolumentos del curador. No queda otra alternativa más que la de aplicar, por analogía, el ordinal 232 del Código Proce­sal Civil que en su párrafo 3°, permite determinar ese monto de manera prudencial y con criterio de equidad.² Al remitir el inciso b) del artículo 23 de Decreto a la forma en la cual han de calcularse los honorarios del curador, para fijar los correspondientes al abogado que asesora a la promotora, nos encontramos con las mismas dificulta­des señaladas. De acuerdo con la jerarquía normativa, una disposición reglamentaria no puede derogar ni modificar un texto legislativo. En el presente asunto, la frase del decreto donde se establece "(5% sobre el activo real conforme con los artículos 926 del Código Civil y 883 del Código de Comercio)², no puede tener un significado diferente al de las disposiciones de rango superior a las cuales remite. El porcentaje indicado, entonces, se refiere a lo que efectivamente haya producido el concurso en beneficio de la masa de acreedores, en este caso, la administración por intervención judicial. En este proceso no se ha llegado a una fase de pagos a los acreedores someti­dos a su suerte. No consta en autos que siquiera se hubiera concluido el proceso de verificación de créditos, menos que se hubiera procedido a saldar­los en parte durante la administración. La participación del licenciado Biolley Riotte, como apoderado de la promotora y abogado director, llegó hasta la confirmación del auto inicial del proceso. Como se indicó, al no haberse producido pagos a los acreedores anteriores a la instauración del proceso, no es posible aplicar el parámetro del 5% al cual ha hecho referencia el licenciado Biolley. Mucho menos, puede interpretarse que el 5% del cual debe partirse lo sea del valor de los activos al momento de la presentación de la administración, sin importar los frutos que ella en definitiva depare a la masa de acreedores, máxime cuando la participación del abogado de la petente concluyó en su fase inicial del proceso de salvamento. No queda otra alterna­tiva, en estas circunstancias, más que aplicar por analogía el ordinal 232 del Código Procesal Civil, que en su párrafo 3°, permite determinar ese monto de manera prudencial y con criterio de equidad, tomando en cuenta, en estos casos, los intereses del abogado, la propia administrada y la masa de acreedores.­² En virtud de recurso de casación interpuesto contra el fallo citado, la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia también procedió a estudiar y decidir el punto, concordando con lo establecido por este Tribunal y Sección. Al respecto, en su voto No. 189 de las 9:30 horas del 28 de marzo del 2001, indicó: ² VI ... El Código Procesal Civil, en las regulaciones del instituto de la ²Administración por Intervención Judicial² (artículos 709 y siguientes) no contenía ninguna regla acerca de cómo fijar los honorarios del Curador, como si lo hace ahora, después de la citada reforma, en su numeral 722 (Remuneración del Interventor –nombre éste último con el que se sustituyó el de ²Curador²) -y tampoco los del abogado del deudor-. Entonces, en principio, como se señala en el recurso, debería partirse de la regla general del artículo 233 citado, que remite a la tarifa fijada de conformidad con el procedimiento señalado en la Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Abogados, y llegarse al artículo 23 del mencionado Arancel, el cual literalmente y en lo que interesa reza: ²Artículo 23. Concurso de acreedores y quiebras. En concursos de acreedores, quiebras y procesos afines o relacionados con aquellos, los honorarios de abogados se regulan así: a) Administración por intervención judicial y convenio preventivo: los honorarios de abogado del curador serán iguales a los del concurso o quiebras (5% sobre el activo real conforme a los artículos 926 del Código Civil y 883 del Código de Comercio). b) Asesoramiento: Por asesoramiento y en su caso la petición de quiebra, administración por intervención judicial o convenio preventivo, los honorarios de abogado serán de una tercera parte del curador de la quiebra. c) ...². VII.- También viene resuelto por el Tribunal un aspecto no impugnado ante este Órgano, cual es el de que en el proceso de administración de Lachner y Sáenz S. A., no se ha llegado a la conclusión de la fase de verificación de los acreedores y no consta que se les haya saldado en alguna medida. VIII.- Planteadas las cosas de un modo literal, la solución de la cuestión parece, a primera vista, sencilla, pues según las normas mencionadas, lo que habría que hacer es pura y simplemente calcular los honorarios del Curador con base en el “activo real”, como si se tratara del Curador de una quiebra, de conformidad con los artículos 926 del Código Civil y 883 del Código de Comercio y, luego, establecer los del abogado del deudor en una tercera parte. Como la disposición hace referencia a los procesos de quiebra, concurso civil, administración por intervención judicial y convenio preventivo, tal cosa puede ser posible, en principio, en algunos de sus supuestos; pero no lo puede ser en el de la administración por intervención judicial. Si se tiene en cuenta la naturaleza de ese proceso preconcursal y sus particularidades, fácil es caer en la cuenta de que la norma Reglamentaria, al incluirlo también en esa forma de cálculo, fue concebida sobre la inexactitud de equipararlo con el de liquidación absoluta (concurso civil y quiebra), pues, mirando las particularidades de uno y otro en términos generales y, particularmente, en la situación del proceso de Lachner y Sáenz S. A., la verdad es que, como estimó el Tribunal, existen obstáculos que impiden aplicar el artículo 23, inciso b), en la forma en que lo ha pretendido y pretende aún en esta sede, el incidentista. IX.- En efecto, el proceso de Administración por Intervención Judicial, busca el salvamento de la empresa que se encuentra en una crisis económica superable, a través de medidas económicas, financieras u organizativas, a modo de un remedio que permita superar el padecimiento. Si bien el proceso es de naturaleza concursal, en la medida en que se permite la participación universal de los acreedores, con efectos especiales respecto de ellos que faciliten el salvamento, no está previsto para una liquidación del patrimonio y ni siquiera es posible hablar, a priori, aparte del objetivo general del salvamento, de resultados económicos específicos esperables, pues todo va a depender de la suerte del proceso, inclusive de la posibilidad de que sea admitida o no la medida de protección demandada. En cambio, el proceso de quiebra o de concurso, que se señala como base de cálculo, busca como resultado, en solución normal, la realización del activo y su distribución entre los acreedores. Esta realización se produce a través del desapoderamiento de los bienes, su valoración y venta. En consecuencia, cuando los artículos 926 del Código Civil y 883 del Comercio refieren la base de cálculo de los honorarios del Curador de la quiebra o concurso a la “cantidad que efectivamente produzca el concurso”, están aludiendo, sin ninguna duda, no al valor contable de los bienes y ni siquiera al valor pericial, sino a lo que resulta de su realización, o sea, de su venta, porque eso es lo que produce el activo patrimonial, y ese resultado puede ser inferior, igual o superior al avalúo pericial, el cual sirve simplemente de base para la venta, pública o privada (artículos 876, inciso j, del Código de Comercio y 781 del Procesal Civil). Debe darse por supuesto que la aplicación de los artículos 926 del Código Civil 883 del Código de Comercio, tiene lugar cuando el proceso concursal llega a la fase de realización y pago de acreedores, pues podría suceder que el proceso no llegue a esa etapa y que la situación sea revertida mediante una revocatoria del pronunciamiento que declaró la apertura, inclusive en una etapa del proceso en la que ha habido desapoderamiento, gestión y administración del patrimonio por parte del Curador. En un supuesto como ese, en que ya no será posible la venta de los bienes para saber cuánto produce efectivamente el activo, los honorarios del Curador no podrán ser fijados con base en el sistema de dichas normas. X.- Así las cosas, si el numeral 23, antes transcrito, hace una referencia expresa y, por lo tanto, inequívoca, al sistema de los artículos 926 y 883 citados, según el cual los honorarios deben fijarse, según ya se dijo, sobre la base del valor real de los bienes del deudor, resultante de su liquidación (producto efectivo del activo), su aplicación supone un resultado económico que puede constatarse, en virtud de la realización del activo del patrimonio del deudor. Esto es posible y esperable así en los procesos de quiebra y de concurso civil y, eventualmente, en uno de concordato preventivo, dependiendo de si su contenido implica una liquidación patrimonial, como suele suceder en el convenio de abandono, a través del cual se propone la dación de un patrimonio universal a cambio de la extinción del total de sus obligaciones. Pero no, por lo menos como un resultado normal, en el supuesto de la administración por intervención judicial, en razón de su finalidad. Esta imposibilidad plantea la interrogante acerca de la solución que debe darse. La tesis expuesta por el Lic. Biolley, -que se entiende esgrimida al no poderse hablar de una suma que sea producto de la liquidación del activo de la empresa- es, como se dijo, la de que por debe entenderse el valor en libros de los activos, o sea el valor contable, y de que sobre él debe aplicarse el cinco por ciento. El Tribunal, por su parte, concluyó como ya se hizo referencia, en el sentido de que el cálculo de los respectivos honorarios debe hacerse ²sobre lo que efectivamente produzca la empresa durante el proceso y además llegue a pagarse a los acreedores sujetos a éste. En armonía con ello, resolvió no aceptar la posición del articulante y, partiendo de que no es posible, según el estado y resultado del proceso al momento de emitir su pronunciamiento, establecer un producto del activo en dichos términos, que permita aplicar la norma, lo procedente es acudir, por analogía, al artículo 232 del Código Procesal y hacer la fijación prudencialmente. Esa posición es criticada en el recurso porque en un antecedente del propio Tribunal que se cita en el fallo, se menciona un criterio que se considera diferente (los honorarios deben calcularse “sobre los pagos que se efectúen y no sobre la cantidad que produzca el concurso( en ambas versiones) parece orientarse a la finalidad del proceso de conservar del activo a través de un administración controlada o intervenida, donde los pagos totales o parciales de pasivos puede ser posibles como consecuencia de la gestión del activo o de los efectos del procedimiento y no necesariamente de su realización o venta. Sin ahondar sobre el punto, pues no es necesario, la Sala comparte la negativa del Tribunal de tomar como base de cálculo el valor contable de los bienes, pues la verdad es que no puede tomarse como sustituto del valor que sugiere el legislador en dichas disposiciones, porque, si éste debe entenderse como el real y verdadero, como parte del resultado de una actividad (realización), o sea lo que efectivamente produzca un activo, debe entenderse por descartado ese otro valor, pues en vista de su naturaleza formal, puede resultar alejado de la realidad e inclusive contrario a los mismos fines del proceso. Desde esa perspectiva, exclusivamente, la Sala es del criterio de que no se quebrantó el numeral 23, inciso b) Reglamentario, pues de acuerdo con lo explicado, atendiendo a las disposiciones legales de rango superior que deben tomarse como determinantes del contenido de la norma reglamentaria, el “activo real” no puede tomarse como aquel valor contable, para fijar, con base en él, los honorarios en la suma pretendida por el recurrente. XI.- Tampoco estima la Sala que el Tribunal, al fijar los honorarios del Lic. Biolley prudencialmente con base en lo dispuesto en el artículo 232, párrafo tercero, del Código Procesal Civil, ante la imposibilidad, que se tuvo como constatada para el caso concreto, de aplicar la norma del Arancel en su verdadero contenido previsto, según quedó explicado. Dice el artículo 232 citado, en la totalidad de sus párrafos, Artículo 232.- Tarifa honorarios y gastos. La Corte Plena establecerá una tarifa para los honorarios y gastos de ejecutores, notificadores, testigos de asistencia y peritos, y para el pago de cualesquiera otras diligencias indispensables que no estén a cargo de funcionarios por su oficio. A esta tarifa que será revisada y actualizada periódicamente, se ajustarán los tribunales al practicar las regulaciones que les recomienda este artículo y los anteriores. El Juez tiene obligación de regular cualquier honorario o pago de trabajo que este Código o leyes especiales no determinen; la regulación se hará de preferencia en forma anticipada, prudencialmente, con criterio de equidad. La parte que debe soportar el pago tendrá derecho a quejarse directamente a la Inspección Judicial, contra las tasaciones excesivas y contra las cargas innecesarias. La Inspección deberá revisarlas con facultad de moderar lo que a su parecer no sea correcto, sin perjuicio de que pueda aplicar las medidas disciplinarias oportunas. Si se tiene en cuenta el contenido total de esa norma, es claro que lo que establece son regulaciones aplicables a los honorarios y gastos de ejecutores, testigos de asistencia y peritos y cualesquiera otras diligencias indispensables que no estén a cargo de funcionarios por su oficio y no a los honorarios de abogado. Lo anterior se reafirma, porque el Código, de seguido establece una serie de reglas para regular ese otro aspecto, dentro de las cuales cabe destacar lo dispuesto por el numeral 233, el cual señala: Artículo 233. Honorarios de abogado, regla general. Los honorarios de abogado se fijarán con base en la tarifa que se establezca mediante el procedimiento que dispone la Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Abogados. Sin embargo, tal inteligencia no puede tomarse como base para decir que el Ad quem las quebrantara, por aplicación indebida, pues recurrió a ella analógicamente ante la imposibilidad de aplicar aquella otra disposición reglamentaria por no haberse dado su presupuesto de aplicación en el caso concreto. De todas maneras, lo que esa disposición recoge es la aplicación del principio de equidad en la solución de aquellos casos no determinados en el ordenamiento y ese principio es fuente de derecho para interpretar, integrar y delimitar el campo de aplicación del ordenamiento escrito, en todos aquellos casos en que las normas no puedan explicarse y aplicarse por sí mismas en relación con un caso concreto (artículos 7 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 5° de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial); de tal suerte que, si en el caso concreto no puede establecerse un producto del activo o en los términos previstos en el artículo reglamentario, -aspecto que es el relevante -, que permita hacer la fijación conforme a su propio postulado, y como tampoco es procedente las tesis del Lic. Biolley Riotte, el camino de la fijación prudencial, conforme a la equidad, no es criticable en los términos que se plantean en el recurso. Consecuentemente, tampoco se ha incurrido en ninguna de las otras violaciones invocadas en el recurso. No puede decirse que el Tribunal desacatara lo dispuesto en el artículo 233 del Código Procesal, ni que hiciera un mal uso de la jerarquía de las normas aplicables, pues lo que hizo fue interpretarlas de acuerdo con las particularidades de hecho del caso concreto y en criterio de la Sala procedió correctamente. No existen motivos jurídicamente válidos en concepto de este Tribunal, para modificar el criterio expuesto, ni mucho menos utilizar como parámetro la suma que presuntamente se pretendía readecuar, para tratar de forzar la aplicación de una tabla a una situación que no le es propia. Es más, con ello se pretendería aplicar la tabla a los presuntos pasivos del señor Chaves, cuando el decreto se refiere al activo real. Por ende, la fijación de los emolumentos del licenciado Pacheco Carranza debe hacerse de manera prudencial, pues este proceso no avanzó como administración por intervención judicial al revocarse el auto inicial. VII. Como se indicó, los honorarios del curador deben fijarse prudencialmente, por su actividad durante el período en el cual fungió como tal. No puede tomarse en cuenta, por ello, lo que realizara después de haber cesado jurídicamente en dicho cargo. Si el promotor de la administración por intervención considera que luego de haber cesado en su puesto de curador el señor Pacheco Carranza actuó de manera indebida o irregular, puede encauzar su reclamo por la vía correspondiente, pero ello no influye en la fijación de los honorarios por la labor que él efectuó cuando era curador, ni resulta procedente ahora, para los fines que interesan, analizar y valorar su conducta. Por ello, no puede tomarse en cuenta a los efectos de la fijación de honorarios, lo acaecido en los procesos ejecutivos que dice el señor Chaves fueron presentados por el licenciado Pacheco. Ambas partes apelantes se muestran disconformes en cuanto al monto fijado en primera instancia. El señor Chaves lo considera excesivo y el ex – curador pide se fijen en ciento cincuenta y un mil doscientos cincuenta dólares. En primer lugar, la fijación debe hacerse en colones, pues la prestación de auxiliar de la justicia se produjo en nuestro país. No tiene relevancia, para determinar la moneda en la cual deben establecerse los honorarios, si las deudas del promotor eran en dólares u otra moneda extranjera. Por otra parte, analizando la actuación del licenciado Carranza, según lo descrito en el considerando primero de la resolución apelada que ha sido mantenido en esta instancia, y la trascendencia económica de la solicitud de administración planteada, así como el monto de los valores y bienes que custodió el curador durante su gestión, estima el Tribunal que el monto fijado por el señor juez debe mantenerse."