Panamanian Bank Evidence Without Costa Rican Judicial Order Is VoidPrueba bancaria panameña sin orden judicial costarricense es nula

III. […] Regarding the challenge to the validity of the evidence from Panama: By a majority composed of magistrates Ramírez Quirós, Pereira Villalobos, and Chinchilla Sandí, this part of the claim is granted, also formulated through the second ground of appeal, decreeing the nullity of the evidence gathered in Panama by means of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama (T.A.L.M.) and all evidentiary elements that directly depend on it. To analyze the claim of the appellants, we must first go back to the origins of the 1996 Code of Criminal Procedure reform, which is inspired by respect for human rights, whether the accused or the victim. Regarding the accused, which is the point under discussion, the principle of Innocence is established as the foundation, from which derives, among others, the necessity of a prior trial and that the process be the one regulated by the Code, as also determined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 11, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14, and the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, paragraph 2, treaties that, as they all refer to the fundamental rights of man, are and must be analyzed with primacy over any treaty of mutual legal assistance between countries, thus Article 2 of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Returning to the background of the Code of Criminal Procedure that currently governs us, one of the fundamental aspects it retakes is respect for Due Process and places special emphasis on the Inviolability of the Defense (Article 39 of the Political Constitution); therefore, we have affirmed, with great accuracy, that the reform in question is nothing more than the constitutionalization of Criminal Procedural Law. Under this conception, the legislator considered that the investigation of criminal cases should be directed by the Public Prosecutor's Office, precisely for greater control in the way evidence is introduced into the process, in strict compliance with the Constitution and the law; in other words, the Public Prosecutor's Office, which is in charge of investigating crime, must direct the actions of investigation officers, in order to bring, through all lawful means at its disposal, the evidentiary elements into the process; the foregoing implies the absolute prohibition of using illegitimate means of proof which, consequently, the Judge cannot give any formal or material significance, because the procedural order, under no circumstances, tolerates the sacrifice of constitutional guarantees that protect the citizen, in favor of the search for truth in criminal proceedings (in this sense, the Judicial Investigation Organism, the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the Judge must strictly adhere to the Constitution, International Human Rights Treaties, and the Law) because the legitimacy of the acts and their lawfulness become the only valid criterion to be taken into consideration by the judge in resolving a specific case; the contrary means the obligation of the hierarchical superior to declare, even ex officio, the ineffectiveness of the procedural act.

In the specific case, the evidentiary elements obtained in the Republic of Panama, although it is true, according to the internal laws of that country, in which, due to the constitutional rank of the Public Prosecutor's Office prior to the reform of the Panamanian Code of Criminal Procedure in the year two thousand eight, it was granted the power to lift banking secrecy without jurisdictional authorization in the course of an investigation in that country, and therefore, as indicated by the appealed judgment, in the procedure carried out in that country, there is no violation of internal Panamanian law, whereby for that system, the evidence is obtained legally; there is a serious procedural defect from the outset, which occurs in Costa Rica, regarding the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure that requires the Public Prosecutor's Office to make the request for lifting banking secrecy to the Guarantee Judge, to process before the Central Authority (pursuant to the Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance) the assistance in order to bring from that country evidence that implies violating the sphere of intimacy of their accounts and private correspondence; this absolute procedural defect, in our opinion, has been overlooked by all intervening authorities in process number 04-005356-042-PE, arguing that, since in Panama the Public Prosecutor's Office is empowered to perform the act, in our country the Public Prosecutor's Office can arrogate the right to directly request the Central Authority (Office of the Attorney General of the Republic) to carry out the proceeding, without the assessment of the Guarantee Judge being necessary; an interpretation that, in our opinion, can in no way be endorsed by those of us who have been appointed as the last instance to which the parties can appeal for the satisfaction and safeguarding of the fundamental rights of their clients. It cannot be valid in our Democratic Rule of Law that, for the sake of agile compliance with the judgment of persons accused of the alleged commission of criminal acts, without exception of the person involved, the rights that assist the persons accused of committing a crime are arbitrarily and illegitimately trampled upon (by whoever had the functional direction of the process in the Public Prosecutor's Office at that determined moment) with an erroneous interpretation of unlimited powers, from the very moment they are considered suspects in the commission of that criminal act. It is clear that our democratic system, in its Legal System, has opted for the wise decision to leave in the hands of the competent jurisdictional body the task of safeguarding fundamental rights (among which are the right to privacy, the secrecy of communications, and the inviolability of private documents); for this reason, it authorizes, under exceptional and previously established circumstances, the cases in which they may be restricted, specifically for the knowledge of matters submitted to the Courts of Justice, in which the judge may order the lifting of that secrecy. In the present case, that jurisdictional assessment was required to request the Central Authority, pursuant to the cited treaty, to give the corresponding processing to the assistance request required by the Public Prosecutor's Office to bring documentary evidence from Panamanian banks to the investigation; this is so because it must be the judge who weighs the necessity, utility, pertinence, and proportionality of the request made by the body in charge of the investigation. It is important to note here that the interpretation given in this process by the Public Prosecutor's Office is erroneous, a body that, in our understanding, is the first that must be clear about its function and its investigative powers, to the extent conferred by the Constitution and the current Law, so as not to perform an action that, it should have known, disregarded the limits that the system imposes by directly requesting the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic to give the corresponding processing to the execution of an assistance request to Panama, which should have been previously authorized by the Guarantee Judge, since it implied violating fundamental rights of persons subjected to proceedings in our country and that, as is known to all and each of the justice operators in Costa Rica, ordinary legislation requires that: a) the order be duly grounded. b) If possible, individualize the documents on which the decision will be executed, the name of whoever holds them, and the place where they are located. c) Have as a prerequisite a criminal activity, with a determination of a verified indication regarding its commission. All these aspects require prior weighing of the necessity, suitability, and proportionality of the request that the Public Prosecutor's Office should have brought to the knowledge of the jurisdictional authority; it would be a crass error to conclude, as the lower court (a quo) does, and as the minority opinion of this Chamber endorses, that this implies giving an order to the Panamanian authorities; quite the contrary, it constitutes the endorsement of the jurisdictional authority of Costa Rica so that the Central Authority of our country, pursuant to the repeatedly cited treaty, could proceed as stipulated before the competent authority of Panama. The foregoing is not a mere formality; it constitutes the procedural act that legitimizes, according to the internal order, the intrusion ordered into the private sphere of a person, because it is not the function or power of the Attorney General, or of the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, to request and impose upon themselves confidential information from persons without prior authorization from the Judge who guarantees respect for the fundamental rights of citizens subjected to process. This is concluded from the stipulations in Article 24 of the Political Constitution, Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 11, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, all encompassed in Articles 2 and 3 of Law on Registration, Seizure, Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications, No. 7425 (a law that even criminally sanctions its non-compliance) and Article 107 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. The power established by the Code of Criminal Procedure, in its Articles 226 and 290 final paragraph, for the Public Prosecutor's Office to request reports from private individuals or public entities, according to what is stipulated, is insofar as it does not involve private information, protected by Article 24 of the Political Constitution; the contrary, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 181 of the CPP, implies a violation of Due Process, for violation of the fundamental right to the privacy of private documents. The Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance aims to strengthen and facilitate the cooperation of the justice administration bodies of the region, through an instrument that permits assistance in criminal matters, but it is clear that it must occur with full respect for the internal legislation of each Member State; what is replaced is the cumbersome consular procedure; to streamline communication channels, its content can in no way have repercussions on the system of guarantees applicable in the country, so much so that its preamble expressly establishes that this assistance is given with full respect for the internal legislation of each State. As mentioned at the beginning of this vote, the possibility of streamlining procedures cannot become an open letter to arbitrariness, arrogance, and disrespect for constitutional guarantees and the current internal order.

It is not legitimate that, as happened in the present case, representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office even traveled to another country in order to be present during the collection of evidence and did not take the minimum time to correctly make the request before the corresponding jurisdictional authority, thereby sacrificing essential evidence for the resolution of the case submitted to the knowledge of the Costa Rican courts, having to decree the ineffectiveness of the act performed in violation of Due Process, and which also entails time and money that all Costa Ricans must also pay. On previous occasions, this Chamber has declared the ineffectiveness of actions in similar procedural acts in which the Public Prosecutor's Office, in their execution, acted contrary to the law, with very regrettable consequences for the correct administration of justice, and in this regard, as noted at the beginning, without exception of the person subjected to the process, the law is equal for all, and consequently, it is not about achieving a conviction at all costs, but rather one that results from the correct introduction of evidence into the process, in accordance with the Constitution and the law in force in the country, and its subsequent assessment, in strict adherence to the rules of sound criticism, such that the accusing entity must be the first interested in presenting a case to the jurisdictional body, not only with the possibility of making its thesis prevail in the adversarial debate, because it possesses sufficient evidence, but that this evidence be effective because its collection respected the constitutional guarantees that protect the person subjected to process. On this point, doctrine has maintained: "…In our environment, the constitutional structuring of procedural norms has always been under discussion. Thus, for example, information obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees cannot be used; therefore, Article 96 of the NCPP conditions the validity of the act to respect for the fundamental rights of the person, except 'if it favors the accused' (Art. 181 NCPP). The doctrinal current holds that these types of irregularities are not susceptible to convalidation in accordance with Article 178 NCPP and must be declared ex officio by the Judge, whenever they imply non-observance of rights and guarantees not only in the Constitution, but in current International or Community Law." (ARMIJO SANCHO, Gilberth, Garantías Constitucionales, Prueba Ilícita y Transición al Nuevo Código Procesal Penal. Premio Anual. Alberto Brenes Córdoba, page 127). Consistent with this position, national jurisprudence has inclined towards the doctrine of "the fruits of the poisonous tree," in the sense that evidence obtained as a result of an illicit one has no probative value whatsoever. It is important to reaffirm that, despite the supra-legal status that the TALM holds, it does not place it above the Political Constitution, given that only human rights treaties achieve that condition (Article 48 of the Political Constitution). In conclusion, the obtaining of the elements of evidence that were introduced into the criminal process followed against Walter Reiche Fischel, Marvin Barrantes Vargas, Eliseo Vargas García, Rafael Ángel Calderón Fournier, Juan Carlos Sánchez Arguedas also known as Sánchez Sánchez, and Gerardo Bolaños Alpízar, through the letters rogatory to Panama and their amplifications, without observance of the constitutional and legal guarantees that govern the ability to request their obtainment pursuant to the internal order in Costa Rica, constitutes spurious evidentiary elements, illegitimately incorporated into the process. By means of defective procedural activity of an absolute nature, their ineffectiveness is declared, as well as that of the other evidentiary elements directly derived from it, specifically: the documentary evidence obtained by means of the Letters Rogatory to Panama and their amplifications; the preliminary statement (declaración indagatoria) of Walter Reiche Fischel, insofar as it is based on the evidence from Panama; the testimonies of Cecilia R. López Fitzpatrik, Panamanian prosecutor, Rolando Antonio Milord Bonilla, assistant Panamanian prosecutor, Edwin Antonio Aldeano Córdoba, Director of the Office of Execution of the Legal Assistance Treaty, all witnesses who refer to the evidence whose ineffectiveness is declared regarding its content and manner of obtainment; the Report of the OIJ, No. 200- DEF-495-04-06, insofar as it alludes to the evidence from Panama; the statement of the experts from the Judicial Investigation Organism, Maribel Porras Garita and Leticia Chavarría Bravo, in what pertains to the reference evidence. Finally, it is necessary to analyze the convalidation that the lower court (a quo) makes of all the evidence based on the letters rogatory to Panama and their amplifications, in hearing number 156 of the debate, with the Court sustaining its decision on the "authorization" given by the accused Walter Reiche Fischel when rendering his preliminary statement (declaración indagatoria); which is absolutely illegal. In the first place, because, as there are several accused parties filing the Defective Procedural Activity motion, for having seen their fundamental rights affected, since the procedural act through which the evidence was obtained did not observe respect for Due Process; the fact that Mr. Reiche Fischel himself withdraws his Defective Procedural Activity motion, an action also performed by his technical defense, cannot convalidate an act that affects other co-defendants in the case, whose fundamental right to the privacy of their documents has been violated. The citation made in the minority vote regarding jurisprudence of this Chamber in no way corresponds to the issue raised here, because in that case there is no harm to the fundamental rights of other implicated parties, and the evidence was only important in proving a fact between the person authorizing it and the offended party. In addition to the foregoing, the authorization that relieves the necessary intervention of the Judge is only valid insofar as it is given prior to the execution of the procedural act, in this sense see the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Law on Registration, Seizure, Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications, No. 7425, a provision that must be harmonized with the provisions of Article 24 of the Political Constitution and Article 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In a second and extremely important aspect, Article 29 of the cited special Law expressly provides that the authorization to gain knowledge of banking documentation, when there are several account holders, must be given by all of its holders. It is accredited in the case that the holders of account No. 104003074 of BAC INTERNATIONAL. BANK DE PANAMA, ARE WALTER REICHE FISCHEL AND EMILIO BRUCE JIMENEZ; this constitutes the main account, as it is the one opened in Panama for the purpose of receiving, as established in the appealed judgment, the monies paid by the company Instrumentarium Corp. Medko Medical, monies that are later derived to their personal accounts Marchwood Holding, Harcourt Holding, Walka, and to the personal account of the co-defendant Marvin Barrantes Vargas, according to the evidence whose ineffectiveness is declared in the majority vote. The foregoing means that, although Walter Reiche had representation, with the possibility of acting individually, this cannot be validly interpreted in contravention of the law, as the lower court (a quo) does in the challenged resolution, because Article 29 of Law No. 7425 of August 9, 1994, expressly requires the authorization of all holders, and this is so precisely because that authorization implies intrusion into the sphere of intimacy of persons and the privacy of documents, protected in the Political Constitution, whereby the provision made by one of its holders cannot violate that right over the others. Consequently, the Court's decision to convalidate the defective procedural activity affecting the letters rogatory to Panama and their amplifications is an act that does not conform to the provisions of the law; consequently, it does not have the effect of convalidating the vitiated act and does not affect in any way what was stated regarding the declaration of ineffectiveness of all evidence from Panama. Magistrates Arroyo Gutiérrez and Víquez Arias dissent. […] Regarding the complaint formulated by the appellants, concerning the fact that the evidence-opening proceeding was not scheduled, it must be indicated that there is no grievance whatsoever to declare. From the appeal filed, it must be understood that their claim, as they mention when questioning this point regarding the evidence collected in Panama, is aimed at pointing out that it is a definitive and irreproducible activity, and that therefore said hearing should have been scheduled. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber defined what should be understood as a definitive and irreproducible act, establishing that: "…an act is irreproducible when it is impossible to execute them under the same conditions, and it is definitive because its incorporation into the disciplinary process can be carried out without repeating it… In this regard, it must be indicated that this type of evidence must be carried out in the presence of all those persons who may be affected by its evacuation, even if they do not appear as investigated parties in a subsequent administrative procedure, who may make the statements they deem necessary at the time said evidence is evacuated, all with the aim of safeguarding the right of defense enshrined in Article 39 of the Political Constitution." (CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE, number 16419 at 6:30 p.m. on November 29, 2005). Our procedural regulations do not specifically contemplate an evidence-opening hearing. Despite this, as a manifestation of the right to participate in all definitive and irreproducible proceedings, so that the act may be witnessed by all those subjects who may be affected by the results of said opening, and in this way they may exercise their right of defense, it has been considered a right of the party to be present during the conduct of said proceeding, accompanied by their trusted defense counsel, if they so wish. An example of this are judicial raids, inspections, jurisdictional advance evidence (anticipos jurisdiccionales de prueba), and any other act that affects the fundamental rights of the parties. Our legislator established this through Articles 292 and 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In the present case, the appellants intend to require the jurisdictional authority to schedule a hearing to "open" the evidence that had arrived from Miami, which is absolutely improper. However, those of us who sign this majority vote reject that thesis, since we do not consider it a definitive and irreproducible act, as this documentation was the product of compliance with an assistance request, through which documentation had been collected in accordance with the formalities of the internal law of the United States of America, as previously stated, such that the Prosecutor's Office was merely receiving the product of the requested assistance, which does not imply an affectation of fundamental rights. All these actions are duly certified by consular authorities, since in this case, this means was used to request and forward them, as indicated above, confirming that the evidence is absolutely valid, and that the chain of custody was not broken, the evidence being intact and without any defect regarding its handling. Nor has any action been confirmed aimed at hiding the evidence from the parties, since all actions were brought to the knowledge of the accused, civil defendants, and other involved parties during the process, at the latest once they are notified of the preliminary hearing, a moment in which all the evidence contained in the different investigation files is made available to all of them, as provided by Article 316 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the specific case, the evidence consists of certifications that were the result of international cooperation for the collection of clues in the criminal process, so their introduction into the debate is authorized by subsection b) of Article 334 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and not by the rules for definitive and irreproducible acts.

Finally, it is worth noting that the appellants have not indicated what grievance was caused to them by the non-conduct of the hearing they miss. However, moved by the duty to analyze the evidence and its legitimacy in a comprehensive manner, and disregarding the omissions of the appellants, it must be concluded that after an examination that makes a hypothetical inclusion of an evidence-opening hearing as requested by the parties, it is not concluded that any advantage exists in it for the accused, given that the evidence was ordered by a Costa Rican judge, sent through legally established channels for the consular processing of the documentation, carried out in the United States of America in accordance with its internal law, and duly certified by the corresponding authorities, this being sufficient reason to consider that a hearing where a package containing that documentation is opened is not relevant for the defense of the accused, especially under the considerations that have been made regarding the purity of the handling of the chain of custody. Based on all these reasons, those of us who concur in this majority vote consider that there is no harm whatsoever to the right to a hearing and defense, nor to due process, with the claim formulated by the defense.

Consequently, this complaint must be declared without merit.” III. […] **Regarding the challenge to the validity of evidence obtained from Panama**: By majority vote of judges **Ramírez Quirós, Pereira Villalobos, and Chinchilla Sandí**, this part of the claim, also raised as the second ground of appeal, is upheld. The nullity of the evidence gathered in Panama through the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama (T.A.L.M.) and all evidentiary elements directly dependent upon it is decreed. To analyze the appellants’ claim, we must first trace the origins of the 1996 reform of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), which is inspired by respect for human rights, whether the individual is an accused (imputado) or a victim. Regarding the accused, which is the point at issue, the principle of Presumption of Innocence is established as a foundation. From this principle derives, among others, the necessity of a prior trial and that the procedure be the one regulated by the Code, as also determined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 11; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14; and the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, paragraph 2. These treaties, as they all refer to fundamental human rights, are and must be analyzed with primacy over any mutual legal assistance treaty between countries, including the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, Article 2. Returning to the antecedents of the Code of Criminal Procedure currently governing us, one of the fundamental aspects it reclaims is respect for Due Process (Debido Proceso), and it places special emphasis on the Inviolability of the Defense (Inviolabilidad de la Defensa) (Article 39 of the Political Constitution). Therefore, we have very rightly affirmed that the reform in question is nothing less than the constitutionalization of Criminal Procedural Law. Under this conception, the legislature considered that the investigation of criminal cases should be directed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público), precisely for greater control over how evidence is brought into the process, in strict compliance with the Constitution and the law. In other words, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which is responsible for criminal investigation, must direct the actions of investigative officers to bring evidentiary elements into the process by all lawful means at their disposal. The foregoing implies the absolute prohibition of using illegitimate means of evidence, which the Judge, consequently, cannot grant any formal or material significance, because the procedural system, under no circumstances, tolerates the sacrifice of constitutional guarantees that protect the citizen in favor of the search for truth in the criminal process. (In this sense, the Judicial Investigation Organism (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público), and the Judge must strictly adhere to the Constitution, International Treaties on Human Rights, and the Law), because the legitimacy of acts and their lawfulness become the only valid criterion to be taken into consideration by the judge in resolving a specific case. The contrary obligates the hierarchical superior to declare, even sua sponte (de oficio), the ineffectiveness (ineficacia) of the procedural act. In the specific case, the evidentiary elements obtained in the Republic of Panama, although it is true that, according to the internal laws of that country, in which, due to the constitutional rank of the Public Prosecutor’s Office prior to the 2008 reform of Panama’s Code of Criminal Procedure, it had the power to lift bank secrecy (secreto bancario) without jurisdictional authorization in the process of an investigation in that country, and therefore, as the appealed judgment indicates, in the procedure carried out in that country, there is no violation of internal Panamanian law, and thus, for that system, the evidence was legally obtained, a serious initial procedural defect exists, occurring in Costa Rica, regarding the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Code requires the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) to submit the request for the lifting of bank secrecy (levantamiento del secreto bancario) to the Judge of Guarantees (Juez de Garantías) in order to request from the Central Authority (Autoridad Central) (pursuant to the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance) the assistance needed to bring from that country evidence that entails violating the sphere of intimacy of individuals’ accounts and private correspondence. This absolute procedural defect, in our view, has been overlooked by all intervening authorities in process number 04-005356-042-PE, by arguing that, since the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Panama is empowered to carry out the act, the Public Prosecutor’s Office in our country can arrogate to itself the right to directly request the Central Authority (the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, Procuraduría General de la República) to perform the diligence, without the assessment of the Judge of Guarantees being necessary. This interpretation, in our view, can in no way be endorsed by those of us who have been appointed as the last instance to which the parties can appeal for the satisfaction and safeguarding of the fundamental rights of their clients. It cannot be valid in our Democratic State of Law that, for the sake of agile compliance in the prosecution of persons accused of the alleged commission of criminal acts, without exception of the person involved, the rights assisting persons accused of a crime, from the very moment they are considered suspects in the commission of that criminal act, be trampled upon (by whoever held the functional direction of the process in the Public Prosecutor’s Office at that specific time) in an arbitrary and illegitimate manner, with an erroneous interpretation of unlimited powers. It is clear that our democratic system, in its Legal System, has opted for the wise decision to leave it in the hands of the competent jurisdictional body to ensure the protection of fundamental rights (among which are the right to intimacy, the secrecy of communications, and the inviolability of private documents). Therefore, it authorizes, under exceptional and previously established circumstances, the cases in which these rights can be restricted, specifically for the knowledge of matters submitted to the Courts of Justice, in which the judge can order the lifting of that secrecy. In the present case, that jurisdictional assessment was required to request the Central Authority, pursuant to the cited treaty, to give the corresponding processing to the request for assistance that the Public Prosecutor’s Office required to bring documentary evidence from Panamanian banks to the investigation. This is so because it must be the judge who weighs the necessity, utility, relevance, and proportionality of the request made by the body in charge of the investigation. It is important to note here that the interpretation given in this process by the Public Prosecutor’s Office is erroneous. This body, in our understanding, is the first that must be clear about its function and its investigative powers, up to where the Constitution and the Law in force confer them. This is to avoid carrying out an action that, it should have known, set aside the limits imposed by the legal system when it directly requested the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic to give the corresponding processing to the execution of a request for assistance to Panama, which should have been previously authorized by the Judge of Guarantees, since it involved violating the fundamental rights of persons subject to process in our country. And, as is known to each and every one of the justice operators in Costa Rica, ordinary legislation requires that: a) the order be duly substantiated; b) if possible, to individualize the documents on which the decision will be executed, the name of the person holding them, and the place where they are located; c) to have as a prerequisite a criminal activity, with a verified indication of its commission. All these aspects require prior weighing of the necessity, suitability, and proportionality of the request, which the Public Prosecutor’s Office should have brought to the attention of the jurisdictional authority. It would be a gross error to conclude, as the lower court (a quo) does, and as endorsed by the minority opinion of this Chamber, that this implies giving an order to the Panamanian authorities. Quite the contrary, it constitutes the endorsement of the jurisdictional authority of Costa Rica so that the Central Authority of our country, pursuant to the repeatedly cited treaty, could proceed as stipulated before the competent authority of Panama. The foregoing is not a mere formality; it constitutes the procedural act that legitimizes, according to the internal legal system, the intrusion into the private sphere of a person. This is because it is not the function or power of the Attorney General (Fiscal General), or of the representatives of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, to request and obtain confidential information from individuals without prior authorization from the Judge who guarantees respect for the fundamental rights of citizens subject to process. This is concluded from the stipulations of Articles 24 of the Political Constitution, 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 11, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, all encompassed in Articles 2 and 3 of the Law on Recording, Seizure, Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications (Ley sobre Registro, Secuestro, Examen de Documentos Privados e Intervención de las Comunicaciones), No. 7425 (a law that even criminally penalizes its non-compliance), and 107 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). The power established in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in its Articles 226 and 290, final paragraph, for the Public Prosecutor’s Office to request reports from private individuals or public entities, according to what is stipulated, applies only insofar as it does not concern private information, protected by Article 24 of the Political Constitution. The contrary, according to the second paragraph of Article 181 of the CPP, implies violation of Due Process (Debido Proceso) for infringement of the fundamental right to the privacy of private documents. The Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance aims to strengthen and facilitate the cooperation of the justice administration organs of the region through an instrument that allows assistance in criminal matters, but it is clear that this must be done with full respect for the internal legislation of each member State. What is substituted is the cumbersome consular procedure; to streamline communication channels, but in no way can its content have repercussions on the system of guarantees applicable in the country. So much so that its Preamble expressly establishes that this assistance is given with full respect for the internal legislation of each State. As mentioned at the beginning of this vote, the possibility of streamlining procedures cannot become an open invitation to arbitrariness, arrogance, and disrespect for constitutional guarantees and the current internal legal system. It is not legitimate that, as happened in the present case, representatives of the Public Prosecutor’s Office even travel to another country to be present at the collection of evidence and yet do not take the minimum time to correctly make the request before the corresponding jurisdictional authority. This sacrifices essential evidence for the resolution of the case submitted to the knowledge of Costa Rican courts, as the ineffectiveness (ineficacia) of the act carried out in violation of Due Process (Debido Proceso) must be decreed, and it also entails time and money that we all Costa Ricans must also pay. On previous occasions, this Chamber has already declared the ineffectiveness of actions in similar procedural acts where the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in the practice thereof, acted contrary to the law, with very regrettable consequences for the proper administration of justice. In this respect, as noted at the outset, without exception of the person subjected to the process, the law is equal for all. Consequently, it is not about achieving a conviction at all costs, but rather the conviction resulting from a correct introduction of evidence into the process, in accordance with the Constitution and the law in force in the country, and its consequent assessment, in strict adherence to the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), such that the prosecuting entity should be the first interested in presenting a case to the jurisdictional body not only with the possibility of making its thesis prevail in the adversarial debate because it possesses sufficient evidence, but also that this evidence is effective because its collection respected the constitutional guarantees that protect the person subject to process. On this subject, the doctrine has held: “…*In our environment, the constitutional structuring of procedural rules has always been under discussion. Thus, for example, information obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees cannot be used. Therefore, Article 96 of the NCPP conditions the validity of the act on respect for the fundamental rights of the person, except ‘if it favors the accused’ (Art 181 NCPP). The doctrinal current is maintained, which orders that these types of irregularities are not susceptible to validation (convalidación) in accordance with Article 178 NCPP and must be declared sua sponte (de oficio) by the Judge, as long as they imply non-observance of rights and guarantees not only in the Constitution but also in current International or Community Law*.” (ARMIJO SANCHO, Gilberth, Garantías Constitucionales, Prueba Ilícita y Transición al Nuevo Código Procesal Penal. Premio Anual. Alberto Brenes Córdoba, page 127). Consistent with this position, national jurisprudence has leaned towards the doctrine of “*the fruits of the poisonous tree*” in the sense that evidence obtained as a result of illicit evidence has no probative value. It is important to reaffirm that, despite the supralegal rank held by the TALM, this does not place it above the Political Constitution, as only human rights treaties achieve that condition (Article 48 of the Political Constitution). In conclusion, the gathering of the evidentiary elements introduced into the criminal process against Walter Reiche Fischel, Marvin Barrantes Vargas, Eliseo Vargas García, Rafael Ángel Calderón Fournier, Juan Carlos Sánchez Arguedas, also known as Sánchez Sánchez, and Gerardo Bolaños Alpízar, through letters rogatory to Panama and their expansions, without observance of the constitutional and legal guarantees required to request their gathering according to the internal legal system in Costa Rica, constitutes spurious evidentiary elements, illegitimately incorporated into the process. Through an absolutely defective procedural activity, their ineffectiveness (ineficacia) is declared, as well as that of the other evidentiary elements directly derived from them, specifically: the documentary evidence obtained through the Letters Rogatory to Panama and their expansions; the investigative statement (declaración indagatoria) of Walter Reiche Fischel, to the extent it is based on the evidence from Panama; the testimonies of Cecilia R. López Fitzpatrick, Panamanian Prosecutor; Rolando Antonio Milord Bonilla, Assistant to the Panamanian Prosecutor’s Office; Edwin Antonio Aldeano Córdoba, Director of the Office for the Execution of the Legal Assistance Treaty; all witnesses who refer to the evidence whose ineffectiveness is declared regarding the content and manner of its gathering; the OIJ Report No. 200-DEF-495-04-06, to the extent it alludes to the evidence from Panama; the declarations of the experts from the Judicial Investigation Organism, Maribel Porras Garita and Leticia Chavarría Bravo, regarding what pertains to the referenced evidence. Finally, it is necessary to analyze the **validation (convalidación) that the lower court (a quo) performs over all the evidence based on the letters rogatory to Panama and their expansions, in hearing number 156 of the trial, with the Court basing its decision on the “authorization” given by the accused (imputado) Walter Reiche Fischel upon rendering his investigative statement (declaración indagatoria)**; this is absolutely illegal. In the first place, because, as there are several accused individuals filing the Defective Procedural Activity (Actividad Procesal Defectuosa) claim, since their fundamental rights were affected because the procedural act through which the evidence was obtained did not observe respect for Due Process (Debido Proceso), the fact that Mr. Reiche Fischel himself desisted from his objection for Defective Procedural Activity, an action also taken by his technical defense, cannot validate (convalidar) an act that affects other co-defendants in the case, whose fundamental right to the privacy of their documents has been violated. The citation made in the minority vote regarding jurisprudence of this Chamber in no way corresponds to the issue raised here, because in that case there was no injury to the fundamental rights of other implicated parties, and the evidence was only important in accrediting a fact between the person authorizing it and the offended party. Adding to the above, the authorization that replaces the necessary intervention of the Judge is only valid insofar as it is given prior to the execution of the procedural act. In this sense, see the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Law on Recording, Seizure, Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications (Ley sobre Registro, Secuestro, Examen de Documentos Privados e Intervención de Comunicaciones), No. 7425, a provision that must be harmonized with what is stipulated in Article 24 of the Political Constitution and Article 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In a second and extremely important aspect, Article 29 of the cited special Law expressly provides that the authorization to obtain bank documentation, when there are multiple account holders, must be given by all its holders. It is accredited in the case that the holders of account No. 104003074 at BAC INTERNATIONAL BANK DE PANAMA are WALTER REICHE FISCHEL AND EMILIO BRUCE JIMENEZ. This constitutes the main account, as it is the one opened in Panama for the purpose of receiving, according to the appealed judgment, the monies paid by the company Instrumentarium Corp. Medko Medical, monies later transferred to their personal accounts Marchwood Holding, Harcourt Holding, Walka, and to the personal account of the co-defendant (co-encartado) Marvin Barrantes Vargas, according to the evidence whose ineffectiveness (ineficacia) is declared in the majority vote. The foregoing means that, although Walter Reiche had representation with the possibility of acting individually, this cannot be validly interpreted in contravention of the law, as the lower court (a quo) does in the challenged decision, because Article 29 of Law No. 7425 of August 9, 1994, expressly requires the authorization of all holders. And this is precisely because that authorization implies intrusion into the sphere of intimacy of persons and the privacy of documents, protected by the Political Constitution. Therefore, the willingness assumed by one of its holders cannot violate that right of the others. Consequently, the Court’s decision to validate (convalidar) the defective procedural activity affecting the letters rogatory to Panama and their expansions is an act not in conformity with the law. Consequently, it does not produce the effect of validating (convalidar) the vitiated act and in no way affects what has been stated regarding the declaration of ineffectiveness (ineficacia) of all evidence originating from Panama. Judges Arroyo Gutiérrez and Víquez Arias dissent.

Regarding the complaint made by the appellants, that the proceeding for the opening of evidence was not scheduled, it must be stated that there is no injury to be declared. From the appeal filed, it must be understood that their claim, as they mention when questioning this point with respect to the evidence gathered in Panama, is aimed at pointing out that it is a definitive and irreproducible (definitiva e irreproductible) activity, and that for that reason said hearing should have been scheduled. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) defined what should be understood as a definitive and irreproducible (definitivo e irreproductible) act, establishing that: “...an act is irreproducible (irreproductible) when there is an impossibility of executing it under the same conditions, and it is definitive because its incorporation into the disciplinary proceeding may be carried out without repeating it... Regarding this matter, it must be stated that this type of evidence must be produced in the presence of all those persons who may be affected by the taking of such evidence, even if they do not appear as investigated parties in a subsequent administrative proceeding, who may make the statements they consider necessary at the moment said evidence is produced, all with the purpose of safeguarding the right to defense enshrined in Article 39 of the Political Constitution.” (CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE, number 16419 of 6:30 p.m. on November 29, 2005). Our procedural law does not specifically contemplate a hearing for the opening of evidence. Despite this, as a manifestation of the right to participate in all definitive and irreproducible (definitivas e irreproductibles) proceedings, so that the act is witnessed by all those subjects who may be affected by the results of that opening, and thus may exercise their right to defense, it has been considered a right of the party to be present during the execution of said proceeding, accompanied by their trusted defense counsel, if they so wish. An example of this are searches, inspections, advance judicial evidence proceedings (anticipos jurisdiccionales de prueba), and any other act that affects the fundamental rights of the parties. This was established in this manner by our legislator through Articles 292 and 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal). In the present case, the challengers intend that the jurisdictional authority be required to schedule a hearing to “open” the evidence that had arrived from Miami, which is absolutely improper. However, those of us who subscribe to this majority opinion reject that thesis, since we do not consider it to be a definitive and irreproducible (definitivo e irreproductible) act, as this documentation was the product of fulfilling a request for assistance, through which documentation had been collected in accordance with the formalities of the internal law of the United States of America, as stated previously, so in the Prosecutor's Office (Fiscalía), the product of the requested assistance was merely being received, which does not imply an infringement of fundamental rights. All these actions are duly certified by the consular authorities, since in this case, this means was used to request and forward them, as indicated above, confirming that the evidence is absolutely valid, and that the chain of custody was not broken, with the evidence being intact and without any defect regarding its handling. Nor has any action aimed at concealing the evidence from the parties been verified, since all actions were made known to the accused, civil defendants, and other involved parties, during the proceeding, at the latest once they are notified of the holding of the preliminary hearing, at which time all the evidence contained in the different investigation files is made available to all of them, as provided by Article 316 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal). In the specific case, the evidence consists of certifications that were the result of international cooperation for the collection of evidence in the criminal proceeding, so its introduction into the debate is authorized by subsection b) of Article 334 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), and not by the rules for definitive and irreproducible (definitivos e irreproductibles) acts. Finally, it should be noted that the appellants have not indicated what injury was caused to them by not holding the hearing they miss. However, moved by the duty to analyze the evidence and its legitimacy completely, and disregarding the challengers' omissions, it must be concluded that after an examination that makes a hypothetical inclusion of a hearing for the opening of evidence as the parties request, it is not concluded that there is any advantage in it for the accused, given that the evidence was ordered by a Costa Rican judge, sent through the channels legally established for the consular processing of documentation, produced in the United States of America, in accordance with its internal law, and duly certified by the corresponding authorities, sufficient reason to consider that a hearing where a package containing that documentation is opened is not relevant to the defense of the accused, especially under the considerations that have been made regarding the purity in the handling of the chain of custody. Based on all these reasons, those of us concurring in this majority opinion consider that there is no injury to the right to a hearing and defense, nor to due process from the claim made by the defense. Consequently, this complaint must be declared without merit.” Under this conception, the legislator determined that the investigation of criminal cases should be directed by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), precisely for greater control in the manner of bringing evidence into the process, in strict compliance with the Constitution and the law; in other words, the Public Prosecutor's Office, which is in charge of crime investigation, must direct the actions of investigative officers, to bring, through all lawful means at its disposal, the evidentiary elements into the process; this implies the absolute prohibition of using illegitimate means of evidence, which, consequently, the Judge cannot grant any formal or material significance, because the procedural system, under no circumstances, tolerates the sacrifice of constitutional guarantees that protect the citizen, in favor of the search for truth in the criminal process (in this sense, the Judicial Investigation Organization (Organismo de Investigación Judicial, OIJ), the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the Judge must adhere strictly to the Constitution, International Treaties on Human Rights, and the Law), because the legitimacy of the acts and their lawfulness become the only valid criterion to be considered by the judge in resolving a specific case; the contrary means the obligation of the hierarchical superior to declare, even ex officio, the nullity (ineficacia) of the procedural act.

In the specific case, the evidentiary elements obtained in the Republic of Panama, although it is true, according to the internal laws of that country, in which, due to the constitutional status of the Public Prosecutor's Office prior to the reform of the Panamanian Code of Criminal Procedure in the year two thousand eight, it was granted the power to lift bank secrecy without jurisdictional authorization during the course of an investigation in that country, and therefore, as the appealed ruling indicates, in the procedure carried out in that country, there is no violation of internal Panamanian law, hence for that legal system, the evidence was obtained legally; there exists a serious procedural defect from the outset, which occurs in Costa Rica, regarding the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires the Public Prosecutor's Office to submit the request to lift bank secrecy to the Guarantee Judge (Juez de Garantías), to manage before the Central Authority (Autoridad Central) (pursuant to the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty) the assistance to bring from that country evidence that implies violating the sphere of privacy of their accounts and private correspondence; this absolute procedural defect, in our opinion, has been overlooked by all the intervening authorities in process number 04-005356-042-PE, arguing that, since in Panama the Public Prosecutor's Office is empowered to carry out the act, in our country the Public Prosecutor's Office can arrogate to itself the right to directly request the Central Authority (Procuraduría General de la República) to carry out the diligence, without the assessment of the Guarantee Judge being necessary; an interpretation that, in our opinion, cannot in any way be endorsed by those of us who have been appointed as the last instance to which the parties may appeal for the satisfaction and safeguarding of the fundamental rights of their clients.

It cannot be valid in our Democratic State of Law that, for the sake of expeditious compliance with the prosecution of persons accused of the alleged commission of criminal acts, without discrimination as to the person involved, the rights that assist persons accused of committing a crime, from the very moment they are deemed suspects of the commission of that criminal act, are arbitrarily and illegitimately trampled (by whomever held the functional direction of the process in the Public Prosecutor's Office at that specific time) due to a mistaken interpretation of unlimited powers. It is clear that our democratic system, in its Legal System, has opted for the wise decision to leave in the hands of the competent jurisdictional body the task of ensuring the protection of fundamental rights (among which are the right to privacy, secrecy of communications, and inviolability of private documents), which is why it authorizes, under exceptional and previously established circumstances, the cases in which these rights may be restricted, specifically for the adjudication of matters submitted to the Courts of Justice, in which the judge may order the lifting of that secrecy.

In the present case, that jurisdictional assessment was required to request the Central Authority, pursuant to the cited treaty, to give the corresponding processing to the request for assistance that the Public Prosecutor's Office required, to bring documentary evidence from Panamanian banks to the investigation; this is so because it must be the judge who weighs the necessity, utility, relevance, and proportionality of the request made by the body in charge of the investigation. Here it is important to note that the interpretation given in this process by the Public Prosecutor's Office is erroneous, a body which, in our understanding, is the first that must be clear about its function and its investigative powers, up to the limits granted by the Constitution and the Law in force, so as not to carry out an action that, it should have known, set aside the limits that the legal system imposes on it by directly requesting the Procuraduría General de la República to process a request for assistance to Panama, which should have been previously authorized by the Guarantee Judge, since it implied violating the fundamental rights of persons subjected to proceedings in our country and, as is known by each and every one of the justice operators in Costa Rica, ordinary legislation requires that: a) the order be duly substantiated. b) If possible, individualize the documents upon which the decision will be executed, the name of the person who holds them, and the place where they are located. c) Have as a prerequisite a criminal activity, with the determination of a verified indication regarding its commission. All these aspects require the prior weighing of the necessity, suitability, and proportionality of the request that the Public Prosecutor's Office should have submitted to the jurisdictional authority; it would be a gross error to conclude, as the a quo court does and the minority opinion of this Chamber endorses, that this implies giving an order to the Panamanian authorities; quite the contrary, it constitutes the endorsement of the Costa Rican jurisdictional authority so that the Central Authority of our country, pursuant to the repeatedly cited treaty, could proceed with the stipulations before the competent authority of Panama.

The foregoing is not a mere formalism; it constitutes the procedural act that legitimizes, according to the internal legal system, the intrusion decreed into the private sphere of a person, because it is neither the function nor the power of the Attorney General, nor of the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, to require and ascertain confidential information of persons, without prior authorization from the Judge, the guarantor of respect for the fundamental rights of citizens subjected to proceedings. This is concluded from the provisions of Articles 24 of the Political Constitution, 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 11, subsections 2 and 3 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, all encompassed in Articles 2 and 3 of Law on Registration, Seizure, Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications, No. 7425 (a law that even criminally sanctions its non-compliance) and 107 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch.

The power established by the Code of Criminal Procedure, in its Articles 226 and 290, final paragraph, for the Public Prosecutor's Office to require reports from private persons or public entities, according to the stipulations, is so as long as it does not concern private information, protected by Article 24 of the Political Constitution; otherwise, according to the second paragraph of Article 181 of the CPP, it implies a violation of Due Process (Debido Proceso), due to infringement of the fundamental right to the privacy of private documents.

The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (Tratado de Asistencia Legal Mutua) aims to strengthen and facilitate the cooperation of the justice administration bodies of the region, through an instrument that allows assistance in criminal matters, but it is clear that this must occur with full respect for the internal legislation of each Member State; what is substituted is the cumbersome consular procedure to expedite communication channels, and its content can in no way have repercussions on the system of guarantees applicable in the country, so much so that its preamble expressly establishes that this assistance is provided with full respect for the internal legislation of each State.

As mentioned at the beginning of this vote, the possibility of expediting procedures cannot become an open letter to arbitrariness, arrogance, and disrespect for constitutional guarantees and the internal legal system in force. It is not legitimate that, as happened in this case, representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office even travel to another country to be present during the collection of evidence and do not take the minimum time to correctly make the request before the corresponding jurisdictional authority, thereby sacrificing essential evidence for the resolution of the case submitted to the knowledge of the Costa Rican courts, as the nullity of the act carried out in violation of Due Process must be decreed, which, moreover, entails time and money that all Costa Ricans must also pay. On previous occasions, this Chamber has declared the nullity of actions in similar procedural acts in which the Public Prosecutor's Office, in their execution, acted contrary to the law, with very regrettable consequences for the correct administration of justice, and in this respect, as noted at the beginning, without discrimination as to the person subjected to the process, the law is equal for all and, consequently, it is not about achieving a conviction at all costs, but rather one that results from the correct introduction of evidence to the process, in accordance with the Constitution and the law in force in the country, and its consequent assessment, in strict adherence to the rules of sound criticism (reglas de la sana crítica), such that the prosecuting entity must be the first interested in presenting a case to the jurisdictional body, not only with the possibility of making its thesis prevail in the adversarial debate because it possesses sufficient evidence, but also that this evidence is effective because in its collection it has respected the constitutional guarantees that protect the person subjected to proceedings. On this subject, doctrine has maintained, “…*In our environment, the constitutional structuring of procedural norms has always been under discussion. Thus, for example, information obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees cannot be used; therefore, Article 96 of the NCPP conditions the validity of the act to respect for the fundamental rights of the person, except “if it favors the accused” (Art 181 NCPP). The doctrinal trend persists, which orders that this type of irregularities are not capable of convalidation in accordance with Article 178 NCPP and must be declared ex officio by the Judge, provided they imply non-observance of rights and guarantees not only in the Constitution but also in International or Community Law in force*.” (ARMIJO SANCHO, Gilberth, Garantías Constitucionales, Prueba Ilícita y Transición al Nuevo Código Procesal Penal. Premio Anual. Alberto Brenes Córdoba, page 127).

Consistent with this position, national jurisprudence has leaned towards the doctrine of “*the fruits of the poisonous tree*,” in the sense that evidence obtained as a result of unlawful evidence has no probative value. It is important to reaffirm that, despite the supra-legal status held by the TALM, it does not place it above the Political Constitution, given that this condition is only achieved by treaties on Human Rights (Article 48 of the Political Constitution). In conclusion, the obtaining of the elements of evidence that were brought into the criminal process against Walter Reiche Fischel, Marvin Barrantes Vargas, Eliseo Vargas García, Rafael Ángel Calderón Fournier, Juan Carlos Sánchez Arguedas known as Sánchez Sánchez, and Gerardo Bolaños Alpízar, through the letters rogatory to Panama and their amplifications, without observing the constitutional and legal guarantees that govern the ability to request their obtaining according to the internal legal system in Costa Rica, constitute spurious (espúria) evidentiary elements, illegitimately incorporated into the process. Through absolutely defective procedural activity, their nullity is declared, as well as that of the other evidentiary elements directly derived from them, specifically: the documentary evidence obtained through the Letters Rogatory to Panama and their amplifications, the investigative statement (declaración indagatoria) of Walter Reiche Fischel, insofar as it is based on the evidence from Panama; the testimonies of Cecilia R. López Fitzpatrik, Panamanian Prosecutor, Rolando Antonio Milord Bonilla, assistant to the Panamanian Prosecutor's Office, Edwin Antonio Aldeano Córdoba, Director of the Office of Execution of the Legal Assistance Treaty, all witnesses who refer to the evidence whose nullity is declared regarding the content and method of obtaining; the Report of the OIJ, No. 200-DEF-495-04-06, insofar as it alludes to the evidence from Panama; statement of the experts of the Judicial Investigation Organization, Maribel Porras Garita and Leticia Chavarría Bravo, in what pertains to the referenced evidence.

Finally, it is appropriate to analyze the **convalidation that the a quo court performs on all the evidence based on the letters rogatory to Panama and their amplifications, in hearing number 156 of the debate, the Court basing its decision on the “authorization” given by the accused Walter Reiche Fischel when rendering his investigative statement**; which is absolutely illegal. In the first place because, since there are several accused who filed the Defective Procedural Activity (Actividad Procesal Defectuosa) motion for having seen their fundamental rights affected, as the procedural act through which the evidence was obtained did not observe respect for Due Process; the fact that Mr. Reiche Fischel himself desists from his Defective Procedural Activity motion, an action also carried out by his technical defense, cannot convalidate an act that affects other co-accused in the case, whose fundamental right to privacy of their documents has been violated. The citation made in the minority opinion of jurisprudence from this Chamber in no way corresponds to the issue raised here, because in that case, there is no injury to fundamental rights of other implicated parties, and the evidence only had importance in accrediting a fact between the person authorizing it and the offended party. Added to the above, the authorization that relieves the necessary intervention of the Judge is only valid insofar as it is given prior to the execution of the procedural act; in this sense, see the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Law on Registration, Seizure, Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications, No. 7425, a provision that must be harmonized with the provisions of Article 24 of the Political Constitution and Article 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In a second and very important aspect, Article 29 of the cited special Law expressly provides that the authorization to access bank documentation, when there are several account holders, must be given by all its holders. It is accredited in the case that the holders of account No. 104003074 of BAC INTERNATIONAL BANK DE PANAMA are WALTER REICHE FISCHEL AND EMILIO BRUCE JIMENEZ; this constitutes the main account, since it is the one opened in Panama for the purpose of receiving, as established in the appealed ruling, the monies paid by the company Instrumentarium Corp. Medko Medical, monies that are then derived to their personal accounts Marchwood Holding, Harcourt Holding, Walka, and to the personal account of the co-defendant Marvin Barrantes Vargas, according to the evidence whose nullity is declared in the majority opinion. The foregoing means that, although Walter Reiche had the representation, with the possibility of acting individually, this cannot validly be interpreted, in contravention of the law, as the a quo court does in the challenged resolution, because Article 29 of Law No. 7425 of August 9, 1994, expressly requires the authorization of all holders, and this is so precisely because that authorization implies intrusion into the sphere of intimacy of persons and into the privacy of documents, protected in the Political Constitution, hence the provision made by one of its holders cannot violate that right of the others. Consequently, the Court's decision to convalidate the defective procedural activity that affects the letters rogatory to Panama and their amplifications is an act that does not conform to the provisions of the law; consequently, it does not have the effect of convalidating the flawed act and does not affect in any way what has been said about the declaration of nullity of all evidence originating from Panama.

Magistrates Arroyo Gutiérrez and Víquez Arias dissent. […] Regarding the complaint made by the appellants, that the diligence of opening the evidence was not scheduled, it must be noted that there is no injury to declare. From the appeal filed, it must be understood that their claim, as mentioned when they question this point regarding the evidence collected in Panama, is aimed at pointing out that it is a definitive and unreproducible (irreproductible) activity, and that therefore said hearing should have been scheduled. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) defined what should be understood as a definitive and unreproducible act, establishing that: “*…an act is unreproducible when there is an impossibility of executing it under the same conditions, and it is definitive because its incorporation into the disciplinary process can be carried out without repeating it… In this regard, it must be noted that this class of evidence must be practiced in the presence of all those persons who may be affected by its evacuation, even if they do not appear as investigated in a subsequent administrative proceeding, who may make the statements they deem necessary at the time said evidence is evacuated, all with the purpose of safeguarding the right of defense enshrined in Article 39 of the Political Constitution.*” (CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE, number 16419 of 18:30 hours of November 29, 2005).

Our procedural regulations do not specifically contemplate an evidence-opening hearing. Despite this, as a manifestation of the right to participate in all definitive and unreproducible diligences, so that the act is witnessed by all those subjects who may be affected by the results of said opening, and in this way they can exercise their right of defense, it has been considered a right of the party to be present during the execution of said diligence, accompanied by their defense attorney of choice, if so desired. An example of this are raids, searches, anticipatory jurisdictional evidence, and any other act that affects the fundamental rights of the parties. This is how our legislator established it through Articles 292 and 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In the present case, the challengers intend that the jurisdictional authority be required to schedule a hearing to “open” the evidence that had arrived from Miami, which is absolutely inadmissible. However, those of us who subscribe to this majority opinion reject that thesis, since we do not consider it to be a definitive and unreproducible act, as this documentation was the product of the fulfillment of a request for assistance, through which documentation had been collected in accordance with the formalities of the internal law of the United States of America, as stated previously, so in the District Attorney's Office (Fiscalía), the product of the requested assistance was merely being received, which does not imply an affectation of fundamental rights.

All these actions are duly certified by the consular authorities, since in this case, this means was used to request and remit them, as indicated above, verifying that the evidence is absolutely valid, and that the chain of custody was not broken, the evidence being found intact and without any defect regarding its handling. Nor has any action aimed at hiding the evidence from the parties been verified, since all the actions were brought to the attention of the accused, civil defendants, and other involved parties during the process, no later than when they are notified of the holding of the preliminary hearing, at which time all the evidence contained in the different investigation files is made available to all of them, pursuant to Article 316 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In the specific case, the evidence consists of certifications that were the result of international cooperation for the collection of indications in the criminal process, so their introduction to the debate is authorized by subsection b) of Article 334 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and not by the rules for definitive and unreproducible acts.

Finally, it is worth highlighting that the appellants have not indicated what injury was caused to them by not holding the hearing they miss. However, moved by the duty to analyze the evidence and its legitimacy in an integral manner, and disregarding the omissions of the challengers, it must be concluded that, after an examination that hypothetically includes an evidence-opening hearing as requested by the parties, it is not concluded that there is an advantage to the accused in it, given that the evidence was ordered by a Costa Rican judge, sent through the legally established channels for the consular processing of documentation, practiced in the United States of America in accordance with its internal law, and duly certified by the corresponding authorities, sufficient reason to consider that a hearing where a package containing that documentation is opened is not relevant for the defense of the accused, especially under the considerations that have been made regarding the purity in the handling of the chain of custody. Based on all these reasons, those of us who concur in this majority opinion consider that there is no injury to the right to a hearing and defense, nor to due process with the claim made by the defense. Therefore, this complaint must be declared without merit.

“III. […] Respecto al alegato contra la validez de la prueba de Panamá: Por mayoría conformada por los magistrados Ramírez Quirós, Pereira Villalobos y Chinchilla Sandí se declara con lugar este extremo del reclamo, formulado también mediante el segundo motivo de apelación, decretándose la nulidad de la prueba recabada en Panamá por medio del Tratado de Asistencia Legal Mutua en Asuntos Penales entre las Repúblicas de Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua y Panamá (T.A.L.M.) y todos los elementos probatorios que de ésta dependen directamente. Para analizar el reclamo de los recurrentes, hemos en primer lugar, remontarnos a los orígenes de la reforma del Código Procesal Penal de 1996, el cual está inspirado en el respeto a los derechos del hombre, sea éste imputado o víctima. Respecto del imputado, que es el punto discutido, se establece como fundamento el principio de Inocencia, del que deriva, entre otros, la necesidad de juicio previo y que el proceso sea el que el Código reglamenta, así lo determinan también La Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, artículo 11, El Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, artículo 14 y La Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, artículo 8, inciso 2, tratados que por referirse todos a los derechos fundamentales del hombre, están y deben ser analizados, con primacía sobre cualquier tratado de asistencia legal mutua entre los países, así artículo 2 Tratado a Asistencia Legal Mutua en Asuntos Penales entre las Repúblicas de Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua y Panamá. Volviendo a los antecedentes del Código Procesal Penal que nos rige en la actualidad, uno de los aspectos fundamentales que retoma, es el respeto al Debido Proceso y, pone especial énfasis en la Inviolabilidad de la Defensa (artículo 39 de la Constitución Política), por ello hemos afirmado, con gran acierto que, la reforma en mención, no es más que la constitucionalización del Derecho Procesal Penal. Bajo esta concepción estimó el legislador que, la investigación de las causas penales, debería estar direccionada por el Ministerio Público, precisamente por un mayor control en la forma de allegar la prueba al proceso, en cumplimiento estricto de la Constitución y la ley; en otras palabras, el Ministerio Público, que tiene a su cargo la investigación del crimen, debe dirigir la actuación de los oficiales de investigación, a efecto de hacer llegar, mediante todos los medios lícitos a su alcance, los elementos probatorios al proceso; lo anterior implica la prohibición absoluta de valerse de medios de prueba ilegítimos que, consecuentemente el Juez no podrá darles alguna trascendencia formal o material, porque el ordenamiento procesal, bajo ninguna circunstancia, tolera el sacrifico de la garantías constitucionales, que protegen al ciudadano, a favor de la búsqueda de la verdad en el proceso penal, ( en este sentido el Organismo de Investigación Judicial, el Ministerio Público y el Juez deben apegarse estrictamente a la Constitución, Tratados Internacionales sobre Derechos Humanos y a la Ley) porque la legitimidad de los actos y su licitud, se convierten en el único criterio válido para ser tomado en consideración por el juez en la resolución de un caso en concreto, lo contrario significa la obligación del superior jerárquico de declarar, aún de oficio, la ineficacia del acto procesal. En el caso concreto, los elementos probatorios obtenidos en la República de Panamá, si bien es cierto, conforme a las leyes internas de ese país, en las cuales, por el rango constitucional del Ministerio Público, anterior a la reforma del Código Procesal Penal de Panamá, del año dos mil ocho, le confería la potestad de levantar el secreto bancario, sin autorización jurisdiccional, en el proceso de una investigación en ese país y por lo tanto, tal como lo indica el fallo recurrido, en el procedimiento realizado en aquel país, no existe violación al derecho interno Panameño, de donde para aquel ordenamiento, la prueba se obtiene legalmente; existe un grave defecto procesal de inicio, que se da en Costa Rica, en cuanto a la aplicación del Código Procesal Penal que, exige al Ministerio Público efectuar la solicitud de levantamiento del secreto bancario al Juez de Garantías, para gestionar ante la Autoridad Central (conforme al Tratado de Asistencia Legal Mutua) la asistencia a fin de traer de aquel país, prueba que, implica violar el ámbito de intimidad de sus cuentas y correspondencia privada; este defecto procesal absoluto, en nuestro criterio, ha sido soslayado por todas las autoridades intervinientes en el proceso número 04-005356-042-PE, aduciendo que, como en Panamá el Ministerio Público está facultado para realizar el acto, en nuestro país el Ministerio Público puede arrogarse ese derecho de solicitar él directamente a la Autoridad Central (Procuraduría General de la República) la realización de la diligencia, sin que sea necesaria la valoración del Juez de Garantías; interpretación que, en nuestro criterio, de modo alguno puede ser avalada, por quienes hemos sido nombrados, como última instancia a la que las partes pueden recurrir en satisfacción y resguardo de los derechos fundamentales de sus patrocinados. No puede ser válido en nuestro Estado Democrático de Derecho que, en aras de un cumplimiento ágil con el juzgamiento de personas acusadas por la presunta comisión de hechos delictivos, sin acepción de la persona de que se trate, se atropellen (por quien en ese momento determinado tuvieron la dirección funcional del proceso en el Ministerio Público) en forma arbitraria e ilegítima, con errada interpretación de poderes ilimitados; los derechos que le asisten a las personas imputadas en la comisión de un delito, desde el momento mismo en que se les tiene como sospechosas de la comisión de ese hecho delictivo. Es claro que, nuestro sistema democrático en su Ordenamiento Jurídico, ha optado por la sabia decisión de dejar en manos del órgano jurisdiccional competente, velar por la tutela de los derechos fundamentales (entre los que se encuentran el derecho a la intimidad, el secreto de las comunicaciones e inviolabilidad de los documentos privados), por ello es que autoriza, bajo circunstancias excepcionales y previamente establecidas, los casos en que los mismos pueden ser restringidos, concretamente para el conocimiento de asuntos sometidos a los Tribunales de Justicia, en los cuales puede ordenar el juez el levantamiento de ese secreto. En la presente causa se requería de esa valoración jurisdiccional para solicitarle a la Autoridad Central, conforme al tratado de cita, que le diere el trámite correspondiente a la solicitud de asistencia que requería el Ministerio Público, para hacer llegar prueba documental de los bancos panameños a la investigación; esto es así porque, ha de ser el juez quien pondere la necesidad, utilidad, pertinencia y proporcionalidad de la solicitud que le hace el órgano encargado de la investigación. Aquí es importante acotar que, es errada la interpretación que se ha dado en este proceso, por el Ministerio Público, órgano que a nuestro entender, es el primero que debe tener clara su función y sus potestades de investigación, hasta donde se las confiere la Constitución y la Ley vigente, para no efectuar una actuación que, debía conocer, dejaba de lado los límites que el ordenamiento le impone al solicitar él directamente a la Procuraduría General de la República, que diera el trámite correspondiente al diligenciamiento de una solicitud de asistencia a Panamá, la cual debió ser previamente autorizada por el Juez de Garantías, toda vez que implicaba violentar derechos fundamentales de personas sometidas a proceso en nuestro país y que, como es de conocimiento de todos y cada uno de los operadores de justicia en Costa Rica, la legislación ordinaria exige que: a) la orden esté debidamente fundamentada. b) De ser posible, individualizar los documentos sobre los que se va a ejecutar la decisión, el nombre de que quien los tenga en su poder y lugar donde se hayan. c) Tener como presupuesto una actividad delictiva, con determinación de indicio comprobado respecto de su comisión. Todos estos aspectos requieren la ponderación previa sobre la necesidad, idoneidad y proporcionalidad de la solicitud que debió poner en conocimiento de la autoridad jurisdiccional, el Ministerio Público; sería un craso error, concluir, como lo hace el a quo, y avala el criterio de minoría de esta Sala, que ello implica dar una orden a las autoridades panameñas; muy por el contrario, constituye el aval de la autoridad jurisdiccional de Costa Rica para que la Autoridad Central de nuestro país, conforme al tratado de repetida cita, procediera con lo estipulado ante la autoridad competente de Panamá. Lo anterior no es un mero formalismo, constituye el acto procesal que legitima, conforme al orden interno, la intromisión dispuesta en la esfera privada de una persona, porque no es función, ni facultad del Fiscal General, ni de los y las representantes del Ministerio Público, requerir e imponerse de información confidencial de las personas, sin previa autorización del Juez garante del respeto a los derechos fundamentales de los ciudadanos sometidos a proceso. Así se concluye de lo estipulado en los artículos 24 de la Constitución Política, 12 de la Declaración Universal sobre Derechos Humanos, 11, incisos 2 y 3 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos y 17 del Pacto Internacional sobre Derechos Civiles y Políticos, todos recogidos en los artículos 2 y 3 de la Ley sobre Registro, Secuestro, Examen de Documentos Privados e Intervención de la Comunicaciones, Nº 7425 ( ley que incluso sanciona penalmente su incumplimiento) y 107 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. La facultad que establece el Código Procesal Penal, en sus artículos 226 y 290 párrafo final, al Ministerio Público para requerir informes a personas particulares o entidades públicas, de acuerdo a lo estipulado, lo es en el tanto no se trate de información privada, protegida por el artículo 24 de la Constitución Política, lo contrario, conforme al párrafo segundo del artículo 181 del CPP, implica violación al Debido Proceso, por vulneración del derecho fundamental a la privacidad de documentos privados. El Tratado de Asistencia Legal Mutua, tiene como fin fortalecer y facilitar la cooperación de los órganos administradores de justicia de la región, a través de un instrumento que permita la asistencia en los asuntos penales pero, es claro que se debe dar con pleno respeto de la legislación interna de cada Estado miembro, lo que se sustituye es el engorroso trámite consular; para agilizar canales de comunicación, de modo alguno su contenido puede tener repercusión en el sistema de garantías aplicables en el país, tan es así que, en su preámbulo establece expresamente que, esa asistencia se da con pleno respeto a la legislación interna de cada Estado. Como se menciona al inicio del presente voto, la posibilidad de agilizar procedimientos no se puede convertir en una carta abierta a la arbitrariedad, prepotencia e irrespeto de las garantías constitucionales y al orden interno vigente. No es legítimo que, como en el presente caso sucedió, incluso se desplacen hasta otro país, representantes del Ministerio Público, a fin de estar presentes en la recolección de la prueba y no se tome el mínimo tiempo para hacer correctamente la solicitud ante la autoridad jurisdiccional que corresponde, sacrificando con ello prueba esencial para la resolución del caso sometido a conocimiento de los tribunales costarricenses, al tener que decretarse la ineficacia del acto realizado con violación al Debido Proceso y que, además, conlleva tiempo y dinero que también debemos pagar todos los costarricenses. Ya en ocasiones anteriores esta Sala ha declarado la ineficacia de actuaciones en actos procesales similares en los que el Ministerio Público, en la práctica de los mismos, ha actuado de manera contraria a la ley, con consecuencias muy lamentables para una correcta administración de justicia y en este aspecto, como se señaló al inicio, sin acepción de la persona que esté sometida al proceso, la ley es igual para todos y consecuentemente, no se trata de lograr una condena a ultranza, sino aquélla que resulte de una correcta introducción de prueba al proceso, conforme a la Constitución y la ley vigente en el país y su consecuente valoración, en estricto apego a las reglas de la sana crítica, de tal forma que el ente acusador, deberá ser el primer interesado en presentar un caso al órgano jurisdiccional, no sólo con posibilidad de lograr hacer prevalecer su tesis en el contradictorio del debate, porque posee la prueba suficiente, sino que esa prueba sea eficaz porque en su recopilación ha respetado las garantías constitucionales, que cobijan a la persona sometida a proceso. En punto a este tema se ha sostenido en la doctrina “…En nuestro medio, siempre ha estado en tela de discusión la estructuración constitucional de las normas procesales. Así por ejemplo, no puede utilizarse la información obtenida con violación de las garantías constitucionales, por ende el artículo 96 del NCPP condiciona la validez del acto al respeto de los derechos fundamentales de la persona, salvo “que favorezca al imputado” (Art 181 NCPP). Se mantiene la corriente doctrinal, que ordena que este tipo de irregularidades no son susceptibles de convalidación de conformidad con el artículo 178 NCPP y deben ser declaradas de oficio por el Juez, siempre que impliquen inobservancia de derechos y garantías no solo en la Constitución, sino en el Derecho Internacional o Comunitario vigente.” (ARMIJO SANCHO, Gilberth, Garantías Constitucionales, Prueba Ilícita y Transición al Nuevo Código Procesal Penal. Premio Anual. Alberto Brenes Córdoba, página 127). Consecuentes con esta posición, la jurisprudencia nacional se ha inclinado por la doctrina de “los frutos del árbol envenenado” en el sentido de que, la prueba obtenida como resultado de una ilícita, no tiene ningún valor probatorio. Es importante reafirmar que, no obstante el rango supra legal que ostenta el TALM, éste no lo coloca por encima de la Constitución Política, dado que esa condición únicamente la alcanzan los tratados sobre Derechos Humanos, (artículo 48 de la Constitución Política). En conclusión, la obtención de los elementos de prueba que se hicieron llegar al proceso penal seguido contra, Walter Reiche Fischel, Marvin Barrantes Vargas, Eliseo Vargas García, Rafael Ángel Calderón Fournier, Juan Carlos Sánchez Arguedas conocido como Sánchez Sánchez y Gerardo Bolaños Alpízar, mediante las cartas rogatorias a Panamá y sus ampliaciones, sin observancia de las garantías constitucionales y legales que rigen para poder solicitar su obtención conforme al orden interno en Costa Rica, constituyen elementos de prueba espúria, ilegítimamente incorporados al proceso. Mediante actividad procesal defectuosa de carácter absoluto, se declara su ineficacia, así como la de los demás elementos de prueba que se derivan directamente de ella, concretamente: la prueba documental obtenida por medio de las Cartas Rogatorias a Panamá y sus ampliaciones, la declaración indagatoria de Walter Reiche Fischel, en lo que se fundamente en la prueba de Panamá; los testimonios de Cecilia R. López Fitzpatrik, Fiscal panameña, Rolando Antonio Milord Bonilla, asistente de Fiscalía panameña, Edwin Antonio Aldeano Córdoba, Director de la Oficina de Ejecución del Tratado de Asistencia Legal, testigos todos que se refieren a la prueba cuya ineficacia se declara en cuanto al contenido y forma de obtención; el Informe del OIJ, Nº 200- DEF-495-04-06, en lo que a la prueba de Panamá haga alusión; declaración de las peritos del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, Maribel Porras Garita y Leticia Chavarría Bravo en lo que corresponda a la prueba de referencia. Por último procede analizar la convalidación que el a quo efectúa, a toda la prueba que se funda en las cartas rogatorias a Panamá y sus ampliaciones, en la audiencia número 156 del debate, sustentando el Tribunal su decisión en la “autorización” que da el imputado Walter Reiche Fischel, al rendir su declaración indagatoria; la cual es absolutamente ilegal. En primer término porque, al ser varios los imputados que interponen la Actividad Procesal Defectuosa, por haber visto afectados sus derechos fundamentales, al no observar el acto procesal, mediante el cual se obtuvo la prueba, el respeto al Debido Proceso; el hecho de que el propio señor Reiche Fischel, desista de su incidencia por Actividad Procesal Defectuosa, actuación que también realiza su defensa técnica, no puede convalidar un acto que afecta a otros co-imputados en la causa, a quienes se les ha violentado el derecho fundamental de privacidad de sus documentos. La cita que se hace en el voto de minoría, sobre jurisprudencia de esta Sala, en nada corresponde con el tema aquí planteado, porque no existe en aquel caso, lesión a derechos fundamentales de otros implicados y la prueba solamente tenía importancia en acreditar un hecho entre quien lo autoriza y el ofendido. Aunado a lo expuesto, la autorización que releva la necesaria intervención del Juez, sólo es válida en el tanto sea dada en forma previa a la realización del acto procesal, en este sentido ver lo dispuesto en el párrafo primero del artículo 29 de la Ley sobre Registro, Secuestro, Examen de Documentos Privados e Intervención de Comunicaciones, Nº 7425, disposición que se debe armonizar con lo dispuesto en el artículo 24 de la Constitución Política y 1 del Código Procesal Penal. En un segundo e importantísimo aspecto, el artículo 29 de la Ley especial de cita, expresamente dispone que, la autorización para imponerse de la documentación bancaria, cuando existan varios titulares de la cuenta, debe ser dada por todos sus titulares. Está acreditado en la causa que los titulares de la cuenta N°104003074 del BAC INTERNATIONAL. BANK DE PANAMA, SON WALTER REICHE FISCHEL Y EMILIO BRUCE JIMENEZ, constituye ésta la cuenta principal, pues es la que se abre en Panamá, con el propósito de recibir, según se establece en el fallo que se recurre, los dineros pagados por la empresa Instrumentarium Corp. Medko Medical, dineros que luego son derivados a sus cuentas personales Marchwood Holding, Harcourt Holding, Walka y a la cuenta personal del co-encartado Marvin Barrantes Vargas, conforme a la prueba cuya ineficacia se declara en el voto de mayoría. Lo anterior significa que, aunque Walter Reiche, tenía la representación, con posibilidad de actuar individualmente, ello no puede válidamente interpretarse, en contraposición con la ley, como lo hace el a quo en la resolución impugnada, porque el artículo 29 de la Ley Nº 7425 del 9 de agosto de 1994, de manera expresa exige la autorización de todos los titulares, y esto es así precisamente porque esa autorización implica la intromisión en el ámbito de intimidad de las personas y en la privacidad de documentos, tutelados en la Constitución Política, de donde la disposición que asuma uno de sus titulares, no puede vulnerar ese derecho sobre los demás. En consecuencia, la decisión del Tribunal de convalidar la actividad procesal defectuosa que afecta las cartas rogatorias a Panamá y sus ampliaciones, es un acto que no se ajusta a lo dispuesto en la ley, en consecuencia no surte el efecto de convalidar el acto viciado y no afecta en nada lo dicho sobre la declaratoria de ineficacia de toda a prueba proveniente de Panamá.Los magistrados Arroyo Gutiérrez y Víquez Arias salvan el voto. […] En cuanto a la queja formulada por los recurrentes, respecto a que no se señaló la diligencia de apertura de evidencia, debe indicarse que no existe agravio alguno que declarar. Del recurso planteado, debe entenderse que su pretensión, al igual que lo menciona cuando cuestiona este punto respecto a la prueba recopilada en Panamá, va dirigida a señalar que es una actividad definitiva e irreproductible, y que por eso debió señalarse dicha audiencia. Al respecto, la Sala Constitucional definió qué debe entenderse como un acto definitivo e irreproductible, estableciendo que: “…un acto es irreproductible cuando exista imposibilidad de ejecutarlas en iguales condiciones, y es definitivo porque su incorporación al proceso disciplinario se podrá realizar sin reiterarlo… Sobre el particular, debe indicarse que esta clase de pruebas deben practicarse en presencia de todas aquellas personas, que puedan verse afectadas por la evacuación de las mismas, aún y cuando no figuren como investigados en un procedimiento administrativo posterior, las cuales podrán realizar las manifestaciones que consideren necesarias en el momento en que se evacua dicha prueba, todo ello con el fin de resguardar el derecho de defensa consagrado en el artículo 39 de la Constitución Política.” (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA, número 16419 de las 18:30 horas del 29 de noviembre de 2005). Nuestra normativa procesal no contempla específicamente una audiencia de apertura de evidencia. Pese a ello, como una manifestación del derecho de participar en todas las diligencias definitivas e irreproductibles, con el fin de que el acto sea presenciado por todos aquellos sujetos que puedan verse afectados con los resultados de aquélla apertura, y de esta forma puedan ejercer su derecho de defensa, se ha considerado un derecho de la parte el estar presente durante la realización de dicha diligencia, haciéndose acompañar de su defensor de confianza, si así lo desea. Un ejemplo de ello son los allanamientos, requisas, anticipos jurisdiccionales de prueba y cualquier otro acto que afecte derechos fundamentales de las partes. De esta forma lo estableció nuestro legislador a través de los artículos 292 y 293 del Código Procesal Penal. En el presente caso, pretenden los impugnantes que se exija a la autoridad jurisdiccional el señalamiento de una audiencia para “abrir” la prueba que había llegado desde Miami, lo que es absolutamente improcedente. Sin embargo, quienes suscribimos este voto de mayoría desechamos esa tesis, ya que no consideramos que se trate de un acto definitivo e irreproductible, pues esta documentación era el producto del cumplimiento de una solicitud de asistencia, a través de la cual se había recolectado documentación de acuerdo con las formalidades del derecho interno de los Estados Unidos de América, según se dijo con anterioridad, por lo que en la Fiscalía, únicamente se estaba recibiendo el producto de la asistencia solicitada, lo que no implica afectación de derechos fundamentales. Todas estas actuaciones se encuentran debidamente certificadas por las autoridades consulares, pues en este caso, se utilizó este medio para solicitarlas y remitirlas, según se indicó líneas atrás, constatándose que la prueba es absolutamente válida, y que no se quebrantó la cadena de custodia, encontrándose con una prueba íntegra y sin vicio alguno respecto a su manejo. Tampoco se ha constatado acción alguna dirigida a ocultar la prueba a las partes, ya que todas las actuaciones fueron puestas en conocimiento de los imputados, demandados civiles y demás partes involucradas, durante el proceso, a más tardar una vez que se les notifica la realización de la audiencia preliminar, momento en el que se ponen a disposición de todos ellos las pruebas que constan en los distintos legajos de investigación, según lo dispone el artículo 316 del Código Procesal Penal. En el caso concreto, la prueba está constituida por certificaciones que fueron el resultado de la cooperación internacional para la recolección de indicios en el proceso penal, por lo que su introducción al debate está autorizada por el inciso b) del artículo 334 del Código Procesal Penal, y no por las reglas de los actos definitivos e irreproductibles. Finalmente, cabe destacar que los recurrentes no han indicado cuál es el agravio que se les produjo al no realizarse la audiencia que extrañan. Sin embargo, movidos por el deber de analizar la prueba y su legitimidad de manera íntegra, y desatendiendo las omisiones de los impugnantes, debe concluirse que luego de un examen que hace una inclusión hipotética de una audiencia de apertura de evidencia como lo solicitan las partes, no se concluye que exista ventaja en ella para los imputados, siendo que la prueba fue ordenada por un juez costarricense, enviada a través de los canales legalmente establecidos para el trámite consular de la documentación, practicada en los Estados Unidos de América, de conformidad con su derecho interno, y debidamente certificada por las autoridades correspondientes, razón suficiente para considerar que una audiencia donde se abre un paquete que contiene esa documentación, no resulta relevante para la defensa del imputado, máxime bajo las consideraciones que se han hecho, respecto a la pureza en el manejo de la cadena de custodia. Con base en todas estas razones, quienes concurrimos en este voto de mayoría consideramos que no existe lesión alguna al derecho de audiencia y defensa, ni al debido proceso con el reclamo formulado por la defensa. Por consiguiente, se debe declarar sin lugar esta queja.”