Denial of Prohibition Pay for IMAS Financial TechnicianImprocedencia del pago de prohibición a técnica financiera del IMAS

V.- PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY: According to the provisions of Article 11 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), “1. The Public Administration shall act in subjection to the legal system and may only perform those acts or provide those public services authorized by said system, in accordance with the hierarchical scale of its sources. 2. An act shall be considered authorized if it is expressly regulated by a written norm, at least with respect to grounds or content, even if imprecisely stated.” This means that if there is no law expressly authorizing it, the administration is forbidden from doing anything not regulated or authorized. Therefore, only those obligations expressly authorized by one of the written sources of the legal system can be considered legitimate and effectively enforceable as obligations incumbent on the public administration (in this respect, see, among others, decisions of this Chamber Nos. 759 of 10:10 a.m. on September 10; 595 of 9:00 a.m. on July 21, both of 2004, and 648 of 10:20 a.m. on October 31, 2001).

VI.- ON THE PROHIBITION: For the recognition of an economic compensation derived from the prohibition (prohibición) to freely practice the profession, it is necessary that a law establish said prohibition and, furthermore, that the same provision also grant the payment of the respective compensation. In other words, to recognize the economic compensation in question, it is insufficient for a prohibition to exist; rather, it is additionally necessary for the possibility of granting an economic retribution as a consequence thereof to be normatively provided. Various norms have granted various public servants the right to enjoy the benefit or compensation for payment of prohibition (pago de prohibición). Historically, the payment of that bonus or supplemental salary originated in an amendment introduced to the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). Article 113 (current 118) established the following: “Prohibition for the personnel of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria). The General Directors, the Subdirectors, the Heads or Sub-heads of Department and Section of the offices of the Tax Administration, as well as the proprietary members of the Administrative Fiscal Tribunal (Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo) and their acting alternates, may not hold other public or private positions, with or without an employment relationship, with the exception of teaching or public functions performed in representation of their respective hierarchical superior, whose positions are remunerated only by per diems. / In general, the personnel of the aforementioned entities are especially prohibited, with the sole exception of teaching, from performing activities in private enterprise related to tax matters or managerial or other positions that involve participation in technical assistance or in the decisions of the enterprise. Likewise, said personnel are prohibited from filing claims on behalf of taxpayers or advising them in their arguments or submissions at any instance, except in matters concerning their personal interests, those of their parents, those of their spouse, or those of their children. / In the cases of exception referred to in this article, in order to avail themselves thereof, their decision to make use of the exceptions provided for in this Code must be communicated to the head of the office” (emphasis added). That provision gave rise to Law No. 5867, of December 15, 1975 (Law on Compensation for Payment of Prohibition—Ley de compensación por pago de prohibición), by means of which the salary bonus or economic compensation for prohibition was created, and the percentages of economic retribution for such concept were set, for the personnel of the Tax Administration who, by reason of their positions, are subject to the prohibition contained in Article 113 (now 118) of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures. Later, through special regulations, in a public and sectoral context, the payment of that prohibition was extended to other servants. From this special regulation, it is concluded that what such provisions mandate payment for, as a salary compensation, is the prohibition to practice the profession for which the servant was hired and which arises from the regulation (organic or statutory) governing the public employment relationship. This type of prohibition has an unquestionable ethical foundation, because what is sought is to prevent the public servant from allocating their time to other activities in the private field when they are inconvenient, because it may affect the necessary intensity of the activities proper to the function or because an undesirable confusion of interests may arise to the detriment of the objectivity that must always prevail in public function. As can be noted from this historical account, the standing to claim the salary bonus for prohibition arises from the laws that determine the recipients of that salary item. Moreover, one must consider the existence of two important prerequisites for the granting of the payment of said economic compensation, namely: that the position occupied by the official is subject to the aforementioned prohibition and that the minimum academic requirement required for the position is met. Now, not all the officials who occupy positions in the units known as “tax administrations” (administraciones tributarias) are recipients of the salary bonus for prohibition, since, as Law No. 5867 indicates in its Article 1, the right was created “...for the personnel of the Tax Administration who are subject, by reason of their positions, to the prohibition contained in Article 113 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures…”. Canon 118 (formerly 113) of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures reads: “Article 118.- Prohibition for the personnel of the Tax Administration. The General Directors, the Subdirectors, the Heads or Sub-heads of Department and Section, of the offices of the Tax Administration, as well as the proprietary members of the Administrative Fiscal Tribunal and the acting alternates, may not hold other public positions with or without an employment relationship, with the exception of teaching or functions performed with the authorization of their respective hierarchical superior, whose positions are remunerated only by per diems. In general, the personnel of the aforementioned entities are prohibited, with the sole exception of teaching, from performing in private enterprise activities related to tax matters. Likewise, said personnel are prohibited from filing claims on behalf of taxpayers or advising them in their arguments or submissions at any instance, except in matters concerning their personal interests, those of their spouse, ascendants, descendants, siblings, parents-in-law, sons-in-law, and brothers-in-law. In the cases of exception referred to in this article, in order to avail themselves thereof, their decision to make use of the exceptions provided for in this Code must be communicated to the superior of the office.” These norms refer to the “personnel of the Tax Administration,” which Article 105 of the cited Code in force when Law No. 5867 came into effect (current 99) defines as the “...administrative body responsible for the collection and oversight of taxes (tributos), whether the Treasury or other public entities that are active subjects (sujetos activos), pursuant to Articles 11 and 14 of this Code” (emphasis added), defining the “active subject” as the entity that is the creditor of the tax. The potential right of the officials of the defendant institute to receive the bonus for prohibition – with the exception of the technical personnel of internal audit, who have an express mention in the cited regulation – derives precisely from the fact that it falls within the concept of tax administration, since it is conceived as an “active subject,” in the terms of the transcribed precept, given that it is clearly a creditor of taxes. Note that Article 61 of the Fiscal Contingency Law (Ley de Contingencia Fiscal, Law No. 8343 of December 18, 2002) provides: “Creation. A tax is created, in favor of the Joint Institute for Social Assistance (Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, IMAS); it shall be paid by businesses qualified and authorized by said Institute as motels, unregistered hotels, occasional lodging houses, massage parlors, 'night clubs' with room service, and the like. Furthermore, IMAS is empowered to classify establishments into three categories, according to the number of rooms and the quality of the complementary services they offer; likewise, it may include in those categories establishments that, even when they have lodging registration, carry out activities that in the judgment of IMAS may be included in the aforementioned classification. To operate, these businesses must first register and be classified by IMAS, considering that they may not be located within a radius of five hundred meters of an educational center officially recognized by the State,” for which purposes numeral 68 establishes that “…IMAS, in its capacity as tax administration (administración tributaria), shall be empowered to order and execute the immediate closure of a business that is in default in the payment of this tax for more than two months” (emphasis added) (As part of the funding of the defendant and within what has been mentioned in this matter, it is pertinent to consider the provisions of numerals 14 subsection a) and 15 of the Law Creating the Joint Institute for Social Assistance – Law No. 4760 of May 5, 1971 – and 1 and 2 of Law No. 6443 of August 23, 1980). From the foregoing, it is clear that the salary compensation for the prohibition to privately practice the profession may not be granted to all servants, but only to those who perform work strictly related to tax matters. The definition of the specific positions entitled to the payment of the prohibition is a matter of exclusive competence of the institution (IMAS), using what the law indicates for these purposes as a parameter. Having said this, we must attend to what was proven in the specific case. In this regard, it is noted: a) The plaintiff has worked for the defendant since November 1, 1999, and as of October 9, 2007 (date of the certification visible on folio 11), she held a permanent position as financial technician in the Treasury Department (Tesorería) (folio 11). b) Article 6 of the agreement of the IMAS Board of Directors (Consejo Directivo del IMAS) No. 026-02 of April 3, 2002, stated: “1) Recognize the character of Tax Administration to the Joint Institute for Social Assistance in all its actions aimed at perceiving, overseeing, and executing the administrative and judicial collection of delinquent taxes (tributos morosos) for which the Joint Institute for Social Assistance is the active subject./ 2) Create a permanent commission of the Tax Administration composed of the following officials:/ a) The General Manager of the Institution./ b) The professional responsible for the Financial Area of the Institution./ c) The professional responsible for the Legal Advisory Office./ d) The professional responsible for the Collection Management Unit (Unidad de Gestión de Cobros)…/ 3) Invest with all the inherent powers, rights, and duties established in Articles 118 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures and 1 of Law 7896, for the personnel responsible for the Tax Administration process, the officials of the Collection Management and Legal Advisory Office units who are directly related to the processes of perception, oversight, and execution of administrative and judicial collection of the referred delinquent taxes./ 4) Issue instructions to the General Management so that henceforth the Collection Management Unit shall be called Tax Administration, whose functions shall be consistent with those provided in the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures./ 5) Order the publication of this agreement in the official gazette La Gaceta.” (sic) (see complaint on folios 6 to 7. In relation, also take into account the statement of [Name1], on folios 65 to 67). c) The Executive Director of the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority (Secretaría Técnica de la Autoridad Presupuestaria), by official letter No. STAP-1188-03 of August 22, 2003, stated: “…considering what was indicated by the Attorney General's Office of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), whose criterion is binding, it is the criterion of this Legal Affairs Unit that it is appropriate to recognize the payment for prohibition to those officials of the Joint Institute for Social Assistance who directly participate in the collection and oversight of said taxes…” (see resolution of 9:00 a.m., September 10, 2004, in which the administrative request made by the plaintiff was denied, because it was considered that the recognition was appropriate for the collaborators of the Tax Administration unit, given that they were the ones who directly participated in the collection and oversight of taxes under the terms set forth by the Budgetary Authority – folios 15 to 17). d) In the resolution of 11:00 a.m., October 19, 2004, which heard the plaintiff's appeal, it was stated: “…the requesting official is not part of the IMAS Tax Administration, but rather, through the exercise of the functions proper to the position she holds (Treasury Unit), she participates in the handling of financial resources that enter the Institution as a product of the collection of this tax. The foregoing, in light of the fact that, for the performance of its work, the Tax Administration must use the human and material resources proper to the Institution, which operate as assistance and support for the work specific to Tax Administration, but such work is not the main, nor sole, function of these officials; rather, their participation is merely assistential and collaborative, so that the Tax Administration has all the necessary conditions for the performance of its own functions…” (folios 21 to 24). e) In the statement of defense, it was stated, among other things: “It must be taken into account that the ordinary and law-given task of the collection as such, of the taxes that favor I.M.A.S., is a function of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social); however, in the face of employer delinquency, the Tax Administration unit manages the administrative collection, where many of the payments generated through this management are deposited in the I.M.A.S. bank accounts, and only a small amount resort to making their deposits at the I.M.A.S. cashier windows. The rest is managed through judicial channels, and what is recovered is deposited in the respective banks./ In this case, the participation of the I.M.A.S. Treasury Department in the tax collection process is a purely circumstantial and not a substantial matter, since its functions include others that are not necessarily related in substance to the specific functions of the Tax Administration./ Under this consideration of fact, which is a reality inherent to the payment of the prohibition provided in Article 57 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures, this Institution could not assume that the Treasury Department's work is of a 'serial' or 'circumstantial' nature within the process of collection and oversight of taxes, since it is not 'substantially' attributable to tax work.” (folio 57). […]. In accordance with the foregoing, the Chamber reaches the conclusion that the plaintiff did not prove that her position essentially and substantially entailed the performance of administrative tasks or functions of that nature (tax administration), that is, related to the collection, oversight, and administration of taxes. For this reason, it is not appropriate to grant her the cited compensatory benefit provided for those servants expressly and exhaustively included by the various laws issued for this purpose. Note that, as the defendant's representation argued, it could be established that the tasks the plaintiff performed related to the matter were not core to her performance, nor to the actions of the officials who did perform those functions for the defendant institute, since these were, as the defendant maintained throughout the process, merely supportive or assistential, a circumstance by which the norm (Article 1 of the law that originated the right) providing the corresponding compensation for “the personnel of the Tax Administration who are subject, by reason of their positions, to the prohibition contained in Article 113 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures…”, would not cover Mrs. [Name2]. Moreover, the plaintiff, Mrs. Zúñiga Picado, is incorrect when she argued: “The IMAS Administration made the decision to name the collection management process 'Tax Administration' to favor a group of officials from the financial team, and it also favors a person from the Legal Department who performs the legal procedures proper to their position, that is, they are favored by the additional payment to their salary of the prohibition…” (sic) (see subsection i) of the complaint, on folio 6), under which criterion, in her administrative request, she proposed: “The Political Constitution, Article 33, establishes equality of rights and non-discrimination. Therefore, let the 30% prohibition be paid to me for the time I stopped receiving it and let it be included in my corresponding salary, in accordance with what Article 1, subsection c) of Law 5867 establishes” (see administrative procedure in fine, on folio 18. In the same sense, observe the revocation appeal with subsidiary appeal that the plaintiff filed in the administrative venue, second paragraph of folio 20), since the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in decision No. 3369-96, of 10:27 a.m. on July 5, 1996, stated:

“It must be noted, in the first place, that for this Chamber the payment of the aforementioned compensation does not constitute, under any circumstance, an uncaused benefit or a privilege for a specific group of servants; rather, it is the fair recognition for those who, by reason of the function they perform, and for the protection of the highest public interest, have no possibility of practicing their profession or trade beyond the administrative office where they work, for which reason the existence of an alleged discrimination must be dismissed from the start, based on the allegation that said payment is a form of privileged treatment for a few public servants. It is a limitation on the private practice of the profession or trade, for whose establishment the State decided to grant economic recognition on the base salary of its employees. It would seem that at bottom, and in order to obtain a percentage increase in salaries, one wishes to compel the State to prohibit the practice of any private work by public servants, despite the fact that there is no incompatibility whatsoever with the public function exercised, a situation that would indeed constitute an uncaused and therefore illegitimate payment, given that if the servant is free to practice their profession or activity outside office hours, there is no logical, legal, and much less constitutional reason, to argue that the non-payment of the 'professional prohibition' (prohibición profesional) in such cases constitutes unreasonable discrimination. In any case, it is clear that these are not identical situations meriting equal treatment in the terms sought: first, there exist, on the one hand, public servants subject to a legal prohibition on the private practice of a specific profession or activity, and on the other, servants not subject to it; furthermore, there is certainly no identity of functions, despite the fact that they may be the same class of position ('technicians' (técnicos) and 'professional technicians' (técnicos profesionales))” (emphasis added).

VII.- Based on the considerations set forth, it is appropriate to overturn the appealed judgment insofar as it ordered the defendant to grant the plaintiff 30% for prohibition (prohibición) from November 1, 1999, to October 16, 2007, the corresponding interest from the moment each item became due, as well as the costs of the action. Instead, it is appropriate to deny such claims and to decide without a special award of costs. The latter because the plaintiff, by virtue of occupying a position as Financial Technician (Técnico Financiero), in which those performing tasks proper to tax administration received the payment for prohibition, together with the fact that within her functions she performed some tasks of support or assistance with that area (the defendant's Tax Administration), could reasonably have had the belief that she held title to the right claimed, leading to the conclusion that Mrs. [Name3] was a good faith litigant (Articles 495 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and 221 and 222 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil)). In all other respects, the judgment must remain intact.

Furthermore, the existence of two important requirements for the payment of the aforementioned economic compensation must be taken into account, namely: that the position held by the official is affected by the aforementioned prohibition and that the minimum academic requirement for the position is met. That said, not all officials who occupy positions in the units known as “tax administrations (administraciones tributarias)” are recipients of the salary supplement for prohibition because, as indicated in Article 1 of the law that originated this right, **“**...for the personnel of the Tax Administration who are subject, by reason of their positions, to the prohibition contained in Article 113 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures…**”** . Canon 118 (formerly 113) of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures reads: “*Article 118.- Prohibition for Tax Administration personnel*. *The General Directors, Deputy Directors, Department and Section Heads or Deputy Heads of the Tax Administration units, as well as the full members of the Tax Administrative Tribunal and the acting alternates, cannot hold other public positions with or without subordination, with the exception of teaching or functions performed with the authorization of their respective hierarchical superior, whose positions are only compensated with per diems. In general, it is prohibited for the personnel of the aforementioned entities, with the sole exception of teaching, to perform activities related to tax matters in private companies. Likewise, it is prohibited for said personnel to file claims on behalf of taxpayers or advise them in their arguments or submissions in any of the instances, unless it involves their personal interests, those of their spouse, ascendants, descendants, siblings, parents-in-law, sons- and daughters-in-law, and brothers- and sisters-in-law. In the cases of exception referred to in this article, to avail oneself of them, one must communicate to the superior of the unit their decision to make use of the exceptions provided in this Code**” . These norms refer to the *“personnel of the Tax Administration”,* which Article 105 of the cited Code in force when Law No. 5867 came into effect (currently 99) defines as the **“** *...administrative body in charge of the* **perception and supervision (percepción y fiscalización)** *of taxes, whether concerning the Treasury or other public entities that are active subjects, in accordance with Articles 11 and 14 of this Code***”** (emphasis added) *,* defining the *“active subject”* as the entity entitled to the tax. The eventual right of the officials of the defendant institute to receive the prohibition supplement—with the exception of the technical personnel of the internal audit office, who have an express mention in the cited regulations—derives precisely from the fact that it falls within the concept of *tax administration,* since it is conceived as an *“active subject”,* in the terms of the transcribed precept, given that it is clear that it is entitled to taxes. See that Article 61 of the Fiscal Contingency Law (Law No. 8343 of December 18, 2002) provides: “*Creation. A tax is created, in favor of the Joint Social Welfare Institute (Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social), (IMAS); it shall be paid by businesses qualified and authorized by said Institute as motels, unregistered hotels, occasional lodging houses, massage parlors, 'night clubs' with room service, and similar. Furthermore, IMAS is empowered to classify establishments into three categories, according to the number of rooms and the quality of the complementary services they offer; likewise, it may include in those categories establishments that, even when they have a lodging registry, carry out activities that in IMAS's judgment can be included in the aforementioned classification. To operate, these businesses must first register and be qualified by IMAS, taking into consideration that they cannot be located within a five-hundred-meter radius of an educational center officially recognized by the State”*, for which purposes numeral 68 establishes that “…*IMAS*, ***in its condition as tax administration***, *shall be empowered to order and execute the immediate closure of the business that is in arrears in the payment of this tax for more than two months”* (emphasis added) (As part of the defendant's financing and within what has been mentioned in this matter, it is appropriate to consider the provisions of numerals 14 subsection a) and 15 of the Law for the Creation of the Joint Social Welfare Institute –Law No. 4760 of May 5, 1971– and 1 and 2 of Law No. 6443 of August 23, 1980)*.* From the foregoing, it follows that the salary compensation for the prohibition on privately practicing the profession cannot be granted to all servants, but only to those who perform work strictly related to tax matters. The definition of the specific positions to which the prohibition payment corresponds is a matter of exclusive competence of the institution (IMAS), taking as a parameter what the law indicates for these effects.

Thus, attention must be paid to what was held as proven in the specific case. To that effect, it is noted: **a)** The plaintiff has worked for the defendant since November 1, 1999, serving, as of October 9, 2007 (the date of the certificate visible on folio 11), in a permanent capacity as a financial technician in the Treasury (folio 11). **b)** In Article 6 of Agreement No. 026-02 of the Board of Directors of IMAS, dated April 3, 2002, it was stated: “*1) Recognize the character of* ***Tax Administration*** *to the Joint Social Welfare Institute in all its actions aimed at perceiving, supervising, and executing the administrative and judicial collection of delinquent taxes for which the Joint Social Welfare Institute is the active subject./ 2) Create a permanent commission of the Tax Administration composed of the following officials: / a) The General Manager of the Institution./ b) The Professional Responsible for the Financial Area of the Institution./ c) The professional responsible for the Legal Advisory Office./ d) The professional responsible for the Collection Management Unit…/ 3)* ***Invest with all inherent powers, rights, and duties*** *established in Articles 118 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures and Article 1 of Law 7896 for the personnel responsible for the Tax Administration process,* ***the officials of the Collection Management and Legal Advisory Office units*** *who are directly related to the processes of perception, supervision, and execution of administrative and judicial collection of the referred delinquent taxes./ 4) Issue instructions to the General Management so that henceforth the Collection Management Unit is called Tax Administration, whose functions will be in accordance with those set forth in the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures./ 5) Order the publication of this agreement in the official newspaper La Gaceta*” (sic) (see complaint on folios 6 to 7. In this regard, also consider the statement of [Name1], on folios 65 to 67). **c)** The Executive Director of the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority, through official document No. STAP-1188-03 of August 22, 2003, mentioned: “…*considering what was indicated by the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, whose opinion is binding, it is the criterion of this Legal Affairs Unit that it is appropriate to recognize the payment for the concept of prohibition to those officials of the Joint Social Welfare Institute who directly participate in the collection and supervision of said taxes…*” (see the resolution from 9:00 a.m. on September 10, 2004, which denied the administrative request made by the plaintiff, because it was considered that recognition was appropriate for the collaborators of the Tax Administration unit, given that they were the ones who directly participated in the collection and supervision of taxes in the terms expressed by the Budgetary Authority -folios 15 to 17-). **d)** In the resolution from 11:00 a.m. on October 19, 2004, which heard the plaintiff's appeal, it was stated: “…*the requesting official is not part of the Tax Administration of IMAS, but rather, through the exercise of the functions inherent to the position she holds (Treasury Unit), she intervenes in the management of the financial resources that enter the Institution as a product of the collection of this tax. The foregoing, based on the fact that, for the performance of its work, the Tax Administration must use the human and material resources of the Institution itself, which operate as assistance and support for the work specific to Tax Administration, but such work is not the main, nor the only, function of these officials, but rather their participation is simply assistance and collaboration, so that the Tax Administration has all the necessary conditions for the performance of its own functions…*” (folios 21 to 24). **e)** In the response to the complaint, it was stated, among other things: “*It must be taken into account that the ordinary and statutorily mandated work of the collection, as such, of the taxes that benefit I.M.A.S., is a function of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund; however, in the event of employer delinquency, the Tax Administration unit manages the administrative collection, where many of the payments generated through this management are deposited into the bank accounts of I.M.A.S., and only a small amount resort to making their deposits at the I.M.A.S. cashiers. The rest is managed through judicial channels, and what is recovered is deposited in the respective banks./ In this case, the participation of the Treasury of I.M.A.S. in the process of tax perception is a merely circumstantial and non-substantial matter, given that among its functions are others that are not necessarily related in substantive matters to the specific functions of the Tax Administration./ Under this factual consideration, which is a reality inherent to the payment of the prohibition provided in Article 57 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures, this Institution could not assume that the work of the Treasury is of a ‘serial’ or ‘circumstantial’ nature within the process of tax perception and supervision, since it is not ‘substantially’ attributable to tax matters*” (folio 57). […]. In accordance with the foregoing, the Chamber reaches the conclusion that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that her position essentially and substantially entailed the performance of administrative tasks or functions of that nature (tax administration), that is, related to the perception, supervision, and administration of taxes. For that reason, it is not appropriate to recognize the cited compensatory benefit provided for those servants expressly and exhaustively included by the different laws issued to that effect. Note that, as alleged by the defendant's representation, it could be established that the tasks the plaintiff performed on the matter were not central to her performance nor to the actions of the officials who did perform those functions for the defendant institute, since these were, as the defendant maintained throughout the process, merely of support or assistance, a circumstance for which the norm (Article 1 of the law that originated the right) that provides the corresponding compensation for “*the personnel of the Tax Administration who are subject, by reason of their positions, to the prohibition contained in Article 113 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures…*”, would not cover Mrs. [Name2]. Furthermore, Mrs. Zúñiga Picado is not correct when she argued: “*The Administration of IMAS makes the decision to give the name ‘Tax Administration’ to the collection management process to favor a group of officials from the financial team, and also favors a person from the Legal Department who performs the legal procedures inherent to their position, that is, they are favored by the additional payment to their salary for the prohibition,…*” (sic) (see subsection i) of the complaint, on folio 6), under which criterion in the administrative request she proposed: “*The Political Constitution, Article 33, establishes equal rights and non-discrimination. Therefore, that I be paid the 30% prohibition for the time I have stopped receiving it and that it be included in my corresponding salary, in accordance with what is established in Article 1 of Law 5867, subsection c)*” (see administrative procedure in fine, on folio 18. In the same sense, observe the appeal for revocation with subsidiary appeal that the plaintiff filed in administrative venue, second paragraph of folio 20), because the Constitutional Chamber, in Voto 3369-96, at 10:27 a.m., on July 5, 1996, expressed:

*“It must first be noted that for this Chamber, the payment of the aforementioned compensation does not constitute, under any circumstance, an unjustified benefit or a privilege for a specific group of servants; rather, it is the fair recognition for those who,* ***by reason of the function they perform, and for the protection of the highest public interest, have no possibility of exercising their profession or trade beyond the administrative unit in which they work***, *so the existence of alleged discrimination must be ruled out from the outset, based on the claim that said payment is a form of privileged treatment for a few public servants. It is a limitation on the private exercise of the profession or trade, for the establishment of which the State decided to provide economic recognition on the base salary of its employees. It would seem that fundamentally, and in order to obtain a percentage increase in salaries, the desire is to oblige the State to prohibit all public servants from exercising any private work, despite there being no incompatibility whatsoever with the public function exercised, a situation that would indeed constitute an unjustified and therefore illegitimate payment, given that if the servant is free to exercise their profession or activity outside office hours, there is no logical, legal, and much less constitutional reason to argue that the non-payment of the "professional prohibition" in those cases constitutes unreasonable discrimination. In any case, it is clear that these are not identical situations that merit equal treatment in the terms sought: first, there are, on the one hand, public servants subject to a legal prohibition on the private exercise of a specific profession or activity, and on the other, servants not subject to it; furthermore, there is certainly no identity of functions, even though it is the same class of position (‘technicians’ and ‘professional technicians’)”* (emphasis added).

**VII.-** Based on the considerations set forth, it is appropriate to overturn the appealed judgment insofar as it ordered the defendant to recognize in favor of the plaintiff a 30% payment for the concept of prohibition from November 1, 1999, to October 16, 2007, the corresponding interest from the moment each item became due, as well as the costs of the action. Instead, it is appropriate to deny such terms and resolve without a special order as to costs. The latter because the plaintiff, by virtue of occupying a Financial Technician position, in which those who performed tasks of tax administration received the prohibition payment, together with the fact that within her functions she performed some of support or assistance to that area (the defendant's Tax Administration), could reasonably have believed she held the right being claimed, for which reason one arrives at the conclusion that Mrs. [Name3] was a litigant in good faith (articles 495 of the Labor Code and 221 and 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure). As for the rest, it must remain unaltered.” V.- PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY: According to the provisions of Article 11 of the General Public Administration Act, “1. The Public Administration shall act subject to the legal system and may only perform those acts or provide those public services that said system authorizes, according to the hierarchical scale of its sources. 2. An act expressly regulated by a written norm shall be considered authorized, at least as to its motive or content, even if in an imprecise form”. This means that if there is no law that expressly authorizes it, the administration is prohibited from doing anything that is not regulated or authorized. Therefore, only those obligations that are expressly authorized by one of the written sources of the legal system may be considered legitimate and effectively enforceable as obligations binding the public administration (in this regard, see among others, the rulings of this Chamber No. 759 at 10:10 a.m. on September 10; No. 595 at 9:00 a.m. on July 21, both of 2004, and No. 648 at 10:20 a.m. on October 31, 2001).

VI.- OF THE PROHIBITION: For the recognition of an economic compensation (compensación económica) derived from the prohibition (prohibición) on the liberal exercise of the profession, it is necessary that a law establishes that prohibition and, furthermore, that the same provision also grants the payment of the respective compensation. In other terms, to recognize the aforementioned economic compensation, it is not enough that a prohibition exists, but it is additionally necessary that the possibility of granting an economic retribution as a consequence thereof is normatively provided. Different norms have granted various public servants the right to enjoy the benefit or compensation for payment of prohibition. Historically, the payment of that bonus or additional salary originated in a reform introduced to the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). Article 113 (current 118) established the following: “Prohibition for Tax Administration Personnel. The General Directors, the Deputy Directors, the Department and Section Chiefs or Deputy Chiefs of the Tax Administration dependencies, as well as the permanent members of the Administrative Tax Tribunal and their alternates in office, may not hold other public or private positions, with or without an employment relationship, with the exception of teaching or public functions performed in representation of their respective hierarchical superior, whose positions are only compensated with per diems. / In general, the personnel of the aforementioned entities are especially prohibited, with the sole exception of teaching, from performing activities related to tax matters in private enterprise or directive positions or others that imply participation in technical assistance or in the decisions of the enterprise. Likewise, said personnel are prohibited from making claims on behalf of taxpayers or advising them in their allegations or submissions in any of the instances, except when involving their personal interests, those of their parents, their spouse, or their children. / In the cases of exception referred to in the article, to avail oneself of them, one must communicate to the head of the dependency their decision to make use of the exceptions provided in this Code” (emphasis added). That provision gave rise to Law No. 5867, of December 15, 1975 (Law of Compensation for Payment of Prohibition), through which the salary bonus or economic compensation for the concept of prohibition was created and the percentages of economic retribution for said concept were established for the Tax Administration personnel who, by reason of their positions, are subject to the prohibition contained in Article 113 (today 118) of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures. Later, through special regulations, in a public and sectorial context, the payment of that prohibition was extended to other servants. From that special regulation, it is concluded that what such provisions mandate to pay, as salary compensation, is the prohibition on exercising the profession for which the servant was hired and which results from the regulation (organic or statutory), governing the public employment relationship. This type of prohibition has an unquestionable ethical basis, since what is sought is to prevent the public servant from dedicating their time to other activities in the private field, when they are inconvenient, because it may affect the necessary intensity of the activities proper to the function or because it may produce an undesirable confusion of interests to the detriment of the objectivity that must always prevail in the public function. As can be noted from this historical account, the standing to claim the prohibition salary bonus arises from the laws that determine the recipients of that salary item. Take into account, in addition, the existence of two important presuppositions for the applicability of the payment of the mentioned economic compensation, namely: that the position held by the official is affected by the aforementioned prohibition and that the minimum academic requirement required for the position is met. Now then, not all officials who hold positions in the units known as “tax administrations (administraciones tributarias)” are recipients of the salary bonus for prohibition because, as Article 1 of the law that originated this right indicates, “...for the Tax Administration personnel who are subject, by reason of their positions, to the prohibition contained in Article 113 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures…”. Canon 118 (former 113) of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures reads: “Article 118.- Prohibition for Tax Administration Personnel. The General Directors, the Deputy Directors, the Department and Section Chiefs or Deputy Chiefs, of the Tax Administration dependencies, as well as the permanent members of the Administrative Tax Tribunal and the alternates in office, may not hold other public positions with or without an employment relationship, with the exception of teaching or functions performed with authorization from their respective hierarchical superior, whose positions are only compensated with per diems. In general, the personnel of the aforementioned entities are prohibited, with the sole exception of teaching, from performing activities related to tax matters in private enterprise. Likewise, said personnel are prohibited from making claims on behalf of taxpayers or advising them in their allegations or submissions in any of the instances, except when involving their personal interests, those of their spouse, ascendants, descendants, siblings, parents-in-law, sons-in-law, and brothers/sisters-in-law. In the cases of exception referred to in this article, to avail oneself of them, one must communicate to the superior of the dependency their decision to make use of the exceptions provided in this Code”. Those norms refer to the “personnel of the Tax Administration”, which Article 105 of the cited Code in force when Law No. 5867 came into effect (current 99) defines as the “...administrative body in charge of the collection and oversight (percepción y fiscalización) of taxes, whether it concerns the Treasury or other public entities that are active subjects, pursuant to Articles 11 and 14 of this Code” (emphasis added), defining the “active subject (sujeto activo)” as the entity to which the tax is owed. The eventual right of the officials of the defendant institute to receive the bonus for prohibition –with the exception of the technical personnel of the internal audit, who have express mention in the cited regulation– derives precisely from the fact that it falls within the concept of tax administration, since it is conceived as an “active subject”, in the terms of the transcribed precept, given that it is clear that it is a creditor of taxes. See that Article 61 of the Fiscal Contingency Law (Ley de Contingencia Fiscal) (Law No. 8343 of December 18, 2002) provides: “Creation. A tax is created, in favor of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, (IMAS); it shall be paid by businesses qualified and authorized, by said Institute, as motels, unregistered hotels, occasional lodging houses, massage parlors, ‘night clubs’ with room service and the like. Furthermore, the IMAS is empowered to qualify the establishments into three categories, according to the number of rooms and the quality of the complementary services they offer; likewise, it may include in those categories establishments that, even when they have a lodging registration, carry out activities that in the judgment of the IMAS may be included in the aforementioned qualification. To operate, these businesses must previously register and be qualified by the IMAS, taking into consideration that they may not be located within a radius of five hundred meters of an educational center, officially recognized by the State”, for which purposes numeral 68 establishes that “… The IMAS, in its condition as tax administration, shall be empowered to order and execute the immediate closure of the business that is delinquent in the payment of this tax for more than two months” (emphasis added) (As part of the financing of the defendant and within what has been mentioned in this matter, it is relevant to take into account the provisions of numerals 14 subsection a) and 15 of the Law Creating the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social –Law No. 4760 of May 5, 1971- and 1 and 2 of Law No. 6443 of August 23, 1980). From the foregoing, it follows that the salary compensation for the prohibition on privately exercising the profession cannot be granted to all servants, but only to those who perform duties strictly related to tax matters. The definition of the specific positions to which the payment of the prohibition corresponds is a matter of exclusive competence of the institution (IMAS), taking as a parameter what the law indicates for these effects.

Thus, attention must be paid to what was taken as proven in the specific case. To this effect, it is noted: a) The plaintiff has worked for the defendant since November 1, 1999, serving, as of October 9, 2007 (date of the certification visible on folio 11), in a permanent capacity as a financial technician in the Treasury (Tesorería) (folio 11). b) In Article 6 of the agreement of the IMAS Board of Directors No. 026-02 of April 3, 2002, it was expressed: “1) Recognize the character of Tax Administration to the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social in all its actions aimed at collecting, overseeing, and executing the administrative and judicial collection of delinquent taxes for which the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social is the active subject./ 2) Create a permanent commission of the Tax Administration composed of the following officials: / a) The General Manager of the Institution./ b) The Professional Responsible for the Financial Area of the Institution./ c) The professional responsible for the Legal Advisory Office./ d) The professional responsible for the Collection Management Unit…/ 3) Invest with all the powers, rights, and inherent duties established in Articles 118 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures and 1 of Law 7896 the personnel responsible for the Tax Administration process, to the officials of the Collection Management and Legal Advisory Units who are directly related to the processes of collection, oversight, and execution of administrative and judicial collection of the referred delinquent taxes./ 4) Issue instructions to the General Management so that henceforth the Collection Management Unit is called Tax Administration, whose functions shall be in accordance with those provided in the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures./ 5) Order the publication of this agreement in the official newspaper La Gaceta” (sic) (see complaint on folios 6 to 7. In relation, also take into account the declaration of [Name1], on folios 65 to 67). c) The Executive Director of the Technical Secretariat of the Budgetary Authority (Autoridad Presupuestaria) through official letter No. STAP-1188-03 of August 22, 2003, mentioned: “…considering what was indicated by the Attorney General’s Office, whose criterion is binding, it is the criterion of this Legal Affairs Unit that it is appropriate to recognize the payment for the concept of prohibition to those officials of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social who directly participate in the collection and oversight of said taxes…” (see ruling at 9:00 a.m., on September 10, 2004, in which the administrative request made by the plaintiff was denied, since it was considered that recognition was appropriate for the collaborators of the Tax Administration unit, given that they were the ones who directly participated in the collection and oversight of taxes in the terms set forth by the Budgetary Authority -folios 15 to 17-). d) In the ruling at 11:00 a.m., on October 19, 2004, which addressed the plaintiff's appeal, it was stated: “…the requesting official does not form part of the Tax Administration of the IMAS, but rather, through the exercise of the functions proper to the position she holds (Treasury Unit), she intervenes in the management of the financial resources that enter the Institution as a product of the collection of this tax. The foregoing, in function of the fact that, for the performance of its duties, the Tax Administration must use the human and material resources proper to the Institution, which operate as assistance and support for the proper work of the Tax Administration, but such work is not the main function, nor the only one, of these officials, but rather their participation is simply assistential and collaborative, so that the Tax Administration has all the necessary conditions for the performance of its own functions…” (folios 21 to 24). e) In the response to the complaint, it was stated among other things: “It must be taken into account that the ordinary labor, as provided by law, of the collection as such, of the taxes that benefit the I.M.A.S., is a function of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social); however, in the face of employer delinquency, the Tax Administration unit manages administrative collection, where many of the payments generated through this management are deposited in the bank accounts of the I.M.A.S., and only a small number resort to making their deposits at the I.M.A.S. cashiers. The rest is managed through judicial channels, and what is recovered is deposited in the respective banks./ In this case, the participation of the Treasury of the I.M.A.S. in the process of tax collection is a merely conjunctural and non-substantial matter, given that among its functions are others that are not necessarily related in substantive matter with the specific functions of the Tax Administration./ Under this consideration of fact, which is a reality consubstantial with the payment of the prohibition provided in Article 57 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, this Institution could not assume that the Treasury's work is of a 'serial' or 'circumstantial' nature within the process of collection and oversight of taxes, since it is not 'substantially' attributable to tax duties” (folio 57). […]. According to what has been set forth, the Chamber reaches the conclusion that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that her position essentially and substantially entailed the performance of administrative tasks or functions of that nature (tax administration), that is, related to the collection, oversight, and administration of taxes. For that reason, it is not appropriate to recognize the cited compensatory benefit provided for those servants expressly and exhaustively included by the different laws issued to that effect. Note that, as the defendant's representation alleged, it could be established that the tasks that the plaintiff performed regarding the matter were not core to her performance nor to the actions of the officials who did perform those functions for the defendant institute, since these were, as the defendant maintained throughout the process, merely for support or assistance, a circumstance by which the norm (Article 1 of the law that originated the right) that provides the corresponding compensation for “the Tax Administration personnel who are subject, by reason of their positions, to the prohibition contained in Article 113 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures…”, would not cover Mrs. [Name2]. Furthermore, Mrs. Zúñiga Picado was not correct when she argued: “The Administration of the IMAS makes the decision to name the collection management process 'Tax Administration' to favor a group of officials from the financial team, and also favors a person from the Legal Department who performs the legal steps proper to their position, that is, they are favored by the additional payment to their salary of the prohibition…” (sic) (see subsection i) of the complaint, on folio 6), under which criterion she stated in the administrative request: “The Political Constitution, Article 33, establishes equality of rights and without discrimination.

Therefore, that I be paid the prohibition of the 30% for the time I have ceased to receive it and that it be included in my corresponding salary, in accordance with the provisions of article 1, subsection c) of Ley 5867" (see administrative procedure in fine, at folio 18. In the same vein, observe the appeal for revocation with subsidiary appeal that the plaintiff filed in the administrative venue, second paragraph of folio 20), since the Constitutional Chamber in Voto 3369-96, of 10:27 a.m., of July 5, 1996, stated:

"It must be noted, in the first place, that for this Chamber the payment of the aforementioned compensation does not constitute, under any circumstance, an unearned benefit or a privilege for a particular group of public servants; rather, it is the fair recognition for those who, *by reason of the function they perform, and for the protection of the highest public interest, have no possibility of exercising their profession or trade beyond the administrative office in which they work*, so any alleged discrimination must be dismissed from now on, based on the allegation that said payment is a form of privileged treatment for a few public servants. It is a limitation on the private exercise of the profession or trade, for the establishment of which the State decided to provide economic recognition on the base salary of its employees. It would seem that, deep down, and in order to obtain a percentage increase in salaries, the desire is to force the State to prohibit the exercise of any private work for public servants, despite the fact that there is no incompatibility whatsoever with the public function exercised, a situation that would indeed constitute an unearned and therefore illegitimate payment, given that if the servant is free to exercise their profession or activity outside office hours, there is no logical, legal, much less constitutional reason, to argue that the non-payment of the 'professional prohibition' in such cases constitutes unreasonable discrimination. In any case, it is clear that these are not identical situations that merit equal treatment in the terms intended: in the first place, there exist, on one hand, public servants subject to a legal prohibition on the private exercise of a specific profession or activity, and on the other, servants not subject to it; furthermore, there is certainly no identity of functions, even though they may involve the same class of position ('technicians' and 'professional technicians')" (emphasis added).

**VII.-** Based on the considerations set forth, it is appropriate to revoke the appealed judgment insofar as it ordered the defendant to recognize the plaintiff 30% for the prohibition concept from November 1, 1999, to October 16, 2007, the corresponding interest from the moment each item became due, as well as the costs of the action. In its place, it is appropriate to deny such claims and resolve without special ruling on costs. The latter because the plaintiff, by virtue of holding a Financial Technician position, in which those who performed tasks typical of tax administration received the prohibition payment, together with the fact that within her functions she performed some support or assistance tasks with that area (the defendant's Tax Administration), could reasonably have held the belief that she was the holder of the claimed right, leading to the conclusion that Ms. [Name3] was a litigant in good faith (articles 495 of the Labor Code and 221 and 222 of the Civil Procedure Code). In all other respects, the judgment must remain undisturbed."

“V.- PRINCIPIO DE LEGALIDAD: Según lo dispone el artículo 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, “1. La Administración Pública actuará sometida al ordenamiento jurídico y solo podrá realizar aquellos actos o prestar aquellos servicios públicos que autorice dicho ordenamiento, según la escala jerárquica de sus fuentes. 2. Se considerará autorizado el acto regulado expresamente por norma escrita, al menos en cuanto a motivo o contenido, aunque sea en forma imprecisa”. Lo que significa que si no hay ley que expresamente autorice, a la administración le está vedado realizar todo lo que no esté regulado o autorizado. Por ello, sólo pueden considerarse legítimas y efectivamente exigibles, como obligaciones a cargo de la administración pública, las que de manera expresa se encuentren autorizadas por alguna de las fuentes escritas del ordenamiento (en este sentido véanse entre otros, los votos de esta Sala n°s 759 de las 10:10 horas del 10 de setiembre; 595 de las 9:00 horas, del 21 de julio, ambos de 2004 y 648 de las 10:20 horas, del 31 de octubre de 2001).

VI.- DE LA PROHIBICIÓN: Para el reconocimiento de una compensación económica derivada de la prohibición para el ejercicio liberal de la profesión es necesario que una ley establezca esa prohibición y, además, que también esa misma disposición acuerde el pago de la compensación respectiva. En otros términos, para reconocer la compensación económica de cita no basta con que exista una prohibición, sino que es necesario, adicionalmente, que esté normativamente dispuesta la posibilidad de otorgar como consecuencia de ello una retribución económica. Distintas normas han concedido a diversos servidores públicos el derecho a disfrutar el beneficio o compensación por pago de prohibición. Históricamente, el pago de ese plus o sobresueldo, se originó en una reforma que se introdujo al Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. El artículo 113 (actual 118) establecía lo siguiente: “Prohibición para el personal de la Administración Tributaria. Los Directores Generales, los Subdirectores, los Jefes o Subjefes de Departamento y de Sección de las dependencias de la Administración Tributaria, así como los miembros propietarios del Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo y sus suplentes en funciones, no pueden ejercer otros puestos públicos o privados, con o sin relación de dependencia, excepción hecha de la docencia o de funciones públicas desempeñadas en representación de su respectivo superior jerárquico, cuyos cargos estén sólo remunerados con dietas. / En general queda especialmente prohibido al personal de los entes precedentemente citados, con la única excepción de la docencia, desempeñar en la empresa privada actividades relativas a materias tributarias o cargos directivos u otros que impliquen la participación en la asistencia técnica o en las decisiones de la empresa. Asimismo está prohibido a dicho personal hacer reclamos a favor de los contribuyentes o asesorarlos en sus alegatos o presentaciones en cualquiera de las instancias, salvo que se trate de sus intereses personales, de sus padres, los de su cónyuge o de sus hijos. / En los casos de excepción a que se refiere el artículo, para acogerse a ellos, debe comunicarse al jefe de la dependencia su decisión de hacer uso de las excepciones previstas en este Código” (énfasis agregado). Esa disposición dio origen a la Ley n° 5867, del 15 de diciembre de 1975 (Ley de compensación por pago de prohibición), mediante la cual se creó el plus salarial o compensación económica por concepto de prohibición y se fijaron los porcentajes de retribución económica por tal concepto, para el personal de la Administración Tributaria, que por razón de sus cargos, se encuentre sujeto a la prohibición contenida en el artículo 113 (hoy 118) del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Luego mediante normativas especiales, en un contexto público y sectorial, se fue extendiendo el pago de esa prohibición, a otros servidores. De esa normativa especial se concluye que lo que tales disposiciones mandan pagar, como una compensación salarial, es la prohibición para ejercer la profesión por la cual el (la) servidor (a) fue contratado (a) y que resulta de la normativa (orgánica o estatutaria), reguladora de la relación de empleo público. Este tipo de prohibiciones tiene un indudable fundamento ético, pues lo que se busca es impedirle al (la) servidor (a) público (a) destinar su tiempo a otras actividades en el campo privado, cuando resultan inconvenientes, porque puede afectar la necesaria intensidad de las actividades propias de la función o bien porque puede producirse una indeseable confusión de intereses en detrimento de la objetividad que debe privar siempre en la función pública. Como puede notarse de este recuento histórico, la legitimación para el reclamo del plus salarial de prohibición surge de las leyes que determinan los destinatarios de ese rubro salarial. Tómese en cuenta, además, la existencia de dos presupuestos importantes para la procedencia del pago de la mencionada compensación económica, a saber: que la plaza ocupada por el (la) funcionario (a) se encuentre afectada por la aludida prohibición y que se reúna el requisito mínimo académico requerido para el cargo. Ahora bien, no todos los (las) funcionarios (as) que ocupen puestos en las unidades conocidas como “administraciones tributarias” son destinatarios (as) del plus salarial por prohibición pues, como lo indica en su artículo 1° la ley que originó este derecho, “...para el personal de la Administración Tributaria que se encuentre sujeto, en razón de sus cargos, a la prohibición contenida en el artículo 113 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios…”. El canon 118 (anterior 113) del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios reza: “Artículo 118.- Prohibición para el personal de la Administración Tributaria. Los Directores Generales, los Subdirectores, los Jefes o Subjefes de Departamento y de Sección, de las dependencias de la Administración Tributaria, así como los miembros propietarios del Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo y los suplentes en funciones, no pueden ejercer otros puestos públicos con o sin relación de dependencia, excepción hecha de la docencia o de funciones desempeñadas con autorización de su respectivo superior jerárquico, cuyos cargos estén sólo remunerados con dietas. En general queda prohibido al personal de los entes precedentemente citados, con la única excepción de la docencia, desempeñar en la empresa privada actividades relativas a materias tributarias. Asimismo está prohibido a dicho personal hacer reclamos a favor de los contribuyentes o asesorarlos en sus alegatos o presentaciones en cualesquiera de las instancias, salvo que se trate de sus intereses personales, los de su cónyuge, ascendientes, descendientes, hermanos, suegros, yernos y cuñados. En los casos de excepción a que se refiere este artículo, para acogerse a ellos, debe comunicarse al superior de la dependencia su decisión de hacer uso de las excepciones previstas en este Código”. Esas normas hacen referencia al “personal de la Administración Tributaria”, la que el artículo 105 del citado Código vigente cuando la Ley n° 5867 entró a regir (actual 99) define como el “...órgano administrativo que tenga a su cargo la percepción y fiscalización de los tributos, ya se trate del Fisco o de otros entes públicos que sean sujetos activos, conforme a los artículos 11 y 14 del presente Código” (énfasis agregado), definiendo al “sujeto activo” como el ente acreedor del tributo. El eventual derecho de los (las) funcionarios (as) del instituto demandado a percibir el plus por prohibición –con la excepción del personal técnico de la auditoria interna, quien tiene una mención expresa en la normativa citada- deriva precisamente del hecho de que éste se enmarca dentro del concepto de administración tributaria, pues se concibe como un “sujeto activo”, en los términos del precepto trascrito, dado que está claro que es acreedor de tributos. Véase que el artículo 61 de la Ley de Contingencia Fiscal (Ley n° 8343 del 18 de diciembre de 2002) dispone: “Creación. Créase un impuesto, a favor del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, (IMAS); será pagado por los negocios calificados y autorizados, por dicho Instituto, como moteles, hoteles sin registro, casas de alojamiento ocasional, salas de masaje, ´night clubs´ con servicio de habitación y similares. Además, se faculta al IMAS para que califique los establecimientos en tres categorías, según el número de habitaciones y la calidad de los servicios complementarios que ofrezcan; asimismo, podrá incluir en esas categorías los establecimientos que, aun cuando tengan registro de hospedaje, lleven a cabo actividades que a juicio del IMAS puedan incluirse en la calificación antes mencionada. Para operar, esos negocios de previo deberán inscribirse y ser calificados por el IMAS, tomando en consideración que no podrán estar ubicados en un radio de quinientos metros de un centro educativo, oficialmente reconocido por el Estado”, a cuyos efectos el numeral 68 establece que “…El IMAS, en su condición de administración tributaria, estará facultado para ordenar y ejecutar el cierre inmediato del negocio que se encuentre moroso en el pago de este impuesto durante más de dos meses” (énfasis agregado) (Como parte del financiamiento del accionado y dentro de lo que se ha hecho mención en este asunto corresponde tomar en cuenta lo dispuesto en los numerales 14 inciso a) y 15 de la Ley de Creación del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social –Ley n° 4760 del 5 de mayo de 1971- y 1 y 2 de la Ley n° 6443 del 23 de agosto de 1980). De lo anterior se desprende que la compensación salarial por la prohibición de ejercer privadamente la profesión no puede serle concedida a todos los (as) servidores (as), sino solo a los (as) que desempeñan labores estrictamente relacionadas con la materia tributaria. La definición de los puestos concretos a los cuales les corresponde el pago de la prohibición es un asunto de competencia exclusiva de la institución (IMAS), tomando como parámetro lo que la ley señala para estos efectos. Así las cosas, debe atenderse a lo que se tuvo por acreditado en el caso concreto. Al efecto, se advierte: a) La actora labora para el demandado desde el 1 de noviembre de 1999, desempeñándose, para el 9 de octubre de 2007 (fecha de la constancia visible a folio 11), en propiedad como técnica financiera en Tesorería (folio 11). b) En el artículo 6 del acuerdo del Consejo Directivo del IMAS n° 026-02 del 3 de abril de 2002 se expresó: “1) Reconocer el carácter de Administración Tributaria al Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social en todas sus acciones tendiente a percibir, fiscalizar y ejecutar el cobro administrativo y judicial de los tributos morosos cuyo sujeto activo sea el Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social./ 2) Crear una comisión permanente de la Administración Tributaria integrada por los siguientes funcionarios: / a) El Gerente General de la Institución./ b) El profesional Responsable del Área Financiera del Institución./ c) El profesional responsable de la Asesoría Jurídica./ d) El profesional responsable de la Unidad de Gestión de cobros…/ 3) Investir con todas las potestades, derecho y deberes inherentes establecidos en los artículos 118 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios y el 1° de la ley 7896 para el personal responsable del proceso de Administración Tributaria, a los funcionarios de las unidades de Gestión de Cobro y Asesoría Jurídica que se encuentren relacionados directamente con los procesos de percepción, fiscalización y ejecución de cobro administrativo y judicial de los referidos tributos morosos./ 4) Girar instrucciones a la Gerencia General para que en adelante la Unidad de Gestión de Cobro sea denominada Administración Tributaria, cuyas funciones serán acordes con las dispuestas en el código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios./ 5) Ordenar la publicación del presente acuerdo en el diarios oficial la Gaceta” (sic) (véase demanda a folios 6 a 7. En relación tómese en cuenta también la declaración de [Nombre1] , a folios 65 a 67). c) La Directora Ejecutiva de la Secretaría Técnica de la Autoridad Presupuestaria mediante oficio n° STAP-1188-03 del 22 de agosto de 2003, mencionó: “…considerando lo señalado por la Procuraduría General de la República, cuyo criterio es vinculante, es criterio de esta Unidad de Asuntos Jurídicos que procede reconocer el pago por concepto de prohibición a aquellos funcionarios del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social que participan directamente de la recaudación y fiscalización de dichos tributos… ” (véase resolución de las 9:00 horas, del 10 de setiembre de 2004, en la cual se denegó la solicitud administrativa que hiciera la actora, por cuanto se consideró que el reconocimiento procedía para los (as) colaboradores (as) de la unidad de Administración Tributaria, dado que eran quienes participaban directamente de la recaudación y fiscalización de tributos en los términos expuestos por la Autoridad Presupuestaria -folios 15 a 17-). d) En la resolución de las 11:00 horas, del 19 de octubre de 2004, que conoció de la apelación de la demandante se dijo: “…la funcionaria solicitante no forma parte de la Administración Tributaria del IMAS, sino que, por el ejercicio de las funciones propias del cargo que desempeña (Unidad de Tesorería), interviene en el manejo de los recursos financieros que ingresan a la Institución como producto de la recaudación de este tributo. Lo anterior, en función de que, para el desempeño de sus labores, la Administración Tributaria debe utilizar los recursos humanos y materiales propios de la Institución, que operan como asistencia y soporte de la labor propia de Administración Tributaria, pero tal labor no es la función principal, ni única, de estos funcionarios, sino que su participación es simplemente asistencial y de colaboración, de manera que la Administración Tributaria disponga de todas condiciones necesarias para el desempeño de sus propias funciones… ” (folios 21 a 24). e) En la contestación de la demanda se expuso entre otras cosas: “Se debe tomar en cuenta que la labor ordinaria y dada por ley, de la recaudación como tal, de los tributos que favorecen al I.M.A.S., es función de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social; no obstante, ante la morosidad patronal, la unidad de Administración Tributaria gestiona el cobro administrativo, donde muchos de los pagos que se generan a través de esta gestión son depositados en las cuentas bancarias del I.M.A.S., y solo una poco cantidad recurre a realizar sus depósitos en las cajas de I.M.A.S. El resto se gestiona por la vía judicial, y lo recuperado se deposita en los respectivos bancos./ En este caso la participación de la Tesorería del I.M.A.S. en el proceso de percepción de los tributos es un asunto meramente coyuntural y no sustancial, puesto que dentro de sus funciones se encuentran otras que no necesariamente están relacionadas en materia de fondo con las funciones específicas de la Administración Tributaria./ Bajo esta consideración de hecho, la cual es una realidad consustancial con el pago de la prohibición dispuesta en el artículo 57 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, no podría esta Institución asumir que la labor de la Tesorería de carácter ´serial´ o ´circunstancial´ dentro del proceso de percepción y fiscalización de tributos, ya que no es ´sustancialmente´ atribuible a las labores tributarias” (folio 57). […]. Conforme a lo expuesto, la Sala llega a la conclusión de que la actora no demostró que su puesto conllevara, esencial y sustancialmente, la realización de tareas o funciones administrativas de aquella naturaleza (administración tributaria), o sea, relacionadas con la percepción, fiscalización y administración de los tributos. Por esa razón no procede reconocerle el citado beneficio compensatorio previsto para aquellos servidores incluidos expresa y taxativamente por las distintas leyes emitidas al efecto. Nótese que, como lo alegó la representación del demandado, pudo establecerse que las tareas que la accionante realizaba en torno a la materia, no eran medulares en su desempeño como tampoco en el accionar de los (as) funcionarios (as) que sí realizaban aquellas funciones para el instituto accionado, pues éstas eran, como lo sostuvo el demandado a lo largo del proceso, meramente de apoyo o asistencia, circunstancia por la cual la norma (artículo 1 de la ley que originó el derecho) que dispone la compensación correspondiente para “el personal de la Administración Tributaria que se encuentre sujeto, en razón de sus cargos, a la prohibición contenida en el artículo 113 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios…”, no cubriría a doña [Nombre2]. Además, no lleva razón la señora Zúñiga Picado cuando argumentó: “La Administración del IMAS toma la decisión de ponerle el nombre de ´Administración Tributaria´ al procesote gestión de cobros para favorecer a un grupo de funcionarios del equipo financiero, y también favorece a una persona del Departamento Legal que realiza las gestiones legales propias de su cargo, es decir, se ven favorecidos por el pago adicional a su salario de la prohibición,…” (sic) (véase apartado i) de la demanda, a folio 6), bajo cuyo criterio en la solicitud administrativa planteó: “La Constitución Política, artículo 33, establece igualdad de derechos y sin discriminación. Por lo tanto, que se me pague la prohibición del 30% por el tiempo dejado de percibirlo y que se me incluya en mi correspondiente salario, de acuerdo con lo que establece el artículo 1, de la ley 5867, inciso c)” (ver gestión administrativa in fine, a folio 18. En igual sentido, obsérvese el recurso de revocatoria con apelación subsidiaria que la actora planteó en sede administrativa, párrafo segundo del folio 20), pues la Sala Constitucional en el voto n° 3369-96, de las 10:27 horas, del 5 de julio de 1996 expresó:

“Debe advertirse, en primer término, que para esta Sala el pago de la compensación aludida no constituye, bajo ninguna circunstancia, un beneficio incausado o un privilegio para un determinado grupo de servidores; antes bien, es el justo reconocimiento para quienes, en razón de la función que desempeñan, y para la protección del más alto interés público, no tienen posibilidad de ejercer su profesión u oficio más allá de la dependencia administrativa en la que laboran, por lo que debe descartarse desde ahora, la existencia de una supuesta discriminación, con base en el alegato de que dicho pago es una forma de trato privilegiada para unos cuantos servidores públicos. Se trata de una limitación al ejercicio privado de la profesión u oficio, por cuyo establecimiento el Estado dispuso hacer un reconocimiento económico sobre el salario base de sus empleados. Pareciera que en el fondo, y con tal de obtener un aumento porcentual de los salarios, se desea obligar al Estado a prohibir el ejercicio de toda labor particular a los servidores públicos, a pesar de que no exista incompatibilidad alguna con la función pública ejercida, situación que sí constituiría un pago incausado y por ende ilegítimo, dado que si el servidor es libre de ejercer fuera de las horas de oficina su profesión o actividad, no existe ninguna razón lógica, jurídica, y mucho menos de orden constitucional, para aducir que el no pago de la "prohibición profesional" en dichos supuestos constituye una discriminación irrazonable. En todo caso, queda claro que tampoco se trata de situaciones idénticas que ameriten un trato igualitario en los términos en que se pretende: en primer lugar, existen por un lado, servidores públicos sujetos a una prohibición legal para el ejercicio privado de una determinada profesión o actividad, y por el otro, servidores no sujetos a ella; además, no existe ciertamente una identidad de funciones, a pesar de que se trate de una misma clase de puesto (´técnicos´ y ´técnicos profesionales´)” (énfasis agregado).

VII.- Con fundamento en las consideraciones expuestas, procede revocar la sentencia recurrida en cuanto condenó al demandado a reconocerle a la actora un 30% por concepto de prohibición desde el 1 de noviembre de 1999 al 16 de octubre de 2007, los intereses correspondientes desde el momento de la exigibilidad de cada rubro así como las costas de la acción. En su lugar, corresponde denegar tales extremos y resolver sin especial condenatoria en costas. Esto último por cuanto la actora en virtud de ocupar un puesto de Técnico Financiero, en el cual a quienes realizaban tareas propias de administración tributaria percibían el pago de prohibición aunado a que dentro de sus funciones realizaba algunas de apoyo o asistencia con esa área (la Administración Tributaria del accionado), razonablemente pudo tener la creencia que ostentaba la titularidad al derecho reclamado, por lo que se arriba a la conclusión de que la señora [Nombre3] fue litigante de buena fe (artículos 495 del Código de Trabajo y 221 y 222 del Procesal Civil). En lo demás, debe mantenerse incólume.”