Discriminatory dismissal on health groundsDespido discriminatorio por razones de salud

**IV.- REGARDING THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TEMPORALIDADES DE LA IGLESIA CATÓLICA DIÓCESIS DE ALAJUELA AND THE PLAINTIFF:** The plaintiff is aggrieved by the criterion of the ad quem court in considering that no employment relationship existed between Mrs. [Nombre1] and the Temporalidades de la Iglesia. Article 2 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) defines the figure of the employer as follows: “*An employer is any natural or legal person, private or under Public Law, who employs the services of another or others, by virtue of an employment contract, express or implied, verbal or written, individual or collective*”. Likewise, canon 4 of the same normative body refers to the worker as that “*natural person who provides to another or others their material, intellectual, or both types of services, by virtue of an employment contract, express or implied, verbal or written, individual or collective*”. Now then, regarding the individual contract, the Labor Code regulates the following: “*An individual employment contract, whatever its denomination may be, is any contract in which a person obligates themselves to provide services to another or to execute a work for them, under the permanent dependency and immediate or delegated direction of the latter, and for remuneration of any kind or form. / The existence of this contract is presumed between the worker who provides their services and the person who receives them*”. As can be elucidated from the set of norms cited, an employment contract exists when there is the personal provision of a service on behalf of another, executed under a regime of subordination in exchange for the payment of a salary. In the present matter, it was duly accredited that the plaintiff began working for the Ministerio de Educación Pública on February 1, 1991, as an administrative assistant (folio 3). Later, she obtained a leave of absence without pay from the State to serve in an interim promotion as a social studies teacher at the Colegio Patriarca San José, a position she held from February 1, 2002, until January 31, 2007 (folios 68, 69, and 195). The foregoing demonstrates that even though she never ceased to be an employee of the Ministerio de Educación Pública, this situation did not prevent her from establishing a new employment relationship with the Temporalidades de la Iglesia Católica, Diócesis de Alajuela. This is because, by virtue of the provisions of Article 73 of the Labor Code, the relationship she maintained with the State was suspended by mutual agreement, an event that becomes clear if we consider that subsequently, the administration ceased to benefit from the plaintiff's services as an administrative assistant and, consequently, there was no payment of remuneration during that period. Regarding the Temporalidades de la Iglesia Católica, it is clear that an employment relationship existed, because although the model for appointing teachers in subsidized schools involves State participation due to the provisions of ordinal 80 of the Constitution (Carta Magna) (without entering into the analysis of the Administration's responsibility for that specific contract, as it is not an issue submitted for consideration in this study), the reality is that it was the educational center owned by it that directly benefited from the plaintiff's work as a social studies teacher and exercised the direction of the personal provision of the service at all times. Proof of this is that, as seen in the documentary evidence at folios 4 and 5, the authorities of that institution annually evaluated the work performed by her and even possessed the power to dismiss her in the performance of her duties. Hence, the appellant is correct in deeming the tribunal's conclusion mistaken regarding the fact that the claim could only be directed against the State, since based on canon 104 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), there is a legitimate interest on the part of the appellant to sue the second co-defendant, in addition to the fact that an employment relationship existed with it.

**V.- ON THE TERM OF THE CONTRACT:** The plaintiff complains that the ruling of the appellate body violated numeral 26 of the Labor Code, by reasoning the inadmissibility of the requested indemnities based on the fact that the contract binding both parties was for a fixed term. On this topic, this Chamber on previous occasions has been clear regarding the exceptional nature of this form of contracting. Thus, in ruling 2010-0929 at 9:55 a.m. on June 30, 2010, it was stated: “The plaintiff argues that his contract was for a determined term, contrary to what was concluded in previous instances. On this topic, authors Palomeque López and Álvarez de la Rosa state: ‘The duration of the contract, from the perspective of employment stability, takes shape in two general models of contracting: indefinite-term or temporary. The indefinite contract is the common one, and the temporary one is only possible when the parties avail themselves of a type of contract of this nature. The typology of temporary contracting may also be, in turn, the product of another option: temporary contracts based on an express cause for temporality (causal temporary contracts) or contracts of determined duration without justifying the cause (non-causal or conjunctural temporary contracts based on a normative employment policy decision). (…) This contract can be used for all types of companies and in any sector of activity, but never for normal or permanent activities, only for those of an autonomous and substantive nature. Such autonomy and substantivity need not refer to novel activities, but rather to those typical of the company’s activity, but which, due to their economic content, duration, intensity, number of workers assigned to attend to them, merit the condition of being autonomous (the identification will be, as stated, of collective conventional or contractual origin).’ (Palomeque López Manuel and Álvarez de la Rosa Manuel (2002). Derecho del Trabajo, Tenth Edition, Editorial Centro de Estudios Ramón Areces S.A., Madrid, Spain, pp. 756-759) the italics are not from the original). The Labor Code establishes in its Article 26 the following: ‘The employment contract may only be stipulated for a determined time in those cases where its conclusion results from the nature of the service to be provided. If, upon expiration of its term, the causes that gave rise to it and the subject matter of the work subsist, it shall be considered a contract for an indefinite time, insofar as it benefits the worker, that contract in which the nature of the work is permanent.’ For its part, numeral 27 of the cited normative body establishes the prohibition of stipulating employment contracts for more than one year to the detriment of the worker, yet it creates an exception for those tasks requiring technical preparation, in which cases the duration may be up to 5 years. From the foregoing, it is deduced that the legislator has given preference to the indefinite-term contract with the objective of protecting the fundamental right regulated in ordinal 56 of the constitutional text; moreover, a clear intention is observed to safeguard the worker from possible spurious practices by their employer aimed at distorting their inalienable rights through this form of contract. Therefore, within the national legal system, the rule in labor contracting will be given by the principle of continuity, limiting the use of the defined-term contract only to those hypotheses where the nature of the service provision makes it necessary.” In harmony with the aforementioned line of thought, it is not feasible that the plaintiff’s duties could have been agreed upon for a fixed term. It should be noted that the tasks she performed as a social studies teacher are inherent to the educational services offered by the Temporalidades de la Iglesia Católica through the Colegio Patriarca San José. For this reason, for purposes of analyzing the indemnities sought, it must be assumed that her relationship was for an indeterminate time.

**VI.- ON DISCRIMINATORY DISMISSAL:** Article 33 of the Constitution establishes a generic principle of equality applicable to employment relations. This maxim provides for equity before the law and the impossibility of discrimination contrary to the dignity of persons. Thus, the working person is covered by effective protection against actions by the employer that threaten to undermine that guarantee, through treatment that conditions fair access to decent and well-remunerated work. Convention 111 of 1958 of the International Labour Organization concerning "Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)" (duly ratified by Costa Rica) defines this concept in its first article as follows: “1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term discrimination includes: / a) any distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment and occupation; / b) any other distinction, exclusion or preference which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation as may be specified by the Member concerned after consultation with representative employers' and workers' organisations, where such exist, and with other appropriate bodies.” The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has integrated these two norms together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, to reason that the right not to suffer discriminatory treatment and respect for human dignity are fundamental pillars of the constitutional order. In this regard, it is appropriate to cite ruling 2005-13205 at 10:30 a.m. on March 9, 2007, from that jurisdictional body: “Regarding the right not to be discriminated against, the constitutional parameter includes norms of constitutional rank, such as Article 33 of the Constitution, and regulations of international human rights law, whose application as a criterion of constitutional validity enjoys express positive substratum and has been widely cemented by the jurisprudence of this Chamber. Thus, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 'all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and, endowed as they are with reason and conscience, should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.' This numeral evidences the intimate relationship between the right to equality and fraternal coexistence—understood as solidarity—in a society, so that one cannot exist without the other. Numeral 2 of that Declaration concretizes the right not to be discriminated against, insofar as 'everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status' (the underlining does not correspond to the original). Likewise, the American Convention on Human Rights stipulates in its first article the duty of States Parties to protect the rights contemplated therein without any discrimination based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition (the underlining does not correspond to the original), and, on the other hand, expressly regulates the right to equality in its numeral 24. Specifically regarding labor discrimination, the State has ratified a series of conventions on the matter, such as ILO Convention 111 on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation, the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, among others. Although none of these conventions explicitly contemplates illness—a broader term than mere disability, since not every ill person is disabled—as a reason for discrimination, it is no less true that, on the one hand, subsection b) of the first article of Convention 111 admits the possibility of specifying, through a certain avenue, any type of discrimination that nullifies or impairs equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation, and, on the other hand, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights expressly proscribe any kind of discriminatory treatment. This conception is embodied by the referred numeral 33 of our Political Constitution, which provides that every person is equal before the law and that no discrimination contrary to human dignity may be practiced. Consequently, the Principle of the Social State of Law, the right not to suffer discriminatory treatment for any reason, and respect for human dignity are elements of our constitutional order that coexist peacefully, whose protection and promotion correspond not only to the State but also to all members of the community.” As can be deduced, the rule contemplated by canon 63 of the Political Constitution finds its limit in the fundamental rights of the working person, since the employer's power of free dismissal is constrained to being executed within the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality. In the same ruling just cited, the Constitutional Chamber has adopted the position of the Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional Español) regarding the shifting of the burden of proof in matters where the practice of discriminatory dismissals is debated. According to this position, the evidentiary activity of the person alleging discrimination will be limited to providing clear and precise indications of the violation of the right to equality. Thus, the obligation to demonstrate that its decision was based on real or true causes unrelated to any underlying discriminatory motive will fall upon the employer entity. Specifically, it was stated: “In this sense, the need arises to guarantee that the fundamental rights of the worker are not ignored by the employer under the formal cover of the exercise by the latter of the rights and faculties recognized by labor norms to organize work provisions, an aspect in which the special difficulty characterizing the operation of unveiling a constitutional violation for discrimination, hidden behind the apparent legality of the employer's act, in the corresponding judicial proceedings cannot be ignored. Such necessity is all the stronger the greater the margin of discretion with which the employer's organizational and disciplinary faculties operate in the employment contract, as occurs with dismissal, which is not unlimited as it is subject to legal and constitutional parameters. On this topic, the Spanish Constitutional Court has established that the shifting of the onus probandi towards each of the parties operates differently, according to the procedural phase in which one finds oneself: / ‘The purpose of the prima facie evidence (prueba indiciaria) is none other than to prevent the impossibility of revealing the true motives of the business act from preventing a declaration that it is harmful to the fundamental right (STC 38/1981, FFJJ 2 and 3), a purpose in order to which the double element of the prima facie evidence is articulated. The first, the need for the worker to provide a reasonable indication that the business act harms their fundamental right (STC 38/1986, FJ 2), a principle of proof aimed at bringing to light, as the case may be, the hidden motive of that act; an indication that, as the jurisprudence of this Court has been highlighting, does not consist of the mere allegation of the constitutional violation, but must allow deducing the possibility that it has occurred (thus, SSTC 166/1987, 114/1989, 21/1992, 266/1993, 293/1994, 180/1994, and 85/1995).’ Only once this first and inexcusable prerequisite is covered, it was added, ‘on the defendant party falls the burden of proving that its action has real causes absolutely unrelated to the alleged violation of fundamental rights, as well as that those had sufficient entity to adopt the decision, the sole means of destroying the harmful appearance created by the indications. It is an authentic burden of proof and not a mere attempt to deny the violation of fundamental rights—which would clearly render the purpose of the prima facie evidence inoperative (STC 114/1989)—, which must lead to the conviction of the judge that such causes have been the only ones that motivated the business decision, so that this would have verisimilarly occurred in any case and regardless of any purpose of violating fundamental rights. It is, in short, that the employer accredits that such causes objectively, reasonably, and proportionately explain by themselves its decision, eliminating all suspicion that it hid the violation of a fundamental right of the worker (these criteria are reflected in SSTC 38/1981, 104/1987, 114/1989, 21/1992, 85/1995, and 136/1996, as well as also SSTC 38/1986, 166/1988, 135/1990, 7/1993, and 17/1996). The absence of proof transcends in this way the purely procedural sphere and determines, ultimately, that the indications provided by the plaintiff deploy all their operability to declare the violation of the worker's own fundamental right (SSTC 197/1990, FJ 1; 136/1996, FJ 4, as well as SSTC 38/1981, 104/1987, 166/1988, 114/1989, 147/1995, or 17/1996).’ (See sentences number STC 17/2005 of February 1, 2005, and STC 171/2003 of September 29, 2003).” / Consequently, prima facie, the protected party alleging labor discrimination must develop a sufficiently concrete and precise pleading activity, around the indications that such a violation of the right to equality has existed. This condition has been widely reiterated by the jurisprudence of this Chamber (see sentences number 2004-11984 at 10:10 a.m. on October 29, 2004, and 2004-11437 at 9:53 a.m. on October 15, 2004). Once a sufficient evidentiary result is reached, as the case may be, by the plaintiff, the burden of proving the existence of sufficient, real, and serious causes falls upon the appellee party, to qualify the questioned employer's decision or practice as reasonable and unrelated to any discriminatory purpose, the sole means of destroying the harmful appearance created by the indications.” **VII.- REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE PAYMENT OF SEVERANCE AND NOTICE PERIOD COMPONENTS:** Ordinal 82 of the Labor Code provides that the working person, in case of being dismissed without just cause, shall have the right to receive the amount corresponding to the notice period (preaviso) and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía). The co-defendant alleged the following as the reason for terminating the employment contract: “After having discussed with the members of the Board of Directors of the Colegio Patriarca San José, having explained the reasons why I consider it appropriate for the Institution to change teachers in the Social Studies area; after talking with you, listening to your concerns and appreciations, as well as mine in my capacity as Secondary School Director, and having the endorsement of the Board of Directors, I inform you of the following: ‘We thank you for the professional services offered to the Institution to date and inform you of the conclusion of your services at this Educational Center’ as of the date on which the appointment made by the Ministerio de Educación Pública suggested by the Direction of the Colegio Patriarca San José ends.” The plaintiff in her petition (libelo) asserted the existence of a discriminatory dismissal to her detriment, carried out for health reasons. As we have seen, in matters related to the violation of fundamental rights, the legal operator must resort to the use of indications when carrying out the respective evidentiary analysis, since these actions are commonly not exposed before public opinion, but rather develop immersed in clandestinity. According to the medical certificate provided at folio 6, Mrs. [Nombre1] suffered from “multifocal carcinoma of the breast and right nipple, lymphatic vessel invasion.” It has been accepted by the parties that, after a prolonged period of disability, she rejoined her duties on October 17, 2006, a date on which the principal of the educational center reduced her lessons, basing his criterion on a presumed reorganization of the social studies department. On December 22, 2006, the school authorities informed her that they would no longer require her services for the reasons noted above (see response to facts nine through thirteen of the claim, visible at folio 111). At folio 4, there is documentation showing that the plaintiff's performance in the years prior to her dismissal was rated as excellent. In the same vein, witnesses [Nombre2] and [Nombre3] attested to that situation. Thus, the first of them, despite admitting to being a friend of the plaintiff, provided a clear statement consistent with the rest of the evidentiary record by referring to a series of points that were known to her by virtue of her condition as former principal of the educational center owned by the co-defendant. Specifically, the witness highlighted the professional aptitudes of the plaintiff and the deep degree of commitment she maintained with her employer: “I was Principal of the Colegio Patriarca from ninety-nine, at that time [Nombre4] was a mother of a family at the Patriarca, her daughters were there, so in two thousand two I had a need for a Social Studies teacher, so I hired her to work at the Patriarca. - She always stood out for her work with both the students, parents, and colleagues, for her Professionalism, Honesty, and Integrity (sic). - I had to evaluate her every year, I always rated her (sic) as excellent. - My greatest surprise was when she told me they had fired (sic) her from the Patriarca. - I want to add that in two thousand five she gets sick and it is the first time she misses school and informs me that what she has is Cancer, she undergoes one operation first in mid-year, the operation does not work entirely and they have to operate on her again in November of that same year. - Even so, with all the health problems she had, she continued attending to the students in their final year of secondary school that year, at her home, at the students' homes” (folios 145 and 146). In similar terms, the deponent [Nombre3], in addition to outlining the situation noted above, brought to light the latent link between the plaintiff's illnesses and the dismissal agreed upon by the representatives of the Colegio Patriarca San José: “Mrs. [Nombre4] began working at the Colegio Patriarca, she was an excellent teacher, an excellent colleague, unfortunately she got sick in two thousand five, even when sick she was always very responsible. - After the disability, she returned and then her duties ceased” (folio 149). The cited evidence demonstrates sufficient elements regarding the discriminatory treatment exercised against Mrs. [Nombre1], since it contradicts the claim that the measure to change the professional in the social studies subject was due to her professional performance. Furthermore, it must be noted that the co-defendant omitted to bring to the process any evidence that reliably clarified the suitability, reasonableness, and proportionality of the reorganization that was presumably carried out in the subject taught by the plaintiff, or the concrete reasons why it was necessary to specifically dispense with her services. This sequence of situations reveals clear, precise, and concordant indications that expose that the underlying motive of the employer's representatives when terminating the relationship that bound them to the plaintiff was to discriminate against her in employment for being a patient under oncology treatment. This situation not only contradicts the principle of social justice in force in our legal system under the terms of Article 1 of the Labor Code, but at the same time represents a clear attack on human dignity, since degrading treatment was applied to the plaintiff based on her state of health, with the firm intention of nullifying inalienable rights and guarantees of which she was a beneficiary. This reprehensible conduct violates constitutional provisions 33, 50, and 56 and, under no perspective, can find protection in our legal system according to the provisions of Articles 20, 21, and 22 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), norms that clearly prevent the abusive or antisocial exercise of a right. Thus, this matter being an unjustified dismissal and attending to the plaintiff's claim, what is appropriate is to revoke the sentence of the appellate body, and instead uphold (dar confirmatoria) that of the lower court (juzgado a-quo).” This is because, by virtue of the provisions of Article 73 of the Labor Code, the relationship she maintained with the State was suspended by mutual agreement, an event that becomes clear if we consider that subsequently, the administration ceased to benefit from the plaintiff's services as an administrative assistant and, consequently, there was no payment of remuneration during that period. Regarding the Temporalidades de la Iglesia Católica, it is clear that an employment relationship existed, because although the appointment model for teachers in subsidized schools implies State participation based on the provisions of Article 80 of the Constitution (</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">without entering into the analysis of the Administration's responsibility for that hiring in the specific case, as it is not an issue submitted for consideration in this study</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">), the reality of the matter is that it was the educational center owned by it that directly benefited from the plaintiff's work as a social studies teacher and, at all times, exercised the direction of the personal provision of the service. Proof of this is that, as observed in the documentary evidence on folios 4 and 5, the authorities of that institution annually evaluated the work performed by her and even possessed the power to terminate her performance of her duties. Hence, the appellant is correct in considering the court's conclusion to be erroneous regarding the fact that the lawsuit could only be directed against the State, since, based on canon 104 of the Civil Procedure Code, a legitimate interest is found on the part of the appellant to sue the second co-defendant, in addition to the fact that an employment relationship with her existed. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">V.- ON THE TERM OF THE CONTRACT: </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">The plaintiff censures that the appellate body's ruling violated Article 26 of the Labor Code, by reasoning the inadmissibility of the requested compensation based on the fact that the contract binding both parties was for a fixed term. On this matter, this chamber on previous occasions has been clear regarding the exceptional nature of this form of contracting. Thus, in </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">Voto 2010-0929 of 9:55 a.m. on June 30, 2010</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> it was stated: </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">“The plaintiff argues that his contract was for a determined term, contrary to what was concluded in previous instances. On this subject, the authors Palomeque López and Álvarez de la Rosa state: 'The duration of the contract, from the perspective of employment stability, is specified in two general models of contracting: for an indefinite term or temporary. The indefinite contract is the common one, and the temporary one is only permissible when the parties avail themselves of a type of contract of this nature. The typology of temporary contracting may also, in turn, be the product of another option: temporary contracts based on an express cause of temporariness (causal temporary contracts) or contracts of determined duration without justifying the cause (non-causal or conjunctural temporary contracts based on a normative employment policy decision). (…) This contract may be used for all types of companies and in any sector of activity, but never for normal or permanent activities, only for those of an autonomous and substantive nature. Said autonomy and substantivity need not refer to novel activities, but to those inherent to the company's activity, but which, due to their economic content, duration, intensity, or number of workers assigned to them, merit the condition of autonomous (the identification will be, as has been said, of a collective bargaining or contractual origin).' (Palomeque López Manuel and Álvarez de la Rosa Manuel (2002).</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> Labor Law, Tenth Edition, Editorial Centro de Estudios Ramón Areces S.A., Madrid, Spain, pp. 756-759) italics are not from the original). The Labor Code establishes in its Article 26 the following: 'The labor contract may only be stipulated for a determined time in those cases in which its conclusion results from the nature of the service to be provided. If upon the expiration of its term, the causes that gave rise to it and the subject matter of the work persist, it shall be considered a contract for an indefinite time, insofar as it benefits the worker, one in which the nature of the work is permanent.' Meanwhile, Article 27 of the cited normative body establishes the prohibition of stipulating labor contracts for more than one year to the detriment of the worker, yet creates the exception for those tasks that require technical preparation, cases in which the duration may be up to 5 years.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the legislator has given preference to the indefinite-term contract with the purpose of safeguarding the fundamental right regulated in Article 56 of the constitutional text; furthermore, a clear intention is observed to protect the worker from possible spurious practices by their employer aimed at distorting their inalienable rights through this form of contract, therefore, within the national legal system, the rule in labor contracting will be given by the principle of continuity, limiting the use of the fixed-term contract only to those hypotheses in which the nature of the provision of the service makes it necessary.”</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> In harmony with the aforementioned line of thought, it is not feasible that the plaintiff's functions could have been agreed upon for a fixed term. Note that the tasks she performed as a social studies teacher are inherent to the education services offered by the Temporalidades de la Iglesia Católica through the Colegio Patriarca San José. For this reason, for the purpose of analyzing the compensation sought, it must be assumed that her relationship was for an indefinite time.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">VI.- ON DISCRIMINATORY DISMISSAL: </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">Article 33 of the Constitution establishes a generic principle of equality applicable to employment relations. This maxim provides for equity before the law and the impossibility of discrimination contrary to human dignity. In such a way, that the working person is covered with effective protection against employer actions that threaten to undermine that guarantee, through treatment that conditions just access to dignified and well-remunerated work. Convention 111 of 1958 of the International Labor Organization called “Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation” (</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">duly ratified by Costa Rica</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">) defines that concept in its first article as follows: “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">1. For the purpose of this Convention the term </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">discrimination </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">includes: / a) any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> / b) any other distinction, exclusion or preference which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation as may be determined by the Member concerned after consultation with representative employers' and workers' organisations, where such exist, and with other appropriate bodies</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">.” The Constitutional Chamber has integrated these two norms together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, to reason that the right not to suffer discriminatory treatment and respect for human dignity are fundamental pillars of the constitutional order. In this regard, it is appropriate to bring up </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">Voto 2005-13205 of 10:30 a.m. on March 9, 2007 </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">from that jurisdictional body: “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Regarding the right not to be discriminated against, the parameter of constitutionality includes norms of constitutional rank, such as Article 33 of the Fundamental Charter, and regulations of international human rights law, whose application as a criterion of constitutional validity enjoys express positive substrate and has been widely cemented by the jurisprudence of this Chamber. Thus, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that 'all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and, endowed as they are with reason and conscience, should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.' This numeral demonstrates the intimate relationship between the right to equality and fraternal coexistence - understood as solidarity - in a society, so that one cannot exist without the other. Article 2 of that Declaration concretizes the right not to be discriminated against, in that 'everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status (the underlining does not correspond to the original). Likewise, the American Convention on Human Rights stipulates in its first article the duty of the States Parties to safeguard the rights contemplated therein without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition (the underlining does not correspond to the original), and, on the other hand, expressly regulates the right to equality in its Article 24. Specifically in the matter of labor discrimination, the State has ratified a series of conventions on the subject, such as ILO Convention 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, among others. Although none of these conventions explicitly contemplates illness - a term broader than mere disability, since not every sick person is disabled - as a ground for discrimination, it is no less true that, on the one hand, paragraph b) of the first article of Convention 111 admits the possibility of specifying, through a certain route, any type of discrimination that nullifies or alters equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation and, on the other hand, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights expressly proscribe all kinds of discriminatory treatment. This conception is collected by the referred Article 33 of our Political Constitution which provides that every person is equal before the law and no discrimination contrary to human dignity may be practiced. Consequently, the Principle of the Social State of Law, the right not to suffer discriminatory treatment for any reason, and respect for human dignity are elements of our constitutional order that coexist peacefully, whose tutelage and promotion not only correspond to the State, but also to all members of the community</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">.” As can be deduced, the rule contemplated by canon 63 of the Political Constitution finds its limit in the fundamental rights of the working person, since the employer's power of free dismissal is restricted to being executed within the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality. In the same ruling just cited, the Constitutional Chamber has adopted the position of the Spanish Constitutional Court regarding the shift of the burden of proof in matters where the practice of discriminatory dismissals is debated. According to this position, the evidentiary activity of the person alleging discrimination will be limited to bringing clear and precise indications of the violation of the right to equality. In such a way, that the obligation to demonstrate that its decision was based on real or truthful causes alien to any underlying discriminatory motive will fall on the employer entity. Thus, specifically it was said: “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">In this sense, the need arises to guarantee that the fundamental rights of the worker are not ignored by the employer under the formal cover of the exercise by the latter of the rights and powers recognized by labor norms to organize the provision of work, an aspect in which one cannot ignore the special difficulty that characterizes the operation of revealing in the corresponding judicial procedures a constitutional violation due to discrimination, concealed behind the apparent legality of the employer's act. Such a need is all the stronger the greater the margin of discretion with which the employer's organizational and disciplinary powers operate in the labor contract, as occurs with dismissal, which is not unlimited as it is subject to legal and constitutional parameters. On this subject, the Spanish Constitutional Court has established that the shift of the onus probandi towards each of the parties operates differently, depending on the procedural phase in which one is: / 'The purpose of circumstantial evidence is none other than to avoid that the impossibility of revealing the true motives of the employer's act prevents declaring that the latter is injurious to the fundamental right (STC 38/1981, Legal Grounds 2 and 3), a purpose for which the dual element of circumstantial evidence is articulated. The first, the need for the worker to provide a reasonable indication that the employer's act injures his fundamental right (STC 38/1986, Legal Ground 2), a principle of proof aimed at revealing, where appropriate, the hidden motive of the former; an indication that, as the jurisprudence of this Court has been highlighting, does not consist in the mere allegation of the constitutional violation, but must allow deducing the possibility that it has occurred (thus, SSTC 166/1987, 114/1989, 21/1992, 266/1993, 293/1994, 180/1994 and 85/1995).' Only once this first and inexcusable requirement is met, we added, 'the burden falls on the defendant party to prove that its action has real causes absolutely foreign to the alleged violation of fundamental rights, as well as that those had sufficient entity to adopt the decision, the sole means of destroying the harmful appearance created by the indications. It is an authentic evidentiary burden and not a mere attempt to deny the violation of fundamental rights —which would clearly render the purpose of the circumstantial evidence inoperative (STC 114/1989)—, which must lead to the conviction of the judge that such causes have been the only ones that motivated the employer's decision, so that the latter would have plausibly occurred in any case and regardless of any purpose of violating fundamental rights. It is, in short, that the employer proves that such causes objectively, reasonably, and proportionately explain his decision by themselves, eliminating all suspicion that the latter concealed the violation of a fundamental right of the worker (these criteria are reflected in SSTC 38/1981, 104/1987, 114/1989, 21/1992, 85/1995 and 136/1996, as well as SSTC 38/1986, 166/1988, 135/1990, 7/1993 and 17/1996). The absence of proof transcends the purely procedural scope in this way and determines, ultimately, that the indications provided by the plaintiff deploy their full operability to declare the violation of the worker's own fundamental right (SSTC 197/1990, Legal Ground 1; 136/1996, Legal Ground 4, as well as SSTC 38/1981, 104/1987, 166/1988, 114/1989, 147/1995 or 17/1996).' (See judgments number STC 17/2005 of February 1, 2005 and STC 171/2003 of September 29, 2003).\" / Consequently, prima facie, the protected person who alleges labor discrimination must develop a sufficiently concrete and precise pleading activity, regarding the indications that such violation of the right to equality has existed. This condition has been widely reiterated by the jurisprudence of this Chamber (see judgments number 2004-11984 of 10:10 a.m. on October 29, 2004 and 2004-11437 of 9:53 a.m. on October 15, 2004). Once a sufficient evidentiary result is achieved, where appropriate, by the plaintiff, the burden falls on the respondent party to prove the existence of sufficient, real, and serious causes, to qualify the questioned employer decision or practice as reasonable and alien to any discriminatory purpose, the sole means of destroying the harmful appearance created by the indications</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">.”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">VII.- REGARDING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF PAYMENT OF THE EXTREMES OF NOTICE AND SEVERANCE PAY</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">: Article 82 of the Labor Code provides that the working person, in the event of being dismissed without just cause, shall have the right to receive the amount corresponding to the notice and severance pay. The co-defendant alleged the following as the reason for the termination of the employment contract: “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">After having discussed with the members of the Board of Directors of the Colegio Patriarca San José, explaining the reasons why I consider it convenient for the Institution to make a change of teacher in the Social Studies area; after speaking with you, listening to your concerns and assessments, as well as mine in my capacity as High School Principal, and counting on the endorsement of the Board of Directors, I inform you of the following: “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">You are thanked for the professional services offered to the Institution to date and you are informed of the conclusion of your services at this Educational Center” </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">as of the date on which the appointment made by the Ministry of Public Education, suggested by the Administration of the Colegio Patriarca San José, ends</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">.” The plaintiff in her complaint asserted the existence of a discriminatory dismissal to her detriment, carried out for health reasons. As we have seen, in matters related to the violation of fundamental rights, the legal operator must resort to the use of indicia when carrying out the respective evidentiary analysis, since these actions are commonly not exposed to public opinion, but rather develop immersed in secrecy. According to the medical certificate provided on folio 6, Mrs. [Name1]</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">suffered from “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">multifocal carcinoma of the right breast and nipple, invasion of the lymphatic vessels</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">.” It has been accepted by the parties that, after a prolonged period of disability, she rejoined her work on October 17, 2006, a date on which the director of the educational center reduced her teaching hours, basing his criteria on a presumed reorganization of the social studies department. On December 22, 2006, the school authorities informed her that they would no longer require her services for the reasons noted above (</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">see response to facts ninth to thirteenth of the complaint visible on folio 111</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">). On folio 4 there is documentation in which it is appreciated that the plaintiff's performance in the years prior to her dismissal was rated as excellent. In the same sense, the witnesses [Name2]</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">and [Name3]</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">gave an account of that situation. Thus, the first of them, even though she admitted to being a friend of the plaintiff, nonetheless provided a clear and consistent statement with the rest of the evidence by referring to a series of points that were within her knowledge by virtue of her condition as former director of the educational center owned by the co-defendant. Specifically, the witness highlighted the professional skills of the plaintiff and the deep degree of commitment that she maintained with her employer: “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">I was the Director of the Colegio Patriarca since ninety-nine, at that time [Name4]</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">was a mother of a student at the Patriarca, her daughters were there, then in two thousand two I had the need for a Social Studies teacher, so I hired her to work at the Patriarca.- She always stood out for her work both for the students, parents and colleagues, for her Professionalism, Integrity and Honesty (sic).- I had to evaluate her every year, I always rated her (sic) as excellent.- My biggest surprise was when she told me they had fired (sic) her from the Patriarca.- I want to add that in two thousand five she gets sick and it is the first time she misses the School and she informs me that what she has is Cancer, they perform an operation first in the middle of the year, the operation does not work completely and they have to operate on her again in November of that same year.- Even so, with all the health problems that she had, she continued attending to the high school graduating students of that year, at her house, at the students' houses</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">” (folios 145 and 146). In similar terms, the deponent [Name3]</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">, in addition to outlining the situation noted above, highlighted the latent connection between the plaintiff's ailments and the termination agreed upon by the representatives of the Colegio Patriarca San José: “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Mrs. [Name4]</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">started working at the Colegio Patriarca, she was an excellent teacher, an excellent colleague, unfortunately she got sick in two thousand five, even sick, always very responsible.- After the disability leave, she returned and then her work ceased</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">” (folio 149). The cited pieces of evidence reveal sufficient elements regarding the discriminatory treatment exercised against Mrs. [Name1], since they contradict that the measure of changing the professional in the subject of social studies was due to her professional performance. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the co-defendant omitted introducing into the process any evidence that would reliably clarify the suitability, reasonableness, and proportionality of the reorganization that was presumably carried out in the subject that was taught by the plaintiff, or the concrete reasons why it was necessary to specifically dispense with her services. This order of situations reveals clear, precise, and concordant indications that expose that the underlying motive of the employer's representatives when terminating the relationship that bound them with the plaintiff was to discriminate against her in employment because she was a patient under oncology treatment. This situation not only contradicts the principle of social justice in force in our legal system according to Article 1 of the Labor Code, but at the same time represents a clear attack against human dignity, since the plaintiff was subjected to degrading treatment based on her state of health, with the firm intention of nullifying the inalienable rights and guarantees of which she was a beneficiary. This reprehensible conduct violates constitutional provisions 33, 50, and 56 and, under no perspective, can it find protection in our legal system in accordance with the provisions of Articles 20, 21, and 22 of the Civil Code, norms that clearly prevent the abusive or antisocial exercise of a right.

Thus, as this matter concerns an unjustified dismissal and in consideration of the plaintiff's claim, the appropriate course is to reverse the judgment of the appellate body (órgano de alzada) and instead confirm that of the trial court (juzgado a-quo).

Thus, it was specifically stated: “<span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">In this regard, the need arises to guarantee that the fundamental rights of the worker are not disregarded by the employer under the formal cover of the latter’s exercise of the rights and powers recognized by labor regulations to organize the provision of work, an aspect in which one cannot ignore the special difficulty that characterizes the operation of unveiling, in the corresponding judicial proceedings, a constitutional violation for discrimination, concealed behind the apparent legality of the employer’s action. Such need is all the stronger the greater the margin of discretion with which the employer’s organizational and disciplinary powers operate in the employment contract, as occurs with dismissal, which is not unlimited since it is subject to legal and constitutional parameters. On this subject, the Spanish Constitutional Court has established that the shifting of the burden of proof (onus probandi) toward each of the parties operates differently, depending on the procedural phase at hand: / “The purpose of circumstantial evidence (prueba indiciaria) is none other than to prevent the impossibility of revealing the true motives of the employer’s action from barring a declaration that said action violates a fundamental right (STC 38/1981, FFJJ 2 and 3), a purpose toward which the dual element of circumstantial evidence is articulated. The first, the need for the worker to provide a reasonable indication (indicio) that the employer’s action violates a fundamental right (STC 38/1986, FJ 2), a principle of proof aimed at revealing, where applicable, the hidden motive of that action; an indication that, as the jurisprudence of this Court has been highlighting, does not consist of the mere allegation of the constitutional violation, but must allow the possibility that said violation has occurred to be inferred (thus, SSTC 166/1987, 114/1989, 21/1992, 266/1993, 293/1994, 180/1994 and 85/1995).” Only once this first and inexcusable prerequisite is met, we added, “upon the defendant party falls the burden of proving that its actions have real causes absolutely unrelated to the alleged violation of fundamental rights, as well as that those causes had sufficient substance to adopt the decision, the only means of destroying the harmful appearance created by the indications. It is a true burden of proof and not a mere attempt to deny the violation of fundamental rights —which would clearly render the purpose of circumstantial evidence inoperative (STC 114/1989)—, which must lead the judge to the conviction that such causes were the only ones that motivated the employer’s decision, such that said decision would have plausibly been taken in any event and regardless of any purpose to violate fundamental rights. In short, it is a matter of the employer proving that such causes objectively, reasonably, and proportionately explain its decision by themselves, eliminating all suspicion that said decision concealed the violation of a fundamental right of the worker (these criteria are reflected in SSTC 38/1981, 104/1987, 114/1989, 21/1992, 85/1995 and 136/1996, as well as SSTC 38/1986, 166/1988, 135/1990, 7/1993 and 17/1996). The absence of proof thus transcends the purely procedural sphere and determines, ultimately, that the indications provided by the plaintiff deploy their full operability to declare the violation of the worker’s own fundamental right (SSTC 197/1990, FJ 1; 136/1996, FJ 4, as well as SSTC 38/1981, 104/1987, 166/1988, 114/1989, 147/1995 or 17/1996).” (See judgments number STC 17/2005 of February 1, 2005 and STC 171/2003 of September 29, 2003).\" / Consequently, prima facie, the protected party (amparado) who alleges labor discrimination must engage in a sufficiently concrete and precise pleading activity, regarding the indications that such a violation of the right to equality has occurred. This condition has been widely reiterated by the jurisprudence of this Chamber (see judgments number 2004-11984 of 10:10 a.m. on October 29, 2004 and 2004-11437 of 9:53 a.m. on October 15, 2004). Once a sufficient evidentiary result is reached, as applicable, by the plaintiff, upon the respondent party falls the burden of proving the existence of sufficient, real, and serious causes to qualify the challenged employer decision or practice as reasonable and unrelated to any discriminatory purpose, the only means of destroying the harmful appearance created by the indications</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">”.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">VII.-REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF THE PAYMENT OF THE ITEMS OF NOTICE PERIOD (PREAVISO) AND SEVERANCE PAY (AUXILIO DE CESANTÍA)</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">: Article 82 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) provides that the worker, in the event of being dismissed without just cause, shall have the right to receive the amount corresponding to the notice period (preaviso) and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía). The co-defendant alleged the following as the reason for the termination of the employment contract: “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">After having discussed with the members of the Board of Directors (Consejo Directivo) of the Colegio Patriarca San José, having explained the reasons why I consider it convenient for the Institution to make a change of teacher in the Social Studies area; after speaking with you, hearing your concerns and assessments, as well as mine in my capacity as High School Principal, and having the endorsement of the Board of Directors, I inform you of the following: “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">We thank you for the professional services offered to the Institution to date and you are notified of the conclusion of your services at this Educational Center” </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">effective from the date on which the appointment made by the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública) suggested by the Administration of the Colegio Patriarca San José ends</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">”. The plaintiff, in her complaint (libelo), asserted the existence of a discriminatory dismissal to her detriment, carried out for health reasons. As we have seen, in matters related to the violation of fundamental rights, the legal operator must resort to the use of indications when carrying out the respective evidentiary analysis, since these actions are commonly not exposed to the public eye, but rather unfold immersed in secrecy. According to the medical certificate provided on folio 6, Mrs. [Nombre1]<span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">suffered from “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">multifocal carcinoma of the breast and right nipple, invasion of lymphatic vessels</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">”. It has been accepted by the parties that, after a prolonged period of disability, she returned to work on October 17, 2006, a date on which the director of the educational center reduced her lessons, basing his criterion on a presumed reorganization of the social studies department. On December 22, 2006, the school authorities informed her that they would not require her services any longer for the reasons indicated above (</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">see the response to facts nine through thirteen of the complaint, visible on folio 111</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">). On folio 4, there is documentation showing that the plaintiff’s performance in the years prior to her dismissal was rated as excellent. In the same vein, witnesses [Nombre2]<span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">and [Nombre3]</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">, attested to that situation. Thus, the first of them, even though she admitted to being a friend of the plaintiff, nevertheless provided a clear statement consistent with the rest of the evidentiary material when referring to a series of points that were known to her by virtue of her status as former director of the educational center owned by the co-defendant. Specifically, the witness highlighted the professional aptitudes of the plaintiff and the deep degree of commitment that she maintained with her employer: “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">I was the Director of the Colegio Patriarca since ninety-nine, at that time [Nombre4]<span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">was a mother of a family at the Patriarca, she had her daughters there, so in two thousand two I had a need for a Social Studies teacher, so I hired her to work at the Patriarca.- She always stood out for her work both for students, parents and colleagues, for her Professionalism, Honesty and Integrity (sic).- I had to evaluate her every year, I always rated her (sic) as excellent.- My biggest surprise was when she told me that they had fired (sic) her from the Patriarca.- I want to add that in two thousand five she gets sick and it is the first time that she is absent from the School and she informs me that what she has is Cancer, they do a first surgery on her mid-year, the surgery does not work entirely and they have to operate on her again in November of that same year.- Even so with all the health problems she had, she continued attending to senior students that year, in her home, in the students' homes</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">” (folios 145 and 146). In similar terms, the deponent [Nombre3]<span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">besides outlining the situation pointed out above, revealed the latent connection between the plaintiff’s ailments and the termination agreed by the representatives of the Colegio Patriarca San José: “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Mrs. [Nombre4]<span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">began working at the Colegio Patriarca, she was an excellent teacher, excellent colleague, unfortunately she got sick in two thousand five, even sick she was always very responsible.- After the disability she returned and then her work ceased</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">” (folio 149). The cited means of proof highlight sufficient elements regarding the discriminatory treatment exercised against Mrs. [Nombre1], since they contradict the assertion that the measure of changing the professional in the social studies subject was due to her professional performance. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the co-defendant failed to bring to the process any evidence that would reliably clarify the suitability, reasonableness, and proportionality of the reorganization that was presumably carried out in the subject that was taught by the plaintiff, or else, the specific reasons why it was necessary to dispense specifically with her services. This set of circumstances reveals clear, precise, and consistent indications exposing that the underlying motive of the employer representatives upon terminating the relationship that bound them with the plaintiff was to discriminate against her in employment because she was a patient under oncology treatment. Said situation not only contradicts the principle of social justice in force in our legal system under the terms of Article 1 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), but at the same time represents a clear attack against human dignity, since degrading treatment was applied to the plaintiff based on her state of health, with the firm intention of annulling non-waivable rights and guarantees of which she was the beneficiary. That reprehensible conduct violates constitutional provisions 33, 50 and 56 and, from no perspective, can find protection in our legal system in accordance with the provisions of Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), rules that plainly prohibit the abusive or antisocial exercise of a right. Thus, since the present matter involves an unjustified dismissal and in consideration of the plaintiff’s claim, the appropriate course is to revoke the judgment of the appellate body (órgano de alzada), and in its place to confirm that of the lower court (juzgado a-quo).”</span></p></div></body></html>"

“IV.- RESPECTO AL VÍNCULO JURÍDICO ENTRE LAS TEMPORALIDADES DE LA IGLESIA CATÓLICA DIÓCESIS DE ALAJUELA Y LA ACTORA: Se muestra agraviada la parte actora con el criterio del ad quem en cuanto consideró que entre la señora [Nombre1] y las Temporalidades de la Iglesia no existió relación laboral. El artículo 2 del Código de Trabajo define la figura del empleador de la siguiente forma: “Patrono es toda persona física o jurídica, particular o de Derecho Público, que emplea los servicios de otra u otras, en virtud de un contrato de trabajo, expreso o implícito, verbal o escrito, individual o colectivo”. Del mismo modo, el canon 4 del mismo cuerpo normativo se refiere al trabajador como aquella “persona física que presta a otra u otras sus servicios materiales, intelectuales o de ambos géneros, en virtud de un contrato de trabajo, expreso o implícito, verbal o escrito, individual o colectivo”. Ahora bien, respecto al contrato individual el Código de Trabajo regula lo siguiente: “Contrato individual de trabajo, sea cual fuere su denominación, es todo aquel en que una persona se obliga a prestar a otra sus servicios o a ejecutarle una obra, bajo la dependencia permanente y dirección inmediata o delegada a ésta, y por una remuneración de cualquier clase o forma. / Se presume la existencia de este contrato entre el trabajador que presta sus servicios y la persona que los recibe”. Como puede dilucidarse de la relación de normas traídas a colación, existirá contratación laboral cuando medie la prestación personal de un servicio por cuenta ajena, ejecutado bajo un régimen de subordinación a cambio del pago de un salario. En el presente asunto, se tuvo debidamente acreditado, que la actora ingresó a laborar para el Ministerio de Educación Pública el 1° de febrero de 1991 como auxiliar administrativa (folio 3). Luego, esta obtuvo un permiso sin goce de salario de parte del Estado para fungir en ascenso interino como profesora de estudios sociales en el Colegio Patriarca San José, puesto en el que estuvo desde el 1° de febrero de 2002 hasta el 31 de enero de 2007 (folios 68, 69 y 195). Lo anterior evidencia que pese a que nunca dejó de ser servidora del Ministerio de Educación Pública, dicha situación no se opuso para que esta estableciera una nueva relación laboral con las Temporalidades de la Iglesia Católica, Diócesis de Alajuela. Ello se debe, a que en virtud de lo establecido por el artículo 73 del Código de Trabajo el vínculo que mantenía con el Estado se suspendió por mutuo acuerdo, suceso que se torna claro si nos atenemos a que posteriormente, la administración dejó de beneficiarse de los servicios de la demandante como auxiliar administrativa y por consiguiente, no hubo durante ese lapso el pago de remuneración. En lo concerniente a las Temporalidades de la Iglesia Católica, resulta diáfano que existió una relación de trabajo, pues aunque el modelo de nombramiento de los profesores en colegios subvencionados implique una participación del Estado a raíz de lo establecido en el ordinal 80 de la Carta Magna (esto sin ingresar en el análisis de la responsabilidad de la Administración por esa contratación en el caso concreto, al no ser un tema sometido al conocimiento del presente estudio), la realidad de las cosas es que fue el centro educativo de su propiedad, el que se favoreció directamente de las labores de la accionante como profesora de estudios sociales y, ejercitó en todo momento la dirección de la prestación personal del servicio. Prueba de ello es que según se observa en la documental de folios 4 y 5, las autoridades de esa institución calificaban anualmente las labores desempeñadas por ella e incluso poseían la potestad de cesarla en el cumplimiento de sus funciones. De ahí que, lleve razón el recurrente al estimar como equivocada la conclusión del tribunal en lo tocante a que la demanda sólo podía dirigirse contra el Estado, puesto que con base en el canon 104 del Código Procesal Civil se halla un interés legítimo de parte de la recurrente para accionar contra la segunda codemandada, amén de que medió una relación laboral con ella.

V.- SOBRE EL PLAZO DEL CONTRATO: Recrimina la parte actora que el fallo del órgano de alzada quebrantó el numeral 26 del Código de Trabajo, al razonar la improcedencia de la indemnizaciones solicitadas con base en que el contrato que ligaba a ambas partes era a plazo fijo. Sobre el tema este despacho en anteriores ocasiones, ha sido claro respecto al carácter excepcional de esta forma de contratación. Así, en el voto 2010-0929 de las 9:55 horas del 30 de junio de 2010 se afirmó: “Discute el actor que su contrato fue a plazo determinado, contrario a lo concluido en instancias precedentes. Sobre este tema exponen los autores Palomeque López y Álvarez de la Rosa: “La duración del contrato, desde la perspectiva de la estabilidad en el empleo, se concreta en dos modelos generales de contratación: por tiempo indefinido o temporal. El contrato indefinido es el común y el temporal sólo cabe cuando las partes se acojan a un tipo de contrato de esta naturaleza. La tipología de la contratación temporal puede ser a su vez también producto de otra opción: contratos temporales con fundamento en una expresa causa de temporalidad (contratos temporales causales) o contratos de duración determinada sin justificar la causa (contratos temporales no causales o coyunturales fundados en una decisión normativa de política de empleo). (…) Puede ser utilizado este contrato para todo tipo de empresas y en cualquier sector de actividad, pero nunca para actividades normales o permanentes, sino de naturaleza autónoma y sustantiva. Dicha autonomía y sustantividad no tiene por qué hacer alusión a actividades novedosas, sino a las propias de la actividad de la empresa, pero que por su contenido económico, duración, intensidad, número de trabajadores destinados a su atención, merezca la condición de autónomas (la identificación será, como se ha dicho, de origen convencional colectivo o contractual)”. (Palomeque López Manuel y Álvarez de la Rosa Manuel (2002). Derecho del Trabajo, Décima Edición, Editorial Centro de Estudios Ramón Areces S.A., Madrid, España, pp. 756- 759) la cursiva no es del original). El Código de Trabajo establece en su artículo 26 lo siguiente: “El contrato de trabajo sólo podrá estipularse por tiempo determinado en aquellos casos en que su celebración resulte de la naturaleza del servicio que se va a prestar. Si vencido su término subsisten las causas que le dieron origen y la materia del trabajo, se tendrá como contrato por tiempo indefinido, en cuanto beneficie al trabajador, aquél en que es permanente la naturaleza de los trabajos”. Por su parte el numeral 27 del cuerpo normativo citado, establece la prohibición de estipular contratos de trabajo por más de un año en perjuicio del trabajador, empero crea la excepción para aquellas labores que requieran una preparación técnica, casos en los cuales la duración podrá ser de hasta 5 años. De lo anterior se deduce que el legislador ha brindado preferencia al contrato a plazo indefinido con el objeto de tutelar el derecho fundamental regulado en el ordinal 56 del texto constitucional; además se observa una clara intención de resguardar al trabajador de posibles prácticas espurias de su patrono tendientes a tergiversar sus derechos irrenunciables mediante esta forma de contratos, por lo tanto dentro del ordenamiento jurídico patrio la regla en la contratación laboral vendrá dada por el principio de continuidad, limitándose el uso del contrato a tiempo definido únicamente a aquellas hipótesis en que por la naturaleza de la prestación del servicio lo haga necesario”. En armonía con la mencionada línea de pensamiento, no es factible que las funciones de la actora pudieran ser pactadas a plazo fijo. Nótese que las tareas que ella desplegó como profesora de estudios sociales son inherentes a los servicios de educación ofrecidos por las Temporalidades de la Iglesia Católica a través del Colegio Patriarca San José. Razón por la cual, para efectos de analizar las indemnizaciones pretendidas debe partirse que su relación fue a tiempo indeterminado.

VI.- SOBRE EL DESPIDO DISCRIMINATORIO: El artículo 33 de la Carta Magna establece un principio genérico de igualdad aplicable a las relaciones de empleo. Esta máxima dispone la equidad ante la ley y la imposibilidad de discriminación contraria a la dignidad de las personas. De tal modo, que se recubre a la persona trabajadora de una tutela efectiva frente a actuaciones del empresario que amenacen con menoscabar esa garantía, mediante tratos que condicionen el justo acceso al trabajo digno y bien remunerado. El Convenio 111 de 1958 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo denominado “sobre la discriminación (empleo y ocupación)” (debidamente ratificado por Costa Rica) define ese concepto en su artículo primero de la siguiente forma: “1. A los efectos de este Convenio, el término discriminación comprende: / a) cualquier distinción, exclusión o preferencia basada en motivos de raza, color, sexo, religión, opinión política, ascendencia nacional u origen social que tenga por efecto anular o alterar la igualdad de oportunidades o de trato en el empleo y la ocupación; / b) cualquier otra distinción, exclusión o preferencia que tenga por efecto anular o alterar la igualdad de oportunidades o de trato en el empleo u ocupación que podrá ser especificada por el Miembro interesado previa consulta con las organizaciones representativas de empleadores y de trabajadores, cuando dichas organizaciones existan, y con otros organismos apropiados”. La Sala Constitucional ha integrado esas dos normas junto a la Declaratoria Universal de los Derechos Humanos y la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, para razonar que el derecho a no sufrir trato discriminatorio y el respeto a la dignidad humana son pilares fundamentales del ordenamiento constitucional. Al respecto, conviene traer a colación el voto 2005-13205 de las 10:30 horas del 9 de marzo de 2007 de ese órgano de la jurisdicción: “En cuanto al derecho a no ser discriminado, el parámetro de constitucionalidad comprende normas de rango constitucional, como el artículo 33 de la Carta Fundamental, y regulaciones del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, cuya aplicación como criterio de validez constitucional goza de expreso sustrato positivo y ha sido ampliamente cimentada por la jurisprudencia de esta Sala. De esta forma, el artículo 1º de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos dispone que "todos los seres humanos nacen libres e iguales en dignidad y derechos y, dotados como están de razón y conciencia, deben comportarse fraternalmente los unos con los otros". Este numeral evidencia la íntima relación entre el derecho a la igualdad y la convivencia fraternal -entiéndase solidaridad- en una sociedad, de manera que el uno sin la otra no se puede dar. El numeral 2 de esa Declaración concretiza el derecho a no ser discriminado, en tanto "toda persona tiene todos los derechos y libertades proclamados en esta Declaración, sin distinción alguna de raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opinión política o de cualquier otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición (el subrayado no corresponde al original). Asimismo, la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos estipula en su primer artículo el deber de los Estados Partes de resguardar los derechos en ella contemplados sin discriminación alguna por motivos de raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opiniones políticas o de cualquier otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición social (el subrayado no corresponde al original), y, por otra parte, de manera expresa regula el derecho a la igualdad en su numeral 24. Propiamente en materia de discriminación laboral, el Estado ha ratificado una serie de convenios sobre la materia, como el Convenio OIT 111 Sobre Discriminación en Materia de Empleo y Ocupación, la Convención Interamericana contra la Discriminación de Discapacitados, la Convención para la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer, entre otros. Sin bien ninguno de estos convenios contempla explícitamente la enfermedad -término más amplio que la mera discapacidad, pues no toda persona enferma es discapacitada- como motivo de discriminación, no menos cierto es que, por una parte, el inciso b) del primer artículo del Convenio 111 admite la posibilidad de especificar, a través de cierta vía, cualquier tipo de discriminación que anule o altere la igualdad de oportunidades o de trato en el empleo u ocupación y, por otra parte, tanto la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos como la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos proscriben de manera expresa toda clase de trato discriminatorio. Esta concepción es recogida por el referido numeral 33 de nuestra Constitución Política que dispone que toda persona sea igual ante la ley y no pueda practicarse discriminación alguna contraria a la dignidad humana. En consecuencia, el Principio del Estado Social de Derecho, el derecho a no sufrir trato discriminatorio por cualesquiera motivos y el respeto a la dignidad humana son elementos de nuestro orden constitucional que coexisten pacíficamente, cuya tutela y fomento no solo le corresponde al Estado, sino también a todos los integrantes de la comunidad”. Como puede deducirse, la regla contemplada por el canon 63 de la Constitución Política encuentra su límite en los derechos fundamentales de la persona trabajadora, toda vez que la potestad patronal de libre despido se ve coartada a que se ejecute dentro de los parámetros de la razonabilidad y la proporcionalidad. En el mismo fallo recién citado, la Sala Constitucional ha recogido la tesitura del Tribunal Constitucional Español respecto al desplazamiento de la carga de la prueba en asuntos donde se debata la práctica de despidos discriminatorios. Según esta posición, la actividad probatoria de la persona que alegue la discriminación se limitará a traer indicios claros y precisos de la violación del derecho de igualdad. De tal suerte, que recaerá sobre la entidad patronal la obligación de demostrar que su decisión fue basada en causas reales o verídicas ajenas a cualquier móvil subyacente discriminatorio. Así, concretamente se dijo: “En este sentido, se plantea la necesidad de garantizar que los derechos fundamentales del trabajador no sean desconocidos por el patrono bajo la cobertura formal del ejercicio por parte de éste de los derechos y facultades reconocidos por las normas laborales para organizar las prestaciones de trabajo, aspecto en el que no se puede obviar la especial dificultad que caracteriza la operación de develar en los procedimientos judiciales correspondientes una lesión constitucional por discriminación, encubierta tras la aparente legalidad del acto patronal. Semejante necesidad es tanto más fuerte cuanto mayor es el margen de discrecionalidad con que operan en el contrato de trabajo las facultades organizativas y disciplinarias del empleador, como sucede con el despido, que no es ilimitado pues está sujeto a parámetros legales y constitucionales. Acerca de este tema, el Tribunal Constitucional Español ha establecido que el desplazamiento del onus probandi hacia cada una de las partes opera de manera distinta, según la fase procesal en que se esté: / “La finalidad de la prueba indiciaria no es sino la de evitar que la imposibilidad de revelar los verdaderos motivos del acto empresarial impida declarar que éste resulta lesivo del derecho fundamental (STC 38/1981, FFJJ 2 y 3), finalidad en orden a la cual se articula el doble elemento de la prueba indiciaria. El primero, la necesidad por parte del trabajador de aportar un indicio razonable de que el acto empresarial lesiona su derecho fundamental (STC 38/1986, FJ 2), principio de prueba dirigido a poner de manifiesto, en su caso, el motivo oculto de aquél; un indicio que, como ha venido poniendo de relieve la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, no consiste en la mera alegación de la vulneración constitucional, sino que debe permitir deducir la posibilidad de que aquélla se haya producido (así, SSTC 166/1987, 114/1989, 21/1992, 266/1993, 293/1994, 180/1994 y 85/1995)”. Sólo una vez cubierto este primer e inexcusable presupuesto, añadíamos, “sobre la parte demandada recae la carga de probar que su actuación tiene causas reales absolutamente extrañas a la pretendida vulneración de derechos fundamentales, así como que aquéllas tuvieron entidad suficiente como para adoptar la decisión, único medio de destruir la apariencia lesiva creada por los indicios. Se trata de una auténtica carga probatoria y no de un mero intento de negar la vulneración de derechos fundamentales —lo que claramente dejaría inoperante la finalidad de la prueba indiciaria (STC 114/1989)—, que debe llevar a la convicción del juzgador que tales causas han sido las únicas que han motivado la decisión empresarial, de forma que ésta se hubiera producido verosímilmente en cualquier caso y al margen de todo propósito vulnerador de derechos fundamentales. Se trata, en definitiva, de que el empleador acredite que tales causas explican objetiva, razonable y proporcionadamente por sí mismas su decisión, eliminando toda sospecha de que aquélla ocultó la lesión de un derecho fundamental del trabajador (reflejan estos criterios las SSTC 38/1981, 104/1987, 114/1989, 21/1992, 85/1995 y 136/1996, así como también las SSTC 38/1986, 166/1988, 135/1990, 7/1993 y 17/1996). La ausencia de prueba trasciende de este modo el ámbito puramente procesal y determina, en último término, que los indicios aportados por el demandante despliegan toda su operatividad para declarar la lesión del propio derecho fundamental del trabajador (SSTC 197/1990, FJ 1; 136/1996, FJ 4, así como SSTC 38/1981, 104/1987, 166/1988, 114/1989, 147/1995 ó 17/1996).” (Ver sentencias número STC 17/2005 de 1º de febrero de 2005 y STC 171/2003 de 29 de septiembre de 2003)." / En consecuencia, prima facie, el amparado que alega discriminación laboral debe desarrollar una actividad alegatoria suficientemente concreta y precisa, en torno a los indicios de que ha existido tal violación al derecho a la igualdad. Esta condición ha sido ampliamente reiterada por la jurisprudencia de esta Sala (ver sentencias número 2004-11984 de las 10:10 horas del 29 de octubre de 2004 y 2004-11437 de las 9:53 horas del 15 de octubre de 2004). Alcanzado, en su caso, un resultado probatorio suficiente por el accionante, sobre la parte recurrida recae la carga de probar la existencia de causas suficientes, reales y serias, para calificar de razonable y ajena a todo propósito discriminatorio la decisión o práctica patronal cuestionada, único medio de destruir la apariencia lesiva creada por los indicios”.

VII.-RESPECTO A LA PROCEDENCIA DEL PAGO DE LOS EXTREMOS DE PREAVISO Y AUXILIO DE CESANTÍA: El ordinal 82 del Código de Trabajo dispone que la persona trabajadora en caso de ser despedida sin causa justa tendrá el derecho a recibir el importe correspondiente al preaviso y auxilio de cesantía. La codemandada alegó como motivo de finalización del contrato de trabajo lo siguiente: “Luego de haber comentado con los señores del Consejo Directivo del Colegio Patriarca San José, explicadas las razones de los por qué considero conveniente para la Institución, hacer un cambio de docente en el área de Estudios Sociales; después de conversar con usted, escuchar sus inquietudes y apreciaciones, así como las mías en calidad de Director de Secundaria, y contando con el aval del Consejo Directivo, le comunico lo siguiente: “Se le agradece los servicios profesionales hasta la fecha ofrecidos a la Institución y se le comunica la conclusión de sus servicios en este Centro Educativo” a partir de la fecha en donde finaliza el nombramiento realizado por el Ministerio de Educación Pública sugerido por la Dirección del Colegio Patriarca San José”. La accionante en su libelo, aseguró la existencia de un despido discriminatorio en su perjuicio, efectuado por razones de salud. Como hemos visto, en asuntos relacionados con la violación a derechos fundamentales, el operador del derecho deberá recurrir a la utilización de indicios al realizar el respectivo análisis probatorio, ya que estas acciones comúnmente no se exponen ante la opinión pública, sino que se desarrollan inmersas en la clandestinidad. Conforme a la constancia médica aportada a folio 6, la señora [Nombre1] padeció de “carcinoma multifocal mama y pezón derecho, invasión de vasos linfáticos”. Ha sido aceptado por las partes que, luego de un prolongado período de incapacidad se incorporó a sus labores el 17 de octubre de 2006, data para la cual, el director del centro educativo redujo sus lecciones, amparando su criterio en una presunta reorganización del departamento de estudios sociales. El 22 de diciembre de 2006 las autoridades del colegio le comunicaron que no iban a requerir más de sus servicios por las razones apuntadas anteriormente (ver contestación de los hechos noveno al décimo tercero de la demanda visible a folio 111). A folio 4 existe documentación en la que se aprecia que el desempeño de la actora en los años previos a su despido fue calificado como excelente. En igual sentido, las testigos [Nombre2] y [Nombre3] , dieron cuenta de esa situación. Así, la primera de ellas, a pesar que admitió ser amiga de la actora. No obstante, brindó una declaración clara y concordante con el resto de la pieza probatoria al referirse sobre una serie de puntos que eran de su conocimiento en virtud de su condición de ex directora del centro educativo propiedad de la codemandada. En forma específica, la testigo puso en evidencia las aptitudes profesionales de la accionante y el profundo grado de compromiso que esta mantenía con su empleador: “Yo era Directora del Colegio Patriarca desde el noventa y nueve, en ese momento [Nombre4] era madre de familia del Patriarca, tenía a sus hijas ahí, entonces en el dos mil dos yo tuve la necesidad de una profesora de Estudios Sociales, por lo que la contraté a ella para que trabajara en el Patriarca.- Siempre se destacó por su trabajo tanto para los estudiante, padres de familia y compañeros, por su Profesionalismo, Honradez y Honestidad (sic).- Yo tenía que calificarla a ella todos los años, siempre la califique (sic) de excelente.- Mi mayor sorpresa que cuando ella me contó que la habían hechado (sic) del Patriarca.- Quiero añadir que en el dos mil cinco ella se enferma y es la primera vez que ella falta al Colegio y me informa que lo que tiene es un Cáncer, lo hacen una operación primero a mediados de años, no funciona del todo la operación y la tienen que volver a operar en noviembre de ese mismo año.- Aún así con toda la problemática de salud que ella tenía, ella continúo atendiendo a estudiante de bachillerato de ese año, en su casa, en casa de los estudiantes” (folios 145 y 146). En similares términos, la deponente [Nombre3] además de reseñar la situación antes apuntada, puso de manifiesto la latente vinculación entre los padecimientos de la actora y el cese acordado por los representantes del Colegio Patriarca San José: “La señora [Nombre4] empezó a trabajar en el Colegio Patriarca, era excelente profesora, excelente compañera, lamentablemente se enfermó en el dos mil cinco, aún enferma siempre muy responsable.- Luego de la incapacidad volvió y luego cesaron sus labores” (folio 149). Los medios de prueba citados, ponen en evidencia elementos suficientes respecto del trato discriminatorio ejercido contra la señora [Nombre1] , puesto que contradicen que la medida de cambiar la profesional en la materia de estudios sociales se debiera a su desempeño profesional. Por otra parte, debe señalarse que la codemandada omitió traer al proceso cualquier prueba que aclarara fehacientemente la idoneidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de la reorganización que presuntamente se llevó a cabo en la asignatura que era impartida por la demandante o bien, de las razones concretas de por qué era necesario desprenderse en específico de sus servicios. Este orden de situaciones, dejan al descubierto indicios claros, precisos y concordantes que exponen que el móvil subyacente de los representantes patronales al cesar el vínculo que los ligaba con la actora, era discriminarla en el empleo por ser esta paciente bajo tratamiento de oncología. Dicha situación, no sólo contradice el principio de justicia social vigente en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico al tenor del artículo 1° del Código de Trabajo, sino que al mismo tiempo representa un claro atentado contra la dignidad humana, toda vez que a la accionante le fueron aplicados tratos degradantes con fundamento en su estado de salud, con la firme intención de anular derechos y garantías irrenunciables de las cuales era destinataria. Esa reprochable conducta violenta las disposiciones constitucionales 33, 50 y 56 y, bajo ninguna óptica puede encontrar resguardo en nuestro sistema jurídico conforme a lo dispuesto por los artículos 20, 21 y 22 del Código Civil, normas que de forma diáfana impiden el ejercicio abusivo o antisocial de un derecho. Así las cosas, al tratarse el presente asunto de un despido injustificado y atendiendo la pretensión de la actora, lo procedente es revocar la sentencia del órgano de alzada, para en su lugar dar confirmatoria a la del juzgado a-quo.”