Legality of Article 118 of the SINPE Regulation on third-party account identificationLegalidad del artículo 118 del Reglamento del SINPE sobre identificación de cuentas de terceros

**III.- On the jurisdictional scope of the supervisory bodies.** Before entering into the analysis of the regulatory power and its exercise in the specific case, it is appropriate to refer, in general terms, to the jurisdictional structure established in the legal system regarding supervision, a concept that encompasses oversight and regulation. In the evolution that central banking has undergone, it is undisputed that a significant part of that directive, supervisory, and monitoring power has passed to other public agencies. In this way, the legislator chose to distribute the various powers that make up these authorities among a series of bodies attached to the Banco Central de Costa Rica. For the purpose of overseeing certain activities, due to their importance in society, it created four superintendencies, in the form of maximum deconcentration (máxima desconcentración) bodies, namely, the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (Sugef), the Superintendencia General de Valores (Sugeval), the Superintendencia de Pensiones (Supen), and, recently, the Superintendencia General de Seguros (Sugese). Of these, the latter two have instrumental legal personality. From an organic standpoint, each one has a superintendent, who acts as the hierarch in administrative matters. They are responsible, according to their subject matter, for verifying compliance by the supervised entities with the provisions that make up the respective normative subsystems, as well as the stability of the system, in what pertains to them according to their jurisdictional scope. Along with the superintendencies, through the *Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores*, a body called the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero was also created. This body is assigned, primarily, the task of regulating the system and simultaneously acts as an improper single-phase hierarch of the superintendencies for purposes of appeals (article 171 of Ley 7732). Of relevance to this appeal, it is important to note that the *Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores* also created the Sugeval as a body of "maximum deconcentration of the Banco Central de Costa Rica" (article 3). Its primary function is to ensure the transparency of securities markets, the correct formation of prices in those markets, the protection of investors, and the dissemination of information necessary to ensure the achievement of these purposes. A competence which, in accordance with canon 3 ibid., is exercised over all securities markets, the activity of natural or legal persons who intervene directly or indirectly in them, and the acts or contracts related to them, as provided by law. This general competence over the securities market is aimed at guaranteeing market stability in pursuit of its development, as well as investor protection. The supervisory bodies, including the Sugeval, are maximum deconcentration bodies of the BCCR that participate in supervising compliance with the monetary policies issued by it, including that aimed at promoting the efficiency and normal functioning of the internal and external payments system.

**IV.- On the regulatory power.** The main object of this dispute, elaborated on in greater detail in the first objection of the appeal by the plaintiff Chamber, is limited to determining whether the challenged rule (article 113 of the SINPE Regulation) falls within the jurisdictional scope that, regarding the issuance of infralegal rules, the legal system assigns to the BCCR. In this regard, it is essential to briefly refer to the content of the regulatory power and the different types of regulations that the Public Administration can issue. Traditionally, it has been indicated that these can be classified into two large groups, for which one may consult ruling of this Chamber no. 749-F-04 from 9:30 a.m. on September 10, 2004, and of the Sala Constitucional, among others, rulings no. 2005-14286 from 2:45 p.m. on October 19, 2005, and 2007-02063 from 2:45 p.m. on February 14, 2007. The first of these, regulated in numeral 140, subsections 3) and 18) of the Political Constitution, is the executive regulation, through which the contents of a legal-rank rule are developed. It is a complementary provision, which serves to specify the content or to facilitate the implementation of what is prescribed in the law. In this sense, constitutional jurisprudence has indicated that this type of rule can only come from the Executive Branch. On this matter, the Sala Constitucional has indicated that it is not "...possible to attempt a broad interpretation in favor of other public agencies..." (ruling no. 17599-2006 from 3:00 p.m. on December 6, 2006). It should be added that this is an autonomous power, the enabling of which is given generically in the Magna Carta, such that the Executive Branch is empowered to regulate, motu proprio, any law of the Republic. Put another way, the existence or not of an enabling provision in the law is irrelevant, to the extent that the competence is given at the constitutional level and can be exercised with respect to all issued laws, whether they provide for it or not. This, of course, without prejudice to a legal rule converting this faculty into a duty, a situation that, in any case, does not change its nature. The second type of regulation is the autonomous regulations, the purpose of which is to regulate the organization of administrative agencies (in which case they are called "autonomous organizational regulations"), or the functioning of the public services they provide (generically referred to as "autonomous service regulations"). These can emanate from both the Centralized Administration and the decentralized one. In the case of the former, by virtue of the express text contained in subsection 18) of cardinal 140 of the Constitution, and for the latter, as a logical and necessary derivation of the power of self-organization implicit in the degree of administrative or first-degree autonomy granted to them at the time of their creation (considerations noted in greater detail, through resolution of this Chamber no. 001000-F-S1-2010 from 9:35 a.m. on August 26, 2010).

**V.-** In this specific case, it is important to clarify two aspects of transcendental importance, before hearing the merits of the appeal. First, it must be made clear that the plaintiff's claim for nullity refers only to article 113 of the SINPE Regulation and not to the entirety of that regulatory body. Second, it is necessary to illustrate that after the issuance of the challenged judgment, the *Reglamento del Sistema de Pagos* (approved by the Junta Directiva of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, via article 11 of the minutes of session 5416-2009, held on March 11, 2009) was modified, so article 113 originally challenged changed its numbering, and currently corresponds to precept 118 ibid. However, the analyzed article maintains its original wording, which literally states: "Identification of third-party accounts. Third-party accounts are identified by the name and identification number of their holders, as well as by a code by type of investor." For purposes of this appeal, it will continue to be mentioned from now on as canon 118 of the SINPE Regulation. The BCCR is an autonomous institution under public law, with its own legal personality and assets, and which also forms part of the National Banking System (article 1 of its Organic Law). The main objective of this entity is to maintain the internal and external stability of the national currency and ensure its convertibility. Likewise, Ley 7558 imposed on the BCCR a series of subsidiary objectives, among others, the obligation to promote the efficiency of internal and external payments systems and maintain their normal functioning (canon 2, subsection c) ibid.). In line with the above, that regulatory body established that for the due fulfillment of its purposes, the Bank must have essential functions such as the establishment, operation, and monitoring of clearing systems; and to erect regulations for the creation, operation, and control of financial entities (precept 3, subsections i), j) of Ley 7558). In addition to the foregoing, article 69 of the analyzed regulatory body categorically provides: "...The Junta Directiva of the Banco Central de Costa Rica shall organize and regulate the functioning of the payments system...". In this way, it can be established that the BCCR has several tasks assigned to it by its Organic Law. It is worthwhile to highlight the obligation to promote the efficiency of the internal and external payments systems and maintain their normal functioning; a task that is currently fundamental, as the existence of a safe, effective, and efficient payments system is of vital importance for the normal performance of the economy, both for internal and external operations. A payments system is constituted by a set of instruments, banking procedures, and funds and securities transfer systems that ensure their circulation in the financial and stock markets respectively. They are mechanisms used for the movement of funds, money, and securities; likewise, they contribute to the development of payments between financial entities, internally and externally. As can be observed from the cited articles, the legislator chose to entrust the Central Bank with the promotion and proper functioning of the payments system, since through it, it could regulate the money markets. In such a way that the Court is correct in considering that from the analysis of these legal concepts, the possibility of the Central Bank to establish, by regulatory means, the Sistema Nacional de Pagos Electrónicos, and everything pertaining to its regulation, functioning, and control is inferred. [...]

**VI.-** [...] This Chamber must indicate that deconcentration is indeed presented as a technique for distributing powers among different bodies of the same entity or superior body; and its purpose is to entrust to a specialized body within an administrative structure, the exercise of certain powers in order to achieve greater efficiency. Deconcentration is contemplated in rule 83 of the General Law of Public Administration by establishing that: "Every body other than the hierarch shall be fully subordinate to the latter and to the immediate hierarchical superior, except for deconcentration operated by law or by regulation...". In this normative precept, two modalities are established, minimum and maximum. The minimum modality indicates that the superior cannot take over the powers of the inferior nor review or substitute the conduct of the inferior, ex officio or at the instance of a party. In the maximum modality, in addition to the foregoing, the superior cannot give orders, instructions, or circulars to the inferior. Up to this point, the representatives of Cambolsa are correct. However, one must not forget that the assignment of the scope of powers of the deconcentrated body normally originates from the rule that creates and regulates it. If it contains powers of authority, such a rule must be of legal rank. But, if the attributions do not involve powers of authority, the attribution may be made by means of regulatory rules. The purpose of deconcentration is to transfer powers and to establish the degree of independence with which these functions can be exercised. They are not simple attributions; what is sought is the specialization of certain bodies in specific matters, in pursuit of satisfying the tasks entrusted to the superior entity (public purpose). But this does not mean that such powers are organically detached from the original structure. For this reason, it is essential to refer to the rule that created the deconcentration, since it will be this rule that establishes the type and scope of deconcentration and what powers the hierarch retains over what has been deconcentrated. The scope of a maximum deconcentration in the terms of article 83 ibid. is not discussed here; on the contrary, upon transferring the competence, it is clear that the hierarchical superior is incompetent to issue acts related to the deconcentrated matter. What must be defined is that the hierarch maintains its competence in the areas not covered by the deconcentration. The deconcentrated body, then, remains subject to hierarchy in those areas. That is why it is insisted, it is fundamental to respect the principle of legality to determine the jurisdictional scope of the entity or the superior or higher body. In the case under examination, as indicated in the preceding lines, the *Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores* created the Superintendencia General de Valores as a body of "maximum deconcentration of the Banco Central de Costa Rica" (article 3). Its primary task is to ensure the transparency of securities markets, the correct formation of prices in them, the protection of investors, and the dissemination of information necessary to ensure the achievement of these purposes. In this sense, it is true that article 116 of Ley 7732 granted the Sugeval the power to regulate the organization and functioning of the registries, the identification systems, and the control of securities represented by means of electronic book entries, as well as the relations and communications of the entities in charge of such registries with issuers and stock exchanges. However, the BCCR continues to maintain its condition as the directive entity and, therefore, the ultimate regulator of the financial, monetary, and credit system; since it is responsible for directing monetary, credit, and financial policy and guaranteeing the smooth functioning of the financial system (according to article 3 of its Organic Law). In this regard, the duty to promote the efficiency of the internal and external payments system, and maintain its normal functioning (canon 2, subsection c) ibid.), is not a function that has been deconcentrated in the Sugeval; on the contrary, this is one of the objectives that the Central Bank must constantly pursue, and must even be classified as "essential". It suffices to remember that it was the *Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores* itself that came to confirm the aforesaid, when through its article 188, subsection d), it expressly modified precept 69 of the Organic Law of the BCCR. With this reform, the legislator reaffirmed the duty of the Junta Directiva of the BCCR to organize and regulate the functioning of the payments system (previously called only the Clearing House). In this sense, the legislator considered that the Central Bank's participation in the matter of the payments system was inherent to it, being essential to its priority task, and that the Organic Law of the Central Bank so commands it. It must be highlighted at this point that the term encompasses establishing, regulating, operating, and overseeing the system. The *Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores*, for its part, does not determine that the functions of the Sugeval in relation to the payments system and the service entailed by the administration of the registry of book-entry securities have been assigned to that body exclusively; on the contrary, from the relationship of articles 188, subsection d) of the *Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores* and 2, 3, 69 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank, it is inferred that the Sistema Nacional de Pagos (creation and functioning) must be in the hands of the BCCR. Therefore, these tasks surrounding the system are the competence of the Junta Directiva of the Bank (this is also derived from subsections c, h, l of article 28 of its Organic Law). Article 116 of Ley 7732 provided that the Sugeval could regulate the organization and functioning of the registries, the identification systems, and the control of securities represented by means of electronic book entries; however, this was done in a generic and not special manner, since the legislator always considered keeping this task in the hands of the Central Bank. In reality, the duty that the BCCR maintained in this regard was never eliminated, since it would be incompatible with the independence of the Central Bank to establish institutional factors that tend to subject it to instructions, authorizations, suspensions, and worse yet, to restrict its competence regarding decisions related to monetary policy and the rest of its subsidiary objectives (among them the maintenance of the SINPE). The existence of a permit or prohibition to exercise a certain monetary instrument would imply a limit on the cited independence and competencies, since the Central Bank would see its faculties limited to establish the strategy aimed at achieving the objectives defined in article 2 of Ley 7558. Nor is the matter exhausted in institutional independence (defining the objectives of monetary policy), but it also involves functional independence to decide the application of the monetary policy instruments that the legislator established, understood as the choice of which instrument should be employed and how it should be done; as occurs with the Sistema de Anotación en Cuenta (which will be examined in greater detail in the following whereas clause) and the SINPE. Within this scheme, a supervisory entity cannot assume the definition of organizational aspects of a system that is administered by the Monetary Authority, since its independence would be affected and, consequently, the effectiveness of the financial system could also be jeopardized. In the sub judice, the BCCR regulated a service that its Organic Law entrusted to it, for which it is not true that the Bank is being recognized for competencies that belong to the Sugeval (as defined in cardinal 3 of its Regulating Law) or that this regulation is not consistent with the later legal rules that were introduced in Ley 7732.

**VII.-** Once the regulatory power held by the Central Bank to issue the SINPE Regulation has been analyzed, it is next necessary to refer to the *Sistema de Anotación en Cuenta* (SAC hereinafter); since the article criticized by the plaintiff is located within the Book of the Regulation called "Anotación en Cuenta". The book-entry (anotación en cuenta) and settlement systems are based on the representation of securities through book entries. It is a computerized system for creating and registering equity-representative securities through the book-entry method. The security is constituted, deposited, and transferred as a book entry, legal acts that do not materialize. This is the trend followed by the *Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores*. Thus, article 115 of that regulatory body establishes: "...Securities issuances registered in the Registro Nacional de Valores e Intermediarios may be represented by means of electronic book entries or through certificates...". The securities clearing and settlement system must seek, states Ley 7732 in its cardinal 129, the generalization of the electronic book-entry system, except for exceptions authorized by the Superintendencia due to market circumstances or the particular nature of certain securities. Securities represented by electronic book entries shall be constituted and transmitted by virtue of their registration in the corresponding book-entry registry (articles 122 and 123 ibid.). Modern securities clearing and settlement systems tend to dematerialize securities, which is achieved through representation by book entries. According to the *Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores*, the book-entry system may be managed by the Banco Central de Costa Rica or by central securities depositories (precept 117). This book-entry registry of securities represented by electronic book entries, proclaims canon 117 of Ley 7732, shall be maintained through a two-level system: a) the first level is comprised of the BCCR (which is responsible for administering the registry of issuances of the State and public institutions) and by the central securities depositories authorized by the Superintendencia (which shall be responsible for administering the registry of issuances of private issuers); b) the second level is formed by the entities adhered to the SAC, which may be all those authorized to provide custody services and the clearing members of the National Securities Clearing and Settlement System. Among these latter entities, eminently, are brokerage firms. The *Reglamento del Sistema de Anotación en Cuenta* (agreement adopted by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero, through article 10, of the minutes of session 606-2006, held on September 28, 2006) regulates in greater detail the organization and functioning of the registries, the identification systems, and the control of securities represented by electronic book entries. This Regulation provides that the Central Bank is responsible for administering the book-entry registry of securities via electronic book entry for the issuances of the State and public institutions, and may delegate that function to a central securities depository (canon 19). Likewise, it mentions that only member entities of the National Book-Entry Registry System that are constituted as central securities depositories, authorized for such purpose by the Superintendencia, may provide book-entry registry administration services for the issuances of private issuers (article 21). That is how the securities registries in Costa Rica are administered according to their issuer. Now, in practice, the SAC functions as a service provided by the BCCR, which was added to the SINPE platform due to the facilities and security that the latter system provided in the country for funds transfer; which meant taking advantage of the tool available, adding one more service (the transfer of securities). The SAC has four clearly defined specific services: 1. the issuance registration service, which functions as a registry where the BCCR and the Ministry of Finance register the issuances that the Sugeval authorizes them to place in the securities market; 2. securities accounts, which is the service responsible for maintaining control and maintenance of the accounts; 3. market settlement, which allows the Bolsa Nacional de Valores to connect with the SINPE to send both the primary and secondary exchange markets for settlement; and finally provides 4. a securities transfer service for handling those securities movements that are not of an onerous nature (on this subject, the witness for the BCCR, Mr. Melvin Jiménez Quesada, referred extensively during the oral and public trial starting at 10:06 a.m. on February 15, 2010). Although the Organic Law of the Central Bank does not contain an article referring to the Bank's participation in the creation of a book-entry system, from the detailed analysis of cardinals 2 and 3 of that Law, it is indeed inferred that book-entry systems fall within the sphere of the Bank's competencies; given that the BCCR, for the fulfillment of its macroeconomic objectives, unavoidably must provide the national economy with an agile, modern, efficient, and safe financial system. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the Central Bank is responsible for "establishing, operating, and monitoring clearing systems," and although the legislator was not precise on this specific topic, it is nevertheless about the entire clearing system, relating to the financial system as a whole; therefore, both the clearing of funds and the clearing of securities. While article 68 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank does not contain detailed regulations like those existing in article 69 ibid. for the payments system, the truth is that the clearing between funds and securities is provided for there; it suffices that they are clearable securities. Therefore, from the analysis of Ley 7558, it is concluded that the Central Bank has among its functions, to develop a securities clearing system. In this understanding, the SAC plays a very important role as a component of the financial system, for which reason, the Bank, in fulfillment of the objective of achieving financial and monetary stability, must promote, drive, and supervise its development, attending to the letter of article 3 ibid.; hence the issuance of the criticized article is in accordance with the legal system.

**VIII.-** [...] Article 40 of Ley 7558 encompasses the duty incumbent upon the offices and agencies of the State, and of the autonomous institutions, to provide assistance and provide general information to the departments of the BCCR, so that the Bank can efficiently fulfill its functions. This duty, considering the literal meaning of the rule, is understood to fall on public offices and agencies; however, in the specific case, it is feasible to recognize an analogical integration for the scenario being analyzed, since there is no rule in Ley 7558 that imposes this duty on private entities, despite the fact that the BCCR uses this data for the exclusive fulfillment of one of its objectives. However, it must be indicated that the Court not only justified the power of the BCCR to request the questioned information based on article 40 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank, since it also analyzed the faculties of the BCCR to request the criticized data, in relation to the powers granted to supervisory entities in the *Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de Uso no Autorizado, Actividades Conexas, Legitimación de Capitales y Financiamiento al Terrorismo* (hereinafter Law no. 8204). This is because the data mentioned in cardinal 118 of the SINPE Regulation are of vital importance to combat and prevent money laundering and related activities through the transfer of securities. An aspect that will be analyzed in greater detail in the following grievance. In this way, no direct violation of the analyzed rule by the judges is found, since the information requested is related to one of the services that that entity directly provides to the entities adhered to the SINPE and the SAC, including among the latter the brokerage firms. The request for the information contemplated in canon 118 of the SINPE Regulation is made so that the BCCR can fulfill one of its basic objectives (maintaining an efficient payments and clearing system), as established in cardinals 2, 3, 24, 69 in relation to canon 40, all of Ley 7558. In relation to this argument, they also accuse that article 118 of the SINPE Regulation is absolutely null for breaching the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness in the field of the regulatory power, given that the BCCR had no competence to regulate the registries and identification systems related to the securities markets. Through the identification mechanism provided for in the *Reglamento del Sistema de Pagos*, they recriminate, knowledge of the clients of its competitors can be imposed, which would generate inequality.

The Constitutional Chamber has stated the following regarding the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness: "… A matter of the first order in every administrative act is proportionality in the strict sense between the means employed by the respective public administration and the ends sought to be achieved thereby, as well as the suitability or necessity of its content and, of course, when it is afflictive or burdensome, the weighing of its intervention or minimal impact. Precisely for this reason, there has emerged in contemporary Constitutional Law, as one of the guiding principles of the administrative function, the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness, according to which administrative conduct must be sufficiently coherent and reasonably grounded in the block of legality, so that it is self-sufficient and self-explanatory. In our constitutional legal order, such a principle emanates from the provisions set forth in the first part of Article 11 of the Political Constitution…" (resolution no. 2004-14421 of 11:00 a.m. on December 17, 2004). The fundamental objective is to avoid arbitrary acts by the public agent, understood as the lack of objective legal support or basis for administrative conduct, consequently violating the existing block of legality. In regulatory matters, this principle plays a relevant role within the legal order. In the sub lite case, as indicated above, the Central Bank was legally empowered to issue the SINPE Regulation and, therefore, the challenged article. From an analysis of numerals 2, 3, and 69 of its Organic Law, it is inferred that the legislator entrusted this function to it, and therefore reference is made to the considerations set forth in the fifth considering clause. Due to the express mandate given by Ley 7558 to the BCCR to create, legalize, and control the Payment System, this Collegiate Body considers that the alleged conflict of jurisdiction between the regulatory powers of SUGEVAL and those conferred upon the BCCR does not exist, and therefore the grievance must be dismissed.

IX.- Within the first objection, they finally reproach that the challenged provision places in the hands of the BCCR, which is itself an issuer in the Costa Rican securities market, information that is not of a public nature and that could even be used for its own benefit in its capacity as a market participant. They add that the Central Bank acts as a competitor of the Brokerage Firms in the market, and through the identification mechanism provided for in the Payment System Regulation, they denounce, knowledge of the clients of its competitors is imposed, which generates inequality. This Chamber must indicate that the BCCR's participation in the creation of a book-entry system that contemplates not only public debt but also private debt was based on the Bank's authority over the financial sector. Since the clearing and settlement process, including the book-entry records, are processes of a financial, economic, and legal nature, they are of interest and competence to the central bank. In this regard, the regulation of the system must maintain a close correspondence with the rest of the legal order, including with Ley 8204, through the establishment of transparent and non-discriminatory rules, based on objective criteria regarding the services that can be accessed. For this reason, one of the main reasons why the Central Bank requires the information discussed here is to faithfully comply with the mandates contained in Ley 8204 and not to compete as the appellants claim. Likewise, when the BCCR issues open market operations, it does so as an instrument of financial policy, in order to maintain stability in the market; it does not do so for profit or for its own benefit. Due to its institutional position, it should be remembered, the BCCR has a transcendent role in monitoring the normal functioning of clearing systems. This competence may be linked to a supervisory task, aimed at maintaining the stability of the financial system, avoiding the presence of a domino effect in the event of liquidity or credit problems on the part of any financial agent. The correct functioning of the clearing and payment systems, as well as the stability of the financial system, is fundamental for the adequate execution of monetary policy; without prejudice to also recognizing the need to maintain confidence in the security and reliability of the systems, in order to preserve the efficiency of the markets and the security of investment. The role of the Bank is restricted to the duty of direction and supervision proper and necessary to achieve system stability and the realization of its monetary policy. Consequently, it is not true that the data obtained by the Central Bank through canon 118 of the SINPE Regulation are used for its benefit or to compete in the market, given that this is not its function; a fact that, moreover, was not demonstrated by the plaintiff Chamber throughout the process. Thus, the first ground must be dismissed in all its aspects.

XI.- Among the objectives of Ley 8204, the regulation and punishment of financial activities stand out, in order to prevent money laundering (legitimación de capitales) and actions that may serve to finance terrorist activities (Article 1). This prevention regime aims to regulate the obligations, actions, and procedures to prevent and impede the use of the financial system, as well as other sectors of economic activity, for the laundering of capital (blanqueo de capitales) proceeding from any type of criminal participation. To this effect, the Law establishes a series of obligations that certain subjects must fulfill. Article 14 of Ley 8204 considers as entities subject to the obligations of the Law, those that regulate, supervise, and inspect, namely: Sugef, Sugeval, Supen, and Sugese. Likewise, the obligations of the Law are applicable to all entities or companies that are members of financial groups supervised by the aforementioned bodies, including financial transactions carried out by banks or financial entities domiciled abroad, through a financial entity domiciled in Costa Rica. The Law grants special attention to systematic or substantial currency and fund exchange operations, carried out by any means, which, in the judgment of this Chamber, could be carried out through the SINPE platform. For this reason, the bodies described in numeral 14 ibidem must ensure that natural or legal persons, whatever their legal domicile or place of operation, who habitually and under any title carry out such activities without authorization, do not operate in Costa Rican territory. It is opportune to clarify that these operations, even if carried out by authorized persons, may be suspicious, hence the control must be permanent. Those financial activities developed by clients of supervised entities that, due to their magnitude, lack of habitualness, speed of turnover, or unjustified complexity conditions, seem to have no economic sense or lawful purpose are considered suspicious. Article 24 of Ley 8204 defines them as "…those carried out outside habitual transaction patterns and those that are not significant but are periodic, without evident economic or legal basis…". At the same time, numerals 16 to 23 of the legislative body analyzed proclaim basic conditions that supervised entities must fulfill to reduce the risks that financial activity provokes within the money launderer's paradigm. Among others, the following stand out: 1. precise identification of clients; 2. maintenance of nominative accounts; 3. prohibition of opening anonymous accounts or accounts under fictitious names; 4. verification, by reliable documentary means, of the identity, representation, domicile, occupation, or corporate purpose of clients; 5. maintenance of documentary records for the duration of the operation and for at least five years after the business relationship ends; 6. recording of every cash transaction in national or foreign currency equal to or exceeding $10,000; 7. special attention to atypical financial activities, such as those carried out outside habitual patterns or lacking economic basis; and 8. duty to report suspicious financial operations to the supervisory and oversight bodies. According to these obligations, any natural or legal person whose economic activity falls within the scope of the rules must be supervised by any of the superintendencies charged with regulating and controlling compliance with anti-money laundering (antilavado) regulations or by the Central Bank, as appropriate. This action is justified not only by the need to implement mechanisms that prevent the entry of illegal capital but also because they constitute financial actions vulnerable to the entry of illicit assets. These regulatory compliance programs aimed at preventing the entry of "dirty" capital into the financial and securities market system are linked to internationally assumed commitments and recommendations that require the national financial system to develop and comply with programs of such nature. For example, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) (GAFIC), to which Costa Rica belongs, evaluates compliance with several recommendations aimed at preventing, among other aspects, the penetration of capital from criminal actions into the national financial system. At the banking level, there is also the Declaration of Principles of the Basel Committee, which seeks to prevent banks and other financial institutions from being used for transfers or deposits of funds of illicit origin. Within this normative analysis, norm 28 of Ley 8204 is of capital importance, as it grants bodies vested with oversight and supervisory powers certain obligations regarding compliance with the same norm, such as monitoring the effective fulfillment of the registration and notification obligations indicated by the Law, but mainly cooperating with the competent authorities and providing them with technical assistance, within the framework of investigations and processes concerning the crimes typified in the Law. This last precept unquestionably reflects that the Central Bank is among the bodies vested with supervisory and oversight powers. For this reason, the BCCR incorporated Article 118 into the SINPE Regulation, in order to have available in its records all the information required to identify the natural or legal persons who carried out securities transactions in the SINPE, since at any moment the competent authorities could require that information as provided by Ley 8204 and the Law on the Registration, Seizure, and Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications (Ley no. 7425).

XIII.- Regarding the potential violation of the right to privacy and stock market secrecy (secreto bursátil), which originates from the application of canon 118 of the SINPE Regulation; it must be indicated that the information requested by the SINPE does not entail such violation, since the requested data, namely the name, identification number, and a code to identify the activity carried out, cannot be considered sensitive, intimate, or private information for the reasons that will be analyzed below. Any data relating to ethnicity, religious beliefs, political affinity, sexual preferences, or strategies specific to the commercial or financial development of a company, among others of a similar nature for both natural and legal persons, would be considered as such. For this reason, that aspect fell outside the scope of coverage protected by the right to privacy. Article 24 of the Political Constitution enshrines the fundamental rights to privacy, to the inviolability of private documents, the secrecy of communications, and the right to informational self-determination or the right to have control over the information that third parties hold about the person in question. This information is comprised of matters that directly concern the sphere of the person, whether because it refers to their family or private life, their beliefs, convictions or sexual preferences, commercial relations, among other aspects (developed in canon 9, subsection 1) of the Law for the Protection of the Person Regarding the Processing of Their Personal Data, Ley no. 8968). On the other hand, there are personal data that are public or may be communicated to third parties, either because they are recorded in public registries or because there is no duty of confidentiality, such as name, identification, profession, data on assets, and, in particular, the economic and financial situation of the person. Now, this latter information qualifies as what is known as private information and although it receives protection from the Constitution (Article 24, paragraph 2), its access may be authorized by law if there is a public interest involved. In this regard, the cited Ley 8968 states in precept 9 the following: "2.- Personal data with restricted access. Personal data with restricted access are those that, even forming part of publicly accessible registries, are not of unrestricted access because they are of interest only to their owner or to the Public Administration. Their processing shall be permitted solely for public purposes or with the express consent of the owner… 4.- Data relating to credit behavior. Data relating to credit behavior shall be governed by the rules regulating the National Financial System, so as to guarantee an acceptable degree of risk on the part of financial entities, without impeding the full exercise of the right to informational self-determination or exceeding the limits of this law." But that protection does not mean that they must be framed within what doctrine, jurisprudence, and the Law know as "sensitive data." For these reasons, it is important to distinguish between both types of data, since sensitive data have no relevance in the exercise of financial activity (regarding the prohibition of processing data relating to the intimate sphere of the citizen by unauthorized entities; the Constitutional Chamber has pronounced itself in Voto no. 1176-2008 of 11:21 a.m. on January 25, 2008). In this way, the information on the identification of third-party accounts that the BCCR obtains on the occasion of the SAC is not configured within the concept of sensitive data, and therefore this Chamber shares the reasons given by the Tribunal for dismissing the plaintiff's allegation (according to the recording of the delivery of the judgment at 8:35 a.m. on February 22, 2010). Now, both the Organic Law of the Central Bank and Ley 8204 empower the BCCR to request the information contemplated in cardinal 118 of the SINPE Regulation, for the sole and exclusive purpose of promoting the efficiency of the payment and clearing system, as well as to prevent money laundering (legitimación de capitales); matters that are of undoubted public interest. In this manner, it can be affirmed that the legal order permits the BCCR to request the information contained in precept 118 of the SINPE Regulation. Within this topic, it is true that canon 108 of Ley 7732 regulates what is known as stock market secrecy (secreto bursátil) that market participants must maintain regarding their clients. Traditionally, bank or stock market secrecy (secreto bancario o bursátil) has been conceived as one of the principal duties arising from commercial relationships—perfect or imperfect—between banks, financial institutions, and in this case, between brokerage firms (puestos de bolsa) and their clients. This secrecy obligates the entities to remain silent, that is, not to divulge or reveal information about clients and the operations they have carried out or were about to carry out. The aim is to protect that private bond between the parties, which materializes through different archives or physical or computer documents, containing aspects related to client identification, the origin and destination of funds, periodic movements, earnings, investments, losses, transfers, and relationships with other persons or institutions. Ley 8204, starting from chapter four, incorporated into the legal order not only the legal tools to investigate the crime of money laundering (legitimación de capitales), but also created the institutions and coordination mechanisms of the entities responsible for its supervision, execution, and investigation. This fact has generated much controversy regarding the information requested by supervisory entities (including the Central Bank), since it has been considered that these mechanisms violate bank secrecy (secreto bancario). A fact that does not escape the case under review. For this reason, this Chamber considers it essential to highlight three aspects regarding Article 118 of the SINPE Regulation. First, the information provided or that may be provided by the BCCR to the Costa Rican Drug Institute (ICD), the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), and the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), falls within the powers recognized by the Organic Law of the Central Bank, Ley 8204, and recently by the Law to Strengthen Legislation against Terrorism (Ley no. 8719 of March 4, 2009), by virtue of the supervisory and oversight role of the Central Bank. Second, such information is not used for the benefit of third parties or for its disclosure; on the contrary, it must be understood as preventive information, which, if required, conforms to the purposes of cardinal one of the Law on the Registration, Seizure, and Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications. Third, related to the previous point, the Central Bank, as the operator of the SAC and the SINPE, is obliged to maintain the confidentiality of the information it obtains, as inferred from precepts 119 subsection c), 166 of Ley 7732; 13, final paragraph of Ley 7558; 44, 133 of the SINPE Regulation; 12 of the Regulation on Book-Entry Systems; 339 of the Penal Code; 10 and 11 of Ley 8968. In national legislation, then, it is expressly established that such interference as well as access to private documentation do not violate the rights to privacy and intimacy of persons, but rather respond to a substantive function of public order (the Constitutional Chamber has expressed itself along this line in Voto no. 5275-03 of 2:53 p.m. on June 18, 2003). The regulatory and oversight functions carried out by the BCCR are necessary for the due control of financial transactions in the country, and its work is aimed at ensuring that the operations occurring in the transfer of funds and securities are lawful, an end that justifies the recognition of the information requested by cardinal 118 of the SINPE Regulation. The aim is thereby to maintain the solvency, stability, and liquidity of the national financial system, within an environment of legality, protecting the investor itself; reasons that are also of public interest. Grounds that are clearly defined in both the Organic Law of the BCCR, the Regulatory Law of the Securities Market, and Ley 8204. Therefore, the appellants are incorrect when they affirm that Articles 11, 24, 28, 121 of the Political Constitution, 19 of the LGAP, and 108 of the Regulatory Law of the Securities Market are violated. Hence, the reproach is not admissible to overturn the challenged ruling." The supervisory bodies, including Sugeval, are organs of maximum deconcentration (desconcentración máxima) of the BCCR that participate in supervising compliance with the monetary policies issued by it, including that aimed at promoting the efficiency and normal functioning of the internal and external payment systems.

**IV.- Regarding the regulatory power.** The main object of the present litigation, developed more extensively in the first objection of the appeal by the plaintiff Chamber, is limited to determining whether the challenged norm (Article 113 of the SINPE Regulation) falls within the scope of competence that, in matters of issuing infralegal norms, the legal system assigns to the BCCR. In this regard, it is essential to briefly refer to the content of the regulatory power and the different types of regulations that the Public Administration can issue. Traditionally, it has been indicated that these can be classified into two large groups, for which one may consult the ruling of this Chamber no. 749-F-04 of 9:30 a.m. on September 10, 2004, and of the Constitutional Chamber, among others, judgments no. 2005-14286 of 2:45 p.m. on October 19, 2005, and no. 2007-02063 of 2:45 p.m. on February 14, 2007. The first of them, regulated in article 140, subsections 3) and 18) of the Political Constitution, is the executive regulation (reglamento ejecutivo), by means of which the contents of a legal-rank norm are developed. It is a complementary provision, which serves to specify the content or to facilitate the implementation of what is prescribed in the law. In this sense, constitutional jurisprudence has indicated that this type of norm can only originate from the Executive Branch. Regarding this particular, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that it is not *“… possible to attempt an extensive interpretation in favor of other public agencies…”* (ruling no. 17599-2006 of 3:00 p.m. on December 6, 2006). It is worth adding, it is an autonomous power, whose enablement is given in a generic form in the Magna Carta, so that the Executive Branch is empowered to regulate, *motu proprio*, any law of the Republic. Said another way, the existence or not of an enablement in the law is irrelevant, insofar as the competence is given at the constitutional level and can be exercised regarding all issued laws, whether they provide for it or not. This, of course, without prejudice to a legal norm turning this power into a duty, a situation that, in any case, does not change its nature. The second type of regulation is that of autonomous regulations (reglamentos autónomos), whose object is to regulate the organization of administrative agencies (in which case they are called "organizational autonomous regulations"), or the functioning of the public services they provide (generically referred to as "service autonomous regulations"). These can emanate from both the Central Administration and the decentralized administration. In the case of the former, by virtue of the express text contained in subsection 18) of article 140 of the Constitution, and for the latter, as a logical and necessary derivation of the power of self-organization implicit in the degree of administrative or first-degree autonomy granted to them at the time of their creation (considerations noted more extensively, through resolution of this Chamber no. 001000-F-S1-2010 of 9:35 a.m. on August 26, 2010).

**V.-** In this specific case, it is important to clarify two aspects of transcendental importance, prior to hearing the merits of the appeal. Firstly, it must be made clear that the plaintiff's claim for nullity refers solely to Article 113 of the SINPE Regulation and not to the entirety of that regulatory body. Secondly, it is necessary to illustrate that after the issuance of the appealed judgment, the Payment System Regulation (approved by the Board of Directors of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, through Article 11 of the minutes of session 5416-2009, held on March 11, 2009) was modified, so that the originally challenged Article 113 changed its numbering, and currently corresponds to precept 118 of the same. However, the analyzed article maintains its original wording, which literally establishes: *“**Identification of third-party accounts**. Third-party accounts are identified by the name and identification number of their holders, as well as by a code per type of investor”*. For the purposes of this appeal, it will henceforth be referred to as canon 118 of the SINPE Regulation. The BCCR is an autonomous institution of public law, with its own legal personality and patrimony, and which also forms part of the National Banking System (Article 1 of its Organic Law). This entity's main objective is to maintain the internal and external stability of the national currency and ensure its convertibility. Likewise, Law 7558 imposed on the BCCR a series of subsidiary objectives, among others, the obligation to promote the efficiency of the internal and external payment systems and maintain their normal functioning (canon 2, subsection c) of the same). In line with the above, that regulatory body established that for the due fulfillment of its purposes, the Bank must have essential functions such as the establishment, operation, and oversight of clearing systems; and to erect the regulations for the creation, operation, and control of financial entities (precept 3, subsections i), j) of Law 7558). In addition to the above, Article 69 of the analyzed regulatory body categorically provides: *“…The Board of Directors of the Banco Central de Costa Rica shall organize and regulate the functioning of the payment system…”*. In this way, it can be established that the BCCR is assigned several tasks by its Organic Law. It is important to highlight the obligation to promote the efficiency of the internal and external payment systems and maintain their normal functioning; a task that is currently fundamental, since the existence of a safe, effective, and efficient payment system is of vital importance for the normal performance of the economy, both for internal and external operations. A payment system is constituted by a set of instruments, banking procedures, and fund and security transfer systems that ensure their circulation in the financial and stock markets, respectively. They are mechanisms used for the movement of funds, money, and securities; they also contribute to the development of payments between financial entities, internally and externally. As observed from the cited articles, the legislator chose to entrust the Central Bank with the promotion and proper functioning of the payment system, since through it, it could regulate the money markets. In such a way, that the Tribunal is correct in considering that from the analysis of these legal concepts, the possibility of the Central Bank to establish, through regulatory means, the National Electronic Payment System, and everything related to its regulation, operation, and control is inferred. **[…]** **VI.-** **[…]** This Chamber must indicate that deconcentration (desconcentración) effectively presents itself as a technique for distributing competencies among different organs of the same entity or superior organ; and whose object is to entrust a specialized organ within an administrative structure with the exercise of certain competencies in order to achieve greater efficiency. Deconcentration is contemplated in norm 83 of the General Law of Public Administration by establishing that: *“Every organ distinct from the chief executive shall be fully subordinated to the latter and to the immediate hierarchical superior, except for deconcentration operated by law or regulation…”*. In this normative precept, two modalities are established, the minimum and the maximum. The minimum informs that the superior cannot assume the competencies of the inferior nor review or substitute the conduct of the inferior, ex officio or at the request of a party. In the maximum, in addition to the above, the superior cannot give orders, instructions, or circulars to the inferior. Up to this point, the representatives of Cambolsa are correct. However, one must not forget that the assignment of the scope of competencies of the deconcentrated organ normally originates in the norm that creates and regulates it. In the event that it contains powers of authority (potestades de imperio), such a norm must be of legal rank. But, if the attributions do not involve powers of authority, the attribution may be made through regulatory norms. The purpose of deconcentration is to transfer competencies, and to establish the degree of independence with which these functions can be exercised. It is not a matter of simple attributions, what is sought is the specialization of certain organs in specific matters, in seeking to satisfy the tasks entrusted to the maximum entity (public purpose). But this does not mean that such competencies are organically detached from the original structure. For this reason, it is essential to refer to the norm that created the deconcentration, since it will be this one that establishes the type and scope of deconcentration and what powers the chief executive retains regarding what has been deconcentrated. The scope of a maximum deconcentration under the terms of Article 83 of the same is not discussed here, on the contrary, when the competence is transferred it is clear that the hierarchical superior becomes incompetent to issue acts related to the deconcentrated matter. What must be defined is that the chief executive maintains his competence in the areas not covered by the deconcentration. The deconcentrated organ, then, remains subject to hierarchy in such areas. That is why it is insisted, it is fundamental to respect the principle of legality to determine the scope of competence of the entity or the superior or higher organ. In the case under examination, as indicated above, the Regulatory Law of the Securities Market created the Superintendencia General de Valores as an organ of “maximum deconcentration (máxima desconcentración) of the Banco Central de Costa Rica” (Article 3). Its primary task consists of ensuring the transparency of the securities markets, the correct formation of prices in them, the protection of investors, and the dissemination of the information necessary to ensure the achievement of these ends. In this sense, it is true that Article 116 of Law 7732 granted Sugeval the power to regulate the organization and operation of the records, the identification systems, and the control of securities represented through electronic book entries (anotaciones electrónicas en cuenta), as well as the relationships and communications of the entities in charge of such records with issuers and stock exchanges. However, the BCCR continues to maintain its condition as the directing entity and, therefore, the ultimate regulator of the financial, monetary, and credit system; since it is responsible for directing monetary, credit, and financial policy and guaranteeing the smooth functioning of the financial system (pursuant to Article 3 of its Organic Law). In this regard, the duty to promote the efficiency of the internal and external payment systems, and maintain their normal functioning (canon 2, subsection c) of the same), is not a function that has been deconcentrated in Sugeval; on the contrary, this is one of the objectives that the Central Bank must constantly pursue, it should even be qualified as “essential”. It suffices to recall that it was the Regulatory Law of the Securities Market itself that came to confirm what was stated, when through its Article 188, subsection d), it expressly modified precept 69 of the Organic Law of the BCCR. With this reform, the legislator reaffirmed the duty of the Board of Directors of the BCCR to organize and regulate the functioning of the payment system (previously called only the Clearing House). In this sense, the legislator considered that the Central Bank's participation in the matter of the payment system was inherent to it because it was essential to its priority task, and that the Organic Law of the Central Bank so commands it. It must be highlighted at this point that the term encompasses establishing, regulating, operating, and overseeing the system. The Regulatory Law of the Securities Market, for its part, does not determine that the functions of Sugeval in relation to the payment system and the service entailed by the administration of the registry of book-entry securities, have been assigned to that organ exclusively; on the contrary, from the relationship of Articles 188, subsection d) of the Regulatory Law of the Securities Market and 2, 3, 69 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank, it is inferred that the National Payment System (creation and operation) must be in the hands of the BCCR. Therefore, these tasks related to the system are the competence of the Board of Directors of the Bank (this also derives from subsections c, h, l of Article 28 of its Organic Law). With Article 116 of Law 7732 it was provided that Sugeval could regulate the organization and operation of the records, the identification systems, and the control of securities represented through electronic book entries; however, this was done in a generic and not special manner, since the legislator always considered maintaining this task in the hands of the Central Bank. In reality, the duty that the BCCR held in this regard was never eliminated, since it would be incompatible with the independence of the Central Bank to establish institutional factors that tend to subject it to instructions, authorizations, suspensions, and worse yet, to restrict its competence regarding decisions related to monetary policy and the rest of its subsidiary objectives (among them the maintenance of the SINPE). The existence of a permit or prohibition to exercise a certain monetary instrument would imply a limit to the cited independence and competencies, since the Central Bank would see its powers limited to establish the strategy aimed at concretizing the objectives defined in Article 2 of Law 7558. Nor is the issue exhausted in institutional independence (defining the objectives of monetary policy) but rather it also concerns functional independence to decide the application of the monetary policy instruments that the legislator established, understood as the choice of which instrument should be employed and how it should be done; just as happens with the Book-Entry System (Sistema de Anotación en Cuenta) (which will be seen in greater detail in the following recital (considerando)) and the SINPE. Within this scheme, a supervisory entity cannot assume the definition of organizational aspects of a system that is administered by the Monetary Authority, since its independence would be affected and consequently the effectiveness of the financial system could also be jeopardized. In the sub júdice, the BCCR regulated a service that its Organic Law entrusted to it, so it is not true that competencies that are proper to Sugeval are being recognized to the Bank (according to what is defined in article 3 of its Regulatory Law) or that this regulation is not consistent with the subsequent legal norms that were introduced in Law 7732.

**VII.-** Having analyzed the regulatory power that the Central Bank has to issue the SINPE Regulation, next, it is necessary to refer to the Book-Entry System (Sistema de Anotación en Cuenta, SAC hereinafter); since the article challenged by the plaintiff is found within the Book of the Regulation titled *“Book Entry”*. The book-entry and settlement systems are based on the representation of securities through book entries (anotaciones en cuenta). It is a computerized system to create and register securities representing capital through the book-entry method. The security is constituted, deposited, and transferred as a book entry, legal acts that do not materialize. This is the trend followed by the Regulatory Law of the Securities Market. Thus, Article 115 of that regulatory body establishes: *“…The issues of securities registered in the National Registry of Securities and Intermediaries may be represented through electronic book entries or through certificates…”*. The Securities Clearing and Settlement System must seek, says Law 7732 in its article 129, the generalization of the electronic book-entry system, except for the exceptions authorized by the Superintendencia by virtue of market circumstances or the particular nature of certain securities. Securities represented through electronic book entries shall be constituted and transmitted by virtue of their registration in the corresponding accounting record (Articles 122 and 123 of the same). Modern securities clearing and settlement systems tend to dematerialize securities, which is achieved through representation by book entries. According to the Regulatory Law of the Securities Market, the book entry may be in charge of the Banco Central de Costa Rica or central securities depositories (precept 117). This accounting record of the securities represented through electronic book entries, proclaims canon 117 of Law 7732, shall be kept by a two-tier system: a) the first tier is comprised of the BCCR (which is responsible for administering the registry of the issues of the State and public institutions) and by the central securities depositories authorized by the Superintendencia (they will be responsible for administering the registry of the issues of private issuers); b) the second tier is formed by the entities adhered to the SAC, which may be all those authorized to provide custody services and the clearing members of the National Securities Clearing and Settlement System. Within these latter entities, broker-dealers are eminently found. The Regulation of the Book-Entry System (agreement adopted by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System, through Article 10, of the minutes of session 606-2006, held on September 28, 2006) regulates in greater detail the organization and operation of the records, the identification systems, and the control of securities represented through electronic book entries. This Regulation provides that the Central Bank is responsible for administering the accounting record of securities through electronic book entry of the issues of the State and public institutions, and may delegate this function to a central securities depository (canon 19). Likewise, it mentions that only entities that are members of the National Book-Entry Registry System that are constituted as central securities depositories, authorized for this purpose by the Superintendencia, may provide the services of administration of the accounting record of securities, through electronic book entry of issues of private issuers (Article 21). That is the way in which the registries of securities in Costa Rica are administered according to their issuer. Now then, in practice the SAC functions as a service provided by the BCCR, which was added to the SINPE platform due to the facilities and security that this latter system provided in the country for the transfer of funds; which implied taking advantage of the available tool, adding one more service (the transfer of securities). The SAC possesses four clearly delimited specific services: **1.** the issue registry service that functions as a registry where the BCCR and the Ministry of Finance register the issues that Sugeval authorizes them to place in the securities market; **2.** securities accounts, the service in charge of maintaining control and maintenance of the accounts; **3.** market settlement, allows the Bolsa Nacional de Valores to connect with the SINPE to send for settlement both the primary and secondary exchange market; and finally it provides for **4.** a securities transfer service for managing those securities movements that do not have an onerous nature (on this topic, the witness of the BCCR, Mr. Melvin Jiménez Quesada referred extensively during the oral and public trial starting at 10:06 a.m. on February 15, 2010). Although the Organic Law of the Central Bank does not contain an article that refers to the Bank's participation in the creation of a book-entry system, from the detailed analysis of articles 2 and 3 of that Law, it does emerge that the book-entry systems are within the sphere of competencies of the Bank; given that the BCCR, for the fulfillment of its macroeconomic objectives, unavoidably must provide the national economy with an agile, modern, efficient, and secure financial system. Moreover, it must be noted that the Central Bank is responsible for *“establishing, operating, and overseeing clearing systems”*, and although the legislator was not precise on this specific topic, it is nevertheless about the entire clearing system, relative to the financial system as a whole; therefore, both the clearing of funds and the clearing of securities. Even if Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank does not contain detailed regulations like those existing in Article 69 of the same for the payment system, the truth is that clearing between funds and securities is provided for there; it suffices that they are clearable securities. Therefore, from the analysis of Law 7558 it is concluded that the Central Bank has among its functions, to develop a securities clearing system.

In this understanding, the SAC plays a very important role as a component of the financial system, for which reason the Bank, in fulfillment of the objective of achieving financial and monetary stability, must promote, drive, and supervise its development, strictly following Article 3 ibídem; hence, the issuance of the criticized article is consistent with the legal system.

**VIII.-** […] Article 40 of Ley 7558 encompasses the duty incumbent upon State offices and dependencies, and upon autonomous institutions, to provide assistance and general information to the departments of the BCCR, so that the Bank can efficiently fulfill its functions. This duty, according to the literal wording of the rule, it is inferred, falls upon public offices and dependencies; however, in the specific case, it is feasible to recognize an analogical integration for the assumption under analysis, since there is no rule in Ley 7558 that imposes this duty on private entities, even though the BCCR uses this data for the exclusive fulfillment of one of its objectives. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Court not only justified the BCCR's power to request the challenged information based on Article 40 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank, since it also carried out an analysis of the BCCR's powers to request the criticized data, in relation to the powers granted to supervisory entities in the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Unauthorized Drugs, Related Activities, Money Laundering, and Financing of Terrorism (hereinafter Ley no. 8204). This is because the data mentioned in article 118 of the SINPE Regulation are of vital importance for combating and preventing money laundering and related activities through the transfer of securities. An aspect that will be analyzed in greater detail in the following grievance. Thus, no direct violation of the analyzed rule by the judges is found, since the information requested is related to one of the services that said entity provides directly to the entities adhered to the SINPE and to the SAC, among the latter the brokerage firms (puestos de bolsa). The request for information contemplated in article 118 of the SINPE Regulation is made so that the BCCR can fulfill one of its basic objectives (maintaining efficient payment and clearing systems), as established by articles 2, 3, 24, 69 in relation to article 40, all of Ley 7558. In relation to this argument, they also accuse that article 118 of the SINPE Regulation is absolutely null, for violating the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness within the scope of regulatory power, given that the BCCR lacked competence to regulate the records and identification systems related to the securities markets. Through the identification mechanism provided for in the Payment System Regulation, they reproach, knowledge of their competitors' clients can be imposed, which would generate inequality. The Constitutional Chamber has said the following about the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness: *"… A matter of the first order in every administrative act is the proportionality in a strict sense between the means employed by the respective public administration and the ends intended to be achieved with it, as well as the suitability or necessity of its content and, of course, when it is afflictive or burdensome, the weighing of its intervention or minimum impact. Precisely for the foregoing reason, the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness has emerged in contemporary Constitutional Law as one of the guiding principles of the administrative function, according to which administrative conduct must be sufficiently coherent and reasonably based on the body of legality, so that it suffices and explains itself. In our constitutional legal system, such principle emanates from the provisions of the first part of Article 11 of the Political Constitution…"* (resolution no. 2004-14421 of 11:00 a.m. on December 17, 2004). The fundamental objective is to avoid arbitrariness by the public agent, understood as the lack of objective legal support or basis for an administrative conduct, consequently violating the existing body of legality. In regulatory matters, this principle plays a relevant role within the legal system. In the sub lite case, as indicated above, the Central Bank was legally empowered to issue the SINPE Regulation and therefore the challenged article. From the analysis of articles 2, 3, and 69 of its Organic Law, it is inferred how the legislator entrusted this function to it, for which reason we refer to the considerations set forth in considering fifth. Due to the express mandate that Ley 7558 gave to the BCCR to create, legalize, and control the Payment System, this Collegiate Body considers that the alleged conflict of competences between the normative powers of SUGEVAL in relation to those conferred on the BCCR does not exist, for which reason the grievance must be dismissed.

**IX.-** Within the first objection, they finally reproach that the challenged rule places in the hands of the BCCR, which is also an issuer in the Costa Rican securities market, information that is not of a public nature and that could even be used for its own benefit in its capacity as a market participant. They add that the Central Bank acts as a competitor of the Brokerage Firms in the market, and through the identification mechanism provided for in the Payment System Regulation, they reproach, knowledge of their competitors' clients is imposed, which generates inequality. This Chamber must indicate that the BCCR's participation in the creation of a book-entry system (sistema de anotación en cuenta) that contemplates not only public debt but also private debt, was founded on the Bank's authority regarding the financial sector. Since the clearing and settlement process (proceso de compensación y liquidación), including book-entry records (registros de anotación en cuenta), are processes of a financial, economic, and legal nature, they are of interest and competence of the central bank. In this regard, the regulation of the system must maintain close correspondence with the rest of the legal system, among them Ley 8204, through the establishment of transparent and non-discriminatory rules, based on objective criteria concerning the services that can be accessed. For this reason, one of the main reasons why the Central Bank requires the information discussed here is to faithfully comply with the mandates contained in Ley 8204 and not to compete as the appellants claim. Likewise, when the BCCR issues open market operations, it does so as a financial policy instrument, with the aim of maintaining stability in the market; it does not do so for profit or for its own benefit. By its institutional position, it must be remembered, the BCCR plays a crucial role in monitoring the normal functioning of clearing systems. This competence may be linked to a supervisory task, aimed at maintaining the stability of the financial system, avoiding the presence of a domino effect in the event of liquidity or credit problems by any financial agent. The correct functioning of clearing and payment systems, as well as the stability of the financial system, is fundamental for the adequate execution of monetary policy; without prejudice to also recognizing the need to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of the systems, in order to preserve market efficiency and investment security. The Bank's role is restricted to the duty of direction and supervision proper and necessary to achieve system stability and the realization of its monetary policy. Consequently, it is not true that the data obtained by the Central Bank through article 118 of the SINPE Regulation are used for its benefit or to compete in the market, given that this is not its function; a fact that, moreover, was not proven by the plaintiff Chamber (Cámara) throughout the process. Thus, the first ground must be dismissed in all its aspects.

**XI.-** Among the objectives of Ley 8204, regulating and sanctioning financial activities stand out, with the purpose of preventing money laundering (legitimación de capitales) and actions that may serve to finance terrorist activities (Article 1). This prevention regime aims to regulate the obligations, actions, and procedures to prevent and impede the use of the financial system, as well as other sectors of economic activity, for the laundering of capital proceeding from any type of criminal participation. To this end, the Law establishes a series of obligations that certain subjects must fulfill. Article 14 of Ley 8204 considers entities subject to the obligations of the Law, those that regulate, supervise, and oversee namely: Sugef, Sugeval, Supen, and Sugese. Likewise, the obligations of the Law are applicable to all entities or companies that are members of the financial groups supervised by the aforementioned bodies, including financial transactions carried out by banks or financial entities domiciled abroad, through a financial entity domiciled in Costa Rica. The Law gives special attention to systematic or substantial money and fund exchange operations, carried out by any means and which, in the opinion of this Chamber, could be carried out through the SINPE platform. For this reason, the bodies described in article 14 ibídem must ensure that natural or legal persons, whatever their legal domicile or place of operation, who habitually and by any title carry out such activities without authorization, do not operate in Costa Rican territory. It is appropriate to clarify that these operations, even if carried out by authorized persons, may be suspicious, hence the control must be permanent. Suspicious are those financial activities carried out by clients of supervised entities that, due to their magnitude, lack of regularity, rotation speed, or unjustified complexity conditions, seem to have no economic sense or lawful purpose. Article 24 of Ley 8204 defines them as *"…those carried out outside of habitual transaction patterns and those that are not significant but are periodic, without evident economic or legal basis…"*. At the same time, articles 16 to 23 of the analyzed legislative body proclaim basic conditions that the overseen entities must fulfill to reduce the risks that financial activity causes within the money launderer's paradigm. Among others, the following stand out: 1. precise identification of clients; 2. maintenance of nominative accounts; 3. prohibition of opening anonymous accounts or accounts under fictitious names; 4. verifying, with reliable documentary means, the identity, representation, domicile, occupation, or corporate purpose of clients; 5. maintenance of documentary records during the term of the operation and for at least five years after the end of the commercial relationship; 6. recording of every cash transaction in national or foreign currency equal to or greater than $10,000; 7. special attention to atypical financial activities, such as those carried out outside of habitual patterns or lacking economic basis; and 8. duty to report suspicious financial operations to the supervisory and oversight bodies. According to these obligations, any natural or legal person whose economic activity falls within the assumption of the rules must be overseen by any of the superintendencies in charge of regulating and controlling regarding anti-money laundering (antilavado) rule compliance or by the Central Bank as applicable. This action is justified not only by the need to implement mechanisms that prevent the entry of illegal capital but also because they constitute financial actions vulnerable to the entry of illicit assets. These compliance programs for regulations aimed at preventing the entry of "dirty" capital into the financial and stock market system are linked with internationally assumed commitments and recommendations that require the national financial system to develop and comply with programs of such nature. For example, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF or GAFIC), to which Costa Rica belongs, evaluates compliance with several recommendations aimed at avoiding, among other aspects, the penetration of capital from criminal actions into the national financial system. Also found at the banking level is the Declaration of Principles of the Basel Committee, which seeks to prevent banks and other financial institutions from being used for transfers or deposits of funds from illicit sources. Within this normative analysis, rule 28 of Ley 8204 is of capital importance, granting certain obligations to bodies endowed with oversight and supervisory powers in relation to compliance with the same rule, such as monitoring the effective compliance with the registration and notification obligations indicated by the Law, but mainly cooperating with the competent authorities and providing them with technical assistance, within the framework of investigations and processes referring to the crimes typified in the Law. This last precept unquestionably reflects that the Central Bank is among the bodies endowed with supervisory and oversight powers. For this reason, the BCCR incorporated article 118 into the SINPE Regulation, to have in its records all the information required to identify the natural or legal persons who carried out securities transactions in the SINPE, since at any time the competent authorities could require that information as provided by Ley 8204 and the Law on the Registration, Seizure, and Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications (Ley no. 7425).

**XIII.-** Regarding the eventual violation of the right to privacy and stock market secrecy (secreto bursátil), which originates from the application of article 118 of the SINPE Regulation; it must be stated that the information requested by the SINPE does not entail that violation, since the data requested, namely the name, identity card number, and a code to identify the activity carried out, cannot be considered sensitive, intimate, or private information for the reasons that will be analyzed below. Any data relating to ethnicity, religious beliefs, political affinity, sexual preferences, or specific strategies of a company's commercial or financial development, among others of a similar nature, whether for natural or legal persons, would be. For this reason, that aspect fell outside the scope of coverage protected by the right to privacy. Article 24 of the Political Constitution enshrines the fundamental rights to privacy, to the inviolability of private documents, the secrecy of communications, and the right to informational self-determination or the right to have control over the information that third parties hold about the person in question. This information is comprised within matters that directly concern the sphere of the person, whether because it refers to their family or private life, their beliefs, convictions or sexual preferences, commercial relationships, among other aspects (developed in article 9, subsection 1) of the Law on the Protection of the Person Regarding the Processing of their Personal Data, Ley no. 8968). On the other hand, there are personal data that are public or can be communicated to third parties, either because they are recorded in public registries, or because there is no duty of confidentiality, such as name, identification, profession, data on assets and, in particular, the economic and financial situation of the person. Now, this latter information qualifies within what is known as private information and although it receives protection from the Constitution (Article 24, paragraph 2), its access can be authorized by law if there is a public interest involved. In this regard, the aforementioned Ley 8968 expresses in precept 9 the following: *"2.- Personal data of restricted access. Personal data of restricted access are those that, even forming part of publicly accessible registries, are not of unrestricted access because they are of interest only to their owner or to the Public Administration. Their processing shall be permitted only for public purposes or if the express consent of the owner is obtained… 4.- Data referring to credit behavior. Data referring to credit behavior shall be governed by the rules that regulate the National Financial System, in such a way as to guarantee an acceptable degree of risk on the part of financial entities, without impeding the full exercise of the right to informational self-determination nor exceeding the limits of this law."* But that protection does not mean they must be framed within what doctrine, jurisprudence, and the Law know as "sensitive data." For these reasons, it is important to distinguish between both types of data, since sensitive data have no relevance in the exercise of financial activity (on the prohibition of the processing of data relating to the intimate sphere of the citizen by entities not authorized for it; the Constitutional Chamber has ruled in Voto no. 1176-2008 of 11:21 a.m. on January 25, 2008). Thus, the information on the identification of third-party accounts obtained by the BCCR on the occasion of the SAC is not configured within the concept of sensitive data, for which reason this Chamber shares the reasons given by the Court to dismiss the plaintiff's allegation (according to the recording of the pronouncement of the judgment at 8:35 a.m. on February 22, 2010). Now, both the Organic Law of the Central Bank and Ley 8204 empower the BCCR to request the information contemplated in article 118 of the SINPE Regulation, for the sole and exclusive purpose of promoting the efficiency of the payment and clearing system, as well as to prevent money laundering (legitimación de capitales); issues that are of undoubted public interest. Thus, it can be affirmed that the legal system allows the BCCR to request the information contained in precept 118 of the SINPE Regulation. Within this topic, it is true that article 108 of Ley 7732 regulates what is known as stock market secrecy (secreto bursátil) that market participants must keep regarding their clients. Banking or stock market secrecy has traditionally been conceived as one of the main duties arising from commercial relationships - perfect or imperfect - between banks, financial institutions, and in this case between brokerage firms (puestos de bolsa) and their clients. This secrecy obliges entities to remain silent, that is, not to divulge or reveal information about clients and the operations they have carried out or have been about to carry out. It tends to protect that private bond between the parties, which materializes through different physical or computer files or documents, containing aspects relating to client identification, the origin and destination of funds, periodic movements, profits, investments, losses, transfers, and relationships with other persons or institutions. Ley 8204, from chapter four onwards, incorporated into the legal system not only the legal tools to investigate the crime of money laundering (legitimación de capitales), but also created the institutions and coordination mechanisms of the entities in charge of its supervision, execution, and investigation. This fact has generated much controversy regarding the information requested by supervisory entities (among them the Central Bank), since it has been considered that these mechanisms violate banking secrecy. A fact that does not escape the case under examination. For this reason, this Chamber considers it essential to highlight three aspects regarding article 118 of the SINPE Regulation. First, the information provided or that may be provided by the BCCR to the Costa Rican Drug Institute (ICD), the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), and the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), falls within the powers recognized by the Organic Law of the Central Bank, Ley 8204, and recently by the Law on Strengthening Legislation against Terrorism (Ley no. 8719 of March 4, 2009), by virtue of the supervisory and oversight role of the Central Bank. Second, said information is not used for the benefit of third parties nor for its disclosure; on the contrary, this must be understood as preventive information, which, if required, complies with the purposes of article one of the Law on the Registration, Seizure, and Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications. Third, related to the previous point, the Central Bank as operator of the SAC and the SINPE is obliged to maintain the confidentiality of the information it obtains, as inferred from precepts 119 subsection c), 166 of Ley 7732; 13 final paragraph of Ley 7558; 44, 133 of the SINPE Regulation; 12 of the Regulation on Book-Entry Systems (Reglamento sobre los Sistemas de Anotación en Cuenta); 339 of the Penal Code, 10 and 11 of Ley 8968. In national legislation, then, it is expressly established that such interference as well as access to private documentation are not violative of the rights of intimacy and privacy of persons, but rather obey a substantive public order task (along these lines the Constitutional Chamber has stated in Voto no. 5275-03 of 2:53 p.m. on June 18, 2003).

The regulatory and oversight functions carried out by the BCCR are necessary for the proper control of financial transactions in the country, and its work is aimed at ensuring that the operations occurring in the transfer of funds and securities are lawful, a purpose that justifies the acknowledgment of the information requested by cardinal 118 of the SINPE Regulation. The aim is to maintain the solvency, stability, and liquidity of the national financial system, within an environment of legality, protecting the investor themselves; reasons that are also of public interest. These grounds are clearly defined in both the Organic Law of the BCCR, the Securities Market Regulatory Law, and Law 8204. Therefore, the appellants are incorrect when they assert that articles 11, 24, 28, 121 of the Political Constitution, 19 of the LGAP, and 108 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law are violated. Hence, the objection is not admissible to quash the contested ruling.**”** **III.- On the scope of competence of the supervisory bodies.** Before entering into the analysis of the regulatory power and its exercise in the specific case, it is appropriate to refer, in general terms, to the competence structure established in the legal system regarding supervision, a concept that encompasses oversight (fiscalización) and regulation. In the development experienced by central banking, it is undisputed that an important part of this directing, supervisory, and vigilance power has been transferred to other public bodies. Thus, the legislator chose to distribute the different competencies that make up these powers among a series of bodies attached to the Banco Central de Costa Rica. For the purpose of overseeing certain activities, due to their importance in society, it created four superintendencies (superintendencias), as bodies of maximum deconcentration (órganos de desconcentración máxima), namely, the General Superintendency of Financial Entities (Sugef), the General Superintendency of Securities (Sugeval), the Superintendency of Pensions (Supen), and, recently, the General Superintendency of Insurance (Sugese). Of these, the latter two have instrumental legal personality. From an organic point of view, each of them has a superintendent, who acts as the head in administrative matters. It is their responsibility, according to the subject matter, to verify compliance by the supervised entities with the provisions that make up the respective normative subsystems, as well as the stability of the system, in what corresponds to them according to their scope of competence. Along with the superintendencies, the Securities Market Regulatory Law also created a body called the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System (Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero). This body is primarily assigned the task of regulating the system and at the same time acts as an improper single-phase superior (jerarca impropio monofásico) of the superintendencies for purposes of challenges (artículo 171 of Law 7732). Relevant to this appeal, it is important to note that the Securities Market Regulatory Law also created the Sugeval as a body of “maximum deconcentration of the Banco Central de Costa Rica” (artículo 3). Its primary function is to ensure the transparency of the securities markets, the correct formation of prices in those markets, the protection of investors, and the dissemination of the information necessary to ensure the achievement of these purposes. This competence, in accordance with canon 3 ibidem, is exercised over all securities markets, the activity of natural or legal persons that intervene directly or indirectly in them, and the acts or contracts related to them, as provided by law. This general competence over the securities market is aimed at guaranteeing market stability for its development, as well as investor protection. The supervisory bodies, including the Sugeval, are bodies of maximum deconcentration of the BCCR that participate in supervising compliance with the monetary policies issued by it, including that aimed at promoting the efficiency and normal operation of the internal and external payment system.

**IV.- On the regulatory power.** The main object of this litigation, developed in greater detail in the first objection of the plaintiff Chamber's appeal, is to determine whether the contested norm (article 113 of the SINPE Regulation) falls within the scope of competence that, regarding the issuance of infralegal norms, the legal system assigns to the BCCR. To this end, it is essential to briefly refer to the content of the regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria) and the different types of regulations that the Public Administration can issue. Traditionally, it has been stated that these can be classified into two large groups, for which purpose, consult the vote of this Chamber no. 749-F-04 of 9 hours 30 minutes on September 10, 2004, and of the Constitutional Chamber, among others, rulings no. 2005-14286 of 14 hours 45 minutes on October 19, 2005, and 2007-02063 of 14 hours 45 minutes on February 14, 2007. The first of these, regulated in numeral 140, subsections 3) and 18) of the Political Constitution, is the executive type, through which the contents of a legal-rank norm are developed. It is a complementary provision, used to clarify the content or to facilitate the implementation of what is prescribed in the law. In this sense, constitutional jurisprudence has indicated that this type of norms can only originate from the Executive Branch.

Regarding this particular matter, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that it is not *“…possible to attempt an extensive interpretation in favor of other public agencies…”* (voto no. 17599-2006 of 15:00 hours on December 6, 2006). It should be added that this is an autonomous power, the authorization for which is given generically in the Magna Carta, such that the Executive Branch is empowered to regulate, *motu proprio*, any law of the Republic. Stated differently, the existence or not of an authorization in the law is irrelevant, insofar as the competence is granted at the constitutional level and can be exercised with respect to all laws issued, whether they provide for it or not. This, of course, is without prejudice to a legal norm converting this power into a duty, a situation which, in any case, does not change its nature. The second typology of regulations is that of autonomous regulations, the purpose of which is to regulate the organization of administrative agencies (in which case they are called “organizational autonomous regulations”), or the functioning of the public services they provide (referred to generically as “service autonomous regulations”). These can emanate from both the Central Administration and the decentralized administration. In the case of the former, by virtue of the express text contained in subsection 18) of constitutional cardinal 140, and for the latter, as a logical and necessary derivation of the power of self-organization implicit in the degree of administrative autonomy or first-degree autonomy granted to them at the time of their creation (considerations noted in greater detail by resolution of this Chamber no. 001000-F-S1-2010 of 9 hours 35 minutes on August 26, 2010).

**V.-** In this specific case, it is important to clarify two aspects of transcendental importance, before addressing the merits of the appeal. First, it must be made clear that the plaintiff’s nullity claim refers solely to article 113 of the SINPE Regulation and not to the entirety of that normative body. Second, it is necessary to illustrate that after the issuance of the challenged judgment, the Payment System Regulation (approved by the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, through article 11 of the minutes of session 5416-2009, held on March 11, 2009) was modified, such that the originally questioned article 113 changed its numbering and currently corresponds to precept 118 *ibídem*. However, the article analyzed maintains its original wording, which literally establishes: *“**Identification of third-party accounts**. Third-party accounts are identified by the name and identification number of their holders, as well as by a code by type of investor”*. For the purposes of this appeal, it will be referred to henceforth as canon 118 of the SINPE Regulation. The BCCR is an autonomous public law institution, with its own legal personality and assets, and which also forms part of the National Banking System (article 1 of its Organic Law). Said entity’s primary objective is to maintain the internal and external stability of the national currency and ensure its convertibility. Likewise, Ley 7558 imposed on the BCCR a series of subsidiary objectives, among others, the obligation to promote the efficiency of the internal and external payments system and maintain its normal functioning (canon 2, subsection c) *ibídem*). In line with the above, that normative body established that for the due fulfillment of its purposes, the Bank must have essential functions such as the establishment, operation, and oversight of clearing systems; and establish the regulations for the creation, functioning, and control of financial entities (precept 3, subsections i), j) of Ley 7558). In addition to the above, article 69 of the analyzed normative body categorically provides: *“…The Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Costa Rica shall organize and regulate the functioning of the payments system…”*. In this way, it can be established that the BCCR has been assigned several duties by its Organic Law. It is worth highlighting the obligation to promote the efficiency of the internal and external payments system and maintain its normal functioning; a task that is currently fundamental, since the existence of a secure, effective, and efficient payments system is of vital importance for the normal performance of the economy, for both internal and external operations. A payments system is constituted by a set of instruments, banking procedures, and systems for the transfer of funds and securities that ensure their circulation in the financial and stock markets, respectively. They are mechanisms used for the movement of funds, money, and securities; they also contribute to the development of payments between financial entities, internally and externally. As can be observed from the cited articles, the legislator chose to entrust the Central Bank with the promotion and proper functioning of the payments system, since through it, it could regulate the money markets. In such a way, the Tribunal is correct in considering that from the analysis of these legal concepts, the Central Bank’s possibility to establish, through regulation, the National Electronic Payments System, and everything related to its regulation, functioning, and control, is inferred. **[…]** **VI.-** **[…]** This Chamber must indicate that deconcentration is effectively presented as a technique for distributing competences among distinct organs of the same entity or superior organ; and its purpose is to entrust a specialized organ within an administrative structure with the exercise of certain competences in order to achieve greater efficiency. Deconcentration is contemplated in norm 83 of the General Law of the Public Administration in establishing that: *“Every organ different from the hierarch shall be fully subordinated to the latter and to the immediate hierarchical superior, except for deconcentration operated by law or by regulation…”*. In this normative precept, two modalities are established: the minimum and the maximum. The minimum informs that the superior cannot assume (avocar) the competences of the inferior nor review or substitute the conduct of the inferior, ex officio or at the request of a party. In the maximum, in addition to the above, the superior cannot give orders, instructions, or circulars to the inferior. The representatives of Cambolsa are correct up to this point. However, one must not forget that the assignment of the scope of competences of the deconcentrated organ originates, normally, in the norm that creates and regulates it. In the event that it contains powers of authority (potestades de imperio), such a norm must be of legal rank. But, if the attributions do not involve powers of authority, the attribution may be made through regulatory norms. The purpose of deconcentration is to transfer competences and establish the degree of independence with which these functions can be exercised. It is not a matter of simple attributions; what is sought is the specialization of certain organs in specific matters, in pursuit of satisfying the tasks entrusted to the maximum entity (public purpose). But this does not mean that such competences are organically detached from the original structure. For this reason, it is essential to refer to the norm that created the deconcentration, since it will be this which establishes the type and scope of deconcentration and what powers the hierarch retains regarding the deconcentrated matter. The scope of a maximum deconcentration in the terms of article 83 *ibídem* is not discussed here; on the contrary, when the competence is transferred, it is clear that the hierarchical superior is incompetent to issue acts related to the deconcentrated matter. What must be defined is that the hierarch maintains his competence in areas not covered by the deconcentration. The deconcentrated organ remains, then, subject to hierarchy in those areas. That is why it is insisted: it is fundamental to respect the principle of legality to determine the jurisdictional scope of the entity or the superior or larger organ. In the case under examination, as indicated above, the Regulatory Law of the Securities Market created the Superintendencia General de Valores as an organ of “maximum deconcentration of the Central Bank of Costa Rica” (article 3). Its primary duty consists of ensuring the transparency of securities markets, the correct formation of prices therein, the protection of investors, and the dissemination of information necessary to ensure the achievement of these purposes. In this sense, it is true that article 116 of Ley 7732 granted the Sugeval the power to regulate the organization and functioning of registries, identification systems, and control of securities represented by means of electronic book-entries, as well as the relations and communications of the entities in charge of such registries with issuers and stock exchanges. However, the BCCR continues to maintain its condition as the directing entity and, therefore, the ultimate regulator of the financial, monetary, and credit system; since it is its responsibility to direct monetary, credit, and financial policy and guarantee the smooth functioning of the financial system (according to article 3 of its Organic Law). In this regard, the duty to promote the efficiency of the internal and external payments system and maintain its normal functioning (canon 2, subsection c) *ibídem*) is not a function that has been deconcentrated to the Sugeval; on the contrary, this is one of the objectives that the Central Bank must constantly pursue, and it must even be qualified as “essential.” It suffices to recall that it was the Regulatory Law of the Securities Market itself that came to confirm what was stated, when through its article 188, subsection d), it expressly modified precept 69 of the Organic Law of the BCCR. With this reform, the legislator reaffirmed the duty of the Board of Directors of the BCCR to organize and regulate the functioning of the payments system (formerly called only the Clearing House). In this sense, the legislator considered that the Central Bank’s participation in the area of the payments system was inherent to it, as it was essential to its priority duty, and that the Organic Law of the Central Bank so mandates it. It must be highlighted in this regard that the term encompasses establishing, regulating, operating, and supervising the system. The Regulatory Law of the Securities Market, for its part, does not determine that the functions of the Sugeval in relation to the payments system and the service involved in administering the registry of book-entry securities have been assigned to that organ exclusively; on the contrary, from the relationship of articles 188, subsection d) of the Regulatory Law of the Securities Market and 2, 3, 69 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank, it is inferred that the National Payments System (creation and functioning) must be in the hands of the BCCR. Therefore, these tasks concerning the system are the competence of the Board of Directors of the Bank (as is also derived from subsections c, h, l of article 28 of its Organic Law). Article 116 of Ley 7732 provided that the Sugeval could regulate the organization and functioning of registries, identification systems, and control of securities represented by means of electronic book-entries; however, this was done in a generic and not a specific manner, since the legislator always considered keeping this task in the hands of the Central Bank. In reality, the duty that the BCCR maintained in this regard was never eliminated, since the establishment of institutional factors tending to subject it to instructions, authorizations, suspensions, and worse yet, to restrict its competence regarding decisions related to monetary policy and the rest of its subsidiary objectives (including the maintenance of the SINPE) would be incompatible with the independence of the Central Bank. The existence of a permit or prohibition to exercise a certain monetary instrument would imply a limit to the cited independence and competences, since the Central Bank would see its powers limited to establish the strategy tending to concretize the objectives defined in article 2 of Ley 7558. The issue is also not exhausted in institutional independence (defining the objectives of monetary policy) but also involves functional independence to decide the application of the monetary policy instruments that the legislator established, understood as the choice of which instrument should be employed and how it should be done; as occurs with the Book-Entry System (which will be examined in greater detail in the following considering) and the SINPE. Within this scheme, a supervisory entity cannot assume the definition of organizational aspects of a system that is administered by the Monetary Authority, since its independence would be affected and, consequently, the efficacy of the financial system could also be put at risk. In the *sub júdice*, the BCCR regulated a service that its Organic Law entrusted to it, so it is not true that the Bank is being recognized with competences that are proper to the Sugeval (according to what is defined in cardinal 3 of its Regulatory Law) or that this regulation is not consistent with the later legal norms that were introduced in Ley 7732.

**VII.-** Once the regulatory power that the Central Bank has to issue the SINPE Regulation has been analyzed, it is next necessary to refer to the Book-Entry System (SAC henceforth); since the article challenged by the plaintiff is located within the Book of the Regulation called *“Book-Entry”*. Book-entry and settlement systems are based on the representation of securities through book-entries. It is a computerized system for creating and recording securities representative of capital through the book-entry method. The security is constituted, deposited, and transferred as a book-entry, legal acts that do not materialize physically. This is the trend followed by the Regulatory Law of the Securities Market. Thus, article 115 of that normative body establishes: *“…Issues of securities registered in the National Registry of Securities and Intermediaries may be represented by means of electronic book-entries or through certificates…”*. The securities clearing and settlement system shall seek, states Ley 7732 in its cardinal 129, the generalization of the electronic book-entry system, except for the exceptions authorized by the Superintendencia by virtue of market circumstances or the particular nature of certain securities. Securities represented by means of electronic book-entries shall be constituted and transferred by virtue of their entry in the corresponding accounting register (articles 122 and 123 *ibídem*). Modern securities clearing and settlement systems tend to dematerialize securities, which is achieved through representation by book-entries. According to the Regulatory Law of the Securities Market, the book-entry may be in charge of the Central Bank of Costa Rica or of central securities depositories (precept 117). This accounting register of securities represented by means of electronic book-entries, preaches canon 117 of Ley 7732, shall be maintained by a two-level system: a) the first level is formed by the BCCR (which is responsible for administering the register of issues of the State and public institutions) and by the central securities depositories authorized by the Superintendencia (they shall be responsible for administering the register of issues of private issuers); b) the second level is formed by the entities adhered to the SAC, which may be all those authorized to provide custody services and the clearing members of the National Securities Clearing and Settlement System. Among these latter entities, brokerage firms are preeminently found. The Book-Entry System Regulation (agreement adopted by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System, through article 10, of the minutes of session 606-2006, held on September 28, 2006) regulates in greater detail the organization and functioning of registries, identification systems, and control of securities represented by means of electronic book-entries. This Regulation provides that the Central Bank is the entity responsible for administering the accounting register of securities through electronic book-entry for issues of the State and public institutions, and may delegate that function to a central securities depository (canon 19). Likewise, it mentions that only the member entities of the National Book-Entry Registration System that are constituted as central securities depositories, authorized for that purpose by the Superintendencia, may provide services for the administration of the accounting register of securities through electronic book-entry for issues of private issuers (article 21). That is how securities registries are administered in Costa Rica according to their issuer. Now then, in practice, the SAC functions as a service provided by the BCCR, which was added to the SINPE platform because of the facilities and security that this latter system provided in the country for fund transfers; which implied taking advantage of the available tool, adding one more service (the transfer of securities). The SAC possesses four clearly delimited specific services: **1.** the issue registration service, which functions as a registry where the BCCR and the Ministry of Finance register the issues that the Sugeval authorizes them to place in the securities market; **2.** securities accounts, which is the service in charge of maintaining control and maintenance of the accounts; **3.** market settlement, which allows the Bolsa Nacional de Valores to connect with the SINPE to send both the primary and secondary stock exchange market for settlement; and finally, **4.** a securities transfer service is provided for the handling of those securities movements that do not have an onerous nature (on this topic, the witness from the BCCR, Mr. Melvin Jiménez Quesada, spoke extensively during the oral and public trial starting at 10 hours 6 minutes on February 15, 2010). Although the Organic Law of the Central Bank does not contain an article that refers to the Bank’s participation in the creation of a book-entry system, from the detailed analysis of cardinals 2 and 3 of that Law, it does emerge that book-entry systems fall within the sphere of the Bank’s competences; given that the BCCR, for the fulfillment of its macroeconomic objectives, unavoidably must endow the national economy with an agile, modern, efficient, and secure financial system. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the Central Bank is responsible for *“establishing, operating, and supervising clearing systems”*, and although the legislator was not precise on this specific topic, it nevertheless concerns the entire clearing system, related to the financial system as a whole; therefore, both the clearing of funds and the clearing of securities. While article 68 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank does not contain detailed regulations like those existing in article 69 *ibídem* for the payments system, the truth is that clearing between funds and securities is provided for there; it suffices that they are compensable securities. Thus, from the analysis of Ley 7558, it is concluded that the Central Bank has among its functions the development of a securities clearing system. In this understanding, the SAC plays a very important role as a component of the financial system, which is why the Bank, in fulfillment of the objective of achieving financial and monetary stability, must promote, drive, and supervise its development, attending to the letter of article 3 *ibídem*; hence, the issuance of the criticized article is in accordance with the legal order.

**VIII.-** **[…]** Article 40 of Ley 7558 encompasses the duty incumbent upon the offices and agencies of the State, and of the autonomous institutions, to provide assistance and grant information of a general nature to the departments of the BCCR, with the purpose that the Bank may fulfill its functions efficiently. This duty, attending the literal wording of the norm, is understood to fall on public offices and agencies; however, in the specific case, it is feasible to recognize an analogical integration for the scenario being analyzed, since there is no norm in Ley 7558 that imposes this duty on private entities, even though the BCCR uses these data for the exclusive fulfillment of one of its objectives. Nevertheless, it must be indicated that the Tribunal not only justified the BCCR’s power to request the questioned information based on article 40 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank, since it also conducted an analysis of the BCCR’s powers to request the criticized data, in relation to the powers granted to supervisory entities in the Law on Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, Related Activities, Money Laundering, and Financing of Terrorism (hereinafter Law no. 8204). This is because the data mentioned in cardinal 118 of the SINPE Regulation are of vital importance to combat and prevent money laundering and related activities through the transfer of securities. An aspect that will be analyzed in greater detail in the following grievance. In this way, no direct violation of the analyzed norm by the judges is found, since the information requested is related to one of the services that this entity provides directly to the entities adhered to the SINPE and the SAC, among these latter the brokerage firms.

The request for the information contemplated in canon 118 of the SINPE Regulation is made for the purpose of enabling the BCCR to fulfill one of its basic objectives (maintaining an efficient payment and settlement system), as established by articles 2, 3, 24, 69 in relation to canon 40, all of Law 7558. In relation to this argument, they also claim that Article 118 of the SINPE Regulation is absolutely null, for violating the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness in the sphere of regulatory power, given that the BCCR lacked the competence to regulate the records and identification systems related to the securities markets. Through the identification mechanism provided for in the Payment System Regulation, they reproach, knowledge of its competitors' clients may be imposed, which would generate inequality. The Constitutional Chamber has stated the following regarding the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness: <i>“… A first-order aspect in every administrative act is proportionality in the strict sense between the means employed by the respective public administration and the ends sought to be achieved with it, as well as the suitability or necessity of its content and, of course, when it is afflictive or burdensome, the consideration of its minimal intervention or impact. Precisely for the foregoing, there has emerged in contemporary Constitutional Law, as one of the guiding principles of the administrative function, that of the prohibition of arbitrariness, according to which administrative conduct must be sufficiently coherent and reasonably grounded in the body of legality, so that it is self-sufficient and self-explanatory. In our constitutional legal system, such a principle emanates from what is established in the first part of Article 11 of the Political Constitution…”</i> (Resolution No. 2004-14421 of 11:00 a.m. on December 17, 2004). The fundamental objective is to avoid arbitrariness by the public agent, understood as the lack of objective legal support or foundation for an administrative conduct, consequently violating the existing body of legality. In regulatory matters, this principle plays a relevant role within the legal system. In the sub lite case, as indicated earlier, the Central Bank was legally empowered to issue the SINPE Regulation and therefore the questioned article. From the analysis of numbers 2, 3, and 69 of its Organic Law, it is inferred how the legislator entrusted this function to it, for which reason it refers to the considerations set forth in the fifth whereas clause. Due to the express mandate that Law 7558 gave to the BCCR to create, legalize, and control the Payment System, this Collegiate Body considers that the alleged conflict of competences between the normative powers of the SUGEVAL in relation to those conferred upon the BCCR does not exist, whereby the grievance must be dismissed.

**IX.-** Within the first objection, they finally reproach that the impugned rule places in the hands of the BCCR, which is itself an issuer in the Costa Rican securities market, information that is not of a public nature and that may even be used for its own benefit in its capacity as a market participant. They add that the Central Bank acts as a competitor of the Brokerage Firms in the market, and through the identification mechanism provided for in the Payment System Regulation, they reproach, knowledge of its competitors' clients is imposed, which generates inequality. This Chamber must indicate that the BCCR's participation in the creation of a book-entry system that contemplates not only public but also private debt, was founded on the Bank's authority regarding the financial sector. Since the clearing and settlement process, including book-entry records, are processes of a financial, economic, and legal nature, they are of interest and competence to the central bank. In this regard, the system's regulation must maintain a close correspondence with the rest of the legal system, including Law 8204, through the establishment of transparent and non-discriminatory rules, based on objective criteria regarding the services that can be accessed. For this reason, one of the main reasons why the Central Bank demands the information discussed here is to faithfully comply with the mandates contained in Law 8204 and not to compete as the appellants claim. Likewise, when the BCCR issues open market operations, it does so as an instrument of financial policy, in order to maintain market stability, not for profit or for its own benefit. Due to its institutional position, let it be remembered, the BCCR has a transcendent role in overseeing the normal functioning of clearing systems. This competence may be joined to a supervisory task, aimed at maintaining the stability of the financial system, avoiding the presence of a domino effect in the event of liquidity or credit problems on the part of some financial agent. The correct functioning of the clearing and payment systems, as well as the stability of the financial system, is fundamental for the proper execution of monetary policy; without prejudice to also recognizing the need to maintain confidence in the security and reliability of the systems, in order to preserve the efficiency of the markets and the security of investment. The role of the Bank is restricted to the duty of direction and supervision proper and necessary to achieve system stability and the concretion of its monetary policy. Consequently, it is not true that the data obtained by the Central Bank through canon 118 of the SINPE Regulation are used for its benefit or to compete in the market, given that this is not its function; a fact that was also not demonstrated by the plaintiff Chamber throughout the process. Thus, the first ground must be dismissed in all its aspects.

**XI.-** Among the objectives of Law 8204, regulating and sanctioning financial activities stand out, in order to prevent money laundering and actions that may serve to finance terrorist activities (Article 1). This prevention regime aims to regulate the obligations, actions, and procedures to prevent and impede the use of the financial system, as well as other sectors of economic activity, for the laundering of capital proceeding from any type of criminal participation. For this purpose, the Law establishes a series of obligations that certain subjects must fulfill. Article 14 of Law 8204 considers entities subject to the obligations of the Law those that regulate, supervise, and oversee, namely: the Sugef, the Sugeval, the Supen, and the Sugese. Likewise, the obligations of the Law are applicable to all entities or companies that are members of the financial groups supervised by the aforementioned bodies, including financial transactions carried out by banks or financial entities domiciled abroad, through a financial entity domiciled in Costa Rica. The Law grants special attention to systematic or substantial money and fund exchange operations, carried out by any means and which, in the opinion of this Chamber, could be carried out through the SINPE platform. For this reason, the bodies described in numeral 14 ibidem must ensure that natural or legal persons do not operate in Costa Rican territory, whatever their legal domicile or place of operation, who habitually and under any title, carry out those activities without authorization. It is appropriate to clarify that these operations, even if carried out by authorized persons, may be suspicious; hence control must be permanent. Those financial activities developed by clients of supervised entities that, due to their magnitude, lack of habitualness, rotation speed, or unjustified complexity conditions, seem to have no economic sense or lawful purpose, are suspicious. Article 24 of Law 8204 defines them as <i>“…those carried out outside the usual transaction patterns and those that are not significant but are periodic, without evident economic or legal basis…”</i>. At the same time, numerals 16 to 23 of the analyzed legislative body proclaim basic conditions that the supervised entities must fulfill to reduce the risks that financial activity provokes within the paradigm of the launderer. Among others, the following stand out: 1. the precise identification of clients; 2. maintenance of nominative accounts; 3. prohibition of opening anonymous accounts or accounts under fictitious names; 4. verification, by reliable documentary means, of the identity, representation, domicile, occupation, or corporate purpose of clients; 5. maintenance of documentary records during the life of the operation and for at least five years after the end of the commercial relationship; 6. recording of every cash operation in national or foreign currency equal to or greater than $10,000; 7. special attention to atypical financial activities, such as those carried out outside habitual patterns or lacking economic basis; and 8. duty to report suspicious financial operations to the supervision and oversight bodies. According to these obligations, any natural or legal person whose economic activity is included in the assumption of the rules must be supervised by any of the superintendencies in charge of regulating and controlling compliance with anti-money laundering (antilavado) rules or by the Central Bank as appropriate. This action is justified not only by the need to implement mechanisms that prevent the entry of illegal capital but also because it constitutes financial actions vulnerable to the entry of illicit assets. These compliance programs for regulations aimed at preventing the entry of "dirty" capital into the financial and stock market system are linked to internationally assumed commitments and recommendations that require the national financial system to develop and comply with programs of such nature. For example, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (GAFIC), to which Costa Rica belongs, evaluates compliance with several recommendations aimed at preventing, among other aspects, the penetration of capital from criminal actions into the national financial system. Also at the banking level is the Declaration of Principles of the Basel Committee, which seeks to prevent banks and other financial institutions from being used for transfers or deposits of funds of illicit origin. Within this normative analysis, norm 28 of Law 8204 is of capital importance, as it grants to bodies endowed with oversight and supervision powers certain obligations regarding compliance with the same norm, such as overseeing the effective fulfillment of the registration and notification obligations indicated by the Law, but mainly cooperating with the competent authorities and providing them with technical assistance, within the framework of investigations and processes referring to the crimes defined in the Law. This last precept unquestionably reflects that the Central Bank is among the bodies endowed with supervisory and oversight powers. For this reason, the BCCR incorporated Article 118 into the SINPE Regulation, to have available in its records all the information required in order to identify the natural or legal persons who carried out securities transactions in the SINPE, since at any time the competent authorities could require that information as stipulated by Law 8204 and the Law on Registration, Seizure, and Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications (Law No. 7425).

**XIII.-** Regarding the eventual violation of the right to privacy and stock market confidentiality (secreto bursátil), which originates with the application of canon 118 of the SINPE Regulation, it must be indicated that the information requested by the SINPE does not entail that violation, since the requested data, namely the name, ID number, and a code to identify the activity carried out, cannot be considered sensitive, intimate, or private information for the reasons that will be analyzed below. Any data relating to ethnicity, religious beliefs, political affiliation, sexual preferences, or strategies specific to the commercial or financial development of a company, among others of a similar nature for both natural and legal persons, would be so. For this reason, that aspect was left outside the scope of coverage that protects the right to privacy. Article 24 of the Political Constitution enshrines the fundamental rights to privacy, the inviolability of private documents, the confidentiality of communications, and the right to informational self-determination or the right to have control over information that third parties hold about the person in question. This information is comprised within matters that directly concern the sphere of the person, whether because it refers to their family or private life, their beliefs, convictions or sexual preferences, commercial relations, among other aspects (developed in canon 9, subsection 1) of the Law for the Protection of the Person against the Processing of their Personal Data, Law No. 8968). On the other side, there are personal data that are public or can be communicated to third parties, either because they appear in public records, or because there is no duty of confidentiality, such as name, identification, profession, data on patrimony and, in particular, the economic and financial situation of the person. Now, this last information qualifies within what is known as private information and although it receives protection from the Constitution (Article 24, paragraph 2), its access may be authorized by law if a public interest is involved. In this regard, the cited Law 8968 states in precept 9 the following: <i>“2.- Personal data of restricted access. Personal data of restricted access are those that, even forming part of records for public access, are not of unrestricted access because they are of interest only to their owner or to the Public Administration. Their processing will be permitted only <u>for public purposes</u> or if the express consent of the owner is obtained… 4.- Data referring to credit behavior. Data referring to credit behavior shall be governed by the rules regulating the National Financial System, so as to guarantee an acceptable degree of risk on the part of the financial entities, without impeding the full exercise of the right to informational self-determination nor exceeding the limits of this law.</i>” But that protection does not mean that they should be framed within what doctrine, jurisprudence, and the Law know as “sensitive data.” For these reasons, it is important to distinguish between both types of data, since sensitive data have no relevance in the exercise of financial activity (regarding the prohibition of processing data relating to the intimate sphere of the citizen by entities not authorized to do so; the Constitutional Chamber has pronounced itself in Voto no. 1176-2008 of 11:21 a.m. on January 25, 2008). Thus, the information on the identification of third-party accounts that the BCCR obtains on the occasion of the SAC is not configured within the concept of sensitive data, so this Chamber shares the reasons given by the Court to dismiss the plaintiff's allegation (according to the recording of the pronouncement of the judgment at 8:35 a.m. on February 22, 2010). Now, both the Organic Law of the Central Bank and Law 8204 empower the BCCR to request the information contemplated in numeral 118 of the SINPE Regulation, for the sole and exclusive purpose of promoting the efficiency of the payment and settlement system, as well as to prevent money laundering; matters that are of undoubted public interest. In this way, it can be affirmed that the legal system allows the BCCR to request the information contained in precept 118 of the SINPE Regulation. Within this topic, it is true that canon 108 of Law 7732 regulates what is known as stock market confidentiality (secreto bursátil) that market participants must keep regarding their clients. Traditionally, banking or stock market confidentiality has been conceived as one of the main duties arising from commercial relationships—perfect or imperfect—between banks, financial institutions, and in this case between brokerage firms and their clients. This confidentiality obliges entities to remain silent, that is, not to divulge or reveal information about clients and the operations they have carried out or have been about to carry out. It tends to protect that private link between the parties, which materializes through different physical or computer files or documents, containing aspects related to the identification of clients, the origin and destination of funds, periodic movements, earnings, investments, losses, transfers, and relationships with other persons or institutions. Law 8204, starting from chapter four, incorporated into the legal system not only the legal tools to investigate the crime of money laundering, but also created the institutions and coordination mechanisms for the entities in charge of its supervision, execution, and investigation. This fact has generated much controversy regarding the information requested by supervisory entities (among them the Central Bank), since it has been considered that these mechanisms violate banking confidentiality. A fact that does not escape the case under review. For this reason, this Chamber considers it indispensable to highlight three aspects regarding Article 118 of the SINPE Regulation. First, the information provided or that may be provided by the BCCR to the Drug Control Institute (ICD), the Judicial Investigation Organization, and the Public Ministry is framed within the powers recognized by the Organic Law of the Central Bank, Law 8204, and recently by the Law for Strengthening Legislation against Terrorism (Law No. 8719 of March 4, 2009), by virtue of the supervisory and oversight role of the Central Bank. Second, said information is not used for the benefit of third parties nor for its disclosure; on the contrary, it must be understood as preventive information, which, if required, must conform to the purposes of article one of the Law on Registration, Seizure, and Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications. Third, related to the previous point, the Central Bank as operator of the SAC and the SINPE is obliged to maintain the confidentiality of the information it obtains, as deduced from precepts 119 subsection c), 166 of Law 7732; 13 final paragraph of Law 7558; 44, 133 of the SINPE Regulation; 12 of the Regulation on Book-Entry Systems; 339 of the Penal Code, 10 and 11 of Law 8968. In national legislation, therefore, it is expressly established that such interference as well as access to private documentation are not violative of the rights to intimacy and privacy of persons, but rather obey a substantive task of public order (the Constitutional Chamber has expressed itself along this line in Voto no. 5275-03 of 2:53 p.m. on June 18, 2003). The regulatory and oversight functions carried out by the BCCR are necessary for the due control of financial transactions in the country, and its work is aimed at ensuring that the operations occurring in the transfer of funds and securities are lawful, an end that justifies the recognition of the information requested by numeral 118 of the SINPE Regulation. It seeks thereby to maintain the solvency, stability, and liquidity of the national financial system, within an environment of legality, protecting the investor themselves; reasons that are also of public interest. Reasons that are clearly defined both in the Organic Law of the BCCR, the Securities Market Regulatory Law, and Law 8204. Therefore, the appellants are not correct when they affirm that Articles 11, 24, 28, 121 of the Political Constitution, 19 of the LGAP, and 108 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law are violated. Hence, the reproach is not admissible to quash the challenged ruling.

“III.- Sobre el ámbito competencial de los órganos de supervisión. Previo a ingresar en el análisis de la potestad reglamentaria, y su ejercicio en el caso concreto, conviene referirse, en forma general sobre la estructura competencial establecida en el ordenamiento jurídico en materia de supervisión, concepto que se encuentra integrado por la fiscalización y la regulación. En el desarrollo que ha sufrido la banca central, no se discute que parte importante de ese poder director, supervisor y de vigilancia ha pasado a otros organismos públicos. De esta forma, el legislador optó por distribuir las distintas competencias que conforman estas potestades en una serie de órganos adscritos al Banco Central de Costa Rica. Para efectos de fiscalizar determinadas actividades, debido a su importancia en la sociedad, creó cuatro superintendencias, en la figura de órganos de desconcentración máxima, a saber, la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (Sugef), la Superintendencia General de Valores (Sugeval), la Superintendencia de Pensiones (Supen) y, recientemente, la Superintendencia General de Seguros (Sugese). De estas, las dos últimas tienen personalidad jurídica instrumental. Desde el punto de vista orgánico, cada una de ellas cuenta con un superintendente, que actúa como jerarca en materia administrativa. Les corresponde, según la materia, verificar el cumplimiento por parte de las entidades fiscalizadas, de las disposiciones que integran los respectivos subsistemas normativos, así como la estabilidad del sistema, en lo que les corresponde según su ámbito competencial. Junto con las superintendencias, mediante la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores se creó, además, un órgano denominado Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. A éste se le asigna, principalmente, la tarea de regular el sistema y a la vez actúa como jerarca impropio monofásico de las superintendencias para efectos impugnaticios (artículo 171 de la Ley 7732). De relevancia para el presente recurso, resulta importante acotar, que la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores también creó la Sugeval como un órgano de “máxima desconcentración del Banco Central de Costa Rica” (artículo 3). Su función primordial consiste en velar por la transparencia de los mercados de valores, la formación correcta de los precios de esos mercados, la protección de los inversionistas y la difusión de la información necesaria para asegurar el logro de estos fines. Competencia que, de conformidad con el canon 3 ibídem, se ejerce sobre todos los mercados de valores, la actividad de las personas físicas o jurídicas que intervengan directa o indirectamente en ellos y los actos o contratos relacionados con ellos, según lo dispuesto en la ley. Esta competencia general sobre el mercado de valores, está dirigida a garantizar la estabilidad del mercado en procurara de su desarrollo, así como la protección del inversionista. Los órganos supervisores, incluida la Sugeval, son órganos de desconcentración máxima del BCCR que participan en la supervisión del cumplimiento de las políticas monetarias emitidas por este, incluida aquella dirigida a promover la eficiencia y el normal funcionamiento del sistema de pagos internos y externos.

IV.- Sobre la potestad reglamentaria. El objeto principal de la presente litis, desarrollado con mayor abundamiento en el primer reparo del recurso de la Cámara actora, se circunscribe a determinar si la norma impugnada (artículo 113 del Reglamento SINPE) se encuentra dentro del ámbito competencial que, en materia de emisión de normas infralegales, le asigna el ordenamiento jurídico al BCCR. En este tanto, resulta esencial referirse brevemente al contenido de la potestad reglamentaria y sobre los diferentes tipos de reglamentos que puede emitir la Administración Pública. Tradicionalmente, se ha indicado que estos se pueden clasificar en dos grandes grupos, para lo cual, puede consultarse el voto de esta Sala no. 749-F-04 de las 9 horas 30 minutos del 10 de setiembre de 2004, y de la Sala Constitucional, entre otros, los fallos no. 2005-14286 de las 14 horas con 45 minutos del 19 de octubre de 2005 y 2007-02063 de las 14 horas 45 minutos del 14 de febrero de 2007. El primero de ellos, regulado en el numeral 140 incisos 3) y 18) de la Constitución Política, es el ejecutivo, mediante el cual se desarrollan los contenidos de una norma de rango legal. Se trata de una disposición complementaria, que sirve para precisar el contenido o para facilitar la implementación de lo preceptuado en la ley. En este sentido, la jurisprudencia constitucional ha indicado que este tipo de normas pueden provenir únicamente del Poder Ejecutivo. Sobre este particular, la Sala Constitucional ha indicado que no es “…posible intentar hacer una interpretación extensiva a favor de las otras dependencias públicas…” (voto no. 17599 -2006 de las 15 horas del 6 de diciembre de 2006). Cabe agregar, se trata de una potestad autónoma, cuya habilitación está dada en forma genérica en la Carta Magna, de forma que el Poder Ejecutivo se encuentra facultado para reglamentar, motu propio, cualquier ley de la República. Dicho de otra manera, carece de interés la existencia o no de una habilitación en la ley, en la medida en que la competencia está dada a nivel constitucional y se puede ejercer respecto de todas las leyes emitidas, sea que éstas lo prevean o no. Esto, claro está, sin perjuicio de que una norma legal convierta esta facultad en un deber, situación que, en todo caso, no varía su naturaleza. La segunda tipología de reglamentos es la de los autónomos, los cuales tienen por objeto regular la organización de las dependencias administrativas (en cuyo caso se denominan “autónomos de organización”), o bien, el funcionamiento de los servicios públicos que prestan (referidos en forma genérica como “autónomos de servicio”). Estos pueden dimanar tanto de la Administración Central como de la descentralizada. En el caso de la primera, en virtud del texto segunda, como una derivación lógica y necesaria de la potestad de auto-organización implícita en el grado de autonomía administrativa o de primer grado que se les otorga al momento de su creación (consideraciones apuntadas con mayor abundamiento, mediante resolución de esta Sala no. 001000-F-S1-2010 de las 9 horas 35 minutos del 26 de agosto de 2010).

V.- En este caso concreto, es importante aclarar dos aspectos de trascendental importancia, de previo a conocer el fondo del recurso. En primer lugar, hay que dejar claro que la pretensión de nulidad de la actora está referida únicamente al artículo 113 del Reglamento del SINPE y no a la totalidad de ese cuerpo normativo. En segundo lugar, es necesario ilustrar que después del dictado de la sentencia impugnada, el Reglamento del Sistema de Pagos (aprobado por la Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica, mediante artículo 11 del acta de la sesión 5416-2009, celebrada el 11 de marzo del 2009) fue modificado, por lo que el artículo 113 originalmente cuestionado cambió su numeración, y actualmente corresponde al precepto 118 ibídem. No obstante, el artículo analizado mantiene su redacción original, el cual literalmente establece: “Identificación de las cuentas de terceros. Las cuentas de terceros se identifican con el nombre y el número de identificación de sus titulares, así como con un código por tipo de inversionista”. A efectos de este recurso, se seguirá mencionando a partir de ahora como el canon 118 del Reglamento SINPE. El BCCR es una institución autónoma de derecho público, con personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propio, y que además forma parte del Sistema Bancario Nacional (artículo 1 de su Ley Orgánica). A dicha entidad le corresponde como objetivo principal mantener la estabilidad interna y externa de la moneda nacional y asegurar su convertibilidad. Asimismo, la Ley 7558 le impuso al BCCR una serie de objetivos subsidiarios, entre otros, la obligación de promover la eficiencia del sistema de pagos internos y externos y mantener su normal funcionamiento (canon 2 inciso c) ibídem). En línea con lo anterior, ese cuerpo normativo estableció que para el debido cumplimiento de sus fines, el Banco debía tener funciones esenciales como el establecimiento, la operación y la vigilancia de sistemas de compensación; y erigir las regulaciones para la creación, el funcionamiento y el control de las entidades financieras (precepto 3 incisos i), j) de la Ley 7558). Aunado a lo anterior, el artículo 69 del cuerpo normativo analizado dispone categóricamente: “…La Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica organizará y reglamentará el funcionamiento del sistema de pagos…”. De esta forma se puede establecer, que el BCCR tiene asignados por su Ley Orgánica, varios cometidos. Conviene resaltar la obligación de promover la eficiencia del sistema de pagos internos y externos y mantener su normal funcionamiento; labor que en la actualidad resulta fundamental, por cuanto la existencia de un sistema de pagos seguro, eficaz y eficiente, resulta de vital importancia para el normal desempeño de la economía, tanto para las operaciones internas como externas. Un sistema de pagos está constituido por un conjunto de instrumentos, procedimientos bancarios y sistemas de transferencia de fondos y valores que aseguran su circulación en los mercados financieros y bursátiles respectivamente. Son mecanismos utilizados para el movimiento de fondos, dinero y valores; asimismo coadyuvan en el desarrollo de pagos entre entidades financieras, interna y externamente. Como se observa de los artículos citados, el legislador optó por encomendar al Banco Central, la promoción y el buen funcionamiento del sistema de pagos, ya que a través de este, podría regular los mercados de dinero. De manera tal, que lleva razón el Tribunal al considerar que del análisis de esos conceptos jurídicos, se infiere la posibilidad del Banco Central de establecer por vía reglamentaria, el Sistema Nacional de Pagos Electrónicos, y todo lo atinente a su regulación, funcionamiento y control. […]

VI.- […] Esta Sala debe indicar, la desconcentración efectivamente se presenta como una técnica para distribuir competencias entre distintos órganos de un mismo ente u órgano superior; y que tiene por objeto encomendar a un órgano especializado dentro de una estructura administrativa, el ejercicio de determinadas competencias con el fin de lograr mayor eficiencia. La desconcentración se encuentra contemplada en la norma 83 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública al establecer que: “Todo órgano distinto del jerarca estará plenamente subordinado a éste y al superior jerárquico inmediato, salvo desconcentración operada por ley o por reglamento…”. En este precepto normativo, se establecen dos modalidades, la mínima y la máxima. La mínima, informa que el superior no puede avocar las competencias del inferior ni revisar o sustituir la conducta del inferior, de oficio o a instancia de parte. En la máxima, además de lo anterior, el superior no puede darle órdenes, instrucciones o circulares al inferior. Hasta este punto llevan razón los representantes de Cambolsa. No obstante, no hay que olvidar que la asignación del ámbito de competencias del órgano desconcentrado tiene origen, normalmente, en la norma que lo crea y regula. En caso de contener potestades de imperio tal norma deberá ser de rango legal. Pero, si las atribuciones no involucran potestades de imperio, la atribución podrá hacerse por medio de normas reglamentarias. La finalidad de la desconcentración es trasladar competencias, y establecer el grado de independencia con que estas funciones pueden ser ejercidas. No se trata de simples atribuciones, lo que su busca es la especialización de ciertos órganos en materias específicas, en procura de satisfacer las tareas encomendadas al ente máximo (fin público). Pero esto no significa que se desliguen orgánicamente tales competencias de la estructura originaria. Por este motivo, resulta esencial acudir a la norma que creó la desconcentración, ya que ésta será la que establezca el tipo y ámbito de desconcentración y qué poderes conserva el jerarca respecto de lo desconcentrado. No se discute aquí los alcances de una desconcentración máxima en los términos del artículo 83 ibídem, por el contrario, al transferirse la competencia es claro que el superior jerárquico resulta incompetente para emitir los actos relativos a la materia desconcentrada. Lo que sí debe dejarse definido, es que el jerarca mantiene su competencia en los ámbitos no cubiertos por la desconcentración. El órgano desconcentrado, queda entonces, sujeto a jerarquía en dichos ámbitos. Por eso se insiste, resulta fundamental respetar el principio de legalidad para determinar el ámbito competencial del ente o del órgano superior o mayor. En el caso de examen, según se indicó líneas atrás, la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores creó la Superintendencia General de Valores como un órgano de “máxima desconcentración del Banco Central de Costa Rica” (artículo 3). Su cometido primordial consiste en velar por la transparencia de los mercados de valores, la formación correcta de los precios en ellos, la protección de los inversionistas y la difusión de la información necesaria para asegurar el logro de estos fines. En este sentido, es cierto que el artículo 116 de la Ley 7732 le otorgó a la Sugeval, la potestad de reglamentar la organización y el funcionamiento de los registros, los sistemas de identificación y el control de los valores representados por medio de anotaciones electrónicas en cuenta, así como las relaciones y comunicaciones de las entidades encargadas de tales registros con los emisores y las bolsas de valores. Sin embargo, el BCCR sigue manteniendo su condición de ente director y, por ende, regulador último del sistema financiero, monetario y crediticio; puesto que le corresponde dirigir la política monetaria, crediticia, financiera y garantizar el funcionamiento fluido del sistema financiero (según el artículo 3 de su Ley Orgánica). En este tanto, el deber de promover la eficiencia del sistema de pagos internos y externos, y mantener su normal funcionamiento (canon 2 inciso c) ibídem), no es una función que haya sido desconcentrada en la Sugeval; por el contrario, este es uno de los objetivos que el Banco Central debe procurar constantemente, inclusive debe ser calificado como “esencial”. Basta recordar que fue la propia Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores la que vino a confirmar lo dicho, cuando a través de su artículo 188 inciso d), modificó expresamente el precepto 69 de la Ley Orgánica del BCCR. Con esta reforma, el legislador reafirmó el deber de la Junta Directiva del BCCR de organizar y reglamentar el funcionamiento del sistema de pagos (antes llamado únicamente Cámara de Compensación). En este sentido, el legislador consideró que la participación del Banco Central en la materia de sistema de pagos le era inherente por resultar esencial con su cometido prioritario, y que la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central así se lo manda. Debe resaltarse en este extremo, que el término engloba establecer, regular, operar y fiscalizar el sistema. La Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores por su lado, no determina que las funciones de la Sugeval en relación con el sistema de pagos y al servicio que conlleva la administración del registro de los valores anotados en cuenta, hayan sido asignadas a ese órgano de forma exclusiva; por el contrario, de la relación de los artículos 188, inciso d) de Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores y 2, 3, 69 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central se colige que el Sistema Nacional de Pagos (creación y funcionamiento) debe estar en manos del BCCR. Por ende, estas tareas en torno al sistema, son competencia de la Junta Directiva del Banco (así se deriva a la vez de los incisos c, h, l del artículo 28 de su Ley Orgánica). Con el artículo 116 de la Ley 7732 se previó que la Sugeval pudiera reglamentar la organización y el funcionamiento de los registros, los sistemas de identificación y el control de los valores representados por medio de anotaciones electrónicas en cuenta; empero, esto se hizo de forma genérica y no especial, puesto que el legislador siempre consideró mantener esta labor en manos de la Banca Central. En realidad nunca se eliminó el deber que mantenía el BCCR al respecto, ya que resultaría incompatible con la independencia del Banco Central, el establecimiento de factores institucionales que tiendan a sujetarlo a instrucciones, autorizaciones, suspensiones y peor aún, a restringir su competencia respecto de las decisiones relacionadas con la política monetaria y el resto de sus objetivos subsidiarios (entre ellos el mantenimiento del SINPE). La existencia de un permiso o prohibición para ejercer un determinado instrumento monetario, implicaría un límite a la citada independencia y competencias, puesto que la Banca Central vería limitada sus facultades para establecer la estrategia tendiente a concretar los objetivos definidos en el artículo 2 de la Ley 7558. Tampoco el tema se agota en la independencia institucional (definir los objetivos de la política monetaria) sino que se trata además de independencia funcional para decidir la aplicación de los instrumentos de política monetaria que el legislador estableció, entendido esto como la escogencia de cuál es el instrumento que debe ser empleado y cómo debe hacerse; tal y como sucede con el Sistema de Anotación en Cuenta (el cual se verá con mayor detenimiento en el considerando siguiente) y el SINPE. Dentro de este esquema, no puede una entidad supervisora, asumir la definición de aspectos organizativos de un sistema que se encuentra administrado por la Autoridad Monetaria, toda vez que se afectaría su independencia y en consecuencia también podría arriesgarse la eficacia del sistema financiero. En el sub júdice, el BCCR reglamentó un servicio que su Ley Orgánica le encomendó, por lo que no es cierto que se le estén reconociendo al Banco competencias que son propias de la Sugeval (según lo definido en el cardinal 3 de su Ley Reguladora) o que esta reglamentación no resulte consistente con las normas legales posteriores que fueron introducidas en la Ley 7732.

VII.- Una vez analizada la potestad reglamentaria con que cuenta el Banco Central para dictar el Reglamento del SINPE, de seguido, es necesario referirse al Sistema de Anotación en Cuenta (SAC en adelante); toda vez que el artículo endilgado por la actora, se encuentra dentro del Libro del Reglamento que se denomina “Anotación en Cuenta”. Los sistemas de anotación y liquidación están basados en la representación de valores mediante anotaciones en cuenta. Es un sistema computarizado para crear y registrar valores representativos de capital mediante el método de anotación en cuenta. El valor se constituye, deposita y se transfiere como anotación en cuenta, actos jurídicos que no se materializan. Esta es la tendencia seguida por la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores. Así, el artículo 115 de ese cuerpo normativo establece: “…Las emisiones de valores inscritas en el Registro Nacional de Valores e Intermediarios, podrán representarse por medio de anotaciones electrónicas en cuenta o mediante títulos…”. El Sistema de compensación y liquidación de valores deberá procurar, dice la Ley 7732 en su cardinal 129, la generalización del sistema de anotaciones electrónicas en cuenta, salvo las excepciones que autorice la Superintendencia en virtud de las circunstancias del mercado o la naturaleza particular de ciertos valores. Los valores representados por medio de anotaciones electrónicas en cuenta se constituirán y transmitirán en virtud de su inscripción en el correspondiente registro contable (artículos 122 y 123 ibídem). Los sistemas de compensación y liquidación de valores modernos tienden a desmaterializar los valores, lo cual se logra mediante la representación por anotaciones en cuenta. Según la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores la anotación en cuenta puede estar a cargo del Banco Central de Costa Rica o de centrales de valores (precepto 117). Este registro contable de los valores representados por medio de anotaciones electrónicas en cuenta, pregona el canon 117 de la Ley 7732, será llevado por un sistema de dos niveles: a) el primer nivel está conformado por el BCCR (que le corresponde administrar el registro de las emisiones del Estado y las instituciones públicas) y por las centrales de valores autorizadas por la Superintendencia (serán las responsables de administrar el registro de las emisiones de los emisores privados); b) el segundo nivel lo forman las entidades adheridas al SAC, que podrán ser todas las autorizadas para prestar servicios de custodia y los miembros liquidadores del Sistema Nacional de Compensación y Liquidación de Valores. Dentro de estas últimas entidades, eminentemente se encuentran los puestos de bolsa. El Reglamento del Sistema de Anotación en Cuenta (acuerdo adoptado por el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero, mediante artículo 10, del acta de la sesión 606-2006, celebrada el 28 de setiembre del 2006) regula con mayor detenimiento la organización y el funcionamiento de los registros, los sistemas de identificación y el control de los valores representados por medio de anotaciones electrónicas en cuentas. Este Reglamento, dispone que el Banco Central es el responsable de administrar el registro contable de valores mediante anotación electrónica en cuenta de las emisiones del Estado y las instituciones públicas, pudiendo delegar esa función en una central de valores (canon 19). Asimismo, menciona que únicamente pueden prestar los servicios de administración del registro contable de valores, mediante anotación electrónica en cuenta de emisiones de emisores privados, las entidades miembros del Sistema Nacional de Registro de Anotaciones en Cuenta que se constituyan como centrales de valores, autorizadas para tal fin por la Superintendencia (artículo 21). Esa es la forma cómo se administran los registros de los valores en Costa Rica según su emisor. Ahora bien, en la práctica el SAC funciona como un servicio que presta el BCCR, el cual fue agregado a la plataforma del SINPE por las facilidades y seguridad que este último sistema brindaba en el país para la transferencia de fondos; lo que implicó aprovechar la herramienta que se disponía, agregándole un servicio más (la transferencia de valores). El SAC posee cuatro servicios específicos claramente delimitados: 1. el servicio de registro de emisiones que funciona como un registro donde el BCCR y el Ministerio de Hacienda registran las emisiones que la Sugeval les autoriza para colocarlas en el mercado de valores; 2. cuentas de valores, es el servicio encargado de llevar un control y mantenimiento de las cuentas; 3. liquidación de mercados, le permite a la Bolsa Nacional de Valores conectarse con el SINPE para enviar a liquidar tanto el mercado primario como secundario de bolsa; y finalmente prevé 4. un servicio de traspaso de valores para el manejo de aquellos movimientos de valores que no tienen naturaleza onerosa (sobre este tema, el testigo del BCCR, el señor Melvin Jiménez Quesada se refirió ampliamente durante el juicio oral y público a partir de las 10 horas 6 minutos del 15 de febrero de 2010). Aunque la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central no contiene un artículo que haga referencia a la participación del Banco en la creación de un sistema de anotación en cuenta, del análisis detallado de los cardinales 2 y 3 de esa Ley, sí se desprende que los sistemas de anotación en cuenta se encuentran en la esfera de competencias del Banco; dado que el BCCR para el cumplimiento de sus objetivos macroeconómicos, insoslayablemente debe dotar a la economía nacional de un sistema financiero ágil, moderno, eficiente y seguro. Además, hay que señalar que al Banco Central le corresponde “establecer, operar y vigilar los sistemas de compensación”, y aunque el legislador no fue preciso en este tema concreto, se trata sin embargo de todo el sistema de compensación, relativo al sistema financiero en su conjunto; por ende, tanto la compensación de fondos como la compensación de valores. Si bien el artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central no contiene regulaciones detalladas como las existentes en el artículo 69 ibídem para el sistema de pagos, lo cierto es que allí está prevista la compensación entre fondos y valores; basta con que se trate de valores compensables. Entonces del análisis de la Ley 7558 se concluye que el Banco Central tiene entre sus funciones, desarrollar un sistema de compensación de valores. En este entendido, el SAC juega un papel muy importante como componente del sistema financiero, por lo cual, el Banco en cumplimiento del objetivo de lograr estabilidad financiera y monetaria, debe promover, impulsar y supervisar su desarrollo, atendiendo a la letra el artículo 3 ibídem; de ahí que la emisión del artículo criticado resulte acorde con el ordenamiento jurídico.

VIII.- […] El artículo 40 de la Ley 7558 engloba el deber que pesa sobre las oficinas y dependencias del Estado, y de las instituciones autónomas, de prestar asistencia y otorgar información de carácter general a los departamentos del BCCR, con el objeto de que el Banco pueda cumplir eficientemente con sus funciones. Este deber, atendiendo la literalidad de la norma, se desprende que recae en oficinas y dependencias públicas; empero, en el caso concreto, resulta factible reconocer una integración analógica para el supuesto que se analiza, puesto que no hay una norma en la Ley 7558 que imponga este deber a los entes privados, a pesar de que el BCCR utiliza estos datos para el cumplimiento exclusivo de uno de sus objetivos. No obstante, hay que indicar que el Tribunal no solamente justificó la potestad del BCCR para solicitar la información cuestionada con base en el artículo 40 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central, puesto que también realizó un análisis de las facultades del BCCR para solicitar los datos criticados, en relación con las potestades que se les otorga a las entidades supervisoras en la Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de Uso no Autorizado, Actividades Conexas, Legitimación de Capitales y Financiamiento al Terrorismo (en lo sucesivo Ley no. 8204). Esto porque los datos que menciona el cardinal 118 del Reglamento SINPE resultan de vital importancia para combatir y prevenir la legitimación de capitales y actividades conexas mediante la transferencia de valores. Aspecto que se analizará con mayor detenimiento en el siguiente agravio. De esta forma, no se encuentra violación directa de la norma analizada por parte de los jueces, ya que la información que se solicita guarda relación con uno de los servicios que esa entidad presta en forma directa a las entidades adheridas al SINPE y al SAC, entre estas últimas los puestos de bolsa. La solicitud de la información que contempla el canon 118 del Reglamento SINPE, se realiza con el objeto de que el BCCR pueda cumplir con uno de sus objetivos básicos (mantener un sistema de pagos y de compensación eficientes), tal y como lo establecen los cardinales 2, 3, 24, 69 en relación con el canon 40 todos de la Ley 7558. En relación con este argumento, también acusan, es nulo absolutamente el artículo 118 del Reglamento SINPE, por quebrantar el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad en el ámbito de la potestad reglamentaria, dado que el BCCR no tenía competencia para regular los registros y sistemas de identificación relacionados con los mercados de valores. A través del mecanismo de identificación que prevé el Reglamento del Sistema de Pagos, recriminan, puede imponerse el conocimiento de los clientes de sus competidores, lo que generaría desigualdad. La Sala Constitucional ha dicho sobre el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad lo siguiente: “… Un aspecto de primer orden en todo acto administrativo es la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto entre los medios empleados por la administración pública respectiva y los fines que se pretenden lograr con éste, así como la idoneidad o necesidad de su contenido y, desde luego, cuando resulta aflictivo o de gravamen, la ponderación de su intervención o impacto mínimo. Precisamente por lo anterior, ha surgido en el Derecho Constitucional contemporáneo, como uno de los principios rectores de la función administrativa el de la interdicción de la arbitrariedad, de acuerdo con el cual la conducta administrativa debe ser suficientemente coherente y razonablemente sustentada en el bloque de legalidad, de modo que se baste y explique por sí misma. En nuestro ordenamiento jurídico constitucional tal principio dimana de lo establecido en la primera parte del artículo 11 de la Constitución Política…” (resolución no. 2004-14421 de las 11 horas del 17 de diciembre de 2004). El objetivo fundamental es evitar arbitrariedades del agente público, entendida como la falta de sustento o fundamento jurídico objetivo de una conducta administrativa, vulnerando en consecuencia el bloque de legalidad existente. En materia reglamentaria, este principio juega un papel relevante dentro del ordenamiento jurídico. En el sub lite, como se indicó líneas atrás, el Banco Central estaba facultado legalmente para emitir el Reglamento SINPE y por ende el artículo cuestionado. Del análisis de los numerales 2, 3 y 69 de su Ley Orgánica, se infiere como el legislador le encomendó esta función, por lo cual se remite a las consideraciones expuestas en el considerando quinto. Debido al mandamiento expreso que realizó la Ley 7558 al BCCR para crear, legalizar y controlar el Sistema de Pagos, este Órgano Colegiado considera que no existe el alegado conflicto de competencias entre las potestades normativas de la SUGEVAL en relación con las conferidas al BCCR, por lo cual el agravio debe ser desestimado.

IX.- Dentro del primer reparo, finalmente reprochan, la norma impugnada coloca en manos del BCCR, quien a su vez es emisor el mercado de valores costarricense, información que no es de carácter público y que incluso, puede ser utilizada para su propio beneficio en su condición de participante del mercado. Agregan, el Banco Central actúa como competidor de los Puestos de Bolsa en el mercado, y a través del mecanismo de identificación que prevé el Reglamento del Sistema de Pagos, recriminan, se impone el conocimiento de los clientes de sus competidores, lo que genera desigualdad. Esta Cámara debe indicar, que la participación del BCCR en la creación de un sistema de anotación en cuenta que contemple no sólo la deuda pública sino también la privada, se fundó en la autoridad del Banco respecto del sector financiero. Al ser el proceso de compensación y liquidación, incluido los registros de anotación en cuenta, procesos de naturaleza financiera, económica y jurídica, son de interés y competencia de la banca central. En este tanto, la regulación del sistema, debe guardar una estrecha correspondencia con el resto del ordenamiento jurídico, entre ellos con la Ley 8204, mediante el establecimiento de normas transparentes y no discriminatorias, basadas en criterios objetivos en relación con los servicios que se pueden acceder. Por ese motivo, una de las principales razones por las que el Banco Central exige la información aquí discutida es para darle fiel cumplimiento a los mandamientos contenidos en la Ley 8204 y no para competir como alegan los recurrentes. Asimismo, el BCCR cuando emite operaciones de mercado abierto lo hace como un instrumento de política financiera, con el fin de mantener una estabilidad en el mercado, no lo realiza con ánimo de lucro ni para provecho propio. Por su posición institucional, recuérdese, el BCCR tiene un papel trascendente en la vigilancia del normal funcionamiento de los sistemas de compensación. Esta competencia puede estar unida a una tarea de supervisión, dirigida a mantener la estabilidad del sistema financiero, evitando la presencia de efecto dominó en caso de problemas de liquidez o crédito por parte de algún agente financiero. El correcto funcionamiento de los sistemas de compensación y de pago, así como la estabilidad del sistema financiero es fundamental para la adecuada ejecución de la política monetaria; sin perjuicio de reconocer además, la necesidad de mantener la confianza en la seguridad y fiabilidad de los sistemas, con el fin de preservar la eficiencia de los mercados y la seguridad de la inversión. El rol del Banco, se restringe al deber de dirección y de supervisión propia y necesaria para lograr la estabilidad del sistema y la concreción de su política monetaria. En consecuencia, no es cierto que los datos que obtiene el Banco Central a través del canon 118 del Reglamento del SINPE, sean utilizados para su provecho o para competir en el mercado dado que esa no es su función; hecho que además no fue demostrado por la Cámara actora a lo largo del proceso. De esta forma el primer motivo debe ser desestimado en todos sus extremos.

XI.- Entre los objetivos de la Ley 8204, sobresalen regular y sancionar las actividades financieras, con el fin de evitar la legitimación de capitales y las acciones que puedan servir para financiar actividades terroristas (artículo 1º). Este régimen de prevención tiene como fin regular las obligaciones, las actuaciones y los procedimientos para prevenir e impedir que se utilice el sistema financiero, así como otros sectores de actividad económica, para el blanqueo de capitales procedentes de cualquier tipo de participación delictiva. A tal efecto, la Ley establece una serie de obligaciones que deben cumplir determinados sujetos. El artículo 14 de la Ley 8204 considera entidades sujetas a las obligaciones de la Ley, aquellas que regulan, supervisan y fiscalizan a saber: la Sugef, la Sugeval, la Supen y la Sugese. Asimismo, las obligaciones de la Ley son aplicables a todas las entidades o empresas integrantes de los grupos financieros supervisados por los órganos anteriores, incluidas las transacciones financieras que realicen los bancos o las entidades financieras domiciliadas en el extranjero, por medio de una entidad financiera domiciliada en Costa Rica. La Ley le otorga especial atención a operaciones sistemáticas o sustanciales de canje de dinero y de fondos, realizadas por cualquier medio y que en criterio de esta Sala, podrían realizarse a través de la plataforma del SINPE. Debido a este motivo, los órganos descritos en el numeral 14 ibídem, deben velar por que no operen, en el territorio costarricense, personas físicas o jurídicas, cualquiera que sea su domicilio legal o lugar de operación que, de manera habitual y por cualquier título, realicen sin autorización aquellas actividades. Resulta oportuno aclarar que estas operaciones, aunque sean realizadas por personas autorizadas pueden resultar sospechosas, de ahí que el control debe ser permanente. Resultan sospechosas aquellas actividades financieras desarrolladas por clientes de entidades supervisadas que por su magnitud, falta de habitualidad, velocidad de rotación o condiciones de complejidad injustificadas, parecen que no tienen sentido económico u objeto lícito. El artículo 24 de la Ley 8204 las define como “…las que se efectúen fuera de los patrones de transacción habituales y las que no sean significativas pero sí periódicas, sin fundamento económico o legal evidente…”. A la vez, pregonan los numerales 16 al 23 del cuerpo legislativo analizado, condiciones básicas que deben cumplir las entidades fiscalizadas para reducir los riesgos que la actividad financiera provoca dentro del paradigma del lavador. Entre otras sobresalen: 1. la identificación precisa de los clientes; 2. mantenimiento de cuentas nominativas; 3. prohibición de apertura de cuentas anónimas o bajo nombres ficticios; 4. verificar, con medios documentales fiables, de la identidad, representación, domicilio, ocupación u objeto social de los clientes; 5. mantenimiento de registros documentales durante la vigencia de la operación y al menos por cinco años después de finalizado el vínculo comercial; 6. registro de toda operación en efectivo en moneda nacional o extranjera igual o superior a $10.000; 7. atención especial a actividades financieras atípicas, como las que se efectúan fuera de los patrones habituales o carezcan de fundamento económico; y 8. deber de comunicar las operaciones financieras sospechosas a los órganos de supervisión y fiscalización. Según estas obligaciones, cualquier persona física o jurídica que su actividad económica esté comprendida en el supuesto de las normas, debe ser fiscalizada por cualquiera de las superintendencias encargadas de regular y controlar en materia de cumplimiento de normas antilavado o por el Banco Central según corresponda. Esta acción se justifica no solo ante la necesidad de implementar mecanismos que prevengan el ingreso de capitales ilegales, sino también por constituir acciones financieras vulnerables al ingreso de activos ilícitos. Estos programas de cumplimiento de la normativa dirigida a prevenir el ingreso de capitales “sucios” al sistema financiero y bursátil, se engarzan con compromisos y recomendaciones internacionalmente asumidas que exigen al sistema financiero nacional, elaborar y cumplir programas de tal naturaleza. Por ejemplo, el Grupo de Acción Financiera del Caribe (GAFIC), al que pertenece Costa Rica, evalúa el cumplimiento de varias recomendaciones dirigidas a evitar, entre otros aspectos, la penetración de capitales provenientes de acciones delictivas al sistema financiero nacional. También se encuentra a nivel bancario, la Declaración de Principios del Comité de Basilea, que busca impedir que los bancos y otras instituciones financieras sean utilizados para transferencias o depósitos de fondos de procedencia ilícita. Dentro de este análisis normativo, resulta de capital importancia la norma 28 de la Ley 8204, que le otorga a los órganos dotados de potestades de fiscalización y supervisión ciertas obligaciones en relación con el cumplimiento de la misma norma, tales como vigilar el cumplimiento efectivo de las obligaciones de registro y notificación que la Ley señala, pero principalmente cooperar con las autoridades competentes y brindarles asistencia técnica, en el marco de las investigaciones y los procesos referentes a los delitos tipificados en la Ley. Este último precepto, incuestionablemente refleja que entre los órganos dotados de potestades de supervisión y fiscalización se encuentra el Banco Central. Por este motivo, el BCCR incorporó el artículo 118 al Reglamento del SINPE, para disponer en sus registros, de toda la información requerida a fin de identificar las personas físicas o jurídicas quienes realizaron transacciones de valores en el SINPE, puesto que en cualquier momento las autoridades competentes podrían requerir esa información como lo dispone la Ley 8204 y la Ley sobre Registro, Secuestro y Examen de Documentos Privados e Intervención de las Comunicaciones (Ley no. 7425).

XIII.- Sobre el eventual quebranto del derecho a la intimidad y al secreto bursátil, que se origina con la aplicación del canon 118 del Reglamento del SINPE; debe indicarse que la información solicitada por el SINPE no conlleva esa violación, puesto que los datos solicitados, a saber el nombre, número de cédula y un código para identificar la actividad desplegada, no puede ser considerada información sensible, íntima o de carácter privado por las razones que de seguido se analizarán. Sí lo sería cualquier dato relativo a la etnia, creencias religiosas, la afinidad política, las preferencias sexuales o estrategias propias del desarrollo comercial o financiero de una empresa, entre otras de similar carácter tanto de las personas físicas como jurídicas. Por tal motivo, ese aspecto quedaba por fuera del ámbito de cobertura que protege el derecho a la intimidad. El artículo 24 de la Constitución Política consagra los derechos fundamentales a la intimidad, a la inviolabilidad de los documentos privados, el secreto de las comunicaciones y el derecho a la autodeterminación informativa o derecho a tener control sobre las informaciones que terceros ostenten sobre la persona de quien se trate. Esta información está comprendida dentro de cuestiones que conciernen directamente a la esfera de la persona, sea porque esté referida a su vida familiar o privada, sus creencias, convicciones o preferencias sexuales, relaciones comerciales, entre otros aspectos (desarrollados en el canon 9 inciso 1) de la Ley de Protección de la Persona frente al Tratamiento de sus Datos Personales, Ley no. 8968). Por el otro sector, existen datos personales que son públicos o pueden ser comunicados a terceros, ya sea por constar en registros públicos, o porque no existe un deber de confidencialidad, tales como el nombre, la identificación, profesión, datos sobre el patrimonio y, en particular, la situación económica y financiera de la persona. Ahora, esta última información califica dentro de lo que se conoce como información privada y si bien recibe protección de la Constitución (artículo 24 párrafo 2), su acceso puede ser autorizado mediante la ley si existe de por medio un interés público. En este tanto, la Ley 8968 citada, expresa en el precepto 9 lo siguiente: “2.- Datos personales de acceso restringido. Datos personales de acceso restringido son los que, aun formando parte de registros de acceso al público, no son de acceso irrestricto por ser de interés solo para su titular o para la Administración Pública. Su tratamiento será permitido únicamente para fines públicos o si se cuenta con el consentimiento datos referentes al comportamiento crediticio se regirán por las normas que regulan el Sistema Financiero Nacional, de modo que permitan garantizar un grado de riesgo aceptable por parte de las entidades financieras, sin impedir el pleno ejercicio del derecho a la autodeterminación informativa ni exceder los límites de esta ley.” Pero esa protección, no significa que deban ser enmarcados en lo que la doctrina, jurisprudencia y la Ley conoce como “datos sensibles”. Por estos motivos, resulta de importancia realizar la distinción entre ambos tipos de datos, toda vez que los datos sensibles no tienen relevancia en el ejercicio de la actividad financiera (sobre la prohibición del procesamiento de datos relativos a la esfera íntima del ciudadano por parte de entidades no autorizadas para ello; la Sala Constitucional se ha pronunciado en el Voto no. 1176-2008 de 11 horas 21 minutos del 25 de enero de 2008). De esta forma, la información sobre la identificación de las cuentas de terceros que obtiene el BCCR con ocasión del SAC, no se configura dentro del concepto de datos sensibles, por lo que esta Sala comparte las razones dadas por el Tribunal para desestimar el alegato de la actora (según grabación del dictado de la sentencia a las 8 horas 35 minutos del 22 de febrero de 2010). Ahora, tanto la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central como la Ley 8204 facultan al BCCR a solicitar la información contemplada en el cardinal 118 del Reglamento SINPE, con la única y exclusiva finalidad de promover la eficiencia del sistema de pagos y compensación, así como para prevenir la legitimación de capitales; cuestiones que resultan de indudable interés público. De esta forma, se puede afirmar que el ordenamiento jurídico permite al BCCR, solicitar la información contenida en el precepto 118 del Reglamento SINPE. Dentro de este tema, es cierto que el canon 108 de la Ley 7732 regula lo que se conoce como el secreto bursátil que deben guardar los participantes en el mercado respecto a sus clientes. Tradicionalmente se ha concebido al secreto bancario o bursátil, como uno de los principales deberes que surgen de las relaciones comerciales -perfectas o imperfectas- entre los bancos, instituciones financieras, y en este caso entre los puestos de bolsas y sus clientes. Este secreto, obliga a las entidades a guardar silencio, es decir, a no divulgar o revelar aquella información sobre los clientes y las operaciones que han realizado o han estado a punto de realizar. Se tiende a tutelar ese vínculo privado entre las partes, el cual se materializa a través de diferentes archivos o documentos físicos o informáticos, que contienen aspectos relativos a la identificación de los clientes, el origen y destino de fondos, movimientos periódicos, ganancias, inversiones, pérdidas, transferencias y relaciones con otras personas o instituciones. La Ley 8204 a partir del capítulo cuarto, incorporó al ordenamiento jurídico, no sólo las herramientas jurídicas para investigar el delito de legitimación de capitales, sino que además creó las instituciones y los mecanismos de coordinación de las entidades encargadas de su supervisión, ejecución e investigación. Este hecho ha generado mucha polémica respecto a la información que solicitan las entidades supervisoras (entre ellas el Banco Central), puesto que se ha considerado que con estos mecanismos se vulnera el secreto bancario. Hecho que no escapa del caso en examen. Por tal razón, esta Sala considera indispensable resaltar tres aspectos alrededor del artículo 118 del Reglamento SINPE. Primero, la información brindada o que pueda brindar el BCCR al Instituto de Control de Drogas (ICD), al Organismo de Investigación Judicial y al Ministerio Público, se enmarca dentro de las facultades reconocidas por la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central, la Ley 8204 y recientemente por la Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Legislación contra el Terrorismo (Ley no. 8719 de 4 de marzo de 2009), en virtud del rol supervisor y fiscalizador del Banco Central. Segundo, dicha información no es utilizada ni para el provecho de terceros ni para su divulgación, por el contrario, esta debe entenderse como información preventiva, que en caso de ser requerida, se ajuste a los fines del cardinal primero de la Ley sobre Registro, Secuestro y Examen de Documentos Privados e Intervención de las Comunicaciones. Tercero, relacionado con el anterior, el Banco Central como operador del SAC y del SINPE está obligado a mantener la confidencialidad de la información que obtiene, según se desprende de los preceptos 119 inciso c), 166 de la Ley 7732; 13 párrafo final de la Ley 7558; 44, 133 del Reglamento SINPE; 12 del Reglamento sobre los Sistemas de Anotación en Cuenta; 339 del Código Penal, 10 y 11 de la Ley 8968. En la legislación nacional entonces, se establece expresamente que tal ingerencia así como el acceso a la documentación privada no son violatorios a los derechos de intimidad y privacidad de las personas, sino que obedece a una labor sustantiva de orden público (en esta línea se ha manifestado la Sala Constitucional en el Voto no. 5275-03 de las 14 horas con 53 minutos del 18 de junio de 2003). Las funciones de regulación y fiscalización que realiza el BCCR, son necesarias para el debido control de las transacciones financieras en el país y su labor va dirigida a velar porque las operaciones que se den en la transferencia de fondos y valores sean lícitas, fin que justifica el reconocimiento de la información que solicita el cardinal 118 del Reglamento SINPE. Se busca con ello, mantener la solvencia, estabilidad y liquidez del sistema financiero nacional, dentro de un ambiente de legalidad, protegiendo al mismo inversionista; razones que además son de interés público. Motivos que se encuentran claramente definidos tanto en la Ley Orgánica del BCCR, Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores y la Ley 8204. Por lo que no llevan razón los recurrentes cuando afirman que se vulneran los artículos 11, 24, 28, 121 de la Constitución Política, 19 de la LGAP y 108 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores. De ahí que el reproche no sea de recibo para casar el fallo cuestionado.”