Automatic application of prohibition and compensation under Law No. 8422, without need for regulationAplicación automática de la prohibición y compensación bajo la Ley N° 8422, sin necesidad de reglamento

**II.-** The institute of the prohibition entails a restriction on professional practice (see articles 56 and 74 of the Political Constitution), since the officials or employees subject to it are absolutely prevented from holding other public offices, as well as from performing, in the private sector, activities related to the positions they hold in the Public Administration and even activities unrelated to those positions, except for the exceptions established by the rule itself, namely: teaching or the defense of personal interests or those of their close relatives. This is so, in protection of the public interest and based on a high ethical standard, aimed at preventing the public servant from devoting their time to other activities in the private field, as this could affect the necessary intensity in fulfilling the duties inherent to the function, or generate an undesirable confusion in the interests of one field or the other (the private and the public), which would eventually imply that public interests would be sacrificed in favor of private interests. Thus, as follows from the foregoing, the prohibition (incompatibility (prohibición) originating in the public employment relationship, for certain positions of professional or academic rank) constitutes a limitation on a fundamental right (cited provisions 56 and 74) and, therefore, its establishment must be reserved to the law. Furthermore, the recognition of economic compensation to reward that restriction additionally requires that the rule creating the limitation (prohibition) or another rule provide for that possibility (the economic compensation) (Sala Segunda, judgments No. 1056 of 8:55 a.m., of December 19, 2008 and No. 231 of 9:35 a.m., of March 20, 2009). Jurisprudentially, it has been considered that this legal institution operates automatically, that is, it is not within the powers of the official to request it or waive it, nor can the Administration grant it discretionarily. It is consubstantial to the employment relationship by provision of law and, consequently, inherent to the service relationship (among many others, the votes of the Sala Constitucional, No. 1396 of 2:31 p.m., of March 22; No. 3370 of 10:30 a.m., of July 5; and No. 4494 of 11:18 a.m., of August 30, all of 1996, and of the Sala Segunda, No. 171 of 2:30 p.m., of November 3, 1989; No. 333 of 10:30 a.m., of October 27, 1999; and No. 141 of 9:10 a.m., of March 26, 2003). Historically in our country, some public servants have been prevented, by virtue of the institute of the prohibition, from private professional practice (by way of example, see among many others, provisions 118 -formerly 113- of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; 9 and 244 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial; article 34 of the Ley General de Control Interno and 14 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito), however, the economic compensation to reward that prohibition arose from the enactment of Law No. 5867 of December 15, 1975. Subsequently, a series of laws were issued through which the recognition of that economic compensation was extended to almost all officials who, by reason of their positions, had a specific prohibition on professional practice (see among many others, Laws No. 6008 of November 9, 1976; No. 6222 of May 2, 1978; No. 6451 of August 1, 1980; No. 6999 of September 3, 1985; No. 9097 of August 18, 1988; No. 6995 of July 22, 1985; No. 6982 of December 19, 1984; No. 7015 of November 22, 1985; No. 7018 of December 20, 1985; No. 7097 of August 18, 1988; No. 7111 of December 12, 1988; No. 7108 of November 8, 1988; No. 7333 of May 5, 1993; No. 7896 of July 30, 1999; No. 8292 of July 31, 2002; and No. 8422 of October 6, 2004). Precisely, in relation to the case at hand, provisions 14 and 15 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública contemplate that incompatibility of the public officials listed therein to freely practice the professions they hold (article 14) as well as the corresponding economic compensation for this (the restriction or limitation) (article 15). Thus, article 14 regulates: “*Prohibition on practicing liberal professions.* No one may practice liberal professions: the President of the Republic, the Vice Presidents, the Magistrates of the Poder Judicial and of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, the Ministers, the Comptroller General and the Deputy Comptroller General of the Republic, the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman for the Inhabitants, the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General of the Republic, the General Regulator of the Republic, the General Prosecutor of the Republic, the Vice Ministers, the Senior Administrative Officers (oficiales mayores), the Executive Presidents, the Managers and the Administrative Directors of deconcentrated entities, autonomous institutions, semi-autonomous institutions and public enterprises, the Superintendents of financial, securities and pension entities, their respective Intendents, as well as the Municipal Mayors and the Deputy Managers and the Deputy Administrative Directors, the Internal Comptrollers and Deputy Internal Comptrollers, the Internal Auditors and Deputy Internal Auditors of the Public Administration, as well as the Department Directors and Deputy Directors and the Heads of Procurement (titulares de proveeduría) of the Public Sector. Within this article are included the other professions that the official possesses, even if they do not constitute a requirement to hold the respective public office./ Excepted from the foregoing prohibition are teaching in higher education centers outside of ordinary working hours, and the handling of matters in which the affected official, their spouse, companion, or any of their relatives by consanguinity or affinity up to the third degree inclusive, is a party. In such cases, the normal and impartial performance of the office must not be affected; nor must it occur in matters handled in the same public entity or Branch of Government in which they work.” On the other hand, provision 15 provides: “*Economic compensation for the prohibition on practicing liberal professions.* Unless a special remuneration regime exists for the public official, the economic compensation for the application of the preceding article shall be equivalent to sixty-five percent (65%) of the base salary established for the specific job category.” And while it is true that said law provides for its regulation when it establishes: “The Poder Ejecutivo must regulate this Law within six months following its entry into force. For the promulgation and amendment of the Regulations, the opinion of the Contraloría General de la República must be sought, to which the draft shall be timely referred so that it may formulate its observations. The lack of regulation shall not prevent the application of this Law nor its mandatory observance, insofar as its provisions are sufficient in themselves for this,” what is thus provided could not affect that legally established prohibition, since, as stated, the principle of legal reserve operates in this matter, given that a fundamental right of the human being is involved. In this sense, the Sala Constitucional has held: “ON LIMITATIONS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.- This Constitutional Court has recognized that the exercise of fundamental rights is not unrestricted, nor absolute, but that it is possible and valid to establish certain limitations, which without emptying their essential content, allow for a greater achievement of the general interest. Pursuant to article 28 of the Political Constitution, it is possible to establish regulations or limits in consideration of morals, public order, and the rights of others. In developing this principle, the Sala has indicated the following:/´I. The thesis is commonly accepted that some subjective rights are not absolute, in the sense that they are born limited; in the first place, because they develop within the framework of the rules that regulate social coexistence; and in the second place, because their exercise is subject to limits intrinsic to their own nature. These limits refer to the right itself, that is, to its specific content, in such a way that the Constitution, in enshrining a public freedom and referring it to the law for its definition, does so in order for the law to determine its scope. It is not a matter of restricting the freedom whose content is already defined by the Constitution itself, but only of specifying, with technical norms, the content of the freedom in question. The limitations refer to the effective exercise of public freedoms, that is, they imply in themselves a reduction in the legal sphere of the subject, under certain conditions and in determined circumstances. For this reason they constitute the frontiers of the right, beyond which one is not facing the legitimate exercise thereof. For limitations on fundamental rights to be valid, they must be contained in the Constitution itself, or failing that, it must authorize the legislator to impose them, under determined conditions…´. (…) Likewise, regarding the principle of legal reserve, in terms of the regulation and limitation of fundamental rights, this Sala ruled as follows: /\”(…) a.) The principle itself of ‘reserve of law’, from which it follows that only by means of a formal law, emanating from the Poder Legislativo through the procedure provided for in the Constitution for the issuance of laws, is it possible to regulate and, where appropriate, restrict fundamental rights and liberties – all of this, of course, to the extent that the nature and regime of these allow it, and within the applicable constitutional limitations-; /b.) That only the executive regulations of those laws can develop their precepts, it being understood that they cannot increase the established restrictions nor create those not established by them, and that they must strictly respect their ‘essential content’; /c.) That neither in executive regulations, much less in autonomous ones or other norms or acts of inferior rank, could the law validly delegate the determination of regulations or restrictions that only it is empowered to impose; from which another essential consequence follows; /d.) Finally, that all administrative activity in this matter is necessarily regulated, without being able to grant discretionary powers to the Administration, because these would obviously imply an abandonment of the legal reserve itself (…)´ (Judgment No. 2175-96 of 9:06 a.m. of May 10, 1996)” (vote No. 2448 of 11:59 a.m., of February 24, 2006). To the foregoing, it must be added, in view of Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 32333 of April 12, 2005 (Reglamento a la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), that what was regulated, in the strict sense, was: the right of the citizen to report; the admissibility and processing of reports (note that pursuant to provision 9 of the Law, the Contraloría General de la República shall determine the procedures for the attention, admissibility, and processing of the reports filed), the time limit for the Contraloría General de la República to resolve requests for the simultaneous performance of remunerated positions and for overtime work; the time limit to request the lifting of incompatibilities and to resolve them; the duty and the time limit to report the receipt of donations and gifts; doubts regarding the valuation of these, their registration, and other particulars regarding their destination, as well as the subjects obligated to file a sworn statement. It is not true that article 27 covered that alleged “deficiency” of the law regarding which the representation of the defendant states: “In other words, the specificity of each position in the Public Administration and the different nomenclatures given to them must be consistent with the ‘will’ of the legislator embodied in the Law, especially since the prohibition regime imposes a limitation on the official, for which reason it is particularly necessary to have well defined the population affected by that rule,” for in this regard, that provision states: “and also the directors and deputy directors of the administrative areas, units, departments or dependencies -according to the corresponding internal nomenclature- of the Public Administration,” that is, it did not specify -despite this being its accusation against the law- the population affected or covered by the rule, since it states “according to the corresponding internal nomenclature.” Thus, the only thing regulated on the subject was the obligation of the servant authorized, by internal regulation, to teach in higher education centers during hours that coincide with the work schedule of public institutions or enterprises to comply with the ordinary working day, also establishing the obligation of the heads to set the suitable mechanisms to guarantee it. In any case, it must also be considered that a regulation, such as the one before us (Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 32333), constitutes a norm aimed at making possible the practical and precise application of the law within the conditions and assumptions that it regulates. Consequently, it cannot contradict the law on which it depends and on which it is based, that is, a regulation could not, among other aspects, complicate the modes of acquiring rights whose assumptions are regulated by law; suppress in whole or in part the content of a right created by law; impose duties that the law does not impose, or increase the number of obligations or subjections that the legal duties contain; or complicate the modes of origin of these duties by adding new requirements that the law does not contain (see [Nombre1], Eduardo. Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, Medellín, Biblioteca Jurídica Dike, Tomo I, 2002, pp. 274 to 285). This being the case, it is incorrect to say that the definition of the positions subject to the prohibition and their specific application to the plaintiff was a matter that should be aired and corrected in the administrative channel in accordance with the procedures established in the administrative legal system, for, as stated, the law (in its provision 14) defined the population of officials subject to the prohibition, aside from the fact that, by virtue of the principle of legal reserve, it was the only one authorized to impose a limitation or restriction of such a nature. Therefore, its application, from the corresponding publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, was automatic and immediate (contrary to what was stated by the defendant) and, consequently, the inability of the servants contemplated in provision 14 of the Law arose from that moment, as well as their right to receive the respective economic compensation (article 15 of the law) provided as compensation for that limitation. On the other hand, the defense of the defendant, based on Transitional Provision VI of the regulation, which in its text provides: “In the case of the positions indicated in article 14 of the Law, regarding which this Regulation establishes the scope of the coverage of the legal prohibition, as occurs with the case of managers, deputy managers, department directors and deputy directors, as well as the heads of procurement (titulares de las proveedurías) of the public sector, the prohibition on the exercise of liberal professions and the corresponding economic compensation shall take effect from the entry into force of this regulation,” is not sustainable, not only because the regulation, regarding what is established in the cited provision 14, could not establish assumptions different from those set forth therein, but also because that provision -for the reasons stated- contravenes the letter of the law and, in this sense, it is imperative not to apply it, pursuant to article 8, subsection 2 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. In this regard, this Sala in judgment No. 114 of 2:10 p.m., of August 14, 1990 stated: “In relation, article 8, subsection 2 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial orders the following: \"officials who administer justice may not: ...2) Apply decrees, regulations, agreements, and other provisions that are contrary to the law\". As a corollary of the foregoing, the argument put forth by the appellant, to the effect that the Regulation in question must be applied until its unconstitutionality or illegality is declared in the corresponding channel, is unacceptable. Quite the contrary, faced with a situation such as that surrounding the present case, the obligation of the Judge is to resolve as the Superior Labor Court (Tribunal Superior de Trabajo) has done, by declaring the regulatory provision in question inapplicable in the specific case. Note that this same principle inspires article 2 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which reads: \"Provisions that contradict another of higher rank shall lack validity\". On the same subject, the former Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación) stated, in its judgment number 30 of the year 1968, that \"Special Laws -and the one under comment, namely number 6835, is one- can only be modified or expressly repealed by another law’\" (in the same sense, see among others resolutions No. 4 of 9:00 a.m., of January 17; No. 54 of 3:00 p.m., of March 18; No. 269 of 9:10 a.m., of October 30; and No. 295 of 9:10 a.m., of December 9, all of 1992, and No. 103 of 9:30 a.m., of May 19, 1993). In addition to the foregoing, it should be added that given the plaintiff’s status as Director General of the Administrative Division of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) (see resolution of that Ministry of 1:50 p.m., of March 15, 2006, at folios 7 to 10 and certification, at folio 87), he was within the express assumptions contemplated by provision 14 ibidem, namely: “the deputy managers and the deputy administrative directors” as well as “the department directors and deputy directors,” without those assessments of the representation of the defendant -aimed at justifying the necessary application of the regulation to the plaintiff’s case- being applicable to the latter (the plaintiff), when in the response to the claim it stated: “...since the persons holding a head position in administrative areas or units do not necessarily hold the status of directors, and that likewise, these administrative areas or units are not necessarily structured or organized as directorates, or else have a different nomenclature, the regulatory rule recognizes these situations and therefore resorts to a fairly general wording, however solely and exclusively referring to the administrative areas, units, departments, dependencies or any other nomenclature used, in the person of their director or deputy director, the prohibition not being extensible then to persons occupying a head position in areas, units, departments, or dependencies that are not administrative, which we reiterate does not constitute a novelty of the regulation but a regulation provided for in the Law (folio 31),” for precisely -as stated- he occupied an administrative director position in the aforementioned ministry. Likewise, as the defendant itself recognizes and as explained before, the normative presupposition in which the Administration has sought to place [Nombre2] (alleging the necessary existence of a regulation and thereby the application of its Transitional Provision VI) “does not constitute a novelty of the regulation but a regulation provided for in the Law” (note that even for all that has been repeatedly examined, the possibility of a novelty in said field was limited. Furthermore, since this is so, it should have made the corresponding payment from the effective date of the law, for from then on that prohibition already applied to the servant), which contradicts its argument that “…provision 14 of Law No. 8422 is not a precept of automatic application, since, for its application, it required the precision of the regulatory norm,…” (folio 33. See statements in the appeal before the Sala, at folios 155 to 167). Likewise, it is not true when the defendant argued: “…we are not in the presence of an assumption where the regulatory norm clearly and manifestly contradicts a legal precept, a situation which, if it were to arise, and as this Procuraduría General de la República has maintained, one would have to opt for the legal norm, and not for the regulatory one, which is not the case,” for based on Transitional Provision VI of the Regulation, applied to this matter by the defendant, that legal provision that established its effective date upon publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta was rendered ineffective, which took place on October 29, 2004 (see in this regard provisions 129 of the Political Constitution and 7 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)) and without the need for a definition of its scope of coverage through regulation justifying that measure, because, as explained, it is a matter reserved to the law (a fundamental right is involved here, for the purposes of which it is important to observe the provisions of articles 56 and 74 of the Political Constitution). In turn, that circular from the Dirección General de Servicio Civil addressed to directors and heads of deconcentrated offices of the civil service also does not constitute a basis for the administrative action, denying the right sought by the plaintiff, when it ordered: “Institutions covered by the Civil Service Regime (Régimen de Servicio Civil) are informed that it is the criterion of this Dirección General that the recognition of the prohibition on professional practice established in provisions 14 and 15 of Law No. 8422 must be applied once the respective regulation to said law has been published” (circular No. DG-00-2004, at folios 51 to 52), for it entailed a “temporary” disapplication of a legal provision in force since its publication. Note that this circular did not even specify the concepts that required regulation in order to proceed with its application, as it merely stated that this office “…has been receiving inquiries from various institutions regarding the contents of the aforementioned articles 14 and 15” (see whereas clause 6 of said circular) and, in this sense, ordered the application of the recognition contained in provisions 14 and 15 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública only upon publication of the regulation to said law, a circumstance that, without a doubt, could not prevail over the express provision of the law (see articles 6 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and 8, subsection 2 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. In a similar sense, provision 2 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)).-” The following may not exercise liberal professions: the President of the Republic, the Vice Presidents, the magistrates of the Judicial Branch and of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the ministers, the Comptroller General and the Deputy Comptroller General of the Republic, the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman, the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General of the Republic, the General Regulator of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, the vice ministers, the chief officers, the executive presidents, the managers and the administrative directors of decentralized entities, autonomous institutions, semi-autonomous institutions, and public enterprises, the superintendents of financial, securities, and pension entities, their respective intendants, as well as the municipal mayors and the deputy managers and deputy administrative directors, the internal comptrollers and deputy internal comptrollers, the internal auditors and deputy internal auditors of the Public Administration, as well as the department directors and deputy directors and the heads of procurement of the Public Sector. Other professions that the official may hold are included within this article, even if they do not constitute a requirement for holding the respective public post. / The foregoing prohibition excludes teaching at higher education centers outside of ordinary working hours and attending to matters in which the affected official, his or her spouse, partner, or any of his or her relatives by consanguinity or affinity up to the third degree inclusive, is a party. In such cases, the normal and impartial performance of the post must not be affected; nor must it occur in matters handled within the same public entity or Branch of Government in which the person works”. Furthermore, numeral 15 provides: “Economic compensation for the prohibition on exercising liberal professions. Unless a special remuneration regime exists for the public official, the economic compensation for the application of the foregoing article shall be equivalent to sixty-five percent (65%) of the base salary set for the specific post category”. And while it is true that said law envisages its regulation when it establishes: “The Executive Branch must regulate this Law within six months following its entry into force. For the promulgation and amendment of the Regulations, the opinion of the Comptroller General of the Republic must be sought, and the draft shall be sent to it in a timely manner so that it may formulate its observations. The lack of regulations shall not impede the application of this Law or its mandatory observance, insofar as its provisions are sufficient by themselves for that purpose”, what was thus provided could not affect that legally established prohibition, since, as stated, the principle of legal reserve operates in this matter, as a fundamental human right is involved. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber has held: “REGARDING LIMITATIONS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.- This Constitutional Court has recognized that the exercise of fundamental rights is neither unrestricted nor absolute, but rather, it is possible and valid to establish certain limitations, which, without emptying their essential content, allow for a greater attainment of the general interest. Pursuant to Article 28 of the Political Constitution, it is possible to establish regulations or limits in consideration of morality, public order, and the rights of third parties. In developing this principle, the Chamber has indicated the following:/´I. The thesis that some subjective rights are not absolute, in the sense that they are born limited, is commonly accepted; first, because they develop within the framework of the rules that regulate social coexistence; and second, because their exercise is subject to intrinsic limits of their own nature. These limits refer to the right itself, that is, to its specific content, so that when the Constitution enshrines a public liberty and refers it to the law for its definition, it does so for it to determine its scope. It is not about restricting the liberty whose content is already defined by the Constitution itself, but solely about specifying, through technical norms, the content of the liberty in question. The limitations refer to the effective exercise of public liberties, that is, they imply in themselves a reduction in the legal sphere of the subject, under certain conditions and in specific circumstances. For this reason, they constitute the boundaries of the right, beyond which one is not before the legitimate exercise thereof. For limitations on fundamental rights to be valid, they must be contained in the Constitution itself, or failing that, it must authorize the legislator to impose them, under certain conditions…´. (…) Likewise, regarding the principle of legal reserve, concerning the regulation and limitation of fundamental rights, this Chamber provided the following: /\"(…) a.) The very principle of «reserve of law», from which it follows that only by means of a formal law, issued by the Legislative Branch through the procedure provided in the Constitution for the enactment of laws, is it possible to regulate and, where appropriate, restrict fundamental rights and liberties – all, of course, to the extent that the nature and regime thereof permit, and within the applicable constitutional limitations -; / b.) That only the executive regulations of those laws can develop the precepts thereof, it being understood that they cannot increase the restrictions established nor create those not established by them, and that they must rigorously respect their «essential content»; / c.) That neither in the executive regulations, much less in autonomous regulations or other lower-ranking norms or acts, could the law validly delegate the determination of regulations or restrictions that only it is empowered to impose; from which a new essential consequence follows; / d.) Finally, that all administrative activity in this matter is necessarily regulated, without the Administration being able to be granted discretionary powers, because these would obviously imply an abandonment of the very reserve of law (…)´ (Judgment No. 2175-96 of 9:06 a.m. on May 10, 1996)” (Decision No. 2448 of 11:59 a.m. on February 24, 2006). To the foregoing, it must be added, in view of Executive Decree No. 32333 of April 12, 2005 (Regulations to the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Service), that what was regulated, in the strict sense, was: the citizen's right to report; the admissibility and processing of complaints (note that pursuant to numeral 9 of the Law, the Comptroller General of the Republic shall determine the procedures for the attention, admissibility, and processing of the complaints presented), the deadline for the Comptroller General of the Republic to resolve requests for the simultaneous performance of remunerated posts and for extraordinary work; the deadline to process the lifting of incompatibilities and to resolve them; the duty and deadline to report the receipt of donations and gifts; doubts regarding their valuation, their registration, and other particularities regarding their destination, in addition to the subjects obliged to file a sworn statement. It is not true that Article 27 covered that alleged “deficiency” of the law regarding which the representation of the defendant affirms: “In other words, the specificity of each post in the Public Administration and the different nomenclatures given to them must be consistent with the 'will' of the legislator embodied in the Law, especially since the prohibition regime imposes a limitation on the official, which is why it is inherently necessary to have the affected population well defined by that norm”, since, in effect, that numeral states: “and also the directors and deputy directors of the administrative areas, units, departments or dependencies – according to the corresponding internal nomenclature – of the Public Administration”, that is, it did not specify – despite that being its accusation against the law – the population affected or covered by the norm, given that it states “according to the corresponding internal nomenclature”. Thus, the only thing regulated on the subject was the obligation to fulfill the ordinary workday by the servant who is authorized, through internal regulations, to exercise teaching at higher education centers during hours that coincide with the work schedule of public institutions or companies, also establishing the obligation of the senior officials to establish the ideal mechanisms to guarantee it. In any case, it must be contemplated, in turn, that a regulation, such as the one at hand (Executive Decree No. 32333), constitutes a norm aimed at making the practical and precise application of the law possible within the conditions and assumptions that it regulates. Consequently, it cannot contradict the law on which it depends and upon which it is founded, that is, a regulation could not, among other aspects, complicate the modes of acquiring rights whose assumptions are regulated by the law; suppress, in whole or in part, the content of a right created by the law; impose duties that the law does not impose, or increase the number of obligations or subjections that the legal duties contain; or complicate the modes of the creation of these duties by adding new requirements that the law does not contain (see [Nombre1], Eduardo. Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, Medellín, Biblioteca Jurídica Dike, Volume I, 2002, pp. 274 to 285). Thus, it is not correct to say that the definition of the posts subject to the prohibition and its specific application to the plaintiff was a matter that should have been discussed and corrected through the administrative channel in accordance with the procedures established in the administrative legal system, because, as stated, the law (in its numeral 14) defined the population of officials falling under the prohibition, in addition to the fact that the latter, by virtue of the principle of legal reserve, was the only one authorized to impose a limitation or restriction of such a nature. Therefore, its application, as of the corresponding publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, was automatic and immediate (contrary to what the defendant affirmed) and, consequently, the inability of the servants contemplated in numeral 14 of the Law arose from that moment onward, as did their right to receive the respective economic compensation (Article 15 of the law) provided as compensation for that limitation. Furthermore, the defense of the defendant, based on Transitory Provision VI of the regulations, which in its text provides: “In the case of the posts indicated in Article 14 of the Law, regarding which the present Regulations establish the scope of coverage of the legal prohibition, as occurs with the case of managers, deputy managers, department directors and deputy directors, as well as the heads of procurement of the public sector, the prohibition on the exercise of liberal professions and the corresponding economic compensation shall take effect as of the entry into force of the present regulations”, is not sustainable, not only because the regulations, regarding what is established in the cited numeral 14, could not establish assumptions different from those set forth therein, but also because that provision – due to what has been said – contravenes the letter of the law and, in that sense, it is imperative not to apply it, in accordance with Article 8, subsection 2 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. In this regard, this Chamber, in Judgment No. 114 of 2:10 p.m. on August 14, 1990, stated: “In this regard, Article 8, subsection 2 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch orders the following: 'officials who administer justice may not: ...2) Apply decrees, regulations, agreements, and other provisions that are contrary to the law'. As a corollary of the foregoing, the argument put forth by the appellant, to the effect that the Regulation in question must be applied until its unconstitutionality or illegality is declared through the corresponding channel, is not acceptable. Quite the contrary, faced with such a situation, as the one surrounding this case, the obligation of the Judge is to resolve it as the Superior Labor Court has done, by declaring the regulatory provision in question inapplicable in the specific case. Note that the same principle inspires Article 2 of the Civil Code, which reads: 'Provisions that contradict another of higher rank shall lack validity'. On the same subject, the former Court of Cassation, in its judgment number 30 of 1968, stated that 'Special Laws – and the one under discussion, namely, number 6835, is one – can only be modified or expressly repealed by another law'\" (in the same vein, see, among others, Resolutions No. 4 of 9:00 a.m. on January 17; No. 54 of 3:00 p.m. on March 18; No. 269 of 9:10 a.m. on October 30, and No. 295 of 9:10 a.m. on December 9, all from 1992, and No. 103 of 9:30 a.m. on May 19, 1993). In addition to the foregoing, it should be added that given the plaintiff's status as General Director of the Administrative Division of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (see resolution of that Ministry of 1:50 p.m. on March 15, 2006, at folios 7 to 10 and certification, at folio 87), he fell under the express assumptions contemplated by numeral 14 idem, namely: “the deputy managers and the deputy administrative directors” as well as “the department directors and deputy directors”, without those assessments of the defendant's representation being applicable to him (the plaintiff) – aimed at justifying the necessary application of the regulations to the plaintiff's case – when, in the response to the complaint, it stated: “...given that persons holding a leadership post in administrative areas or units do not necessarily hold the status of directors, and that likewise, these administrative areas or units are not necessarily structured or organized as directorates, or have a diverse nomenclature, the regulatory norm recognizes these situations and, for that reason, employs drafting that is quite general, yet solely and exclusively refers to the administrative areas, units, departments, dependencies, or any other nomenclature used, in the person of their director or deputy director; the prohibition therefore not being extended to persons occupying a leadership post in areas, units, departments, or dependencies that are not administrative, which we reiterate does not constitute a novelty of the regulations but rather a regulation provided for in the Law (folio 31)”, because precisely – as stated – he held an administrative director post in the aforementioned ministry. Likewise, as the defendant himself acknowledges and as explained above, the normative basis upon which the Administration has attempted to place Mr. [Nombre2] (alleging the necessary existence of regulations and thus the application of its Transitory Provision VI) “does not constitute a novelty of the regulations but rather a regulation provided for in the Law” (note that, even for everything that has been repeatedly examined, the possibility of a novelty in that sphere was limited. Furthermore, as that is the case, it should have made the corresponding payment as of the law's entry into force, since that prohibition for the servant was already in effect from that point onward), which contradicts its argument that “…numeral 14 of Law No. 8422 is not a self-executing precept, given that, for its application, it required the clarification of the regulatory norm,…” (folio 33. See statements in the appeal before the Chamber, at folios 155 to 167). Similarly, it is not true when the defendant argued: “…we are not in the presence of a situation where the regulatory norm contradicts, in an evident and manifest way, a legal precept, a situation which, should it arise, and as this Office of the Attorney General of the Republic has maintained, one would have to opt for the legal norm, and not the regulatory one, which is not the case”, because on the basis of Transitory Provision VI of the Regulations, applied to this matter by the defendant, that legal provision that established its entry into force as of its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, which took place on October 29, 2004 (see for this purpose numerals 129 of the Political Constitution and 7 of the Civil Code) was rendered ineffective, without that measure being justified by the need for a definition of its scope of coverage through regulatory means, since, as explained, it concerns a matter reserved to the law (a fundamental right is involved here, for whose purposes it is important to observe the provisions of Articles 56 and 74 of the Political Constitution). In turn, that circular from the General Directorate of Civil Service addressed to directors and heads of decentralized offices of the civil service also does not constitute a basis for the administrative action denying the right sought by the plaintiff, when it provided: “It is communicated to the institutions covered by the Civil Service Regime that it is the criterion of this General Directorate that the recognition of the prohibition on the professional exercise established in numerals 14 and 15 of Law No. 8422 must be applied once the respective regulations to said law have been published” (circular No. DG-00-2004, at folios 51 to 52), because it entailed a “temporary” non-application of a legal provision effective as of its publication. Note that that circular did not even specify the concepts that required the regulations in order to proceed with their application, since it merely stated that that department “…has been receiving consultations from various institutions, regarding the contents of the aforementioned Articles 14 and 15” (see recital 6 of the referenced circular) and, in that sense, ordered the application of the recognition contained in numerals 14 and 15 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Service only upon the publication of the regulations to said law, a circumstance that, without a doubt, could not prevail over the express provision of the law (see Articles 6 of the General Law of Public Administration and 8, subsection 2 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. In a similar vein, numeral 2 of the Civil Code).- **II.-** The institution of the prohibition (prohibición) entails a restriction on professional practice (see Articles 56 and 74 of the Political Constitution), since the officials or employees subject to it are absolutely barred from holding other public offices, as well as from performing, in the private sector, activities related to the positions they hold in the Public Administration and even those unrelated to such positions, except for the exceptions established by the rule itself, namely: teaching or defending personal interests or those of their close relatives. This is so in protection of the public interest and based on a high ethical standard, aimed at preventing the public servant from devoting time to other activities in the private sphere, as this could affect the necessary intensity in the fulfillment of the duties inherent to the function, or else generate an undesirable confusion between the interests of one sphere or the other (private and public), which would eventually imply that public interests would be sacrificed in favor of private interests. Thus, as can be deduced from the foregoing, the prohibition (incompatibility arising from the public employment relationship, for certain positions of a professional or academic rank) constitutes a limitation on a fundamental right (cited Articles 56 and 74) and, therefore, its establishment must be reserved to law. Additionally, the recognition of economic compensation to remunerate that restriction requires, additionally, that the rule creating the limitation (prohibition) or another rule provide for that possibility (economic remuneration) (Second Chamber, judgments No. 1056 of 8:55 a.m., December 19, 2008, and No. 231 of 9:35 a.m., March 20, 2009). Case law has considered that this legal institution operates automatically; that is, it is not within the powers of the official to request or waive it, nor can the Administration grant it discretionally. It is inherent to the employment relationship by provision of law and, consequently, inherent to the service relationship (among many others, votes of the Constitutional Chamber, No. 1396 of 2:31 p.m., March 22; No. 3370 of 10:30 a.m., July 5; and No. 4494 of 11:18 a.m., August 30, all of 1996; and of the Second Chamber, No. 171 of 2:30 p.m., November 3, 1989; No. 333 of 10:30 a.m., October 27, 1999; and No. 141 of 9:10 a.m., March 26, 2003). Historically in our country, some public servants have been barred, by virtue of the institution of the prohibition, from private professional practice (by way of example, see among many others, Articles 118—formerly 113—of the Tax Code of Rules and Procedures; 9 and 244 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch; Article 34 of the General Law of Internal Control; and 14 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service), however, the economic compensation to remunerate that prohibition arose after the enactment of Law No. 5867 of December 15, 1975. Subsequently, a series of laws were issued through which the recognition of that economic remuneration was extended to almost all officials who had, by reason of their positions, a specific prohibition for professional practice (see among many others, Laws No. 6008 of November 9, 1976; No. 6222 of May 2, 1978; No. 6451 of August 1, 1980; No. 6999 of September 3, 1985; No. 9097 of August 18, 1988; No. 6995 of July 22, 1985; No. 6982 of December 19, 1984; No. 7015 of November 22, 1985; No. 7018 of December 20, 1985; No. 7097 of August 18, 1988; No. 7111 of December 12, 1988; No. 7108 of November 8, 1988; No. 7333 of May 5, 1993; No. 7896 of July 30, 1999; No. 8292 of July 31, 2002; and No. 8422 of October 6, 2004). Precisely, regarding the case before us, Articles 14 and 15 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service contemplate that incompatibility of the public officials listed therein to freely practice the professions they hold (Article 14) as well as the economic remuneration corresponding to it (the restriction or limitation) (Article 15). Thus, Article 14 regulates: “**Prohibition on practicing liberal professions.** Public officials may not practice liberal professions: the President of the Republic, the Vice Presidents, the magistrates of the Judicial Branch and of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the ministers, the Comptroller General and the Deputy Comptroller General of the Republic, the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman, the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General of the Republic, the General Regulator of the Republic, the Chief Prosecutor of the Republic, the vice-ministers, the senior administrative officers, the executive presidents, the managers and administrative directors of decentralized entities, autonomous institutions, semi-autonomous institutions and public enterprises, the superintendents of financial, securities and pension entities, their respective intendants, as well as the municipal mayors and the deputy managers and deputy administrative directors, the internal comptrollers and deputy internal comptrollers, the internal auditors and deputy internal auditors of the Public Administration, as well as the department directors and deputy directors and the heads of procurement of the Public Sector. Other professions held by the official are included within this article, even if they do not constitute a requirement to hold the respective public office./ Excepted from the above prohibition are teaching at higher education centers outside the ordinary workday and attending to matters in which the affected official, his/her spouse, partner, or any of his/her relatives by blood or affinity up to the third degree inclusive are a party. In such cases, the normal and impartial performance of the position must not be affected; nor shall it occur in matters handled within the same public entity or Branch of Government in which the person works.” On the other hand, Article 15 provides: “**Economic remuneration for the prohibition on practicing liberal professions.** Unless there is a special remuneration regime for the public official, the economic compensation for the application of the preceding article shall be equivalent to sixty-five percent (65%) of the base salary established for the specific position category.” And while it is true that said law provides for its regulation when it states: “The Executive Branch must regulate this Law within six months after its entry into force. For the promulgation and amendment of the Regulation, the opinion of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic shall be sought, to which the draft shall be forwarded in a timely manner so that it may formulate its observations. The lack of regulation shall not impede the application of this Law or its mandatory observance, insofar as its provisions are sufficient in themselves for that purpose,” what is thus provided could not affect that legally established prohibition, since, as stated, the principle of legal reserve (reserva legal) applies in this matter, as a fundamental human right is involved. In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber has held: “**ON LIMITATIONS TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.-** This Constitutional Court has recognized that the exercise of fundamental rights is not unrestricted or absolute, but rather that it is possible and valid to establish certain limitations, which, without emptying their essential content, allow for greater achievement of the general interest. Pursuant to Article 28 of the Political Constitution, it is possible to establish regulations or limits in attention to morality, public order and the rights of third parties. In developing this principle, the Chamber has indicated the following:/'I. It is commonly accepted the thesis that some subjective rights are not absolute, in the sense that they are born limited; firstly, because they develop within the framework of the rules that regulate social coexistence; and secondly, because their exercise is subject to limits intrinsic to their own nature. These limits refer to the right itself, that is, to its specific content, so that the Constitution, when enshrining a public freedom and referring it to the law for its definition, does so for it to determine its scope. It is not a matter of restricting the freedom whose content is already defined by the Constitution itself, but solely of specifying, with technical norms, the content of the freedom in question. Limitations refer to the effective exercise of public freedoms, that is, they imply in themselves a reduction in the legal sphere of the subject, under certain conditions and in certain circumstances. For this reason, they constitute the boundaries of the right, beyond which one is not facing its legitimate exercise. For limitations on fundamental rights to be valid, they must be contained in the Constitution itself, or failing that, the Constitution must authorize the legislator to impose them, under certain conditions…' (…) Likewise, regarding the principle of legal reserve, concerning the regulation and limitation of fundamental rights, this Chamber ruled as follows: /\"(…) **a.)** *<u>The principle of 'reserve of law' itself</u>, from which it follows that only through a formal law, issued by the Legislative Branch through the procedure provided in the Constitution for the enactment of laws, is it possible to regulate and, where appropriate, restrict fundamental rights and freedoms—all, of course, to the extent that their nature and regime allow it, and within the applicable constitutional limitations—;/* **b.)** *<u>That only the executive regulations (reglamentos ejecutivos) of those laws can develop their precepts</u>, it being understood that they cannot increase the restrictions established or create those not established by them, and that they must rigorously respect their 'essential content';/* **c.)** *<u>That not even in executive regulations, much less in autonomous ones or other lower-ranking norms or acts</u>, could the law validly delegate the determination of regulations or restrictions that only it is empowered to impose; from which another essential consequence follows;/* **d.)** *Finally, that <u>all administrative activity in this matter is necessarily regulated, without being able to grant discretionary powers to the Administration</u>, because these would obviously imply an abandonment of the reserve of law itself (…)' (Judgment No. 2175-96 of 9:06 a.m. May 10, 1996).*” (vote No. 2448 of 11:59 a.m., February 24, 2006). To the above, it must be added, in view of Executive Decree No. 32333 of April 12, 2005 (Regulation to the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service), that what was regulated, in the strict sense, was: the citizen's right to report; the admissibility and processing of reports (note that pursuant to Article 9 of the Law, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic shall determine the procedures for the attention, admissibility and processing of the reports filed); the deadline for the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic to resolve requests for the simultaneous performance of paid positions and for extraordinary work; the deadline to request the lifting of incompatibilities and to resolve them; the duty and the deadline to report the receipt of donations and gifts; doubts regarding their valuation, their registration and other particularities regarding their destination, in addition to the subjects obligated to file a sworn statement. It is not true that Article 27 covered that alleged "*deficiency*" of the law regarding which the defendant's representation affirms: "*In other words, the specificity of each position in the Public Administration and the different nomenclatures given to them must be consistent with the 'intent' of the legislator embodied in the Law, especially since the prohibition regime imposes a limitation on the official, for which reason it is necessary to have a well-defined population affected by that rule*," because, to that effect, that article states: "*and also the directors and sub-directors of the areas, units, departments or dependencies—according to the corresponding internal nomenclature—of the Public Administration*," that is, it did not specify—despite this being its accusation against the law—the population affected or covered by the rule, given that the rule itself includes "*according to the corresponding internal nomenclature.*" Thus, the only thing regulated on this topic was the obligation to fulfill the ordinary workday by the servant who is authorized, by internal regulation, to teach at higher education centers at times that coincide with the work schedule of public institutions or enterprises, also establishing the obligation of the heads to establish the suitable mechanisms to guarantee it. In any case, it must also be considered that a regulation, such as the one before us (Executive Decree No. 32333), constitutes a norm aimed at making the practical and precise application of the law possible *<u>within the conditions and assumptions that it regulates</u>*. Consequently, it cannot contradict the law on which it depends and on which it is based; that is, a regulation could not, among other aspects, complicate the modes of acquisition of rights whose assumptions are regulated by the law; suppress in whole or in part the content of a right created by law; impose duties the law does not impose, or increase the number of obligations or subjections that legal duties contain; or complicate the modes of creation of these duties by adding new requirements not contained in the law (see [Name1], Eduardo. *<u>Tesis de Derecho Administrativo</u>*, Medellín, Biblioteca Jurídica Dike, Volume I, 2002, pp. 274 a 285). This being the case, it is incorrect to say that the definition of positions subject to prohibition and their specific application to the plaintiff was a matter that should have been aired and corrected through administrative channels in accordance with the procedures established in the administrative legal system, because, as stated, the law (in its Article 14) defined the population of officials covered by the prohibition, besides that the law, by virtue of the principle of legal reserve, was the only one authorized to impose a limitation or restriction of such a nature. Therefore, its application, from the corresponding publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, was automatic and immediate (contrary to what was stated by the defendant), and consequently, the inability of the servants contemplated in Article 14 of the Law arose from that moment onward, as did their right to receive the respective economic remuneration (Article 15 of the law) provided as compensation for that limitation.

On the other hand, the defense of the respondent, based on Transitory Provision VI of the regulation, which in its text provides: “In the case of the positions indicated in Article 14 of the Law, for which this Regulation establishes the scope of coverage of the legal prohibition, as occurs with managers, sub-managers, directors, and sub-directors of departments, as well as the heads of procurement offices in the public sector, the prohibition on engaging in independent professional practice (ejercicio de profesionales liberales) and the corresponding economic compensation shall take effect upon the entry into force of this regulation,” is unsustainable, not only because the regulation, with respect to the provisions of the aforementioned Article 14, could not establish circumstances different from those set forth therein, but also because that provision—for the reasons stated—contravenes the letter of the law and, in that sense, it is imperative not to apply it, pursuant to Article 8, subsection 2, of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). In this regard, this Chamber, in ruling No. 114 of 2:10 p.m. on August 14, 1990, stated: “In relation thereto, Article 8, subsection 2, of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch orders the following: ‘officials who administer justice may not: ...2) Apply decrees, regulations, agreements, or other dispositions that are contrary to the law.’ As a corollary of the foregoing, the argument put forth by the appellant, to the effect that the Regulation in question must be applied until its unconstitutionality or illegality is declared through the appropriate channel, is unacceptable. Quite the contrary, faced with a situation such as that involved in the present case, the obligation of the Judge is to resolve as the Superior Labor Tribunal (Tribunal Superior de Trabajo) has done, by declaring the regulatory provision in question inapplicable in this instance. Note that this same principle inspires Article 2 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which reads: ‘Provisions that contradict another of higher rank shall lack validity.’ On the same subject, the former Court of Cassation (Sala de Casación), in its ruling No. 30 of 1968, stated that ‘Special laws—and the law under comment, namely No. 6835, is one—can only be modified or expressly repealed by another law’” (in the same vein, see, among others, rulings No. 4 of 9:00 a.m. on January 17; No. 54 of 3:00 p.m. on March 18; No. 269 of 9:10 a.m. on October 30; and No. 295 of 9:10 a.m. on December 9, all from 1992; and No. 103 of 9:30 a.m. on May 19, 1993). In addition to the foregoing, it must be added that, given the plaintiff’s status as Director General of the Administrative Division of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) (see resolution of said Ministry at 1:50 p.m. on March 15, 2006, on folios 7 to 10, and certification on folio 87), he fell within the express circumstances contemplated by Article 14 thereof, namely: “sub-managers and administrative sub-directors” as well as “directors and sub-directors of departments,” without those assessments by the respondent’s representation—aimed at justifying the necessary application of the regulation to the plaintiff’s case—being applicable to him (the plaintiff), when, in the answer to the complaint, it stated: “...given that persons holding a leadership position in administrative areas or units do not necessarily hold the condition of directors, and likewise, these administrative areas or units are not necessarily structured or organized as directorates, or may have a different nomenclature, the regulatory norm recognizes these situations and therefore uses quite general wording, which is, however, solely and exclusively referred to the administrative areas, units, departments, dependencies, or whatever other nomenclature is used, in the person of their director or sub-director, the prohibition not being extended, therefore, to persons occupying a leadership position in areas, units, departments, or dependencies that are not administrative, which, we reiterate, does not constitute a novelty of the regulation but rather a regulation already provided for in the Law” (folio 31), precisely because—as stated—he held an administrative directorship position in the aforementioned ministry. Likewise, as the respondent itself acknowledges and as was explained earlier, the normative premise under which the Administration has attempted to place Mr. [Nombre2] (alleging the necessary existence of a regulation and thus the application of its Transitory Provision VI) “does not constitute a novelty of the regulation but rather a regulation already provided for in the Law” (note that, for all the reasons repeatedly examined, the possibility of a novelty in that area was limited. Furthermore, since that is the case, the corresponding payment should have been made as of the effective date of the law, because as of that date that prohibition was already in effect for the public servant), which contradicts its argument that “…Article 14 of Law No. 8422 is not a self-executing provision, given that its application required the clarification of the regulatory norm…” (folio 33. See statements in the appeal before the Chamber, on folios 155 to 167). Similarly, it is not true when the respondent argued: “…we are not in the presence of a case where the regulatory norm evidently and manifestly contradicts a legal precept, a situation in which, if it were to occur, and as this Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) has maintained, one would have to opt for the legal norm and not the regulatory one, which is not the case,” because, based on Transitory Provision VI of the Regulation, applied to this matter by the respondent, that legal provision was set aside which established its effective date from its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, which took place on October 29, 2004 (see, in this regard, Articles 129 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 7 of the Civil Code), nor is that measure justified by the need for a definition of its scope of coverage through a regulation, since, as explained, this is a matter reserved to the law (a fundamental right is involved here, for the purposes of which it is important to observe the provisions of Articles 56 and 74 of the Political Constitution). In turn, that circular from the General Directorate of Civil Service (Dirección General de Servicio Civil) addressed to directors and heads of decentralized civil service offices also does not constitute a basis for the administrative action denying the right sought by the plaintiff, when it ordered: “Institutions covered by the Civil Service Regime (Régimen de Servicio Civil) are hereby notified that it is this General Directorate’s criterion that the recognition of the prohibition on professional practice established in Articles 14 and 15 of Law No. 8422 shall be applied once the respective regulation to said law is published” (circular No. DG-00-2004, on folios 51 to 52), for it entailed a “temporary” non-application of a legal provision in force from its publication. Note that this circular did not even specify the concepts that required the regulation to proceed with its application, as it merely stated that this office “…has been receiving inquiries from various institutions regarding the contents of the aforementioned Articles 14 and 15” (see recital (considerando) 6 of the said circular) and, in that sense, ordered the application of the recognition contained in Articles 14 and 15 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública) until the publication of the regulation to said law, a circumstance which, without a doubt, could not prevail over the express provision of the law (see Article 6 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and Article 8, subsection 2, of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. Similarly, Article 2 of the Civil Code).”

“II.- El instituto de la prohibición supone una restricción al ejercicio profesional (véase artículos 56 y 74 de la Constitución Política), pues los funcionarios o empleados sujetos a ésta se encuentran imposibilitados en forma absoluta para el ejercicio de otros cargos públicos, así como para desempeñar, en la empresa privada, actividades relativas a los puestos que ocupan en la Administración Pública e inclusive ajenas a esos puestos, salvo las excepciones que la propia norma establece, a saber: el desempeño de la docencia o la defensa de intereses personales o de sus parientes cercanos. Lo anterior es así, en tutela del interés público y con sustento en un alto contenido ético, tendiente a impedirle al servidor público destinar su tiempo a otras actividades en el campo privado, pues con ello se podría afectar la necesaria intensidad en el cumplimiento de las actividades propias de la función, o bien, generarse una indeseable confusión, en los intereses de uno u otro campo (el privado y el público), lo que eventualmente supondría que los intereses públicos se sacrificaran en pro de intereses privados. Así, según se desprende de lo expuesto, la prohibición (incompatibilidad originada en la relación de empleo público, para determinados cargo de rango profesional o académico) constituye una limitación a un derecho fundamental (numerales 56 y 74 citados) y, por ende, su establecimiento debe estar reservado a la ley. Además, el reconocimiento de una compensación económica para retribuir esa restricción requiere, en forma adicional, que la norma creadora de la limitación (prohibición) u otra, prevea esa posibilidad (la retribución económica) (Sala Segunda, sentencias n°s 1056 de las 8:55 horas, del 19 de diciembre de 2008 y 231 de las 9:35 horas, del 20 de marzo de 2009). Jurisprudencialmente se ha considerado que esta institución jurídica opera automáticamente, es decir, no se encuentra dentro de las facultades del funcionario solicitarla o renunciarla, ni tampoco puede la Administración otorgarla en forma discrecional. Es consubstancial a la relación de trabajo por disposición de la ley y, consecuentemente, inherente a la relación de servicio (entre muchos otros, los votos de la Sala Constitucional, n°s 1396 de las 14:31 horas, del 22 de marzo; 3370 de las 10:30 horas, del 5 de julio y 4494 de las 11:18 horas, del 30 de agosto, todas de 1996 y de la Sala Segunda, los n°s 171 de las 14:30 horas, del 3 de noviembre de 1989; 333 de las 10:30 horas, del 27 de octubre de 1999 y 141 de las 9:10 horas, del 26 de marzo de 2003). Históricamente en nuestro país algunos servidores públicos se han encontrado imposibilitados, en virtud del instituto de la prohibición, para el ejercicio profesional privado (a modo de ejemplo, véase entre muchos otros, los numerales 118 -antes 113- del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; 9 y 244 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial; artículo 34 de la Ley General de Control Interno y 14 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito), no obstante la compensación económica para retribuir esa prohibición surgió a partir de la promulgación de la Ley n° 5867 del 15 de diciembre de 1975. Posteriormente se emitieron una serie de leyes mediante las cuales se extendió el reconocimiento de esa retribución económica a casi todos los funcionarios que tuviesen, en razón de sus cargos, una prohibición específica para el ejercicio de la profesión (véase entre muchas otras, las Leyes n°s 6008 del 9 de noviembre de 1976; 6222 del 2 de mayo de 1978; 6451 del 1 de agosto de 1980; 6999 del 3 de setiembre de 1985; 9097 del 18 de agosto de 1988; 6995 del 22 de julio de 1985; 6982 del 19 de diciembre de 1984; 7015 del 22 de noviembre de 1985; 7018 del 20 de diciembre de 1985; 7097 del 18 de agosto de 1988; 7111 del 12 de diciembre de 1988, 7108 del 8 de noviembre de 1988; 7333 del 5 de mayo de 1993; 7896 del 30 de julio de 1999, 8292 del 31 de julio de 2002 y 8422 del 6 de octubre de 2004). Precisamente, en torno al caso que nos ocupa, los numerales 14 y 15 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública contemplan aquella incompatibilidad de los funcionarios públicos ahí enumerados para ejercer liberalmente las profesiones que ostentan (artículo 14) así como la retribución económica correspondiente a ésta (la restricción o limitación) (artículo 15). Así, el artículo 14 regula: “Prohibición para ejercer profesiones liberales. No podrán ejercer profesiones liberales, el presidente de la República, los vicepresidentes, los magistrados del Poder Judicial y del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, los ministros, el contralor y el subcontralor generales de la República, el defensor y el defensor adjunto de los habitantes, el procurador general y el procurador general adjunto de la República, el regulador general de la República, el fiscal general de la República, los viceministros, los oficiales mayores, los presidentes ejecutivos, los gerentes y los directores administrativos de entidades descentralizadas, instituciones autónomas, semiautónomas y empresas públicas, los superintendentes de entidades financieras, de valores y de pensiones, sus respectivos intendentes, así como los alcaldes municipales y los subgerentes y los subdirectores administrativos, los contralores y los subcontralores internos, los auditores y los subauditores internos de la Administración Pública, así como los directores y subdirectores de departamento y los titulares de proveeduría del Sector Público. Dentro del presente artículo quedan comprendidas las otras profesiones que el funcionario posea, aunque no constituyan requisito para ocupar el respectivo cargo público./ De la prohibición anterior se exceptúan la docencia en centros de enseñanza superior fuera de la jornada ordinaria y la atención de los asuntos en los que sean parte el funcionario afectado, su cónyuge, compañero o compañera, o alguno de sus parientes por consaguinidad o afinidad hasta el tercer grado inclusive. En tales casos, no deberá afectarse el desempeño normal e imparcial del cargo; tampoco deberá producirse en asuntos que se atiendan en la misma entidad pública o Poder del Estado en que se labora”. Por otra parte, el numeral 15 dispone: “Retribución económica por la prohibición de ejercer profesiones liberales. Salvo que existe un régimen especial de remuneración para el funcionario público, la compensación económica por la aplicación del artículo anterior será equivalente a un sesenta y cinco por ciento (65%) sobre el salario base fijado para la categoría del puesto específica”. Y si bien es cierto, dicha ley prevé su reglamentación cuando establece: “El Poder Ejecutivo deberá reglamentar la presente Ley, dentro de los seis meses posteriores a su entrada en vigencia. Para la promulgación y reforma del Reglamento deberá procurarse la opinión de la Contraloría General de la República, cuyo proyecto se le remitirá oportunamente, a fin de que formule sus observaciones. La falta de reglamentación no impedirá la aplicación de esta Ley ni su obligatoria observancia, en cuanto sus disposiciones sean suficientes por sí mismas para ello”, lo así dispuesto no podría afectar aquella prohibición fijada legalmente, pues tal y como se dijo, en la materia opera el principio de reserva legal, al encontrarse involucrado un derecho fundamental del ser humano. En ese sentido, la Sala constitucional ha sostenido: “SOBRE LAS LIMITACIONES A DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES.- Este Tribunal Constitucional ha reconocido que el ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales no es irrestricto, ni absoluto, sino que, es posible y válido establecer ciertas limitaciones, que sin vaciar su contenido esencial, permita una mayor consecución del interés general. Conforme al artículo 28 de la Constitución Política, resulta posible establecer regulaciones o límites en atención a la moral, el orden público y los derechos de terceros. Al desarrollar este principio, la Sala ha indicado lo siguiente:/´I. Es corrientemente aceptada la tesis de que algunos derechos subjetivos no son absolutos, en el sentido de que nacen limitados; en primer lugar, en razón de que se desarrollan dentro del marco de las reglas que regulan la convivencia social; y en segundo, en razón de que su ejercicio está sujeto a límites intrínsecos a su propia naturaleza. Estos límites se refieren al derecho en sí, es decir, a su contenido específico, de manera tal que la Constitución al consagrar una libertad pública y remitirla a la ley para su definición, lo hace para que determine sus alcances. No se trata de restringir la libertad cuyo contenido ya se encuentra definido por la propia Constitución, sino únicamente de precisar, con normas técnicas, el contenido de la libertad en cuestión. Las limitaciones se refieren al ejercicio efectivo de las libertades públicas, es decir, implican por sí mismas una disminución en la esfera jurídica del sujeto, bajo ciertas condiciones y en determinadas circunstancias. Por esta razón constituyen las fronteras del derecho, más allá de las cuáles no se está ante el legítimo ejercicio del mismo. Para que sean válidas las limitaciones a los derechos fundamentales deben estar contenidas en la propia Constitución, o en su defecto, la misma debe autorizar al legislador para imponerlas, en determinadas condiciones…´. (…) Asimismo, sobre el principio de reserva legal, en cuanto a la regulación y limitación de los derechos fundamentales, esta Sala dispuso, lo siguiente: /"(…) a.) El principio mismo de «reserva de ley», del cual resulta que solamente mediante ley formal, emanada del Poder Legislativo por el procedimiento previsto en la Constitución para la emisión de las leyes, es posible regular y, en su caso, restringir los derechos y libertades fundamentales -todo, por supuesto, en la medida en que la naturaleza y régimen de éstos lo permita, y dentro de las limitaciones constitucionales aplicables-; /b.) Que sólo los reglamentos ejecutivos de esas leyes pueden desarrollar los preceptos de éstas, entendiéndose que no pueden incrementar las restricciones establecidas ni crear las no establecidas por ellas, y que deben respetar rigurosamente su «contenido esencial»; /c.) Que ni aún en los reglamentos ejecutivos, mucho menos en los autónomos u otras normas o actos de rango inferior, podría válidamente la ley delegar la determinación de regulaciones o restricciones que sólo ella está habilitada a imponer; de donde resulta una nueva consecuencia esencial; /d.) Finalmente, que toda actividad administrativa en esta materia es necesariamente reglada, sin poder otorgarse a la Administración potestades discrecionales, porque éstas implicarían obviamente un abandono de la propia reserva de ley (…)´ (Sentencia Nº 2175-96 de las 9:06 hrs. del 10 de mayo de 1996)” (voto n° 2448 de las 11:59 horas, del 24 de febrero de 2006). A lo anterior, debe agregarse, con vista en el Decreto Ejecutivo n° 32333 del 12 de abril de 2005 (Reglamento a la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), que lo reglamentado, en sentido estricto, fue: el derecho del ciudadano a denunciar; la admisibilidad y el trámite de las denuncias (véase que conforme al numeral 9 de la Ley, la Contraloría General de la República determinará los procedimientos para la atención, admisibilidad y trámite de las denuncias presentadas), el plazo de la Contraloría General de la República para resolver las solicitudes para el desempeño simultaneo de cargos remunerados y para el trabajo extraordinario; el plazo para gestionar el levantamiento de incompatibilidades y para resolverlas; el deber y el plazo para informar sobre la recepción de donaciones y obsequios; las dudas sobre la valoración de éstas, su registro y demás particularidades sobre su destino amén de los sujetos obligados a presentar declaración jurada. No es cierto que el artículo 27 cubriera aquella alegada “deficiencia” de la ley respecto de la que la representación del accionado afirma: “En otras palabras, la especificidad de cada puesto en la Administración Pública y las distintas nomenclaturas que se le dan a estos, deben ser concordantes con la ´voluntad´ del legislador plasmada en la Ley, máxime que el régimen de prohibición le impone una limitación al funcionario, por lo que es de suyo necesario, tener bien definida la población afecta con esa norma”, pues al efecto en ese numeral se recoge: “y también los directores y subdirectores de las áreas, unidades, departamentos o dependencias -según la nomenclatura interna que corresponda- administrativas de la Administración Pública”, es decir, no concretó -pese a que esa fue su acusación frente a la ley- la población afecta o cubierta con la norma, toda vez que en ella se recoge “según la nomenclatura interna que corresponda”. Así, lo único que se reguló sobre el tema fue la obligación de cumplir la jornada ordinaria por parte del servidor al que se autoriza, por reglamentación interna, a ejercer la docencia en centros de educación superior en horas que coinciden con el horario de trabajo de las instituciones o empresas públicas, estableciéndose también la obligación de los jerarcas de fijar los mecanismos idóneos para garantizarlo. En todo caso, debe contemplarse, a su vez, que un reglamento, como el que nos ocupa (Decreto Ejecutivo n° 32333), se constituye en una norma orientada a hacer posible la aplicación práctica y precisa de la ley dentro de las condiciones y supuestos que ésta regula. Consecuentemente, no puede contrariar la ley de la que depende y en la que se funda, es decir, no podría un reglamento, entre otros aspectos, complicar los modos de adquisición de los derechos cuyos supuestos se hallan regulados por la ley; suprimir en todo o parte el contenido de un derecho creado por la ley; imponer deberes que la ley no impone, o aumentar el número de obligaciones o sujeciones que los deberes legales contienen; o complicar los modos de nacimiento de estos deberes agregando nuevos requisitos que la ley no contiene (véase [Nombre1] , Eduardo. Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, Medellín, Biblioteca Jurídica Dike, Tomo I, 2002, pp. 274 a 285). Así las cosas, no es correcto que se diga que la definición de los puestos afectos a prohibición y su aplicación concreta al actor, era un asunto que debía ventilarse y corregirse en la vía administrativa conforme a los procedimientos establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo, pues como se dijo, la ley (en su numeral 14) definió la población de funcionarios inmersos en la prohibición, amén de que ésta, en virtud del principio de reserva legal, era la única autorizada para imponer una limitación o restricción de tal naturaleza. Por ello, su aplicación, a partir de la correspondiente publicación en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta, fue automática e inmediata (contrario a lo afirmado por el demandado) y, por consiguiente, la imposibilidad de los servidores contemplados en el numeral 14 de la Ley surgió a partir de ese momento así como su derecho a percibir la respectiva retribución económica (artículo 15 de la ley) prevista como compensación a aquella limitación. Por otra parte, la defensa del accionado, sustentada en el transitorio VI del reglamento, que en su texto dispone: “En el caso de los cargos señalados en el artículo 14 de la Ley, respecto de los cuales en el presente Reglamento se establezca los alcances de la cobertura a la prohibición legal, tal y como ocurre con el caso de gerentes, subgerentes, directores y subdirectores de departamento, así como los titulares de las proveedurías del sector público, la prohibición para el ejercicio de profesionales liberales y la correspondiente compensación económica, regirán a partir de la entrada en vigencia del presente reglamento”, no resulta sostenible, no sólo porque el reglamento en cuanto a lo establecido en el numeral 14 citado no podía establecer supuestos distintos a los fijados ahí sino también porque esa disposición -por lo dicho- contraviene la letra de la ley y, en tal sentido, resulta imperativo no aplicarlo, al tenor del artículo 8 inciso 2 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Al respecto, esta Sala en la sentencia n° 114 de las 14:10 horas, del 14 de agosto de 1990 señaló: “En relación, el artículo 8, inciso 2° de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, ordena lo siguiente: "no podrán los funcionarios que administran justicia: ...2) Aplicar decretos, reglamentos, acuerdos y otras disposiciones que sean contrarias a la ley". Como corolario de lo expuesto, no es de recibo la argumentación esgrimida por el recurrente, en el sentido de que el Reglamento en cuestión tiene que ser aplicado, hasta que no sea declarada su inconstitucionalidad o ilegalidad en la vía correspondiente. Todo lo contrario, ante una situación tal, como la que envuelve el presente caso, la obligación del Juzgador es la de resolver como lo ha hecho el Tribunal Superior de Trabajo, al declarar no aplicable en la especie la disposición reglamentaria en cuestión. Obsérvese que ese mismo principio inspira al artículo 2 del Código Civil, el cual reza: "Carecerán de validez las disposiciones que contradigan a otra de rango superior". Sobre el mismo tema, ha dicho la antigua Sala de Casación, en su sentencia número 30 del año 1968, que "Las Leyes especiales -y la de comentario, a saber, la número 6835, lo es- sólo pueden ser modificadas o derogadas expresamente por otra ley´" (en igual sentido, véase entre otras las resoluciones n°s 4 de las 9:00 horas, del 17 de enero; 54 de las 15:00 horas, del 18 de marzo; 269 de las 9:10 horas, del 30 de octubre y 295 de las 9:10 horas, del 9 de diciembre, todas de 1992 y 103 de las 9:30 horas, del 19 de mayo de 1993). Además de lo expuesto, cabe agregar que dada la condición del actor como Director General de la División Administrativa del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (véase resolución de ese Ministerio de las 13:50 horas, del 15 de marzo de 2006, a folios 7 a 10 y certificación, a folio 87), se encontraba en los supuestos expresos contemplados por el numeral 14 ídem, a saber: “los subgerentes y los subdirectores administrativos” así como “los directores y subdirectores de departamento”, sin que al efecto resulten aplicables a éste (al actor) aquellas apreciaciones de la representación del accionado -tendientes a justificar la necesaria aplicación del reglamento al caso del demandante-, cuando en la contestación de la demanda refirió: “...dado que las personas que ostentan un puesto de jefatura en las áreas o unidades administrativas, no necesariamente ostentan la condición de directores, y que de igual forma, estas áreas o unidades administrativas no necesariamente están estructuradas u organizadas como direcciones, o bien tiene una nomenclatura diversa, la norma reglamentaria reconoce estas situaciones y por ello echa mano de una redacción bastante general, sin embargo única y exclusivamente referida a las, áreas, unidades, departamentos, dependencias o cualesquiera otra nomenclatura que se utilice, administrativas en la persona de su director o su subdirector, no siendo extensiva la prohibición entonces a personas que ocupen un puesto de jefatura en áreas, unidades departamento o dependencias que no sean administrativas, lo cual reiteramos no constituye una novedad del reglamento sino una regulación prevista en la Ley (folio 31)”, pues precisamente -como se dijo- éste ocupaba un puesto de dirección administrativa en el mencionado ministerio. Asimismo, como lo reconoce el propio demandado y conforme se explicó antes, el presupuesto normativo en el cual la Administración ha pretendido ubicar a don [Nombre2] (alegando la necesaria existencia de un reglamento y con ello la aplicación de su transitorio VI) “no constituye una novedad del reglamento sino una regulación prevista en la Ley” (véase que incluso por todo lo que reiteradamente se ha examinado, la posibilidad de una novedad en dicho ámbito estaba limitada. Además, como eso es así debió hacer el pago correspondiente a partir de la vigencia de la ley, pues ya a partir de entonces regía aquella prohibición para el servidor), lo que contradice su argumento de que “…el numeral 14 de la Ley n° 8422, no es un precepto de aplicación automática, dado que, para su aplicación, requería de la precisión de la norma reglamentaria,…” (folio 33. Véase manifestaciones en recurso ante la Sala, a folios 155 a 167). Del mismo modo, no es cierto cuando el accionado argumentó: “…no estamos en presencia de un supuesto donde la norma reglamentaria contradice, en forma evidente y manifiesta, un precepto legal, situación, que en caso de presentarse, y tal y como lo ha sostenido esta Procuraduría General de la República, habría que optar por la norma legal, y no por la reglamentaria, que no es el caso”, pues con fundamento en el transitorio VI del Reglamento, aplicado a este asunto por el demandado, se dejó sin efecto aquella disposición legal que fijaba su rige a partir de la publicación en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta, lo cual tuvo lugar el día 29 de octubre de 2004 (véase al efecto los numerales 129 de la Constitución Política y 7 del Código Civil) y sin que justifique esa medida la necesidad de una definición de su ámbito de cobertura por vía reglamentaria, pues, según se explicó, se trata de una materia reservada a la ley (aquí está involucrado un derecho fundamental, a cuyos efectos es importante observar lo dispuesto en los artículos 56 y 74 de la Constitución Política). A su vez, aquella circular de la Dirección General de Servicio Civil dirigida a directores y encargados de oficinas desconcentradas del servicio civil tampoco constituye un fundamento para la actuación administrativa, denegatoria del derecho pretendido por el actor, cuando dispuso: “Se comunica a las instituciones cubiertas por el Régimen de Servicio Civil, que es criterio de esta Dirección General que el reconocimiento de la prohibición para el ejercicio profesional establecido en los numerales 14 y 15 de la Ley N° 8422, deberá aplicarse una vez publicado en respectivo reglamento a dicha ley” (circular n° DG-00-2004, a folios 51 a 52), pues supuso una desaplicación “temporal” de una disposición legal vigente a partir de su publicación. Véase que esa circular ni siquiera precisó los conceptos que requerían de la reglamentación para proceder a su aplicación, pues tan sólo sostuvo que esa dependencia “…ha estado recibiendo consultas por parte de las diversas instituciones, en el sentido de los contenidos de los artículos 14 y 15 supracitados” (véase considerando 6 de la referida circular) y en tal sentido, dispuso la aplicación del reconocimiento contenido en los numerales 14 y 15 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública hasta la publicación del reglamento a dicha ley, circunstancia que, sin lugar a dudas, no podría prevalecer frente a la disposición expresa de la ley (véase artículos 6 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 8 inciso 2 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. En sentido similar, el numeral 2 del Código Civil)-.”