Judicial error and State liability following acquittal on reviewError judicial y responsabilidad del Estado por absolución en revisión

III.- Regarding the statute of limitations and prescription defense. In the closing arguments phase, the State representation reiterates the defenses of statute of limitations (caducidad) and prescription (prescripción) invoked at the preliminary hearing held on June 9, 2010, and which were rejected in the procedural stage by a resolution at 3 p.m. It points out that the statute of limitations is evident, given that if the plaintiff felt aggrieved by judicial actions, he should have filed the civil liability process against the judge provided for in canon 85 of the Civil Procedure Code. However, the 1-year period regulated by mandate 87 ibidem, at the time of filing the lawsuit, had expired. It points out, regarding prescription, that more than the four years established by precept 198 of the General Public Administration Law have elapsed since the condemnatory judgment became final.

On this matter, the following should be noted. In civil treasury proceedings, as established by numeral 41 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, the maximum period to initiate the process is the same period that the legal system provides as the prescription period for the substantive right. This entails an analysis in each case of the validity or not of the prescriptive period of the substantive right, such that as long as it is in force, the judicial avenue remains open. From this perspective, it is clear that in this matter, the statute of limitations of the action does not apply, but rather the prescription of the substantive right. In this line, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has expressed itself, among others, in ruling No. 654-2008 at 10:05 a.m. on September 26, 2008. Therefore, the statute of limitations defense must be rejected. The statute of limitations argument based on the expiration of the year provided for in numeral 87 of the aforementioned Code must meet the same fate. The present process is not one of civil liability of the judge provided for in ordinals 85 to 95 of the Civil Procedure Code, but rather one of State liability for the jurisdictional function, so the applicable rules are not those invoked by the State attorney, but those that will be stated later. Now, regarding prescription, it is clear that the applicable period for the prescription of liability for the exercise of the jurisdictional function is four years, due to the application of numeral 198 of the General Public Administration Law to this matter.

Although in the specific case of that jurisdictional function, no special rule is established that sets a specific period for these effects, it is necessary to carry out an integration of the legal system. In this sense, dynamically, faced with this gap, one must resort to examining the nature of the debated legal relationship in order to infer the most appropriate regulation. Thus, in the absence of an express rule in the specific matter subject to this ruling, by virtue of the principles of plenitude and coherence of the legal system, one must resort to integration mechanisms to resolve said gap and establish the most suitable period for this specialized matter. For this, it must be clear that the type of liability at issue is extracontractual in nature, which would make the application of statements regulating contractual prescription unviable. Being within the framework of State liability, the legal sources regulating similar aspects must be considered first. In that regard, among the different norms related to the matter of prescription, insofar as the point to be elucidated is the duty of reparation on the part of the State, the prescriptive space defined by the legal system for cases of State liability must be used as an integration mechanism. For this, one must start from the maxim that public liability is based on the general liability clause established by constitutional canon 9. It is evident that the legislative development of this topic has occurred with greater emphasis in the General Public Administration Law, a regulation that, apart from specific regulations in judicial or legislative matters, has become the referential basis for the treatment of the topic concerning the Legislative and Judicial Branches. Hence, due to the affinity of the matter, the closest rule regulating the prescriptive period is precept 198 of the General Public Administration Law, which establishes a four-year period for the prescription of the right to claim compensation. As the First Chamber indicated in the aforementioned ruling 654-2008: "In this way, if the legal system imposes, by special rule, a four-year period to claim from the State compensation for a harm it has caused with its conduct, attending to the principle of equality, for reasons of certainty and legal certainty, that same period is the one applicable when the detriment originates from the exercise of its jurisdictional functions. In this way, based on integrative mechanisms of Law, this collegiate body concludes that the applicable period is the four-year period indicated, as it corresponds to extracontractual State liability, which therefore, is usable in this case." Now, in the specific case, unlike what was argued by the State representative, the starting point of the cited prescriptive period is not the condemnatory judgment No. 327-2004 of April 15, 2004, nor its confirmation by cassation judgment No. 2004-01100 of September 10, 2004. The computation of this period must begin from the issuance and notification of the judgment issued in the review process that ordered the acquittal of the then-accused, namely, ruling No. 2006-00565 of June 7, 2006, notified on June 29 of that same year. It is with that jurisdictional determination that the plaintiff is in a position to establish that the effects of the prior judicial decisions that determined his guilt in the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay and ordered his imprisonment, have caused him, as he claims, harm due to judicial error that the State must indemnify. Before that factual circumstance, one cannot speak of the existence of an objective basis that allows establishing the liability claim now being resolved in this litigation, so starting the four-year period from dates prior to the due notification of the ruling issued in the review phase is contrary to the rules derived from the cited ordinal 198 of Law No. 6227 and exposes the person alleging a right to its expiration by the passage of time, without having the objective possibility of knowing the source of the harm and claiming its reparation. Ergo, it is from June 29, 2006, that the cited prescription period must be computed, so its expiration would occur on June 30, 2010. From the review of the case file, it is evident that the present lawsuit was filed on October 21, 2009, supplemented on November 4, 2009 (folios 1 and 26 of the main file). The State was notified of this process on December 3, 2009, according to the notification record visible at folio 37 of the judicial file. The foregoing makes it clear that the liability claim was filed and notified before the expiration of the prescriptive period. Therefore, the prescription defense raised by the State must be rejected.

IV.- State Liability for the Jurisdictional Function. Foundation of the regime. The core object of this process revolves around the determination of the existence or not of liability that, according to the plaintiff, arises from having served prison time due to judgment No. 327-2004 at 4 p.m. on April 15, 2004, of the Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, which declared him responsible for the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay, for which he was sentenced to a custodial sentence of 10 years, later confirmed by ruling No. 2004-01100 at 11:50 a.m. on September 10, 2004, of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. He points out that, by judgment No. 2006-00565 at 3:10 p.m. on June 7, 2006, that same Chamber, hearing an extraordinary motion for review, ordered his acquittal for the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay, ordering his release, if no other cause prevents it. He seeks compensation for the time he was imprisoned despite the fact that the aforementioned acquittal was later issued.

Given this subject matter, it is necessary to make a brief reference to core aspects regarding the liability of the State in its jurisdictional exercise, with special emphasis on that which may arise from a judicial error determined in a review process, under the terms of canon 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The relationships that occur between individuals and public authority centers are subject to a series of principles that configure the amalgam of rights and obligations attending each of the involved parties. In this dynamic, within the framework of the Social State of Law, numeral 11 of the Magna Carta establishes the so-called principle of legality (principio de legalidad) as the governing criterion of public functioning. It is a maxim that imposes the subjection of the State to the law, and by virtue of which, all public conduct must occur within the framework of legality, understood as the set of written and unwritten sources (according to the hierarchical scale of sources -article 7 ibidem) that regulate that functioning. The allusion to the State is made in its broad dimension, that is, the set of units that make up the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches, which includes constitutionally relevant bodies.

From this examination perspective, canon 9 of the Magna Carta establishes the general liability clause of the State, a norm that constitutes a basic guarantee allowing a person who, as a consequence of an action or omission of a public power center that has caused a harmful effect that they have no legal duty to bear, to demand reparation for that harmful effect. Likewise, it finds development and complement in the principle of legality (article 11), equity in the distribution of public burdens (ordinals 18 and 33), protection of consolidated legal situations and rights (precept 34), integral reparation of harm (article 41), protection of assets (canon 45), effective judicial protection (mandate 49), maxim of social solidarity (74 constitutional), liability of the presidential office (148 ibidem), liability of the Judicial Branch (154 and 166 ejusdem), liability of autonomous institutions (numeral 188). These norms constitute the bases of the referred system, which requires the economic reparation of pecuniary or non-pecuniary injuries occurring as a derivative of public conducts or omissions that the victim has no duty to bear. The fundamental basis of that liability has been a subject of development by the Constitutional Chamber, in its judgment no. 5981 at 3:41 p.m. on November 7, 1995. Indeed, such duty turns out to be the consequence of a constitutional system of guarantees that the Legal System grants to individuals and form the core structure of the rule of law, namely: legality, universal control of state conduct, distribution of functions, and a system of public liability.

The empowerment granted to the State for the fulfillment of its purposes, within the framework of its diverse functions, executive, legislative, and judicial, carries as a direct consequence the creation of a liability system that allows the reparation of harmful effects that its conduct may generate in the legal sphere of individuals, protection that includes, according to numeral 49 of the Magna Carta, subjective rights and legitimate interests. This subject has seen greater development in the case of the liability of the Public Administration, a topic even regulated in ordinals 170.1, 190 to 213 of the General Public Administration Law, and with broad evolution in national jurisprudence. On this matter, see, among many, ruling no. 584 at 10:40 a.m. on August 11, 2005, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. However, the same General Law indicated refers in article 194.3 to liability for the enactment of laws, opening the regulation for the attribution of liability for the parliamentary exercise of law-making. By parity of reason and based on those same constitutional norms already noted, the mentioned regime allows liability for legislative omission, laws declared unconstitutional, and the approval of international treaties. Of course, in each case, it is incumbent upon the affected party to prove the existence of effective, evaluable, and individualizable harm, as a prerequisite for the duty of reparation.

V.- This broad scheme of public liability is complemented by that which may arise against the State for its jurisdictional (not judicial) function. Fundamentally, this function is exercised mainly (not exclusively) by the Judicial Branch. According to what is established by mandate 153 of the Political Constitution, by virtue of that jurisdictional function, it corresponds to the Judicial Branch to resolve the conflicts of individuals, definitively, that is, with the authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada) and force of legal truth. Such jurisdictional exercise can also be observed in the processes that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal corresponds to resolve exclusively, in the so-called electoral jurisdiction. On this matter, canon 220 of the Electoral Code, Law No. 8765 assigns that jurisdictional competence in the following matters: a) The electoral amparo appeal, b) The challenge of agreements of political party assemblies in the process of constitution and registration, c) The action for nullity of party agreements, d) The electoral appeal, e) The demand for nullity concerning electoral results, f) The cancellation or annulment of credentials, and g) The complaint for partiality or political belligerence. Hence, not all functions that the legal system attributes and assigns to the Judicial Branch should be included within liability for the jurisdictional exercise. From that perspective, the core function of the judge is the control of legality and the application of Law for the solution of specific cases in order to materialize the principles of swift and complete justice and effective judicial protection. Ergo, if it holds that condition of guarantor of the Legal System, the Law must protect the necessary guarantees that allow the attribution of liability for judicial errors. It is clear that such typology of liability should not be confused with the civil liability of the judge for personal fault (falta personal), which regulates numerals 85 to 95, both inclusive, of the Civil Procedure Code. In this, it is a direct attribution to the male or female official, therefore, it adheres, within the framework of that regulation, to a subjectively oriented system, which requires proof of intent or gross negligence. Liability for the jurisdictional exercise surpasses that criterion. It extends to a duty that involves the State as such. In relation, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, among others, in ruling 1011-2006, established that the jurisdictional function is subject to the unavoidable limits imposed by the Legal System, so its exercise must be compatible and harmonious with the constitutional and legal precepts that, by virtue of its nature, it must apply to the specific cases being judged. The foregoing is derived from what is established by numerals 11 and 154 of the Magna Carta. In this conduct, it is clear that its actions, as long as they are arbitrary and contrary to Law, can generate harm to individuals, from which it derives and is justified that it is liable for those eventual consequences, provided that, within a framework of causality, it can be demonstrated that the harm is the result of arbitrary conduct contrary to Law. This has been established even by the Constitutional Chamber itself, an instance that on the subject of the liability of the Judicial Branch has pointed out, among others, in vote 5981 at 3:41 p.m. on November 7, 1995, the following: "V. OF THE OBJECTIVE LIABILITY OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH. PRINCIPLES. (…) The liability of the State derived from the exercise of the jurisdictional function must be governed in accordance with what is established in the Political Constitution itself and in the law, as provided in the Fundamental Charter in its article 154 (…): "The Judicial Branch is only subject to the Constitution and the Law, and the resolutions it issues in matters of its competence impose no other responsibilities than those expressly indicated by legislative precepts."; from which two basic conclusions are derived: 1.) First, it constitutes a constitutional principle the direct liability of the State in cases of judicial error and abnormal functioning of the administration of justice, which derives precisely from what is specifically provided in constitutional article 9, (…) in relation to constitutional articles 11, 33, 41 and 154, and which is consistent with the principles of the Social State of Law, precisely with that of the prohibition of arbitrariness of public powers, that of legal certainty and equality of all citizens before the law. This liability is justified by the fact that the function of judging is a manifestation of a Power, one of the three of the State, which implies its condition as a public service, an organization of material and personal means aimed at satisfying the social demand for justice. In this sense, in a State of Law, both the administrative function and the jurisdictional function constitute modes of execution of the law, and their only distinction lies in the effects; the courts of justice are responsible for the verification of facts and law through judgments that possess a special force, the own legal value called "res judicata" (cosa juzgada), by virtue of which it cannot be modified, discussed, withdrawn, retracted, except only through the remedies established in the law; the decision of the Administration does not have this force of legal truth recognized for res judicata. It must be clear that they are two distinct functions, both respond to distinct ends; while the administrative function is intended to provide for the needs of the community, the jurisdictional function has the purpose of consolidating public order with the solution of differences and the sanctioning of law violations; but that, equally, they are subject to the State's liability regime, because the harm caused by the exercise of any of these functions is attributable to an act of the State, and therefore, capable of engaging its liability. By virtue of what is provided in the transcribed articles 9 in relation to constitutional 153, in accordance with the general principle that 'anyone who causes an injury must repair it,' the Judicial Branch could not be exempted from liability for 'judicial error' in the exercise of the jurisdictional function. It should be noted that this objective liability of the State is a complement to the civil, criminal, and disciplinary liability to which the judge is subject, since these are not sufficient to properly guarantee the interests of the litigants, which, due to the difficulties for their enforcement, turn the possible claim into a veritable obstacle course, and in the majority of cases, leave aside and without protection those situations in which it is not possible to appreciate the intent or negligence of the judge. The liability must originate from intentional or negligent conduct of the jurisdictional body, whether or not constituting a crime (liability for fault).” On the subject, one may also consult, from that same Chamber, resolution no. 5207-2004, at 2:55 p.m. on May 18, 2004.

VI.- However, it is insisted, the proper liability of the Judicial Branch in the jurisdictional exercise must not be confused with the other facets of its competencies, which do not conform to that category. On one hand, arises that concerning the function of administration of justice, viewed as a public service. It is the duty to resolve conflicts objectively, swiftly, and timely. Included within this category are all those non-jurisdictional acts emanating from the offices that form part of what doctrine has called the “Judicial Branch organization”. That is, they are the bodies and organizational support that allow the exercise of the jurisdictional function properly speaking. It refers to the objective profiles of the jurisdictional function: organization and functioning of courts, efficient management of judicial offices, functions of administrative bodies. To this space must be added the jurisdictional bodies that by legal imperative perform a non-hierarchical comptroller function of a biphasic nature, improper, as currently done by the Contentious Administrative Tribunal regarding municipal matters, by imperative of mandate 189 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code. In this space, as it concerns non-jurisdictional matters, the rules on objective liability of the General Public Administration Law would be applicable. On a second plane, are located the auxiliary units that do not perform typical administrative activity, but that definitively cannot be considered a jurisdictional conduct. These are the so-called judicial actions. This is the case of the Judicial Investigation Agency, Public Ministry, Forensic Sciences, Public Defense, among others. These serve as support and fulfill an auxiliary role to the jurisdictional function, but their acts are not considered as jurisdictional insofar as they carry out the task of instruction and investigation. Their decisions are judicial acts stricto sensu. This distinction is evident in the regulations on criminal procedure. In precept 277 ibidem, it is established with complete clarity in its final paragraph, the impossibility for prosecutors to perform jurisdictional acts, as well as the restriction on judges, except with legal authorization, to carry out investigative acts. The same applies to the Public Ministry, whose functions can be observed in numerals 62, 275, 289, 290, and 291 of the Criminal Procedure Code, all related to its investigative and reporting powers. The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has taken note of this distinction, among others, in ruling No. 654-2008 at 10:45 a.m. on September 26, 2008. However, what is of interest in this case is that which is proper to that jurisdictional exercise, when it has incurred a judicial error. In this way, in this last scenario (relevant to the present case), as long as there exists an unlawful or illegitimate injury caused to the litigant, produced as a consequence of these competencies, the objective liability of the State as Judge is imposed. As has been said, the foregoing finds support in numerals 9, 11, 33, 41, and 154, all of the Magna Carta, norms that lay the foundations for liability for judicial error, the abnormal or illicit functioning of the jurisdictional function.

VII.- Now, apart from the discussion that may be generated around the need or not for the liability system for the jurisdictional exercise to require specific legal development, the truth of the matter is that in certain matters, the legislator has issued express rules that address the subject of that liability and its various prerequisites. It should be noted, however, that this Tribunal, in resolution No. 765-2008 of October 2, 2008, has already stated that regardless of the content of precepts 154 and 166 of the Magna Carta, which imply the necessary legislative production to be able to attribute liability for the jurisdictional function, that liability and its corresponding right to integral reparation of harm finds support in the same Law of the Constitution, in ordinals 11, 18, 33, 41, 45, 49, 50, 74, 188. In this line, the First Chamber, in the already cited ruling 1011-2006, indicated on the matter: "It has already been pointed out that said liability derives from the same framework of the Law of the Constitution, as a relevant counterbalance in the State's relations with individuals and as a factor of high importance in the equation of the State of Law. Ultimately, a guarantee in favor of the litigant, who turns to the Judicial Branch so that their conflict is resolved according to legality, thus depositing trust in that facet of the Public Power. The principle of state liability that emanates, as a general rule, from constitutional precept 9 and finds protection in other norms that safeguard the individual's guarantees, does not find exception frameworks. Although, in each sphere of that triple dimension of functions (executive, legislative, and judicial) nuances operate that require specific treatment in each context, the truth is that the Legal System does not incorporate exemption frameworks, outside reasonable assumptions when an unlawful injury is produced at its base, linked to a public conduct. The principles that arise from the Law of the Constitution give content to said liability, therefore, even the absence of legal regulation, which, although it may specify that regime, does not in any way limit the duty to indemnify, when pertinent according to Law. Hence, one could not sustain an 'impunity' of the State as Judge, under the basis that it lacks legal development, since that is established by principle, within the framework of the Constitution, at the same time that it would entail a violation of legal certainty, the principle of equality, and the control of arbitrariness of public powers. Thus seen, its recognition is not conditioned on the existence of a legal mandate that regulates it, ergo, what is provided in article 166 ibidem is not an obstacle. The aforementioned liability is governed by what is established in the Fundamental Charter, that is, it constitutes a principle of constitutional basis, imposed by the referred norms and which seeks the control of the exercise of said function and the protection of the rights and interests of the litigants." VIII.- Within that set of assumptions where there is legislative development on the subject, criminal law stands out, in which there are express rules, specifically, in numeral 271 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the case of liability for the imposition of arbitrary precautionary measures and the case of pretrial detention in a process in which a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) or acquittal with full demonstration of innocence is later ordered, canon 108 of the Criminal Code which regulates the eventual subsidiary liability of the State when, by virtue of a motion for review, the innocence of the defendant is declared when they obtain an acquittal judgment, after having suffered more than one year of pretrial detention, and finally, pursuant to 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which establishes public liability for the existence of judicial error proven in a judgment issued in a review process. These last manifestations are especially relevant to the case, being those that are applicable to the specific case and which, therefore, will be addressed later. However, it is necessary to specify the scope of the so-called judicial error. To do this, what was explained by the First Chamber in the aforementioned vote No.

654-2008 in the following sense: "Note that numeral 154 of the Magna Carta uses the term 'resolution' (*resolución*), thereby encompassing the different models that make up this category, be it a decree (*providencia*), order (*auto*), order having the force of a judgment (*auto con carácter de sentencia*), or judgment (*sentencia*) (numeral 153 of the Civil Procedure Code). On the other hand, it may occur, it is insisted, as a matter of principle, either through judicial error (*error judicial*) or through abnormal functioning (*funcionamiento anormal*). The former is a species of the broad genus of abnormal functioning, since, indeed, every judicial error theoretically presupposes an abnormality in that functioning (ultimately, the most significant manifestation), but not vice versa. Judicial error encompasses any jurisdictional decision that deprives a person of one of their rights or legitimate interests and that proves erroneous or contrary to law. Thus viewed, it is exclusive to the jurisdictional function, being, therefore, a modality of abnormal functioning that only fits within that dimension. The foregoing includes not only an error of fact (due to mistaken knowledge or assessment of the facts, a ruling is issued that does not conform to the factual reality and, for that reason, becomes unjust) but also an error of law (such as a violation of the Law due to its improper interpretation, erroneous application, or lack of application). At this point, despite the existence of an entire system of appeals against those decisions, the determining factor is that once the recognition of that judicial error has occurred, compensable damages must have been produced in the legal sphere of the person as a consequence of those deficiencies (causal link), in accordance with the Legal System. Ergo, the compensable error is not limited to the specific cases in which the legal system provides for such a consequence, nor to criminal matters, as in the present case, due to a precautionary measure that turns out to be improper, but on the contrary, its application transcends those circumstances to encompass the entirety of the jurisdictional function, that is, any resolution, regardless of the jurisdiction in which it is issued, may give rise to the State's duty to repair if it generates an unlawful damage." (Emphasis added) IX.- On the scope of judicial error (*error judicial*). Without prejudice to that alluded development, the following must be pointed out. Although judicial error allows for the reparation of the damage caused, it is essential to establish the implications of that term. The reparability referred to depends, inescapably, on the accreditation of the existence of a judicial error in that jurisdictional decision that has caused an unlawful injury at its base. For this, it must be clear that the simple fact that the recipient of the ruling does not share its content in no way implies the existence of that referred criterion of imputation. Indeed, as is rightly noted, judicial error encompasses any jurisdictional decision that deprives a person of one of their rights or legitimate interests and that proves erroneous or contrary to law. Note that this concept is different from abnormal functioning, for example, due to delay in the resolution of a specific case. In that latter variable, different rules apply from those specific to judicial error, which are not relevant in this proceeding. On the matter of interest (judicial error), it is indispensable that its existence has been demonstrated. The foregoing presupposes a declaration within the proceeding itself, or as part of it, within the appellate phases established by the legal system, which establishes the existence of an erroneous jurisdictional decision, contrary to law, whether by indirect violation (of fact or of law), or direct violation (by improper application, erroneous application, or defective interpretation), whether substantive or procedural. Nevertheless, the mere annulment or revocation of a resolution does not imply, per se, an error of this nature and much less a sort of automatic right to compensation. For this, several presuppositions arise that condition the reparability of the injury. On one hand, the error must be gross (*crasso*), that is, it must be a blatant, grave, and substantial defect. On this point, it is reiterated, the existence of the irregularity must be expressed through a resolution by the authority itself (via revocation or sua sponte nullity), or by an ordinary appellate instance, be it the appellate venue. A declaration through the exercise of extraordinary remedies is also feasible, be it through a cassation judgment or one issued by virtue of an extraordinary remedy of review. In essence, it is indispensable that there exists a jurisdictional declaration regarding a grave judicial error (within the same proceeding by the competent authority), detailing the aspects that determine that deficiency, an aspect that falls upon each of the instances that, given that appellate scheme, is responsible for hearing the matter. For this, it is necessary that the jurisdictional remedies or recourses offered by the legal system to challenge the resolution that, in the recipient's opinion, causes them damages, have been utilized. This is decisive since inertia regarding this right, despite the possibility granted by the normative body to cease the disturbance, leads to the effects of said ruling acquiring finality and, therefore, its implications in the legal sphere of the individual find support in a decision with the authority of material res judicata (*cosa juzgada material*) on which there has been no controversy within the proceeding, or at least not formally. It is clear that the absence of the exercise of appeals against the decision alleged, whether through the appropriate ordinary remedies (criteria of specificity of challenges) or through extraordinary ones, prevents, within the dynamic of the proceedings, another jurisdictional unit from reviewing the decision of the lower court and, in protection of the rights of the person subject to justice, suppressing that error that affects them, all due to the tacit acquiescence of the alleged affected party. On this point, it must be understood that the appellate scale, embodied in each procedural regime, is precisely a guarantee of due process and the tool that allows the person subject to justice to challenge the decision with which they do not agree. In this line, an error that can be compensated could not be constituted by one contained in a decision that has been challenged and has not taken effect, but only one that has generated effective, evaluable, and individualizable damage, thanks to a jurisdictional determination that has produced material effects with an injurious result for the recipient in the terms indicated. Of course, those resolutions that produce direct effects, despite having been challenged through ordinary mechanisms (remedy with a devolutive effect -v.gr., numeral 569 of the Civil Procedure Code-), allow for that pecuniary reparation insofar as a judicial error is accredited. The contrary, that is, supposing the possibility of alleging a judicial error in a proceeding on State liability, without there being a ruling by a superior authority, or by the same authority that has recognized its error (revocation or sua sponte nullity), would lead to allowing, through this type of civil fiscal proceedings, an attempt to analyze the legality of final jurisdictional decisions with the authority of res judicata, against the grain of the appellate system established by law and in complete disregard of the effects of that material res judicata. It should be remembered that resolutions with that hierarchy can only be analyzed through extraordinary remedies (review and cassation), so accepting the review of those conducts as a presupposition for a determination of the existence or not of judicial error not only breaks the security and legal certainty of res judicata but also invades the competencies proper to the Cassation Chambers, an aspect that, of course, this Court cannot share. It does not correspond to this Administrative Litigation Court to qualify the conducts of other jurisdictions in order to establish whether they were issued with judicial error or not. This would imply, it is insisted, the reflexive review of those criteria, a matter reserved for the competent appellate instances, and the exercise of a power that cannot be detached from the generic competence granted by Article 2, subsection b) of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code -which encompasses claims of liability against the Administration and in general against the State, in application of canon 49 of the Magna Carta-, therefore, without an enabling legal basis.

X.- It must be insisted, the error must be grave, evident, and gross. The mere circumstance that in the appellate or cassational instance a different legal criterion is chosen could not be considered a reparable judicial error. The decision must be openly arbitrary, openly contrary to the legality of the case, and so expressed in the ruling that revokes or annuls the lower court's criterion. The same applies when the new criterion is supported by allegations not expressed before the trial judge (provided they are matters that must be debated by the parties in application of the rogatory principle), or is founded on new evidence provided in the appellate phase. In those cases, the existence of a judicial error could not be affirmed when the questioned judgment was issued without having those elements of conviction or substantive arguments that can only be the subject of a pronouncement if they were debated by the parties (congruence), without this implying a disregard of the maxim iura novit curia. Therefore, the mere variation of a preceding criterion does not, as a general rule, lead to a compensable judicial error. A meticulous and casuistic examination of the particularities of each proceeding is necessary in order to establish whether that type of error has occurred that allows liability for the jurisdictional function to arise. For instance, a ruling ordering the auction of a property given as guarantee for a credit obligation already cancelled by set-off—a situation unknown to the judge despite the constant allegations of the alleged debtor and its accreditation within the case file, leading to a decision that the debt is not cancelled and ordering the auction of the real guarantee—does not merit the same treatment as the liability that can arise from the legal criterion of considering a certain faculty subject to a prescriptive term to be in force, which later, due to different legal assessments, the appellate court considers to be time-barred. In the first case, it is clear that a compensable error can be configured due to the disregard of a situation accredited in the case file, which produced, ultimately, the auction of the property. In the second, it involves different criteria and normative assessments, ultimately, the judge's independence of criterion, unless the aforementioned expiration is evident. There is no compensable judicial error for the mere dissonance of legal criterion; there must be a declaration of the existence of a grave mistake, generating damages to a third party. This is precisely the third aspect, that is, the accreditation that this criterion held to be mistaken produced a concrete damage. More simply, it must be specified that the existence of this right to reparation is subject, on one hand, to the resolution containing a possible judicial error having deployed its effects and, with them, having produced a detriment in the legal sphere of the affected party. As an additional aspect, it should be clarified that the compensable error is not limited to the hypothesis of the remedy of review, although it constitutes the case in which it can most likely be inferred. Nevertheless, as a matter of principle, what is usual is that it derives from a final jurisdictional decision possessing the authority of res judicata. Nor is it exclusive to the criminal jurisdiction. It is clear that it permeates the other jurisdictions, since, although criminal law is where the legal development of the figure is evident, that does not imply it cannot occur in the others. This criterion should not be confused with the abnormal functioning that occurs in the classic conception of lack of functioning, or defective or erroneous service. Thus viewed, it is a term of greater breadth, covering the already mentioned case of judicial error, but also the deficiencies that, in terms of deficient service or delay of justice, are linked, in principle, with the aspect of the administration of justice or the judicial function, therefore, regulated by the liability regime addressed in the General Law of the Public Administration. (On that precision, see the aforementioned judgment No. 654-2008 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice) XI.- On liability for judicial error (*error judicial*) accredited in a remedy of review. Having clarified the generalities of the system of liability for judicial error and the scope of judicial error, we proceed to examine the allegations raised in the specific case. The plaintiff bases his claim on what he considers liability of the State as adjudicator for the judicial error committed by having declared him guilty of the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay, sentencing him to ten years in prison through ruling No. 327-2004 of the Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José and later having been acquitted by resolution No. 2006-00565 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. In essence, he argues that the penalty was imposed on him without having taken the offered evidence consisting of the testimony of Joseph Molina Alfaro and Freddy Meléndez Pacheco. He accuses that he was acquitted without considering the error committed by the judges. He says that when he was tried, the only existing evidence was a report from the Municipal Police and the testimony of the complainant. He indicates that the judgment that convicted him did not refer to the impossibility of taking the offered testimonial evidence, leaving him in a state of defenselessness. He claims to have suffered an attack with a bladed weapon while he was incarcerated on March 13, 2005. He accuses that he deducted preventive detention time without any evidence indicating that he had committed the crime. He asserts that the criminalistic analysis report issued by the Department of Forensic Sciences of the Judicial Investigation Agency states that no male cells were detected and concluded that no evidence of the presence of semen was found. He explains that these elements did not compromise him and were not a sufficient basis to impose preventive detention on him, much less to hold him as the responsible perpetrator of the reported acts. The summarized allegations require entering into the analysis of the figure of compensation for judicial error by virtue of the acquittal issued in a remedy of review. As has been indicated in the previous sections, the liability of the State in its jurisdictional function requires the accreditation of abnormal functioning and, for what is relevant to the present proceeding, the demonstration of a judicial error that has been declared by the competent authorities within the appellate exercise applicable against the resolution. Such a declaration is inescapable, considering that it is not the purview of this Court to analyze the legality, appropriateness, or not of the final judicial pronouncements of other jurisdictional bodies, a matter that falls outside the competence of this jurisdiction and that only concerns the authorities to which such competence has been assigned. In this area, criminal procedural regulations govern the matter of liability for judicial error, specifically, when in the extraordinary review phase, it is determined that in the convicting judgment, an error of fact or law existed. On this particular, mandate 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code indicates: "When, as a result of the review of the proceeding, a judicial error is recognized, as a consequence of which the sentenced person served a sentence they should not have served, or a greater or more severe one than that which corresponded to them, the court hearing the review may order the payment of compensation by the State and at the instance of the interested party, provided that the latter has not contributed with willful misconduct or fault to producing the error./ The judges who issued the reviewed judgment shall be jointly and severally liable with the State when they have acted arbitrarily or with gross fault in the terms of Article 199 of the General Law of the Public Administration./ Civil reparation may only be granted in favor of the convicted person or their legitimate heirs." (Emphasis is not from the original) From the analysis of said regulation, the imperative necessity arises that the competent authority to hear the remedy of review, in this case, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, has recognized the existence of a judicial error. However, from a meticulous analysis of the case file, it does not appear that said Chamber, in judgment number 2006-00565 of 15 hours 10 minutes of June 7, 2006, decreed the existence of such a mistake, a presupposition of the reparation requested. In effect, the analysis expressed by that high Court reflects that the decreed acquittal was due to the acceptance of new testimonial evidence not weighed and taken in the trial phase or in the cassation venue, namely, the deposition of Freddy Meléndez Pacheco, which, once received, led the Court to consider that given the reasonable doubt as to whether the accused had committed or not the crime attributed to him, the appropriate course was acquittal. In that sense, it essentially ordered: "Confronted this testimonial evidence with the prosecution evidence examined in the judgment, from the two police officers who testified about what was narrated by the victim and from what was said by the injured party upon reporting, that he had been the object of a sexual attack by an unknown person, this Chamber finds that although it is not conclusively demonstrated that the fact did not exist or that the accused did not commit it, it does have the virtue of generating an important doubt about the circumstances in which the fact occurs. (...) Certainly, there is a medical-legal report revealing that the victim presents anal fissures, however, that in itself does not allow deriving the circumstances under which they were produced. As a corollary of the above, the evidence provided by the accused in the review does not make the fact disappear, but introduces a fundamental element that undermines the evidentiary bases that gave rise to the conviction, by calling into question the statements of the victim in his complaint, about not knowing the defendant and about the veracity of the fact attributed to the defendant, generating a doubt about what really happened. Our procedural and constitutional system requires that a conviction be supported by the certainty yielded by the evidence and as in this case, the evidence provided in the review, examined in relation to that received at trial, has left a doubt about the responsibility of the accused, compelling the application of Article 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code which establishes that in case of doubt on factual issues, one must rule in favor of what is most favorable to the accused. Consequently, it is appropriate to accept the review submitted, set aside the imposed conviction, and instead acquit the accused Jorge Brooks Casasola of the crime of rape attributed to him to the detriment of J.J.G.G. The freedom of the accused is ordered if no other cause prevents it." (Emphasis is not from the original) As observed, the acquittal result was based on a criterion of reasonable doubt and in dubio pro reo, derived from the incorporation of a new element of conviction not considered in the prior phases of the proceeding. Although the plaintiff argues that from the beginning of the criminal proceeding he offered the testimony of Mr. Freddy Meléndez Pacheco, which can be cross-checked in the minutes of the preliminary hearing held at 15 hours on February 27, 2004, folios 139-141 of the certification of criminal case file No. 03-013207-0042-PE, and that the failure to take such evidence caused defenselessness and later judicial error, the truth of the matter is that in the order opening trial of 16 hours 04 minutes of February 27, 2004, regarding those testimonial proofs it was indicated: "Testimonial. (...) Although it is true the defense mentioned the interview of Messrs. Freddy Meléndez Pacheco and Francisco Jiménez Elizondo as grounds for the request for provisional dismissal, the truth is that they did not offer them as testimonial evidence (...)" (Folio 144 of the criminal case file). No disagreement was formulated against that decision, neither in the oral and public trial held at 8 hours 40 minutes on April 1, 2004 (folios 163-168 of the criminal case file), nor in the cassation appeal that runs on folios 181-200 of the criminal dossier. It was not until the remedy of review that the plaintiff offered the witness Freddy Meléndez Pacheco as new evidence. In resolution No. 2005-01525 of 9 hours 35 minutes on September 23, 2005, the Third Chamber admitted the remedy of review regarding the mentioned offer of new testimony (folios 308-310 of the criminal dossier). Ultimately, as has been indicated, weighing the testimonial deposition together with the other evidence contained in the criminal case file, it ordered the acquittal of the accused due to doubt, thereby ordering his release. The foregoing implies that the plaintiff did not formally offer the evidence later incorporated in the review proceeding, nor did he timely challenge the judge's criterion of not considering the statements of Freddy Meléndez Pacheco and Francisco Jiménez Elizondo as testimonial evidence. From the foregoing, it is deduced that the criterion for ordering acquittal was the weighing of that new evidence offered and admitted (Article 408, subsection e of the Criminal Procedure Code). However, that does not imply, as the plaintiff affirms, a judicial error. The new criterion is supported by the assessment of demonstrative aspects that were not present in the convicting judgment. Note that even the criterion of the Trial Court was confirmed by the Third Chamber through resolution No. 2004-01100, reflecting that the factual and legal assessment made with the evidence existing in the case file at that time was in accordance with law. This accredits that in this case, there has been no declaration of the existence of a judicial error. The ruling of that high Court in a review proceeding does not speak of such an error, nor can this Chamber infer it from the analysis of the case file. From that standpoint, the reparation requested is unfeasible, given that the basic presupposition to order it is absent, that is, the inescapable criterion of imputation for such purposes.

XII.- From that standpoint, in the absence of judicial error (*error judicial*) and by virtue of the cause for acquittal, it is the criterion of this Chamber that compensation is not appropriate for the imprisonment to which the plaintiff was subjected, nor for the preventive detention imposed at the time. Regarding the former, it is clear that the imprisonment to which the plaintiff was exposed as a derivation of the convicting judgment and its confirmation in the cassation venue cannot constitute a parameter for compensation in the terms requested. This is because it was the reasonable doubt about the commission of the illicit act that motivated his release, a product of the weighing of evidence not available during the oral and public trial, for which, in the terms already set forth, the convicting judgment was in accordance with law. It was only upon the issuance of the ruling in the review phase, and as a consequence of assessments of new evidence elements, that he is acquitted, which implies that the imprisonment ordered based on that first ruling, confirmed on cassation, was supported by a judicial ruling upon which, ultimately, the concurrence of a judicial error was not demonstrated. From that standpoint, the imprisonment was the result of the application of a final jurisdictional ruling, which was endorsed by the same Third Chamber upon hearing the cassation appeal filed by the plaintiff and which, therefore, implies the effectiveness of a resolution on which no irregularity in the factual, evidentiary, or legal analysis was detected. Although acquittal was later ordered for the reasons already exhaustively discussed, this does not mean that those decisions were erroneous with clear judicial error, and to that extent, the imprisonment imposed, as an effect of those, is not a basis for possible reparation under a criterion of liability for judicial error. Thus, it cannot be constituted as a parameter to justify the intended compensation. The same occurs with the mentioned preventive detention. For the purposes of numeral 108 of the Criminal Code, the precautionary measure of a personal nature subject to comment cannot be considered unfounded. It does not appear from the case file that the measures of preventive detention and their respective extensions were ordered arbitrarily. Quite the contrary, each of the resolutions issued in that sense, that is, the ruling of 11 hours 40 minutes on July 13, 2003 (Folios 8-14 of the criminal case file), resolution of 16 hours 30 minutes on October 13, 2003 (Folios 42-45 of the criminal case file), were confirmed by the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by resolutions of 8 hours 30 minutes on August 1, 2003, and No. 999-03 of 14 hours 30 minutes on October 22, 2003, respectively. The determination of 15 hours 45 minutes on January 13, 2004, is equally well-founded; once again, the Criminal Court of San José decreed the extension of preventive detention for a period of three months, expiring on April 13, 2004. In all these resolutions, an analysis of the presuppositions allowing for this type of personal precautionary measure is set forth, in accordance with ordinals 238 and 239, both of the Criminal Procedure Code. In this line of exposition, the eventual liability provided for in Article 108 mentioned earlier is only viable when the acquittal ordered in a review proceeding was based on criteria of full demonstration of innocence. Otherwise, that is, when it was based on the presumption of innocence, national case law has understood that preventive detention constitutes an important tool for the dynamic of preliminary investigations and the proper conduct of the criminal proceeding. In that line, resolution No. 115 of 14 hours 30 minutes on November 11, 1998, of the First Chamber, cited in ruling No. 1011-2006 of that high Court, analyzing the applicability of the liability referred to in numeral 108 of the Criminal Code, interpreted: "VIII.- The referred article of the Criminal Code, in light of what is set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, would only be applicable in the event there is preventive detention and subsequently the innocence of the accused is fully demonstrated. Only under this circumstance could the deprivation of liberty, resulting from a necessary judicial investigation, be considered unjustified and susceptible to reparation. Otherwise, the action of justice, in terrains as rugged and sinister for society as drug trafficking currently is, would be ostensibly hindered. (...) When the acquittal is obtained, as occurs in this case, by virtue of the application of the principle 'in dubio pro reo', obviously the innocence has not been indubitably demonstrated. (...) Therefore, as set forth in paragraph IV, in those cases there are indeed sufficient reasons to conduct the investigation of the illicit act and, consequently, to take all necessary measures provided for in our legal system for those purposes. Among them, preventive detention. Within those circumstances, such measures are not illegitimate, as the plaintiff argues." "Therefore, they cannot generate liability for the State or its servants." Ergo, given the lack of proof of full demonstration of innocence and the non-occurrence of a judicial error in this case, the compensation is inappropriate, also on that ground.

III.- On the defense of lapsing (caducidad) and statute of limitations (prescripción). In the conclusions phase, the State's representation reiterates the defenses of lapsing (caducidad) and statute of limitations (prescripción) invoked in the preliminary hearing held on June 9, 2010, which were rejected in the procedural stage by a ruling at 3:00 p.m. It points out that the lapsing (caducidad) is evident, since if the plaintiff felt aggrieved by judicial actions, he should have filed the process of civil liability of the judge provided for in canon 85 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). However, the 1-year period regulated by mandate 87 of the same Code, at the time of filing the lawsuit, has expired. It points out, regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción), that from the finality of the conviction, more than the four years established by precept 198 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) have elapsed. On this particular matter, the following should be noted. In civil treasury processes, as established by numeral 41 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), the maximum period to initiate the process is the same as that established by the legal system as the statute of limitations period for the substantive right. This implies an analysis in each case of the validity or not of the prescriptive period of the substantive right, so that as long as this is in force, the judicial avenue is available. From this perspective, it is clear that in this area, lapsing (caducidad) of the action does not operate, but rather the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the substantive right. In this line, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has expressed itself, among others, in ruling No. 654-2008 of 10:05 a.m. on September 26, 2008. Therefore, the defense of lapsing (caducidad) must be rejected. The same fate should befall the allegation of lapsing (caducidad) due to the expiration of the year provided for in numeral 87 of the aforementioned Code. This process is not one of civil liability of the judge provided for in ordinals 85 to 95 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), but one of State liability for jurisdictional function, so the applicable rules are not those invoked by the State's attorney, but those that will be stated below. Now, regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción), it is clear that the applicable period for the prescription of liability for the exercise of the jurisdictional function is four years, by application to that matter of numeral 198 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Although in the specific case of that jurisdictional function no special rule is established setting a specific period for those purposes, it is necessary to carry out an integration of the legal system. In this sense, in the dynamic, faced with this gap, one must resort to examining the nature of the legal relationship debated, in order to deduce the most compatible regulation. Thus, given the absence of an express rule in the specific matter subject to this ruling, by virtue of the principles of completeness and coherence of the legal system, integration mechanisms must be used to resolve said gap and establish the most appropriate period for this specialized area. To do this, it must be clear that the type of liability alleged is of an extracontractual nature, which would make the application of provisions regulating contractual prescription unfeasible. In dealing with the framework of State liability, the legal sources regulating similar aspects must first be considered. To that extent, among the various rules pertaining to the matter of prescription, insofar as the point to be elucidated is the duty of reparation by the State, the prescriptive period defined by the legal system for cases of State liability must be used as an integration mechanism. For this, one must start from the maxim that public liability is based on the general clause of liability established by constitutional canon 9. It is evident that the legislative development of this topic has occurred with greater emphasis in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), a regulation which, aside from specific regulations in judicial or legislative matters, has become the reference base for the treatment of the topic regarding the Legislative Branch and the Judicial Branch. Hence, due to the affinity of the matter, the closest rule regulating the prescriptive period is precept 198 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which establishes a four-year period for the prescription of the right to claim compensation. As the First Chamber (Sala Primera) indicated in the aforementioned ruling 654-2008: "In this way, if the legal system imposes, by special rule, a four-year period to claim from the State compensation for a damage it has caused by its conduct, attending to the principle of equality, for reasons of certainty and legal security, that same period is the one applicable when the detriment arises from the exercise of its jurisdictional functions. Thus, based on integrative mechanisms of Law, this collegiate body concludes that the applicable period is the indicated four-year one, as it corresponds to State extracontractual liability, which is therefore usable in this case." Now, in this case, contrary to what the State's representative argued, the starting point of said prescriptive period is not the conviction No. 327-2004 of April 15, 2004, nor its confirmation by cassation judgment No. 2004-01100 of September 10, 2004. The beginning of the computation of that period must be taken from the issuance and notification of the judgment issued in the review process (proceso de revisión) that orders the acquittal of the then-defendant, that is, ruling No. 2006-00565 of June 7, 2006, notified on June 29 of that same year. It is with that jurisdictional determination that the plaintiff is in a position to establish that the effects of the judicial precedents that ordered his culpability for the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay and ordered his imprisonment, have caused him, according to his statement, damage due to judicial error that the State must compensate. Before that factual circumstance, one cannot speak of the existence of an objective basis that allows establishing the claim for liability now being settled in this litigation, so making the four-year period run from dates prior to the proper notification of the ruling issued in the review phase is contrary to the rules derived from the cited ordinal 198 of Law No. 6227 (Ley No. 6227) and exposes the person who claims to have a right to its expiration over time, without having the objective possibility of knowing the source of the damage and claiming its reparation. Ergo, it is from June 29, 2006, that the cited statute of limitations period must be computed, so its expiration would occur on June 30, 2010. From the review of the case file, it is determined that this lawsuit was filed on October 21, 2009, corrected on November 4, 2009 (folios 1 and 26 of the main file). The State was notified of this process on December 3, 2009, according to the notification record visible on folio 37 of the judicial file. The foregoing makes it evident that the liability claim was filed and notified before the expiration of the prescriptive period. Therefore, the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) raised by the State must be rejected.

IV.- Liability of the State for jurisdictional function. Basis of the regime. The core object of this process revolves around determining the existence or not of liability that, according to the plaintiff, arises from having served prison time due to judgment No. 327-2004 at 4:00 p.m. on April 15, 2004, of the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, which declared him responsible for the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay, for which he was sentenced to a prison term of 10 years, later confirmed by ruling No. 2004-01100 at 11:50 a.m. on September 10, 2004, of the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia). He points out that, by judgment No. 2006-00565 at 3:10 p.m. on June 7, 2006, that same Chamber, hearing an extraordinary review appeal (recurso extraordinario de revisión), ordered his acquittal for the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay, ordering his release, if no other cause prevents it. He requests compensation for the time he was imprisoned despite the fact that the aforementioned acquittal was later issued. Given this subject matter, it is necessary to make a brief reference to core aspects regarding State liability in its jurisdictional exercise, with special emphasis on that which may arise from a judicial error determined in a review process (proceso de revisión), in the terms of canon 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal). The relationships that occur between individuals and public authority centers are subject to a series of principles that configure the amalgam of rights and obligations applicable to each of the parties involved. In this dynamic, within the framework of the Social State of Law, numeral 11 of the Magna Carta (Carta Magna) establishes the so-called principle of legality as a guiding criterion for public functioning. This is a maxim that imposes the submission of the State to law, and by virtue of which, all public conduct must occur within the framework of legality, understood as the set of written and unwritten sources (according to the hierarchical scale of sources - article 7 of the same) that regulate that functioning. The reference to the State is made in its broad dimension, that is, the set of units that make up the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches, which includes bodies of constitutional relevance. From this angle of examination, canon 9 of the Magna Carta (Carta Magna) establishes the general liability clause of the State, a norm that is constituted as a basic guarantee that allows a person who, as a consequence of an action or omission of a public power center that has caused them a harmful effect that they have no legal duty to bear, to demand reparation for that harmful effect. Likewise, it finds development and complement in the principle of legality (article 11), equity in the distribution of public burdens (ordinals 18 and 33), protection of legal situations and consolidated rights (precept 34), integral reparation of damage (article 41), patrimonial indemnity (canon 45), effective judicial protection (mandate 49), maxim of social solidarity (74 constitutional), liability of the presidential office (148 of the same), liability of the Judicial Branch (154 and 166 of the same), liability of autonomous institutions (numeral 188). These norms constitute the bases of the referred system, which requires the economic reparation of patrimonial or non-patrimonial injuries occurring as a derivation of public conducts or omissions, which the victim has no duty to bear. The fundamental basis of that liability has been a subject of development by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in its judgment no. 5981 at 3:41 p.m. on November 7, 1995. Indeed, such duty turns out to be the consequence of a constitutional regime of guarantees that the Legal System grants to individuals and forms the core structure of the rule of law, namely: legality, universal control of State conducts, distribution of functions, and a system of public liability. The empowerment granted to the State for the fulfillment of its purposes, within the framework of its various functions—executive, legislative, and judicial—carries as a direct consequence the creation of a liability system that allows the reparation of the harmful effects that its conduct may generate in the legal sphere of individuals, protection that comprises, as stated by numeral 49 of the Magna Carta (Carta Magna), subjective rights and legitimate interests. This topic has had greater development in the case of the liability of the Public Administration (Administración Pública), a topic even regulated in ordinals 170.1, 190 to 213 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and with extensive evolution in national jurisprudence. On this matter, see, among many, ruling no. 584 at 10:40 a.m. on August 11, 2005, of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia). However, the same General Law mentioned refers in article 194.3 to liability for the issuance of law, opening the regulation for the attribution of liability for the parliamentary exercise of law creation. By parity of reasoning and based on those same constitutional norms already pointed out, the mentioned regime allows for liability for legislative omission, law declared unconstitutional, and the approval of international treaties. Of course, in each case, it is necessary for the affected party to prove the existence of an effective, assessable, and individualizable damage, as a prerequisite for the duty of reparation.

V.- This broad scheme of public liability is complemented by that which may arise against the State for its jurisdictional function (which is not judicial). Fundamentally, this function is exercised primarily (not exclusively) by the Judicial Branch. According to what is established by mandate 153 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), by virtue of that jurisdictional function, it corresponds to the Judicial Branch to resolve the conflicts of individuals, in a definitive manner, that is, with the authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada) and force of legal truth. Such jurisdictional exercise can also be observed in the processes that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) is exclusively responsible for deciding, in the so-called electoral jurisdiction. On this matter, canon 220 of the Electoral Code (Código Electoral), Law No. 8765 assigns that jurisdictional competence in the following matters: a) The electoral habeas corpus appeal (recurso de amparo electoral), b) The challenge of agreements of assemblies of political parties in the process of constitution and registration, c) The action of nullity of party agreements, d) The electoral appeal appeal (recurso de apelación electoral), e) The claim of nullity related to electoral results, f) The cancellation or annulment of credentials, and g) The complaint for partiality or political belligerence. Hence, not all functions that the legal system attributes and assigns to the Judicial Branch should be included within the liability for jurisdictional exercise. From that perspective, the core function of the judge is the control of legality and the application of Law for the solution of specific cases in order to materialize the principles of swift and complete justice and effective judicial protection. Ergo, if they hold that condition of guarantor of the Legal System, the Law must protect the necessary guarantees that allow the attribution of liability for judicial errors. It is clear that such typology of liability should not be confused with the civil liability of the judge for personal fault, which is regulated by numerals 85 to 95, both inclusive, of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). In this case, it is a direct attribution to the official, therefore, it adheres, within the framework of that regulation, to a subjective orientation system, which requires proof of fraud (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). The liability for jurisdictional exercise surpasses that criterion. It extends to a duty that involves the State as such. In this regard, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), among others, in ruling 1011-2006, established that the jurisdictional function is subject to the unavoidable limits imposed on it by the Legal System, so that its exercise must be compatible and harmonious with the constitutional and legal precepts that by virtue of its nature, it must apply to the specific cases being judged. The foregoing follows from what is established by numerals 11 and 154 of the Magna Carta. In this proceeding, it is clear that its actions, insofar as they are arbitrary and contrary to Law, can generate damages to individuals, from which it derives and is justified that it is responsible for those eventual consequences, provided that within a framework of causality, it can be demonstrated that the damage is the result of arbitrary conduct contrary to Law. The Constitutional Chamber itself has even established this, an instance which, on the topic of Judicial Branch liability, has stated, among others, in vote 5981 at 3:41 p.m. on November 7, 1995, the following: "V. OF THE OBJECTIVE LIABILITY OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH. PRINCIPLES. (…) The liability of the State derived from the exercise of the jurisdictional function must be governed in accordance with what is established in the Political Constitution itself and in the law, as provided in the Fundamental Charter (Carta Fundamental) in its article 154 (…): 'The Judicial Branch is only subject to the Constitution (Constitución) and the Law (Ley), and the resolutions it issues in matters of its competence impose no other liabilities than those expressly indicated by legislative precepts.'; from which two basic conclusions are derived: 1.) In the first place, the direct liability of the State in cases of judicial error and abnormal functioning of the administration of justice constitutes a constitutional principle, which derives precisely from what is specifically provided in constitutional article 9, (…) in relation to constitutional articles 11, 33, 41 and 154, and which is consistent with the principles of the Social State of Law, precisely with that of the prohibition of arbitrariness of public powers, that of legal security, and equality of all citizens before the law. This liability is justified by the fact that the function of judging is a manifestation of a Power, one of the three of the State, which implies its condition of public service, of organization of material and personal means destined for the satisfaction of the social demand for justice. In this sense, in a State of Law, both the administrative function and the jurisdictional one constitute modes of execution of the law, and their only distinction lies in the effects; the courts of justice are responsible for the verification of facts and law through judgments that possess a special force, the own legal value called 'res judicata' (cosa juzgada), by virtue of which it cannot be modified, discussed, withdrawn, retracted, except only through the remedies established in the law; the decision of the Administration (Administración) does not have this force of legal truth recognized to res judicata. It must be clear that they are two distinct functions, both respond to different purposes; while the administrative function is destined to provide for the needs of the community, the jurisdictional function has the purpose of consolidating public order by solving differences and sanctioning violations of the law; but that, equally, they are subject to the State liability regime, since the damage caused by the exercise of any of these functions is attributable to an act of the State, and therefore, capable of compromising its liability. By virtue of what is provided in the transcribed articles 9 in relation to constitutional article 153, in accordance with the general principle that 'whoever causes an injury must repair it,' the Judicial Branch could not be exempted from liability for 'judicial error' in the exercise of the jurisdictional function. It should be noted that this objective liability of the State is a complement to the civil, criminal, and disciplinary liability to which the judge is subject, since these are not sufficient to adequately guarantee the interests of those subject to justice, which due to the difficulties for its enforcement, turn the possible claim into a true obstacle course, and in the majority of cases, leaves aside and without protection those situations in which it is not possible to appreciate the fraud (dolo) or negligence (culpa) of the judge. The liability must arise from fraudulent or negligent conduct of the jurisdictional body, whether or not it constitutes a crime (liability for fault)." On the subject, one may also consult, from that same Chamber, resolution no. 5207-2004, at 2:55 p.m. on May 18, 2004.

VI.- However, it must be reiterated, the liability proper to the Judicial Branch in jurisdictional exercise should not be confused with the other facets of its competencies, which do not fall into that category. On one hand, the liability concerning the function of administration of justice, visualized as a public service, arises. This concerns the duty to resolve conflicts in an objective, swift, and timely manner. Included within this category are all those non-jurisdictional acts emanating from the offices that form part of what doctrine has termed the "Judicial Branch organization." That is, these are the bodies and organizational support that allow the exercise of the jurisdictional function itself. It refers to the objective profiles of the jurisdictional function: organization and functioning of courts, efficient management of offices, functions of administrative bodies.

In this space must be added the jurisdictional organs that by legal imperative perform a non-hierarchical improper oversight function of a biphasic nature, as is currently done by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo with respect to municipal matters, by imperative of mandate 189 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. In this space, as it concerns non-jurisdictional matters, the rules on strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) of the Ley General de la Administración Pública would be applicable. On a second plane are located the auxiliary units that do not perform typical administrative activity, but which, definitively, cannot be considered a jurisdictional proceeding. These are the so-called judicial actions. This is the case of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, Ministerio Público, Ciencias Forenses, la Defensa Pública, among others. These serve as support and fulfill an auxiliary role to the jurisdictional function, but their acts are not considered jurisdictional insofar as they carry out the task of instruction and investigation. Their decisions are judicial acts stricto sensu. This distinction is evident in the regulations on criminal procedure. In precept 277 ibidem it is established with complete clarity in its final paragraph, the impossibility of prosecutors performing jurisdictional acts, as well as the restriction of judges, except by legal authorization, to carry out investigative acts. The same occurs with the Ministerio Público, whose functions can be observed in numerals 62, 275, 289, 290, and 291 of the Código Procesal Penal, all related to its powers of investigation and complaint. This distinction has been noted by la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, among others, in ruling No. 654-2008 of 10 hours 45 minutes on September 26, 2008. However, what is of interest in this particular is that which is proper to that jurisdictional exercise, when it has incurred in judicial error. In this way, in this last scenario (relevant to the present case), as long as there exists an unlawful or illegitimate injury caused to the justiciable, produced as a consequence of these competencies, the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) of the State as Judge is imposed. As has been said, the foregoing finds support in numerals 9, 11, 33, 41, and 154, all of la Carta Magna, norms that lay the foundations of liability for judicial error, the abnormal or illicit functioning of the jurisdictional function.

**VII.-** Now then, aside from the discussion that may be generated around the necessity or not of the system of liability for jurisdictional exercise requiring specific legal development, the truth of the matter is that in certain matters, the legislator has issued express norms that deal with the topic of that liability and its diverse presuppositions. It is worth indicating, nevertheless, that this Tribunal, in resolution No. 765-2008 of October 2, 2008, has stated that apart from the content of precepts 154 and 166 of la Carta Magna, which imply the necessary legislative production to be able to impute liability for the jurisdictional function, that liability and its corresponding right to integral reparation of the damage finds support in the very law of la Constitución, in ordinals 11, 18, 33, 41, 45, 49, 50, 74, 188. In that line, la Sala Primera, in ruling 1011-2006 already cited, indicated on this particular: "*It has already been pointed out that said liability derives from the same framework of the Law of la Constitución, as a relevant counterweight in the relations of the State with individuals and as a factor of high transcendence in the equation of the Rule of Law. Ultimately, a guarantee in favor of the justiciable, who turns to the Judicial Branch so that their conflict is resolved in accordance with legality, thus depositing trust in that aspect of Public Power. The principle of state liability that emanates, as a general rule, from constitutional precept 9 and finds protection in other norms that safeguard the guarantees of the individual, does not find exception frameworks. Although in each sphere of that triple dimension of functions (executive, legislative, and judicial) nuances operate that require specific treatment in each context, the truth of the matter is that the Legal System does not incorporate frameworks of dispensation, outside of reasonable cases when an unlawful injury is produced at its base, linked to a public proceeding. The principles that arise from the Law of la Constitución give content to said liability, therefore, even the absence of legal regulation, which, although it may specify that regime, does not limit in any way the duty to indemnify, when pertinent in accordance with Law. Hence, one could not sustain an “impunity” of the State as Judge, under the basis that it lacks legal development, since that liability is established by principle, within the framework of la Constitución, while also supposing a breach of legal certainty, the principle of equality, and the control of arbitrariness of public powers. Seen this way, its recognition is not conditioned on the existence of a legal mandate that regulates it, ergo, the provision in Article 166 ibidem is not an obstacle. The aforementioned liability is governed by what is established in la Carta Fundamental, that is, it constitutes a principle of constitutional basis, imposed by the referred norms and that seeks the control of the exercise of said function and the protection of the rights and interests of the justiciables.*" **VIII.-** Within that set of cases in which there exists legislative development on the topic, criminal matters stand out, in which there are express rules, specifically, in numeral 271 of the Código Procesal Penal for the case of liability for the issuance of arbitrary precautionary measures and the case of pretrial detention in a process in which afterward a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) or acquittal with full demonstration of innocence is ordered, canon 108 of the Código Penal that regulates the eventual subsidiary liability of the State when, by virtue of a petition for review (recurso de revisión), the innocence of the accused is declared when they obtained an acquittal sentence, after having suffered more than one year of pretrial detention, and finally, in accordance with 419 of the Código Procesal Penal, which fixes public liability for the existence of judicial error accredited in a sentence issued in a review process. These last manifestations are especially relevant to the case, being that they are those that result applicable to the specific case and that therefore, will be addressed below. Nevertheless, it is necessary to specify the scope of what is termed judicial error. For this, the explanation given by la Sala Primera in the aforementioned vote No. 654-2008 must be brought up in the following sense: "*Note that numeral 154 of la Carta Magna uses the term “resolution” (resolución), with which, the different models that make up this category are comprised, be it, procedural orders (providencia), court orders (autos), court orders with character of sentence (autos con carácter de sentencia), and sentences (sentencias) (numeral 153 Código Procesal Civil). On the other hand, it can occur, it is insisted, in thesis of principle, as much by judicial error as by abnormal functioning (funcionamiento anormal). The former is a species of the common genus of abnormal functioning, for indeed, every judicial error supposes, theoretically, an abnormality in that functioning (ultimately, the most transcendent manifestation), but not the reverse. Judicial error comprises every jurisdictional decision that deprives the person of one of their rights or legitimate interests and that results erroneous or contrary to law. Seen this way, it is exclusive to the jurisdictional function, being then, a modality of abnormal functioning that only fits in that dimension. The foregoing comprises not only error of fact (due to mistaken knowledge or valuation of the facts, a ruling is issued that is not adjusted to the factual reality and which, for such, becomes unjust), but also of law (as a breach of Law due to its improper interpretation, erroneous application, or lack of application). **At this point, despite the existence of an entire system of appeals against those decisions, what is determining is that once the recognition of that judicial error has been given, damages indemnifiable in accordance with the Legal System must have been produced in the legal sphere of the person, as a consequence of those deficiencies** (causal link). Ergo, the indemnifiable error is not limited to the specific cases in which the legal system foresees said consequence, nor to criminal matters, as the present, for a precautionary measure that becomes improper, but on the contrary, its application transcends those circumstances to encompass the totality of the jurisdictional function, that is, any resolution, regardless of the jurisdiction in which it is issued, can derive in the duty of reparation by the State if it generates an unlawful injury.*" (The highlighting is added) **IX.- On the scope of judicial error.** Without prejudice to that alluded development, it is necessary to point out the following. Although judicial error permits the reparation of the damage caused, it is fundamental to establish the implications of that term. The reparability (reparabilidad) referred to depends, unavoidably, on the accreditation of the existence of a judicial error in that jurisdictional decision that has caused an unlawful injury at its base. For this, it must be clear that the simple fact that the recipient of the ruling does not share its content, does not in any way suppose the existence of that referred criterion of imputation. In effect, as is well pointed out, judicial error comprises every jurisdictional decision that deprives the person of one of their rights or legitimate interests and that is erroneous or contrary to law. Note that this concept is different from abnormal functioning, for example, due to delay in the resolution of a specific case. In that last variable, different rules apply from those proper to judicial error, which are not relevant in this process. In the issue of interest (judicial error), it is indispensable that its existence has been demonstrated. The foregoing supposes a declaration within the process itself, or else, as part of it, within the appellate (recursivas) phases established by the legal system, which establishes the existence of an erroneous jurisdictional decision, contrary to law, be it by indirect violation (of fact or of law), or else direct (by improper application, erroneous application, or defective interpretation), be it substantive or procedural. Nevertheless, the mere annulment or revocation of a resolution does not imply, per se, an error of this nature and much less a sort of automatic right to indemnification. For this, several presuppositions arise that condition the reparability of the injury. On one hand, the error must be gross (crasso), that is, it must be a palpable, serious, and substantial defect. At this point, it is reiterated, the existence of the irregularity must be expressed through a resolution of the authority itself (via revocation or ex officio nullity), or from an ordinary instance of appeal (instancia de alzada ordinaria), be it, the appellate venue (sede apelativa). Also feasible is the declaration through the exercise of extraordinary remedies, be it through a cassation sentence (sentencia de casación) or one issued by virtue of an extraordinary petition for review. In essence, it is indispensable that there exists a jurisdictional declaration regarding a serious judicial error (within the same process by the competent authority), with detail of the aspects that determine that deficiency, an aspect that falls to each of the instances that, given that appellate scheme, has competence to hear the matter. For this, it is necessary that the remedies or jurisdictional remedies offered by the legal system to challenge the resolution that, in the recipient's opinion, causes them damages have been utilized. This is determining since the inertia in this right, despite the possibility granted by the normative plexus to cease the disturbance, leads to the effects of said ruling acquiring finality (firmeza) and therefore, its implications in the legal sphere of the individual finding support in a decision with authority of substantive res judicata (cosa juzgada material) on which there has been no controversy within the process, or at least not formally. It is clear that the absence of an appellate exercise against the decision that is alleged, be it through ordinary admissible remedies (criterion of appeal taxativeness, taxatividad impugnaticia) or through extraordinary ones, prevents within the dynamics of the processes, another jurisdictional unit from reviewing the decision of the lower court (A quo), and in protection of the rights of the justiciable, suppresses that error that affects them, all due to the tacit consent of the supposed affected party. At this point, it must be understood that the appellate scale, embodied in each procedural regime, is precisely a guarantee of due process and the tool that allows the justiciable to challenge the decision with which they disagree. In this line, an indemnifiable error could not be configured from one contained in a decision that has been challenged and that has not had effects, but only that which has generated an effective, assessable, and individualizable damage, thanks to a jurisdictional determination that has produced material effects with a harmful result to the recipient in the terms noted. Of course, those resolutions that have direct effects, despite having been challenged by ordinary mechanisms (remedy in devolutive effect -v.gr., numeral 569 of the Código Procesal Civil-), as long as a judicial error is accredited, permit that pecuniary reparation. The contrary, that is, supposing the possibility of alleging a judicial error in a process of State liability, without there existing a ruling from a superior authority, or from the same authority that has recognized its error (revocation or ex officio nullity), would lead to allowing through these types of civil treasury processes, an attempt to analyze the legality of final jurisdictional decisions, with authority of res judicata, against the grain of the appellate system fixed by law and in complete disregard of the effects of that substantive res judicata. It is worth recalling that resolutions with that hierarchy can only be analyzed through extraordinary remedies (review and cassation), therefore accepting the review of those conducts as a presupposition of a determination of existence or not of judicial error, not only breaches the security and legal certainty of res judicata, but also invades the competencies proper to the Salas de Casación, an aspect that, of course, this Tribunal cannot share. It does not correspond to this Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo to qualify the conducts of other jurisdictions in order to establish whether they were issued with judicial error or not. That would imply, it is insisted, the reflexive review of those criteria, a topic that is reserved to the competent appellate (recursivas) instances, and the exercise of a power that cannot be detached from the generic competence granted by Article 2, subsection b) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo –which comprises claims of liability against la Administración and generally against the State, in application of canon 49 of la Carta Magna–, therefore, without an enabling legal basis.

**X.-** It is worth insisting, it is necessary that the error be serious, evident, and gross. The sole circumstance that in the appellate or cassation instance, a different legal criterion is chosen could not be considered a reparable judicial error. It is necessary that the decision be openly arbitrary, openly contrary to the legality of the case, and so expressed in the ruling that revokes or annuls the criterion of the lower court (A quo). The same occurs when the new criterion is supported by allegations not expressed before the instance judge (as long as they are issues that must be debated by the parties in application of the rogatory principle), or is based on novel evidence provided in the appellate phase. In those cases, the existence of a judicial error could not be affirmed when the questioned sentence was issued without having those elements of conviction or substantive arguments that can only be the object of a pronouncement if they were debated by the parties (consistency, congruencia), without that implying a disregard of the maxim iura novit curia. Therefore, the mere variation of a preceding criterion does not generally lead to an indemnifiable judicial error. A meticulous and casuistic examination of the particularities of each process is necessary in order to establish whether that type of error has been produced that allows liability for the jurisdictional function to arise. For example, a ruling that orders the auction of an asset given as guarantee for a credit obligation already canceled by compensation, a situation unknown to the judge despite the constant allegations of the supposed debtor and their accreditation within the case file, to resolve that the debt is not canceled, ordering the auction of the real guarantee, does not merit the same treatment as the liability that can be produced by the legal criterion of considering in force a certain faculty subject to a statute of limitations (plazo prescriptivo), which later, due to diverse legal valuations, the reviewing court (Ad quem) considers is prescribed. In the first case, it is clear that an indemnifiable error can be configured due to the disregard of a situation accredited in the record, which produced, ultimately, the auction of the asset. In the second, it concerns diverse criteria and normative valuations, in the end, independence of the judge's criterion, unless the alluded expiry is evident. There is no indemnifiable judicial error for the mere dissonance of legal criteria; there must be a declaration of the existence of a serious mistake, generating damages to a third party. This is precisely the third aspect, that is, the accreditation that this criterion, held to be mistaken, produced a specific damage. More simply, it must be specified that the existence of that right to reparation is subject, on one hand, to the resolution containing a possible judicial error having deployed its effects and with them, having produced a detriment in the legal sphere of the affected party. As an additional aspect, it should be specified, the indemnifiable error is not limited to the hypothesis of the petition for review (recurso de revisión), although it constitutes the case in which it can most probably be discerned. Nevertheless, in thesis of principle, what is usual is that it derives from a final jurisdictional decision possessing authority of res judicata. Neither is it exclusive to criminal jurisdiction. It is clear that it permeates the other jurisdictions, for indeed, although criminal matters are those in which the legal development of the figure is evidenced, that does not imply that it cannot occur in the others. This criterion should not be confused with the abnormal functioning that occurs in the classic conception of lack of functioning, defective performance, or erroneous performance. Seen this way, it is a term of greater breadth, which covers the already commented case of judicial error, but in addition, the deficiencies that in terms of deficient performance or delay of justice, are linked, in principle, to the aspect of administration of justice or the judicial function, therefore, regulated by the liability regime treated in the Ley General de la Administración Pública. (On that specification, see the aforementioned sentence No. 654-2008 of la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) **XI.- On liability for judicial error accredited in a petition for review.** Having specified the generalities of the system of liability for judicial error and the scope of judicial error, we enter into the examination of the claims raised in the specific case. The claimant bases their claim on what they consider the liability of the State as judge for the judicial error committed by having declared them guilty of the crime of rape (violación) to the detriment of Juan José García Garay, sentencing them to ten years of prison through ruling No. 327-2004 of the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) of the First Judicial Circuit of San José and later having been acquitted by resolution No. 2006-00565 of la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. In the core, they argue, the penalty was imposed on them without having processed the offered evidence consisting of the testimony of Joseph Molina Alfaro and Freddy Meléndez Pacheco. They accuse, they were acquitted without taking into account the error committed by the judges. They say, when they were tried, the only existing evidence was a report from la Policía Municipal and the testimony of the complainant. They indicate, in the sentence that convicted them, no reference was made to the impossibility of evacuating (inevacuabilidad) the testimonial evidence offered, leaving them in a state of defenselessness. They assert having suffered an attack with a bladed weapon when they were incarcerated on March 13, 2005. They accuse having deducted pretrial detention without elements of proof indicating they had committed the crime. They assert, the criminalistic analysis report issued by the Departamento de Ciencias Forenses of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial indicates that no male cells were detected and concluded that no evidence of the presence of semen was found. They state, those elements did not compromise them and were not sufficient basis to impose pretrial detention and much less to hold them as the responsible author of the reported events. The summarized claims require entering into the analysis of the figure of indemnification for judicial error by virtue of the acquittal issued in a petition for review. As has been pointed out in the previous sections, the liability of the State in its jurisdictional function requires the accreditation of an abnormal functioning and, for what is relevant to the present process, the demonstration of a judicial error that has been declared by the competent authorities within the appellate exercise applicable against the resolution. Such declaration is unavoidable, considering that it is not the resort of this Tribunal to analyze the legality, appropriateness, or not of the final judicial pronouncements of other jurisdictional organs, a matter that escapes the competence of this jurisdiction and that only concerns the authorities to which such competence has been assigned. In this area, the criminal procedural regulations govern the issue of liability for judicial error, specifically, when in the extraordinary review phase, it is determined that in the conviction sentence, there existed an error of fact or of law. On this particular, mandate 419 of the Código Procesal Penal indicates: “***When due to the review of the procedure a judicial error is recognized**, as a consequence of which the sentenced person served a sentence they should not have served, or a greater or more severe one than corresponded to them, the court hearing the review may order the payment of indemnification charged to the State and at the request of the interested party, provided that the latter has not contributed with intent (dolo) or fault (culpa) to produce the error./ The judges who issued the reviewed sentence will be jointly and severally (solidariamente) liable with the State, when they have acted arbitrarily or with gross fault (culpa grave) in the terms of Article 199 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública./ Civil reparation may only be agreed in favor of the convicted person or their legitimate heirs.*” (The highlighting is not from the original) From the analysis of said regulations, the imperative need emerges that the competent authority to hear the petition for review, in this case, la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, has recognized the existence of a judicial error. However, from a meticulous analysis of the case records, it does not emerge that said Chamber, in sentence number 2006-00565 of 15 hours 10 minutes on June 7, 2006, decreed the existence of such mistake, a presupposition of the reparation requested. In effect, the analysis expressed by that high Tribunal reflects that the decreed acquittal was due to the acceptance of a new testimonial proof that was not weighed and processed in the trial phase nor in the cassation venue (sede casacional), that is, the deposition of Freddy Meléndez Pacheco, which, once received, led the Tribunal to consider that given the reasonable doubt of whether the accused had committed or not the crime attributed to them, what was appropriate was acquittal.

In that sense, in its core reasoning it held: "<i>Confronting this testimonial evidence with the prosecution evidence examined in the judgment, from the two police officers who testified about what was related by the victim and about what was stated by the injured party upon reporting that he had been the object of a sexual attack by an unknown person, this Chamber finds that although it is not conclusively demonstrated that the act did not occur or that the accused did not carry it out, it does have the virtue of generating significant doubt about the circumstances in which the act occurred. (...) Certainly, there is a medical-legal opinion that reveals that the victim presents anal fissures; however, this in itself does not allow deriving the circumstances in which they were produced. <u>As a corollary of the foregoing, the evidence provided by the accused in the review does not make the act disappear, but it introduces a fundamental element that undermines the evidentiary bases that gave rise to the conviction</u>, by calling into question the statements of the injured party in his report, regarding not knowing the defendant and regarding the truthfulness of the act attributed to the defendant, generating doubt about what really occurred. Our procedural and constitutional system requires that a conviction be supported by the certainty yielded by the evidence, and <u>since in this case, the evidence provided in the review, examined in relation to that received at trial, has left doubt as to the responsibility of the accused, it obliges the application of article 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code which establishes that when in doubt on questions of fact, one must resolve in favor of the most favorable outcome for the accused.</u> Consequently, it is appropriate to accept the review filed, set aside the conviction imposed, and instead acquit the accused Jorge Brooks Casasola for the crime of rape attributed to him to the detriment of J.J.G.G. The release of the accused is ordered if no other cause prevents it.</i>" (The highlighting is not from the original) As can be seen, the result of acquittal was based on a criterion of reasonable doubt and in dubio pro reo (in dubio pro reo), derived from the incorporation of a new element of conviction that was not taken into account in the prior phases of the proceeding. Although the claimant alleges that from the beginning of the criminal proceeding he offered the testimony of Mr. Freddy Meléndez Pacheco, which can be verified in the record of the preliminary hearing held at 3:00 p.m. on February 27, 2004, folios 139-141 of the certification of criminal case file No. 03-013207-0042-PE, and that because such evidence was not adduced, defenselessness and then judicial error (error judicial) were caused, the truth of the matter is that in the order opening trial issued at 4:04 p.m. on February 27, 2004, regarding those witness items of evidence it was stated: "<b><i>Testimonial.</i></b><i> (...) While it is true that the defense mentioned the interview of Messrs. Freddy Meléndez Pacheco and Francisco Jiménez Elizondo as grounds for the request for provisional dismissal, it is true that it did not offer them as testimonial evidence (...)</i>" (Folio 144 of the criminal case file) No disagreement was raised against that decision either in the oral and public hearing held at 8:40 a.m. on April 1, 2004 (folios 163-168 of the criminal case file), or in the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) that appears at folios 181-200 of the criminal file. It was only in the review remedy (recurso de revisión) that the claimant offered witness Freddy Meléndez Pacheco as new evidence. In resolution No. 2005-01525 of 9:35 a.m. on September 23, 2005, the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) admitted the review remedy regarding the aforesaid offering of new testimony (folios 308-310 of the criminal file). Ultimately, as has been indicated, weighing the testimonial deposition, together with the other items of evidence that were in the criminal case record, it ordered the acquittal of the accused based on doubt, ordering his release. The foregoing implies that the claimant did not formally offer the evidence that he later incorporated in the review proceeding, nor did he timely question the trial judge's criterion of not considering the statements of Freddy Meléndez Pacheco and Francisco Jiménez Elizondo as testimonial evidence. From the foregoing, it is inferred that the criterion for ordering the acquittal was the weighing of that new evidence offered and admitted (article 408, subsection e of the Criminal Procedure Code). However, that does not entail, as the plaintiff claims, a judicial error (error judicial). The new criterion is supported by the assessment of evidentiary aspects that were not present in the conviction judgment. It should be noted that even the criterion of the Trial Court was confirmed by the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) through resolution No. 2004-01100, reflecting that the factual and legal assessment carried out with the evidence existing in the case file at that time was in accordance with law. This confirms that in this specific case, no declaration of the existence of a judicial error (error judicial) has existed. The ruling of that high Court in the review proceeding does not speak of such an error, nor can this Chamber derive it from the analysis of the records. From that standpoint, the requested remedy is unfeasible, given that the basic prerequisite for ordering it is absent, that is, the unavoidable element of imputation for such purposes. </span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:17.0pt;line-height:150%'><span style='font-family:Arial;color:#010101'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class=SpellE><b>XII</b></span><b>.-</b> From that standpoint, in the absence of judicial error (error judicial) and by virtue of the cause of acquittal, it is the criterion of this Chamber that no compensation is appropriate for the imprisonment to which the plaintiff was subjected, nor for the preventive detention (prisión preventiva) imposed at the time. Regarding the former, it is clear that the imprisonment to which the actor was subjected as a result of the conviction judgment and its confirmation at the cassation (casacional) stage, cannot be considered as a basis for compensation in the terms requested. </span><span style='font-family:Arial'>This is because reasonable doubt about the commission of the unlawful act was what motivated the release, as a result of the weighing of an item of evidence that was not available at the oral and public hearing, such that, in the terms already stated, the conviction judgment was in accordance with law. It was only upon the issuance of the ruling in the review phase, and as a consequence of assessments of new elements of evidence, that he was acquitted, which implies that the imprisonment ordered based on that first ruling, confirmed at cassation (casación), was protected by a judicial decision regarding which, ultimately, the concurrence of judicial error (error judicial) was not demonstrated. <span style='color:#010101'>From that standpoint, the imprisonment was the result of the application of a final jurisdictional decision, which was upheld by the same Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) upon hearing the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by the plaintiff, and which therefore implies the effectiveness of a resolution regarding which no irregularity in the factual, evidentiary, or legal analysis was detected. Although the acquittal was subsequently ordered for the reasons extensively discussed, this does not mean that those prior decisions were mistaken due to clear judicial error (error judicial), and to that extent, the imprisonment imposed, as an effect of those decisions, is not a basis for possible redress under the criterion of liability for judicial error (error judicial). </span>Thus, it cannot constitute a basis to justify the intended compensation. <span style='color:#010101'>The same occurs with the aforementioned preventive detention (prisión preventiva). For the purposes of numeral 108 of the Penal Code, the personal precautionary measure in question cannot be considered unfounded. I</span>t cannot be deduced from the case records that the preventive detention (prisión preventiva) measures and their respective extensions were ordered arbitrarily. Quite the contrary, each of the resolutions issued in that regard, that is, the ruling at 11:40 a.m. on July 13, 2003, (Folios 8-14 of the criminal case file), the resolution at 4:30 p.m. on October 13, 2003 (Folios 42-45 of the criminal case file), were confirmed by the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José), by resolutions at 8:30 a.m. on August 1, 2003 and No. 999-03 at 2:30 p.m. on October 22, 2003, respectively. Equally substantiated is the determination at 3:45 p.m. on January 13, 2004, where, again, the Criminal Court of San José (Juzgado Penal de San José) decreed the extension of preventive detention (prisión preventiva) for a period of three months, expiring on April 13, 2004. In all those resolutions, an analysis of the prerequisites that accommodate this type of personal precautionary measure is presented, in accordance with articles 238 and 239, both of the Criminal Procedure Code. In this vein, the potential liability provided for in article 108 mentioned previously is only viable when the acquittal ordered in a review proceeding was based on criteria of full demonstration of innocence. Otherwise, that is, when it was based on the presumption of innocence (presunción de inocencia), national jurisprudence has understood that preventive detention (prisión preventiva) constitutes an important tool for the dynamics of preliminary investigations and the proper conduct of the criminal process itself. In this line, resolution No. 115 at 2:30 p.m. on November 11, 1998, of the First Chamber (Sala Primera), cited in ruling No. 1011-2006 of that high Court, analyzing the applicability of the liability referred to in numeral 108 of the Penal Code, interpreted: <i>“VIII.- The referred article of the Penal Code, in light of what was stated in the immediately preceding recital, would only be applicable in the event of there being preventive detention (preventiva) and, subsequently, the innocence of the accused is fully demonstrated. Only under this circumstance, could the deprivation of liberty, arising from a necessary judicial investigation, be deemed unjustified and susceptible to compensation. Otherwise, the action of justice, in areas as treacherous and sinister for society as drug trafficking is currently, would be manifestly hindered. (...) When acquittal is obtained, as occurs in this specific case, by virtue of the application of the principle “in dubio pro reo” (in dubio pro reo), obviously innocence has not been indubitably demonstrated. (...) Therefore, as stated in recital IV, in such cases there are sufficient reasons to carry out the investigation of the unlawful act and, consequently, to take all necessary measures, provided for in our legal system for those purposes. Among them, preventive detention (prisión preventiva). Within such assumptions, such measures are not illegitimate, as the plaintiff alleges. Therefore, they cannot generate liability for the State or its servants.” </i>Ergo, given the lack of accreditation of full demonstration of innocence and the non-concurrence of a judicial error (error judicial) in this case, the remedy is also inappropriate for this reason.</span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> </div> </body> </html> Hence, due to the affinity of the subject matter, the closest rule regulating the prescriptive period is precept 198 of the General Law of Public Administration, which establishes a four-year period for the prescription of the right to claim compensation. As indicated by the First Chamber in the aforementioned ruling 654-2008: "<i>Thus, if the legal system imposes, by special norm, a period of four years to claim from the State compensation for a harm it has caused by its conduct, in observance of the principle of equality, for aspects of certainty and legal certainty, that same period is the one applicable when the detriment arises from the exercise of its jurisdictional functions. Thus, based on integrative mechanisms of Law, this collegiate body concludes that the applicable period is the indicated four-year period, as it corresponds to State extracontractual liability, which is therefore usable in this case.</i>" Now then, in the specific case, contrary to what was argued by the State representative, the starting point of the cited prescriptive period is not the conviction judgment No. 327-2004 of April 15, 2004, nor its confirmation by cassation judgment No. 2004-01100 of September 10, 2004. The commencement of the computation of that lapse must be taken from the issuance and notification of the judgment rendered in the review process that orders the acquittal of the then accused, that is, ruling No. 2006-00565 of June 7, 2006, notified on June 29 of that same year. It is with that jurisdictional determination that the plaintiff finds himself in a position to establish that the effects of the preceding judicial decisions that found him guilty of the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay and ordered his imprisonment, have caused him, according to him, a harm by judicial error that the State must compensate. Before that factual circumstance, one cannot speak of the existence of an objective basis allowing the establishment of the claim of liability now being settled in this litigation, such that making the four-year period run from dates prior to the due notification of the judgment issued in the review phase is contrary to the rules derived from the cited ordinal 198 of Law No. 6227 and exposes whoever alleges to have a right to its extinguishment by the passage of time, without having the objective possibility of knowing the source of the harm and claiming its reparation. Ergo, it is from June 29, 2006, that the cited statute of limitations period must be computed, such that its expiration would occur on June 30, 2010. From the review of the case records, it is evident that the present claim was filed on October 21, 2009, corrected on November 4, 2009 (folios 1 and 26 of the principal file). The State was notified of this process on December 3, 2009, according to the notice of service deed visible at folio 37 of the judicial file. The foregoing makes it evident that the liability claim was filed and notified before the expiry of the prescriptive period. Therefore, the defense of prescription raised by the State must be rejected.

**IV.- State Liability for jurisdictional function.** **Basis of the regime.** The core object of this process revolves around the determination of the existence or not of liability which, according to the plaintiff, arises from having served prison time due to judgment No. 327-2004 at 4:00 p.m. on April 15, 2004, of the Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, which declared him responsible for the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay, for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 years, later confirmed by ruling No. 2004-01100 at 11:50 a.m. on September 10, 2004, of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. He indicates, by judgment No. 2006-00565 at 3:10 p.m. on June 7, 2006, that same Chamber, hearing an extraordinary review appeal, ordered his acquittal for the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay, ordering his release, if no other cause prevents it. He requests compensation for the time he was imprisoned despite the fact that the aforementioned acquittal was later ordered. Given this subject matter, it is necessary to make a brief reference to core aspects regarding State liability in its jurisdictional exercise, with special emphasis on that which may arise from a judicial error determined in a review process, in the terms of canon 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The relationships that arise between individuals and centers of public authority are subject to a series of principles that configure the amalgam of rights and obligations attending each of the parties involved. In this dynamic, within the framework of the Social State of Law, numeral 11 of the Magna Carta establishes as a guiding criterion of public functioning the so-called principle of legality. It is a maxim that imposes the subjection of the State to the law, and by virtue of which, all public conduct must occur within the framework of juridicity, understood as the set of written and unwritten sources (according to the hierarchical scale of sources - article 7 ibid.) that regulate this functioning. The allusion to the State is made in its broad dimension, that is, the set of units that make up the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches, which includes organs of constitutional relevance. From that angle of examination, canon 9 of the Magna Carta establishes the general clause of State liability, a norm that constitutes a basic guarantee that allows a person who, as a consequence of an action or omission of a center of public power that has caused a pernicious effect which they have no legal duty to bear, to demand reparation for that harmful effect. Likewise, it finds development and complement in the principle of legality (article 11), equity in the distribution of public burdens (ordinals 18 and 33), protection of legal situations and consolidated rights (precept 34), full reparation of harm (article 41), patrimonial indemnity (canon 45), effective judicial protection (mandate 49), maxim of social solidarity (74 constitutional), liability of the presidential office (148 ibid.), liability of the Judicial Branch (154 and 166 ejusdem), liability of autonomous institutions (numeral 188). These norms constitute the bases of the referred system, which requires the economic reparation of patrimonial or extra-patrimonial injuries occurring as a derivation of public conducts or omissions that the victim has no duty to bear. The fundamental basis of this liability has been a subject of development by the Constitutional Chamber, in its judgment no. 5981 at 3:41 p.m. on November 7, 1995. Indeed, such a duty turns out to be the consequence of a constitutional regime of guarantees that the Legal System grants to individuals and form the core structure of the rule of law, that is: legality, universal control of state conduct, distribution of functions, and a system of public liability. The empowerment granted to the State for the fulfillment of its purposes, within the framework of its diverse functions—executive, legislative, and judicial—carries as a direct consequence the creation of a liability system that allows the reparation of harmful effects that its conduct may generate in the legal sphere of individuals, a protection that encompasses, according to numeral 49 of the Magna Carta, subjective rights and legitimate interests. This topic has had greater development in the case of the liability of the Public Administration, a subject even regulated in ordinals 170.1, 190 to 213 of the General Law of Public Administration, and with a broad evolution in national jurisprudence. On this point, one may see, among many, ruling no. 584 at 10:40 a.m. on August 11, 2005, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. However, the same General Law mentioned refers in article 194.3 to liability for the issuance of law, opening the regulation for the imputation of liability for the parliamentary exercise of law-making. By parity of reasoning and based on those same constitutional norms already noted, the mentioned regime allows liability for legislative omission, law declared unconstitutional, and the approval of international treaties. Of course, in each case, it is necessary for the affected party to prove the existence of an effective, assessable, and individualizable harm, as a prerequisite for the duty of reparation.

**V.-** This broad scheme of public liability is complemented by that which may arise against the State for its jurisdictional (not judicial) function. Fundamentally, this function is exercised mainly (not exclusively) by the Judicial Branch. In accordance with what is established by mandate 153 of the Political Constitution, by virtue of this jurisdictional function, it corresponds to the Judicial Branch to resolve the conflicts of individuals definitively, that is, with the authority of res judicata and force of legal truth. Such jurisdictional exercise can also be observed in the processes that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal must exclusively settle, in the so-called electoral jurisdiction. On this point, canon 220 of the Electoral Code, Law No. 8765 assigns that jurisdictional competence in the following matters: **a)** The electoral amparo appeal, **b)** The challenge of agreements of political party assemblies in the process of constitution and registration, **c)** The nullity action of party agreements, **d)** The electoral appeal, **e)** The nullity claim relative to electoral results, **f)** The cancellation or annulment of credentials, and **g)** The complaint for partiality or political belligerence. Hence, all the functions that the legal system attributes and assigns to the Judicial Branch should not be included within the liability for jurisdictional exercise. From that plane, the core function of the judge is the control of legality and the application of Law for the resolution of specific cases in order to materialize the principles of prompt and complete justice and effective judicial protection. Ergo, if it holds that condition of guarantor of the Legal System, the Law must protect the necessary guarantees that allow the attribution of liability for judicial errors. It is clear that such a typology of liability should not be confused with the civil liability of the judge for personal fault, which is regulated by numerals 85 to 95, both inclusive, of the Civil Procedure Code. In this case, it involves a direct imputation to the official, therefore, it addresses, within the framework of that regulation, a system of subjective orientation, which requires the proof of intent or gross negligence. Liability for jurisdictional exercise surpasses that criterion. It extends to a duty that involves the State as such. In relation, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, among others, in ruling 1011-2006, established that the jurisdictional function is subject to the unavoidable limits imposed by the Legal System, so that its exercise must be compatible and harmonious with the constitutional and legal precepts that, by virtue of its nature, it must apply to the specific cases being judged. The foregoing follows from what is established by numerals 11 and 154 of the Magna Carta. In this conduct, it is clear that its actions, insofar as they are arbitrary and contrary to Law, can generate damages to individuals, from which it derives and is justified that it is responsible for those eventual consequences, provided that, within a framework of causality, it can be demonstrated that the harm is the result of arbitrary conduct contrary to Law. This has even been established by the same Constitutional Chamber, an instance that on the subject of the liability of the Judicial Branch has indicated, among others, in vote 5981 at 3:41 p.m. on November 7, 1995, the following: "<i>V. OF THE OBJECTIVE LIABILITY OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH. PRINCIPLES. (…) State liability derived from the exercise of the jurisdictional function must be governed in accordance with what is established in the Political Constitution itself and in the law, as provided in the Fundamental Charter in its article 154 (…): "The Judicial Branch is only subject to the Constitution and the Law, and the resolutions it issues in matters of its competence impose no other responsibilities than those expressly indicated by legislative precepts."; from which two basic conclusions are derived: 1.) Firstly, the direct liability of the State in cases of judicial error and abnormal functioning of the administration of justice constitutes a constitutional principle, which derives precisely from what is concretely provided in article 9 of the Constitution, (…) in relation to articles 11, 33, 41, and 154 of the Constitution, and which is consistent with the principles of the Social State of Law, precisely with the prohibition of arbitrariness of public powers, that of legal certainty, and equality of all citizens before the law. This liability is justified by the fact that the function of judging is a manifestation of a Power, one of the three of the State, which implies its condition as a public service, an organization of material and personal means destined for the satisfaction of the social demand for justice. In this sense, in a State of Law, both the administrative function and the jurisdictional function constitute modes of execution of the law, and their only distinction consists in their effects; courts of justice are responsible for verifying facts and law through judgments that possess a special force, the proper legal value called "res judicata", by virtue of which it cannot be modified, discussed, withdrawn, retracted, except solely through the remedies established in the law; the decision of the Administration does not have this force of legal truth recognized to res judicata. It must be kept clear that they are two distinct functions, both respond to distinct ends; while the administrative function is destined to provide for the needs of the community, the jurisdictional function has the aim of consolidating public order through the solution of disputes and the sanctioning of law violations; but they are equally subject to the State liability regime, because the harm caused by the exercise of any of these functions is imputable to an act of the State, and therefore, susceptible of engaging its responsibility. By virtue of what is provided in transcribed articles 9 in relation to 153 of the Constitution, in consonance with the general principle that "anyone who causes an injury must repair it," the Judicial Branch could not be exempted from liability for "judicial error" in the exercise of the jurisdictional function. It is worth noting that this objective liability of the State is a complement to the civil, criminal, and disciplinary liability to which the judge is subject, since these are not sufficient to duly guarantee the interests of those seeking justice, which, due to the difficulties for its enforcement, turn the possible claim into a true obstacle course, and in the majority of cases, leaves aside and without protection those situations where it is not possible to appreciate the intent or fault of the judge. Liability must arise from intentional or negligent conduct of the jurisdictional body, whether or not it constitutes a crime (liability for fault)." </i>On the subject, one may also consult, from that same Chamber, resolution no. 5207-2004, at 2:55 p.m. on May 18, 2004.

**VI.-** However, it is insisted, one must not confuse the liability proper to the Judicial Branch in jurisdictional exercise with the other facets of its competencies that do not conform to that category. On one hand, it arises concerning the function of administration of justice, viewed as a public service. It involves the duty to resolve conflicts in an objective, prompt, and timely manner. Included within this category are all those non-jurisdictional acts emanating from the offices that form part of what in doctrine has been called the "Judicial Branch organization." That is, they are the bodies and organizational support that allow the proper exercise of the jurisdictional function. It refers to the objective profiles of the jurisdictional function: organization and functioning of tribunals, efficient management of judicial offices, functions of administrative bodies. Within this space must be added the jurisdictional bodies that, by legal imperative, perform a function of non-hierarchical controller inappropriate to a biphasic nature, as is currently the case of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal regarding municipal matters, by imperative of mandate 189 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. In this space, as it deals with non-jurisdictional subject matter, the norms on objective liability of the General Law of Public Administration would be applicable. On a second plane, the auxiliary units that do not perform typical administrative activity are located, but which, in definitiveness, cannot be considered jurisdictional conduct. This concerns the so-called judicial proceedings. This is the case of the Judicial Investigation Agency, Public Ministry, Forensic Sciences, the Public Defense, among others. These serve as support and fulfill an auxiliary role to the jurisdictional function, but their acts are not considered jurisdictional insofar as they carry out the task of inquiry and investigation. Their decisions are judicial acts stricto sensu. This distinction is manifested in the regulations on criminal procedure. In precept 277 ibid., it is established with complete clarity in its final paragraph, the impossibility of prosecutors performing jurisdictional acts, as well as the restriction on judges, except for legal authorization, from carrying out investigative acts. The same happens with the Public Ministry, whose functions can be observed in numerals 62, 275, 289, 290, and 291 of the Criminal Procedure Code, all related to its investigation and complaint faculties. The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, among others, in ruling No. 654-2008 at 10:45 a.m. on September 26, 2008, has taken note of this distinction. However, what is of interest in this matter is that which is proper to said jurisdictional exercise, when it has incurred a judicial error. Thus, in this last scenario (relevant to the present case), insofar as there exists an unlawful or illegitimate injury caused to the person seeking justice, produced as a consequence of these competencies, the objective liability of the State as Judge is imposed. As has been said, the foregoing finds support in numerals 9, 11, 33, 41, and 154, all of the Magna Carta, norms that lay the foundations of liability for judicial error, the abnormal or illicit functioning of the jurisdictional function.

**VII.-** Now then, on the margins of the discussion that may arise regarding the necessity or not of the system of liability for jurisdictional exercise requiring concrete legal development, the truth of the matter is that in certain subject matters, the legislator has issued an express norm that deals with the theme of this liability and its diverse presuppositions. It is worth indicating, however, that this Tribunal, in resolution No. 765-2008 of October 2, 2008, has expressed that, on the margins of the content of precepts 154 and 166 of the Magna Carta, which suggest the necessary legislative production to be able to impute liability for the jurisdictional function, that liability and its corresponding right to full reparation of harm find support in the same law of the Constitution, in ordinals 11, 18, 33, 41, 45, 49, 50, 74, 188. In that line, the First Chamber, in ruling 1011-2006 already cited, indicated on the matter: "<i>It has already been pointed out that said liability derives from the very framework of the Law of the Constitution, as a relevant counterweight in the relations of the State with individuals and as a factor of high transcendence in the equation of the State of Law. Ultimately, a guarantee in favor of the person seeking justice, who turns to the Judicial Branch so that their conflict is resolved according to legality, thus depositing trust in that facet of Public Power. The principle of state liability that emanates, as a general rule, from constitutional precept 9 and finds protection in other norms that safeguard the guarantees of the individual, does not find frameworks of exception. Although, in each sphere of this triple dimension of functions (executive, legislative, and judicial), nuances operate that require specific treatment in each context, the truth of the matter is that the Legal System does not incorporate charts of dispensation, beyond the reasonable suppositions when a unlawful injury is produced at its base, linked to public conduct. The principles that arise from the Law of the Constitution give content to said liability, therefore, even in the absence of legal regulation, which, although it may specify that regime, does not in any way limit the duty to indemnify, when pertinent according to Law. Hence, one could not sustain an "impunity" of the State as Judge, under the basis that it lacks legal development, since that is established by principle, within the framework of the Constitution, and at the same time would suppose a breach of legal certainty, the principle of equality, and the control of the arbitrariness of public powers. Seen thus, its recognition is not conditioned on the existence of a legal mandate that regulates it, ergo, what is provided in article 166 ibid. is not an obstacle. The aforementioned liability is governed by what is established in the Fundamental Charter, that is, it constitutes a constitutional basis principle, imposed by the referred norms and that seeks the control of the exercise of said function and the protection of the rights and interests of those seeking justice.</i>" **VIII.-** Within that set of suppositions in which there exists legislative development on the subject, criminal matters stand out, in which there are express rules, specifically, in numeral 271 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the case of liability for the issuance of arbitrary precautionary measures and the supposition of pretrial detention in a process in which a definitive dismissal or acquittal with full demonstration of innocence is later ordered, canon 108 of the Criminal Code which regulates the eventual subsidiary liability of the State when, by virtue of a review appeal, the innocence of the defendant is declared when they obtain an acquittal judgment, after having suffered more than one year of pretrial detention, and finally, according to 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which establishes public liability for the existence of judicial error proven in a judgment issued in a review process. These last manifestations are especially relevant to the case, as they are the ones that result applicable to the specific case and that, consequently, will be addressed further below. However, it is necessary to specify the scope of the so-called judicial error. To this end, one must bring up what was explained by the First Chamber in the aforementioned vote No. 654-2008 in the following sense: "<i>Note that numeral 154 of the Magna Carta uses the term "resolution," thus encompassing the distinct models that make up this category, that is, decree, orders, orders with the character of judgment, and judgments (numeral 153 Civil Procedure Code).

On the other hand, it can occur, it is insisted, as a matter of principle, both due to judicial error and due to abnormal functioning. The former is a species of the common genus of abnormal functioning, for, indeed, every judicial error theoretically presupposes an abnormality in that functioning (ultimately, the most significant manifestation), but not the other way around. Judicial error encompasses any jurisdictional decision that deprives a person of one of their rights or legitimate interests and that proves to be erroneous or contrary to law. Viewed thus, it is exclusive to the jurisdictional function, being, therefore, a modality of abnormal functioning that only fits within that dimension. The foregoing includes not only error of fact (due to mistaken knowledge or assessment of the facts, a ruling not adjusted to the factual reality is issued, and which, as such, becomes unjust), but also error of law (such as a breach of the Law through its improper interpretation, erroneous application, or lack of application). <b><u>On this point, despite the existence of an entire system of appeals against those decisions, the determining factor is that once the acknowledgment of that judicial mistake has occurred, damages eligible for compensation in accordance with the Legal System must have been produced in the legal sphere of the person as a consequence of those deficiencies</u></b> (causal link). Ergo, the compensable error is not limited to the specific cases in which the legal system provides for such a consequence, nor to criminal matters, as in the present case, due to a precautionary measure that proves to be improper, but on the contrary, its application transcends those circumstances to encompass the totality of the jurisdictional function, that is, any resolution, regardless of the jurisdiction in which it is issued, may give rise to the duty of reparation on the part of the State if it generates an unlawful damage." (Emphasis is ours) **IX.- On the scope of judicial error.** Notwithstanding that alluded-to development, it is necessary to point out the following. Although judicial error allows for the reparation of the damage caused, it is essential to establish the implications of that term. The reparability referred to depends, unavoidably, on the accreditation of the existence of a judicial error in that jurisdictional decision that has caused an unlawful injury at its base. For this, it must be clear that the mere fact that the recipient of the ruling does not share its content does not in any way imply the existence of that referred-to criterion of imputation. Indeed, as is rightly pointed out, judicial error encompasses any jurisdictional decision that deprives a person of one of their rights or legitimate interests and that proves to be erroneous or contrary to law. Note that this concept is different from abnormal functioning, for example, due to delay in the resolution of a specific case. In that latter variable, different rules apply than those specific to judicial error, which are not relevant in this proceeding. Regarding the matter at hand (judicial mistake), it is essential that its existence has been demonstrated. The foregoing presupposes a declaration within the proceeding itself, or else, as part of it, within the appellate phases established by the legal system, that establishes the existence of an erroneous jurisdictional decision, contrary to law, whether due to indirect violation (of fact or of law), or direct violation (due to improper application, erroneous application, or defective interpretation), whether substantive or procedural. However, the mere annulment or revocation of a resolution does not imply, per se, a mistake of this nature, much less a sort of automatic right to compensation. For this, several presuppositions arise that condition the reparability of the injury. On the one hand, the error must be gross (crasso), that is, it must be a palpable, serious, and substantial defect. On this point, it is reiterated, the existence of the irregularity must be expressed through a resolution of the authority itself (via revocation or ex officio nullity), or through an ordinary appellate instance, that is, the appellate venue. A declaration through the exercise of extraordinary remedies is also feasible, whether through a cassation judgment or one issued by virtue of an extraordinary review remedy. In essence, it is essential that there exists a jurisdictional declaration regarding a serious judicial error (within the same proceeding by the competent authority), detailing the aspects that determine that deficiency, an aspect that falls upon each of the instances that, given that appellate structure, are competent to hear the matter. For this, it is necessary that the jurisdictional remedies or resources offered by the legal system have been used to challenge the resolution that, in the opinion of the recipient, causes them damages. This is decisive since inertia in exercising this right, despite the possibility granted by the normative plexus to cease the disturbance, leads to the effects of said ruling becoming final, and therefore, its implications in the individual's legal sphere find support in a decision with the authority of substantive res judicata over which there has been no controversy within the proceeding, or at least, not formally. It is clear that the absence of the exercise of appeals against the decision alleged, whether through available ordinary remedies (criterion of impugnation taxativity) or extraordinary ones, prevents, within the dynamics of the proceedings, another jurisdictional unit from reviewing the lower court's (A quo) decision and, in protection of the rights of the justiciable, suppressing that mistake that affects them, all due to the tacit acquiescence of the alleged affected party. On this point, it must be understood that the appellate structure, embodied in each procedural regime, is precisely a guarantee of due process and the tool that allows the justiciable to challenge the decision with which they do not agree. In this line, an error contained in a decision that has been challenged and has not taken effect could not constitute a compensable error, but only one that has generated an effective, evaluable, and individualizable damage, by virtue of a jurisdictional determination that has produced material effects with a harmful result for the recipient in the terms pointed out. Of course, those resolutions that produce direct effects, despite having been challenged through ordinary mechanisms (remedy with devolutive effect - e.g., numeral 569 of the Civil Procedure Code), allow for that pecuniary reparation, so long as a judicial error is accredited. The contrary, that is, supposing the possibility of alleging a judicial error in a proceeding on State liability, without there being a ruling from a higher authority, or from the same authority that has recognized its mistake (revocation or ex officio nullity), would lead to permitting, through this type of civil proceedings against the public treasury, an attempt to analyze the legality of final jurisdictional decisions, with res judicata authority, against the grain of the appellate system established by law and in complete disregard of the effects of that substantive res judicata. It is worth recalling that resolutions with that hierarchy can only be analyzed through extraordinary remedies (review and cassation), so accepting the review of those conducts as a presupposition for a determination of the existence or not of a judicial error not only breaches the security and legal certainty of res judicata, but also invades the competencies proper to the Cassation Chambers, an aspect that, of course, this Court cannot share. It is not for this Administrative Contentious Court to qualify the conduct of other jurisdictions in order to establish whether they were issued with judicial error or not. That would imply, it is insisted, the reflexive review of those criteria, a matter that is reserved to the competent appellate instances, and the exercise of a power that cannot be derived from the generic competence granted by Article 2, subsection b) of the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure - which includes claims for liability against the Administration and in general against the State, in application of Canon 49 of the Magna Carta - therefore, without an enabling legal basis.

**X.-** It must be insisted, the error must be serious, evident, and gross. The mere circumstance that in the appellate or cassation instance, a different legal criterion is chosen could not be considered a compensable judicial error. The decision must be openly arbitrary, openly contrary to the legality of the case, and so expressed in the ruling that revokes or annuls the lower court's (A quo) criterion. The same occurs when the new criterion relies on arguments not expressed before the trial judge (provided they were matters that must be debated by the parties in application of the rogatory principle), or is based on novel evidence provided in the appellate phase. In such cases, the existence of a judicial error could not be affirmed when the questioned judgment was handed down without having those elements of conviction or substantive arguments that can only be the object of a ruling if they were debated by the parties (congruence), without this implying a disregard of the maxim iura novit curia. Therefore, the mere variation of a preceding criterion does not, as a general rule, lead to a compensable judicial error. A meticulous and casuistic examination of the particularities of each proceeding is necessary, in order to establish whether that type of mistake has occurred that allows liability for the jurisdictional function to arise. For example, a ruling that orders the auction of a property given as guarantee for a credit obligation already cancelled by setoff, a situation unknown to the judge despite the constant allegations of the alleged debtor and their accreditation within the case file, resolving that the debt is not cancelled, ordering the auction of the real guarantee, does not merit the same treatment as the liability that may arise from the legal criterion of considering a certain power subject to a prescriptive term to be in force, which later, due to different legal assessments, the appellate court (Ad quem) considers to be time-barred. In the first case, it is clear that a compensable error may arise from the disregard of a situation accredited in the case record, which ultimately produced the auction of the property. In the second, it involves different criteria and normative assessments, ultimately, the judge's independence of criterion, unless the mentioned expiration is evident. There is no compensable judicial error due to the mere dissonance of legal criteria; there must be a declaration of the existence of a serious error, generating damages to a third party. This is precisely the third aspect, that is, the accreditation that this criterion deemed erroneous produced a concrete damage. More simply, it must be specified that the existence of that right to reparation is subject, on the one hand, to the resolution containing a possible judicial error having deployed its effects and, with them, having produced a detriment in the legal sphere of the affected person. As an additional aspect, it is worth specifying, the compensable error is not limited to the hypothesis of the review remedy, although it constitutes the case in which it can most probably be derived. However, as a matter of principle, what is usual is that it derives from a final jurisdictional decision possessing res judicata authority. Neither is it exclusive to criminal jurisdiction. It is clear that it permeates the other jurisdictions, for, although criminal matters are where the legal development of the figure is evident, this does not imply that it cannot occur in the others. This criterion should not be confused with the abnormal functioning that occurs in the classic conception of lack of functioning, defective, or erroneous provision. Viewed thus, it is a broader term, which covers the already-commented case of judicial error, but also the deficiencies that, in terms of defective provision or delay of justice, are linked, in principle, to the aspect of administration of justice or the judicial function, therefore, regulated by the liability regime addressed in the General Law of the Public Administration. (On that specification, see the aforementioned judgment No. 654-2008 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice) **XI.- On liability for judicial error accredited in a review remedy.** Having specified the general principles of the system of liability for judicial error and the scope of judicial error, we proceed to the examination of the claims raised in the specific case. The plaintiff bases their claim on what they consider to be the liability of the State-as-judge for the judicial error committed in having declared them guilty of the crime of rape to the detriment of Juan José García Garay, sentencing them to ten years in prison by judgment No. 327-2004 of the Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, and later having been acquitted by resolution No. 2006-00565 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. At its core, they argue that the sentence was imposed without having taken the offered evidence, consisting of the testimony of Joseph Molina Alfaro and Freddy Meléndez Pacheco. They accuse that they were acquitted without considering the error committed by the judges. They say that when they were judged, the only existing evidence was a report from the Municipal Police and the testimony of the complainant. They indicate that in the judgment that convicted them, no reference was made to the impossibility of taking the offered testimonial evidence, leaving them in a state of defenselessness. They assert having suffered an attack with a bladed weapon while incarcerated on March 13, 2005. They accuse having served preventive detention without elements of proof indicating they had committed the crime. They assert that the criminalistic analysis report issued by the Department of Forensic Sciences of the Judicial Investigation Agency states that no male cells were detected and concluded that no evidence of the presence of semen was found. They expose that those elements did not incriminate them and were not sufficient grounds to impose preventive detention on them, much less to consider them the responsible perpetrator of the reported acts. The summarized claims require entering into the analysis of the figure of compensation for judicial error by virtue of the acquittal ordered in a review remedy. As has been pointed out in the preceding sections, the State's liability in its jurisdictional function requires the accreditation of abnormal functioning and, for what is relevant to the present proceeding, the demonstration of a judicial error that has been declared by the competent authorities within the appellate exercise available against the resolution. Such a declaration is unavoidable, considering that it is not within the purview of this Court to analyze the legality, propriety, or not of the final judicial pronouncements of other jurisdictional bodies, a subject matter that escapes the competence of this jurisdiction and that only falls upon the authorities to which such competence has been assigned. In this area, criminal procedural law regulates the issue of liability for judicial error, specifically, when in the extraordinary review phase, it is determined that in the condemnatory judgment, there existed an error of fact or of law. On this particular, Article 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code indicates: *"<b><u>When by reason of the review of the proceeding a judicial error is recognized</u></b>, as a consequence of which the sentenced person served a sentence they should not have served, or a longer or more severe one than corresponded to them, the court hearing the review may order the payment of compensation at the expense of the State and at the request of the interested party, provided that the latter has not contributed with intent or fault to producing the error./ The judges who issued the reviewed judgment shall be jointly and severally liable with the State when they have acted arbitrarily or with gross fault in the terms of Article 199 of the General Law of the Public Administration./ Civil reparation may only be ordered in favor of the convicted person or their legitimate heirs."* (Emphasis not in the original) From the analysis of said regulation, the imperative need emerges that the authority competent to hear the review remedy, in this case, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, has recognized the existence of a judicial error. However, from a meticulous analysis of the case record, it does not appear that said Chamber, in judgment number 2006-00565 of 3:10 p.m. on June 7, 2006, decreed the existence of such an error, a prerequisite for the reparation petitioned. Indeed, the analysis expressed by that high Court reflects that the decreed acquittal was due to the acceptance of new testimonial evidence that was not weighed and taken in the trial phase or in the cassation venue, that is, the deposition of Freddy Meléndez Pacheco, which, once received, led the Court to consider that given the reasonable doubt as to whether the accused had or had not committed the crime attributed to them, acquittal was proper. In that sense, it substantively held: *"Confronting this testimonial evidence with the prosecution evidence examined in the judgment, from the two police officers who testified about what was narrated by the victim and what was said by the aggrieved party upon denouncing, that he had been the object of a sexual attack by an unknown person, this Chamber finds that although it is not conclusively demonstrated that the event did not exist or that the accused did not commit it, it does have the virtue of generating significant doubt about the circumstances in which the event occurred. (...) Certainly, there is a medical-legal report that reveals that the victim presents anal fissures, however, that by itself does not permit deriving the circumstances in which they were produced. <u>As a corollary of what has been said, the evidence provided by the accused in the review does not make the event disappear, but introduces a fundamental element that undermines the evidentiary bases that gave rise to the conviction</u>, by calling into question the statements of the victim in his denunciation, about not knowing the defendant and about the veracity of the act attributed to the defendant, generating doubt about what really occurred. Our procedural and constitutional system requires that a conviction be supported by the certainty that the evidence yields, and <u>as in this case, the evidence provided in the review, examined in relation to that received at trial, has left doubt about the responsibility of the accused, it obliges the application of Article 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which establishes that in the face of doubt on questions of fact, one must apply what is most favorable to the accused.</u> Consequently, it is proper to admit the review presented, to set aside the imposed conviction, and instead acquit the accused Jorge Brooks Casasola of the crime of rape attributed to him to the detriment of J.J.G.G. The release of the accused is ordered if no other cause prevents it."* (Emphasis not in the original) As observed, the result of acquittal responded to a criterion of reasonable doubt and in dubio pro reo, derived from the incorporation of a new element of conviction that had not been present in the prior phases of the proceeding. Although the plaintiff argues that from the beginning of the criminal proceeding, they offered the testimony of Mr. Freddy Meléndez Pacheco, which can be checked in the record of the preliminary hearing held at 3:00 p.m. on February 27, 2004, folios 139-141 of the certification of criminal case file No. 03-013207-0042-PE, and that the failure to take such evidence caused defenselessness and later judicial error, the truth of the matter is that in the trial opening order of 4:04 p.m. on February 27, 2004, regarding those testimonial proofs, it was indicated: *"<b><i>Testimonial.</i></b><i> (...) Although it is true that the defense mentioned the interview of Messrs. Freddy Meléndez Pacheco and Francisco Jiménez Elizondo as the basis for the request for provisional dismissal, it is true that it did not offer them as testimonial evidence (...)"</i>* (Folio 144 of the criminal case file) No objection whatsoever was formulated against that decision, neither in the oral and public trial held at 8:40 a.m. on April 1, 2004 (folios 163-168 of the criminal case file), nor in the cassation appeal that rolls on folios 181-200 of the criminal docket. It was only in the review remedy that the plaintiff offers Mr. Freddy Meléndez Pacheco as new evidence. In resolution No. 2005-01525 of 9:35 a.m. on September 23, 2005, the Third Chamber admitted the review remedy regarding the aforementioned offer of the new testimony (folios 308-310 of the criminal docket). Ultimately, as has been pointed out, weighing the testimonial deposition, together with the other probative elements in the criminal case record, it ordered acquittal of the accused due to doubt, ordering their release. The foregoing implies that the plaintiff did not formally offer the evidence that they later incorporated in the review proceeding, nor did they timely challenge the judge's criterion of not considering the statements of Freddy Meléndez Pacheco and Francisco Jiménez Elizondo as testimonial evidence. From what has been set forth, it is deduced that the criterion for ordering the acquittal was the weighing of that new evidence offered and admitted (Article 408, subsection e) of the Criminal Procedure Code). However, that does not imply, as the plaintiff claims, a judicial error. The new criterion is supported by the assessment of demonstrative aspects that were not present in the condemnatory judgment. Note that even the criterion of the Trial Court was confirmed by the Third Chamber through resolution No. 2004-01100, reflecting that the factual and legal assessment conducted with the evidence existing in the case file at that time was in accordance with law. This accredits that in the case at hand, there has been no declaration of the existence of a judicial error. The judgment of that high Court in a review proceeding does not speak of such a mistake, nor can this Chamber derive it from the analysis of the case record. From that standpoint, the requested reparation is unfeasible, as the basic prerequisite for ordering it is absent, that is, the unavoidable criterion of imputation for such purposes.

**XII.-** From that standpoint, in the absence of judicial error and by virtue of the cause for acquittal, it is the criterion of this Chamber that no compensation is appropriate for the imprisonment to which the plaintiff was subjected, nor for the preventive detention imposed at the time. Regarding the former, it is clear that the imprisonment to which the plaintiff was exposed as a derivation of the condemnatory judgment and its confirmation in the cassation venue cannot constitute a parameter for compensation in the terms requested. This is because it was the reasonable doubt about the commission of the illegal act that motivated the release, a product of the weighing of evidence that was not available in the oral and public trial, so in the terms already set forth, the condemnatory judgment was in accordance with law. It was not until the issuance of the ruling in the review phase, and as a consequence of assessments of new elements of proof, that they were acquitted, which implies that the imprisonment ordered based on that first judgment, confirmed on cassation, was supported by a judicial ruling regarding which, ultimately, the concurrence of a judicial error was not demonstrated. From that standpoint, the imprisonment was the result of the application of a final jurisdictional ruling, which was upheld by the same Third Chamber upon hearing the cassation appeal filed by the plaintiff, and which therefore implies the efficacy of a resolution in which no irregularity was detected in the factual, evidentiary, or legal analysis. Although acquittal was later ordered for the reasons already amply discussed, that does not mean that those decisions were erroneous with a clear judicial error, and to that extent, the imprisonment imposed, as an effect of those decisions, is not the basis for a possible reparation under the criterion of liability for judicial error. Thus, it cannot constitute a parameter that allows justifying the compensation sought. The same occurs with the aforementioned preventive detention. For the purposes of Article 108 of the Criminal Code, the precautionary measure of a personal nature under discussion cannot be considered unfounded. It does not appear from the case record that the measures of preventive detention and their respective extensions were ordered arbitrarily. Quite to the contrary, each of the resolutions issued in that sense, namely, the ruling of 11:40 a.m. on July 13, 2003 (Folios 8-14 of the criminal case file), the resolution of 4:30 p.m. on October 13, 2003 (Folios 42-45 of the criminal case file), were confirmed by the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by resolutions of 8:30 a.m. on August 1, 2003, and No. 999-03 of 2:30 p.m. on October 22, 2003, respectively. Equally reasoned is the determination of 3:45 p.m. on January 13, 2004; again, the Criminal Court of San José decreed the extension of the preventive detention for a period of three months, to expire on April 13, 2004. In all those resolutions, an analysis is made of the prerequisites that give rise to this type of precautionary measure of a personal nature, in accordance with Articles 238 and 239, both of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Within this line of reasoning, the eventual liability provided for in Article 108 mentioned above is only viable when the acquittal ordered in a review proceeding was based on criteria of full demonstration of innocence. Otherwise, that is, when it has relied on the presumption of innocence, national case law has understood that pretrial detention constitutes an important tool for the dynamics of preliminary investigations and the conduct inherent to criminal proceedings. In this regard, Resolution No. 115 of 14 hours 30 minutes of November 11, 1998 of the First Chamber, cited in decision No. 1011-2006 of that high Court, analyzing the appropriateness of applying the liability referred to in section 108 of the Penal Code, interpreted: “VIII.- The referenced article of the Penal Code, in light of what was stated in the immediately preceding recital, would only be applicable in the event of pretrial detention and it is subsequently fully proven that the accused is innocent. Only under this circumstance can the deprivation of liberty, arising from a necessary judicial investigation, be deemed unjustified and susceptible to compensation. Otherwise, the action of justice, in areas as thorny and sinister for society as drug trafficking is today, would be ostensibly hindered. (...) When acquittal is obtained, as occurs in this case, by virtue of the application of the principle ‘in dubio pro reo’, obviously innocence has not been unquestionably demonstrated. (...) Therefore, as stated in recital IV, in those cases sufficient grounds do exist to conduct the investigation of the unlawful act and, consequently, to take all necessary measures provided for in our legal system for those purposes. Among them, pretrial detention. Within those scenarios, such measures are not illegitimate, as the plaintiff alleges. Thus, they cannot generate liability for the State or its officials.” Ergo, in the absence of proof of full demonstration of innocence and the non-occurrence of a judicial error in this case, compensation is also improper on those grounds.

“III.- Sobre la defensa de caducidad y prescripción. En la fase de conclusiones, la representación estatal reitera las defensas de caducidad y prescripción invoccdas en la audiencia preliminar celebrada el 9 de junio del 2010 y que fuera rechazadas en la etapa de trámite por resolución de las 15 horas. Señala, la caducidad es evidente siendo que si el actor se sentía agraviado por actuaciones judiciales, debió plantear el proceso de responsabilidad civil del juez previsto en el canon 85 del Código Procesal Civil. Empero, el plazo de 1 año que regula el mandato 87 ibidem, al momento de presentar la demanda está fenecido. Señala, en cuanto a la prescripción, desde la firmeza de la sentencia condenatoria han transcurrido más de los cuatro años que establece el precepto 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Sobre el particular cabe señalar lo siguiente. En los procesos civiles de hacienda, según lo establece el numeral 41 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, el plazo máximo para incoar el proceso es el mismo que disponga el ordenamiento como plazo de prescripción del derecho de fondo. Ello supone un análisis en cada caso de la vigencia o no del plazo prescriptivo del derecho de fondo, de manera que en tanto este se encuentre vigente, la vía judicial se encuentra expedita. Desde este plano, es claro que en esta materia, no opera la caducidad de la acción, sino la prescripción del derecho de fondo. En esa línea se ha expresado la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, entre otras, en el fallo No. 654-2008 de las 10 horas 05 minutos del 26 de septiembre del 2008. Por tanto, la defensa de caducidad debe ser rechazada. Igual suerte debe correr el alegato de caducidad por vencimiento del año previsto en el numeral 87 del Código aludido. El presente proceso no es de responsabilidad civil del juez previsto en los ordinales 85 al 95 del Código Procesal Civil, sino uno de responsabilidad del Estado por función jurisdiccional, por lo que las reglas aplicables no son las invocadas por la abogada estatal, sino las que adelante se dirán. Ahora bien, en cuanto a la prescripción, es claro que el plazo aplicable para la prescripción de la responsabilidad por el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional, es de cuatro años, por la aplicación a esa materia del numeral 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Si bien en el caso concreto de esa función jurisdiccional no se establece una norma especial que fije un plazo concreto para esos efectos, es necesario realizar una integración del ordenamiento. En este sentido, en la dinámica, ante esta laguna, debe acudirse al examen de la naturaleza de la relación jurídica debatida, a fin de colegir la nromativa que sea más afin. Así, ante la ausencia de norma expresa en la materia concreta objeto de este fallo, en virtud de los principios de plenitud y coherencia del ordenamiento jurídico, ha de acudirse a los mecanismos de integración para resolver dicha laguna y establecer el plazo más adecuado para esta materia especializada. Para ello debe tenerse claridad en el sentido de que el tipo de responsabilidad acusada es de naturaleza extracontractual, lo que haría inviable la aplicación de enunciados que regulan la prescripción contractual. Tratándose del marco de responsabilidad estatal, deben considerarse, entonces, primero a las fuentes jurídicas que regulan aspectos similares. En ese tanto, de las distintas normas atinentes a la materia de la prescripción, en la medida en que el punto a dilucidar es el deber de reparación a cargo del Estado, debe utilizarse, como mecanismo de integración, el espacio prescriptivo que define el ordenamiento jurídico para supuestos de responsabilidad estatal. Para ello debe partirse de la máxima que la responsabilidad pública se fundamenta en la cláusula general de responsabilidad que establece el canon 9 constitucional. Es evidente que el desarrollo legislativo de este tema se ha dado con mayor énfasis en la Ley General de la Administración Pública, normativa que al margen de regulaciones concretas en materia judicial o legislativa, se ha constituido en la base referencial para el tratamiento del tema en lo atinente al Poder Legislativo y al Judicial. De ahí que por la afinidad de la materia, la regla más próxima que regula el plazo prescriptivo es el precepto 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que establece un plazo cuatrienal para la prescripción del derecho de reclamo indemnizatorio. Como ha indicado la Sala Primera en el precitado fallo 654-2008: "De este modo, si el ordenamiento impone, por norma especial, un plazo de cuatro años para reclamar al Estado la indemnización de un daño que ha ocasionado con su proceder, atendiendo al principio de igualdad, por aspectos de certeza y seguridad jurídica, ese mismo plazo es el que resulta aplicable cuando el detrimento provenga del ejercicio de sus funciones jurisdiccionales. De este modo, con base en mecanismos integrativos del Derecho, este órgano colegiado concluye que el plazo aplicable es el cuatrienal señalado, por corresponder a la responsabilidad extracontractual estatal, que por ende, es utilizable en este caso." Ahora bien, en la especie, a diferencia de lo argüido por la mandataria estatal el punto de partida del citado plazo prescriptivo, no es la sentencia condenatoria No. 327-2004 del 15 de abril del 2004, ni su confirmación mediante sentencia de casación No. 2004-01100 del 10 de septiembre del 2004. El inicio del cómputo de ese lapso debe tomarse desde la emisión y notificación de la sentencia emitida en el proceso de revisión que dispone la absolutoria del entonces imputado, sea, fallo No. 2006-00565 del 7 de junio del 2006, notificado el 29 de junio de ese mismo año. Es con esa determinación jurisdiccional que el accionante se encuentra en posibilidad de establecer que los efectos de los precedentes judiciales que dispusieron su culpabilidad en el delito de violación en perjuicio de Juan José García Garay y ordenaron su aprisionamiento, le han ocasionado, a su decir, un daño por error judicial que el Estado debe indemnizar. Antes de esa circunstancia fáctica, no puede decirse de la existencia de una base objetiva que permita establecer el reclamo de responsabilidad que ahora se dirime en este litigio, por lo que hacer correr el plazo cuatrienal desde fechas previas a la debida notificación del fallo dictado en fase de revisión, resulta contrario a las reglas que se desprenden del citado ordinal 198 de la Ley No. 6227 y expone a quien alega tener un derecho a su fenecimiento por decurso del tiempo, sin contar con posibilidad objetiva de conocer la fuente del daño y reclamar su reparación. Ergo, es desde el 29 de junio del 2006 que ha de computarse el citado plazo de prescripción, por lo que vencimiento ocurriría el 30 de junio del 2010. De la revisión de los autos se desprende que la presente demanda fue presentada en fecha 21 de octubre del 2009, subsanada el 4 de noviembre del 2009 (folios 1 y 26 del principal). El Estado fue notificado de este proceso el 3 de diciembre del 2009, según acta de notificación visible a folio 37 del expediente judicial. Lo anterior pone en evidencia que la demanda de responsabilidad fue presentada y notificada antes del fenecimiento del plazo prescriptivo. Por ende, debe rechazarse la defensa de prescripción planteada por el Estado.

IV.- Responsabilidad del Estado por función jurisdiccional. Fundamento del régimen. El objeto medular de este proceso gravita en torno a la determinación de la existencia o no de responsabilidad que a decir del actor se desprende por haber descontado prisión debido a la sentencia No. 327-2004 de las 16 horas del 15 de abril del 2004 del Tribunal de Juicio del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, que le declaró responsable del delito de violación en perjuicio de Juan José García Garay, por el que se le impuso pena privativa de libertad de 10 años, luego confirmada por el fallo No. 2004-01100 de las 11 horas 50 minutos del 10 de septiembre del 2004 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Señala, por sentencia No. 2006-00565 de las 15 horas 10 minutos del 7 de junio del 2006, esa misma Sala, conociendo de un recurso extraordinario de revisión dispuso su absolutoria por el delito de violación en perjuicio de Juan José García Garay, ordenando su libertad, si otra causa no lo impide. Pide indemnización por el tiempo en que estuvo encarcelado pese a que luego se dictó la aludida absolutoria. Dada esa temática, es necesario realizar una breve referencia a aspectos medulares en torno a la responsabilidad del Estado en su ejercicio jurisdiccional, con especial énfasis a la que pueda producirse por un error judicial determinado en un proceso de revisión, en los términos del canon 419 del Código Procesal Penal. Las relaciones que se producen entre las personas y los centros de autoridad pública se encuentran sujetas a una serie de principios que configuran la amalgama de derechos y obligaciones que acuden a cada una de las partes involucradas. En esa dinámica, en el marco del Estado Social de Derecho, el numeral 11 de la Carta Magna establece como criterio rector del funcionamiento público el denominado principio de legalidad. Se trata de una máxima que impone el sometimiento del Estado al derecho, y en virtud del cual, todo proceder público debe darse dentro del marco de juridicidad, entendido como el conjunto de fuentes escritas y no escritas (según la escala jerárquica de las fuentes -artículo 7 ibidem) que regulan ese funcionamiento. La alusión al Estado, se hace en su dimensión amplia, esto es, el conjunto de unidades que conforman el Poder Ejecutivo, Legislativo y Judicial, lo que incluye, los órganos de relevancia constitucional. Desde esa arista de examen, el canon 9 de la Carta Magna establece la cláusula general de responsabilidad del Estado, norma que se constituye como una garantía de base que permite a la persona que como consecuencia de una acción u omisión de un centro de poder público que le ha ocasionado un efecto pernicioso que no tenga el deber jurídico de soportar, exigir una reparación de ese efecto lesivo. Así mismo, encuentra desarrollo y complemento en el principio de legalidad (artículo 11), equidad en la distribución de las cargas públicas (ordinales 18 y 33), tutela de las situaciones jurídicas y derechos consolidados (precepto 34), reparación integral del daño (artículo 41), indemnidad patrimonial (canon 45), tutela judicial efectiva (mandato 49), máxima de solidaridad social (74 constitucional), responsabilidad del cargo presidencial (148 ibidem), responsabilidad del Poder Judicial (154 y 166 ejusdem), responsabilidad de las instituciones autónomas (numeral 188). Estas normas constituyen las bases del referido sistema, que exige la reparación económica de las lesiones patrimoniales o extrapatrimoniales ocurridas como derivación de conductas u omisiones públicas, que la víctima no tenga el deber de soportar. El basamento fundamental de esa responsabilidad ha sido tema de desarrollo por parte de la Sala Constitucional, en cuya sentencia no. 5981 de las 15 horas 41 minutos del 7 de noviembre de 1995. En efecto, tal deber resulta ser la consecuencia de un régimen constitucional de garantías que el Ordenamiento otorga a las personas y forman la estructura medular del estado de Derecho, sea: legalidad, control universal de las conductas estatales, distribución de funciones y un sistema de responsabilidad pública. El empoderamiento que se otorga al Estado para el cumplimiento de sus fines, en el marco de sus diversas funciones, ejecutiva, legislativa y judicial, llevan como consecuencia directa, la creación de un sistema de responsabilidad que permita la reparación de los efectos lesivos que su proceder pueda generar en la esfera jurídica de las personas, tutela que comprende, a decir del numeral 49 de la Carta Magna, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos. Esta temática ha tenido un mayor desarrollo en el caso de la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública, tema incluso regulado en los ordinales 170.1, 190 al 213 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, y con una amplia evolución en la jurisprudencia patria. Sobre el particular puede verse, entre muchas, el fallo no. 584 de las 10 horas 40 minutos del 11 de agosto del 2005 de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Con todo, la misma Ley General señalada refiere en el artículo 194.3 a la responsabilidad por emisión de ley, abriendo la regulación para la imputación de responsabilidad por el ejercicio parlamentario de creación de leyes. Por paridad de razón y con fundamento en esas mismas normas constitucionales ya apuntadas, el régimen mencionado permite la responsabilidad por omisión legislativa, ley declarada inconstitucional y la aprobación de tratados internacionales. Desde luego que en cada caso, es menester del afectado acreditar la existencia de un daño efectivo, evaluable e individualizable, como presupuesto del deber de reparación.

V.- Este amplio esquema de responsabilidad pública se complementa con la que puede surgir contra el Estado por su función jurisdiccional (que no judicial). En lo fundamental, esta función se ejerce principalmente (no de manera exclusiva) por el Poder Judicial. Conforme a lo estatuido por el mandato 153 de la Constitución Política, en virtud de esa función jurisdiccional, corresponde al Poder Judicial resolver los conflictos de las personas, de manera definitiva, esto es, con autoridad de cosa juzgada y fuerza de verdad legal. Tal ejercicio jurisdiccional puede observarse además en los procesos que corresponde dirimir de manera exclusiva al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en la denominada jurisdicción electoral. Sobre el particular, el canon 220 del Código Electoral, Ley No. 8765 asigna esa competencia jurisdiccional en las siguientes materias: a) El recurso de amparo electoral, b) La impugnación de acuerdos de asambleas de partidos políticos en proceso de constitución e inscripción, c) La acción de nulidad de acuerdos partidarios, d) El recurso de apelación electoral, e) La demanda de nulidad relativa a resultados electorales, f) La cancelación o anulación de credenciales y g) La denuncia por parcialidad o beligerancia política. De ahí que no deba incluirse dentro de la responsabilidad por el ejercicio jurisdiccional, todas las funciones que el ordenamiento atribuye y asigna al Poder Judicial. Desde ese plano, la función medular del juzgador es el control de legalidad y la aplicación del Derecho para la solución de casos concretos a fin de materializar los principios de justicia pronta y cumplida y la tutela judicial efectiva. Ergo, si ostenta esa condición de garante del Ordenamiento, el Derecho debe tutelar las garantías necesarias que permitan la atribución de responsabilidad frente a los errores judiciales. Es claro que tal tipología de responsabilidad no debe confundirse con la responsabilidad civil del juzgador por falta personal, que regula los numerales 85 al 95, ambos inclusive, del Código Procesal Civil. En esta, se trata de una imputación directa al funcionario o funcionaria, por tanto, atiende, en el marco de esa regulación, a un sistema de orientación subjetiva, que requiere de la acreditación del dolo o culpa grave. La responsabilidad por ejercicio jurisdiccional supera ese criterio. Se extiende a un deber que involucra al Estado como tal. En relación, ya la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, entre otras, en el fallo 1011-2006, estableció que la función jurisdiccional está sujeta a los límites insoslayables que le impone el Ordenamiento Jurídico, de modo que su ejercicio debe ser compatible y armónico con los preceptos constitucionales y legales que en virtud de su naturaleza, debe aplicar a los casos concretos que sean juzgados. Lo anterior se desprende de lo establecido por los numerales 11 y 154 de la carta Magna. En este proceder, es claro que sus acciones, en tanto arbitrarias y contrarias a Derecho, pueden generar perjuicios a las personas, de lo que deriva y se justifica, que es responsable de esas eventuales consecuencias, siempre que dentro de un marco de causalidad, pueda demostrarse que el daño es el resultado de una conducta arbitraria y contraria a Derecho. Así lo ha establecido incluso la misma Sala Constitucional, instancia que sobre el tema de la responsabilidad del Poder Judicial ha señalado, entre otros, en el voto 5981 de las 15 horas 41 minutos del 7 de noviembre de 1995 lo siguiente: "V. DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD OBJETIVA DEL PODER JUDICIAL. PRINCIPIOS. (…) La responsabilidad del Estado derivada del ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional debe regirse de conformidad con lo establecido en la propia Constitución Política y en la ley, según lo dispuesto en la Carta Fundamental en su artículo 154 (…): "El Poder Judicial sólo está sometido a la Constitución y a la Ley, y las resoluciones que dicte en los asuntos de su competencia no le imponen otras responsabilidades que las expresamente señaladas por los preceptos legislativos."; de lo cual se derivan dos conclusiones básicas: 1.) En primer término, constituye un principio constitucional la responsabilidad directa del Estado en los casos de error judicial y funcionamiento anormal de la administración de justicia, la cual deriva precisamente de lo dispuesto concretamente en el artículo 9 constitucional, (…) en relación con los artículos 11, 33, 41 y 154 constitucionales, y que resulta congruente con los principios del Estado Social de Derecho, precisamente con el de interdicción de arbitrariedad de los poderes públicos, el de seguridad jurídica e igualdad de todos los ciudadanos ante la ley. Esta responsabilidad se justifica por el hecho de que la función de juzgar es manifestación de un Poder, uno de los tres del Estado, lo cual implica su condición de servicio público, de organización de medios materiales y personales destinados a la satisfacción de la demanda social de justicia. En este sentido, en un Estado de Derecho, tanto la función administrativa como la jurisdiccional constituyen modos de ejecución de la ley, y su única distinción consiste en los efectos; a los tribunales de justicia les corresponde la comprobación de los hechos y del derecho mediante fallos que poseen una fuerza especial, el valor jurídico propio que se llama "cosa juzgada", en virtud de la cual no puede ser modificada, discutida, retirada, retractada, sino únicamente mediante los recursos establecidos en la ley; la decisión de la Administración no tiene esta fuerza de verdad legal que se le reconoce a la cosa juzgada. Debe tenerse en claro que son dos funciones distintas, ambas responden a fines distintos; mientras que la función administrativa está destinada a proveer a las necesidades de la colectividad, la función jurisdiccional tiene por fin consolidar el orden público con la solución de las diferencias y la sanción a las violaciones de la ley; pero que, por igual están sujetas al régimen de responsabilidad del Estado, por cuanto el daño causado por el ejercicio de cualquiera de estas funciones es imputable a un acto del Estado, y por lo tanto, susceptible de comprometer su responsabilidad. En virtud de lo dispuesto en los transcritos artículos 9 en relación con el 153 constitucionales, en consonancia con el principio general de que "todo aquel que causa un agravio debe repararlo", no podría eximirse de responsabilidad al Poder Judicial por el "error judicial" en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional. Cabe señalar que esta responsabilidad objetiva del Estado resulta complemento de la responsabilidad civil, penal y disciplinaria a que está sujeto el juez, pues éstas no resultan suficientes para garantizar debidamente los intereses de los justiciables, que por las dificultades para su exigencia, convierten en una verdadera carrera de obstáculos la posible reclamación, y en la mayoría de los casos, deja al margen y sin protección aquellas situaciones en las que no es posible apreciar el dolo o culpa del juzgador. La responsabilidad debe provenir de una conducta dolosa o culposa del órgano jurisdiccional, constitutiva o no de delito (responsabilidad por falta).” Sobre el tema, puede consultarse además, de esa misma Sala, resolución no. 5207-2004, de las 14 horas y 55 minutos del 18 de mayo del 2004.

VI.- Con todo, se insiste, no debe confundirse la responsabilidad propia del Poder Judicial en ejercicio jurisdiccional, de las otras facetas de sus competencias, que no se avienen a esa categoría. Por una parte, surge al atinente a la función de administración de justicia, visualizada como servicio público. Se trata del deber de resolver los conflictos de manera objetiva, pronta y oportuna. Ingresan dentro de esta categoría todos aquellos actos no jurisdiccionales emanados de las oficinas que forman parte de lo que en doctrina se ha denominado “Poder Judicial organización”. Es decir, son los órganos y soporte organizacional que permiten el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional propiamente. Se refiere a los perfiles objetivos de función jurisdiccional: organización y funcionamiento de tribunales, manejo eficiente de despachos, funciones de órganos administrativos. Debe agregarse en este espacio los órganos jurisdiccionales que por imperativo de ley realizan una función de contralor no jerárquico impropio de naturaleza bifásica, como en la actualidad lo hace el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo respecto de la materia municipal, por imperativo del mandato 189 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. En este espacio, por tratarse de materia no jurisdiccional, serían de aplicación las normas sobre responsabilidad objetiva de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. En un segundo plano, se ubican las unidades auxiliares que no realizan actividad administrativa típica, pero que en definitiva, no pueden tenerse como un proceder jurisdiccional. Se trata de las denominadas actuaciones judiciales. Es el caso del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, Ministerio Público, Ciencias Forenses, la Defensa Pública entre otros. Estos sirven de apoyo y cumplen un rol auxiliar a la función jurisdiccional, pero sus actos no son considerados como jurisdiccionales en tanto llevan a cabo la tarea de instrucción e investigación. Sus decisiones son actos judiciales estricto sensu. Esta distinción se pone de manifiesto en las regulaciones sobre el procedimiento penal. En el precepto 277 ibidem se establece con toda claridad en su párrafo final, la imposibilidad de que los fiscales realicen actos jurisdiccionales, así como la restricción de los jueces, salvo habilitación legal, de desplegar actos de investigación. Igual sucede con el Ministerio Público, cuyas funciones se pueden observar en los numerales 62, 275, 289, 290 y 291 del Código Procesal Penal, todas relacionadas a sus facultades de investigación y denuncia. De esta distinción ha dado cuenta la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, entre otras, en el fallo No. 654-2008 de las 10 horas 45 minutos del 26 de septiembre del 2008. Empero, interesa en el particular la que es propia de ese ejercicio jurisdiccional, cuando haya incurrido en error judicial. De este modo, en este último escenario (relevante al presente caso), en tanto exista una lesión antijurídica o ilegítima causada al justiciable, producida como consecuencia de estas competencias, se impone la responsabilidad objetiva del Estado Juez. Como se ha dicho, lo anterior encuentra sustento en los numerales 9, 11, 33, 41 y 154, todos de la Carta Magna, normas que sientan las bases de la responsabilidad por el error judicial, el funcionamiento anormal o ilícito de la función jurisdiccional.

VII.- Ahora bien, al margen de la discusión que pueda generarse en torno a la necesidad o no de que el sistema de responsabilidad por ejercicio jurisdiccional requiera de desarrollo legal concreto, lo cierto del caso es que en determinadas materias, el legislador ha emitido norma expresa que trata la temática de esa responsabilidad y sus diversos presupuestos. Cabe indicar con todo que ya este Tribunal, en la resolución No. 765-2008 del 02 de octubre del 2008, ha externado que al margen del contenido de los preceptos 154 y 166 de la Carta Magna, que hacen presumir de la necesaria producción legislativa para poder imputar responsabilidad por la función jurisdiccional, esa responsabilidad y su correspondiente derecho de reparación integral del daño, encuentra sustento en el mismo derecho de la Constitución, en los ordinales 11, 18, 33, 41, 45, 49, 50, 74, 188. En esa línea, la Sala Primera, en el fallo 1011-2006 ya citado, sobre el particular indicó: "Ya se ha señalado que dicha responsabilidad deriva del mismo marco del Derecho de la Constitución, como contrapeso relevante en las relaciones del Estado con las personas y como factor de alta trascendencia en la ecuación del Estado de Derecho. A la postre una garantía a favor del justiciable, quien acude al Poder Judicial para que su conflicto sea resuelto conforme a legalidad, depositando así la confianza en esa arista del Poder Público. El principio de responsabilidad estatal que dimana, como regla general, del precepto 9 constitucional y encuentra amparo en otras normas que tutelan las garantías del individuo, no encuentra marcos de excepción. Si bien, en cada ámbito de esa triple dimensión de funciones (ejecutiva, legislativa y judicial) operan matices que exigen un tratamiento concreto en cada contexto, lo cierto del caso es que el Ordenamiento no incorpora cuadros de dispensa, fuera de los supuestos razonables cuando se produzca una lesión antijurídica en su base, vinculada con un proceder público. Los principios que surgen del Derecho de la Constitución dan contenido a dicha responsabilidad, por ende, aún la ausencia de regulación legal, la cual, pese que pueda precisar ese régimen, no limita en modo alguno el deber de indemnizar, cuando resulte pertinente conforme a Derecho. De ahí que no podría sostenerse una “impunidad” del Estado Juez, bajo el fundamento de que carece de desarrollo legal, pues aquella se encuentra establecida por principio, en el marco de la Constitución, a la vez que supondría un quebranto a la seguridad jurídica, el principio de igualdad y al control de la arbitrariedad de los poderes públicos. Así visto, su reconocimiento no está condicionado a la existencia de mandato legal que la regule, ergo, no es óbice lo dispuesto en el artículo 166 ibidem. La responsabilidad aludida se rige por lo estatuido en la Carta Fundamental, es decir, constituye un principio de base constitucional, impuesto por las normas referidas y que busca el control del ejercicio de dicha función y la tutela de los derechos e intereses de los justiciables." VIII.- Dentro de ese conjunto de supuestos en que existe desarrollo legislativo sobre el tema, destaca la materia penal, en la que, existen reglas caso de la responsabilidad por el dictado de medidas cautelares arbitrarias y el supuesto de prisión preventiva en un proceso en el que luego que dispone sobreseimiento definitivo o absolutoria con plena demostración de inocencia, el canon 108 del Código Penal que regula la eventual responsabilidad subsidiaria del Estado cuando en virtud de recurso de revisión fuere declarada la inocencia del reo cuando éste obtuviere sentencia absolutoria, después de haber sufrido (más de un año de prisión preventiva y finalmente, conforme al 419 del Código Procesal Penal, que fija la responsabilidad pública por la existencia de error judicial acreditado en una sentencia dictada en proceso de revisión. Estas últimas manifestaciones resultan especialmente relevantes al caso, siendo que son las que resultan de aplicación al caso concreto y que por ende, serán abordadas adelante. Con todo, es necesario precisar los alcances del denominado error judicial. Para ello, debe traerse a colación lo explicado por la Sala Primera en el precitado voto No. 654-2008 en el siguiente sentido: "Nótese que el numeral 154 de la Carta Magna utiliza el término “resolución”, con lo cual, resultan comprendidos los distintos modelos que integran esta categoría, sea, providencia, autos, autos con carácter de sentencia y sentencias (numeral 153 Código Procesal Civil). Por otro lado, puede darse, se insiste, en tesis de principio, tanto por error judicial como por funcionamiento anormal. El primero, es una especie del género común del funcionamiento anormal, pues bien, todo error judicial supone, teóricamente, una anormalidad en ese funcionamiento (a la postre, la manifestación más trascendente), pero no a la inversa. El error judicial comprende toda decisión jurisdiccional que prive a la persona de uno de sus derechos o intereses legítimos y que resulte errónea o contraria a derecho. Así visto, es exclusivo de la función jurisdiccional, siendo entonces, una modalidad de funcionamiento anormal que solo cabe en esa dimensión. Lo anterior comprende no solo el error de hecho (por equivocado conocimiento o valoración de los hechos, se dicta un fallo no ajustado a la realidad fáctica y que por tal, deviene en injusta), sino el de derecho (como quebranto al Derecho por su indebida interpretación, errónea o falta de aplicación). En este punto, pese a la existencia de todo un sistema recursivo contra esas decisiones, lo determinante es que una vez dado el reconocimiento de ese yerro judicial, se hubieren producido en la esfera jurídica de la persona, como consecuencia de esas deficiencias (nexo causal), daños indemnizables conforme al Ordenamiento Jurídico. Ergo, el error indemnizable no se encuentra limitado a los supuestos concretos en que el ordenamiento prevé dicha consecuencia, ni a la materia penal, como el presente, por una medida cautelar que deriva en improcedente, sino que por el contrario, su aplicación trasciende dichas circunstancias para abarcar la totalidad de la función jurisdiccional, esto es, cualquier resolución, indistintamente de la jurisdicción en la que se emita, puede derivar en el deber de reparación a cargo del Estado si genera un daño antijurídico." (El resaltado es propio) IX.- Sobre los alcances del error judicial. Sin perjuicio de ese desarrollo aludido, es necesario apuntar lo siguiente. Si bien el error judicial permite la reparación del daño ocasionado, es fundamental establecer las implicaciones de ese término. La reparabilidad a la que se hace referencia pende, de manera impostergable, de la acreditación de la existencia de un error judicial en esa decisión jurisdiccional que haya ocasionado una lesión antijurídica en su base. Para ello ha de tenerse claro que el simple hecho de que el destinatario del fallo no comparta su contenido, no supone en modo alguno la existencia de ese criterio de imputación referido. En efecto, como bien se apunta, el error judicial comprende toda decisión jurisdiccional que prive a la persona de uno de sus derechos o intereses legítimos y que resulte errónea o contraria a derecho. Nótese que este concepto es diverso del funcionamiento anormal, por ejemplo, por dilación en la resolución de un determinado caso. En esa última variable, se dan reglas diversas a las que son propias del error judicial, que no resultan relevantes en este proceso. En el tema que interesa (yerro judicial), es indispensable que se haya demostrado su existencia. Lo anterior supone una declaración dentro del propio proceso, o bien, como parte de este, dentro de las fases recursivas que establece el ordenamiento jurídico, que establezca la existencia de una decisión jurisdiccional errónea, contraria a derecho, sea por violación indirecta (de hecho o de derecho), o bien directa (por indebida aplicación, errónea aplicación o defectuosa interpretación) sea de fondo o procesal. Con todo, la sola anulación o revocatoria de una resolución no implica, per se, un yerro de esta naturaleza y mucho menos, una suerte de derecho automático a la indemnización. Para ello, surgen varios presupuestos que condicionan la reparabilidad de la lesión. Por un lado, el error debe ser crasso, esto es, debe tratarse de un defecto palmario, grave y sustancial. En este punto, se reitera, la existencia de la irregularidad debe expresarse mediante una resolución de la propia autoridad (vía revocatoria o nulidad oficiosa), o bien de una instancia de alzada ordinaria, sea, sede apelativa. También resulta factible la declaración mediante el ejercicio de los recursos extraordinarios, sea mediante sentencia de casación o la que se dicte en virtud de un recurso extraordinario de revisión. En esencia, es indispensable que exista una declaración jurisdiccional respecto de un error judicial grave (dentro del mismo proceso por la autoridad competente), con detalle de los aspectos que determinan esa deficiencia, aspecto que incumbe a cada una de las instancias que dado ese esquema recursivo le compete conocer del asunto. Para ello, es menester que se hayan utilizado los recursos o remedios jurisdiccionales que ofrece el ordenamiento para cuestionar la resolución que a criterio del destinatario, le ocasiona daños. Esto es determinante toda vez que la inercia en este derecho, pese a la posibilidad que otorga el plexo normativo para hacer cesar la perturbación, lleva a que los efectos de dicho fallo adquieran firmeza y por ende, sus implicaciones en la esfera jurídica del particular encuentren respaldo en una decisión con autoridad de cosa juzgada material sobre la que no ha existido controversia dentro del proceso, o bien, no al menos formalmente. Es claro que la ausencia de ejercicio recursivo de la decisión que se alega, sea por los recursos ordinarios procedentes (criterio de taxatividad impugnaticia) o bien por los extraordinarios, impide que dentro de la dinámica de los procesos, otra unidad jurisdiccional, revise la decisión del A quo, y en protección de los derechos del justiciable, suprima ese yerro que le afecta, todo por la anuencia tácita del supuesto afectado. En este punto, debe entenderse que la escala recursiva, plasmada en cada régimen procesal, es precisamente una garantía del debido proceso y la herramienta que permite al justiciable, cuestionar la decisión con la cual no concuerda. En esta línea, no podría configurar error indemnizable el que se contenga en una decisión que ha sido impugnada y que no haya surtido efectos, sino solo aquel que ha generado un daño efectivo, evaluable e individualizable, merced de una determinación jurisdiccional que ha producido efectos materiales con resultado lesivo al destinatario en los términos apuntados. Desde luego que aquellas resoluciones que surtan efectos directos, pese haber sido impugnadas por los mecanismos ordinarios (recurso en efecto devolutivo -v.gr., numeral 569 del Código Procesal Civil-), en tanto se acredite un yerro judicial, permiten esa reparación pecuniaria. Lo contrario, esto es, suponer la posibilidad de alegar un error judicial en un proceso de responsabilidad del Estado, sin que exista un fallo de una autoridad superior, o bien, de la misma autoridad que ha reconocido su yerro (revocatoria o nulidad oficiosa), llevaría a permitir que mediante este tipo de procesos civiles de hacienda, se pretenda analizar la legalidad de decisiones jurisdiccionales firmes, con autoridad de cosa juzgada, a contra pelo del sistema recursivo que fija la ley y en pleno desconocimiento de los efectos de esa cosa juzgada material. Cabe recordar que las resoluciones con esa jerarquía solo pueden ser analizadas mediante los recursos extraordinarios (revisión y casación), por lo que aceptar la revisión de esas conductas como presupuesto de una determinación de existencia o no de yerro judicial, no solo quebranta la seguridad y certeza jurídica de la cosa juzgada, sino además, invade las competencias que son propias de las Salas de Casación, aspecto que desde luego, no puede compartir este Tribunal. No corresponde a este Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo calificar las conductas de otras jurisdicciones a fin de establecer si se dictaron con error judicial o no. Ello implicaría, se insiste, la revisión refleja de esos criterios, tema que está reservado a las instancias recursivas competentes, y el ejercicio de una potestad que no puede desprenderse de la competencia genérica que otorga el artículo 2 inciso b) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo -que comprende los reclamos de responsabilidad contra la Administración y en general contra el Estado, en aplicación del canon 49 de la Carta Magna-, por ende, sin base jurídica habilitante.

X.- Cabe insistir, es preciso que el error sea grave, evidente y grosero. No podría considerarse error judicial reparable la sola circunstancia de que en la instancia apelativa o casacional, se opte por un criterio jurídico diverso. Es preciso que la decisión sea abiertamente arbitraria, abiertamente contraria a la legalidad del caso y así se exprese en el fallo que revoca o anula el criterio del A quo. Igual sucede cuando el nuevo criterio se ampare en alegatos no expresados ante el juzgador de instancia (siempre que fueren cuestiones que deban ser debatidas por las partes en aplicación del principio rogatorio), o bien, se fundare en pruebas novedosas aportadas en la fase recursiva. En esos casos, no podría afirmarse la existencia de un error judicial cuando la sentencia cuestionada fue dictada sin contar con esos elementos de convicción o argumentos de fondo que solo pueden ser objeto de pronunciamiento si fueron debatidos por las partes (congruencia), sin que ello suponga un desconocimiento de la máxima iura novit curia. Por tanto, la sola variación de un criterio precedente no lleva, por regla general, a un error judicial indemnizable. Es menester un examen minucioso y casuístico de las particularidades de cada proceso, a fin de establecer si se ha producido ese tipo de yerro que permite hacer surgir la responsabilidad por la función jurisdiccional. Verbigracia, no amerita igual tratamiento un fallo que dispone el remate de un bien dado en garantía de una obligación de crédito ya cancelada por compensación, situación desconocida por el juzgador pese a los constantes alegatos del supuesto deudor y su acreditación dentro del expediente, para resolver que la deuda no está cancelada, disponiendo el remate de la garantía real, que la responsabilidad que se puede producir por el criterio jurídico de considerar vigente una determinada facultad sujeta a plazo prescriptivo, que luego, por valoraciones jurídicas diversas, el Ad quem considera se encuentra prescrita. En el primer caso, es claro que puede configurarse un error indemnizable por el desconocimiento de una situación acreditada en autos, que produjo, en última instancia, el remate del bien. En el segundo, se trata de criterios y valoraciones normativas diversas, a fin de cuentas, independencia de criterio del juzgador, salvo que el aludido fenecimiento sea evidente. No existe yerro judicial indemnizable por la sola disonancia de criterio legal, debe existir una declaración de existencia de un equívoco grave, generador de daños a un tercero. Esto es precisamente el tercer aspecto, sea, la acreditación de que ese criterio que se tuvo por equívoco, produjo un daño concreto. Más simple, debe precisarse que la existencia de ese derecho de reparación se encuentra sujeta, por un lado, a que la resolución que contiene un posible error judicial, haya desplegado sus efectos y con ellos, se haya producido un menoscabo en la esfera jurídica del afectado. Como aspecto adicional, cabe precisar, el error indemnizable no se encuentra limitado a la hipótesis del recurso de revisión, aunque constituye el supuesto en que con mayor probabilidad puede desprenderse. Con todo, en tesis de principio, lo usual es que derive de una decisión jurisdiccional firme que posea autoridad de cosa juzgada. Tampoco es exclusivo de la jurisdicción penal. Es claro que impregna las demás jurisdicciones, pues bien, pese a que la materia penal es en la que se evidencia el desarrollo legal de la figura, ello no implica que no pueda ocurrir en las demás. Este criterio no debe confundirse con el funcionamiento anormal que ocurre en la concepción clásica de falta de funcionamiento, prestación defectuosa o errónea. Así visto, es un término de mayor amplitud, que cubre el supuesto ya comentado de error judicial, pero además, las deficiencias que en términos de prestación deficiente o dilación de justicia, se encuentran vinculadas, en principio, con la arista de administración de justicia o la función judicial, por ende, regulado por el régimen de responsabilidad tratado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública. (Sobre esa precisión, véase la aludida sentencia No. 654-2008 de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) XI.- Sobre la responsabilidad por error judicial acreditado en recurso de revisión. Precisadas las generalidades del sistema de responsabilidad por error judicial y los alcances del error judicial, se ingresa al examen de los alegatos planteados en el caso concreto. El accionante fundamenta su reclamo en lo que considera responsabilidad del Estado juzgador por el error judicial cometido por haberle declarado culpable del delito de violación en perjuicio de Juan José García Garay, condenándole a diez años de prisión mediante el fallo No. 327-2004 del Tribunal de Juicio del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José y luego haber sido absuelto por la resolución No. 2006-00565 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. En lo medular, argumenta, se le impuso la pena sin haber evacuado la prueba ofrecida consistente en el testimonio de Joseph Molina Alfaro y Freddy Meléndez Pacheco. Acusa, se le absolvió sin tomar en cuenta el error cometido por los juzgadores. Dice, al juzgársele la única prueba existente era un parte de la Policía Municipal y el testimonio del denunciante. Indica, en la sentencia que le condenó no se hizo referencia a la inevacuabilidad de la prueba testimonial ofrecida, dejándole en estado de indefensión. Asegura haber sufrido una agresión con arma blanca cuando estaba recluido en fecha 13 de marzo del 2005. Acusa haber descontado prisión preventiva si elementos de prueba que indicaran que había cometido el delito. Asegura, el dictamen de análisis criminalístico emitido por el Departamento de Ciencias Forenses del Organismo de Investigación Judicial se señala que no se detectaron células masculinas y concluyó que no se encontraron evidencias de presencia de semen. imponerle prisión preventiva y mucho menos tenerle como autor responsable de los hechos denunciados. Los alegatos resumidos exigen ingresar al análisis de la figura de la indemnización por error judicial en virtud de la absolutoria dictada en recurso de revisión. Como se ha señalado en los apartes previos, la responsabilidad del Estado en su función jurisdiccional, requiere de la acreditación de un funcionamiento anormal y para lo que viene relevante al presente proceso, de la demostración de un error judicial que haya sido declarado por las autoridades competentes dentro del ejercicio recursivo que cabe contra la resolución. Tal declaración resulta impostergable, considerando que no es resorte de este Tribunal analizar la legalidad, procedencia o no de los pronunciamientos judiciales firmes de otros órganos jurisdiccionales, materia que escapa de la competencia de esta jurisdicción y que solo incumbe a las autoridades a las cuales se haya asignado tal competencia. En este ámbito, la normativa procesal penal regula el tema de la responsabilidad por error judicial, en concreto, cuando en la fase extraordinaria de revisión, se determine que en la sentencia condenatoria, existió error de hecho o de derecho. Sobre este particular, el mandato 419 del Código Procesal Penal indica: “Cuando a causa de la revisión del procedimiento se reconozca un error judicial, a consecuencia del cual el sentenciado descontó una pena que no debió cumplir, o una mayor o más grave de la que le correspondía, el tribunal que conoce de la revisión podrá ordenar el pago de una indemnización a cargo del Estado y a instancia del interesado, siempre que este último no haya contribuido con dolo o culpa a producir el error./ Los jueces que dictaron la sentencia revisada serán solidariamente responsables con el Estado, cuando hayan actuado arbitrariamente o con culpa grave en los términos del artículo 199 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública./ La reparación civil sólo podrá acordarse en favor del condenado o sus herederos legítimos.” (El resaltado no es del original) Del análisis de dicha normativa se desprende la imperiosa necesidad de que la autoridad competente para conocer del recurso de revisión, en este caso, la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, haya reconocido la existencia de un error judicial. No obstante, de un análisis minucioso de los autos, no se desprende que dicha Sala, en la sentencia número 2006-00565 de las 15 horas 10 minutos del 7 de junio del 2006 haya decretado la existencia de tal equívoco, presupuesto de la reparación que se peticiona. En efecto, el análisis expresado por ese alto Tribunal, refleja que la absolutoria decretada lo fue por la aceptación de una nueva prueba testimonial que no fue ponderada y evacuada en la fase de juicio ni en sede casacional, sea, la deposición de Freddy Meléndez Pacheco, la cual, una vez recibida, llevó al Tribunal a considerar que ante la duda razonable de si el imputado había cometido o no el delito que se le atribuía, lo procedente era la absolutoria. En ese sentido, en lo medular dispuso: "Confrontada esta prueba testimonial con la de cargo examinada en la sentencia, de los dos oficiales de policía que declararon acerca de lo narrado por el ofendido y de lo dicho por el perjudicado al denunciar, de que había sido objeto de un ataque sexual por un desconocido, encuentra esta Sala que si bien no se demuestra fehacientemente que el hecho no existió o que el imputado no lo realizó, sí tiene la virtud de generar una duda importante sobre las circunstancias en que se da el hecho. (...) Ciertamente, hay un dictamen médico legal que revela que el ofendido presenta fisuras anales, sin embargo, ello por sí mismo no permite derivar las circunstancias en que se le producen. Como corolario de lo dicho, la prueba aportada por el imputado en la revisión, no hace desaparecer el hecho, pero introduce un elemento fundamental que socaba las bases probatorias que dieron origen a la condena, al poner en entredicho las manifestaciones del ofendido en su denuncia, sobre no conocer al encartado y sobre la veracidad del hecho atribuido al encartado, generando una duda sobre lo realmente ocurrido. Nuestro sistema procesal y constitucional exige que una condena se encuentre sustentada en la certeza que arroja la prueba y como en este caso, la prueba aportada en revisión, examinada en relación con la recibida en juicio, ha dejado una duda sobre la responsabilidad del acusado, obliga a aplicar el artículo 9 del Código Procesal Penal que establece que ante la duda sobre cuestiones de hecho debe estarse a lo más favorable para el imputado. En consecuencia, procede acoger la revisión presentada, dejar sin efecto la condena impuesta y en su lugar absolver al imputado Jorge Brooks Casasola por el delito de violación que se le atribuyó en perjuicio de J.J.G.G. Se ordena la libertad del acusado si otra causa no lo impide." (El resaltado no es del original) Como se observa, el resultado de absolutoria atendió a un criterio de duda razonable y de in dubio pro reo, derivado de la incorporación de un nuevo elemento de convicción que no se tuvo presente en las fases previas del proceso. Si bien el accionante aduce que desde el inicio del proceso penal ofreció el testimonio del señor Freddy Meléndez Pacheco, lo que se puede cotejar en el acta de la audiencia preliminar celebrada a las 15 horas del 27 de febrero del 2004, folios 139-141 de la certificación del expediente penal No. 03-013207-0042-PE y que al no ser evacuada tal prueba se causó indefensión y luego error judicial, lo cierto del caso es que en el auto de apertura a juicio de las 16 horas 04 minutos del 27 de febrero del 2004, en cuanto a esas probanzas testimoniales se indicó: "Testimonial. (...) Si bien es cierto la defensa mencionó como fundamento de la solicitud de sobreseimiento provisional la entrevista de los señores Freddy Meléndez Pacheco y Francisco Jiménez Elizondo, es lo cierto que no los ofreció como prueba testimonial (...)" (Folio 144 del expediente penal) Contra esa decisión no se formuló inconformidad alguna ni en el juicio oral y público celebrado a las 8 horas 40 minutos del 1 de abril del 2004 (folios 163-168 del legajo penal. No fue sino hasta en recurso de revisión que el accionante ofrece como prueba nueva al testigo Freddy Meléndez Pacheco. En la resolución No. 2005-01525 de las 9 horas 35 minutos del 23 de septiembre del 2005, la Sala Tercera admitió el recurso de revisión en cuanto al ofrecimiento aludido del nuevo testimonio (folios 308-310 del legajo penal). En definitiva, según se ha señalado, ponderando la deposición testimonial, junto con las demás probanzas que rolaban en autos penales, dispuso absolver por duda al imputado, ordenando su liberación. Lo anterior implica que el accionante no ofreció formalmente la prueba que luego incorporó en el procedimiento de revisión, ni cuestionó oportunamente el criterio del juzgador de no tener como prueba testimonial las declaraciones de Freddy Meléndez Pacheco y Francisco Jiménez Elizondo. De lo expuesto se colige que el criterio para ordenar la absolutoria, fue la ponderación de esa nueva prueba ofrecida y admitida (artículo 408 inciso e del Código Procesal Penal). Empero, ello no supone, como afirma el demandante, un error judicial. El nuevo criterio se ampara en la valoración de aspectos demostrativos que no estaban presentes en la sentencia condenatoria. Nótese que incluso el criterio del Tribunal de Juicio fue confirmado por la Sala Tercera mediante resolución No. 2004-01100, reflejando que la valoración fáctica y jurídica realizada con las pruebas que obraban en el expediente en ese momento, estaba apegada a derecho. Esto acredita que en la especie, no ha existido declaración de existencia de un error judicial. El fallo de ese alto Tribunal en procedimiento de revisión no dice de ese yerro, ni puede desprenderlo esta cámara del análisis de los autos. Desde ese plano, resulta inviable la reparación solicitada, siendo que se encuentra ausente el presupuesto básico para disponerla, sea, el criterio de imputación impostergable para tales fines.

XII.- Desde ese plano, ante la ausencia de error judicial y en virtud de la causa de absolutoria, es critrerio de esta Cámara, no cabe indemnización por la prisión a la que fue sometida el demandante, ni por la preventiva impuesta en su momento. En cuanto a la primera, es claro que la prisión a la que fue expuesta el actor como derivación de la sentencia condenatoria y su confirmación en sede casacional, no puede constituirse como parámetro de indemnización en los términos que solicita. Esto dado que fue la duda razonable sobre la comisión del ilícito lo que motivó la liberación, producto de la ponderación de una probanza que no se tuvo a disposición en el juicio oral y público por lo que en los términos ya expuestos, la sentencia condenatoria estaba ajustada a derecho. Fue hasta la emisión del fallo en fase de revisión, y como consecuencia de valoraciones de nuevos elementos de prueba que se le absuelve, lo que implica, la prisión dictada con fundamento en aquel primer fallo, confirmado en casación, estaba amparada a un fallo judicial sobre el que, en definitiva, no se demostró concurrencia de error judicial. Desde ese plano, la prisión fue el resultado de la aplicación de un fallo jurisdiccional firme, que fue acuerpado por la misma Sala Tercera en conocimiento del recurso de casación opuesto por el demandante y que por ende, supone la eficacia de una resolución sobre la cual, no se detectó irregularidad en el análisis fáctico, probatorio o jurídico. Si bien luego se dispuso la absolutoria por los motivos ya harto comentados, ello no dice de que esas decisiones fueras desacertadas con claro error judicial y en esa medida, la prisión que se impuso, como efecto de aquellas, no es base de una posible reparación por criterio de responsabilidad por error judicial. Así, no puede constituirse en parámetro que permita justificar la indemnización pretendida. Lo mismo ocurre con la aludida prisión preventiva. Para los efectos del numeral 108 del Código Penal, no puede considerarse como infundada la medida cautelar de orden personal objeto de comentario. No se desprende de los autos que las medidas de prisión preventiva y sus respectivas prórrogas se hayan dictado de manera arbitraria. Todo lo contrario, cada una de las resoluciones emitidas en ese sentido, sea, fallo de las 11 horas 40 minutos del 13 de julio del 2003, (Folios 8-14 del expediente penal), resolución de las 16 horas 30 minutos del 13 de octubre del 2003 (Folios 42-45 del expediente penal), fueron confirmadas por el Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, por resoluciones de las 8 horas 30 minutos del 01 de agosto del 2003 y No. 999-03 de las 14 horas 30 minutos del 22 de octubre del 2003 respectivamente. Igualmente fundamentada se encuentra la determinación de las 15 horas 45 minutos del 13 de enero del 2004, nuevamente, el Juzgado Penal de San José, decretó la prórroga de la prisión preventiva por un espacio de tres meses, a vencer el 13 de abril del 2004. En todas esas resoluciones se expone un análisis de los presupuestos que dan cabida a este tipo de medida cautelar de orden personal, conforme a los ordinales 238 y 239, ambos del Código Procesal Penal. En esta línea de exposición, la responsabilidad eventual prevista en el artículo 108 de previa mención, solo es viable cuando la absolutoria dispuesta en procedimiento de revisión lo ha sido por criterios de plena demostración de inocencia. De otro modo, esto es, cuando haya atendido a la presunción de inocencia, la jurisprudencia patria ha entendido que la prisión preventiva constituye una importante herramienta para la dinámica de las investigaciones previas y el llevamiento propio del proceso penal. En esa línea, la resolución No. 115 de las 14 horas 30 minutos del 11 de noviembre de 1998 de la Sala Primera, cita en el fallo No. 1011-2006 de ese alto Tribunal, analizando la procedencia de aplicar la responsabilidad a que hace referencia el numeral 108 del Código Penal interpretó: “VIII.- El referido artículo del Código Penal, a la luz de lo expuesto en el considerando próximo anterior, únicamente resultaría aplicable en el evento de haber detención preventiva y, luego se demuestre plenamente la inocencia del imputado. Sólo bajo esta circunstancia, la privación de libertad, proveniente de una necesaria investigación judicial, cabría reputarla injustificada y susceptible de reparación. De otra manera, la acción de la justicia, en terrenos tan escabrosos y siniestros para la sociedad, como lo es el del narcotráfico en la actualidad, se vería ostensiblemente entorpecida. (...) Cuando la absolutoria se obtiene, como ocurre en la especie, en virtud de la aplicación del principio "in dubio pro reo", obviamente la inocencia no ha sido indubitablemente demostrada. (...) Por ello, según se expuso en el considerando IV, en esos casos sí existen suficientes motivos para efectuar la investigación del ilícito y, en consecuencia, tomar todas las medidas necesarias, previstas en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico para esos efectos. Entre ellas, la prisión preventiva. Dentro de esos supuestos, no resultan ilegítimas tales medidas, como lo aduce el actor. Por ende, no pueden generar responsabilidad para el Estado o sus servidores.” Ergo, ante la falta de acreditación de plena demostración de inocencia y la no concurrencia de un error judicial en este caso, la reparación resulta improcedente, también por ese concepto.¨