Distinction between simple land division and complex urban developmentDistinción entre fraccionamiento simple y urbanización compleja

VII.- THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBDIVISION (FRACCIONAMIENTO) AND DEVELOPMENT (URBANIZACIÓN) PROCESSES.- Due to the importance derived from the legal implications that subdivision and development processes entail, which is of interest for the specific case, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of both concepts. Thus, reference is made to the considerations given by this Court in resolutions number 175-2009 and 176-2009, of this Court, in which it addressed this topic in the following manner:

"The subdivision (fraccionamiento) is the division of a property with the purpose of introducing it into commerce, which implies, as each local government must verify when granting the corresponding approval (visado), that it conforms, in terms of size and characteristics, to the current urban planning provisions, especially the local land Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) – if one exists – as well as the development regulations and other special public order laws. The subdivision that the law calls 'simple,' does not include an urban habilitation process for the use and enjoyment of the parcels resulting from that subdivision, and this is so because the legislator starts from the premise that in these cases, the properties have access and green areas resulting from a previous urban development. It is for this reason that Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) provides:

'(…) Likewise, simple subdivisions of parcels in previously urbanized areas are exempted from the obligation to cede areas for parks and community facilities…' (emphasis not in original).

When a specific area is previously urbanized, the purchasers of the subdivided parcels have access to the properties, parks, and community facilities, and it must not be lost sight of that this is part of their right to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (Article 50 of the Constitution). For this reason – it is reiterated – the legislator has not deemed it necessary to demand larger land endowments for reasons of social interest in the case of a 'simple' subdivision with urban development. The approval (visado) for simple subdivisions, due to its limited significance, is usually granted to an official (e.g., Municipal Engineer) different from the one entrusted with 'complex' approvals (e.g., Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal), urban planning commissions, etc.), the former lacking the competence to authorize a different approval; this in the event that urban planning norms make such a distinction. Now, the subdivision that forms part of the development process (proceso urbanizador) and entails a habilitation of the properties, for the first time, for urban purposes, must be provided with streets, green areas, and parks, as well as the necessary services for their use and enjoyment. In this second scenario, we are facing a complex process of subdivision and development (fraccionamiento y urbanización) that introduces limitations on private property for reasons of urban planning (Article 22 of the Urban Planning Law), which the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) has indicated are fully in accordance with Constitutional Law (ruling No. 5097-93 of 10:24 a.m. on October 15, 1993). The residential project or subdivision that we will call 'complex,' is provided for in numeral 40 of the Urban Planning Law which, in the pertinent part, provides:

'Every subdivider of land (…) and every developer (urbanizador) shall cede free of charge for public use both the areas designated for roads and those corresponding to parks and community facilities; what is established for the latter two concepts shall be determined in the respective regulation, by setting percentages of the total area to be subdivided or developed, which may fluctuate between five percent and twenty percent, according to the average size of the lots, the use intended for the land, and the respective norms. Notwithstanding the above, the sum of the lands to be ceded for public roads, parks, and community facilities shall not exceed forty-five percent of the total surface area of the land to be subdivided or developed. (…)

The obligation of the developer (urbanizador) to provide the subdivided parcels with access, green areas, parks, and public roads, obliges them to comply with the urban provisions that establish minimum standards regarding space, quality, quantity, and other requirements demanded by law and development regulations regarding those areas. The local government must exercise its police power in a timely manner, guaranteeing the residents of the canton that the works will be carried out in the manner indicated by urban planning norms and with the conditions those provisions set forth. It is sufficient that a parceling requires works to enable access and provide various services to some of those properties, to maintain that it is not a 'simple subdivision (fraccionamiento)', but rather a residential project that must, consequently, comply with all the indicated requirements. Urban residential projects can only enable access to the properties through public roads that must have the dimensions and requirements of the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos) and, the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Developments (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones), in the absence – in this last case – of concrete provisions in local norms. None of the municipal bodies has the competence to authorize a project in which the access ways to the properties are made through 'cobblestone agricultural easements (servidumbres agrícolas adoquinadas),' 'agricultural easements (servidumbres agrícolas),' or 'simple easements (simples servidumbres),' since they are figures of Private Law and not of the urban residential regime governed by the norms and principles of Public Law.' (Highlighting is from the original.)

In accordance with the foregoing, it is of special interest the control that the local government is responsible for verifying, in this case by the deliberative body (Council (Concejo)), in the case of approving construction permits for developments (urbanizaciones), since it must confirm that it fully complies with the legal requirements, namely the provision of public roads, green and communal areas, as well as the habilitation and implementation, by the developer, of public services, such as electricity, telephony, potable water, and aqueducts and sewers, the latter, in case the infrastructure for it exists. Consequently, the non-adaptation of urban projects to the requirements established in the urban planning system obliges – per se – the rejection of the filed procedures, in application of the principle of legality, which binds the entire state apparatus, of which the municipalities form part.

VIII.- ON MUNICIPAL COMPETENCE IN VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH URBAN PLANNING NORMS.- The scope of municipal competence in local urban planning is not limited only to the enactment of the respective regulations – regulatory plans (planes reguladores) and related regulations – but extends also to the control exercised regarding compliance with local urban planning norms. In this sense, as this Court has indicated in various pronouncements (among them, numbers 175-2009, at fifteen hours forty minutes, and 176-2009, at fifteen hours fifty minutes, both of January thirtieth, two thousand nine), 'local governments must act in a timely manner in the exercise of police power, using the powers that the legal system has granted them to achieve their objectives' (underlining is not from the original); which, in urban planning matters, materializes in the control of development and subdivision processes, and is specifically set forth in Article 1 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), insofar as it literally provides:

'The Municipalities of the Republic are the entities responsible for ensuring that the cities and other towns meet the necessary conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty in their public roads, in the buildings and constructions erected on lands within them, without prejudice to the powers that the laws grant in these matters to other administrative bodies.' Thus, 'police power' is the competence recognized to the Administration, so that, based on a law, it regulates an activity, in order to ensure public order, health, tranquility; the safety of persons, as well as the moral, political, and economic organization of society; an attribution by virtue of which, the imposition of restrictions on the enjoyment of fundamental rights is reasonable, insofar as its justification is found precisely in the consideration that fundamental rights are limited by those of other persons, as they must coexist with each and every one of the other fundamental rights. Thereby, the measures that the State adopts with the purpose of protecting safety, health, and tranquility, are of social public interest, manifested through the police power, understood as the regulatory power over the enjoyment of rights and the fulfillment of constitutional duties. (In this sense, one may consult rulings number 401-91, at fourteen hours on February twentieth, and 619-91, at fourteen hours forty-five minutes on March twenty-second, both resolutions of nineteen ninety-one, and 2003-2864, at fifteen hours twenty minutes on April ninth, two thousand three, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)).

IX.- ON THE APPLICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL NORMS TO THE URBAN SPHERE.- The protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment is regulated in our legal-constitutional system in a dual dimension: namely, as a fundamental right, that is, as a subjective right derived from the condition and dignity of the human person, contributing to their growth and integral development, which by the express will of our constituents (original, by constitutional interpretation of Articles 21, 50, 69, and 89; and derived, by addition), is recognized in our fundamental text in that character, whose content is inevitably nourished by international norms, as a direct consequence of the application of Article 48 also of our Constitution, and is classified in doctrine as a third-generation right, inasmuch as it addresses the interests of the community and is based on the principle of solidarity; and at the same time, as a public function or power, which as such, translates into concrete obligations for the State as a whole, thus conditioning the political objectives, and consequently, the action of public powers in general, to give full compliance to this fundamental right. In accordance with the above, and as derived from the content of Article 50 of the Constitution, the constitutional environmental principles and environmental regulations are applicable to Urban Planning Law, insofar as it can well be affirmed that this system forms part of Environmental Law; which has not been foreign to our Constitutional Court, which in this regard considered:

'[...] that the defense and preservation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitution, is the fundamental right of every person and functions as an inescapable general principle, so that in this matter it is not possible to make generic exceptions (in urban planning matters and other topics addressed by Articles 19 and 20) to exonerate compliance with environmental obligations, since by doing so, there is a risk of deconstitutionalizing the guarantee of state response in defense of the environment.

[...] the Chamber considers that it must be a fundamental requirement – which, obviously, does not violate the constitutional principle of municipal autonomy – that every urban development regulatory plan must, prior to being approved and developed, have an environmental impact assessment from the perspective given by Article 50 of the Constitution, so that land-use planning and its various regimes are compatible with the scope of the superior norm; above all, if one considers that this provision establishes the right of all inhabitants to obtain an environmental response from all public authorities, and this undoubtedly includes the Municipalities, which are not exempt from the application of the constitutional norm and its implementing legislation. It is evident that in this case, the national interest and the local interest are entirely coincident, and therefore, local governments can and must demand compliance with environmental requirements in their territory, and in case of conflict with the governing authorities on environmental matters, they may submit the controversies to the jurisdictional controller, according to the nature of the infraction. It is for the above reasons that the tutelary norms of the environment are not incompatible, from a constitutional point of view, with the powers and competences of the municipalities, which are obliged, by the imperative of Article 50 of the Political Constitution, to lavish protection on the environment.' (Ruling No. 2002-01220, at 14:48 hours on February 6, 2002, of the Constitutional Chamber.)

For the sake of adequate protection and conservation of natural resources and the landscape, which includes the urban environment, it is binding for any project of this nature, that is, developments (urbanizaciones) and constructions, where environmental norms are fully applicable. Thus, Urban Planning Law, both in its normative dimension and in its entire planning system, must place in a preponderant position the protection and conservation of everything that constitutes the heritage of a community, whether as part of nature or the product of human endeavor that has been inherited by a specific society; a task that the local government will specify in each project through the power of verifying urban planning norms.

X.- ON GREEN AREAS OR COMMUNAL PROPERTY.- Green areas are understood as those areas resulting from urban projects, which have their origin in the burden imposed on the developer (urbanizador or desarrollador) in Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), to cede 'free of charge' to the municipal entities a portion of land – between five and twenty percent of the land destined for the project – for use as public roads, parks, and community facilities, the cost of which is transferred to the value of the resulting parcels or lots. It is thus that they 'nominally' belong to the municipalities (insofar as they hold the bare ownership of the property), but in a strict sense are classified as communal property, insofar as they are destined for neighborhood use, precisely because their (constitutional) basis is the provision of the minimum services of the phenomenon of development – which in general terms implies the 'creation of cities' –, as the Constitutional Chamber has clearly and precisely specified in various pronouncements.

"XX. The free transfer to the municipalities of lands to be subdivided or developed is made to allocate them for certain services for the community, such as public roads and green areas; the latter – which are those that interest us – will be used to build parks, gardens, educational centers, sports, and recreational areas. The basis of this obligation must be situated in a kind of consideration owed by the developer (urbanizador) for the greater value that the development or parceling process will give to the developed land; that is, it is ultimately a contribution in kind in urban planning law, as a mechanism to ensure that the increased value that the properties acquire due to the development or subdivision reverts to the community. Before this regulation, a serious social situation existed, derived from the fact that landowners received the full prices obtained from their lands as a net benefit, while the new neighborhoods were left without service provisions, a deficiency for which the municipal Administration was attempted to be held responsible, incapable of covering that deficit effectively. One of the principles of urban planning law consists precisely in that the considerable capital gains generated by the urban development process must be the primary source to defray the costs in services that this same development causes to arise. The challenged obligation – to cede free of charge a percentage of land to the municipality – attempts precisely to enforce the principle of economic compensation and retribution in service of the needs of the community that is created, as a correlate of the enrichment perceived from urban development.

XXI.In this way, the content of property is configured, from the criterion of its social function; it is a technical specification of that function which ceases to be a simple moral admonishment to the consciences of the owners to become a system of positive duties that are legally enforceable. Thus, the owners may exercise as their own all the faculties of urban use of the resulting properties, only that simultaneously, they must also assume the positive duties with which the legal system attempts to compensate the economic gain. The development or subdivision plan must previously contemplate all the provisions for community services – roads, water and electrical lighting connections, green areas, children's playgrounds, etc. – before starting the construction and individual use of the lots; execution that falls upon the owner. ... , and it will be the new owners who will ultimately be benefited by the green areas and facilities referred to in Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana)." (Ruling number 4205-96, at fourteen hours thirty-three minutes on August twentieth, nineteen ninety-six.)

But particularly, the transfer of these strips of land in development projects serves the realization of the fundamental rights to recreation and to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, precisely of the residents of a development (COLOM PIAZUELO, Eloy, Los Bienes Comunales en la Legislación de Régimen local. Editorial Tecnos, S.A. Madrid. Spain. 1994. page 35), as our Constitutional Court also considered in ruling number 2000-4332, at ten hours fifty-one minutes on May nineteenth, two thousand, in which it warned of the absolute impossibility of modifying its purpose:

"III.- Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) provides that 'No less than one third of the area represented by the percentage set pursuant to the previous paragraph, shall be applied unfailingly for the use of a park, but reserving first and foremost from that third the space or spaces necessary for children's playgrounds, in a proportion not less than ten square meters per family. The remaining two thirds of the referred percentage or the remainder thereof that may be available after covering the park needs shall serve to install community facilities that are initially proposed by the subdivider (fraccionador) or developer (urbanizador)…'. The mere reading of that norm allows one to arrive at the certainty that the legislator, in development of the Supreme Charter, has established the mandatory existence of green areas and parks for the enjoyment of the community; hence, it could not be understood that the construction of what the Municipality has called a community facility – such as the erection of buildings planned by the associations that have been favored with the questioned agreements – is compatible with that norm, because that interpretation would empty the essential content of the residents' right to enjoy a green recreational area, which forms part of the quality of life that the Constitution guarantees them. The local municipality cannot freely eliminate the purpose of lands dedicated to parks, nor could the legislator do so – without defining in exchange a space that compensates for the loss of the park area – because that would make unconstitutional the agreement or the law that so provides, for disrespect of the essential content of the residents' right to enjoy those recreational areas, which, as indicated, form part of the quality of life that the Constitution guarantees them. The term 'community facilities' does not have the breadth intended to be implied. It is obvious to this Chamber that it refers to constructions indispensable for the communal enjoyment of the property destined for green area, park, and recreation; consequently, the construction of buildings for public services – for example, libraries, schools, community halls, etc. – are incompatible with the purpose of park and green areas that the legislator has required for some lands, and, without doubt, for the interested associations to be able to undertake the construction of buildings such as those that are of interest to them, they must defray – what involves all the members or residents of the locality who will benefit from the public and general use of the property – the cost thereof. The Chamber cannot admit that through the route of donation or construction authorizations such as those attempted, the right of the plaintiff residents to enjoy the land that in an integral manner belongs to the community of Cipreses as a green area and park, and which the Municipality only holds in administration for the local interests, is disregarded." (The highlighting is from the original.)

Consequently, these areas possess the characteristics of public domain property, by destination and vocation, under the designation of green areas, as the Constitutional Chamber asserted in ruling number 4605-96, cited above:

"XXII. The green areas destined for public use, by virtue of their use and nature, are part of the community's heritage and must remain under the jurisdiction of the municipal entities to be administered as public domain property, with which they participate in the legal regime of these properties, which makes them inalienable, imprescriptible, and unseizable; that is, they cannot be the object of private property by the developer or subdivider, just as Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law provides. (...)" XI.- ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR GREEN AREAS.- Having clarified the concept of green or communal area, as resulting from development projects, it is pertinent to note that according to Article II.3 of the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Developments (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones), the areas ceded under that concept must be 'without restrictions,' that is, free from any limitation established in the legal system; insofar as they have a specific purpose by legal mandate – for parks, children's playgrounds, and community facilities –, according to the proportionality established by the cited numeral 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), so that the topographic conditions, dimensions, and size must be suitable and consistent with their purpose. In this sense, as provided for by Article 33 subsection b) of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) (number 7575, of February fifth, nineteen ninety-five, and its amendments), a protection area is established of 'A strip of fifteen meters in a rural area and ten meters in an urban area, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, streams, or brooks, if the land is flat, and of fifty horizontal meters, if the land is steep.' Thus, lots or areas that have this limitation cannot be considered for allocation to parks, community facilities, or children's playgrounds, as inferred from the indicated provisions; since that would imply a breach of the legal system, which in this matter (urban-environmental) carries a special connotation, being of public order, a characteristic that refers not only to the importance it holds for the interest of the community, but also to its binding nature, that is, its non-disposability by the parties, whether they are public authorities or subjects of private law (individuals); that is, it is not subject to agreement either for individuals or for public authorities due to the importance it has for the life and survival of humanity. Thus, environmental norms are binding on the State – in relation to the individual, it is a matter without discussion – which makes its exception impossible, except, of course, in situations of urgency or emergency, which in itself, is a condition source of law.

XII.- ON THE BLOCK OF LEGALITY.- It is relevant to recall that the block of legality is comprised not only of written sources, starting from the Political Constitution (including with it, not only with respect to its text, but also the values and principles that emanate from it, the international treaties on fundamental rights), international treaties, laws, and regulatory provisions, as numeral 6 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) orders; but also, and in particular, the univocal rules of science and technique, insofar as they constitute a delimiting parameter for administrative discretion, pursuant to Article 16 of the cited legal body, insofar as it obliges the Administration to base its actions on duly motivated theoretical knowledge acquired from the various methodologies and disciplines of science and technique, when the matter merits it – as in the case of urban planning matters – so that the will of public institutions does not depend on their free will (or choice), but on objective assessments obtained in accordance with the technical rules applicable to the case. In this sense, the objectivity of technical criteria is highlighted, since '... if a technique is scientific and, therefore, by definition, certain, objective, universal, subject to uniform rules that do not depend on the personal appreciation of an individual subject, it is obvious that one cannot speak in this aspect of «complete discretion,» but rather, on the contrary, speaks almost of «regulation» (subjection to norms, in the case of technique)' (MARTÍN GONZÁLEZ, M., in his work El grado de determinación legal de los conceptos jurídicos. RAP, number 54, 1967, p. 239), cited by DESDENTADO DAROCA, Eva. Los problemas del control judicial de la discrecionalidad técnica. (Un estudio crítico de la jurisprudencia. Editorial Civitas, S. A. Madrid. Spain. 1997. p. 43.) In concordant form, Eduardo ORTIZ ORTIZ expressed this in the Legislative Commission that discussed the bill of the General Law of Public Administration to include the univocal rules of science and technique as a parameter of administrative discretion, when considering '... in cases where the Administration acts in technical matters that have a clear and precise meaning in the particular case, the technical rules will be, in this case, like laws; the violation of the technical aspects of an administrative act of a public service, naturally, will be an illegality exactly as if a legal precept were being violated.' (QUIRÓS CORONADO, Roberto. Ley General de Administración Pública, Concordada y Anotada con el Debate Legislativo y la Jurisprudencia Constitucional. Editorial Aselex, S. A. San José, Costa Rica. 1996. p.

99.)

XIII.— CONFORMITY OF THE CHALLENGED DECISION WITH THE LEGAL ORDER.— In light of the foregoing considerations, this Tribunal finds that the challenged decision —the resolution adopted in Article Ten of ordinary session 23-2008-2010, of October sixth, two thousand nine— is in conformity with the legal order; for the following reasons:

First: In this regard, it is appropriate to consider that there is no impairment of subjective rights, as alleged by the appellant company, which curiously derives this from the approval of plans (visado de planos) for the lots whose formal acceptance it seeks; because that act (approval of plans) is a necessary requirement for the subdivision (segregación) of lots; and that, by virtue thereof, it only confers the right to subdivide for sale, as derived from Article 33 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), meaning that the legal effects derived from it are not disregarded, nor is it possible to extend them to urbanization projects. Therefore, since there is no declaratory act of rights in the determination of the green areas of an urbanization project based on the approval of plans by the local entity, there can be no injury to the principle of the irrevocability of one's own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios), developed by the case law of the Constitutional Chamber in direct application of Articles 34 and 45 of the Fundamental Law (in this regard, among others, one may consult the judgments of that Tribunal numbers 2753-93, 4596-93, 585-94, 2186-94, 2187-94, and 899-95), by virtue of which the Administration is prevented from arbitrarily or capriciously reversing declaratory acts of subjective rights, such that it must resort to the intervention of the jurisdictional bodies through the lesividad process (regulated in Articles 183 of the General Law of Public Administration and 10, subsection 5), and 34 of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code), to challenge these acts when deemed “injurious” —to the public interest, for reasons of an economic or other nature—, based on an absolute nullity that is neither evident nor manifest, or a relative nullity, which leads to its claim for elimination from the legal world, a process in which the guarantee of constitutional due process, as a fundamental right, must be followed.

Second, the challenged act was issued in the exercise of the powers that the legal order confers on local governments, precisely in safeguarding the (urban) territorial planning (ordenación del territorio) of the canton and, with it, compliance with urban-environmental regulations. It should be remembered that municipalities have been delegated the function of control and supervision in the execution of urbanization projects, a task they perform at various stages of the process, among them, of great importance, the land-use certification (certificación de uso de suelo), which determines the project's conformity with the land use regulated in urban planning regulations, and by virtue thereof, has declaratory effects, that is, it is not constitutive of rights; the approval of cadastral plans (visado de los planos catastrados), which, as indicated, allows the owner to subdivide the property for sale, but which does not refer to the approval of the urbanization; the granting of the permit to carry out the specific project; the definition of the building alignment (alineamiento de construcción); and the acceptance of the green areas, for communal facilities, playgrounds, and children’s playgrounds. In this sense, it is noted that the approval of the construction plans for the urbanization project is a task that falls, in the first instance, to the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, INVU), pursuant to Article 38 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) and Article VI.3 of the National Subdivision and Urbanization Regulations (Reglamento nacional de Fraccionamiento y Urbanizaciones), issued by that same institution; it being that the approval of the municipalities is required for the purpose of obtaining the construction license, required for any work of that nature in the canton. Consequently, with regard specifically to the formal acceptance of the areas intended for children's playgrounds, parks, and communal facilities, this is the exclusive and excluding task of the local authorities, who are responsible for verifying that these areas comply with the requirements established in the regulations governing the matter (Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law, II.2 and III.3.6.2 of the National Subdivision and Urbanization Regulations (Reglamento Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones)), such as proportion and size, correct location, and that the play area is delivered equipped, grassed, and with mesh fencing. The appellant is correct in considering that all these interventions progressively close stages (precluyendo fases) in the process, and in some of the cases, though not all, they do confer rights on the administered party, a circumstance which, it is repeated, does not occur in the present case, in the terms intended by the appellant company.

Third, the refusal of the formal acceptance of several lots is based on the actual existence of a stream (quebrada), of an intermittent nature, as is evident from the cadastral plans (at folios 2, 4, and 5) and expert report (Dr. William Borges, Environmental Regent (Regente Ambiental) of the La Cabriola Urbanization project, at folios 89 and 90), provided by the interested party itself, which clearly and forcefully record the foregoing. As such, since the legal order (Article 33 of Law 7575) does not distinguish the type of stream whose protection it mandates, that is, whether they are permanent or intermittent, this prevents its acceptance, and denotes the developer's non-compliance with the regulations indicated, given that the communal or green areas of an urbanization must be free of restrictions.

Fourth and last, it must be considered, as indicated, that the provision of green areas is established for the benefit of the community, and responds to the requirements of urban and environmental regulations; therefore, in no way can a subjective right or consolidated legal situation or legitimate interest be legitimately claimed to breach this obligation; there being no legal opinion (dictamen) from the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) to that effect, which in any case, is only binding on the consulting entity, but not on the rest of the Public Administration, with respect to which it would hold the status of a non-normative source of law, by way of administrative case law, which, if it had the content alleged by the appellant, would be not only contrary to constitutional case law, binding erga omnes pursuant to Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, but also contra legem, as has been indicated.

XIV.— CONCLUSIONS.— Based on the foregoing considerations, as it is evident, not only that the absolute nullity alleged by the appellant company does not exist, but also that the challenged resolution is in conformity with the legal order (the legality block in the previously established terms), its confirmation in all its aspects is appropriate.” (In this regard, one may consult judgments number 401-91, of fourteen hundred hours on the twentieth of February and 619-91, of fourteen hundred hours forty-five minutes on the twenty-second of March, both resolutions of nineteen ninety-one, and 2003-2864, of fifteen hundred hours twenty minutes on the ninth of April of two thousand three, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional).)

**IX.- ON THE APPLICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS TO THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT.-** The protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment is regulated in our legal-constitutional order in a dual dimension, that is, as a **fundamental right**, that is, as a subjective right deriving from the condition and dignity of the human person, which contributes to their growth and integral development, which by express will of our constituents (original, through constitutional interpretation of Articles 21, 50, 69 and 89; and derived, by addition), is recognized in our fundamental text in such character, whose content is unavoidably nourished by international regulations, as a direct consequence of the application also of Article 48 of our Constitution, and is classified in doctrine as a third-generation right, insofar as it addresses the interests of the community and is based on the principle of solidarity; and at the same time, as a **public function or power**, which as such, translates into concrete obligations for the State as a whole, thus conditioning the political objectives, and consequently, the action of the public powers in general, to give full compliance to this fundamental right. In light of the foregoing, and as derived from the content of Article 50 of the Constitution, the **environmental constitutional principles and environmental regulations are applicable to Urban Planning Law (Derecho Urbanístico),** insofar as it can well be affirmed that this system forms part of Environmental Law; which has not been foreign to our Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional), which in this regard considered:

"[...] *that the defense and preservation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitution, is the fundamental right of every person and functions as an unavoidable general principle, so that in this matter it is not possible to make generic exceptions (in **urban planning matters** and other topics addressed by Articles 19 and 20) to exempt compliance with environmental obligations, **since doing so runs the risk of deconstitutionalizing the guarantee of state response in defense of the environment.*** [...] *this Chamber (Sala) considers that it must be a fundamental requirement, which obviously does not violate the constitutional principle of municipal autonomy, that every urban development regulatory plan must have, prior to being approved and developed, an examination of the environmental impact from the perspective provided by Article 50 of the Constitution, so that land-use planning and its various regimes are compatible with the scope of the superior norm, especially if one considers that this provision establishes the right of all inhabitants to obtain an environmental response from all public authorities, and that undoubtedly includes the Municipalities, which are not exempt from the application of the constitutional norm and its implementing legislation. It is evident that in this case, the national and local interests are totally coincident, and therefore local governments can and must demand compliance with environmental requirements in their territory, and in case of conflict with the governing authorities on environmental matters, they may submit the controversies to the jurisdictional controller, according to the nature of the infraction. It is for this reason that the norms protecting the environment are not incompatible, from a constitutional point of view, with the faculties and competencies of the municipalities, which are obliged, by imperative of Article 50 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), to lavish themselves in the protection of the environment.*" (Judgment No. 2002-01220, of 14:48 hours on February 6, 2002, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional).)

For the sake of the adequate protection and conservation of natural resources and the landscape, which includes the urban environment, it is binding for any project of this nature, that is, of urbanizations and constructions, where environmental regulations are fully applicable. Thus, Urban Planning Law (Derecho Urbanístico), both in its normative dimension and in its entire planning system, must place in a preponderant position the protection and conservation of everything that constitutes the ***heritage of a community***, whether as part of nature or the product of human endeavor that has been inherited by a given society; a task that the local government will concretize in each project through the power of verification of urban planning regulations.

**X.- ON GREEN ZONES OR COMMUNAL PROPERTY (BIENES COMUNALES).-** **Green zones are those areas** resulting from urban development projects, which have their origin in the burden imposed on the developer (or urbanizer) in Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), of transferring "*free of charge*" to the municipal entities a portion of land -between five and twenty percent of the land designated for the project-, for use as public roads, parks, and communal facilities, the cost of which is transferred to the value of the resulting plots or lots. This is how "*nominally*" they belong to the municipalities (insofar as they hold the bare ownership of the property), but in a strict sense they are classified as **communal property (bienes comunales)**, insofar as they are destined for neighborhood use, precisely because their (constitutional) foundation is the provision of the minimum services of the urbanization phenomenon -which broadly implies the "*creation of cities*"-, as has been clearly and precisely specified by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in various pronouncements.

"*XX. The gratuitous transfer to the municipalities of land to be subdivided (fraccionar) or urbanized is done to allocate in them certain services for the community, such as public roads and green zones, the latter -which are the ones that interest us- will be used to build parks, gardens, educational centers, sports, and recreational zones. The foundation of this obligation must be situated in a kind of consideration due by the developer for the greater value that the urbanization or parceling process will give to the urbanized land, that is, it is ultimately a contribution in kind in urban planning law, as a mechanism to ensure that the surplus value acquired by the properties due to urbanization or subdivision reverts to the community. Before this regulation, a serious social situation arose, derived from the fact that the landowners received as net benefit the entire prices obtained from their land, while the new neighborhoods were left without the provision of services, a deficiency that was attempted to be attributed to the municipal Administration, incapable of covering that deficit effectively. One of the principles of urban planning law consists precisely in that the considerable surplus values generated by the process of urban development must be the primary source to defray the costs in services that this same development gives rise to. The contested obligation -of transferring gratuitously a percentage of land to the municipality-, seeks precisely to make effective the principle of economic compensation and retribution in service of the needs of the community that is created, as a correlate of the enrichment perceived from urban development.* *XXI. In this way, the content of property is configured, from the criterion of its social function; it is a technification of that function that ceases to be a simple moral admonition to the consciences of the owners to become a system of legally enforceable positive duties. Thus, the owners may exercise as their own all the faculties of urban use of the resulting plots, only that simultaneously, they must also assume the positive duties with which the legal system attempts to compensate the economic gain. The urbanization or subdivision plan must contemplate in advance all the provisions for communal services -roads, water and electric lighting connections, green zones, playgrounds, etc.- before starting the construction and individual use of the lots; an execution that falls upon the owner. ..., and it will be the new owners who will ultimately be benefited by the green areas and facilities referred to in Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana).*" (Judgment number 4205-96, of fourteen hours thirty-three minutes on the twentieth of August of nineteen ninety-six.)

But particularly, the transfer of these strips of land in urbanization projects addresses the realization of the fundamental rights to recreation and to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, precisely for the residents of an urbanization (COLOM PIAZUELO, Eloy, *Los Bienes Comunales en la Legislación de Régimen local*. Editorial Tecnos, S.A. Madrid. Spain. 1994. p. 35), as our Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) also considered in judgment number 2000-4332, of ten hours fifty-one minutes on the nineteenth of May of two thousand, in which it warned of the **absolute impossibility of modifying their purpose**:

"*III.- Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) provides that "Not less than one-third of the area represented by the percentage set in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be applied unfailingly for park use, but reserving first from that third the necessary space or spaces for children's playgrounds, in a proportion that is not less than ten square meters per family. The remaining two thirds of the referred percentage or the remainder thereof that remains available after covering the needs for park space shall serve to install communal facilities that the developer or urbanizer may initially propose...". The mere reading of that norm allows one to arrive at the certainty that the legislator, in development of the Supreme Charter (Carta Suprema), has established the obligatory existence of green zones and parks for the enjoyment of the community, hence it could not be understood that the construction of what the Municipality (Municipalidad) has called a communal facility, such as the erection of buildings planned by the associations that have been favored with the agreements under challenge, is compatible with that norm, since that interpretation would empty **the essential content of the right of the residents to enjoy a green zone for recreation, which forms part of the quality of life that the Constitution (Constitución) guarantees them**. The local municipality cannot freely eliminate the purpose of the land dedicated to parkland; neither could the legislator do so -without defining in exchange a space that compensates for the loss of the park area-, as this would render unconstitutional the agreement or the law that so provides, for disrespect of the essential content of the right of the residents to enjoy those recreation zones, which, as indicated, form part of the quality of life that the Constitution (Constitución) guarantees them. The term "communal facilities" does not have the breadth that is sought to be implied. It is obvious to this Chamber (Sala) that it refers to constructions indispensable for the communal enjoyment of the property destined for green area, park, and recreation; consequently, the construction of buildings for public services, such as for example libraries, schools, community halls, etc., are incompatible with the purpose of park and green zone areas that the legislator has required for some lands, and, without a doubt, for the interested associations to be able to undertake the construction of buildings like those that are of their interest, they must defray -what involves all the members or residents of the locality who will benefit from the public and general use of the property- the cost thereof. This Chamber (Sala) cannot admit that by way of donation or construction authorizations such as those attempted, the right of the plaintiff residents to enjoy the plot of land that in its entirety belongs to the community of Cipreses as a green zone and park and which the Municipality (Municipalidad) only holds in administration of the local interests is disregarded.*" (The highlighting is from the original.)

Consequently, these areas **enjoy the characteristics of public domain property**, **by purpose and vocation, under the invocation of green zones**, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) asserted in judgment number 4605-96, cited supra:

"*XXII. The green areas destined for public use, by virtue of their use and nature, are part of the heritage of the community and must remain under the jurisdiction of the municipal entities so that they may administer them **as public domain property, with which they participate in the legal regime of these assets, which renders them inalienable, imprescriptible, and unattachable**, that is, they cannot be the object of private property of the developer or subdivider, as provided in Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana).* **XI.- REGARDING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR GREEN ZONES.-** Having clarified the concept of green or communal area, as resulting from urbanization projects, it is pertinent to note that as established by article II.3 of the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, the areas ceded under such concept must be "***without restrictions***" (*sin restricciones*), that is, they must not be burdened by any limitation established in the legal system; since they have a specific purpose by legal mandate – for parks, children's playgrounds, and community facilities – according to the proportionality established by the cited numeral 40 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, such that the topographical conditions, dimensions, and size must be suitable and consistent with their purpose. In this regard, as provided for in Article 33(b) of the Ley Forestal (number 7575, of February 5, 1995, and its amendments), a protection area is established:

"*A strip of fifteen meters in rural zones and ten meters in urban zones, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, streams (quebradas), or brooks, if the terrain is flat, and fifty horizontal meters, if the terrain is broken.*" Thus, lots or areas that are subject to this limitation cannot be considered for allocation to parks, community facilities, or children's playgrounds, as inferred from the indicated provisions; since this would imply a breach of the legal system, which, in this matter (urban-environmental), holds a special connotation, as it is of **public order** (*orden público*), a characteristic that does not refer solely to its transcendence for the collective interest, but to its **binding nature** (*vinculatoriedad*), that is, its **unavailability for the parties** (*indisponibilidad para las partes*), whether they be public authorities or subjects of private law (individuals), that is, it is not subject to agreement either for individuals or for public authorities due to the transcendence it has for the life and survival of humanity. Thus, the environmental regulations are binding on the State – in relation to the individual it is a matter that has no discussion –, which makes their exception impossible, except, of course, in situations of urgency or emergency, which in itself is a condition as a source of law.

**XII.- REGARDING THE LEGALITY BLOCK (*BLOQUE DE LEGALIDAD*).-** It is relevant to recall that the legality block is composed not only of ***written sources***, starting from the Political Constitution (comprising, in addition to its text, the values and principles emanating from it, international treaties on fundamental rights), international treaties, laws, and regulatory provisions, as ordered by Article 6 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; but also, and in particular, the ***univocal rules of science and technique***, as they constitute a delimiting parameter of administrative discretion, according to Article 16 of the cited legal body, insofar as it obligates the Administration to ensure its actions are duly motivated by the ***theoretical knowledge acquired from the various methodologies and disciplines of science and technique***, when merited – as in the case of urban planning matters – such that the will of public institutions does not depend on their free will (or choice), but on the ***objective assessments obtained in accordance with the technical rules applicable to the case.*** In this sense, the objectivity of technical criteria is highlighted, as "*... if a technique is scientific and, therefore, by definition, certain, objective, universal, subject to uniform rules that do not depend on the personal appreciation of an individual subject, it is obvious that in this aspect one cannot speak of 'complete discretion,' but rather it corresponds, on the contrary, to speak of little less than 'regulation' (subjection to norms, in the case of technique)…*" (MARTÍN GONZÁLEZ, M., in his work *El grado de determinación legal de los conceptos jurídicos*. RAP, number 54, 1967, p.239), cited by DESDENTADO DAROCA, Eva. *Los problemas del control judicial de la discrecionalidad técnica. (Un estudio crítico de la jurisprudencia*. Editorial Civitas, S. A. Madrid. Spain. 1997. p. 43.) In concordant form, Eduardo ORTIZ ORTIZ stated before the Legislative Commission that discussed the bill for the Ley General de Administración Pública to include univocal rules of science and technique as a parameter of administrative discretion, considering "*... in cases where the Administration acts in technical matters that have a clear and precise meaning in the case, the technical rules will be, in this case, like laws, the violation of the technical aspects of an administrative act of a public service will naturally be an illegality exactly as if a legal precept were being violated.*" (QUIRÓS CORONADO, Roberto. *Ley General de Administración Pública, Concordada y Anotada con el Debate Legislativo y la Jurisprudencia Constitucional.* Editorial Aselex, S. A. San José, Costa Rica. 1996. p. 99.)

**XIII.- REGARDING THE CONFORMITY OF THE CHALLENGED AGREEMENT WITH THE LEGAL SYSTEM.-** In light of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds that the challenged decision – the agreement adopted in Article Ten of ordinary session 23-2008-2010, of October 6, 2009 – is in accordance with the legal system, for the following reasons:

**First**: In this sense, it is possible to consider that ***there is no impairment of subjective rights***, as alleged by the appellant company, which, curiously, derives this from the approval (*visado*) of plans for the lots whose formal acceptance it seeks; since that act (approval of plans), ***is a necessary requirement for the segregation of lots***; and by virtue thereof, it only confers the right to segregate for sale, as derived from Article 33 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, whereby the legal effects derived from it are not disregarded, without it being possible to extend them to urbanization projects. Therefore, as there is no declaratory act of rights in the determination of the green areas of an urbanization project, based on an approval of plans by the local entity, ***there can be no injury*** to the principle of intangibility of one's own acts (*principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios*), developed by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (*Sala Constitucional*) in direct application of Articles 34 and 45 of the Fundamental Law (in this sense, among others, the judgments of that Court numbers 2753-93, 4596-93, 585-94, 2186-94, 2187-94 and 899-95 can be consulted), by virtue of which the Administration is prevented from arbitrarily or capriciously reversing declaratory acts of subjective rights, so it must resort to the intervention of the jurisdictional bodies through the lesividad proceeding (*proceso de lesividad*) (regulated in Articles 183 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and 10(5) and 34 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), for the challenge of these acts by considering it "*lesivo*" – to the public interest, for economic reasons or of another nature – based on a non-evident and non-manifest absolute nullity or a relative one, which entails its claim for elimination from the legal world, a process in which the guarantee of constitutional due process must be followed, as a fundamental right.

**Second**, ***the challenged act was issued in the exercise of the powers that the legal system confers on local governments, precisely in safeguarding the (urban) territorial planning of the canton and thereby, compliance with urban-environmental regulations***. It should be remembered that municipalities have been delegated the function of control and supervision in the execution of urbanization projects, a task they perform in various phases of processing, among them, of great importance, the ***land-use certification (certificación de uso de suelo)***, which determines the conformity of the project with the land use regulated in urban planning regulations, and by virtue thereof, has declaratory effects, that is, not constitutive of rights; the ***approval of cadastral plans (visado de los planos catastrados)***, which, as indicated, allow the owner the segregation of the property for sale, but do not refer to the approval of the urbanization; ***granting of the permit to carry out the specific project***; the definition of the ***building alignment (alineamiento de construcción)***, and the ***acceptance of green areas***, for community facilities, playgrounds, and children's playgrounds. In this regard, it is noted that the ***approval of the construction plans for the urbanization project*** is a task that belongs, in the first instance, to the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, according to Article 38 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana and Article VI.3 of the Reglamento Nacional de Fraccionamiento y Urbanizaciones, issued by that same institution; with the approval of the municipalities being required for the purposes of obtaining the building license, required for any work of that nature in the canton. Hence, specifically regarding the formal acceptance of the areas intended for children's playgrounds, parks, and community facilities, ***this is an exclusive and excluding task of the local authorities***, to whom it corresponds to verify that these comply with the requirements established in the regulations governing the matter (Article 40 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, II.2 and III.3.6.2 of the Reglamento Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones), such as proportion and size, correct location, that the playground area be delivered equipped, grassed, and with a mesh fence. The appellant is correct in considering that all these interventions are precluding phases in the proceeding, and in some cases, not all, they do confer rights on the administered party, a circumstance that, it is reiterated, does not arise in the present case, in the terms sought by the appellant company.

**Third**, the rejection of the formal acceptance of several lots ***is based on the real existence of a stream, of an intermittent nature***, as is evident from the cadastral plans (at folios 2, 4, and 5) and the expert report (Dr. William Borges, Environmental Regent of the Urbanización La Cabriola project, at folios 89 and 90), provided by the interested party itself, which clearly and conclusively record the foregoing. Therefore, since the legal system (Article 33 of Law 7575) does not distinguish the type of stream whose protection it imposes, that is, whether they are permanent or intermittent, this prevents its acceptance, and denotes the developer's non-compliance with the indicated regulations, as it is required that the communal or green areas of an urbanization be ***without restrictions***.

**Fourth and finally**, it must be considered, as indicated, that the provision of green areas is established for the benefit of the community, and responds to the requirements of urban planning and environmental regulations; therefore, in no way can a subjective right, a consolidated legal situation, or a legitimate interest be legitimately alleged to fail to comply with that obligation; without there being any opinion from the Procuraduría General de la República in that sense, which in any case, is binding only for the consulting entity, but not for the rest of the Public Administration, with respect to which it would hold the status of a non-normative source of law, by way of administrative jurisprudence, which, if it had the content alleged by the appellant, would be not only against the constitutional jurisprudence, binding *erga omnes* under Article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, but also *contra legem*, as has been indicated.

**XIV.- CONCLUSIONS.-** Based on the foregoing considerations, it being evident not only that the absolute nullity alleged by the appellant company does not arise, but that the challenged agreement is in accordance with the legal system (legality block in the terms previously established), its confirmation, in all its aspects, proceeds.” **VII.- ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBDIVISION AND URBANIZATION PROCESSES.-** Due to the significance derived from the legal implications involved in subdivision and urbanization processes, which is of interest for the specific case, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of both concepts. Thus, reference is made to the considerations given by this Court in resolutions number 175-2009 and 176-2009, of this Court, in which it addressed this topic as follows:

***Subdivision (fraccionamiento)*** *is the division of a property with the purpose of introducing it into commerce, which supposes, as each local government must verify when granting the corresponding approval (visado), that it conforms, in terms of size and characteristics, to the current urban planning provisions, especially the local Land-Use Plan (Plan Regulador) –if one exists– as well as the development regulations and other special public-order laws. The subdivision that the law calls* ***"simple"** does not include an urban development enablement process for the use and enjoyment of the parcels resulting from that subdivision, and this is so because the legislator assumes that in these cases, the lands have access roads and green areas resulting from a prior urban development. It is for this reason that Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law provides:* *"(...) Likewise, the obligation to cede areas for parks and community facilities is excepted* ***for simple subdivisions of parcels*** *in* ***previously** urbanized areas* *(...)" (highlighting is not from the original).* *When a certain area is previously urbanized, the purchasers of the subdivided parcels have access to the lands, parks, and community facilities, and it should not be overlooked that this is part of their right to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (Article 50 of the Constitution). For this reason –it is reiterated– the legislator has not deemed it necessary to demand, in the case of a "simple" subdivision with prior urban development, further land allocations for reasons of social interest. The approval for simple subdivisions, due to its minor significance, is usually granted to an official (e.g., Municipal Engineer) different from the one entrusted with "complex" approvals (e.g., Municipal Council, urban planning commissions, etc.), with the former lacking competence to authorize a different type of approval; this in the event that urban planning regulations make such a distinction. Now then,* ***the subdivision that forms part of the urbanization process** and that entails an enablement of the lands,* ***for the first time,** for urban purposes,* *must be provided* ***with streets, green areas, and parks***, *as well as the necessary* ***services*** *for their use and enjoyment. In this second scenario, we are dealing with* *a complex process of subdivision and urbanization that introduces* *limitations on private property for urban planning reasons (Article 22 of the Urban Planning Law), which the Constitutional Court has indicated are fully consistent with the Law of the Constitution (Voto N° 5097-93 of 10:24 hrs of October 15, 1993). The residential project or subdivision that we will call "complex" is provided for in numeral 40 of the Urban Planning Law, which, in pertinent part, states:* *"**Every subdivider (fraccionador)** of lands (…) and every* ***developer (urbanizador)*** *shall cede free of charge for public use both the areas destined for roads as well as those corresponding to parks and community facilities; what is established for the latter two concepts shall be determined in the respective regulation, by setting percentages of the total area to be subdivided or urbanized, which may fluctuate between five percent and twenty percent, depending on the average size of the lots, the use intended for the land, and the relevant norms. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the sum of the lands that must be ceded for public roads, parks, and community facilities shall not exceed forty-five percent of the total surface area of the land to be subdivided or urbanized. (...)"* *The developer's obligation to provide the subdivided parcels with access roads, green areas, parks, and public roads, obliges them to comply with the urban provisions that establish minimum standards regarding space, quality, quantity, and other requirements demanded by law and the development regulations concerning those areas. The local government must exercise its police power in a timely manner, guaranteeing to the residents of the canton that the works will be carried out in the manner indicated by the urban planning norms and with the conditions that those provisions establish.* *The mere fact that a parceling requires works to enable access and provide various services to some of those lands is sufficient to assert that* ***there is no** "simple subdivision", but rather a residential project that must, consequently, comply with all the stipulated requirements.* *Urban residential projects can only enable access to the lands through* ***public roads*** *that must have the dimensions and requirements of the General Law of Public Roads and the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, in the absence –in this latter case– of specific provisions in local regulations. None of the municipal bodies has the competence to authorize a project in which the land enablements are made through* ***"agricultural easements (servidumbres agrícolas) with paving"***, ***"agricultural easements"** or "simple easements",* *since these are figures proper to Private Law and not to the residential urban planning regime, which is governed by the norms and principles of Public Law.*" (Highlighting is from the original.)

In light of the above, **the control that the local government is responsible for verifying, in this case by the deliberative body (Council), is of special interest, when it comes to the approval of construction permits for urbanizations, since it must confirm that it fully complies with the legal requirements, namely the provision of public roads, green and community areas**, as well as the enablement and implementation, by the developer, of public services, such as electricity, telephone service, potable water and aqueducts, and sewer systems, the latter, in the event that the infrastructure for it exists. Consequently, the failure of urban development projects to conform to the requirements established in the urban planning system obliges –*per se*– the rejection of the initiated proceedings, in application of the principle of legality, which binds the entire state apparatus, of which the municipalities form a part.

**VIII.- ON MUNICIPAL COMPETENCE IN THE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH URBAN PLANNING NORMS.-** The scope of municipal competence in local urban planning is not limited solely to the enactment of the respective regulations –land-use plans (planes reguladores) and related regulations–, but rather ***extends also to the control it exercises regarding compliance with local urban planning regulations***.

In this regard, as this Tribunal has noted in various pronouncements (among them, numbers 175-2009, at fifteen hours forty minutes; 176-2009, at fifteen hours fifty minutes, both of January thirtieth, two thousand nine), "<i>local governments must act in a timely manner in the <b>exercise of police power (poder de policía)</b>, using the powers that the legal system has granted them to achieve their purposes</i>" (underlining not in original); which, in urban planning matters, is embodied in the control of urbanization and subdivision (fraccionamiento) processes, and which is exhaustively set forth in Article 1 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), as it literally provides:

"<i>The Municipalities of the Republic are responsible for ensuring that cities and other towns meet the necessary conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty in their public thoroughfares, buildings, and constructions erected on lands thereof, without prejudice to the powers that laws grant in these matters to other administrative bodies.</i>" Thus, "police power (poder de policía)" is the competence recognized to the Administration, so that, based on a law, it can regulate and rule an activity, in order to ensure <b><i>public order, public health, tranquility; the safety of persons, as well as the moral, political, and economic organization of society</i></b>; an attribution by virtue of which the imposition of restrictions on the enjoyment of fundamental rights is reasonable, since its justification lies precisely in the consideration that fundamental rights are limited by those of other persons, given that they must coexist with each and every other fundamental right. Therefore, the measures that the State adopts for the purpose of protecting safety, health, and tranquility are of public social interest, manifested through police power, understood as the regulatory power over the enjoyment of rights and the fulfillment of constitutional duties. (In this regard, see judgments number 401-91, at fourteen hours of February twentieth, and 619-91, at fourteen hours forty-five minutes of March twenty-second, both rulings of nineteen ninety-one, and 2003-2864, at fifteen hours twenty minutes of April ninth, two thousand three, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional).)

**IX.- ON THE APPLICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS (NORMATIVA AMBIENTAL) TO THE URBAN SPHERE.-** The protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment is regulated in our legal-constitutional system in a dual dimension, that is, as a <b>fundamental right</b>, a subjective right deriving from the condition and dignity of the human person, which contributes to their growth and integral development, which by the express will of our constituent framers (original, by constitutional interpretation of Articles 21, 50, 69, and 89; and derivative, by addition), is recognized in our fundamental text as having such character, the content of which is inevitably nourished by international norms, as a direct consequence of the application also of Article 48 of our Constitution, and is classified in legal doctrine as a third-generation right, insofar as it addresses the interests of the community and is based on the principle of solidarity; and at the same time, as a <b>public function or power</b>, which as such, translates into specific obligations for the State as a whole, thus conditioning political objectives and, consequently, the action of public powers in general, in order to fully comply with this fundamental right. In accordance with the foregoing, and as derived from the content of constitutional Article 50, the <b>constitutional environmental principles and environmental regulations are applicable to Urban Planning Law (Derecho Urbanístico),</b> insofar as it can well be affirmed that this system forms part of Environmental Law; which has not been overlooked by our Constitutional Court, which in this respect considered:

"[...] <i>that the defense and preservation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, as enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitution, is the fundamental right of every person and functions as an unavoidable general principle, so that in this matter it is not possible to make generic exceptions (in <b>urban planning matters (materia urbanística)</b> and other topics addressed by Articles 19 and 20) to exempt compliance with environmental obligations, <b>because doing so runs the risk of deconstitutionalizing the guarantee of state response in defense of the environment.</b></i> [...] <i>the Chamber considers that it should be a fundamental requirement, which obviously does not violate the constitutional principle of municipal autonomy, that every land-use plan (plan regulador) for urban development must have, prior to being approved and developed, an examination of the environmental impact from the perspective provided by Article 50 of the Constitution, so that the land-use planning and its various regimes are compatible with the scope of the higher norm, especially if one considers that this provision establishes the right of all inhabitants to obtain an environmental response from all public authorities, and this undoubtedly includes the Municipalities, which are not exempt from the application of the constitutional norm and its implementing legislation. It is evident that in this case, the national and local interest are completely coincident, and for this reason local governments can and must demand compliance with environmental requirements in their territory, and in the event of conflict with the governing authorities on environmental matters, they may submit the disputes to the jurisdictional comptroller, depending on the nature of the infraction. It is for the foregoing reasons that environmental protection norms are not incompatible, from the constitutional viewpoint, with the powers and competencies of the municipalities, which are obliged, by mandate of Article 50 of the Political Constitution, to actively engage in the protection of the environment</i>." (Judgment No. 2002-01220, at 14:48 hours of February 6, 2002, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional).)

For the sake of the adequate protection and conservation of natural resources and the landscape, which includes the urban environment, environmental regulations (normativa ambiental) are binding for any project of this nature, whether for developments (urbanizaciones) and constructions, where environmental regulations are fully applicable. Thus, Urban Planning Law, both in its normative dimension and throughout its planning system, must place in a preponderant position the protection and conservation of everything that constitutes the <b><i>patrimony of a community</i></b>, whether as part of nature or the product of human endeavor that has been inherited by a given society; a task that the local government will carry out in each project through its power to verify compliance with urban planning regulations.

**X.- ON GREEN ZONES OR COMMUNAL PROPERTY (BIENES COMUNALES).-** <b>Green zones are those areas</b> resulting from urban development projects, originating from the burden imposed on the developer (urbanizador) in Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), to cede <i>"gratuitously"</i> to municipal entities a portion of land –between five and twenty percent of the land allocated to the project–, for use as public thoroughfares, parks, and communal facilities, the cost of which is transferred to the value of the resulting parcels or lots. It is thus that "nominally" they belong to the municipalities (as they hold the bare title (nuda propiedad) to the property), but in a strict sense they are classified as <b>communal property (bienes comunales)</b>, insofar as they are destined for neighborhood use, precisely because their (constitutional) basis is the provision of the minimum services of the phenomenon of urbanization –which roughly implies the "<i>creation of cities</i>"–, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has clearly and precisely stated in various pronouncements.

"<b><i>XX.</i></b><i> The gratuitous cession to the municipalities of lands to be subdivided or developed is made to dedicate certain services for the community therein, such as public thoroughfares and green zones, the latter –which are the ones of interest to us– shall be used to build parks, gardens, educational centers, sports and recreational areas. The basis for this obligation must be situated in a kind of consideration owed by the developer for the increased value that the urbanization or parceling process will confer upon the developed land; that is, it ultimately deals with a contribution in kind in urban planning law, as a mechanism to ensure that the surplus value acquired by the properties by reason of the urbanization or subdivision (fraccionamiento) reverts to the community. Before this regulation, a grave social situation existed, derived from the fact that the landowners perceived the full prices obtained from their lands as net benefit, while the new neighborhoods were left without the provision of services, a deficiency for which attempts were made to hold the Municipal Administration responsible, which was incapable of covering that deficit effectively. One of the principles of urban planning law consists precisely in that the considerable surplus values generated by the process of urban development must be the primary source to cover the costs in services that this same development creates. The contested obligation –to gratuitously cede a percentage of land to the municipality–, aims precisely to effectuate the principle of economic compensation and retribution in service of the needs of the community that is created, as a corollary of the enrichment perceived from the urban development.</i> <b><i>XXI.</i></b><i> In this way, the content of property is configured, from the criterion of its social function; it is a technical rendering of that function which ceases to be a simple moral admonition to the consciences of the owners to become a system of positive duties that are legally enforceable. Thus, the owners may exercise as their own all the powers of urban use of the resulting properties, only that simultaneously, they must also assume the positive duties with which the legal system attempts to compensate the economic gain. The urbanization or subdivision plan must contemplate in advance all the provisions for communal services –thoroughfares, water connections and electric lighting, green zones, children's playgrounds, etc.– before initiating the construction and individual exploitation of the lots; execution which falls on the owner. ... and it will be the new owners who will ultimately benefit from the green areas and facilities referred to in Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law.</i>" (Judgment number 4205-96, at fourteen hours thirty-three minutes of August twentieth, nineteen ninety-six.)

But particularly, the cession of these strips of land in development projects (urbanización) serves the realization of the fundamental rights to recreation and to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, precisely for the residents of a development (COLOM PIAZUELO, Eloy, <u>Los Bienes Comunales en la Legislación de Régimen local</u>. Editorial Tecnos, S.A. Madrid. Spain. 1994. p. 35), as our Constitutional Court also considered in judgment number 2000-4332, at ten hours fifty-one minutes of May nineteenth, two thousand, in which it noted the <b>absolute impossibility of modifying its designated use (destino)</b>:

"<b><i>III.-</i></b><i> Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law provides that 'No less than one-third of the area represented by the percentage fixed according to the preceding paragraph shall be applied unfailingly to park use, but reserving in the first place from that third the space or spaces necessary for a children's playground or playgrounds, in a proportion no less than ten square meters per family. The remaining two-thirds of said percentage or the remainder that would be available from them after covering the park needs shall serve to install communal facilities that in principle are proposed by the developer or urbanizer...' . The mere reading of this norm allows one to arrive at the certainty that the legislator, in development of the Supreme Charter, has established the obligatory existence of green zones and parks for the enjoyment of the community, hence it could not be understood that the construction of what the Municipality has called a communal facility –such as the erection of buildings planned by the associations that have been favored with the agreements being challenged– is compatible with that norm, because that interpretation would empty <b><u>the essential content of the right of the residents to enjoy a green zone for recreation, which</u></b> <b><u>forms part of the quality of life that the Constitution guarantees them</u></b>. The local municipality cannot freely eliminate the designated use of lands dedicated to parks, nor could the legislator do so –without defining in exchange a space that compensates for the loss of the park area–, because that would render unconstitutional the agreement or law that so disposes, for disrespecting the essential content of the right of residents to enjoy those recreational areas, which, as indicated, form part of the quality of life that the Constitution guarantees them. The term 'communal facilities' does not have the breadth that is sought to be implied. It is obvious to this Chamber that it refers to constructions indispensable for the communal enjoyment of the property destined as a green area, park, and recreation; consequently, the construction of buildings for public services, such as libraries, schools, communal halls, etc., are incompatible with the designated use of park areas and green zones that the legislator has required for certain lands, and, without a doubt, in order for the interested associations to undertake the construction of buildings such as those that are of interest to them, they must defray –which involves all the members or residents of the locality who are going to benefit from the public and general use of the property– the cost thereof.

The Chamber cannot accept that through donations or construction authorizations such as those being attempted, the right of the plaintiff neighbors to enjoy the land that in its entirety belongs to the community of Cipreses as a green zone (zona verde) and park, and which the Municipality merely holds in administration of local interests, is disregarded." (Highlighting is from the original.)

Consequently, these areas enjoy the characteristics of public domain assets, by destination and vocation, under the designation of green zones, as asserted by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in judgment number 4605-96, cited supra:

"XXII. Green areas destined for public use, by virtue of their use and nature, are part of the community's heritage and must remain under the jurisdiction of municipal entities so that they administer them as public domain assets, with which they participate in the legal regime of these assets, which makes them inalienable, imprescriptible, and unattachable, that is, they cannot be the object of private property of the developer or subdivider, as provided in Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana). (...)" XI.- ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR GREEN ZONES.- Having clarified the concept of green area (área verde) or communal area, as resulting from urbanization projects, it is appropriate to note that as established by Article II.3 of the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones), the areas ceded under that concept must be "without restrictions", that is, no limitation established in the legal system may weigh upon them; insofar as they have a specific purpose by legal mandate —for parks, children's playgrounds, and community facilities—, according to the proportionality established by the aforementioned numeral 40 of the Urban Planning Law, such that the topographical conditions, dimensions, and size must be suitable and consistent with their purpose. In this regard, as provided by Article 33, subsection b) of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) (number 7575, of February 5, 1995, and its amendments), a protection area is established in "A strip of fifteen meters in rural zones and ten meters in urban zones, measured horizontally on both sides, on the banks of rivers, quebradas, or streams, if the terrain is flat, and fifty horizontal meters, if the terrain is broken." Therefore, lots or areas that have this limitation cannot be considered for use as parks, community facilities, or children's playgrounds, as inferred from the indicated provisions; since that would entail breaching the legal system, which in this matter (urban-environmental), holds a special connotation, being of public order, a characteristic that refers not only to its significance for the interest of the collectivity, but also to its binding nature, that is, its unavailability for the parties, be they public authorities or subjects of private law (individuals), that is, it is not subject to agreement, neither for individuals nor for public authorities, due to its significance for the life and survival of humanity. Thus, environmental regulations are binding on the State —in relation to the individual, it is a matter beyond dispute—, which makes their exception impossible, save, of course, in situations of urgency or emergency, which in themselves, constitute a source of law.

XII.- ON THE BLOCK OF LEGALITY.- It is relevant to recall that the block of legality is composed not only of written sources, starting from the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) (including with it, not only its text, but also the values and principles emanating from it, international treaties on fundamental rights), international treaties, laws, and regulatory provisions, as ordered by numeral 6 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública); but also, and in particular, the univocal rules of science and technique, insofar as they constitute a delimiting parameter of administrative discretion, according to Article 16 of the cited legal body, as it obliges the Administration to base its actions duly on the theoretical knowledge acquired from the different methodologies and disciplines of science and technique, when the case merits it —as in the matter of urban planning—, so that the will of public institutions does not depend on their free will (or choice), but on objective evaluations obtained according to the technical rules applicable to the case. In this sense, the objectivity of technical criteria stands out, since "... if a technique is scientific and, therefore, by definition, certain, objective, universal, subject to uniform rules that do not depend on the personal appreciation of an individual subject, it is obvious that one cannot speak of 'complete discretion' in this aspect, but rather, on the contrary, one must speak of little less than 'regulation' (subjection to norms, in the case of the technique)'" (MARTÍN GONZÁLEZ, M., in his work El grado de determinación legal de los conceptos jurídicos. RAP, number 54, 1967, p.239), cited by DESDENTADO DAROCA, Eva. Los problemas del control judicial de la discrecionalidad técnica. (Un estudio crítico de la jurisprudencia. Editorial Civitas, S. A. Madrid. España. 1997. p. 43.) Concordantly, Eduardo ORTIZ ORTIZ stated in the Legislative Commission that discussed the bill for the General Law of Public Administration to include the univocal rules of science and technique as a parameter of administrative discretion, considering "... in cases where the Administration acts in technical matters that have a clear and precise meaning in the case, the technical rules will be, in this case, like laws; the violation of the technical aspects of an administrative act of a public service will naturally be an illegality exactly as if a legal precept were being violated." (QUIRÓS CORONADO, Roberto. Ley General de Administración Pública, Concordada y Anotada con el Debate Legislativo y la Jurisprudencia Constitucional. Editorial Aselex, S. A. San José, Costa Rica. 1996. p. 99.)

XIII.- ON THE CONFORMITY OF THE CHALLENGED AGREEMENT WITH THE LEGAL SYSTEM.- In light of the foregoing considerations, this Tribunal deems that the challenged decision —an agreement adopted in Article Ten of ordinary session 23-2008-2010, of October 6, 2009— is in conformity with the legal system; for the following reasons:

First: In this sense, it is feasible to consider that there is no violation of subjective rights, as alleged by the appellant company, which, curiously, derives it from the approval of plans (visado de planos) for the lots whose formal reception it seeks; because that act (approval of plans) is a necessary requirement for the segregation of lots; and as such, it only confers the right to segregate for sale, as derived from Article 33 of the Urban Planning Law, with which, the legal effects derived from it are not disregarded, without it being possible to extend them to urbanization projects. Therefore, as there is no declaratory act of rights in the determination of the green areas of an urbanization project, based on an approval of plans by the local entity, there can be no injury to the principle of intangibility of one's own acts, developed by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber in direct application of Articles 34 and 45 of the Fundamental Law (Ley Fundamental) (in this sense, among others, the judgments of that Tribunal numbers 2753-93, 4596-93, 585-94, 2186-94, 2187-94, and 899-95 can be consulted), by virtue of which the Administration is prevented from arbitrarily or capriciously reversing declaratory acts of subjective rights, and therefore, must resort to the intervention of jurisdictional bodies through the lesividad process (regulated in Articles 183 of the General Law of Public Administration and 10, subsection 5) and 34 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo)), for their challenge by deeming them "harmful" —to the public interest, for economic reasons or of another nature—, based on an absolute nullity that is not evident and not manifest, or a relative nullity, which leads to its claim for elimination from the legal world, a process in which the guarantee of constitutional due process, as a fundamental right, must be followed.

Second, the challenged act was issued in the exercise of the powers that the legal system confers on local governments, precisely in safeguarding the territorial (urban) planning of the canton and, with it, compliance with urban-environmental regulations. It should be remembered that municipalities have been delegated the function of control and supervision in the execution of urbanization projects, work they carry out in various stages of their processing, among them, of great importance, the certification of land use (certificación de uso de suelo), which determines the project's conformity with the land use regulated in urban planning regulations, and as such, has declarative effects, that is, it does not constitute rights; the approval of cadastral plans (visado de planos catastrados), which, as indicated, allow the holder the segregation of the property for sale, but do not refer to the approval of the urbanization; granting of the permit to carry out the specific project; the definition of the construction alignment (alineamiento de construcción), and the reception of green areas (recepción de áreas verdes), for community facilities, playgrounds, and children's playgrounds. In this sense, it is noted that the approval of construction plans for the urbanization project is a task that corresponds, in the first instance, to the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo), according to Article 38 of the Urban Planning Law and Article VI.3 of the National Regulation of Subdivision and Urbanizations (Reglamento Nacional de Fraccionamiento y Urbanizaciones), issued by that same institution; with the approval being required from the municipalities, for the purpose of obtaining the construction license, required for any work of that nature in the canton. Consequently, regarding specifically the formal reception of the areas designated for children's playgrounds, parks, and community facilities, this is an exclusive and excluding task of local authorities, who are responsible for verifying that they conform to the requirements established in the regulations governing the matter (Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law, II.2 and III.3.6.2 of the National Regulation of Subdivisions and Urbanizations (Reglamento Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones)), such as proportion and measurement, correct location, that the play area is delivered equipped, grassed (enzacatado), and with mesh. The appellant is correct in considering that all these interventions are precluding stages in the proceeding, and in some of the cases, though not all, they do confer rights on the administered party, a circumstance that, it is repeated, does not occur in the present case, in the terms claimed by the appellant company.

Third, the rejection of the formal reception of several lots is based on the real existence of a quebrada, of an intermittent nature, as is evident from the cadastral plans (at folios 2, 4, and 5) and the expert report (Dr. William Borges, Environmental Regent of the La Cabriola Urbanization project, at folios 89 and 90), provided by the interested party itself, which clearly and forcefully record the foregoing. Consequently, given that the legal system (Article 33 of Law 7575) does not distinguish the type of quebrada whose protection it mandates, that is, whether they are permanent or intermittent, this prevents its reception, and denotes the non-compliance, on the part of the developer, with the indicated regulations, insofar as it is required that the communal or green areas of an urbanization be without restrictions.

Fourth and finally, it must be considered, as indicated, that the provision of green areas is established for the benefit of the community, and responds to the requirements of urban planning and environmental regulations; therefore, in no way can a subjective right, consolidated legal situation, or legitimate interest be legitimately alleged to breach this obligation; there being no ruling from the General Attorney's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) in that sense, which in any case, is binding only for the consulting entity, but not for the rest of the Public Administration, regarding which it would hold the status of a non-normative source of law, by way of administrative jurisprudence, which, if it had the content alleged by the appellant, would be, not only against constitutional jurisprudence, binding erga omnes under Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), but also contra legem, as has been indicated.

XIV.- CONCLUSIONS.- Based on the foregoing considerations, as it is evidenced not only that the absolute nullity alleged by the appellant company does not occur, but also that the challenged agreement conforms to the legal system (block of legality in the terms previously established), its confirmation, in all its aspects, is in order."

“VII.- DE LA DISTINCIÓN DE LOS PROCESOS DE FRACCIONAMIENTO Y URBANIZACIÓN.- Por la trascedencia derivada de las implicaciones jurídicas que conllevan los procesos de fraccionamiento y urbanizaciones, que resulta de interés para el caso concreto, clarificar el significado de ambos conceptos. Así, se remite a las consideraciones dadas por este Tribunal en las resoluciones número 175-2009 y 176-2009, de este Tribunal, en que se avocó a este tema de la siguiente manera:

"El fraccionamiento, es la división de un predio con la finalidad de introducirlo al comercio de los hombres, lo que supone, tal y como lo debe constatar cada gobierno local al otorgar el visado correspondiente, que el mismo se ajuste, en cuanto a tamaño y características, a las disposiciones urbanísticas vigentes, en especial, al Plan Regulador del suelo local –si lo hubiere- así como a la normativa de desarrollo y demás leyes especiales de orden público. El fraccionamiento que la ley denomina como “simple”, no incluye un proceso de habilitación urbana para el uso y disfrute de las parcelas resultantes de ese fraccionamiento y ello es así porque el legislador parte de que en estos, los fundos cuentan con accesos y áreas verdes producto de un desarrollo urbanístico anterior. Es por este motivo que el artículo 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana dispone:

“(…)Asimismo se exceptúa de la obligación de ceder áreas para parques y facilidades comunales a los simples fraccionamientos de parcelas en áreas previamente urbanizadas…” (el destacado no es del original).

Cuando una determinada área se encuentra previamente urbanizada, los adquirentes de las parcelas fraccionadas cuentan con acceso a los fundos, parques y facilidades comunales y es que no debe perderse de vista que ello hace parte de su derecho a disfrutar de un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado (artículo 50 constitucional). Por este motivo –se reitera- el legislador no ha estimado necesario exigir en el caso del fraccionamiento “simple” con desarrollo urbanístico, mayores dotaciones de tierra por motivos de interés social. El visado para fraccionamientos simples, por su poca trascendencia, suele otorgarse a un funcionario (v.gr. Ingeniero Municipal) diverso de aquél al que se encomiendan los visados “complejos” (v. gr. Concejo Municipal, comisiones de urbanismo, etc), careciendo el primero de competencia para autorizar un visado diverso; ello en el caso de que las normas urbanísticas hagan tal distinción. Ahora bien, al fraccionamiento que hace parte del proceso urbanizador y que conlleva una habilitación de los fundos, por vez primera, para fines urbanos, debe proveérsele de calles, áreas verdes y parques, así como de los servicios necesarios para su uso y disfrute. En este segundo supuesto, estamos ante un proceso complejo de fraccionamiento y urbanización que introduce limitaciones a la propiedad privada por razón de urbanismo (artículo 22 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana), las que el Tribunal Constitucional ha señalado son totalmente conformes con el Derecho de la Constitución (voto N° 5097-93 de las 10:24 hrs del 15 de octubre de 1993 ) . El proyecto residencial o de fraccionamiento que llamaremos “complejo”, se encuentra previsto en el numeral 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana que, en lo conducente, dispone:

“Todo fraccionador de terrenos (…) y todo urbanizador cederá gratuitamente al uso público tanto las areas destinadas a vías como las correspondientes a parques y facilidades comunales; lo que fijará por los dos conceptos últimos se determinará en el respective reglamento, mediante la fijación de porcentajes, del area total a fraccionar o urbanizar, que podrá fluctuar entre un cinco por ciento a un veinte por ciento, según el tamaño promedio de los lotes, el uso que se pretenda dar al terreno y las normas al respecto. No obstante lo anterior, la suma de los terrenos que deben cederse para vías públicas, parques y facilidades comunales no excederá de un cuarenta y cinco por ciento de la superficie total del terreno a fraccionar o urbanizar. (…)

La obligación del urbanizador de dotar las parcelas fraccionadas de accesos, zonas verdes, parques, vías públicas, le obliga a acatar las disposiciones urbanas que establecen estándares mínimos en cuanto a espacio, calidad, cantidad y demás requisitos exigidos por ley y los reglamentos de desarrollo en cuanto a esas áreas. El gobierno local tiene que ejercer oportunamente su poder de policía, garantizando a los vecinos del cantón, que las obras se realizarán de la forma que las normas urbanísticas lo indican y con las condiciones que aquellas disponen. Basta que un parcelamiento requiera obras para habilitar el ingreso y brindar servicios diversos a algunos de esos fundos, para sostener que no existe un “simple fraccionamiento”, sino un proyecto residencial que debe, en consecuencia, cumplir con todos los requisitos señalados. Los proyectos residenciales urbanos sólo pueden habilitar el ingreso a los fundos a través de vías públicas que deben tener las dimensiones y exigencias de la Ley General de Caminos Públicos y, el Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamintos y Urbanizaciones, a falta, -en este ultimo caso- de disposiciones concretas en las normas locales. Ninguno de los órganos municipales tiene competencia para autorizar un proyecto en el que las habilitaciones a los fundos se hace mediante “servidumbres agrícolas adoquinadas”, "servidumbres agrícolas" o “simples servidumbres”, puesto que ellas son figuras propias del Derecho Privado y no del régimen urbanístico residencial que se rige por las normas y principios del Derecho Público." (El resaltado es del original.)

Al tenor de lo cual, reviste de especial interés el control que corresponde verificar al gobierno local, en este caso a cargo del órgano deliberativo (Concejo), tratándose de la aprobación de permisos de construcción de urbanizaciones, ya que debe corroborar que cumple a cabalidad con los requerimientos de ley, a saber dotación de vías públicas, áreas verdes y comunales, así como de la habilitación e implementación, a cargo del urbanizador, de los servicios públicos, tales como el de la luz, telefonía, agua potable y acueductos y alcantarillados, éste último, en caso de que exista la infraestructura para ello. Con lo cual, la no adecuación de los proyectos urbanísticos a los requerimientos establecidos en el ordenamiento urbano, obligan -per ser-, al rechazo de las gestiones incoadas, en aplicación del principio de legalidad, que sujeta a todo el aparato estatal, del que forman parte las municipalidades.

VIII.- DE LA COMPETENCIA MUNICIPAL EN LA VERIFICACIÓN DEL CUMPLIMIENTO DE LAS NORMAS URBANÍSTICAS.- El ámbito de la competencia municipal en la planificación urbana local no se circunscribe únicamente a la promulgación de las respectivas regulaciones -planes reguladores y regulaciones conexas-, sino que se extiende también al control que ejerce respecto del cumplimiento de la normativa urbanística local. En este sentido, como lo ha señalado este Tribunal en diversos pronuciamientos (entre ellos, los número 175-2009, de las quince horas cuarenta minutos 176-2009, de las quince horas cincuenta minutos, ambos, del treinta de enero del dos mil nueve), "los gobiernos locales deben actuar oportunamente en el ejercicio del poder de policía, utilizando las potestades que el ordenamiento jurídico les ha otorgado para alcanzar sus cometidos" (el subrayado no es del original); que en la materia de urbanismo, se concreta en el control de los procesos de urbanización y fraccionamiento, y que se concreta de manera taxativa en el artículo 1 de la Ley de Construcciones, en tanto dispone literalmente:

"Las Municipalidades de la República son las encargadas de que las ciudades y demás poblaciones reúnan las condiciones necesarias de seguridad, salubridad, comodida, y belleza en sus vías públicas, en los edificios y construcciones que en terrenos de las mismas levanten sin perjuicio de las facultades que las leyes conceden en estas materia a otros órganos administrativos." Así, el "poder de policía" es la competencia que se le reconoce a la Administración, para que, con fundamento en una ley, ésta regule y reglamente una actividad, a fin de asegurar el orden público, la salubridad, la tranquilidad; la seguridad de las personas, así como la organización moral, política y económica de la sociedad; atribución, en virtud de la cual, la imposición de restricciones al goce de los derechos fundamentales, resulta razonable, en tanto su justificación se encuentra precisamente en la consideración de que los derechos fundamentales se encuentran limitados por los de las demás personas, toda vez que deben coexistir con todos y cada uno de los otros derechos fundamentales. Con lo cual, las medidas que el Estado adopte con la finalidad de proteger la seguridad, la salubridad y tranquilidad, son de interés público social, que se manifiestan por medio del poder de policía, entendida como la facultad reguladora del goce de los derechos y del cumplimiento de los deberes constitucionales. (En este sentido, se pueden consultas las sentencias número 401-91, de las catorce horas del veinte de febrero y 619-91, de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintidós de marzo, ambas, resoluciones de mil novecientos noventa y uno y 2003-2864, de las quince horas veinte minutos del nueve de abril del dos mil tres, de la Sala Constitucional.)

IX.- DE LA APLICACIÓN DE LA NORMATIVA AMBIENTAL AL ÁMBITO URBANO.- La tutela del ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado está regulado en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico-constitucional en una doble dimensión, sea, como derecho fundamental, esto es, como un derecho subjetivo que deriva de la condición y dignidad de la persona humana, que coadyuva a su crecimiento y desarrollo integral, que por voluntad expresa de nuestros constituyentes (originarios, por interpretación constitucional de los artículos 21, 50, 69 y 89; y derivados, por adición), está reconocido en nuestro texto fundamental en tal carácter, cuyo contenido se nutre, ineludiblemente, de la normativa internacional, como consecuencia directa de la aplicación del artículo 48 también, de nuestra Constitución, y es clasificado en la doctrina como derecho de tercera generación, en tanto atiende a los intereses de la colectividad y se sustenta en el principio de la solidaridad; y al mismo tiempo, como función o potestad pública, que como tal, se traduce en obligaciones concretas para el Estado en su conjunto, condicionando así, los objetivos políticos, y en consecuencia, la acción de los poderes públicos en general, para darle cabal cumplimiento a este derecho fundamental. Al tenor de lo anterior, y como derivado del contenido del artículo 50 constitucional, los principios constitucionales ambientales y regulaciones ambientales son de aplicación al Derecho Urbanístico, en tanto bien puede afirmarse que este sistema forma parte del Derecho Ambiental; lo que no ha sido ajeno a nuestro Tribunal Constitucional, que al respecto consideró:

"[...] que la defensa y la preservación del derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, conceptuado en el artículo 50 constitucional, es el derecho fundamental de toda persona y funciona como un principio general ineludible, de manera que en esta materia no es posible hacer excepciones genéricas (en materia urbanística y otros tópicos de lo que se ocupan los artículos 19 y 20) para exonerar el cumplimiento de obligaciones ambientales, pues con ello se corre el riesgo de desconstitucionalizar la garantía de respuesta estatal en defensa del ambiente.

[...] estima la Sala que debe ser requisito fundamental que, obviamente, no atenta contra el principio constitucional de la autonomía municipal, el que todo plan regulador del desarrollo urbano deba contar, de previo a ser aprobado y desarrollado, con un examen del impacto ambiental desde la perspectiva que da el artículo 50 constitucional, para que el ordenamiento del suelo y sus diversos regímenes, sean compatibles con los alcances de la norma superior, sobre todo, si se repara en que esta disposición establece el derecho de todos los habitantes a obtener una respuesta ambiental de todas las autoridades públicas y ello incluye, sin duda, a las Municipalidades que no están exentas de la aplicación de la norma constitucional y de su legislación de desarrollo. Es evidente que en este caso, es totalmente coincidente el interés nacional y el local, y por ello los gobiernos locales pueden y deben exigir el cumplimiento de requisitos ambientales en su territorio, y en caso de conflicto con las autoridades rectoras de la materia ambiental, pueden someter las controversias al contralor jurisdiccional, según la naturaleza de la infracción. Es por lo anterior que las normas tutelares del medio ambiente no son incompatibles, desde el punto de vista constitucional, con las facultades y competencias de las municipalidades, las que están obligadas, por imperativo del artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, a prodigarse en la protección del medio ambiente." (Sentencia No. 2002-01220, de las 14:48 horas del 6 de febrero del 2002, de la Sala Constitucional.)

En aras de la adecuada protección y conservación de los recursos naturales y del paisaje, que comprende el ambiente urbano, es que resulta vinculante para cualquier proyecto de esta naturaleza, sea, de urbanizaciones y construcciones, donde resulta de plena aplicación la normativa ambiental. Así, el Derecho Urbanístico, tanto en su dimensión normativa como en todo su sistema de planeamiento, debe colocar en una posición preponderante la protección y conservación de todo aquello que constituye el patrimonio de una colectividad, sea como parte de la naturaleza o del producto del quehacer humano que ha sido heredado por una sociedad determinada; labor que concretará el gobierno local en cada proyecto a través de la potestad de verificación de la normativa urbanística.

X.- DE LAS ZONAS VERDES O BIENES COMUNALES.- Por zonas verdes se tienen aquellas áreas resultantes de proyectos urbanísticos, que tiene su origen en la carga que se impone al urbanizador (o desarrollador) en el artículo 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, de ceder "gratuitamente" a los entes municipales una porción de terreno -entre el cinco y el veinte por ciento del terreno que se dispone al proyecto-, para uso de las vías públicas, parques y facilidades comunales, cuyo costo se traslada al valor de las parcelas o lotes resultantes. Es así como "nominalmente" pertenecen a las municipalidades (en tanto ostentan la nuda propiedad del bien), pero que en sentido estricto se califican como bienes comunales, en tanto están destinadas al aprovechamiento vecinal, precisamente por cuanto su fundamento (constitucional), la dotación de los servicios mínimos del fenómeno de la urbanización -que a grosso modo implica la "creación de ciudades"-, según lo ha precisado de manera clara y precisa la Sala Constitucional en diversos pronunciamientos.

"XX. La cesión gratuita a las municipalidades de terrenos a fraccionar o urbanizar, se hace para destinar en ellos ciertos servicios para la comunidad, como lo son las vías públicas y las zonas verdes, éstas últimas -que son las que nos interesan- se utilizarán para construir parques, jardines, centros educativos, zonas deportivas y de recreo. El fundamento de esta obligación debe situarse en una especie de contrapartida debida por el urbanizador por el mayor valor que el proceso de urbanización o parcelamiento dará al suelo urbanizado, es decir, se trata en definitiva de una contribución en especie en el derecho urbanístico, como mecanismo para hacer que la plusvalía que adquieran los inmuebles con motivo de la urbanización o fraccionamiento revierta a la comunidad. Antes de esta regulación se presentaba una grave situación social, derivada del hecho de que los propietarios de suelo percibían como beneficio neto los precios íntegros obtenidos de sus terrenos, mientras que los nuevos barrios quedaban sin dotaciones de servicios, carencia que se intentaba hacer responsable a la Administración municipal, incapaz de cubrir ese déficit en forma eficaz. Uno de los principios del derecho urbanístico consiste precisamente en que las considerables plusvalías generadas por el proceso del desarrollo urbano deben ser las primeras fuente para sufragar los costos en servicios que ese mismo desarrollo hace surgir. La obligación impugnada -de ceder gratuitamente un porcentaje de terreno a la municipalidad-, pretende justamente hacer efectivo el principio de compensación económica y retribución en servicio de las necesidades de la comunidad que se crea, como correlato del enriquecimiento que del desarrollo urbanístico se percibe.

XXI.De esta manera se configura el contenido de la propiedad, desde el criterio de su función social; se trata de una tecnificación de esa función que deja de ser una simple admonición moral a las conciencias de los propietarios para convertirse en un sistema de deberes positivos jurídicamente exigibles. Así, los propietarios podrán ejercitar como propias todas las facultades de utilización urbana de los fundos que resulten, sólo que simultáneamente, deben asumir también los deberes positivos con que el ordenamiento intenta compensar la ganancia económica. El plan urbanizador o fraccionador deberá contemplar previamente todas las previsiones de los servicios comunales -vías, conexiones de agua y alumbrado eléctrico, zonas verdes, parques infantiles, etc.- antes de iniciar la construcción y aprovechamiento individual de los lotes; ejecución que recae en el propietario. ... , y serán los nuevos propietarios los que en definitiva se verán beneficiados por las áreas verdes e instalaciones a que se refiere el artículo 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana." (Sentencia número 4205-96, de las catorce horas treinta y tres minutos del veinte de agosto de mil novececientos noventa y seis.)

Pero particularmente la cesión de estas franjas de terreno en los proyectos de urbanización atiende a la efectivación de los derechos fundamentales al esparcimiento y a un ambiente a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, precisamente de los vecinos de una urbanización (COLOM PIAZUELO, Eloy, Los Bienes Comunales en la Legislación de Régimen local. Editorial Tecnos, S.A. Madrid. España. 1994. pag. 35), según consideró también nuestro Tribunal Constitucional en sentencia número 2000-4332, de las diez horas cincuenta y un minutos del diecinueve de mayo del dos mil, en que advirtió la imposibilidad absoluta de la modificación de su destino:

"III.- El artículo 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana dispone que "No menos de una tercera parte del área representada por el porcentaje fijado conforme al párrafo anterior, será aplicada indefectiblemente al uso de parque, pero reservando en primer término de ese tercio el o los espacios necesarios para campo o campos de juegos infantiles, en proporción que no sea inferior a diez metros cuadrados por cada familia. Los dos tercios restantes del referido porcentaje o el remanente que de ellos quedase disponible después de cubiertas las necesidades de parque servirán para instalar facilidades comunales que en principio proponga el fraccionador u urbanizador…" . La sola lectura de esa norma permite arribar a la certeza de que el legislador, en desarrollo de la Carta Suprema, ha establecido la obligada existencia de zonas verdes y parques para el disfrute de la comunidad, de ahí que no podría entenderse que la construcción de lo que la Municipalidad ha llamado una facilidad comunal como el levantamiento de edificios que planean las asociaciones que se han visto favorecidas con los acuerdos que se cuestionan- sea compatible con aquella norma, pues esa interpretación vaciaría el contenido esencial del derecho de los vecinos a disfrutar de una zona verde de esparcimiento, lo que hace parte de la calidad de vida que la Constitución les garantiza. La municipalidad local no puede libremente eliminar el destino de los terrenos dedicados a parque, tampoco podría hacerlo el legislador -sin definir a cambio un espacio que compense la pérdida del área de parque-, pues ello convirtiría en inconstitucional el acuerdo o la ley que así lo disponga, por irrespeto del contenido esencial del derecho de los vecinos a disfrutar de esas zonas de esparcimiento, que como se indicó, hacen parte de la calidad de vida que la Constitución les garantiza. El término "facilidades comunales" no tiene la amplitud que se le quiere implicar. Resulta obvio para esta Sala que se refiere a construcciones indispensables para el disfrute comunal del bien destinado a área verde, parque y esparcimiento; consiguientemente, la construcción de edificios para servicios públicos a manera de ejemplo bibliotecas, escuelas, salones comunales, etc, resultan incompatibles con el destino de áreas de parque y zona verde que el legislador ha exigido para algunos terrenos, y, sin duda, para que las asociaciones interesadas puedan emprender la construcción de edificaciones como las que resultan de su interés, deben sufragar lo que involucra a todos los miembros o vecinos de la localidad que se van a beneficiar con el uso público y general del inmueble- el costo del mismo. La Sala no puede admitir que por la vía de donación o autorizaciones de construcción como las que se intentan, se desconozca el derecho de los vecinos accionantes a disfrutar del terreno que en forma íntegra pertenece a la comunidad de Cipreses como zona verde y parque y que la Municipalidad únicamente posee en administración de los intereses locales." (El resaltado es del original.)

Consecuentemente, éstas áreas gozan de las características de los bienes de dominio público, por destino y vocación, bajo la advocación de zonas verdes, como lo aseveró la Sala Constitucional en sentencia número 4605-96, supra citada:

"XXII. Las áreas verdes destinadas al uso público, en virtud de su uso y naturaleza, es parte del patrimonio de la comunidad y deben quedar bajo la jurisdicción de los entes municipales para que los administre como bienes de dominio público, con lo cual participan del régimen jurídico de estos bienes, que los hace inalienables, imprescriptibles e inembargables, es decir, no pueden ser objeto de propiedad privada del urbanizador o fraccionador, tal y como lo dispone el artículo 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana. (...)" XI.- DE LOS REQUERIMIENTOS DE LAS ZONAS VERDES.- Aclarado el concepto de área verde o comunal, como resultante de los proyectos de urbanización, conviene advertir que conforme lo establece el artículo II.3 del Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, las áreas que se cedan en tal concepto, deben ser "sin restricciones", esto es, que no pese sobre ellas ninguna limitación establecida en el ordenamiento; en tanto tienen un destino específico por mandato legal -para parques, juegos infantiles y facilidades comunales-, según la proporcionalidad que establece el citado numeral 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, de manera que las condiciones topográficas, dimensiones y el tamaño debe ser apto y consecuente a su destino. En este sentido, conforme lo prevé el artículo 33 inciso b) de la Ley Forestal (número 7575, de cinco de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, y sus reformas), se establece un área de protección en "Una franja de quince metros en zona rural y de diez metros en zona urbana, medidas horizontalmente a ambos lados, en las riberas de los ríos, quebradas, o arroyos, si el terreno es plano, y de cincuenta metros horizontales, si el terreno es quebrado." De manera que, los lotes o áreas que cuenten con esta limitación no puede ser considerada para destinarla a parques, facilidades comunales o juegos infantiles, según se infiere de las disposiciones indicadas; ya que ello implicaría quebrantar el ordenamiento jurídico, que tratándose de esta materia (urbano-ambiental), reviste de una connotación especial, al ser de orden público, característica que no se refiere únicamente a la trascendencia que reviste para interés de la colectividad, sino a su vinculatoriedad, esto es, a su indisponibilidad para las partes, sean éstas autoridades públicas o sujetos de derecho privado (particulares), esto es, no está sujeto a pacto ni para los particulares ni para las autoridades públicas en razón de la trascendencia que tiene para la vida y sobrevivencia de la humanidad. Así la normativa ambiental es vinculante para el Estado –en relación con el particular es un asunto que no tiene discusión-, lo que hace imposible su excepción, salvo claro está, en situaciones de urgencia o emergencia, que en sí mismo, es una condición de fuente de derecho.

XII.- DEL BLOQUE DE LEGALIDAD.- Resulta de relevancia recordar que el bloque de legalidad está conformado no sólo por las fuentes escritas, partiéndose de la Constitución Política (comprendiendo con ella, no sólo en lo que respecta a su texto, sino también a los valores y principios que de ella dimanan, los tratados internacionales de derechos fundamentales), los tratados internacionales, leyes y disposiciones reglamentarias, según ordena el numeral 6 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; sino también, y en particular, las reglas unívocas de la ciencia y la técnica, en tanto se constituyen en un parámetro delimitador de la discrecionalidad administrativa, conforme al artículo 16 del citado cuerpo legal, en tanto obliga a la Administración a que su actuación esté debidamente motivada en el conocimiento teórico adquirido de las distintas metodologías y disciplinas de la ciencia y la técnica, cuando ello lo amerite –como en el caso de la materia urbanística-, de manera que la voluntad de las instituciones públicas no depende de su libre arbitrio (o escogencia), sino de las valoraciones objetivas obtenidas conforme a las reglas técnicas aplicables al caso. En este sentido, se destaca la objetividad de los criterios técnicos, por cuanto "... si una técnica es científica y, por lo tanto, por definición, cierta, objetiva, universal, sujeta a reglas uniformes que no dependen de la apreciación personal de un sujeto individual, es obvio que no pueda en este aspecto hablarse de «completa discrecionalidad, sino que corresponde, por el contrario, hablar poco menos que de 'regulación' (sujeción a normas, en el caso de la técnica)»" (MARTÍN GONZÁLEZ, M., en su obra El grado de determinación legal de los conceptos jurídicos. RAP, número 54, 1967, p.239), citado por DESDENTADO DAROCA, Eva. Los problemas del control judicial de la discrecionalidad técnica. (Un estudio crítico de la jurisprudencia. Editorial Civitas, S. A. Madrid. España. 1997. p. 43.) En forma concordante, se manifestó Eduardo ORTIZ ORTIZ en la Comisión Legislativa que discutió el proyecto de ley de la Ley General de Administración Pública para incluir como parámetro de la discrecionalidad administrativa las reglas unívocas de la ciencia y la técnica, al considerar "... en los casos en que la Administración actúe en materias técnicas que tengan un significado claro y preciso en el caso, las reglas técnicas van a ser, en este caso, como leyes, la violación de los aspectos técnicos de un acto administrativo de un servicio público, naturalmente va a ser una ilegalidad exactamente como si se estuviera violando un precepto legal." (QUIRÓS CORONADO, Roberto. Ley General de Administración Pública, Concordada y Anotada con el Debate Legislativo y la Jurisprudencia Constitucional. Editorial Aselex, S. A. San José, Costa Rica. 1996. p. 99.)

XIII.- DE LA CONFORMIDAD DEL ACUERDO IMPUGNADO CON EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO.- Al tenor de las anteriores consideraciones, estima este Tribunal que la decisión impugnada -acuerdo adoptado en el artículo Diez de la sesión ordinaria 23-2008-2010, del seis de octubre del dos mil nueve- resulta conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico; por los siguientes motivos:

En primer lugar: En este sentido es dable considerar que, no hay afectación de derechos subjetivos, como alega la sociedad apelante, que curiosamente, lo deriva del visado de planos de los lotes cuya recepción formal pretende; por cuanto ese acto (visado de planos), es un requisito necesario para la segregación de lotes; y que en tal virtud únicamente confiere derecho de segregar para vender, conforme se deriva del artículo 33 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, con lo cual, no se desconocen los efectos jurídicos derivados del mismo, sin que sea posible extenderlos a los proyectos de urbanización. Por ello, al no haber un acto declarativo de derechos en la determinación de las áreas verdes de un proyecto de urbanización, sobre la base de un visado de planos por parte del ente local, no puede haber lesión el principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios, desarrollado por la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional en aplicación directade los artículos 34 y 45 de la Ley Fundamental (en este sentido, entre otras, se pueden consultas las sentencias de ese Tribunal números 2753-93, 4596-93, 585-94, 2186-94, 2187-94 y 899-95), en virtud del cual se impiden que la Administración revierta en forma arbitraria o antojadiza los actos declarativos de derechos subjetivos, por lo que, debe acudir a la intervención de los órganos jurisdiccionales a través del proceso de lesividad (regulado en los artículos 183 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 10 inciso 5) y 34 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), para la impugnación de éstos por estimarlo "lesivo" -del interés público, por razones de orden económico o de otra naturaleza-, sobre la base de una nulidad absoluta no evidente y no manifiesta o relativa, lo que conlleva a su pretensión de eliminación del mundo jurídico, proceso en el que se debe seguir la garantía del debido proceso constitucional, como derecho fundamental.

En segundo lugar, el acto impugnado se encuentra dictado en ejercicio de las competencias que el ordenamiento jurídico le confiere a los gobiernos locales, precisamente en resguardo de la ordenación del territorio (urbana) del cantón y con ello, del cumplimiento de la normativa urbano-ambiental. Recuérdese que a las municipalidades se les ha delegado lafunción de control y supervisión en la realización de proyectos de urbanización, labor que hacen en diversas fases en su tramitación, entre ellas, de gran importancia, la certificación de uso de suelo, que determina la conformidad del proyecto con el uso de suelo reglamentado en la normativa urbanística, y en tal virtud, tiene efectos declarativos, sea, no constitutivo de derechos; el visado de los planos catastrados, que según se indicó, permiten al titular la segregación del bien para la venta, pero que no se refieren a la aprobación de la urbanización; otorgamiento del permiso para realizar el proyecto concreto; la definición del alineamiento de construcción, y la recepción de las áreas verdes, para facilidades comunales, juegos y juegos infantiles. En este sentido, se advierte que el visado de los planos constructivos del proyecto de urbanización es tarea que competete, en primera instancia al Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, conforme al artículo 38 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana y el artículo VI.3 de la Reglamento nacional de Fraccionamiento y Urbanizaciones, dictado por esa misma institución; siendo que se requiere el visado de parte de las municipalidades, para efectos de obtener la licencia de construcción, requerida para cualquier obra de esa naturaleza en el cantón. Con lo cual, en lo que respecta concretamente a la recepción formal de las áreas destinadas para juegos infantiles, parque y facilidades comunales, ello es tarea exclusiva y excluyente de las autoridades locales, a quienes les corresponde verificar que las mismas resultan conformes con las exigencias establecidas en normativa que regula la materia (artículo 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, II.2 y III.3.6.2 del Reglamento Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones), tales como proporción y medida, correcta ubicación, que el área de juegos se entregue equipado, enzacatado y con malla. Sí lleva razón la apelante en considerar que todas estas intervenciones van precluyendo fases en el trámite, y en algunos de los casos, no en todos, sí confieren derechos al administrado, circunstancia que se repite no se da en la especie, en los términos pretendidos por la sociedad apelante.

En tercer lugar, el rechazo de la recepción formal de lotes varios lotes está sustentada en la existencia real de una quebrada, de naturaleza intermitente, como se desprende de los planos catastrados (a folios 2, 4 y 5) y pericia (Dr. William Borges, Regente Ambiental del proyecto Urbanización La Cabriola, a folios 89 y 90), aportados por la propia interesada, que registran de manera clara y contundente lo anterior. Con lo cual, siendo que el ordenamiento (artículo 33 de la Ley 7575) no distingue el tipo de quebrada cuya protección impone, esto es si son permanentes o intermitentes, ello impide su recepción, y denota el incumplimiento, de parte del desarrollador, de la normativa de las regulaciones indicadas, en tanto se exige que las áreas comunales o verdes de una urbanización sea sin restricciones.

En cuarto y último lugar, debe considerarse, según se indicó, que la dotación de áreas verdes está prevista en beneficio de la comunidad, y responde a exigencias de la normativa urbanística y ambiental; por lo que, en modo alguno puede alegarse legítimamente el derecho subjetivo o situación jurídica consolidada o interés legítimo para incumplirse esa obligación; sin que exista ningún dictamen de la Procuraduría General de la República en tal sentido, que en todo caso, es vinculante únicamente para la entidad consultante, más no así para el resto de la Administración Pública, respecto de la cual ostentaría la condición de fuente de derecho no normativa, a modo de jurisprudencia administrativa, que de tener el contenido alegado por la apelante, sería, no sólo contra la jurisprudencia constitucional, vinculante erga omnes al tenor del artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, sino contra legem, según se ha indicado.

XIV.- CONCLUSIONES.- Con sustento en las anteriores consideraciones, al evidenciarse, no sólo que no se da la nulidad absoluta alegada por la sociedad apelante, sino que el acuerdo impugnado es conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico (bloque de legalidad en los términos previamente establecidos), procede su confirmatoria, en todos sus extremos.”