Salary prohibition constitutes an acquired right despite the annulment of the budgetary norms that supported itProhibición salarial constituye derecho adquirido pese a la nulidad de las normas presupuestarias que la fundamentaban

**DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATES JULIA VARELA ARAYA AND EVA MARIA CAMACHO VARGAS** **III.- THE PROHIBITION ON PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (LA PROHIBICIÓN DEL EJERCICIO PROFESIONAL):** We equally share the majority vote's view that the core issue of the present dispute lies in determining whether the petitioner is entitled to the payment of the prohibition (prohibición) from April 17, 2000 (proven facts numbers 3 and 10 of the first-instance judgment, confirmed by the Ad quem, without objection from any of the parties), the date on which the payment was suspended, until the date of his resignation, August 15, 2004, as an employee of the defendant (eighteenth fact of the complaint and its answer, and folios 21 and 22). The basis for that payment resided in Article 14 of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para 1985, number 6982, of December 19, 1984 and its amendments, among others, the amendment by Article 101 of the Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario number 7015, of November 22, 1985, and Article 14, subsection 17) of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario para 1986, No. 7018, of December 20, 1985 (proven fact 4) of the first-instance judgment, confirmed by the second-instance judgment, folio 641; fourth fact of the complaint and its answer, folios 2 and 72). By reason of the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) filed by the Procuraduría General de la República against the cited norms, the Sala Constitucional, in sustaining it through Voto n° 4647 of June 16, 1999, annulled them, noting that this "*...declaration is retroactive to the effective date of the annulled norms, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith (derechos adquiridos de buena fe)*". By resolution number 6327, at 10:03 a.m. on August thirteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, that Court resolved a request for addition and clarification of the cited vote. Based on these constitutional resolutions, the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of the Banco Central, by agreement under Article 6, numerals A and B, of session No. 5032-2000, held on April 11, 2000, ordered the cessation of the prohibition payment (prohibición) to the officials and technical staff of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras as of the 17th of that same month (folios 178 to 180 and 348 to 350).

**IV.-** It must be borne in mind that the prohibition (prohibición) is not an employer's liberality, but a condition legally imposed on a specific position due to the nature of the functions comprising it, which requires their transparent, impartial, and objective exercise, far from any conflict of interest; it is an ethical requirement and a condition inherent to the position that imposes a specific legal situation upon its holder, from which arises the duty for the official appointed to the position not to practice their profession or trade for the benefit of third parties, with the corresponding right to the payment of economic compensation for said limitation. It involves an incompatibility between the exercise of public function and that of private profession due to the potential clash of interests that could be generated. The payment of the prohibition (prohibición) depends on the position held being under that regime and on the official meeting the prerequisites set forth in the regulations establishing it. Exclusive dedication (dedicación exclusiva) must be understood, on the other hand, in the sense that the Administration establishes it contractually in accordance with the nature of the functions of the positions, when it deems it appropriate that their holders should not externally perform functions related to their position, therefore its basis is not necessarily legal and it has been granted in the Public Sector in various forms: by regulation, conventionally, and even through administrative acts that recognize the need for exclusivity of services and therefore institute it.

**V.-** Now then, the appellant maintains that the prohibition (prohibición) is not a salary supplement (plus salarial), but rather compensation (indemnización) for the limitation on the private practice of the profession, for which reason it is necessary to analyze all possible components of the salary in relation to the specific case. The total amount received as salary is composed of sums from diverse concepts that elude unitary treatment, despite having a single and central point of reference or determining reason for their existence: the employment relationship. In our system, a distinction is made between base salary (salario base) and salary supplements (complementos salariales). The former refers to the remuneration established for each professional category. The latter are those other economic payments earned by the worker due to various circumstances, which may be of a personal nature or related to the work position. The issue of whether the prohibition (prohibición) forms part of the salary or is merely simple compensation lacks importance for our purposes, because regardless of one conclusion or another, what matters is that it is a supplement (plus) whose reason for being exists on the occasion of the employment relationship, and which may be provided for in the law—if it is a prohibition (prohibición)—or in another source of law—when it involves exclusive dedication (dedicación exclusiva).

**VI.-** It must be remembered that at the Banco Central de Costa Rica, the payment of the prohibition (prohibición) had two distinct sources: A.- In the case of the workers of said Bank, it entered into a Convenio de Partes with its employees, which in point 27 established: "The Bank will keep the Manual de Clasificación de Puestos updated, especially regarding requirements, so that it adequately reflects the demands required by the functions and responsibilities of each position. The Bank will require, in accordance with the nature of the functions of those position classes where it deems appropriate that their holders cannot externally perform functions related to their position. In these cases, the Bank will economically compensate them according to the percentage scale applied to the base of the prohibition (prohibición) that governs for the officials of the Auditoría General de Bancos (meaning the prohibition concept was taken as a parameter for calculating the supplement (plus) for said limitation or exclusive dedication (dedicación exclusiva)), but extendable to other lower-level positions to which a percentage of—incorrectly termed—prohibition (prohibición) proportional fixed by the Bank will be recognized (...) ". Said clause, as it could not be conciliated, was included in the arbitration award (laudo arbitral) issued at 10 a.m. on March 26, 1987 by the Tribunal de Trabajo de San José. Years later, the Sala IV declared arbitration awards in the Public Sector unconstitutional (Voto n° 1696-92), with ruling 3285-92 indicating that rights acquired in good faith through an arbitration award must be respected. Recapitulating, the legal basis for the payment of the so-called prohibition (prohibición) was provided for, for the workers of the Banco Central, in Article 27 of the Convenio de Partes. Subsequently, the basis became Article 8 of session No. 4621 of December 9, 1992, which referred for its application to Article 27 of the Convenio de Partes (which, in the end, had already been affected by the declaration of unconstitutionality aforementioned). B.- For its part, in the case of the officials of the Auditoría General de Bancos (today SUGEF), the prohibition (prohibición) regime was based on atypical budgetary norms which, for that reason, were annulled. Indeed, the Sala Constitucional, in judgment No. 4647-99, declared the unconstitutionality of a series of norms included in different budget laws, considering that they contained general rules extraneous to budgetary matters. The precepts declared unconstitutional on that occasion were:

"Article 14 Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para 1985, number 6982 of December 19, 1984. Add a paragraph to Article 1 of Law 5867 stating:

"The benefits and prohibitions (prohibiciones) indicated in this article include the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos".

"Article 101 Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, number 7015 of November 22, 1985. The technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos shall receive the economic benefits of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975 and its amendments, subject to the prohibitions (prohibiciones) of said law." "Article 14 Ley de Presupuesto para 1986 number 7018 of December 20, 1985.

1. ...

• 17)The prohibitions (prohibiciones) and benefits contained in Article 1 of Law No. 5867 of December 15, 1975, are applicable to the Audit Departments of the Sistema Bancario Nacional".

In that pronouncement, it was clearly established that the declaration was made without prejudice to rights acquired (derechos adquiridos), and in a later vote, issued at 10:03 a.m. on August 13, 1999 (No. 6327-99), derived from a request for addition and clarification, it was reiterated that "the declaration cannot prejudice rights acquired in good faith (derechos adquiridos de buena fe)". The Banco Central justified the elimination of the "prohibition" regime (prohibición) on the grounds that the servants of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, a deconcentrated body of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, based that payment on Article 101 of the Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario No. 7015 of November 22, 1985, Article 14 of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, and Article 14 subsection 17 of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario para 1986, No. 7018 of December 20, 1985; and that the economic compensation ceased in execution of the votes of the Sala Constitucional, No. 4647 at 4:20 p.m. on June 16, 1999, and 6327 at 10:03 a.m. on August 13 of the same year, which declared unconstitutional and annulled Article 101 of the Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario de la República 7015 of November 22, 1985, Article 14 of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República de 1985, No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, and Article 14 subsection 17 of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario de 1986, No. 7018 of December 20, 1985, annulment retroactive to the entry into force of such norms, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith under the validity of such norms. Furthermore, the Bank based its elimination of the prohibition (prohibición) on the fact that Article 8 of session No. 4621-92 was an administrative act extinguished due to impossibility of material and legal execution, being based on Article 27 of the Convenio de Partes which, by reflex effect of the sustaining judgments of unconstitutionality numbers 1696-92 and 3285-92, saw its efficacy and enforceability diminished in accordance with the provisions of Articles 88 and 90 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

**VII.- ON RIGHTS ACQUIRED (DERECHOS ADQUIRIDOS):** As indicated in the preceding recital (considerando) in fine, the annulling votes of the Sala Constitucional were clear in stating that rights acquired in good faith were to be preserved. This necessitates a review of what the Sala Constitucional has indicated on that point and on consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas). That court, in Voto n° 2765-97, stated:

"The concepts of "right acquired (derecho adquirido)" and "consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada)" appear closely related in constitutional doctrine. It is feasible to affirm that, in general terms, the former denotes that consummated circumstance in which a thing—material or immaterial, be it a previously foreign good or a previously non-existent right—has entered (or impacted upon) the individual's patrimonial sphere, such that the individual experiences an advantage or verifiable benefit. For its part, the "consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada)" represents not so much a patrimonial gain (plus patrimonial), but a state of affairs fully defined in terms of its legal characteristics and effects, even though these have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant regarding the consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada), precisely, is not whether those effects still persist or not, but rather that—by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared—a clear and defined rule has already emerged in legal life that connects a factual presupposition (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect). From this perspective, the individual's situation is given by a logical proposition of the type 'if..., then...'; that is to say: if the conditioning fact occurred, then the 'consolidated legal situation' implies that the conditioned effect must necessarily also occur. In both cases (right acquired or consolidated legal situation), the legal system protects—rendering it intangible—the situation of the person who obtained the right or enjoys the situation, for reasons of equity and legal certainty. In this case, the constitutional guarantee of non-retroactivity of the law translates into the certainty that a change in the legal system cannot have the consequence of removing the good or right already acquired from the individual's patrimony, or of causing that, if the factual presupposition had occurred prior to the legal amendment, the (beneficial, it is understood) consequence that the interested party expected from the consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada) no longer arises. Now then, specifically regarding the latter, it has also been understood that no one has a 'right to the immutability of the legal system,' that is, that the rules should never change. Therefore, the constitutional precept does not consist in that, once born into legal life, the rule connecting the fact with the effect cannot be modified or even suppressed by a subsequent norm; what it means is that—as explained—if the conditioning supposition has occurred, a legal amendment that changes or eliminates the rule cannot have the virtue of preventing the conditioned effect that was expected under the rule of the prior norm from arising. This is so because, as stated, what is relevant is that the state of affairs enjoyed by the person was already defined in terms of its elements and its effects, even though these are still being produced or have even not begun to be produced. In this way, what the person has the right to is the consequence, not the rule".

It is also relevant to transcribe another pronouncement of the Sala Constitucional, No. 1623-08, issued on the occasion of an amparo (recurso de amparo) appeal against the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal (IFAM):

"In 1990, the appellant and IFAM signed 'a prohibition contract (contrato de prohibición)', in which it was provided that the protected party would receive economic compensation equivalent to 65% of her base salary (salario base). In ordinary session number 3704 of November 16, 2007, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal repealed subsection l, of Article 29, of the Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio of that Institute. By official letter number [Placa1] of November 22, 2007, the Executive Directorate of the respondent Institute ordered the Human Resources Section to immediately notify each official who received the 'prohibition' payment (prohibición) of the repeal of the norm that grounded said remuneration. By official letter DAI-2231-SRH-542-2007 of November 23, 2007, the Head of the Human Resources Section of the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal informed the appellant of the suppression of the payment she received for the prohibition (prohibición) concept (...). The Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio del Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal may be amended or repealed by the Board of Directors of that entity, given the discretionary nature of the regulatory power; however, that possibility has as its limit the respect for rights acquired in good faith (derechos adquiridos de buena fe). In the case at hand, the respondent entity has disrespected the appellant's right to the enjoyment of the benefit granted, by virtue of the repeal of the 'prohibition' payment (prohibición), violating the provisions of numeral 34 of the Constitución Política. Under this understanding, the Court deems that the grievance claimed has been produced. Therefore (Por tanto): The appeal is sustained. It is ordered that the protected party be restored to the full enjoyment of her rights". (In a similar sense, see judgment number 3040 of that same Court, at 10:58 a.m. on February 29, 2008). The transcribed judgment—like the one cited—deals with a repeal, but the reasoning also applies to the supposition of the annulment of a norm for reasons of constitutionality, in the sense that the changes suffered by the legal system do not matter: even if the norm that gave rise to the prohibition (prohibición) disappears, it is integrated as a right acquired (derecho adquirido) into the salary (note that the Sala Constitucional itself holds the view that rights acquired can indeed be claimed in statutory relationships, which defeats another of the appeal's arguments). There exists a very similar precedent from the Sala Segunda, No. 70-93 (issued in an ordinary labor lawsuit against the Banco Central):

"On August 10, 1988, the plaintiff entered into, with the defendant, a prohibition contract (contrato de prohibición), in which it was agreed to pay him a forty-five percent compensation, starting from February 16, 1988. Subsequently, on March 31, 1989, he signed an addendum, based on the provisions of Law No. 7097, in which he is recognized sixty percent on the base salary (salario base), for the same concept, also counted from February 16, 1988. By virtue of the repeal of Article 127 of that Law No. 7097, effected by norm 9, of Article 24 of Law No. 7108, of November 11, 1988, which eliminated the increase in prohibition (prohibición) from forty-five percent to sixty percent, the Banco Central has refused to grant the respective recognition. It is important to highlight that Mr. [Name1] obtained a benefit that was incorporated by full right into his employment contract, without it being able to be affected by the subsequent repeal of the law. Indeed, numeral 34 of our Constitución Política enshrines the principle of non-retroactivity of laws, consolidating the certainty and legal security that must inspire the entire legal system, conferring upon it its essential and functional value. This provision tends to give credit to the law, solidity and permanence to the right, so that the individual knows what to expect. It is true that regulations adapt to reality, through the enactment of new legislation, amending or repealing prior ones; but such variations should not affect obtained benefits, nor consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas), because otherwise security would be endangered, promoting chaos. In the specie, the repeal of Law 7097, of August 18, 1988, could not affect Mr. [Name2], because the benefit of the sixty percent economic compensation for prohibition (prohibición) had been incorporated into his employment contract, and the argument that it was in force for a very short time is not receivable, as it was sufficient to produce full effects and protect rights exercised under its aegis". In accordance with the foregoing, a right acquired (derecho adquirido) is constituted not only by the sums entered, for the payment of the prohibition (prohibición), into the patrimony of those who were in the factual supposition provided for by the norm while it was in force, but rather the composition of the salary as such at the time of the disappearance of the norm that supported the regime also holds that character. In other words, the elimination of the norm had the virtue of affecting future workers, but not those who were already earning that supplement (plus).

**VIII.-** Analyzing the specific situation of Mr. [Name3], it is found that he worked for the Banco Central from April 1, 1976; starting in June 1988, he was promoted as an assistant in the Legal Advisory Department (Asesoría Jurídica) of the Auditoría General de Bancos, today SUGEF; subsequently and until the termination of the employment relationship (September 15, 2004), he served as a legal professional (profesional en derecho) in that legal advisory office (first and second facts of the complaint and its answer, folios 1 and 71, respectively). Likewise, from the time he began providing his services at SUGEF, he was paid the prohibition (prohibición); initially at a lower percentage and, finally, from November 1, 1988 until April 16, 2000, at 65% of the salary (third fact of the complaint and its answer, folios 1 and 42, respectively). Upon declaring the nullity of the norms that provided the basis for the payment of the prohibition (prohibición) (Article 14 of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para 1985, number 6982, of December 19, 1984 and its amendments, by Article 101 of the Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario number 7015, of November 22, 1985, and Article 14 subsection 17) of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario para 1986, number 7018, of December 20, 1985), as indicated before, the Board of Directors of the Banco Central, by agreement under Article 6, numerals A and B, of session No. 5032-2000, held on April 11, 2000, ordered the cessation of the prohibition payment (prohibición) to the officials and technical staff of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras as of the 17th of that same month (folios 178 to 180 and 348 to 350). That is to say, the plaintiff indeed suffered the effects of the defendant entity's decision to suppress the payment he received for the prohibition (prohibición), despite the fact that, as previously expressed, when declaring the nullity for unconstitutionality of the legal norms that served as its basis, the constitutional court ordered that the rights acquired (derechos adquiridos) by the workers affected by said declaration be respected. Precisely, in relation to the petitioner, his acquired rights were not respected, since not only the sums already entered into his patrimony under the title of "prohibition" (prohibición) constituted that acquired right, as was interpreted by the defendant, but also the composition of the salary as such at the time of the disappearance, due to the declaration of unconstitutionality, of the norm that supported the regime holds that character. In other words, the elimination of the norm had the virtue of affecting future workers, but not those who were already earning that supplement (plus), as was the case of the petitioner. It is worth rescuing what was stated in ruling No. 772-06 of this Chamber (always referring to the suppression of the "prohibition" (prohibición) at the Banco Central):

"(...) the plaintiff had indeed acquired the right to enter the prohibition (prohibición) regime, which, although also established in attention to the purposes and interests of the Administration, brought her a benefit of economic compensation that cannot be ignored. Consequently, the specific case is not one in which for better organization or attending to public interests, the position she held did not subsequently require being subject to the prohibition (prohibición), but rather that the exclusion derived from incorrect proceeding in the approval of the norms that included her in the regime, without such circumstance being able to affect her rights (...)".

As a final observation, it is valid to note that judgment No. 1257-09 of this Court is not unknown, to which we Magistrates now subscribing to this dissenting vote (voto de minoría) concurred (in which, faced with a similar matter, the conclusion was reached that the prohibition (prohibición) was not a right acquired (derecho adquirido)); however, revisiting the examination of the question, as well as the analysis of votes numbers 1623-08 and 3040-08 of the Sala Constitucional, it was deemed necessary to make a reconsideration, in the terms set forth herein, regarding the issue of rights acquired (derechos adquiridos), concluding that the salary supplements (pluses salariales) deriving from a norm that has disappeared from the legal system must be maintained within the servant's patrimony, meaning that the total salary must not be affected (within which was the bonus pay (sobresueldo) that the plaintiff received when the norm that served as its support was annulled)." **V.-** Now, the appellant argues that the prohibition is not a salary supplement, but rather compensation for the limitation on the private practice of the profession, making it necessary to analyze all possible salary components in relation to the specific case. The total amount received as salary is made up of amounts from various concepts that escape a unitary treatment, despite having a single, central point of reference or determining reason for their existence: the employment relationship. In our system, a distinction is made between base salary and salary complements. The former refers to the remuneration set for each professional category. The latter are those other economic payments earned by the worker due to various circumstances that may be of a personal nature or related to the job. The issue of whether the prohibition forms part of the salary or is merely simple compensation lacks importance for our purposes, since regardless of one conclusion or the other, what is important is that it is a supplement that has its reason for being on the occasion of the employment relationship, and which may be provided for in the law—if it is a prohibition—or in another source of law—when it involves exclusive dedication.

**VI.-** It should be remembered that at the Banco Central de Costa Rica, the payment of the prohibition had two distinct sources: **A.-** In the case of the employees of said Bank, it entered into a Collective Agreement with its employees, which in point 27 established: “*The Bank will keep the Position Classification Manual updated, especially regarding requirements, so that it adequately reflects the demands of the functions and responsibilities of each position. The Bank will require, according to the nature of the functions of those position classes where it deems appropriate, that their holders may not externally perform functions related to their position. In these cases, the Bank will compensate them economically according to the percentage scale applied to the prohibition base that governs for the officials of the Auditoría General de Bancos* (that is, the concept of prohibition was taken as a parameter to calculate the supplement for that limitation or exclusive dedication) *but extendable to other lower-level positions which will be recognized a percentage of the* -misnamed- *prohibition, proportionally set by the Bank (…)*.” Said clause, as it could not be reconciled, was included in the arbitration award issued at 10:00 a.m. on March 26, 1987, by the Labor Court of San José. Years later, Sala IV declared arbitration awards in the Public Sector unconstitutional (vote no. 1696-92), indicating in ruling 3285-92 that rights acquired in good faith through an arbitration award had to be respected. In summary, the legal basis for the payment of the misnamed prohibition was provided for, for the employees of the Banco Central, in Article 27 of the Collective Agreement. Later, the basis became Article 8 of session no. 4621 of December 9, 1992, which referred for its application to Article 27 of the Collective Agreement (which, ultimately, had already been affected by the declaration of unconstitutionality outlined above). **B.-** On the other hand, regarding the officials of the Auditoría General de Bancos (today SUGEF), the prohibition regime was based on atypical budget norms that, for that reason, were annulled. Indeed, the Constitutional Chamber, in judgment no. 4647-99, declared the unconstitutionality of a series of norms included in different budget laws, considering that they contained rules of a general nature foreign to budgetary matters. The precepts declared unconstitutional on that occasion were:

"*Article 14, Law of Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget of the Republic for 1985, number 6982 of December 19, 1984. Add a paragraph to Article 1 of Law 5867 that reads:* "*The benefits and prohibitions indicated in this article include the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos*." “*Article 101, Law of Extraordinary Budget, number 7015 of November 22, 1985. The technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos will receive the economic benefits of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975, and its amendments, subject to the prohibitions of said law.*" "*Article 14, Budget Law for 1986, number 7018 of December 20, 1985.* *1. ...* *17) The prohibitions and benefits contained in Article 1 of Law No. 5867 of December 15, 1975, are applicable to the Audit Offices of the National Banking System*." In that pronouncement, it was clearly established that the declaration was made without prejudice to acquired rights, and in another subsequent vote, issued at 10:03 a.m. on August 13, 1999 (no. 6327-99), arising from a motion for addition and clarification, it was reiterated that “*the declaration cannot prejudice the rights acquired in good faith*.” The Banco Central justified the elimination of the “prohibition” regime on the grounds that the employees of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, a deconcentrated body of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, based that payment on Article 101 of the Law of Extraordinary Budget No. 7015 of November 22, 1985, Article 14 of the Law of Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget of the Republic No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, and Article 14, subsection 17 of the Law of Ordinary Budget for 1986, No. 7018 of December 20, 1985; and that the economic compensation ceased in execution of the votes of the Constitutional Chamber, no. 4647 of 4:20 p.m. on June 16, 1999, and 6327 of 10:03 a.m. on August 13 of the same year, which declared unconstitutional and annulled Article 101 of the Law of Extraordinary Budget of the Republic 7015 of November 22, 1985, Article 14 of the Law of Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget of the Republic of 1985, No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, and Article 14, subsection 17 of the Law of Ordinary Budget of 1986, No. 7018 of December 20, 1985, with retroactive annulment to the entry into force of such norms, without prejudice to the rights acquired in good faith under the protection of the validity of such norms. Furthermore, the Bank based the elimination of the prohibition on the fact that Article 8 of session no. 4621-92 was an administrative act extinguished due to impossibility of material and juridical execution, as it was founded on Article 27 of the Collective Agreement which, by reflective effect of the estimatory judgments of unconstitutionality numbers 1696-92 and 3285-92, saw its effectiveness and enforceability diminished in accordance with the provisions of Articles 88 and 90 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.

**VII.- ON ACQUIRED RIGHTS:** As indicated in the preceding whereas clause *in fine*, the annulling votes of the Constitutional Chamber were clear in that they preserved rights acquired in good faith. This requires a review of what the Constitutional Chamber has indicated on that point and on consolidated juridical situations. That tribunal, in vote no. 2765-97, expressed:

“*The concepts of 'acquired right' and 'consolidated juridical situation' appear closely related in constitutional doctrine. It can be stated that, in general terms, the first denotes that consummated circumstance in which a thing—material or immaterial, be it a previously foreign good or a previously non-existent right—has entered into (or had an impact on) the patrimonial sphere of the person, such that the person experiences an ascertainable advantage or benefit. For its part, the 'consolidated juridical situation' represents not so much a patrimonial surplus, but rather a state of affairs fully defined as to its juridical characteristics and its effects, even if these have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant regarding the consolidated juridical situation, precisely, is not whether those effects still endure or not, but that—by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared—a clear and defined rule has already emerged into juridical life, connecting a factual premise (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect). From this perspective, the person's situation is given by a logical proposition of the type 'if..., then...'*; *that is to say: if the conditioning fact has occurred, then the 'consolidated juridical situation' implies that the conditioned effect must necessarily also occur. In both cases (acquired right or consolidated juridical situation), the legal system protects—making it intangible—the situation of the person who obtained the right or enjoys the situation, for reasons of equity and juridical certainty. In this case, the constitutional guarantee of the non-retroactivity of the law translates into the certainty that a change in the legal system cannot have the consequence of withdrawing the good or the right already acquired from the person's patrimony, or of causing that, if the factual premise had occurred prior to the legal reform, the consequence (beneficial, it is understood) that the interested party expected from the consolidated juridical situation no longer arises. Now, specifically regarding the latter, it has also been understood that no one has a 'right to the immutability of the legal system', that is, that the rules never change. For this reason, the constitutional precept does not consist in the fact that, once born into juridical life, the rule connecting the fact with the effect cannot be modified or even suppressed by a later norm; what it means is that—as explained—if the conditioning premise has occurred, a legal reform that changes or eliminates the rule cannot have the virtue of preventing the emergence of the conditioned effect that was expected under the rule of the previous norm. This is so because, it has been said, what is relevant is that the state of affairs enjoyed by the person was already defined as to its elements and its effects, even if these are still being produced or, indeed, have not yet begun to be produced. In this way, what the person has a right to is the consequence, not the rule*.” It is also relevant to transcribe another pronouncement from the Constitutional Chamber, No. 1623-08, issued on the occasion of an amparo appeal against the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal (IFAM):

“*In 1990, the appellant and IFAM entered into 'a prohibition contract', in which it was provided that the amparo-protected party would receive economic compensation equivalent to 65% of her base salary. In ordinary session number 3704 of November 16, 2007, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal repealed subsection l of Article 29 of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of that Institute. By official letter number [Placa1] of November 22, 2007, the Executive Directorate of the respondent Institute ordered the Human Resources Section to immediately proceed to notify each official receiving the 'prohibition' payment of the repeal of the norm that supported said remuneration. By official letter DAI-2231-SRH-542-2007 of November 23, 2007, the Head of the Human Resources Section of the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal informed the appellant of the suppression of the payment she received for the concept of prohibition (…). The Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal may be reformed or repealed by the Board of Directors of that entity, given the discretionary nature of the regulatory power; however, that possibility has as a limit the respect for rights acquired in good faith. In the case before us, the respondent entity has disrespected the appellant's right to the enjoyment of the granted benefit, by virtue of the repeal of the 'prohibition' payment, violating the provisions of numeral 34 of the Political Constitution. Under this understanding, the Chamber considers that the claimed grievance occurred.* **Por tanto:** *The appeal is granted. It is ordered that the amparo-protected party be restored to the full enjoyment of her rights*.” (In a similar sense, see the judgment of that same Chamber, number 3040, of 10:58 a.m. on February 29, 2008). The transcribed judgment—like the one cited—deals with a repeal, but the reasoning also applies to the scenario of the annulment of a norm for reasons of constitutionality, in the sense that changes to the juridical system do not matter: even if the norm that gave rise to the prohibition disappears, it is integrated as an acquired right into the salary (note that the Constitutional Chamber itself is of the opinion that acquired rights can indeed be claimed in statutory relationships, thus undermining another of the appeal's arguments). There is a very similar precedent from Sala Segunda, No. 70-93 (issued in an ordinary labor proceeding against the Banco Central):

“*On August 10, 1988, the plaintiff entered into, with the defendant, a prohibition contract, in which it was agreed to pay him forty-five percent as compensation, effective from February 16, 1988. Subsequently, on March 31, 1989, he signed an addendum, based on the provisions of Law No. 7097, in which he is recognized sixty percent over the base salary, for the same concept, also effective from February 16, 1988. By virtue of the repeal of Article 127 of that Law No. 7097, effected by norm 9 of Article 24 of Law No. 7108 of November 11, 1988, which eliminated the prohibition increase from forty-five percent to sixty percent, the Banco Central has refused to make the respective recognition. It is important to highlight that Mr. [Nombre1] obtained a benefit that was incorporated by full right into his employment contract, without it being able to be affected by the subsequent repeal of the law. Indeed, numeral 34 of our Political Constitution enshrines the principle of non-retroactivity of laws, consolidating the certainty and juridical security that should inspire the entire legal system, conferring its essential and functional value. This provision tends to give credit to the law, solidity, and permanence to the right, so that the individual knows what to expect. It is true that the regulations adapt to reality through the enactment of new legislation, modifying or repealing previous ones; but such changes must not affect the benefits obtained, nor the consolidated juridical situations, because otherwise security would be endangered, promoting chaos. In this case, the repeal of Law 7097 of August 18, 1988, could not affect Mr. [Nombre2], because the benefit of the economic compensation of sixty percent prohibition had been incorporated into his employment contract, without the claim that it was in force for a very short time being admissible, as it was sufficient to produce full effects and protect rights exercised under its aegis*.” In accordance with the foregoing, an acquired right is constituted not only by the sums received, for the concept of prohibition payment, into the patrimony of those who were in the factual situation provided for by the norm while it was in force, but also the composition of the salary as such at the moment of the disappearance of the norm that supported the regime holds that character. In other words, the elimination of the norm had the virtue of affecting future workers, but not those who were already earning that supplement.

**VIII.-** Analyzing the specific situation of Mr. **[Nombre3]**, it is established that he worked for the Banco Central since April 1, 1976; starting in June 1988, he was promoted as assistant to the Legal Advisory Office in the Auditoría General de Bancos, today SUGEF; subsequently and until the termination of the employment relationship (September 15, 2004), he served as a law professional in that legal advisory office (first and second facts of the complaint and its answer, folios 1 and 71, respectively). Likewise, from the time he began providing services at SUGEF, he was paid prohibition; initially at a lower percentage and, finally, from November 1, 1988, until April 16, 2000, at 65% of the salary (third fact of the complaint and its answer, folios 1 and 42, respectively). Upon declaring the nullity of the norms that gave foundation to the prohibition payment (Article 14 of the Law of Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget of the Republic for 1985, number 6982, of December 19, 1984, and its amendments, by Article 101 of the Law of Extraordinary Budget number 7015, of November 22, 1985, and Article 14, subsection 17) of the Law of Ordinary Budget for 1986, number 7018, of December 20, 1985), as indicated before, the Board of Directors of the Banco Central, by agreement of Article 6, numerals A and B, of session no. 5032-2000, held on April 11, 2000, ordered the payment of prohibition to the officials and technical personnel of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras to cease starting the 17th of that same month (folios 178 to 180 and 348 to 350). That is, the plaintiff effectively suffered the effects of the defendant entity's decision to suppress the payment he received for the concept of prohibition, despite the fact that, as expressed before, at the moment of declaring the nullity for unconstitutionality of the juridical norms that served as its foundation, the constitutional tribunal ordered that the acquired rights of the workers affected by said declaration be respected. Precisely, in relation to the petitioner, his acquired rights were not respected, since not only the sums already incorporated into his patrimony under the title of “prohibition” constituted that acquired right, as was interpreted by the defendant, but rather, **the composition of the salary as such at the moment of the disappearance from the juridical system, due to the declaration of unconstitutionality, of the norm that supported the regime, also holds that character.** In other words, the elimination of the norm had the virtue of affecting future workers, but not those who were already earning that supplement, as was the case of the petitioner. It is worth rescuing what was recorded in ruling no. 772-06 of this Chamber (always regarding the suppression of the “prohibition” at the Banco Central):

“*(…) the plaintiff had indeed acquired the right to enter the prohibition regime, which, although also provided for in accordance with the goals and interests of the Administration, brought her a benefit of economic compensation that cannot be disregarded. Therefore, this specific case is not one in which, for better organization or in attention to public interests, the position she held did not subsequently require being subject to the prohibition, but rather the exclusion resulted from an incorrect procedure in the approval of the norms that included her in the regime, without such a circumstance being able to affect her rights (…)*.” As a final observation, it is valid to note that we do not ignore ruling no. 1257-09 of this Office, in which we, the Judges now subscribing this dissenting vote, participated (in which, faced with a similar matter, the conclusion was reached that the prohibition was not a vested right); however, upon revisiting the examination of the issue, as well as the analysis of votes numbers 1623-08 and 3040-08 of the Constitutional Chamber, it was deemed necessary to reconsider, in the terms as set forth, the issue of vested rights (derechos adquiridos), concluding that salary supplements (pluses salariales) deriving from a norm that has disappeared from the legal system must be maintained within the employee's patrimony, meaning that the total salary (which included the additional pay that the plaintiff received when the norm serving as its support was annulled) should not be affected." **DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGES JULIA VARELA ARAYA AND EVA MARIA CAMACHO VARGAS** "**III.- THE PROHIBITION ON PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE:** We also share with the majority vote that the substantive issue of the present litigation resides in defining whether the petitioner is entitled to the payment of the prohibition from April 17, 2000 (proven facts numbers 3 and 10 of the first-instance judgment, confirmed by the Ad quem, without being objected to by any of the parties), the date on which the payment was suspended, until the date of his resignation, August 15, 2004, as an employee of the defendant (eighteenth fact of the claim and its response and folios 21 and 22). The basis for that payment resided in Article 14 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic for 1985, number 6982, of December 19, 1984, and its amendments, among others, that of Article 101 of the Extraordinary Budget Law number 7015, of November 22, 1985, and Article 14, subsection 17) of the Ordinary Budget Law for 1986, No. 7018, of December 20, 1985 (proven fact 4) of the first-instance judgment, confirmed by the second-instance judgment, folio 641; fourth fact of the claim and its response, folios 2 and 72). By reason of the unconstitutionality action filed by the Attorney General's Office against the cited norms, the Constitutional Chamber, upon declaring it with merit through vote No. 4647 of June 16, 1999, annulled them, stating that said *“…declaration is retroactive to the effective date of the annulled norms, without prejudice to the vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of good faith.”* Through resolution number 6327, of 10:03 hours on August thirteen, 1999, that Chamber resolved a request for addition and clarification of the cited vote. Based on those constitutional resolutions, the Board of Directors of the Central Bank, through an agreement under Article 6, items A and B, of session No. 5032-2000, held on April 11, 2000, ordered the cessation of the prohibition payment to officials and technical staff of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (SUGEF) as of the 17th of that same month (folios 178 to 180 and 348 to 350).

**IV.-** It must be borne in mind that the prohibition is not an employer's liberality, but rather a condition legally imposed on a specific position by reason of the nature of the functions that comprise it, which requires its transparent, impartial, and objective exercise, far from any conflict of interest; it is an ethical requirement and a condition inherent to the position that imposes on its holder a specific legal situation, from which the duty arises for the official appointed to the position not to practice their profession or trade in favor of third parties, with the correlative right to the payment of financial compensation for said limitation. It is an incompatibility between the exercise of the public function and that of the private profession due to the potential clash of interests that could arise. The payment of the prohibition depends on the position occupied being under that regime and on the official meeting the requirements established by the regulations instituting it. Exclusive dedication, on the other hand, must be understood in the sense that the Administration establishes it contractually according to the nature of the functions of the positions, when it deems it convenient that their holders not perform functions related to their position externally, and therefore its basis is not necessarily legal and has been granted in the Public Sector in various ways: by regulation, conventionally, and even through administrative acts that recognize the need for exclusivity of services and therefore institute it.

**V.-** Now, the appellant maintains that the prohibition is not a salary supplement (plus salarial), but rather compensation for the limitation on the private practice of the profession, making it necessary to analyze all possible components of the salary in relation to the specific case. The total amount received as salary is composed of sums from diverse concepts that elude a unitary treatment, despite having a single, central point of reference or determining reason for their existence: the employment relationship. In our context, a distinction is made between what is the base salary and salary supplements (complementos salariales). The former refers to the remuneration established for each professional category. The latter are those other financial perceptions that the worker earns due to various circumstances that may be of a personal nature or related to the job position. The issue of whether the prohibition is part of the salary or is merely simple compensation is unimportant for our purposes, since regardless of one conclusion or the other, the important thing is that it is a supplement (plus) that has its reason for being on the occasion of the employment relationship, and that may be provided for in the law -if it is a prohibition- or in another source of law -when it is a matter of exclusive dedication-.

**VI.-** It should be remembered that in the Banco Central de Costa Rica, the payment of the prohibition had two different sources: **A.-** In the case of the employees of said Bank, it entered into an Agreement of the Parties with its employees, which in point 27 established: “*The Bank will keep the Position Classification Manual updated, especially regarding requirements, so that it adequately reflects the demands required by the functions and responsibilities of each position. The Bank will require, according to the nature of the functions of those position classes where it deems convenient, that their holders may not externally perform functions related to their position. In these cases, the Bank will compensate them financially according to the percentage scale applied to the prohibition base that governs for the officials of the Auditoría General de Bancos* (that is, the concept of prohibition was taken as a parameter to calculate the supplement (plus) for that limitation or exclusive dedication) *but extendable to other lower-level positions to which a percentage of* -misnamed- *prohibition will be recognized, proportionally set by the Bank (…)*." Said clause, as it could not be conciliated, was included in the arbitration award of 10:00 hours on March 26, 1987, issued by the Labor Court of San José. Years later, the Constitutional Chamber declared arbitration awards in the Public Sector unconstitutional (vote No. 1696-92), indicating in ruling 3285-92 that the vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of good faith acquired through an arbitration award had to be respected. In recap, the legal basis for the payment of the so-called prohibition was provided for, for the Central Bank employees, in Article 27 of the Agreement of the Parties. Subsequently, the basis became Article 8 of session No. 4621 of December 9, 1992, which referred for its application to Article 27 of the Agreement of the Parties (which, ultimately, had already been affected by the declaration of unconstitutionality outlined). **B.-** For its part, in the case of the officials of the Auditoría General de Bancos (today SUGEF), the prohibition regime was based on atypical budgetary norms that, for that reason, were annulled. Indeed, the Constitutional Chamber, in judgment No. 4647-99, declared the unconstitutionality of a series of norms included in different budget laws, considering that they contained rules of a general nature foreign to budgetary matters. The precepts that were declared unconstitutional on that occasion were:

*"Article 14 Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic for 1985, number 6982 of December 19, 1984. Add a paragraph to Article 1 of Law 5867 that reads:* *"*The benefits and prohibitions indicated in this article include the technical staff of the Auditoría General de Bancos*".* *“Article 101 Extraordinary Budget Law, number 7015 of November 22, 1985. The technical staff of the Auditoría General de Bancos will receive the economic benefits of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975, and its amendments, subject to the prohibitions of said law."* *"Article 14 Budget Law for 1986 number 7018 of December 20, 1985.* *1. ...* *17) The prohibitions and benefits contained in Article 1 of Law No. 5867 of December 15, 1975, are applicable to the Auditorships of the National Banking System".* In that pronouncement, it was clearly established that the declaration was made without prejudice to vested rights (derechos adquiridos), and in another subsequent vote, issued at 10:03 hours on August 13, 1999 (No. 6327-99), derived from a request for addition and clarification, it was reiterated that “*the declaration cannot prejudice the vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of good faith*.” The Central Bank justified the elimination of the “prohibition” regime on the grounds that the servers of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, a deconcentrated body of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, based that payment on Article 101 of the Extraordinary Budget Law No. 7015 of November 22, 1985, Article 14 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, and Article 14 subsection 17 of the Ordinary Budget Law for 1986, No. 7018 of December 20, 1985; and that the financial compensation ceased in execution of the votes of the Constitutional Chamber, No. 4647 of 16:20 hours on June 16, 1999, and 6327 of 10:03 hours on August 13 of the same year, which declared unconstitutional and annulled Article 101 of the Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic 7015 of November 22, 1985, Article 14 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic of 1985, No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, and Article 14 subsection 17 of the Ordinary Budget Law of 1986, No. 7018 of December 20, 1985, with retroactive annulment to the entry into force of such norms, without prejudice to the vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of good faith under the effectiveness of such norms. Furthermore, the Bank based itself on the fact that Article 8 of session No. 4621-92 was an administrative act extinguished due to the impossibility of material and legal execution, as it was founded on Article 27 of the Agreement of the Parties which, by reflective effect of the estimatory unconstitutionality judgments numbers 1696-92 and 3285-92, saw its efficacy and enforceability diminished in accordance with the provisions of Articles 88 and 90 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.

**VII.- ON VESTED RIGHTS (DERECHOS ADQUIRIDOS):** As indicated in the preceding considerando in fine, the annulling votes of the Constitutional Chamber were clear in that the vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of good faith were safeguarded. This obliges a review of what the Constitutional Chamber has stated on that point and on consolidated legal situations. That court in vote No. 2765-97 expressed:

“*The concepts of 'vested right' (derecho adquirido) and 'consolidated legal situation' (situación jurídica consolidada) appear closely related in constitutional doctrine. It is possible to affirm that, in general terms, the former denotes that consummated circumstance in which a thing - material or immaterial, be it a previously alien good or a previously non-existent right - has entered into (or impacted upon) the person's patrimonial sphere, so that the latter experiences a verifiable advantage or benefit. For its part, the 'consolidated legal situation' represents not so much a patrimonial plus, but rather a state of affairs defined fully in terms of its legal characteristics and its effects, even if these have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant regarding the consolidated legal situation, precisely, is not whether those effects still endure or not, but that - by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared - a rule, clear and defined, has already emerged into legal life, which connects a factual presupposition (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect). From this perspective, the person's situation is given by a logical proposition of the type «if..., then...»* *; that is to say: if the conditioning fact has occurred, then the 'consolidated legal situation' implies that, necessarily, the conditioned effect must also occur. In both cases (vested right or consolidated legal situation), the legal system protects - making it intangible - the situation of the person who obtained the right or enjoys the situation, for reasons of equity and legal certainty. In this case, the constitutional guarantee of the non-retroactivity of the law translates into the certainty that a change in the legal system cannot have the consequence of removing the good or the right already acquired from the person's patrimony, or of causing that, if the factual presupposition had occurred prior to the legal reform, the consequence (advantageous, it is understood) that the interested party expected from the consolidated legal situation no longer arises. Now, specifically regarding the latter, it has also been understood that no one has a 'right to the immutability of the legal system,' meaning, to the rules never changing. Therefore, the constitutional precept does not consist in that, once born into legal life, the rule connecting the fact with the effect cannot be modified or even suppressed by a subsequent norm; what it means is that - as explained - if the conditioning assumption has occurred, a legal reform that changes or eliminates the rule cannot have the virtue of preventing the arising of the conditioned effect that was expected under the rule of the previous norm. This is so because, it was said, what is relevant is that the state of affairs that the person enjoyed was already defined in terms of its elements and its effects, even if these are still being produced or, even, have not yet begun to be produced. Thus, what the person is entitled to is the consequence, not the rule.”* It is also relevant to transcribe another pronouncement of the Constitutional Chamber, No. 1623-08, issued on the occasion of an amparo appeal against the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal (IFAM):

“*In 1990, the appellant and the IFAM signed 'a prohibition contract,' which stipulated that the protected party would receive financial compensation equivalent to 65% of her base salary. In ordinary session number 3704 of November 16, 2007, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal repealed subsection l, of article 29, of the Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of said Institute. Through official letter number [Placa1] of November 22, 2007, the Executive Directorate of the appealed Institute ordered the Human Resources Section to immediately proceed to notify each official who received the 'prohibition' payment about the repeal of the norm that supported said remuneration. By official letter DAI-2231-SRH-542-2007 of November 23, 2007, the Head of the Human Resources Section of the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal informed the appellant about the suppression of the payment she received for the concept of prohibition (…). The Autonomous Regulation of Organization and Service of the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal can be reformed or repealed by the Board of Directors of that entity, given the discretionary nature of the regulatory power; however, that possibility is limited by the respect for vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of good faith. In the case before us, the appealed entity has disregarded the appellant's right to the enjoyment of the benefit granted, by virtue of the repeal of the 'prohibition' payment, violating the provisions of numeral 34 of the Political Constitution. Under this understanding, the Chamber considers that the grievance claimed has occurred.* ***Therefore:*** *The appeal is granted. It is ordered that the protected party be restored to the full enjoyment of her rights.”* (In a similar sense, see the judgment of that same Chamber number 3040, of 10:58 hours on February 29, 2008). The transcribed judgment—like the one cited—deals with a repeal, but the reasoning also applies to the assumption of the annulment of a norm for constitutionality reasons, in the sense that changes the legal system undergoes do not matter: even if the norm that gave rise to the prohibition disappears, it is integrated as a vested right (derecho adquirido) into the salary (note that the Constitutional Chamber itself is of the opinion that vested rights can indeed be alleged in statutory relationships, whereby another of the arguments of the appeal falls). There is a very similar precedent from the Second Chamber, No. 70-93 (issued in an ordinary labor proceeding against the Central Bank):

“*On August 10, 1988, the plaintiff signed a prohibition contract with the defendant, in which it was agreed to pay him forty-five percent compensation, starting from February 16, 1988.* </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> Subsequently, on March 31, 1989, he signed an addendum, based on the provisions of Law No. 7097, in which he is recognized a sixty percent of the base salary, for the same concept, also counted from February 16, 1988.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> By virtue of the repeal of Article 127 of that Law No. 7097, effected by rule 9 of Article 24 of Law No. 7108 of November 11, 1988, which eliminated the increase of prohibition (prohibición) from forty-five percent to sixty percent, the Banco Central has refused to make the respective recognition.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> It is important to note that Mr. [Nombre1] obtained a benefit that was incorporated by full right into his employment contract, without being able to be affected by the subsequent repeal of the law.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> Indeed, numeral 34 of our Political Constitution enshrines the principle of non-retroactivity of laws, consolidating the certainty and legal security (seguridad jurídica) that must inspire the entire legal order, conferring upon it its essential and functional value.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> This provision tends to give credit to the law, solidity and permanence to the right, so that the individual knows what to expect.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> It is true that regulations adapt to reality through the enactment of new legislation, modifying or repealing previous ones; but such variations must not affect benefits obtained, nor consolidated legal situations, because otherwise security would be endangered, promoting chaos.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> In the present case, the repeal of Law 7097 of August 18, 1988, could not affect Mr. [Nombre2], because the benefit of the economic compensation of the sixty percent prohibition (prohibición) had been incorporated into his employment contract, and the argument that it was in force for a very short time is unacceptable, since it was sufficient to produce full effects and protect rights exercised under its aegis.” </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">In accordance with the foregoing, it constitutes an acquired right (derecho adquirido), not only the sums received, as payment for prohibition (prohibición), into the patrimony of those who were in the factual situation provided for by the rule while it was in force, but also the composition of the salary as such at the time of the disappearance of the rule that supported the regime bears that character. In other words, the elimination of the rule had the effect of affecting future workers, but not those who were already earning that bonus.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">VIII.-</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> Analyzing the specific situation of Mr. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">[Nombre3] </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">, it is found that he worked for the Banco Central from April 1, 1976; starting in June 1988, he was promoted as assistant to the Legal Advisory Office in the General Audit of Banks, today SUGEF; subsequently and until the termination of the employment relationship (September 15, 2004), he served as a legal professional in that legal advisory office (facts one and two of the complaint and its response, folios 1 and 71, respectively). Likewise, since he began providing services at SUGEF, he was paid prohibition (prohibición); initially at a lower percentage and, finally, from November 1, 1988, until April 16, 2000, at 65% of the salary (fact three of the complaint and its response, folios 1 and 42, respectively). Upon the declaration of nullity of the rules that gave basis to the payment of prohibition (prohibición) (Article 14 of the Law of Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget of the Republic for 1985, number 6982, of December 19, 1984, and its reforms, by Article 101 of the Extraordinary Budget Law number 7015, of November 22, 1985, and 14 subsection 17) of the Ordinary Budget Law for 1986, number 7018, of December 20, 1985), as indicated before,</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> the Board of Directors of the Banco Central, by agreement of Article 6, numerals A and B, of session No. 5032-2000, held on April 11, 2000, ordered the cessation of the payment of prohibition (prohibición) to the officials and technical personnel of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (SUGEF) as of the 17th of that same month (folios 178 to 180 and 348 to 350). That is, the plaintiff effectively suffered the effects of the decision of the defendant entity to suppress the payment of what he received as prohibition (prohibición), despite the fact that, as stated before, at the time of declaring the nullity on grounds of unconstitutionality of the legal rules that served as its basis, the constitutional court ordered respect for the acquired rights (derechos adquiridos) of the workers affected by said declaration. Precisely, in relation to the petitioner, his acquired rights (derechos adquiridos) were not respected, since not only the sums already entered into his patrimony as “prohibition (prohibición)” constituted that acquired right (derecho adquirido), as was interpreted by the defendant, but </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">the composition of the salary as such at the time of the disappearance of the legal order, by reason of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the rule that supported the regime, also bears that character</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">. In other words, the elimination of the rule had the effect of affecting future workers, but not those who were already earning that bonus, as was the case of the petitioner. It is worth highlighting what was recorded in ruling No. 772-06 of this Chamber (always referring to the suppression of “prohibition (prohibición)” in the Banco Central):</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">“(…) the plaintiff had indeed acquired the right to enter the prohibition (prohibición) regime, which, although also established in response to the purposes and interests of the Administration, brought her a benefit of economic compensation that cannot be ignored. Therefore, the specific case is not one in which, for better organization or in response to public interests, the position she held no longer required being subject to the prohibition (prohibición) thereafter, but rather that the exclusion resulted from an incorrect procedure in the approval of the rules that included her in the regime, without such circumstance being able to affect her rights (…)”. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">As a final observation, it is valid to note that we do not disregard ruling No. 1257-09 of this Office, in which we, the Magistrates now subscribing to this minority vote, participated (in which, faced with a similar matter, the conclusion was reached that prohibition (prohibición) was not an acquired right (derecho adquirido)); however, revisiting the examination of the question, as well as the analysis of decisions numbers 1623-08 and 3040-08</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), it was deemed necessary to make a reconsideration, in the terms that have been set forth, regarding the issue of acquired rights (derechos adquiridos), concluding that salary bonuses that derive from a rule that has disappeared from the legal order must be maintained within the employee's patrimony, that is, the total salary must not be affected (within which was the bonus that the plaintiff was receiving when the rule that served as its support was annulled).” </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>"

VOTO SALVADO DE LAS MAGISTRADAS JULIA VARELA ARAYA Y EVA MARIA CAMACHO VARGAS “III.- LA PROHIBICIÓN DEL EJERCICIO PROFESIONAL: Igualmente compartimos con el voto de mayoría que el tema de fondo de la presente litis reside en la definición de si al petente le corresponde el pago de la prohibición desde el 17 de abril de 2000 (hechos probados números 3 y 10 de la sentencia de primera instancia, confirmados por el Ad quem, sin que fuera objetado por ninguna de las partes), data en que se suspendió el pago, hasta la fecha de su renuncia, el 15 de agosto de 2004, como empleado de la demandada (hecho decimoctavo de la demanda y su contestación y folios 21 y 22). El fundamento de ese pago residió en el artículo 14 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para 1985, número 6982, de 19 de diciembre de 1984 y sus reformas, entre otras, la del artículo 101 de la Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario número 7015, del 22 de noviembre de 1985 y el 14 inciso 17) de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario para 1986, n° 7018, del 20 de diciembre de 1985 (hecho probado 4) de la sentencia de primera instancia, confirmado por la de segunda, folio 641; hecho cuarto de la demanda y su contestación, folios 2 y 72). En razón de la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por la Procuraduría General de la República contra las citadas normas, la Sala Constitucional, al declararla con lugar mediante voto n° 4647 del 16 de junio de 1999, las anuló, señalando que esa “…declaratoria es retroactiva a la fecha de vigencia de las normas anuladas, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe”. Mediante resolución número 6327, de las 10:03 horas del trece de agosto de 1999, esa Sala resolvió solicitud de adición y aclaración del citado voto. Con fundamento en esas resoluciones constitucionales la Junta Directiva del Banco Central, mediante acuerdo de Artículo 6, numerales A y B, de la sesión n° 5032-2000, celebrada el 11 de abril de 2000, ordenó cesar el pago de prohibición a los funcionarios y personal técnico de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras a partir del 17 de ese mismo mes (folios 178 a 180 y 348 a 350).

IV.- Debe tenerse presente que la prohibición no es una liberalidad patronal, sino una condición impuesta legalmente a un puesto determinado en razón de la naturaleza de las funciones que lo integran, el cual requiere de su ejercicio transparente, imparcial y objetivo, lejos de todo conflicto de intereses; es una exigencia ética y condición propia del puesto que impone a su titular una situación jurídica determinada, de la cual deviene para el funcionario nombrado en el puesto el deber de no ejercer su profesión u oficio a favor de terceras personas, con el derecho correlativo al pago de una compensación económica por dicha limitación. Se trata de una incompatibilidad entre el ejercicio de la función pública y el de la profesión privada por el eventual choque de intereses que se podría generar. El pago de la prohibición depende de que el puesto que se ocupe esté bajo ese régimen y que el funcionario cumpla los presupuestos que prevé la normativa que la instaura. La dedicación exclusiva debe entenderse, en cambio, en el sentido de que la Administración la establece contractualmente de acuerdo con la naturaleza de las funciones de los puestos, cuando estime conveniente que sus titulares no deban ejercer funciones afines a su cargo externamente, por lo que su fundamento no es necesariamente legal y ha sido concedida en el Sector Público de diversas formas: por reglamento, de manera convencional e incluso por actos administrativos que reconocen la necesidad de la exclusividad de los servicios y por eso la instauran.

V.- Ahora bien, quien recurre sostiene que la prohibición no es un plus salarial, sino una indemnización por la limitación al ejercicio privado de la profesión, por lo que es necesario analizar todos los componentes posibles del salario en relación con el caso concreto. El importe total recibido como salario se integra por cantidades provenientes de conceptos diversos que escapan a un tratamiento unitario, no obstante tener un único y central punto de referencia o motivo determinante de su existencia: la relación laboral. En nuestro medio se distingue entre lo que es el salario base y los complementos salariales. El primero hace referencia a la retribución fijada para cada categoría profesional. Los segundos son aquellas otras percepciones económicas que devenga el trabajador en razón de circunstancias diversas que pueden ser de índole personal o estar relacionadas con el puesto de trabajo. El tema de si la prohibición forma parte del salario o es solo una simple indemnización carece de importancia para nuestros efectos, pues con independencia de una u otra conclusión, lo importante es que se trata de un plus que tiene su razón de ser con ocasión de la relación laboral, y que puede estar prevista en la ley -si es prohibición- o en otra fuente de derecho -cuando se trata de dedicación exclusiva-.

VI.- Debe recordarse que en el Banco Central de Costa Rica el pago de la prohibición tenía dos fuentes distintas: A.- Para el caso de los trabajadores de dicho Banco, este suscribió con sus empleados un Convenio de Partes, que en el punto 27 establecía: “El Banco mantendrá actualizado el Manual de Clasificación de Puestos especialmente en lo que se refiere a requisitos de tal manera que esto refleje adecuadamente las exigencias que demanda las funciones y responsabilidades de cada puesto. El Banco exigirá de acuerdo con la naturaleza de las funciones de aquellas clases de puestos en que estime conveniente que sus titulares no puedan ejercer externamente funciones afines a su cargo. En estos casos el Banco le compensará económicamente de acuerdo con la escala porcentual aplicada a la base de la prohibición que rige para los funcionarios de la Auditoría General de Bancos (o sea que se tomó el concepto de prohibición como parámetro para calcular el plus por esa limitación o dedicación exclusiva) pero extensible a otros puestos de menor nivel a los cuales se les reconocerá un porcentaje de -mal denominada- prohibición proporcional fijado por el Banco (…)”. Dicha cláusula, como no pudo ser conciliada, fue recogida en el laudo arbitral de las 10 horas del 26 de marzo de 1987 dictado por el Tribunal de Trabajo de San José. Años después, la Sala IV declaró inconstitucionales los laudos arbitrales en el Sector Público (voto n° 1696-92), indicándose en el fallo 3285-92 que los derechos adquiridos de buena fe mediante un laudo arbitral debían ser respetados. Haciendo una recapitulación, se tiene que el sustento jurídico del pago de la mal llamada prohibición estaba prevista, para los trabajadores del Banco Central, en el artículo 27 del Convenio de Partes. Luego el fundamento pasó a ser el artículo 8 de la sesión n° 4621 del 9 de diciembre de 1992, que remitía para su aplicación al artículo 27 del Convenio de Partes (el cual, a la postre, ya había sido afectado por la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad reseñada). B.- Por su parte, tratándose de los funcionarios de la Auditoría General de Bancos (hoy SUGEF), el régimen de prohibición se basaba en normas presupuestarias atípicas que, por esa razón, fueron anuladas. En efecto, la Sala Constitucional, en la sentencia n° 4647-99, declaró la inconstitucionalidad de una serie de normas incluidas en distintas leyes de presupuesto, por considerar que contenían reglas de carácter general ajenas a la materia presupuestaria. Los preceptos que se declararon inconstitucionales en esa oportunidad fueron:

"Artículo 14 Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para 1985, número 6982 de 19 diciembre 1984. Agréguese un párrafo al artículo 1 de la Ley 5867 que diga:

"Los beneficios y prohibiciones que se indican en este artículo, incluyen al personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos".

“Artículo 101 Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, número 7015 del 22 noviembre 1985. El personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos recibirá los beneficios económicos de la Ley 5867 de 15 de diciembre de 1975 y sus reformas sujeto a las prohibiciones de dicha ley." "Artículo 14 Ley de Presupuesto para 1986 número 7018 de 20 de diciembre de 1985.

1. ...

• 17)Las prohibiciones y beneficios contenidos en el artículo 1 de la Ley No. 5867 15 de diciembre de 1975, son aplicables a las Auditorías del Sistema Bancario Nacional".

En ese pronunciamiento se dejó claramente establecido que la declaratoria se hacía sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos, y en otro voto posterior, dictado a las 10:03 horas del 13 de agosto de 1999 (n° 6327-99), derivado de una gestión de adición y aclaración, se reiteró que “la declaratoria no puede perjudicar los derechos adquiridos de buena fe”. El Banco Central justificó la eliminación del régimen de “prohibición” en que los servidores de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, órgano desconcentrado del Banco Central de Costa Rica, fundaban ese pago en el artículo 101 de la Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario n° 7015 del 22 de noviembre de 1985, 14 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República n° 6982 del 19 de diciembre de 1984 y 14 inciso 17 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario para 1986, n° 7018 de 20 de diciembre de 1985; y en que la compensación económica cesó en ejecución de los votos de la Sala Constitucional, n° 4647 de las 16:20 horas del 16 de junio de 1999 y 6327 de las 10:03 horas del 13 de agosto del mismo año, que declararon inconstitucionales y anularon el artículo 101 de la Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario de la República 7015 del 22 de noviembre de 1985, 14 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República de 1985, n° 6982 del 19 de diciembre de 1984, y 14 inciso 17 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario de 1986, n° 7018 del 20 de diciembre de 1985, anulación retroactiva a la entrada en vigencia de tales normas, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe al amparo de la vigencia de tales normas. Además, el Banco se fundamentó para eliminar la prohibición en que el artículo 8 de la sesión n° 4621-92 era un acto administrativo extinto por imposibilidad de ejecución material y jurídica, al fundarse en el artículo 27 del Convenio de Partes que, por efecto reflejo de las sentencias estimatorias de inconstitucionalidad números 1696-92 y 3285-92, vio disminuida su eficacia y ejecutoriedad conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 88 y 90 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

VII.- SOBRE LOS DERECHOS ADQUIRIDOS: Como se indicó en el considerando anterior in fine, los votos anulatorios de la Sala Constitucional fueron claros en cuanto a que se dejaban a salvo los derechos adquiridos de buena fe. Esto obliga efectuar un repaso sobre lo que la Sala Constitucional ha señalado sobre ese punto y sobre las situaciones jurídicas consolidadas. Ese tribunal en el voto n° 2765-97 expresó:

“Los conceptos de "derecho adquirido" y "situación jurídica consolidada" aparecen estrechamente relacionados en la doctrina constitucionalista. Es dable afirmar que, en términos generales, el primero denota a aquella circunstancia consumada en la que una cosa - material o inmaterial, trátese de un bien previamente ajeno o de un derecho antes inexistente- ha ingresado en (o incidido sobre) la esfera patrimonial de la persona, de manera que ésta experimenta una ventaja o beneficio constatable. Por su parte, la "situación jurídica consolidada" representa no tanto un plus patrimonial, sino un estado de cosas definido plenamente en cuanto a sus características jurídicas y a sus efectos, aun cuando éstos no se hayan extinguido aún. Lo relevante en cuanto a la situación jurídica consolidada, precisamente, no es que esos efectos todavía perduren o no, sino que -por virtud de mandato legal o de una sentencia que así lo haya declarado- haya surgido ya a la vida jurídica una regla, clara y definida, que conecta a un presupuesto fáctico (hecho condicionante) con una consecuencia dada (efecto condicionado). Desde esta óptica, la situación de la persona viene dada por una proposición lógica del tipo «si..., entonces...»; vale decir: si se ha dado el hecho condicionante, entonces la "situación jurídica consolidada" implica que, necesariamente, deberá darse también el efecto condicionado. En ambos casos (derecho adquirido o situación jurídica consolidada), el ordenamiento protege -tornándola intangible- la situación de quien obtuvo el derecho o disfruta de la situación, por razones de equidad y de certeza jurídica. En este caso, la garantía constitucional de la irretroactividad de la ley se traduce en la certidumbre de que un cambio en el ordenamiento no puede tener la consecuencia de sustraer el bien o el derecho ya adquirido del patrimonio de la persona, o de provocar que si se había dado el presupuesto fáctico con anterioridad a la reforma legal, ya no surja la consecuencia (provechosa, se entiende) que el interesado esperaba de la situación jurídica consolidada. Ahora bien, específicamente en cuanto a ésta última, se ha entendido también que nadie tiene un "derecho a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento", es decir, a que las reglas nunca cambien. Por eso, el precepto constitucional no consiste en que, una vez nacida a la vida jurídica, la regla que conecta el hecho con el efecto no pueda ser modificada o incluso suprimida por una norma posterior; lo que significa es que -como se explicó- si se ha producido el supuesto condicionante, una reforma legal que cambie o elimine la regla no podrá tener la virtud de impedir que surja el efecto condicionado que se esperaba bajo el imperio de la norma anterior. Esto es así porque, se dijo, lo relevante es que el estado de cosas de que gozaba la persona ya estaba definido en cuanto a sus elementos y a sus efectos, aunque éstos todavía se estén produciendo o, incluso, no hayan comenzado a producirse. De este modo, a lo que la persona tiene derecho es a la consecuencia, no a la regla”.

También resulta relevante transcribir otro pronunciamiento de la Sala Constitucional, n.° 1623-08, dictado con ocasión de un recurso de amparo contra el Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal (IFAM):

“En el año 1990 la recurrente y el IFAM suscribieron “un contrato de prohibición”, en el que se dispuso que la amparada percibiría una compensación económica equivalente al 65% de su salario base. En la sesión ordinaria número 3704 del 16 de noviembre de 2007, la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal derogó el inciso l, del artículo 29, del Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de ese Instituto. Mediante oficio número [Placa1] del 22 de noviembre de 2007, la Dirección Ejecutiva del Instituto recurrido ordenó a la Sección de Recursos Humanos que procediera de inmediato a notificar a cada funcionario que percibía el pago de “prohibición” sobre la derogatoria de la norma que fundamentaba dicha retribución. Por oficio DAI-2231-SRH-542-2007 del 23 de noviembre de 2007, la Jefa de la Sección de Recursos Humanos del Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal informó a la recurrente sobre la supresión del pago que recibía por concepto de prohibición (…). El Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio del Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal puede ser reformado o derogado por la Junta Directiva de ese ente, dado el carácter discrecional de la potestad reglamentaria; sin embargo, esa posibilidad tiene como límite el respeto a los derechos adquiridos de buena fe. En el caso que nos ocupa, el ente recurrido ha irrespetado el derecho de la recurrente al disfrute del beneficio otorgado, en virtud de la derogatoria del pago de la “prohibición”, quebrantando lo dispuesto por el numeral 34 de la Constitución Política. Bajo esta inteligencia, estima la Sala que se produjo el agravio que se reclama. Por tanto: Se declara con lugar el recurso. Se ordena que se restituya a la amparada en el pleno goce de sus derechos”. (En sentido similar puede verse la sentencia de esa misma Sala número 3040, de las 10:58 horas del 29 de febrero de 2008). La sentencia transcrita -al igual que la citada- versa sobre una derogación, pero el razonamiento también aplica para el supuesto de la anulación de una norma por motivos de constitucionalidad, en el sentido de que no importan los cambios que sufra el ordenamiento jurídico: aunque desaparezca la norma que daba pie a la prohibición, esta se integra como derecho adquirido al salario (obsérvese que la propia Sala Constitucional es del criterio de que sí pueden alegarse derechos adquiridos en las relaciones estatutarias, con lo que cae otro de los argumentos del recurso). Existe un antecedente muy parecido de la Sala Segunda, n° 70-93 (dictado en un ordinario laboral contra el Banco Central):

“El 10 de agosto de 1988, el actor suscribió, con el demandado, un contrato de prohibición, en el que se acordó pagarle un cuarenta y cinco por ciento de compensación, a partir del 16 de febrero de 1988. Posteriormente, el 31 de marzo de 1989, firmó un adendum, con base en las disposiciones de la Ley N ° 7097, en el que se le reconoce un sesenta por ciento sobre el salario base, por el mismo concepto, contado también desde el 16 de febrero de 1988. En virtud de la derogatoria del artículo 127, de esa Ley N ° 7097, efectuada por la norma 9, del artículo 24 de la Ley N ° 7108, del 11 de noviembre de 1988, que eliminó el aumento de prohibición de un cuarenta y cinco por ciento a un sesenta por ciento, el Banco Central se ha negado a hacer el reconocimiento respectivo. Interesa destacar que, don [Nombre1]., obtuvo un beneficio que se incorporó de pleno derecho a su contrato de trabajo, sin que pudiera ser afectado por la derogatoria posterior de la ley. Efectivamente, el numeral 34 de nuestra Constitución Política consagra el principio de irretroactividad de las leyes, consolidando la certeza y la seguridad jurídica, que debe inspirar todo el ordenamiento, confiriéndole su valor esencial y funcional. Esta disposición tiende a darle crédito a la ley, solidez y permanencia al derecho, a fin de que el individuo sepa a qué atenerse. Es cierto que la normativa se adapta a la realidad, mediante la promulgación de nueva legislación, modificando o derogando las anteriores; pero tales variantes no deben afectar los beneficios obtenidos, ni las situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, porque de lo contrario peligraría la seguridad promoviéndose el caos. En la especie, la derogatoria de la Ley 7097, del 18 de agosto de 1988, no pudo afectar a don [Nombre2], porque el beneficio de la compensación económica del sesenta por ciento de prohibición se había incorporado a su contrato de trabajo, sin que sea de recibo el alegato de que estuvo en vigencia muy poco tiempo, pues el mismo fue suficiente para surtir efectos plenos y amparar derechos ejercidos bajo su égida”. Conforme a lo dicho, constituyen derecho adquirido, no solo las sumas ingresadas, por concepto del pago de prohibición, al patrimonio de quienes se encontraban en el supuesto de hecho previsto por la norma mientras esta estuvo vigente, sino que reviste ese carácter la composición del salario como tal al momento de la desaparición de la norma que le daba sustento al régimen. En otras palabras, la eliminación de la norma tuvo la virtud de afectar a los trabajadores futuros, pero no a los que ya estuvieren devengando ese plus.

VIII.- Analizando la situación concreta del señor [Nombre3] , se tiene que trabajó para el Banco Central desde el 1 de abril de 1976; a partir del mes de junio de 1988, se le ascendió como asistente de la Asesoría Jurídica en la Auditoría General de Bancos, hoy SUGEF; posteriormente y hasta la terminación de la relación laboral (15 de setiembre de 2004), se desempeñó como profesional en derecho en esa asesoría legal (hechos primero y segundo de la demanda y su contestación, folios1 y 71, respectivamente). Asimismo, desde que inició su prestación de servicios en la SUGEF se le pago prohibición; inicialmente en un porcentaje menor y, finalmente, desde el 1 de noviembre de 1988 y hasta el 16 de abril de 2000, en un 65% del salario (hecho tercero de la demanda y su contestación, folios 1 y 42, respectivamente). Al declararse la nulidad de las normas que le dieron fundamento al pago de la prohibición (el artículo 14 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para 1985, número 6982, de 19 de diciembre de 1984 y sus reformas, por artículo 101 de la Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario número 7015, del 22 de noviembre de 1985, y el 14 inciso 17) de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario para 1986, número 7018, del 20 de diciembre de 1985), como se indicó antes, la Junta Directiva del Banco Central, mediante acuerdo de Artículo 6, numerales A y B, de la sesión n° 5032-2000, celebrada el 11 de abril de 2000, ordenó cesar el pago de prohibición a los funcionarios y personal técnico de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras a partir del 17 de ese mismo mes (folios 178 a 180 y 348 a 350). Es decir, el actor efectivamente sufrió los efectos de la decisión del ente demandado de suprimirle el pago de lo que recibía por concepto de prohibición, pese a que, como se expresó antes, al momento de declarar la nulidad por inconstitucionales de las normas jurídicas que le servían de fundamento, el tribunal constitucional ordenó respetar los derechos adquiridos por los trabajadores afectados con dicha declaratoria. Precisamente, en relación con el petente, sus derechos adquiridos no fueron respetados, pues, no solo las sumas ya ingresadas a su patrimonio a título de “prohibición” constituían ese derecho adquirido, como fue interpretado por la accionada, sino que, también reviste ese carácter, la composición del salario como tal al momento de la desaparición del ordenamiento jurídico, en razón de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad, de la norma que le daba sustento al régimen. En otras palabras, la eliminación de la norma tuvo la virtud de afectar a los trabajadores futuros, pero no a los que ya estuvieren devengando ese plus, como era el caso del petente. Merece la pena rescatar lo consignado en el fallo n° 772-06 de esta Cámara (siempre referente a la supresión de la “prohibición” en el Banco Central):

“(…) la actora sí había adquirido el derecho de ingresar al régimen de prohibición, que si bien también está dispuesto en atención a los fines e intereses de la Administración, le traía un beneficio de compensación económica que no puede desconocerse. Luego, el caso concreto no se trata de uno en el que para una mejor organización o en atención a los intereses públicos el cargo que ella ocupaba no requería en lo subsiguiente estar sujeto a la prohibición, sino que la exclusión derivó por un incorrecto proceder en la aprobación de las normas que la incluyeron en el régimen, sin que tal circunstancia pueda afectar sus derechos (…)”.

A modo de observación final, es válido acotar que no se desconoce el fallo n° 1257-09 de este Despacho, al cual concurrimos las Magistradas que ahora suscribimos este voto de minoría (en el cual, ante un asunto similar, se llegó a la conclusión de que la prohibición no era un derecho adquirido); no obstante, retomando el examen de la cuestión, así como el análisis de los votos números 1623-08 y 3040-08 de la Sala Constitucional, se estimó necesario hacer un replanteamiento, en los términos en que ha quedado expuesto, en relación con el tema de los derechos adquiridos, concluyendo que los pluses salariales que derivan de una norma desaparecida del ordenamiento, se deben mantener dentro del patrimonio del servidor, o sea que no se debe afectar el salario total (dentro del cual estaba el sobresueldo que recibía el actor cuando se anuló la norma que le servía de soporte).”