Lesividad over registration of public-domain property within Juan Castro Blanco Forest ReserveLesividad sobre inscripción registral de bien demanial en Reserva Forestal Juan Castro Blanco

**IV.** Regarding what was asserted concerning Article 173 LGAP, it is necessary to indicate the following. Its wording has undergone two reforms. The first through Law No. 7871 of April 21, 1999; the second, by Law No. 8508 of October 28, 2006 (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). They entered into force, in that order, on April 29, 1999 and January 1, 2008. The aforementioned version from the year 1999 is the one applicable to this lite, as it was the one in force at the time the lawsuit was filed. That provision states: “**1.-** *When the nullity of an act declaratory of rights is evident and manifest, <u>it may be declared by the Administration in the administrative proceeding, without the need to resort to the lesividad proceeding indicated in articles 10 and 35 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, No 3667, of March 12, 1966,</u> after a favorable opinion from the Procuraduría General de la República. When the nullity concerns administrative acts directly related to the budgetary process or administrative procurement, the Contraloría General de la República must render the favorable opinion. / **2.-** When it involves the State administration, the superior Constitutional body that issued the respective act must declare the nullity. For acts of the Poder Ejecutivo, the Minister of the corresponding branch shall designate the directing body of the procedure. If it involves other public entities or Poderes del Estado, each administrative head must declare the nullity. Against what is decided by them, only a motion for reconsideration or renewal shall be admissible. With the resolution of the motions, the administrative proceeding is exhausted. / **3.-** Before annulling the acts referred to in this article, the final act must be preceded by an ordinary administrative procedure, in which the principles and guarantees of due process have been observed and all parties involved have been granted a hearing. / **4.-** In the previous cases, the opinion must expressly rule on the absolute, manifest, and evident character of the nullity. / **5.-** The power of ex officio review enshrined in this article shall expire in four years. / **6.-** The administrative annulment of an act contrary to the provisions of this article, whether due to omission of the required formalities or because the nullity is not absolute, evident, and manifest, shall be absolutely null. Moreover, the Administration shall be obligated to pay costs, damages, and losses, without prejudice to the personal liabilities of the acting official, pursuant to the second paragraph of article 199. / **7.-** A claim of lesividad may not be brought by way of counterclaim. / **8.-** For cases in which the issuance of the administrative act vitiated by absolute, evident, and manifest nullity corresponds to two or more Ministries, or when it involves the declaration of nullity of related administrative acts, but issued by different bodies, the provisions of subsection d), article 26 of this law shall apply. …” (The underlining is supplied). From its reading, it is determined, first, that subsection 4) does not provide for the expiration of the ex officio review power within a period of one year from the adoption of the act. On the contrary, paragraph 5) indicates that it shall expire in four years. Second, in light of what is indicated in subsections 1) and 5), it is inferred, without a doubt, that the annulment of an act in the administrative proceeding, because the defect is evident and manifest, is discretionary for the Administration —not mandatory, as the appellant seeks to make it appear—. Consequently, if it does not follow that procedure, it has the open possibility of seeking its nullity in the jurisdictional venue, through the ordinary lesividad proceeding, as occurred in this lite and is accepted by the appellant himself. Consequently, the provision under comment is not applicable to the sub júdice. Ergo, it has not been violated by the instance judges by not applying it. **V.** In relation to what was stated by the appellants regarding the competence of the then Minister of Justice to declare the lesividad of the contested act, it must be noted that, although it is a novel argument, raised only now in cassation, the provisions of Article 608 of the Código Procesal Civil are not applicable. This is because this Chamber, among others, in judgments numbers 811 of 10 hours 5 minutes, 821 of 10 hours 55 minutes, both of December 4, 2008, and 180 of 16 hours 20 minutes of February 19, 2009, held that the analysis of the subject who issues the lesividad act, in order to determine whether they are competent to do so, must be conducted even ex officio, as it affects one of the elements for its validity, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 129 and 182 of the LGAP. Consequently, its analysis proceeds in the following terms. Law No. 5695 of May 28, 1975, Law Creating the Registro Nacional, in the version in force at the time when the contested act was declared lesivo, being the one applicable to the sub júdice, states in what is relevant: “ARTICLE 1º.- The Registro Nacional is created, subordinate to the Ministerio de Justicia, which shall integrate into a single body the registries and offices indicated in the following article. Its purposes shall be: To unify criteria in registration matters, coordinate functions, facilitate procedures for users, streamline tasks, and improve registration techniques; for all of which the systems shall be modernized. / (Thus reformed by article 1º of Law No. 6934 of November 28, 1983). … ARTICLE 3º.- The Registro Nacional shall be directed by a Junta Administrativa, which shall have legal personality (personalidad jurídica) for the fulfillment of the purposes of this law and whose general functions shall be: / a) To dictate the organizational and operational measures for its offices; / b) To protect, conserve its assets and ensure their improvement; / c) To formulate and execute improvement programs, in accordance with the needs of the offices under its charge; / d) To administer the specific funds assigned to each of them, as well as other income it receives for other reasons, through separate accounts, dictating budgets, agreeing on expenditures, making investments it deems appropriate, promoting and resolving the public tenders that are applicable, subject to the provisions of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República and this law; and / e) To prepare necessary bills and regulations and to issue internal regulations for the better functioning of the various offices. … ARTICLE 6º.- There shall be a Director General, upon whom the directors of the various integrated offices of the Registro Nacional shall be hierarchically dependent, for administrative purposes. … / The Director General shall be responsible for: / 1) Carrying out the executive functions (sic) of the Junta, in whose sessions they shall have a voice but no vote. / 2) Proposing to the Junta the projects for the fulfillment of the functions entrusted to it in Article Three. / 3) Coordinating the functions of all the offices of the Registro Nacional. / 4) Unifying the qualification criteria and dictating, in a general manner, the measures of a registral nature in the different registries, without being responsible for the analysis or qualification of specific cases whose pronouncement falls to the Director, manager, or head of each office. / 5) Approving the budget projects presented to the Junta. / 6) Ordering general administrative measures for all the bodies that comprise the Registro Nacional. / 7) Taking all measures deemed appropriate for the operation of the Registro Nacional and its offices, in accordance with the rules issued by the Junta. / The Director of the Registro Nacional may not be the director of any of the individual registries. / The Director of the Registro Nacional is prohibited from taking on (avocar) matters that each of the registries is individually responsible for resolving. (Thus reformed by article 1º of Law No. 6934 of November 28, 1983).” (The underlining is supplied). From the foregoing provisions, it is determined that the Registro Nacional is not a deconcentrated body (órgano desconcentrado). Furthermore, its core function is registral; however, it is reiterated, there is no deconcentration (desconcentración) regarding it. Likewise, it is inferred that the legal personality (personalidad jurídica) granted to its Junta Administrativa is not in registral matters —which confirms the lack of deconcentration in that aspect— but administrative; specifically, regarding the administration of the Registro Nacional. Similarly, it is inferred that the Director General, unlike what the appellant indicated, was not conferred powers in the resolution of registral conflicts; therefore, they are not the hierarchical superior regarding administrative acts of registral registration; on the contrary, they were expressly prohibited from taking on matters that each of the registries is individually responsible for resolving. For its part, Law No. 6739, Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Justicia, in its wording in force when the lesividad was declared, in the relevant part states: “ARTICLE 1º.- It shall correspond to the Ministerio de Justicia: … c) To administer the system of official registries regarding property and legal persons. … ARTICLE 3º.- The Ministerio de Justicia shall exercise its functions through the following main offices: … b) Dirección General del Registro Nacional. … ARTICLE 6º.- The following bodies shall be attached to the Ministerio de Justicia: … / b) The Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional, which shall function in accordance with the terms and conditions indicated in Law No. 5695 of May 28, 1975. … ARTICLE 7º.- The functions of the Ministerio de Justicia shall be: … d) To administer the national system of registries and registrations of property and legal persons, in accordance with the provisions of the law creating the Registro Nacional, No. 5695 of May 28, 1975.” With the transcribed provisions, it becomes evident that it is the head of the Justice branch who is responsible for administering the system of official registries of Costa Rica, a function they perform both through the Director General of the Registro Nacional and in their capacity as president of the Junta Administrativa —article 4 of Law No. 5695—. This, coupled with the fact that, as noted, in registral matters no deconcentration whatsoever (minimal or maximum, as indicated by precept 83 of the LGAP) was granted to the Registro Nacional; that the legal personality (personalidad jurídica) of the Junta Administrativa does not encompass the registral function; that the Director General is not the hierarchical superior regarding administrative acts of registral registration, as they were not conferred powers in the resolution of registral conflicts; and considering its nature as a body subordinate to the Ministerio de Justicia, “the superior body of the administrative hierarchy” of the Registro Nacional, as prescribed by Article 10.1.4 of the LRJCA, in light of the provisions of precept 28.1 of the LGAP, contrary to what the appellant asserts, is the head of that branch. In the sub lítem, what is contested is the administrative act of registration of the property title of Mrs. Virginia Solera Flores (originating farm number 171 492-000) as it was done to the detriment of the public domain (demanio público). Ergo, since the object of this process is eminently registral, resolution No. 200 167 of 14 hours on March 11, 2002, by which the aforementioned act was declared lesivo to the interests of the State, was issued by the competent subject for it: the then Minister of Justice and Gracia. Consequently, it is necessary to dismiss this part of the grievance under consideration. **VI.** Finally, regarding what the appellant stated concerning the deadline for filing the sub lítem, this Chamber does not share their assertions. In this respect, it is appropriate to transcribe the first paragraph of Article 35 of the LRJCA: “When the Administration itself, author of any act declaratory of rights, intends to sue for its annulment before the contencioso-administrativo jurisdiction, it must first declare it lesivo to public interests, economic or of another nature, within a period of four years counted from the date on which it was issued.” This procedural provision is of public order; therefore, it must be adhered to. Otherwise, it could cause the judge or parties to attempt to substitute or modify the will of the legislator. However, this Court deems, contrary to the appellant's criterion, and as the second-instance judges correctly indicated, that by virtue of a singular or exceptional situation, the expiration period (plazo de caducidad) established therein is not applicable to this lite. The contested act, as has been stated, refers to the registral registration of a property that forms part of the forest heritage (patrimonio forestal) of the State; which, moreover, is included within the limits of the Forest Reserve, Protective Zone, and National Park, all named Juan Castro Blanco (proven fact preceded by the letter u), not challenged by the appellant). Consequently, it forms part of the public domain (dominio público) owned by the State (see articles 261 and 262 of the Código Civil; as well as Laws No. 4052 of January 19, 1968, 4465 of November 25, 1969; and Executive Decrees numbers 4965-A of June 26, 5387-A of October 28, both of 1975; 18763-MIRENEM of September 12, 1988 and 22669 of November 2, 1993) bearing the characteristic of inalienable and imprescriptible. Ergo, the actions for its protection cannot be subject to expiration periods (plazos de caducidad). On the subject of public domain assets (bienes demaniales), the Sala Constitucional of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, has indicated: "I.- The public domain (dominio público) is composed of assets that manifest, by the express will of the legislator, a special purpose of serving the community, the public interest. These are called public domain assets (bienes demaniales), public goods or things, which do not belong individually to private persons, which are destined for public use and subject to a special regime, outside commerce, for which reason they are affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected by their own nature, which is invariably essential by virtue of an express provision. These are characterized by being inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, they cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law and the administrative action substitutes interdicts to recover the domain." (Voto 2725-94 of 15 hours 18 minutes of June 9, 1994. In the same sense, ruling 20346 of 9 hours 21 minutes of December 3, 2010, can be consulted). In accordance with the foregoing, in matters where the noted particularity occurs, the property in dispute, due to its characteristic as a public domain asset (bien de dominio público), determines the inapplicability of the peremption periods for filing the lawsuit, provided for in the procedural provisions. Certainly, as the appellant points out, the principle of legality could be called into question, by not applying the precept under comment according to its letter; however, given the evident collision with another postulate, even of higher hierarchy, such as public interest, by virtue of the interests at stake, the latter is the one that prevails (article 113 of the LGAP). Consequently, since the second-instance judges understood it in this manner, they did not breach the provisions of precept 35.1 of the LRJCA, and the rejection of this part of the ground of challenge under analysis is also required. **VII.** In the second censure, the appellant alleges failure to apply Article 474 of the Código Civil and improper application of precept 35.1 of the LRJCA. They transcribe the first of these provisions. The violation of the indicated article 474 is specified, they allege, given that the contested judgment, by declaring the nullity of the supposedly contested administrative act, permits canceling a registral registration through the administrative proceeding via Article 173 of the LGAP, or through administrative lesividad, after the one-year period provided in the LGAP has elapsed. The implications of allowing a judgment such as the one appealed, they comment, to remain in force and be confirmed, would allow that, by not requiring the procedure established in the precept of the Código Civil, the possibility is also considered imprescriptible that the same administration, under the principle of autotutela, may declare null any registration act, in accordance with 173 LGAP, simply by declaring the act evident and manifestly null. They transcribe, in what is of interest, ruling of this Chamber No. 91 of 15 hours 5 minutes of June 10, 1992. By upholding the lawsuit filed by the State, they indicate, choosing the ordinary lesividad proceeding and not the ordinary one, as determined by law for this type of act, the indicated provision of the Código Civil was violated, by non-application, allowing the review of registral acts through an administrative procedure, without considering whether they affect third parties or not. **VIII.** In Considerando IV of this judgment, the reasons were set forth why this Chamber considers, contrary to what the appellant indicated, that Article 173 of the LGAP was not applied either by the Administration or by the second-instance judges; for which reason it has not been violated. Likewise, in section VI, the arguments were provided for why the period provided in Article 35 of the LRJCA is also not applicable to this lite. On the other hand, precept 474 of the Código Civil provides: “A registration shall not be canceled except by final judgment (providencia ejecutoria) or by virtue of a public deed or authentic document, in which the person in whose favor the registration was made, or their successors in interest or legitimate representatives, express their consent for the cancellation.” (The underlining is not from the original). From its literal tenor, it is determined that the cancellation of entries (asientos), definitively registered, only proceeds in the scenarios indicated in that provision (when there is a final judgment (providencia ejecutoria) issued by a court of the republic in a proceeding in which it is competent, or, by public deed or authentic document in which the person in whose favor the registration was made expresses their consent, for the purpose of cancellation). These are two factually expressly assessed and "numerus clausus" scenarios that do not admit another form for the cancellation of a registered entry (asiento inscrito). Said precept, despite being contained in that legislative body —more than one hundred years old—, is a special provision, placed in Title VII, called "Of the Public Registry", of Chapter Six, called "Of the cancellation of registrations". No other legal provision is applicable to the case of canceling registered entries (asientos inscritos), even less Article 173 of the LGAP, since this general provision was intended for all those scenarios where an attempt is made to annul, in the administrative proceeding (ex officio review), an act declaratory of rights or favorable to the administered party, provided no special provision exists. That is, the expression “A registration shall not be cancelled except by final judgment (providencia ejecutoria)”, which is the one of interest for resolving the appeal, implies that the cancellation of registrations must be carried out in the judicial venue by means of a final judgment, which is constituted by the final judgment (sentencia firme) issued in a plenary proceeding (canon 157 of the Código Procesal Civil). As noted, the State did not follow the procedure of ex officio review of the contested act. That is, it did not annul, in the administrative proceeding, according to the procedure provided in Article 173 of the LGAP, the registration act of the property in dispute. On the contrary, after declaring it lesivo to its interests, it went to the judicial venue, through the ordinary lesividad proceeding, requesting the contencioso-administrativo judge to decree its nullity, by virtue of it forming part of the public domain (demanio público). This was so ordered by the Ad quem in the contested judgment. In light of the foregoing, it is determined, without a doubt, that the appellant is not correct in alleging the violation of the indicated Article of the Código Civil. This is because, it is insisted, in the sub júdice, the cancellation of the registered registral entry (asiento registral inscrito) is ordered by a judicial authority —the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo—, by means of a judgment issued in a plenary proceeding over which it has jurisdiction to hear the matter. Ergo, the grievance under consideration must be dismissed.” **3.-** Before annulling the acts referred to in this article, the final act must be preceded by an ordinary administrative procedure, in which the principles and guarantees of due process have been observed and all involved parties have been heard. **4.-** In the previous cases, the opinion must expressly rule on the absolute, manifest, and evident nature of the nullity. **5.-** The power of ex officio review enshrined in this article shall lapse in four years. **6.-** The administrative annulment of an act contrary to the provisions of this article, whether due to omission of the prescribed formalities or because the nullity is not absolute, evident, and manifest, shall be absolutely null. Furthermore, the Administration shall be obligated to pay costs, damages, and losses, without prejudice to the personal responsibilities of the acting public servant, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 199. **7.-** A claim of detriment (pretensión de lesividad) may not be brought by way of a counterclaim. **8.-** For cases in which the issuance of the administrative act vitiated by absolute, evident, and manifest nullity falls to two or more Ministries, or involves the declaration of nullity of related administrative acts issued by different bodies, the provisions of subsection d), Article 26 of this law shall govern.…” (The underlining is supplied). From its reading, it is determined, first, that subsection 4) does not provide for the lapse of the ex officio review power within one year from the adoption of the act. On the contrary, section 5) indicates that it shall lapse in four years. Second, in light of what is indicated in subsections 1) and 5), it is inferred, without a doubt, that the annulment of an act through administrative channels, due to the defect being evident and manifest, is discretionary for the Administration —not mandatory, as the appellant seeks to present it. Consequently, if it does not follow that procedure, it has the open possibility of seeking its nullity in a judicial venue, through the ordinary detriment (lesividad) process, just as occurred in this litigation and is accepted by the appellant himself. Consequently, the norm in question is not applicable to the case at hand (sub júdice). Therefore, it has not been violated by the lower court judges by not acting upon it.

**V.** Regarding the appellant's statements concerning the competence of the then Minister of Justice to declare the detriment (lesividad) of the challenged act, it must be noted that, although it is a novel argument, raised only now in cassation, the provisions of canon 608 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable. This is because this Chamber, in rulings number 811 of 10 hours 5 minutes, and 821 of 10 hours 55 minutes, both of December 4, 2008, and 180 of 16 hours 20 minutes of February 19, 2009, held that the analysis of the subject who issues the detriment (lesividad) act, in order to determine if they are competent to do so, must be carried out even ex officio, as it affects one of the elements for its validity, in accordance with the provisions of canons 129 and 182 of the LGAP. Consequently, its analysis proceeds in the following terms. Law No. 5695 of May 28, 1975, the Law for the Creation of the National Registry, in the version in force at the time when the challenged act was declared detrimental (lesivo), being the applicable law to the case at hand, states, as relevant: “**ARTICLE 1º.-** *The National Registry is created, under the Ministry of Justice, which shall integrate under a single body the registries and dependencies indicated in the following article. Its purposes shall be: To unify criteria in registration matters, coordinate functions, facilitate procedures for users, streamline tasks, and improve registration techniques; for all of which the systems shall be modernized.* / (As amended by Article 1 of Law No. 6934 of November 28, 1983). … **ARTICLE 3º.-** *The National Registry shall be directed by an Administrative Board (Junta Administrativa), which shall have legal personality for the fulfillment of the purposes of this law and whose general functions shall be*: / a) To issue organizational and operational measures for its dependencies; / b) To protect and conserve its assets and ensure their improvement; / c) To formulate and execute improvement programs, in accordance with the needs of the dependencies under its charge; / d) To administer the specific funds assigned to each of them, as well as other income received for other concepts, through separate accounts, issuing budgets, agreeing on expenses, making the investments it deems appropriate, promoting and resolving tenders that may arise, subject to the provisions of the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and this law; and / e) To prepare necessary bills of law and regulations and issue internal regulations for the better functioning of the various dependencies. … **ARTICLE 6º.-** *There shall be a General Director, on whom the directors of the various integrated dependencies of the National Registry shall hierarchically depend for administrative purposes.* … / *The General Director shall be responsible for*: / 1) Performing the work of executive official (sic) of the Board, in whose sessions he shall have voice but no vote. / 2) Proposing to the Board the projects for the fulfillment of the functions entrusted to it in Article Three. / 3) *Coordinating the functions of all the dependencies of the National Registry*. / 4) *Unifying qualification criteria and issuing, in a general manner, the measures of a registral nature in the different registries, without corresponding to the analysis or qualification of specific cases whose ruling falls to the Director, person in charge, or head of each dependency*. / 5) Approving the budget projects submitted to the Board. / 6) *Ordering the general administrative measures for all the bodies that make up the National Registry*. / 7) Taking all measures he deems appropriate for the functioning of the National Registry and its dependencies, in accordance with the rules issued by the Board. / The Director of the National Registry may not be the director of any of the particular registries. / *The Director of the National Registry is prohibited from taking up (avocar) matters that each one of the registries must resolve individually*. (As amended by Article 1 of Law No. 6934 of November 28, 1983).” (The underlining is supplied). From the foregoing norms, it is determined that the National Registry is not a deconcentrated body (órgano desconcentrado). Furthermore, its core function is registration; however, it is reiterated, regarding it, there is no deconcentration (desconcentración). Likewise, it is inferred that the legal personality granted to its Administrative Board is not in registration matters—which confirms the non-deconcentration in that aspect—but rather administrative; specifically, regarding the administration of the National Registry. Similarly, it is inferred that the General Director, contrary to what the appellant stated, was not conferred competencies in the matter of resolving registration conflicts; therefore, he is not the hierarchical superior in matters of administrative acts of registration; on the contrary, he was expressly prohibited from taking up (avocar) matters that each one of the registries must resolve individually. For its part, Law No. 6739, the Organic Law of the Ministry of Justice, in its wording in force when the detriment (lesividad) was declared, provides as pertinent: “**ARTICLE 1º.-** *The Ministry of Justice shall be responsible for*: … *c) Administering the system of official registries regarding property and legal persons.* … * **ARTICLE 3º.-** *The Ministry of Justice shall exercise its functions through the following main dependencies*: … *b) General Directorate of the National Registry.* … **ARTICLE 6º.-** *The following shall be bodies attached to the Ministry of Justice*: … / *b) The Administrative Board of the National Registry, which shall function in accordance with the terms and conditions indicated in Law No. 5695 of May 28, 1975.* … **ARTICLE 7º.-** *The functions of the Ministry of Justice shall be*: … *d) Administering the national system of registries and inscriptions of property and legal persons, in accordance with what is stipulated by the law for the creation of the National Registry, No. 5695 of May 28, 1975.*” With the transcribed provisions, it is clear that it is the head of the Ministry of Justice who is responsible for administering the system of official registries of Costa Rica, a function carried out both through the General Director of the National Registry and in his capacity as president of the Administrative Board—Article 4 of Law No. 5695. This, coupled with the fact that, as noted, no deconcentration (mínima o máxima, as indicated by precept 83 of the LGAP) was granted to the National Registry in registral matters; that the legal personality of the Administrative Board does not encompass the registral function; that the General Director is not the hierarchical superior in matters of administrative acts of registration, as he was not conferred competencies in the matter of resolving registral conflicts; and considering its nature as a body dependent on the Ministry of Justice, “*the superior body of the administrative hierarchy*” of the National Registry, as prescribed by canon 10.1.4 of the LRJCA, in light of the provisions of precept 28.1 of the LGAP, contrary to what the appellant affirmed, is the head of that Ministry. In the case at hand (sub lítem), what is challenged is the administrative act of registering the property title of Mrs. Virginia Solera Flores (originating property (finca) number 171 492-000), having been done to the detriment of the public domain. Therefore, the object of this process being eminently registral, Resolution No. 200 167 of 14 hours on March 11, 2002, through which the aforementioned act was declared detrimental (lesivo) to the interests of the State, was issued by the competent subject for this: the then Minister of Justice and Grace. Consequently, it is necessary to dismiss this part of the grievance under consideration.

**VI.** Finally, regarding the appellant's statements concerning the time limit for filing the claim in the case at hand (sub lítem), this Chamber does not share his affirmations. In this regard, it is opportune to transcribe the first paragraph of canon 35 of the LRJCA: “*When the Administration itself , author of an act declarative of rights, seeks to demand its annulment before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, it must first declare it detrimental (lesivo) to public, economic, or other interests, within a period of four years counted from the date on which it was issued.*” This procedural norm is of public order; therefore, it must be abided by. Otherwise, it could cause the judge or the parties to attempt to substitute or modify the will of the legislature. However, this Chamber considers, contrary to the opinion of the appellant, and as the second-instance judges correctly pointed out, by virtue of a singular or exceptional situation, the lapse period provided therein is not applicable to this litigation. The challenged act, as has been stated, refers to the registral inscription of a real estate property that forms part of the forest heritage (patrimonio forestal) of the State; which is also included within the limits of the Juan Castro Blanco Forest Reserve (Reserva Forestal), Protective Zone (Zona Protectora), and National Park (Parque Nacional) (proven fact preceded by letter u), not objected to by the appellant). Consequently, it forms part of the public domain owned by the State (see articles 261 and 262 of the Civil Code; as well as Laws No. 4052 of January 19, 1968, and 4465 of November 25, 1969; and Executive Decrees numbers 4965-A of June 26, and 5387-A of October 28, both of 1975; 18763-MIRENEM of September 12, 1988, and 22669 of November 2, 1993), bearing the characteristic of being inalienable and imprescriptible. Therefore, actions for its protection cannot be subject to lapse periods. Regarding the topic of public domain assets (bienes demaniales), the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: *"I.-The public domain is constituted by assets that manifest, by the express will of the legislature, a special purpose of serving the community, the public interest. These are the so-called public domain assets (bienes demaniales), public goods or things, which do not belong individually to private parties, are destined for public use, and subjected to a special regime, outside the commerce of men, which is why they are affected by their very nature and vocation. Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept; they are affected by their own nature, which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. These are characterized by being inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, they cannot be mortgaged nor be subject to any lien under the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action substitutes the possessory actions to recover the domain.*" (Vote 2725-94 of 15 hours 18 minutes of June 9, 1994. In the same vein, consult ruling 20346 of 9 hours 21 minutes of December 3, 2010). In accordance with the foregoing, in matters in which the noted particularity is present, the real estate in litigation, due to its characteristic as a public domain asset, determines the inapplicability of the peremption periods for filing the claim, provided for in the procedural norms. Certainly, as the appellant points out, the principle of legality could be called into question by not acting upon the precept in question according to its letter; however, given the evident collision with another postulate, even of higher hierarchy, such as that of public interest, by virtue of the interests at stake, it is the latter that prevails (Article 113 of the LGAP). Consequently, having understood it this way, the second-instance judges did not violate the provisions of precept 35.1 of the LRJCA, also necessitating the rejection of this part of the ground of disagreement under analysis.

**VII.** In the **second** censure, the appellant alleges lack of application of canon 474 of the Civil Code and improper application of precept 35.1 LRJCA. He transcribes the first of these norms. The violation of the indicated Article 474 is, he alleges, because the appealed judgment, by declaring the nullity of the supposed challenged administrative act, allows a registral inscription to be canceled through administrative channels via canon 173 of the LGAP, or through administrative detriment (lesividad), after the one-year period provided for in the LGAP has elapsed. The implications of allowing a judgment like the appealed one, he comments, to remain in force and be confirmed, would allow that, by not requiring the procedure established in the precept of the Civil Code, the possibility for the same administration, under the principle of self-tutelage (autotutela), to declare null any act of inscription, in accordance with 173 LGAP, is also considered imprescriptible, simply by declaring the act evidently and manifestly null. He transcribes, as relevant to his interest, ruling No. 91 of this Chamber of 15 hours 5 minutes of June 10, 1992. By upholding the claim filed by the State, he points out, choosing the ordinary process of detriment (lesividad) and not the ordinary one, as the law has determined for this type of act, the indicated provision of the Civil Code was violated by non-application, allowing the review of registral acts through an administrative procedure, without considering whether they affect third parties or not.

**VIII.** In Consideration IV of this judgment, the reasons were set forth for which this Chamber considers, contrary to what the appellant stated, that Article 173 of the LGAP was not applied by either the Administration or the second-instance judges; which is why it has not been violated. Likewise, in Section VI, the arguments were provided for which it is considered that the period provided for in canon 35 of the LRJCA is also not actionable in this litigation. Moreover, precept 474 of the Civil Code provides: “*No inscription shall be canceled except by executory order (providencia ejecutoria) or by virtue of a public deed or authentic document, in which the person in whose favor the inscription was made, or their successors-in-interest or legitimate representatives, express their consent for the cancellation.*” (The underlining is not original). From its literal wording, it is determined that the cancellation of entries, definitively inscribed, only proceeds under the assumptions indicated in that norm (when there is an executory order issued by a court of the republic in a process in which it is competent, or by public deed or authentic document in which the person in whose favor the inscription was made expresses their consent for the purpose of the cancellation). These are two fact-based hypotheses, expressly defined and “numerus clausus,” that do not admit any other form for the cancellation of an inscribed entry. Said precept, despite being contained in that legislative body—more than a century old—is a special norm, placed in Title VII, called "Of the Public Registry," of Chapter Six, called "*Of the cancellation of inscriptions*." No other legal provision is applicable to the assumption of the cancellation of inscribed entries, much less canon 173 of the LGAP, given that this general norm was foreseen for all those hypotheses where one seeks to annul, through administrative channels (ex officio review), an act declarative of rights or favorable to the administered party, provided no special norm exists. That is, the expression “*No inscription shall be canceled except by executory order*,” which is of interest for resolving the appeal, implies that the cancellation of inscriptions must be done in a judicial venue through an executory order, which is constituted by the final judgment (sentencia firme) issued in a plenary proceeding (canon 157 of the Code of Civil Procedure).

As noted, the State did not follow the procedure of the ex officio review (revisión oficiosa) of the challenged act. That is, it did not annul, through administrative channels, according to the procedure set forth in Article 173 of the LGAP, the act of registration of the property in litigation. On the contrary, after declaring it harmful to its interests, it turns to the judicial venue, through the ordinary proceeding of lesividad (proceso ordinario de lesividad), requesting the contentious-administrative judge to decree its nullity, by virtue of it being part of the public domain (demanio público). That is how the Ad quem decided in the contested judgment. In light of the foregoing, it is determined, without a doubt, that the appellant is incorrect in alleging the violation of the indicated article of the Civil Code. This is because, it is insisted, in the sub júdice, the cancellation of the registered entry (asiento registral) is ordered by a judicial authority –the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal–, by means of a judgment issued in a plenary proceeding (proceso de conocimiento) of which it is competent to hear. Ergo, the grievance on the merits must be dismissed.” / <u>It is prohibited for the Director of the National Registry to assume jurisdiction over matters that concern each of the registries to resolve individually</u>. (Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 6934 of November 28, 1983).” (The underlined text is supplied). From the foregoing rules, it is determined that the National Registry is not a deconcentrated body. Furthermore, its core function is registration; however, it is reiterated, there is no deconcentration regarding it. Likewise, it is inferred that the legal personality granted to its Administrative Board is not in registration matters—which confirms the lack of deconcentration in that aspect—but rather administrative; specifically, regarding the administration of the National Registry. Similarly, it is inferred that the Director General, unlike what the appellant indicated, was not granted powers in resolving registration disputes; therefore, he is not the hierarchical superior regarding administrative acts of registration. On the contrary, he was expressly prohibited from assuming jurisdiction over matters that concern each of the registries to resolve individually. For its part, Law No. 6739, Organic Law of the Ministry of Justice, in its wording in force when the declaration of lesivity was made, provides as relevant: “**ARTICLE 1.-** The following shall correspond to the Ministry of Justice: … c) Administer the system of official registries on property and legal entities. … **ARTICLE 3.-** The Ministry of Justice shall exercise its functions through the following principal dependencies: … b) General Directorate of the National Registry. … **ARTICLE 6.-** The following shall be bodies attached to the Ministry of Justice: … / b) The Administrative Board of the National Registry, which shall function in accordance with the terms and conditions indicated in Law No. 5695 of May 28, 1975. … **ARTICLE 7.-** The following shall be functions of the Ministry of Justice: … d) Administer the national system of registries and inscriptions of property and legal entities, in conformity with what is stipulated in the law creating the National Registry, No. 5695 of May 28, 1975. ” With the transcribed provisions, it is evident that it is the head of the Justice portfolio who is responsible for administering the system of official registries of Costa Rica, a function performed both through the Director General of the National Registry and in his capacity as president of the Administrative Board—Article 4 of Law No. 5695. This, coupled with the fact that, as noted, no deconcentration (minimum or maximum, as indicated by precept 83 of the LGAP) was granted to the National Registry in registration matters; that the legal personality of the Administrative Board does not encompass the registration function; that the Director General is not the hierarchical superior regarding administrative acts of registration, as he was not granted powers in resolving registration disputes; and considering its nature as a body dependent on the Ministry of Justice, “the superior body of the administrative hierarchy” of the National Registry, according to the provisions of canon 10.1.4 of the LRJCA, in light of the provisions of precept 28.1 of the LGAP, contrary to what the appellant affirmed, is the head of that portfolio. In the sub lite, what is challenged is the administrative act of registration of the property title of Mrs. Virginia Solera Flores (originating property number 171 492-000) as it was done to the detriment of the public domain. Ergo, as the object of this process is eminently registration-related, Resolution No. 200 167 of 2:00 p.m. on March 11, 2002, through which the aforementioned act was declared lesive to the interests of the State, was issued by the competent subject for this: the then Minister of Justice and Grace. Consequently, it is necessary to dismiss this part of the grievance under consideration. **VI.** Finally, regarding what the appellant stated concerning the time limit for filing the sub lite, this Chamber does not share his affirmations. In this regard, it is appropriate to transcribe the first paragraph of canon 35 of the LRJCA: “When the Administration itself, author of any act declaratory of rights, intends to demand its annulment before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, it must first declare it lesive to public, economic, or other interests, within a period of four years counted from the date it was issued.” This procedural rule is of public policy, therefore, it must be adhered to. Otherwise, it could cause the judge or the parties to attempt to substitute or modify the will of the legislator. However, this Chamber considers, contrary to the appellant’s criteria, and as the second-instance judges correctly pointed out, by virtue of a singular or exceptional situation, the expiration period established therein is not applicable to this litis. The challenged act, as has been stated, refers to the registration of a real estate property that forms part of the forest heritage of the State; which, moreover, is included within the boundaries of the Forest Reserve (Reserva Forestal), Protected Zone (Zona Protectora), and National Park (Parque Nacional), all named Juan Castro Blanco (proven fact preceded by letter u), not contested by the appellant). Consequently, it forms part of the public domain property of the State (see Articles 261 and 262 of the Civil Code; as well as Laws No. 4052 of January 19, 1968, 4465 of November 25, 1969; and Executive Decrees (Decretos Ejecutivos) Numbers 4965-A of June 26, 5387-A of October 28, both of 1975; 18763-MIRENEM of September 12, 1988, and 22669 of November 2, 1993) possessing the characteristic of inalienable and imprescriptible. Ergo, actions for its protection cannot be subject to expiration periods. Regarding the issue of public domain property (bienes demaniales), the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has stated: *“I.-The public domain is comprised of goods that manifest, by the express will of the legislator, a special purpose of serving the community, the public interest. These are called public domain goods, public goods or things, which do not belong individually to private parties, are destined for public use, and are subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men, for which reason they are affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, these goods belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, are affected by their own nature, which is invariably essential by virtue of express rule. These are characterized by being inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, cannot be mortgaged or be susceptible to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action substitutes for interdicts to recover possession.”* (Vote 2725-94 of 3:18 p.m. on June 9, 1994. In the same sense, see ruling 20346 of 9:21 a.m. on December 3, 2010). In accordance with the foregoing, in matters where the noted particularity arises, the property in litigation, due to its characteristic as a public domain good, determines the inapplicability of peremption periods for filing the lawsuit, provided for in the procedural rules. Certainly, as the appellant points out, the principle of legality could be called into question by not applying the precept under discussion according to its letter; however, given the evident collision with another postulate, even of higher rank, such as the public interest, by virtue of the interests at stake, it is the latter that prevails (Article 113 of the LGAP). Consequently, the second-instance judges having understood it this way did not violate the provisions of precept 35.1 of the LRJCA, also requiring the rejection of this part of the ground of disagreement under analysis. **VII.** In the **second** censure, the appellant alleges the non-application of canon 474 of the Civil Code and the improper application of precept 35.1 of the LRJCA. He transcribes the first of those rules. The violation of the indicated Article 474 is materialized, he alleges, because the contested judgment, by declaring the nullity of the supposed challenged administrative act, allows cancelling a registration entry through the administrative channel via canon 173 of the LGAP, or by administrative lesivity, after the one-year period provided in the LGAP has elapsed. The implications of allowing a judgment like the one appealed, he comments, to remain in force and be confirmed, would permit that, by not requiring the channel established in the precept of the Civil Code, the possibility is also considered imprescriptible that the Administration itself, under the principle of self-tutelage, can declare void any act of registration, in accordance with 173 of the LGAP, simply by declaring the act evidently and manifestly void. He transcribes, as relevant, ruling of this Chamber No. 91 of 3:05 p.m. on June 10, 1992. By admitting the lawsuit filed by the State, he indicates, choosing the channel of the ordinary lesivity process and not the ordinary one, as determined by law for this type of act, the indicated provision of the Civil Code was violated by non-application, allowing the review of registration acts through an administrative procedure, without considering whether they affect third parties or not. **VIII.** In recital IV of this judgment, the reasons were set forth for which this Chamber considers, contrary to what the appellant stated, that Article 173 of the LGAP was not applied either by the Administration or by the second-instance judges; for which reason it has not been violated. Likewise, in section VI, the arguments were provided for which it is considered that the period provided in canon 35 of the LRJCA is also not applicable to this litis. On the other hand, precept 474 of the Civil Code provides: “*<u>An inscription shall not be canceled except by final order (providencia ejecutoria) </u>or by virtue of a public deed or authentic document, in which the person in whose favor the inscription was made, or their successors-in-interest or legitimate representatives, express their consent for the cancellation.*” (The underlined text is not from the original). From its literal tenor, it is determined that the cancellation of entries, definitively registered, only proceeds in the cases indicated in that rule (when there is a final order issued by a court of the republic in a process in which it is competent, or by public deed or authentic document in which the person in whose favor the inscription was made expresses their consent for the cancellation). These are two factually taxed and “numerus clausus” hypotheses that do not admit any other form for canceling a registered entry. Said precept, despite being contained in that legislative body—more than a century old—is a special rule, placed in Title VII, called "Of the Public Registry," of Chapter Six, called "*Of the cancellation of inscriptions*". No other legal provision is applicable to the case of canceling registered entries, even less canon 173 of the LGAP, since this general rule was foreseen for all those hypotheses where one intends to annul, through administrative channels (ex officio review), an act declaratory of rights or favorable to the administered party, provided no special rule exists. That is, the expression “*An inscription shall not be canceled except by final order*”, which is the one of interest for resolving the appeal, implies that the cancellation of inscriptions must be done in the judicial venue by means of a final order, which is constituted by the final judgment issued in a plenary proceeding (canon 157 of the Civil Procedure Code). As noted, the State did not follow the procedure of ex officio review of the challenged act. That is, it did not annul, through the administrative channel, according to the procedure provided in canon 173 of the LGAP, the act of registering the property in litigation. On the contrary, after declaring it lesive to its interests, it goes to the judicial venue, through the ordinary lesivity process, requesting the contentious-administrative judge to decree its nullity, by virtue of it forming part of the public domain. Thus, it was ordered by the Ad quem in the contested judgment. In light of the above, it is determined, without a doubt, that the appellant is not correct in alleging the violation of the indicated canon of the Civil Code. This is because, it is insisted, in the sub judice, the cancellation of the registered entry is ordered by a judicial authority—Contentious-Administrative Tribunal—by means of a judgment issued in a plenary proceeding of which it is competent to hear. Ergo, the grievance under consideration must be dismissed.”

“IV. Tocante a lo afirmado en torno al canon 173 LGAP, es menester indicar lo siguiente. Su redacción ha 21 de abril de 1999; la segunda, por la Ley no. 8508 del 28 de octubre de 2006 (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). Entraron en vigencia, por su orden, el 29 de abril de 1999 y el 1ero. de enero de 2008. La referida versión del año 1999 es la actuable a esta lite, por ser la vigente al momento de incoarse la demanda. Dispone esa norma: “1.- Cuando la nulidad de un acto declaratorio de derechos fuere evidente y manifiesta, podrá ser declarada por la Administración en la vía administrativa, sin necesidad de recurrir al contencioso de lesividad señalado en los artículos 10 y 35 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, No 3667, del 12 de marzo de 1966, previo dictamen favorable de la Procuraduría General de la República. Cuando la nulidad versare sobre actos administrativos relacionados directamente con el proceso presupuestario o la contratación administrativa, la Contraloría General de la República deberá rendir el dictamen favorable. / 2.- Cuando se tratare de la administración del Estado, el órgano Constitucional superior que emitió el respectivo acto deberá declarar la nulidad. En los actos del Poder Ejecutivo, el Ministro del ramo designará al órgano director del procedimiento. Si se tratare de otros entes públicos o Poderes del Estado, deberá declarar la nulidad cada jerarca administrativo. Contra lo resuelto por ellos, solo cabrá recurso de reconsideración o reposición. Con la resolución de los recursos se dará por agotada la vía administrativa. / 3.- Antes de anular los actos referidos en este artículo, el acto final debe estar precedido por un procedimiento administrativo ordinario, en el que se hayan observado los principios y las garantías del debido proceso y se haya brindado audiencia a todas las partes involucradas. / 4.- En los casos anteriores, el dictamen deberá pronunciarse expresamente sobre el carácter absoluto, manifiesto y evidente de la nulidad. / 5.- La potestad de revisión oficiosa consagrada en este artículo caducará en cuatro años. / 6.- La anulación administrativa de un acto contra lo dispuesto en este artículo, sea por omisión de las formalidades previstas o por no ser la nulidad absoluta, evidente y manifiesta, será absolutamente nula. Además, la Administración estará obligada a pagar las costas, los daños y perjuicios, sin mengua de las responsabilidades personales del servidor agente, conforme al segundo párrafo del artículo 199. / 7.- La pretensión de lesividad no podrá deducirse por vía de contrademanda. / 8.- Para los supuestos en los que la emisión del acto administrativo viciado de nulidad absoluta, evidente y manifiesta, corresponda a dos o más Ministerios, o bien, se trate de la declaración de nulidad de actos administrativos relacionados, pero dictados por órganos distintos, regirá lo dispuesto en el inciso d), artículo 26 de esta ley. …”(Lo subrayado es suplido). De su lectura, se determina, en primer lugar, que el inciso 4) no dispone la caducidad de la potestad revisora de oficio en el plazo de un año a partir de la adopción del acto. Por el contrario, el apartado 5) señala que caducará en cuatro años. En segundo término, a la luz de lo indicado en los incisos 1) y 5), se colige, sin lugar a dudas, que la anulación de un acto en vía administrativa, por ser el vicio evidente y manifiesto, es potestativa para la Administración -no obligatoria, como lo quiere hacer ver el casacionista-. Por consiguiente, si no sigue ese procedimiento, tiene abierta la posibilidad de pretender su nulidad en sede jurisdiccional, a través del proceso ordinario de lesividad, tal y como sucedió en esta lite y es aceptado por el propio recurrente. En consecuencia, la norma en comentario no resulta aplicable al sub júdice. Ergo, no ha sido conculcada por los juzgadores de instancia al no actuarla. V. En relación con lo manifestado por el casacionsita en cuanto a la competencia de la entonces Ministra de Justicia para declarar la lesividad del acto cuestionado, debe señalarse que, si bien se trata de un argumento novedoso, aducido hasta ahora en casación, no resulta aplicable lo dispuesto en el canon 608 del Código Procesal Civil. Ello por cuanto, esta Sala, entre otras, en las sentencias números 811 de las 10 horas 5 minutos, 821 de las 10 horas 55 minutos, ambas del 4 de diciembre de 2008 y 180 de las 16 horas 20 minutos del 19 de febrero de 2009, dispuso que el análisis del sujeto que emite el acto de lesividad, a efecto de determinar si resulta competente para ello, debe hacerse aún de oficio, por incidir en uno de los elementos para su validez, de conformidad con lo preceptuado en los cánones 129 y 182 de la LGAP. En consecuencia, procede su análisis en los siguientes términos. La Ley no. 5695 del 28 de mayo de 1975, Ley de Creación del Registro Nacional, en la versión vigente al momento cuando se declaró lesivo el acto cuestionado, siendo la aplicable al sub júdice, en lo de interés señala: “ARTÍCULO 1º.- Créase el Registro Nacional, dependiente del Ministerio de Justicia, el cual integrará bajo un solo organismo los registros y dependencias que señala el artículo siguiente. Sus fines serán: Unificar criterios en materia de registro, coordinar las funciones, facilitar los trámites a los usuarios, agilizar las labores y mejorar las técnicas de inscripción; para todo lo cual se modernizarán los sistemas. / (Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la ley Nº 6934 de 28 de noviembre de 1983). … ARTÍCULO 3º.- El Registro Nacional estará dirigido por una Junta Administrativa, que tendrá personalidad jurídica para el cumplimiento de los fines de esta ley y cuyas funciones generales serán: / a) Dictar las medidas de organización y funcionamiento de sus dependencias; / b) Proteger, conservar sus bienes y velar por su mejoramiento; / c) Formular y ejecutar los programas de mejoras, de acuerdo con las necesidades de las dependencias a su cargo; / d) Administrar los fondos específicos asignados a cada una de ellas, así como los demás ingresos que por otros conceptos reciba, mediante cuentas separadas, dictando los presupuestos, acordando los gastos, haciendo las inversiones que estimare adecuadas, promoviendo y resolviendo las licitaciones que fueren del caso, con sujeción a lo dispuesto por la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y la presente ley; y / e) Preparar los proyectos de ley y reglamentos necesarios y dictar los reglamentos internos para el mejor funcionamiento de las diversas dependencias. … ARTÍCULO 6º.- Habrá un Director General, de quien dependerán jerárquicamente, para efectos administrativos, los directores de las diversas dependencias integradas del Registro Nacional. … / Al Director General corresponderá: / 1) Ejercer la labor de funcionarios ejecutivos (sic) de la Junta, en cuyas sesiones tendrá voz pero carecerá de voto. / 2) Proponer a la Junta los proyectos para el cumplimiento de las funciones encomendadas a esta en el artículo tercero. / 3) Coordinar las funciones de todas las dependencias del Registro Nacional. / 4) Unificar los criterios de calificación y dictar, en forma general, las medidas del carácter registral en los distintos registros, sin que le corresponda el análisis o calificación de casos concretos cuyo pronunciamiento competa al Director, encargado o jefe de cada dependencia. / 5) Aprobar los proyectos de presupuesto que se presenten a la Junta. / 6) Disponer las medidas administrativas generales para todos los organismos que integran el Registro Nacional. / 7) Tomar todas las medidas que estime convenientes para la marcha del Registro Nacional y sus dependencias, de acuerdo con las normas dictadas por la Junta. / El Director del Registro Nacional no podrá ser director de ninguno de los registros en particular. / Queda prohibido al Director del Registro Nacional abocar los asuntos que concierne resolver individualmente a cada uno de los registros. ( Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la ley Nº 6934 de 28 de noviembre de 1983 ).”(Lo subrayado es suplido). De las anteriores normas se determina que el Registro Nacional no es un órgano desconcentrado. Además, que su función medular es la registral; empero, se reitera, en torno a ella no existe desconcentración. Asimismo, se colige que la personalidad jurídica otorgada a su Junta Administrativa no lo es en materia registral –lo cual confirma la no desconcentración en ese aspecto- sino administrativa; en concreto, respecto a la administración del Registro Nacional. De igual manera, se infiere que al Director General, distinto a lo señalado por el casacionista, no le fueron conferidas competencias en materia resolutiva de conflictos registrales; por ende, no es el superior jerárquico en materia de actos administrativos de inscripción registral; por el contrario, de manera expresa se le prohibió avocar los asuntos que concierne resolver, de manera individual, a cada uno de los registros. Por su parte, la Ley no. 6739, Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Justicia, en su redacción vigente cuando se declaró la lesividad, en lo conducente dispone: “ARTICULO 1º.- Corresponderá al Ministerio de Justicia: … c) Administrar el sistema de registros oficiales sobre bienes y personas jurídicas. … ARTICULO 3º.- El Ministerio de Justicia ejercerá sus funciones por medio de las siguientes dependencias principales: … b) Dirección General del Registro Nacional. … ARTICULO 6º.- Serán organismos adscritos al Ministerio de Justicia, los siguientes: … / b) La Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional, la cual funcionará de acuerdo con los términos y condiciones que se indican en la ley Nº 5695 del 28 de mayo de 1975. … ARTICULO 7º.- Serán funciones del Ministerio de Justicia: … d) Administrar el sistema nacional de registros e inscripciones de bienes y personas jurídicas, de conformidad con lo que estipula la ley de creación del Registro Nacional, Nº 5695 del 28 de mayo de 1975. ” Con las disposiciones transcritas queda en evidencia que es el titular de la cartera de Justicia a quien le compete administrar el sistema de registros oficiales de Costa Rica, función que realiza tanto por medio del Director General del Registro Nacional, como en su calidad de presidente de la Junta Administrativa –artículo 4 de la Ley no. 5695-. Ello, aunado a que, como se anotó, en materia registral no le fue otorgada al Registro Nacional desconcentración alguna (mínima o máxima, según lo indica el precepto 83 de la LGAP); que la personalidad jurídica de la Junta Administrativa no abarca la función registral; que el Director General no es el superior jerárquico en materia de actos administrativos de inscripción registral, al no conferírsele competencias en materia resolutiva de conflictos registrales; y atendiendo a su naturaleza de órgano dependiente del Ministerio de Justicia, “el órgano superior de la jerarquía administrativa” del Registro Nacional, según lo preceptuado por el canon 10.1.4 de la LRJCA, a la luz de lo dispuesto en el precepto 28.1 de la LGAP, distinto a lo afirmado por el casacionista, es el titular de esa cartera. En el sub lítem, lo cuestionado es el acto administrativo de inscripción del título de propiedad de la señora Virginia Solera Flores (originando la finca número 171 492-000) al haberse hecho en perjuicio del demanio público. Ergo, al ser el objeto de este proceso eminentemente registral, la resolución n.° 200 167 de las 14 horas del 11 de marzo de 2002, mediante la cual se declaró lesivo a los intereses del Estado el aludido acto, fue emitida por el sujeto competente para ello: la entonces Ministra de Justicia y Gracia. En consecuencia, se impone desestimar esta parte del agravio de mérito. VI. Por último, tocante a lo manifestado por el recurrente, en cuanto al plazo para la interposición del sub lítem, esta Sala no comparte sus afirmaciones. Al respecto es oportuno transcribir el párrafo primero del canon 35 de la LRJCA: “Cuando la propia Administración , autora de algún acto declarativo de derechos, pretenda demandar su anulación, ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, previamente deberá declararlo lesivo a los intereses públicos, económicos o de otra naturaleza, en el plazo de cuatro años contados a partir de la fecha en que haya sido dictado.” Esta norma procesal es de orden público, por ende, a ella hay que atenerse. Caso contrario, podría ocasionar que el juez o las partes pretendiesen sustituir o modificar la voluntad del legislador. Empero, estima esta Cámara, distinto al criterio del casacionista, y como bien lo señalaron los juzgadores de segunda instancia, en virtud de una situación singular o excepcional, el plazo de caducidad ahí dispuesto no resulta aplicable a esta lite. El acto impugnado, como se ha dicho, se refiere a la inscripción registral de un bien inmueble que forma parte del patrimonio forestal del Estado; el cual, además, está incluido dentro de los límites de la Reserva Forestal, Zona Protectora y Parque Nacional, todos denominados Juan Castro Blanco (hecho probado antecedido con la letra u), no objetado por el recurrente). En consecuencia, integra el dominio público propiedad del Estado (véanse los artículos 261 y 262 del Código Civil; así como las leyes nos. 4052 del 19 de enero de 1968, 4465 del 25 de noviembre de 1969; y los Decretos Ejecutivos números 4965-A del 26 de junio, 5387-A del 28 de octubre, ambos de 1975; 18763-MIRENEM del 12 de septiembre de 1988 y 22669 del 2 de noviembre de 1993) revistiendo la característica de inalienable e imprescriptible. Ergo, las acciones para su protección no pueden estar sujetas a plazos de caducidad. En torno al tema de los bienes demaniales, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, ha señalado: "I.-El dominio público se encuentra integrado por bienes que manifiestan por voluntad expresa del legislador, un destino especial de servir a la comunidad, al interés público. Estos son los llamados bienes demaniales, bienes o cosas públicas, que no pertenecen individualmente a los particulares, que están destinados a un uso público y sometidos a un régimen especial, fuera del comercio de los hombres, razón por la cual, están afectados por su propia naturaleza y vocación. En consecuencia, esos bienes pertenecen al Estado en el sentido más amplio del concepto, están afectados por su propia naturaleza, la que invariablemente es esencial en virtud de norma expresa. Estos se caracterizan por ser inalienables, imprescriptibles, inembargables, no pueden ser hipotecados ni ser susceptibles de gravamen en los términos del Derecho Civil y la acción administrativa sustituye a los interdictos para recuperar el dominio." (Voto 2725-94 de las 15 horas 18 minutos del 9 de junio de 1994. En igual sentido, puede consultarse el fallo 20346 de las 9 horas 21 minutos del 3 de diciembre de 2010). De conformidad con lo anterior, en asuntos en los cuales se presenta la particularidad apuntada, el inmueble en litigio, por su característica de bien de dominio público, determina la inaplicabilidad de los plazos de perención para interponer la demanda, previstos en las normas procesales. Ciertamente, como lo señala el recurrente, podría ponerse en entredicho el principio de legalidad, al no actuarse el precepto en comentario según su letra; empero, ante la evidente colisión con otro postulado, incluso de mayor jerarquía, como es el del interés público, en virtud de los intereses en juego, este es el que prevalece (artículo 113 de la LGAP). En consecuencia, al haberlo entendido de esta forma los juzgadores de segunda instancia, no quebrantaron lo dispuesto en el precepto 35.1 de la LRJCA, imponiéndose también el rechazo de esta parte del motivo de disconformidad en análisis. VII.En la segunda censura alega el recurrente falta de aplicación del canon 474 del Código Civil e indebida aplicación del precepto 35.1 LRJCA. Transcribe la primera de esas normas. El quebranto del indicado artículo 474 se concreta, alega, dado que la sentencia impugnada, al declarar la nulidad del supuesto acto administrativo impugnado, permite cancelar una inscripción registral por la vía administrativa mediante el canon 173 de la LGAP, o bien por la lesividad administrativa, luego de haber transcurrido el plazo del año previsto en la LGAP. Los alcances de permitir que una sentencia como la recurrida, comenta, permanezca vigente y sea confirmada, permitirían que, al no requerirse la vía establecida en el precepto del Código Civil, se considere también imprescriptible la posibilidad de que la misma administración, bajo el principio de autotutela, pueda declarar nulo cualquier acto de inscripción, de conformidad con el 173 LGAP, simplemente declarando el acto evidente y manifiestamente nulo. Transcribe, en lo de su interés, el fallo de esta Sala no. 91 de las 15 horas 5 minutos del 10 de junio de 1992. Al acogerse la demanda presentada por el Estado, señala, eligiendo la vía del proceso ordinario de lesividad y no la ordinaria, conforme lo ha determinado la ley para este tipo de actos, se violentó, por desaplicación la disposición indicada del Código Civil, permitiéndose la revisión de actos registrales por medio de un procedimiento administrativo, sin considerar si afectan a terceros o no. VIII. En el considerando IV de esta sentencia se expusieron las razones por las cuales esta Sala estima, distinto a lo señalado por el casacionsita, que el artículo 173 de la LGAP no fue aplicado ni por la Administración ni por los juzgadores de segunda instancia; razón por la cual no ha sido conculcado. Asimismo, en el apartado VI se brindaron los argumentos por los cuales se estima que el plazo previsto en el canon 35 de la LRJCA tampoco resulta actuable a esta lite. Por otro lado, el precepto 474 del Código Civil dispone: “No se cancelará una inscripción sino por providencia ejecutoria o en virtud de escritura o documento auténtico, en el cual expresen su consentimiento para la cancelación, la persona a cuyo favor se hubiere hecho la inscripción o sus causahabientes o representantes legítimos.” (Lo subrayado no es del original). De su tenor literal se determina que la cancelación de asientos, definitivamente inscritos, solo procede en los supuestos señalados en esa norma (cuando media una providencia ejecutoria expedida por algún tribunal de la república en un proceso en el que sea competente, o bien, por escritura pública o documento auténtico en el que exprese su consentimiento, para efecto de la cancelación, la persona a cuyo favor se hubiere efectuado la inscripción). Se trata de dos hipótesis fácticas expresamente tasadas y “numerus clausus” que no admiten otra forma para la cancelación de un asiento inscrito. Dicho precepto, pese a estar contenido en ese cuerpo legislativo -más que centenario-, es una norma especial, emplazada en el Titulo VII, denominado "Del Registro Publico", del Capítulo Sexto, llamado "De la cancelación de inscripciones". Ninguna otra disposición legal resulta aplicable al supuesto de la cancelación de asientos inscritos, menos aún el canon 173 de la LGAP, puesto que esta norma general fue prevista para todas aquellas hipótesis donde se pretenda anular, en vía administrativa (revisión de oficio), un acto declaratorio de derechos o favorable para el administrado, siempre y cuando no exista norma especial. Es decir, la expresión “No se cancelará una inscripción sino por providencia ejecutoria”, que es la que interesa para resolver el recurso, lo que implica es que la cancelación de inscripciones deberá hacerse en sede judicial mediante ejecutoria, la cual está constituida por la sentencia firme dictada en un proceso de conocimiento (canon 157 del Código Procesal Civil). Conforme se apuntó, el Estado no siguió el procedimiento de la revisión oficiosa del acto cuestionado. Esto es, no anuló en vía administrativa, según el procedimiento previsto en el canon 173 de la LGAP, el acto de inscripción del inmueble en litigio. Por el contrario, luego de declararlo lesivo a sus intereses, acude a la sede judicial, a través del proceso ordinario de lesividad, requiriéndole al juzgador contencioso administrativo decretar su nulidad, en virtud de configurar parte del demanio público. Así fue dispuesto por el Ad quem en la sentencia combatida. A la luz de lo anterior, se determina, sin lugar a dudas, que no lleva razón el casacionista al alegar el quebranto del indicado canon del Código Civil. Ello por cuanto, se insiste, en el sub júdice, la cancelación del asiento registral inscrito es ordenada por una autoridad judicial –Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo-, por medio de una sentencia emitida en un proceso de conocimiento del cual es competente para conocerlo. Ergo, débese desestimar el agravio de mérito.”