Constitutional query on forfeiture in reckless drivingConsulta de constitucionalidad del comiso en conducción temeraria

**I.-** [...] In order to determine the constitutionality of the application of this figure with respect to the crime of reckless driving, it is of interest to briefly analyze its nature. As has already been indicated, its origin responds to the purpose of depriving the offender of the instruments used to commit the crime, due to the harmful results this produces for society, that is, a preventive purpose governs. Regarding the objects that result from or are produced by the crime, such as false or altered public documents, vehicles with their identification numbers erased, forfeiture (comiso) likewise obeys a preventive purpose, since security mandates their destruction, as for these items, such a fate proceeds independently of the declaration of guilt and of whomever the owner or possessor may be. It has subsequently received different treatments; however, it has traditionally been classified as an accessory penalty (pena accesoria) or a mandatory consequence of every conviction, also as a security measure (medida de seguridad), and, as has been indicated, lately as a civil consequence. As an accessory penalty, it affects private property, since it consists of the deprivation of assets in order to cause affliction or impairment to the accused's patrimony; consequently, it must be personal and seek retribution, for which proportionality must prevail. It must also seek the special preventive purpose regarding the offender and general prevention regarding society. As has already been indicated, this is not the treatment afforded to it by our criminal legislation; rather, it is placed as a civil consequence of the punishable act, and therefore, the following considerations must govern: every civil consequence has the purpose of repairing the damage caused, and therefore, its purpose has a private nature. Furthermore, the personal considerations of the criminal act do not govern, since joint and several or subsidiary liability may operate. These reasons lead us to conclude, like [Name1] (*op.cit*, p. 384), that forfeiture is not a civil consequence of the punishable act.

It must be clarified that, although the figure of forfeiture has been recently introduced into legislation through the creation of special laws—articles 83 and 87 of the Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de uso no autorizado y actividades conexas—this obeys different purposes. The advancement as well as the structural complexity of criminal organizations that generate a large amount of economic resources has repercussions on the economy; therefore, the aim is to reduce illicit markets and thus protect the "licit" economy. For this reason, we consider that the prevailing rules for the forfeiture of the products of that prohibited activity do not apply to the inquiry conducted here. Furthermore, the regulation of forfeiture in a special law supports the position that this institute is not a civil consequence of the crime.

**II.-** Specifically regarding the application of vehicle forfeiture in the crime of reckless driving, as typified in article 254 bis of the Penal Code, we must bear the following in mind: our Political Constitution establishes the Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho) as the political model that governs us. This is deduced from constitutional principles that seek the greatest well-being of all the country's inhabitants (article 50). For this purpose, a series of principles are enshrined, such as the inviolability of private property—enshrined in articles 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 21.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights—which may only be deprived for legally proven public interest and with prior compensation (article 45), with the penalty of confiscation being expressly prohibited (article 40), and the right to work, for which the State must ensure that everyone has an honest and useful occupation (article 56). In addition to this, article 39 enshrines the principle of criminal legality, according to which penalties must be duly established by the legislator.

**III.-** As a matter of criminal policy, through Law No. 8696 titled "*Reforma parcial de la Ley de Tránsito por vías terrestres*," published in La Gaceta No. 248 of December 23, 2008, article 254 bis was introduced into the Penal Code. This article literally reads: "*A prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five (0.75) grams of alcohol per liter of blood. A repeat offender shall be imposed a prison sentence of two (2) to eight (8) years. When a prison sentence of three (3) years or less is imposed, the court may substitute the custodial sentence with an alternative measure of community service provision, which may range from two hundred (200) hours to nine hundred and fifty (950) hours of service, in the places and manner indicated in article 71 ter of the Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres.*" As can be observed, this is a crime of danger, since its configuration does not require the production of a result. Given that the use of a vehicle is necessary to carry out the action and that forfeiture operates *ex lege* in our legislation, once the crime is verified, the seizure of the motor vehicle in favor of the State proceeds, as it is the instrument with which the crime was committed. The only exception so that this consequence does not operate automatically is that the asset is registered in the name of a third party, which highlights that the nature of this figure is not civil, as enshrined in the law. This manner of applying forfeiture to the indicated assets has become an accessory penalty, and at times more burdensome than the prison sentence itself, because if the sentence is equal to or less than three years, the accused may become eligible for the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence or request its substitution with community service provision. As an aggravating factor, we have that the majority of the country's inhabitants belong to the middle or lower class; therefore, the vehicle is often used as a means of work, transportation, and recreation, not only for the accused, but for their families. Thus, the forfeiture transcends the person of the offender to impact the entire family unit, which will see its standard of living diminished, as the work instrument passed into the hands of the State. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that, generally and given the economic level prevailing among most of the country's inhabitants, motor vehicles have been acquired through the effort and sacrifice of many years, and although driving while intoxicated as indicated by the law is not justified, it is questionable that the State, which holds the monopoly on the production of alcoholic beverages, thereby fosters their consumption, and once citizens incur the crime of reckless driving, disproportionately and by way of penalty, deprives them of assets that constitute their private property and sometimes their work tool.

In summary, we observe conflicts regarding the application of forfeiture in the crime of reckless driving typified in paragraph 4 of article 254 bis of the Penal Code with the principles contained in the Political Constitution, namely: 1.- Although the Penal Code places forfeiture as a civil consequence of the punishable act, this is contrary to its own nature, because there is no reparative purpose, since there is no particular victim demanding it. 2.- The forfeiture applied in the indicated crime has become a particular form of confiscation, since its ownership is transferred to the State. 3.- It has become an accessory penalty, upon which the criteria of rationality and proportionality do not govern, because it is an *ex delito* consequence, and once guilt is proven, unless the asset belongs to a third party, forfeiture is imposed in favor of the State, which contravenes the principle of legality of penalties and the proportionality and rationality of sanctions. This consequence of the crime—in practice, a penalty—transcends the person of the criminal to impact their family, which is thereby deprived of its means of transportation and work, a measure contrary to the principles of the Social State of Law, which must ensure the best quality of life for the country's inhabitants. 4.- It does not respond to a special preventive purpose, because the fact that the vehicle is seized from the offender will not prevent them from driving another motor vehicle. The only purposes observed in the application of this measure are as an accessory penalty and as general prevention, since property deprivation entails an impairment to the accused's and their family's economic situation, visualizing only an intimidating end at a social level. In this way, the question arises as to whether ordering forfeiture in this crime is contrary to the purposes that govern our Rule of Law State, in which the better distribution of wealth must be promoted and dignified work ensured, as well as respect for private property, and whether it constitutes a covert way of imposing a criminal sanction not provided for by the legislator, and therefore, without the parameters that should govern its quantification, such as rationality and proportionality, being considered. Furthermore, given the value of the forfeited assets, at times the sole patrimony of the active subject, it constitutes a confiscation, a figure expressly prohibited in article 40 of the Magna Carta. In this sense, we respectfully pose the inquiry, for the purpose of establishing whether the application of the rule contained in article 110 of the Penal Code, regarding the crime of reckless driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the degree provided in article 254 bis of the Penal Code, is consistent with the principles enshrined in the Political Constitution.

**IV.-** Consequently, the processing of the appeal filed in this case is suspended until the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) rules on this inquiry. The parties are cited and summoned so that within three days they may appear before said Chamber to assert their rights (articles 102, first paragraph, and 104 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).” “I.- […] In order to determine the constitutionality of the application of this figure regarding the crime of reckless driving (conducción temeraria), it is of interest to briefly analyze its nature. As has already been indicated, its origin responds to the purpose of depriving the criminal of the instruments used to commit the crime, due to the harmful results this produces for society, that is, a preventive purpose governs. Regarding the objects that result from or produce the crime, such as false or altered public documents, vehicles with their identifying numbers erased, the confiscation (comiso) likewise obeys a preventive purpose, since security obliges their destruction, as for them, such destination proceeds independently of the declaration of guilt and whoever the owner or holder may be. Subsequently, it has received different treatments; however, traditionally it has been cataloged as an accessory penalty (pena accesoria) or a mandatory consequence of every condemnatory sentence, also as a security measure (medida de seguridad), and as has been indicated, lately as a civil consequence (consecuencia civil). As an accessory penalty, it affects private property, as it consists of the deprivation of goods in order to cause affliction or a detriment to the accused’s patrimony; consequently, it must be personal and seek retribution, for which proportionality must govern. Furthermore, it must seek the special preventive purpose upon the infracting person, and general prevention regarding society. As has already been indicated, this is not the treatment that our criminal legislation grants it; instead, it is situated as a civil consequence of the punishable act, therefore, the following considerations must govern: every civil consequence has the purpose of repairing the damage caused; therefore, its purpose has a private character. Moreover, the personal considerations of the criminal act do not govern, since joint or subsidiary liability can operate. These reasons lead us to conclude, just as [Name1] (op.cit, p. 384), that the confiscation is not a civil consequence of the punishable act.

It must be clarified that, although the figure of confiscation has been modernly introduced into legislation through the creation of special laws—articles 83 and 87 of the Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de uso no autorizado y actividades conexas—this obeys diverse purposes. The advancement as well as the complexity of the structure of criminal organizations that generate a great amount of economic resources impacts the economy; for this reason, the aim is to reduce illicit markets and thus protect the “licit” economy. Therefore, we estimate that the prevailing rules for the confiscation of the products of that prohibited activity do not apply in the consultation (consulta) being made here. Moreover, the regulation of confiscation in a special law supports the position that this institute is not a civil consequence of the crime.

II.- Now, properly regarding the application of the confiscation of vehicles in the crime of reckless driving, as typified in Article 254 bis of the Código Penal, we must keep the following in mind: our Constitución Política establishes the Social State of Law as the political model that governs us. This is deduced from constitutional principles that seek the greatest well-being of all the country’s inhabitants (Article 50). For this purpose, a series of principles are enshrined, such as the inviolability of private property—enshrined in Articles 17 of the Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos and 21.2 of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos—which can only be deprived solely for legally proven public interest and with prior indemnification (Article 45), with the penalty of confiscation being expressly prohibited (Article 40), the right to work, for which the State must ensure that everyone has an honest and useful occupation (Article 56). Added to this, Article 39 enshrines the principle of criminal legality, according to which penalties must be duly established by the legislator.

III.- By criminal policy, through Law No. 8696 titled “Reforma parcial de la Ley de Tránsito por vías terrestres,” published in La Gaceta No. 248 of December 23, 2008, Article 254 bis was introduced into the Código Penal. Said numeral textually reads: “A prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed upon anyone who drives under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five (0.75) grams of alcohol per liter of blood. A repeat offender shall be imposed a prison sentence of two (2) to eight (8) years. When a prison sentence of three (3) years or less is imposed, the court may substitute the custodial sentence with an alternative measure of community service (prestación de servicio de utilidad pública) that may range from two hundred (200) hours to nine hundred fifty (950) hours of service, in the places and manner indicated in Article 71 ter of the Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres.” As observed, this is a crime of endangerment, since its configuration does not require the production of a result. Because the use of a vehicle is necessary to carry out the action and because the confiscation operates ex lege in our legislation, once the crime is corroborated, the seizure of the motor vehicle in favor of the State proceeds, as it is the instrument with which the crime was committed. The only exception so that this consequence does not operate automatically is that the good is registered in the name of a third person, with which it is observed that the nature of this figure is not civil, as is enshrined in the law. This manner of applying the confiscation to the indicated goods has become an accessory penalty and, on occasions, more burdensome than the prison sentence itself, since if the latter is equal to or less than three years, the accused may become eligible for the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence or may request its substitution for community service. As an aggravating factor, we have that the majority of the country’s inhabitants belong to the middle or lower class, for which reason the vehicle is frequently used as a means of work, transportation, and recreation, not only for themselves, but for their families; therefore, the confiscation transcends the person of the infractor, to impact the entire family nucleus, which will see its standard of living diminished, as the work instrument passed into the hands of the State. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that, generally and given the economic level that prevails for the majority of the country’s inhabitants, the motor vehicles have been acquired through the effort and sacrifice of many years, and although driving while intoxicated as indicated by law is not justified, it is questionable that the State, which holds the monopoly on the production of alcoholic beverages, thereby encourages its consumption and, once citizens incur the crime of reckless driving, disproportionately and by way of penalty, deprives them of goods that constitute their private property and, on occasions, their work tool.

In summary, we observe frictions regarding the application of the confiscation in the crime of reckless driving typified in paragraph 4 of Article 254 bis of the Código Penal with the principles contained in the Constitución Política, namely: 1.- Although the confiscation is situated in the Código Penal as a civil consequence of the punishable act, this is contrary to its own nature, since there is no reparative purpose, as there is no particular victim to demand it. 2.- The confiscation applied in the indicated crime has become a particular form of confiscation (confiscación), since its property is transferred to the State. 3.- It has become an accessory penalty, upon which the criteria of rationality and proportionality do not govern, this because it is an ex delito consequence, and once guilt is demonstrated, unless the good belongs to a third party, the confiscation in favor of the State is imposed, which contravenes the principle of legality of penalties and the proportionality and rationality of sanctions. This consequence of the crime—in practice, a penalty—transcends the person of the criminal, to impact their family, which is deprived of its means of transportation and work, a measure contrary to the principles of the Social State of Law, which must ensure the best quality of life for the country’s inhabitants. 4.- It does not respond to a special preventive purpose, since the fact that the vehicle is seized from the infractor will not prevent them from driving another motor vehicle. The only purposes observed in the application of this measure are as an accessory penalty and as general prevention, since it deprives them of their property, which entails a detriment to the economic situation of the accused and their family, with only an intimidating purpose at the social level being visualized. In this way, the questioning arises whether ordering the confiscation in this crime is contrary to the purposes that govern our State of Law, in which the better distribution of wealth must be fostered and dignified work sought, as well as respect for private property, and whether it constitutes a veiled manner of imposing a penal sanction not provided for by the legislator and, therefore, without the parameters that should govern its quantification, such as rationality and proportionality, mediating. Furthermore, given the value of the confiscated goods, on occasions the sole patrimony of the active subject, it constitutes a confiscation, a figure expressly prohibited in numeral 40 of the Carta Magna. In this sense, we respectfully pose the consultation, for the purpose of establishing whether the application of the norm contained in Article 110 of the Código Penal regarding the crime of reckless driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages at the level provided for in Article 254 bis of the Código Penal is in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Constitución Política.

IV.- Consequently, the processing of the appeal (recurso) filed in this cause is suspended until the Sala Constitucional rules on this consultation. The parties are cited and summoned so that within three days they appear before said Chamber to assert their rights (articles 102, first paragraph, and 104 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).”      

“I.- […] A fin de determinar la constitucionalidad de la aplicación de esta figura en cuanto al delito de conducción temeraria, es de interés analizar someramente su naturaleza. Como ya se ha indicado su origen responde a la finalidad de privar al delincuente de los instrumentos utilizados para cometer el delito, por los resultados perjudiciales que ello produce para la sociedad, es decir rige un fin preventivo. Sobre los objetos que resultan o produce el delito, tal como documentos públicos falsos o alterados, vehículos con los números que los identifican borrados, el comiso obedece de igual forma a un fin preventivo, pues la seguridad obliga a su destrucción, pues en ellos, tal destino procede con independencia de la declaratoria de culpabilidad y de quien fuere el propietario o tenedor. Posteriormente ha recibido diferentes tratos, sin embargo tradicionalmente se le ha catalogado como pena accesoria o consecuencia obligada de toda sentencia condenatoria, también como medida de seguridad y como se ha indicado, últimamente como consecuencia civil. En cuanto a pena accesoria, afecta la propiedad privada, pues consiste en la privación de bienes a fin de causar una aflicción o un menoscabo en el patrimonio del imputado, en consecuencia, debe ser personal y buscar la retribución, para ello debe privar la proporcionalidad. Además debe buscar el fin preventivo especial, sobre la persona infractora y la prevención general, en cuanto a la sociedad. Como ya se ha indicado no es este el trato que le otorga nuestra legislación penal, sino que se ubica como consecuencia civil del hecho punible, por ende, deben regir las siguientes consideraciones: toda consecuencia civil tiene como fin reparar el daño causado, por ende, su finalidad tiene un carácter privado. Además no rigen las consideraciones personales del hecho delictivo, pues puede operar la responsabilidad solidaria o subsidiaria. Estas razones, nos llevan a concluir igual que [Nombre1] (op.cit, p. 384) que el comiso no es una consecuencia civil del hecho punible.

Debe hacerse la aclaración, que si bien, modernamente se ha introducido la figura del comiso en la legislación mediante la creación de leyes especiales -artículos 83 y 87 de la Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de uso no autorizado y actividades conexas-, ello obedece a fines diversos. El avance así como la complejidad de la estructura de las organizaciones criminales que generan gran cantidad de recursos económicos, repercute en la economía, por ello, se pretende reducir los mercados ilícitos y proteger así la economía "lícita". Por ello, estimamos que las reglas imperantes para el comiso de los productos de esa actividad prohibida, no aplican en la consulta que aquí se realiza. Además la regulación del comiso en una ley especial avala la posición de que este instituto no es una consecuencia civil del delito.

II.- Ya propiamente sobre la aplicación del comiso de vehículos en el delito de conducción temeraria tipificado en el artículo 254 bis del Código Penal, debemos tener presente lo siguiente: nuestra Constitución Política establece como modelo político que nos rige el Estado Social de Derecho. Ello se deduce de principios constitucionales que procuran el mayor bienestar de todos los habitantes del país (artículo 50). Para tal efecto, se consagran una serie de principios tales como la inviolabilidad de la propiedad privada -consagrado en los los artículos 17 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos y 21.2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos- la que puede ser privada únicamente por interés público legalmente comprobado y previa indemnización (artículo 45), quedando de forma expresa prohibida la pena de confiscación (artículo 40), el derecho al trabajo, para el cual el Estado debe procurar que todos tengan una ocupación honesta y útil (artículo 56). Aunado a ello, el artículo 39 consagra el principio de legalidad criminal, según el cual las penas deben estar debidamente establecidas por el legislador.

III.- Por política criminal mediante Ley N. 8696 titulada "Reforma parcial de la Ley de Tránsito por vías terrestres", publicada en la Gaceta N. 248 del 23 de diciembre de 2008, se introdujo el artículo 254 bis en el Código Penal. Dicho numeral textualmente reza "Se impondrá prisión de uno (1) a tres (3) años, a quien conduzca bajo la influencia de bebidas alcohólicas, cuando la concentración de alcohol en sangre sea mayor a cero coma setenta y cinco (0, 75), gramos de alcohol por cada litro de sangre. Al conductor reincidente se le impondrá una pena de prisión de dos (2) a ocho (8) años. Cuando se imponga una pena de prisión de tres (3) años o menos, el tribunal podrá sustituir la pena privativa de libertad por una medida alternativa de prestación de servicio de utilidad pública que podrá ser desde doscientas (200) horas hasta novecientas cincuenta (950) horas de servicio, en los lugares y la forma señalados en el artículo 71 ter de la Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres." Como se observa, este es un delito de peligro, ya que para su configuración no se requiere la producción de un resultado. Debido a que es necesario la utilización de un vehículo para realizar la acción y que el comiso opera ex lege en nuestra legislación, una vez corroborado el delito, procede la incautación del automotor a favor del Estado, pues es el instrumento con el cual se cometió el delito. La única salvedad para que esta consecuencia no opere de forma automática, es que el bien esté inscrito a nombre de una tercera persona, con lo que se observa que la naturaleza de esta figura no es civil, como se consagra en la ley. Esta forma de aplicar el comiso en los bienes indicados se ha convertido en una pena accesoria y en ocasiones más gravosa que la pena de prisión misma, pues si ésta es igual o inferior a tres años, el imputado puede hacerse acreedor del beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena o bien solicitar su sustitución por la prestación de servicio de utilidad pública. Como agravante tenemos que la mayoría de los habitantes del país pertenecemos a la clase media o baja, por ello con frecuencia se utiliza el vehículo como medio de trabajo, transporte y recreación, no sólo suya, sino de sus familias, por ende, el comiso trasciende la persona del infractor, para repercutir en todo el núcleo familiar, el que verá menoscabado su nivel de vida, pues el instrumento de trabajo pasó a manos del Estado. Además debe tenerse presente, que generalmente y dado el nivel económico que impera en la mayoría de los habitantes del país, los automotores han sido adquiridos mediante el esfuerzo y sacrificio de muchos años y si bien, no se justifica la conducción en estado de ebriedad conforme lo señala la ley, es cuestionable, que el Estado, quien tiene el monopolio en la producción de bebidas alcohólicas fomente con ello su consumo y una vez que los ciudadanos incurren en el delito de conducción temeraria, de forma desproporcionada y a manera de pena, les prive de bienes que constituyen su propiedad privada y en ocasiones la herramienta de trabajo.

En resumen, observamos roces en cuanto a la aplicación del comiso en el delito de conducción temeraria tipificado en el párrafo 4 del artículo 254 bis del Código Penal con los principios que contiene la Constitución Política a saber: 1.-Si bien, en el Código Penal se ubica el comiso como consecuencia civil del hecho punible, ello es contrario a su propia naturaleza, pues no existe un fin reparador, ya que no hay una víctima particular que lo demande. 2.-El comiso aplicado en el delito indicado, ha pasado a ser una forma particular de confiscación, pues su propiedad se transfiere al Estado. 3.-Se ha convertido en una pena accesoria, sobre la cual no rigen los criterios de racionalidad y proporcionalidad, ello por cuanto es una consecuencia ex delito y una vez demostrada la culpabilidad, salvo que el bien pertenezca a un tercero, se impone el comiso a favor del Estado, lo que contraría el principio de legalidad de las penas y la proporcionalidad y racionalidad de las sanciones. Esta consecuencia del delito -en la práctica, una pena- trasciende la persona del delincuente, para repercutir en su familia, la cual, se ve privada de su medio de transporte y de trabajo, medida contraria a los principios del Estado Social de Derecho que debe velar por la mejor calidad de vida de los habitantes del país. 4.- No responde a un fin preventivo especial, pues el hecho de que se le incaute el vehículo al infractor, no va a evitar que conduzca otro automotor. Los únicos fines que se observan en la aplicación de esta medida, es como pena accesoria y como prevención general, pues se está privando de su propiedad lo que conlleva un menoscabo en la situación económica del imputado y su familia, visualizándose únicamente un fin intimidatorio a nivel social. De esta forma, surge el cuestionamiento, si ordenar el comiso en este delito, es contrario a los fines que rigen nuestro Estado de Derecho, en el que se debe fomentar el mejor reparto de la riqueza y procurar un trabajo digno, así como el respeto de la propiedad privada y si constituye una forma solapada de imponer una sanción penal no prevista por el legislador y por ello, sin que medien los parámetros que deben regir en su cuantificación, tales como racionalidad y proporcionalidad. Además, dada la cuantía de los bienes comisados, en ocasiones el único patrimonio del sujeto activo, constituye una confiscación, figura expresamente prohibida en el numeral 40 de la Carta Magna. En ese sentido planteamos respetuosamente la consulta, a efectos de que se establezca si la aplicación de la norma contenida en el artículo 110 del Código Penal en cuanto al delito de conducción temeraria bajo la influencia de bebidas alcohólicas en el grado previsto en el artículo 254 bis del Código Penal, es acorde con los principios consagrados en la Constitución Política.

IV.- En consecuencia, se suspende el trámite del recurso interpuesto en esta causa hasta que la Sala Constitucional se pronuncie sobre la presente consulta. Se cita y emplaza a las partes para que dentro de tercero día concurran ante dicha Sala a hacer valer sus derechos (artículos 102 párrafo primero y 104 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).”