Fishing in Isla del Coco National Park does not require express mention of lack of permit in piracy accusationPesca en Parque Nacional Isla del Coco no requiere mención expresa de falta de permiso en la acusación por piratería

III.In his second ground, he claims lack of reasoning of the judgment. The trial court acquits, indicating that the accusation did not contain an element of the offense, consisting of the absence of authorization, permission, or license that would empower the accused to carry out the fishing activity within the limits of Isla del Coco National Park. However, the judgment does not explain the reasons why this was essential, given that fishing is absolutely prohibited in that place because it is a natural reserve. In the appellant's view, this circumstance was not essential, since the absence of authorization is not an absence of criminal liability. He requests that the judgment be annulled and a remand trial (juicio de reenvío) be ordered. The claim is admissible, albeit for the reasons that will be stated. In the present case, the Court acquits the accused L. by indicating: “the accused L. here has been accused by the local Public Prosecutor's Office of having committed the criminal wrong of Piracy, provided for and sanctioned in numeral two hundred fifty-eight of the Penal Code, a classification that is based on the following factual scenario, namely: “On the twenty-ninth of March, two thousand and two, at nine hours twenty minutes, located in the Eastern Pacific, in Isla del Coco National Park, four hundred meters from Ulloa Islet, within the twelve nautical miles, the accused L., in his capacity as captain of the vessel Miss Stancy, […], with full knowledge of his unlawful act, proceeded to exploit the fishery resources (riquezas ictiológicas) within Isla del Coco, by fishing with trolling equipment two yellowfin tuna, which were alive in the fishing nets, which were released at the moment of seizure. The ecological and economic damage caused of 417.7 dollars (sic)”. Having said the above, it is appropriate to establish that the wrong of Piracy, as a substantive norm, we locate it in legal precept number 258, first paragraph of the Penal Code, which prescribes the following: “Article 258.- Shall be punished with imprisonment of three to fifteen years: 1) Whoever carries out, in navigable rivers, in the territorial sea, or on the continental shelf, the unauthorized exploitation of the fishery resources (riquezas ictiológicas) of the nation….” A norm that has a willful connotation, meaning that the active subject must fulfill the cognitive and volitional elements of the criminal offense in question. Notwithstanding that, and in order to proceed into the rigorous analytical reasoning, it is also feasible, moreover, to bear in mind that in the present case there is an accusation prepared indeed by the Public Prosecutor's Office of this jurisdiction. In any event, it is important to indicate in this ruling that the same contains an insurmountable omission that frustrates what is sought to be demonstrated; and it is that, if we then refer to the crime charged—Piracy—established in Article 258, first paragraph of the Penal Code, it is easy to verify the requirement of an objective element (elemento objetivo) of the criminal offense, which is: not having authorization to exploit the fishery resources (riquezas ictiológicas). And this becomes extremely important to highlight by virtue of the fact that the accusation appearing on pages ninety-six to ninety-eight unjustifiably omitted to indicate whether the accused… exploited the fishery resources of Isla del Coco, with or without authorization, an element of a sine qua non nature that tempers the nascent accusation and, at the same time, precludes this Court from supplying such a serious omission… Stated another way, the absence of the objective element of the criminal offense does not permit its application to the subject held as accused… note that the so-called authorization, undoubtedly, is an objective element of the transcribed criminal offense, and therefore in the prosecutorial accusation that we question in this judicial venue, such an important element was not contemplated,… It being not indicated, not even remotely, whether the defendant L. had or did not have the respective authorization for the purpose of exploiting the fishery resources of the well-known Isla del Coco…” (cf. Folios 265 to 267). In accordance with this transcription, it is corroborated that the lower court (a quo) establishes as an objective element of the offense the “absence of authorization or permission,” which is not far from the truth, since, effectively, the legislator provided for that circumstance as a prerequisite for applying that criminal offense. Despite the foregoing, in this case, the Court bases its criterion on pointing out that it was essential that the accusation expressly or literally indicate that circumstance. Now then, it remains to be established whether the assessment made by the judges is in accordance with the law, for which purpose the accusation must be revisited, where the following is stated: “On the twenty-ninth of March, two thousand and two, at nine hours twenty minutes, located in the Eastern Pacific, in the Isla del Coco National Park, four hundred meters from Islote Ulloa, within the twelve nautical miles, the accused L., in his capacity as captain of the vessel Miss Stancy, […], with full knowledge of his unlawful act, proceeded to exploit the fishery resources within Isla del Coco, by fishing with trolling equipment two yellowfin tuna, which were alive in the fishing nets, which were released at the moment of seizure. The ecological and economic damage caused of 417.7 dollars” (cf. Folios 96 front and back. The highlighting is not in the original). As the Court points out, the prosecution does not literally include that he carried out that activity without permission or authorization. But, from the reading of these facts it can be inferred, without a doubt, and without affecting due process, that from the location where he was situated—Isla del Coco National Park—and what was stated as “knowledge of his unlawful act,” the Public Prosecutor’s Office was attributing to the accused that his action was carried out against the legal order and, therefore, with knowledge of the lack of authorizations or permits to fish in a National Park, it being unnecessary, in this particular case, to state literally that the accused had knowledge of his unlawful act because he did not have permits to carry out said activity in that place. Moreover, attention must be paid to what Article eight of the National Parks Service Creation Law, or Law number 6084, in force at the time of the facts, prescribes: "ARTICLE 8.- Within national parks, visitors are prohibited from: …5) Fishing for sport, artisanal, or industrial purposes, except as provided in Article ten." Article 10 of this law states: "The Service may, with the prior affirmative opinion of the council, authorize sport and artisanal fishing in certain areas of the national parks, when it is proven that they will not produce ecological alterations." In the present case, as can be clearly observed from the accusation, the accused was the captain of a vessel that was fishing within the limits of Isla del Coco National Park, and which did not fall under the assumptions of sport fishing, nor artisanal fishing, according to the facts of the same accusation. Therefore, adding in the indictment the phrase “without permission or authorization” was unnecessary, since the Public Prosecutor’s Office was already indicating that the place where the crime was being committed was a National Park—where fishing is generally prohibited—and that the accused had knowledge of his unlawful act. If the lower court (a quo), after receiving all the evidence in the adversarial proceeding, determined that the accused indeed knew of his unlawful act because he knew he did not have permission for that activity within the limits of Isla del Coco—a situation that must be determined in the adversarial proceeding—the right to defense, nor the right to accusation, would not be violated, because the accusation had already indicated the essential elements for charging the accused with the crime of piracy. As has been emphasized, this decision is made for the specific case, because the activity was being carried out in a place where fishing was not permitted, and, consequently, the interpretation given to the context of the accusation is that the accused effectively did not have permits for the fishing activity in which he was found. Therefore, this Chamber considers that the judgment has reasoning defects, since by determining that the accusation lacked an essential element, when in reality it was indeed included within the factual account that the accusation set forth as the factual platform, it rendered that assessment unfounded. Therefore, the claim must be declared with merit, the judgment vacated, and the respective remand trial (juicio de reenvío) ordered, which must be conducted in accordance with Articles 465 and 466 bis of the Criminal Procedure Code, that is, by the same trial court that heard this matter by competence, with a different panel, in careful respect for the principles of objectivity and judicial impartiality.

Folios 265 a 267). According to this transcript, it is corroborated that the accused establishes as an objective element of the offense the "absence of authorization or permit", which is not far from the truth, since, indeed, the legislator provided for that circumstance as a prerequisite for applying that criminal offense. Despite the foregoing, in this case, the Court bases its criterion, pointing out that it was essential that the accusation indicate that circumstance expressly or literally. Now then, it remains to be determined whether the assessment made by the judges is in accordance with law, for which the accusation must be revisited, where the following is stated: "On the twenty-ninth day of March two thousand two, at nine hours twenty minutes, located in the Eastern Pacific, **in the Isla del Coco National Park (Parque Nacional Isla del Coco)**, four hundred meters from Islote Ulloa, within the twelve nautical miles, the defendant L. in his capacity as captain of the vessel Miss Stancy, […], **with full knowledge of his unlawful conduct**, **proceeded to exploit the ichthyological resources within Isla del Coco**, **by fishing with trolling equipment two yellowfin tuna**, which were found alive in the fishing nets, which were released at the time of the seizure. The ecological and economic damage caused by the 417.7 dollars" (cfr.

Folios 96 front and back. (The highlighting does not belong to the original). As the Court points out, the prosecution does not literally include that this activity was carried out without permission or authorization. However, from the reading of these facts it can be inferred, without any doubt, and without affecting due process, that by the place where it was located –Parque Nacional Isla del Coco– and what was stated as the "knowledge of his unlawful conduct," the Ministerio Público attributed to the accused that his actions were carried out against the legal order and, therefore, with knowledge of the lack of authorizations or permits to fish in a National Park, it being unnecessary, in this particular case, to literally state that the accused had knowledge of his unlawful conduct because **he did not have permits to carry out said activity in that place**. Furthermore, attention must be paid to the provisions of Article 8 of the Law for the Creation of the Servicio de Parques Nacionales or Law number 6084, in force at the time of the events: "ARTICLE 8º.- Within the national parks, visitors are prohibited from: …5) Fishing for sport, artisanal, or industrial purposes, except in the case provided for in Article Ten.". Article 10 of this law states: "The Service may, with the prior affirmative opinion of the council, authorize sport and artisanal fishing in certain areas of the national parks, when it is proven that they will not produce ecological alterations.". In the present case, as can be clearly seen from the accusation, the accused was the captain of a vessel that was fishing within the limits of the Parque Nacional Isla del Coco, and that he was not in the situations of sport or artisanal fishing, according to the facts of the accusation itself. Therefore, adding the phrase “without permission or authorization” in the indictment was unnecessary, since the Ministerio Público was already indicating that the place where the crime was being committed was a National Park –where fishing is generally prohibited–, and that the accused had knowledge of his unlawful conduct. If the lower court, after receiving all the evidence in the adversarial proceeding, determined that the accused indeed knew of his unlawful conduct because he knew he did not have permission for that activity within the limits of the Isla del Coco –a situation that must be determined in the adversarial proceeding–, the right to defense and the right to proper imputation were not violated, since the accusation had already indicated the essential elements for charging the accused with the crime of piracy. As has been stressed, this decision is made for the specific case, because the activity was being carried out in a place where fishing should not have occurred, and, consequently, the interpretation given to the context of the accusation is that the accused indeed did not have permits for the fishing activity in which he was found. Therefore, this Chamber considers that the judgment has flaws in its reasoning, because by determining that the accusation lacked an essential element, when in reality it was included within the factual narrative that the accusation provided as a platform, it rendered that assessment unfounded, so the claim must be granted, the judgment must be quashed, and the respective new trial (reenvío) must be ordered, which must be conducted in accordance with Articles 465 and 466 bis of the Código Procesal Penal, that is, by the same Trial Court that originally heard this matter by competence, with a different integration, in attentive respect of the principles of objectivity and judicial impartiality.

they have been (sic) accused by the local Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) of having committed the criminal wrong of Piracy (Piratería), provided for and sanctioned under numeral two hundred fifty-eight of the Penal Code (Código Penal), a classification based on the following factual scenario, to wit: “On the twenty-ninth day of March two thousand two, at nine hours twenty minutes, located in the Naional Pacific (sic) Isla del Coco, four hundred meters from Isolte (sic) Ulloa, within the twelve nautical miles, the accused L. in his capacity as captain of the vessel Miss Stancy, […], with full knowledge of his unlawful conduct, proceeded to exploit the ichthyological resources (riquezas ictiológicas) within Isla del Coco, by fishing with trolling equipment two yellowfin tuna, which were found alive in the fishing nets, which were released at the time of the seizure. The ecological and economic damage caused for the 417.7 dollars (sic)”. Having said the above, it is appropriate to establish that the wrong of Piracy (Piratería), as a substantive norm, is located in legal precept number 258, first subsection of the Penal Code (Código Penal), which prescribes the following: “Article 258.- Whoever carries out in the navigable rivers, in the territorial sea, or on the continental shelf, the unauthorized exploitation of the ichthyological resources (riquezas ictiológicas) of the nation shall be punished with imprisonment from three to fifteen years….” A norm that has an intentional connotation, meaning that the active subject must fulfill the cognitive and volitional elements of the criminal type in question. Notwithstanding this, and in order to delve deeper into the rigorous analytical reasoning, it is also feasible to bear in mind that in the instant case there is an accusation prepared by the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) of this jurisdiction. In any event, it is important to indicate in this judgment that it contains an insurmountable omission that frustrates what it seeks to demonstrate; and that is, if we refer then to the crime charged —Piracy (Piratería)— established in Article 258, first subsection of the Penal Code (Código Penal), it is easy to verify the requirement of an objective element of the criminal type, which is: not having authorization to exploit the ichthyological resources (riquezas ictiológicas). And this becomes extremely important to highlight because the accusation that appears on pages ninety-six to ninety-eight unjustifiably omitted to indicate whether the accused… exploited the ichthyological resources (riquezas ictiológicas) of Isla del Coco, with or without authorization, an element of a sine quanon (sic) nature that tempers the nascent accusation and, at the same time, bars this Court from supplanting such a serious omission… Stated otherwise, the absence of the objective element of the criminal type does not permit its application to the person held as accused… note that the so-called authorization, without a doubt, is an objective element of the transcribed criminal type, and therefore, in the prosecutorial accusation that we question in this judicial venue, such an important element was not contemplated,… Not indicating, not even remotely, whether the defendant L. had or did not have the respective authorization to exploit the ichthyological resources (riquezas ictiológicas) of the well-known Isla del Coco…” (cfr. Folios 265 a 267). According to this transcription, it is corroborated that the aquo establishes as an objective element of the type the “absence of authorization or permit”, which is not far from the truth, since, effectively, the legislator provided for that circumstance as a prerequisite to apply that criminal type. Despite the foregoing, in this case, the Court bases its criterion, noting that it was essential that the accusation indicated that circumstance in an express or literal form. Now then, it remains to be established whether the appreciation made by the judges is in accordance with law, for which purpose the accusation must be revisited, where the following is stated: “On the twenty-ninth day of March two thousand two, at nine hours twenty minutes, located in the Eastern Pacific, in the Isla del Coco National Park (Parque Nacional Isla del Coco), four hundred meters from Islote Ulloa, within the twelve nautical miles, the accused L. in his capacity as captain of the vessel Miss Stancy, […], with full knowledge of his unlawful conduct, proceeded to exploit the ichthyological resources (riquezas ictiológicas) within Isla del Coco, by fishing with trolling equipment two yellowfin tuna, which were found alive in the fishing nets, which were released at the time of the seizure. The ecological and economic damage caused for the 417.7 dollars” (cfr.).

Folios 96 front and back. (The highlighting does not belong to the original). As the Court points out, the prosecutorial authority (fiscalía) does not literally include that this activity was carried out without permit or authorization. However, from a reading of these facts, it can be inferred, without a doubt, and without affecting due process, that because of the place where it was located –Coco Island National Park (Parque Nacional Isla del Coco)– and what was stated as the “knowledge of his illicit conduct,” the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) was attributing to the defendant (imputado) that his actions were carried out against the legal order and, therefore, with knowledge of the lack of authorizations or permits to fish in a National Park, it being unnecessary, in this particular case, to literally state that the defendant had knowledge of his illicit conduct because **he did not have permits to carry out said activity in that place**. Furthermore, one must observe what is prescribed by Article Eight of the Law on the Creation of the National Parks Service (Ley de Creación del Servicio de Parques Nacionales) or Law Number 6084, in force at the time of the events: “*ARTICLE 8.- Within national parks, visitors are prohibited from: …5) Fishing for sport, artisanally, or industrially, except in the case provided for in Article Ten*.” Article 10 of this law states “*The Service may, with the prior affirmative opinion of the council, authorize sport and artisanal fishing in certain areas of national parks, when it is proven that they will not produce ecological alterations*.” In the present case, as is clearly observed from the accusation (acusación), the defendant was the captain of a vessel that was fishing within the limits of Coco Island National Park, and that he was not within the assumptions of sport fishing, nor artisanal fishing, according to the facts of the same accusation. Therefore, adding the phrase “without permit or authorization” in the requisitoria was unnecessary, since the Public Ministry was already stating that the place where the crime was being committed was a National Park –where fishing is generally prohibited–, and that the defendant had knowledge of his illicit conduct. If the a quo, after receiving all the evidence in the adversarial proceeding, determined that the accused (acusado) indeed knew his conduct was illicit because he knew he did not have a permit for that activity within the limits of Coco Island –a situation that must be determined in the adversarial proceeding–, the right to defense, nor to a proper accusation (imputación), was violated, since the essential elements for charging the defendant with the crime of piracy had already been indicated in the accusation. As has been emphasized, this decision is made for the specific case, because the activity was being carried out in a place where one should not fish, and, consequently, the interpretation given to the context of the accusation is that the defendant indeed did not have permits for the fishing activity in which he was found. Therefore, this Chamber considers that the judgment (sentencia) has defects in its reasoning (vicios de fundamentación), since by determining that the accusation lacked an essential element, when in reality it was indeed included within the factual account (relato) that the accusation set forth as its factual platform, it made that assessment unfounded, so the claim must be granted, the judgment reversed (casándose), and the respective referral trial (juicio de reenvío) ordered, which must be done in accordance with Articles 465 and 466 bis of the Criminal Procedural Code, that is, by the same Trial Court that, by competence, heard this matter, with a different panel, in careful respect for the principles of judicial objectivity and impartiality.”

“III. En su segundo motivo, reclama falta de fundamentación de la sentencia. El Tribunal de juicio absuelve indicando que la acusación no contenía un elemento del tipo, consistente en la ausencia de autorización, permiso o licencia que facultara al acusado realizar la actividad de pesca dentro de los límites del Parque Nacional Isla del Coco. Sin embargo, no se explica en la sentencia las razones por las que esto era esencial, ya que en ese lugar la pesca está absolutamente prohibida por ser una reserva natural. En criterio del recurrente, esta situación no era esencial, ya que la ausencia de autorización no es ausencia de responsabilidad penal. Solicita se anule la sentencia y se ordene el juicio de reenvío. El reclamo es atendible, aunque por las razones que se dirán. En el presente caso, el Tribunal absuelve al imputado L. indicando: “al aquí acriminado L. se les (sic) ha venido acusando por parte del Ministerio Público local por haber cometido el injusto penal de Piratería, previsto y sancionado en el numeral doscientos cincuenta y ocho del Código Penal, calificación que se basa en el siguiente cuadro fáctico a saber: “El día veintinueve de marzo del dos mil dos, al ser las nueve horas veinte minutos, sita en el Pacífico Naional (sic) Isla del Coco, cuatrocientos metros de Isolte (sic) Ulloa, dentro de las doce millas náuticas, el imputado L. en su condición de capitán de la embarcación Miss Stancy, […], con pleno conocimiento de su actuar ilícito, procedió a explotar las riquezas ictiológicas dentro de la Isla del Coco, al pescar con equipo de troleo dos atunes de aleta amarilla, que se encontraban vivos en las redes de pesca, los cuales fueron liberados al momento del decomiso. El daño ecologico (sic) y economico (sic) ocasionado por el 417.7 dolares(sic)”. Dicho lo anterior, conviene establecer que el injusto de Piratería, como norma sustantiva la ubicamos en el precepto legal número 258, inciso primero del Código Penal, que preceptúa lo siguiente: “Artículo 258.- Será reprimido con prisión de tres a quince años: 1)El que realizare en los ríos navegables en el mar territorial o en la plataforma continental, la explotación no autorizada de las riquezas ictiológicas de la nación….”Norma que tiene una connotación dolosa, sea que el sujeto activo ha de cumplir con los elementos cognitivo y volitivo del tipo penal en cuestión. No obstante ello y a efecto de irnos adentro en la fundamentación analítica de rigor, es dable además, tener presente que en la especie se cuenta con una acusación elaborada pues por el Ministerio Público de esta jurisdicción. En todo es importante indicar en este fallo que en la misma se da una insalvable omisión que da al traste con lo que se pretende demostrar; y es que, si nos remitimos entonces al delito acusado- Piratería-estatuido en el artículo 258 inciso primero del Código Penal, es fácil constatar la exigencia de un elemento objetivo del tipo penal, cual es: no contar con la autorización para explotar las riquezas ictiológicas. Y ello deviene sumamente importante resaltarlo en virtud de que la acusación que rola a páginas noventa y seis a noventa y ocho, omitió, injustificadamente, indicar si el acusado…explotó las riquezas ictiológicas de la Isla del Coco, con o sin autorización, elemento de carácter sine quanon (sic) que atempera la acusación en ciernes y que a la vez, veda a este Tribunal de suplantar tan grave omisión…Dicho de otra forma, la ausencia del elemento objetivo del tipo penal no permite su aplicación al sujeto tenido por acusado…nótese que la llamada autorización, a no dudarlo, es un elemento objetivo del tipo penal transcrito, y por lo tanto en la acusación fiscal que cuestionamos en esta sede judicial, no se contempló tan importante elemento,…No indicándose, ni por asomo, si el justiciable L. contaba o no con la respectiva autorización a efecto de explotar las riquezas ictiológicas de la conocida Isla del Coco…” (cfr. Folios 265 a 267). De acuerdo con esta transcripción, se corrobora que el aquo establece como un elemento objetivo del tipo la “ausencia de autorización o permiso”, lo que no está alejado de la verdad, pues, efectivamente, el legislador previó esa circunstancia como un presupuesto para aplicar ese tipo penal. Pese a lo anterior, en este caso, el Tribunal fundamenta su criterio, señalando que era esencial que la acusación indicara esa circunstancia de forma expresa o literal. Ahora bien, resta por establecer si la apreciación que hacen los juzgadores está ajustada a derecho, para lo cual debe retomarse la acusación, donde se señala lo siguiente: “El día veintinueve de marzo del dos mil dos, al ser las nueve horas veinte minutos, sita en el Pacífico Oriental, en el Parque Nacional Isla del Coco, cuatrocientos metros de Islote Ulloa, dentro de las doce millas náuticas, el imputado L. en su condición de capitán de la embarcación Miss Stancy, […], con pleno conocimiento de su actuar ilícito, procedió a explotar las riquezas ictiológicas dentro de la Isla del Coco, al pescar con equipo de troleo dos atunes de aleta amarilla, que se encontraban vivos en las redes de pesca, los cuales fueron liberados al momento del decomiso. El daño ecológico y económico ocasionado por el 417.7 dólares”(cfr. Folios 96 frente y vuelto. El resaltado no pertenece al original). Como hace notar el Tribunal, la fiscalía no incluye literalmente que esa actividad la realizaba sin permiso ni autorización. Mas, de la lectura de estos hechos se puede inferir, sin lugar a dudas, y sin afectar el debido proceso, que por el lugar donde se ubicó –Parque Nacional Isla del Coco- y lo que se enunció como el “conocimiento de su actuar ilícito”, el Ministerio Público le atribuía al imputado que su actuación la realizaba contra el ordenamiento y, por ende, con conocimiento sobre la carencia de autorizaciones o permisos para pescar en un Parque Nacional, siendo innecesario, en este caso particular, señalar de manera literal que el imputado tenía conocimiento de su actuar ilícito porque no contaba con permisos para realizar dicha actividad en ese lugar. Además, debe atenderse lo que preceptúa el artículo ocho de la Ley de Creación del Servicio de Parques Nacionales o ley número 6084, vigente para el momento de los hechos: “ARTICULO 8º.- Dentro de los parques nacionales, queda prohibido a los visitantes: …5) Pescar deportiva, artesanal o industrialmente, salvo el caso previsto en el artículo diez.”. El artículo 10 de esta ley señala “El Servicio podrá, previo dictamen afirmativo del consejo, autorizar la pesca deportiva y artesanal en determinadas áreas de los parques nacionales, cuando se compruebe que no producirán alteraciones ecológicas.”. En el presente caso, como bien se observa a partir de la acusación, el imputado era capitán de una embarcación que se encontraba pescando dentro de los límites del Parque Nacional Isla del Coco, y que no estaba en los supuestos de pesca deportiva, ni artesanal, según los hechos de la misma acusación. Por ello, agregar en la requisitoria la frase “sin permiso ni autorización”, era innecesario, pues ya se estaba señalando por parte del Ministerio Público, que el lugar donde se estaba cometiendo el delito era un Parque Nacional –donde está vedado pescar por regla general-, y que el imputado tenía conocimiento de su actuar ilícito. Si el a quo, luego de recibir toda la prueba en el contradictorio, determinaba que efectivamente el acusado conocía de su actuar ilícito pues sabía que no tenía permiso para esa actividad dentro de los límites de la Isla del Coco –situación que deberá determinarse en el contradictorio-, no se violentaba el derecho de defensa, ni de imputación, pues en la acusación ya se habían indicado los elementos esenciales para imputar el delito de piratería al acusado. Como bien se ha recalcado, esta decisión se toma para el caso concreto, pues la actividad se estaba realizando en un lugar donde no se debía pescar, y, en consecuencia, la interpretación que se le da al contexto de la acusación es que el imputado efectivamente no contaba con permisos para la actividad de pesca en la que se le encontró. Por ello, esta Cámara considera que la sentencia tiene vicios de fundamentación, pues al determinar que la imputación carecía de un elemento esencial, cuando en realidad sí estaba comprendido dentro del relato que como plataforma fáctica dispuso la acusación, convirtió esa apreciación en infundada, por lo que debe declararse con lugar el reclamo, casándose la sentencia y ordenándose el respectivo juicio de reenvío, el cual debe hacerse de conformidad con los artículos 465 y 466 bis del Código Procesal Penal, es decir, por el mismo Tribunal de juicio que por competencia conoció este asunto, con una integración distinta, en atento respeto de los principios de objetividad e imparcialidad judicial.”