Immediate Application of Reduced Appeal Deadline in Public ProcurementAplicación inmediata del plazo de apelación reducido en contratación administrativa

“V.- The core point to be defined is which procedural regulation was applicable to the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed against the award made within international tender 2008LI-000037-PROV, in particular, the time limit within which it had to be filed. Having analyzed the point, this Chamber shares the criterion expressed by the Tribunal, which endorsed the flat rejection for being untimely ordered by the Contraloría General de la República, as well as the arguments on the basis of which it adopted that decision. The lower court judges considered that procedural rules, once they enter into force, are of immediate application, unless the legislator establishes a transitional period, which does not occur in this case. Furthermore, they indicated that the aforementioned particularity does not cause a violation of the principle of non-retroactivity, given that “the regulatory adjustment introduced by Article 26 of Ley 8660, regarding the reduction of the time limit from ten to five business days for filing the appeal (recurso de apelación) against the award decision, did not have the virtue of affecting or impacting procedural stages that were already precluded (precluídas), quite the contrary, since prior to the legal reform introduced by Article 26 of Ley 8660, the conditioning factual prerequisite (the issuance and publication of the award decision) had not yet occurred, from which a specific effect would have been expected, that is, the possibility of challenging the award decision within the 10-business-day time limit provided for in Article 84 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, in the event that it was contrary to their interests.” As is argued in the challenged judgment, even though the provision that established the five-day time limit (instead of the 10 days provided for in Article 84 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa) entered into force after the tender procedure had begun, the truth is that when the award decision was communicated, it was already in force. Thus, the rule that at that time provided—and provides—coverage for the vertical challenge mechanism established, among the factual prerequisites necessary for its admissibility, that it be filed within the aforementioned five-day time limit. Certainly, a change in the regulation cannot affect procedural stages that have not yet been precluded (precluído), but that is not what happens in this case, insofar as the means of appeal (medios recursivos) are independent of the processing phase prior to the issuance of the final decision. Now then, one of the arguments outlined by the appellant in cassation (casacionista) deals with the retroactive application of Article 26 of Ley 8660. However, from what has just been indicated, it is clear that the triggering event for the application of the rule is nothing other than the issuance of the final decision—of award—which occurs after the repeatedly cited reform entered into force on August 13, 2008. Consequently, the disregard of Article 34 of the Constitution claimed does not occur. On the contrary, what the appellant (recurrente) seeks is the ultractivity (ultractividad) for the specific case of the provisions of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and its Reglamento, which implies the survival of its effects despite a modification in the applicable legal regime. Stated differently, the appellant in cassation’s (casacionista) argument would lead one to consider that, despite the fact that at the time the appeal (recurso) was filed, the legal time limit for its formulation was five days, the previously provided 10-day time limit should be applied, as if the reform had not taken effect. In this regard, and given that this is one of the criticisms made against the judgment, it is appropriate to refer to the possible transitionality in the entry into force of a legal rule, whether by retroactivity or by ultractivity (ultractividad). In this respect, Article 129 of the Constitution, whose violation is claimed, provides: “Laws are binding and take effect from the day they designate; failing this requirement, ten days after their publication in the Diario Oficial / No one may plead ignorance of the law, except in cases the law itself authorizes. / … A law is neither abrogated nor repealed except by a subsequent one; against its observance, disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary may not be alleged…” As can be inferred from the rule, only the Legislative Assembly, as the body charged with enacting laws, has the power to determine, within the scope of legislative discretion inherent to this state function, the moment from which they enter into force, as well as their eventual transitional regime. Now then, in this sense, it must be pointed out that, unless a law-level rule provides for a different situation, the principle that applies in this matter is that laws govern, and therefore, are of mandatory application, from the date on which they entered into force. In this context, it is necessary to refer to transitional provisions, a topic on which this Chamber has had the opportunity to rule in these terms: “this type of rule is intimately linked to the recognition of legal situations—not yet consolidated—constituted under the protection of the regulation that is repealed or modified. Its incorporation implies the recognition that the legal system is far from immutable, and therefore, the normative framework applicable to individuals may vary, respecting, of course, the constitutional guarantee of non-retroactivity. To that extent, the transitional provision seeks either to determine the temporal application of the rule, or to set the rules by which the legal situations, constituted in accordance with the previous legislation, are made compatible with the new one. The latter can be achieved through the early consolidation of these by mandate of law, temporally modulating the effects of the legal modification for certain special cases that meet the factual prerequisites established in the transitional provision, or by granting ultractivity (ultractividad) to the affected rule. In any case, regardless of the scenario involved, it must be clear that these provisions are characterized by being accessory and instrumental with respect to the general and specific rules whose effects are intended to be mitigated, and to that extent, applicable only with respect to legal situations constituted prior to their effectiveness.” (voto 928-F-S1-10 of 9:25 a.m. on August 5, 2010) The foregoing is of interest for the specific case insofar as, just as the Tribunal indicated, at the time the award decision was issued and communicated, Ley 8660 had already entered into force, without any exception related to tender procedures already initiated as of that date being stipulated. As for Transitorio III of the Reglamento to Ley 8660, this does not contradict what has just been stated. In the first place, and as already indicated, only the Legislative Assembly has the authority to modify the general rule established in the Constitution regarding the moment from which law-level rules enter into force, so an executive decree (reglamento ejecutivo) does not have the power or force to vary what is provided in Ley 8660. Added to the foregoing, it must be taken into account that according to its own wording, it establishes a margin of transitionality regarding its own application (that of the Reglamento), not of the legal text. In this sense, the provision states: “Contracts initiated and in the process of award at the time of entry into force of this Reglamento shall conclude up to the award itself in accordance with the procedures of the Ley and Reglamento de Contratación Administrativa. Contracts in the execution phase at the time of entry into force of this Reglamento shall be subject to it.” In any case, and aside from what has just been stated, the truth is that the regulation contained in the repeatedly cited Transitorio III does not reach the appeals phase (fase recursiva), but only the procedures initiated and not yet awarded. All of the foregoing consequently means that the appellant (recurrente) is not correct when accusing the lack of application of Articles 84 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and 174 of its Reglamento, respectively, given that this would imply granting them an ultractivity (ultractividad) that the law did not foresee. The reasons set forth lead to the dismissal of the objection raised.” **V.-** The core point to define is which procedural regulations were applicable to the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed against the award made within the international public tender 2008LI-000037-PROV, in particular, the deadline within which it had to be filed. Having analyzed the point, this Chamber shares the criterion expressed by the lower court (Tribunal), which endorsed the outright rejection for being untimely (extemporáneo) ordered by the Contraloría General de la República, as well as the arguments on which it based that ruling. The instance judges considered that procedural rules, once they enter into force, are of immediate application, unless the legislator establishes a transition period, which does not occur in this case. Furthermore, they noted that the aforementioned particularity does not generate a violation of the principle of non-retroactivity, given that “*the regulatory adjustment introduced by Article 26 of Law 8660, regarding the reduction of the deadline from ten to five business days for filing the appeal against the award act, did not have the effect of influencing or affecting procedural stages that were precluded, quite the contrary, since prior to the legal reform introduced by Article 26 of Law 8660, the conditioning factual prerequisite (the issuance and publication of the award act) had not yet occurred, from which a certain effect would have been expected, that is, the possibility of challenging the award act within the 10-business-day period provided in Article 84 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, should it prove contrary to their interests.*” As argued in the challenged judgment, even though the provision that established the five-day deadline (instead of the 10 days provided in Article 84 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa) entered into force after the tender procedure had begun, the truth is that when the award act was communicated, it was already in effect. Therefore, the rule that at that time provided—and provides—coverage for the vertical challenge mechanism established, within the factual prerequisites necessary for its admissibility, that it be filed within the aforementioned five-day period. Certainly, a change in the regulation cannot affect procedural stages that have not yet been precluded, but that is not what happens in this case, insofar as the means of appeal are independent of the processing phase prior to the issuance of the final act. Now, one of the arguments outlined by the appellant (casacionista) concerns the retroactive application of Article 26 of Law 8660. However, from what has just been stated, it is clear that the triggering event for the application of the rule is none other than the issuance of the final act—the award—which occurs after the repeatedly cited reform entered into force on August 13, 2008. Consequently, the disregard of Constitutional Article 34 that is claimed does not occur. On the contrary, what the appellant seeks is the ultra-activity (ultractividad) for the specific case of the provisions of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and its Regulations, which would entail the survival of its effects despite a modification in the applicable legal regime. In other words, the appellant's approach would lead to the consideration that, despite the fact that at the time the appeal was filed the legal deadline for its filing was five days, the previously provided 10-day period should be applied, as if the reform had not taken effect. In this sense, and since it is one of the criticisms made against the judgment, it is appropriate to refer to the potential transition period in the entry into force of a legal norm, whether by retroactivity or ultra-activity. In this regard, Article 129 of the Constitution, whose infringement is claimed, provides: “*Laws are binding and take effect from the day they designate; in the absence of this requirement, ten days after their publication in the Official Gazette. / No one may plead ignorance of the law, except in cases authorized by the law itself. / ... No law is abrogated or repealed except by a subsequent one; disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary cannot be alleged against its observance...*” As can be inferred from the norm, only the Legislative Assembly, as the body responsible for the enactment of laws, has the power to determine, within the scope of legislative discretion that is characteristic of this state function, the moment from which they enter into force, as well as their eventual transitional regime. Now, in this sense, it must be noted that, unless a legal norm provides for a different situation, the principle that applies in the matter is that laws govern, and therefore are of mandatory application, from the date they entered into force. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the transitional provisions, a subject on which this Chamber has had the opportunity to rule in these terms: “*this type of norm is intimately linked to the recognition of legal situations—not consolidated—constituted under the protection of the regulation that is repealed or modified. Its incorporation implies the recognition that the legal system is far from immutable, and therefore, the regulatory framework applicable to individuals may vary, always respecting, of course, the constitutional guarantee of non-retroactivity. To that extent, the transitional provision seeks either to determine the temporal application of the norm, or to establish the rules by which the legal situations, constituted in accordance with the previous legislation, are made compatible with the new one. The latter can be carried out through the anticipated consolidation of these by mandate of law, temporally tempering the effects of the legal modification for certain special cases that meet the factual prerequisites established in the transitional provision, or by granting ultra-activity to the affected norm. In any case, regardless of the scenario in question, it must be clear that these provisions are characterized by being accessory and instrumental with respect to the general and specific norms whose effects are intended to be mitigated, and to that extent, applicable only with respect to legal situations constituted prior to their entry into force*”. (vote 928-F-S1-10 of 9:25 a.m. on August 5, 2010) The foregoing is of interest for the specific case insofar as, as noted by the lower court, at the time the award act was issued and communicated, Law 8660 had already entered into force, without stipulating any exception related to the tender procedures already initiated by that date. Regarding Transitory Provision III of the Regulations to Law 8660, this does not detract from what has just been stated. Firstly, and as already indicated, only the Legislative Assembly has the power to modify the general rule established in the Constitution regarding the moment from which legal norms enter into force, so an executive decree does not have the power or resilience to vary the provisions of Law 8660. In addition to the foregoing, it must be taken into account that according to its own wording, it establishes a margin of transition regarding its own application (that of the Regulations), not of the legal text. In this sense, the provision states: “*Contracts initiated and in the award process at the time this Regulation enters into force shall conclude up to the award itself in accordance with the procedures of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and its Regulations. Contracts in the execution phase at the time this Regulation enters into force shall be subject to it.*” In any case, and regardless of what has just been stated, the truth is that the regulation contained in the repeatedly cited Transitory Provision III does not extend to the appeals phase, but only to the procedures initiated that have not yet been awarded. All of the foregoing consequently means that the appellant is not correct when he accuses the lower court of failing to apply Articles 84 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and 174 of its Regulations, respectively, since doing so would imply granting them an ultra-activity that the law did not foresee. The reasons set forth lead to the dismissal of the objection raised.

“V.- El punto medular a definir es cuál normativa procesal resultaba aplicable al recurso de apelación interpuesto contra la adjudicación realizada dentro de la licitación internacional 2008LI-000037-PROV, en particular, el plazo en el que este debía ser presentado. Analizado el punto, esta Sala comparte el criterio externado por el Tribunal, que avaló el rechazo de plano por extemporáneo dispuesto por la Contraloría General de la República, así como los argumentos con base en los cuales adoptó ese fallo. Los juzgadores de instancia consideraron que las normas procesales, una vez que entran en vigencia, son de aplicación inmediata, salvo que el legislador establezca un período de transitoriedad, lo que no se da en la especie. Además, señalaron que la anterior particularidad no genera un quebranto del principio de irretroactividad, toda vez que “la adecuación normativa que introdujo el artículo 26 de la Ley 8660, en cuanto a la reducción del plazo de diez a cinco días hábiles para interponer el recurso de apelación contra el acto adjudicatorio, no tuvo la virtud de incidir o afectar etapas del procedimiento que estuvieras (sic) precluídas, todo lo contrario, ya que con anterioridad a la reforma legal introducida por el artículo 26 de la ley 8660, aún no se había dado el presupuesto fáctico condicionante (el dictado y publicación del acto de adjudicación), del que se hubiera esperado un determinado efecto, o sea, la posibilidad de impugnar el acto de adjudicación en el plazo de 10 días hábiles previsto en el artículo 84 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, en el caso de que resultara contrario a sus intereses.” Tal y como se arguye en la sentencia impugnada, aún y cuando la disposición que estableció el plazo de los cinco días (en lugar de los 10 previstos en el artículo 84 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa) entró en vigencia luego de que el procedimiento licitatorio había iniciado, lo cierto es que cuando se comunicó el acto de adjudicación, esta ya se encontraba vigente. Así las cosas, la norma que en ese momento le daba –y le da- cobertura al mecanismo de impugnación vertical establecía, dentro de los presupuestos de hecho necesarios para su admisibilidad, que este fuera presentado en el plazo mencionado de cinco días. Ciertamente, un cambio en la regulación no puede afectar etapas procedimentales que aún no hayan precluído, pero eso no es lo que sucede en la especie, en la medida en que los medios recursivos resultan independientes respecto de la fase de tramitación previa al dictado del acto final. Ahora bien, uno de los argumentos esbozados por el casacionista versa sobre la aplicación retroactiva del artículo 26 de la Ley 8660. Empero, de lo recién indicado queda claro que el supuesto desencadenante de la aplicación de la norma no es otra cosa que el dictado del acto final –de adjudicación-, lo que se da luego de que la reforma tantas veces citada entrara en vigencia el 13 de agosto de 2008. En consecuencia, no se produce la desatención del artículo 34 constitucional que se reclama. Por el contrario, lo que pretende el recurrente es la ultractividad para el caso concreto de las disposiciones de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y su Reglamento, lo que supone la pervivencia de sus efectos a pesar de una modificación en el régimen jurídico aplicable. Dicho de otra manera, el planteamiento del casacionista llevaría a considerar que, a pesar de que al momento en que se presentó el recurso el plazo legal para su formulación era de cinco días, se le aplique el de 10 días previsto anteriormente, tal y como si no hubiese operado la reforma. En este sentido, y siendo que es uno de los reproches realizados en contra de la sentencia, conviene referirse a la eventual transitoriedad en la entrada en vigencia de una norma jurídica, sea por retroactividad o por ultractividad. Al respecto, el artículo 129 de la Carta Magna, cuya infracción se reclama, dispone: “Las leyes son obligatorias y surten efectos desde el día que ellas designen; a falta de este requisito, diez días después de su publicación en el Diario Oficial / Nadie puede alegar ignorancia de la ley, salvo en los casos que la misma autorice. / … La ley no queda abrogada ni derogada sino por otra posterior; contra su observancia no podrá alegarse desuso, costumbre ni práctica en contrario…” Según se puede colegir de la norma, únicamente la Asamblea Legislativa, como órgano encargado de la promulgación de las leyes, tiene la potestad de determinar, dentro del ámbito de discrecionalidad legislativa que es propia de esta función estatal, el momento a partir del cual entran en vigencia, así como su eventual régimen transitorio. Ahora bien, en este sentido debe apuntarse que, salvo que una norma de rango legal disponga una situación diversa, el principio que aplica en la materia es el de que las leyes rigen, y por lo tanto, son de aplicación obligatoria, a partir de la fecha en que entraron en vigencia. En este contexto, es preciso referirse a las disposiciones transitorias, tema sobre el cual esta Sala ha tenido oportunidad de pronunciarse en estos términos: “este tipo de normas se encuentran íntimamente ligadas al reconocimiento de situaciones jurídicas –no consolidadas- constituidas al amparo de la regulación que se deroga o modifica. Su incorporación implica el reconocimiento de que el ordenamiento jurídico dista de ser inmutable, y por tanto, el marco normativo aplicable a los particulares puede variar, respetando, claro está, la garantía constitucional a la no retroactividad. En ese tanto, la disposición transitoria procura, ya sea determinar la aplicación temporal de la norma, o bien, fijar las reglas mediante las cuales las situaciones jurídicas, constituidas con apego a la anterior legislación, se compatibilizan con la nueva. Esto último se puede realizar mediante la consolidación anticipada de estas por mandato de ley, matizando temporalmente los efectos de la modificación legal para ciertos casos especiales que cumplan con los presupuestos de hecho establecidos en el transitorio, o bien, otorgando ultractividad a la norma afectada. En todo caso, independientemente del supuesto que se trate, debe quedar claro que estas disposiciones se caracterizan por ser accesorias e instrumentales respecto de las normas generales y concretas cuyos efectos se pretende paliar, y en ese tanto, aplicables, únicamente, respecto de las situaciones jurídicas constituidas en forma previa a la vigencia de estas”. (voto 928-F-S1-10 de las 9 horas 25 minutos del 5 de agosto de 2010) Lo anterior resulta de interés para el caso concreto en la medida en que, tal y como lo señaló el Tribunal, al momento en que se dictó y comunicó el acto de adjudicación, la Ley 8660 ya había entrado en vigor, sin que se estipulara alguna excepción relacionada con los procedimientos licitatorios ya iniciados para esa fecha. En cuanto al Transitorio III del Reglamento a la Ley 8660, este no desvirtúa lo recién expuesto. En primer lugar, y según lo ya indicado, únicamente la Asamblea Legislativa tiene la facultad de modificar la regla general establecida en la Carta Magna respecto del momento a partir del cual entran en vigencia las normas de rango legal, por lo que un reglamento ejecutivo no tiene la potencia o resistencia para variar lo dispuesto en la Ley 8660. Aunado a lo anterior, debe tomarse en cuenta que según su propia literalidad, establece un margen de transitoriedad respecto de su propia aplicación (la del Reglamento), no del texto legal. En este sentido señala la disposición: “Las contrataciones iniciadas y en proceso de adjudicación al momento de entrada en vigencia del presente Reglamento terminarán hasta la adjudicación misma de conformidad con los procedimientos de la Ley y Reglamento de Contratación Administrativa. Las contrataciones en fase de ejecución al momento de entrada en vigencia del presente Reglamento estarán sujetas a este.” En todo caso, y al margen de lo recién expuesto, lo cierto es que la regulación contenida en el transitorio III tantas veces citado no alcanza a la fase recursiva, sino únicamente a los procedimientos iniciados y que aún no han sido adjudicados. Todo lo anterior genera, en consecuencia, que no lleve razón el recurrente cuando acusa la falta de aplicación de los artículos 84 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y 174 de su Reglamento, respectivamente, toda vez que ello implicaría otorgarles una ultractividad que la ley no previó. Las razones expuestas llevan a desestimar el reparo planteado.”