Costs award in criminal proceedings without private complainant or civil partyCondena en costas en proceso penal sin querellante ni actor civil

**Sole issue.** Attorney [Nombre1], public defender of the accused, filed an appeal in cassation on procedural grounds, alleging as the sole ground the lack of reasoning in the judgment because the judgment orders his client to pay costs without providing any reasoning in that regard. He indicates that ordering the accused to pay costs, when there is no private prosecutor or civil plaintiff, constitutes an illegitimate encumbrance on the accused's assets and an unwarranted increase in favor of the Public Administration. He notes that the Sala Tercera has on occasion annulled cost orders so imposed or has indicated that the costs correspond to the State, and he cites in support thereof decisions number 1154-2007, 26-2008, and 845-2009 from that jurisdictional body. He adds that that judicial instance has also referred to the fact that Article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies only when there is a civil action or a private criminal complaint, and he again cites the last two pronouncements indicated above. He indicates that if in this case the only parties were the accused and the Public Prosecutor's Office, there is no basis for ordering the former to pay costs. The argument is partially admissible. This Tribunal, with a composition partially similar to the current one, has ruled on the issue of cost orders based on the current rules established by criminal procedure legislation. In this regard, decision number 2010-305 stated:

"In the present case, the judgment, without further reasoning, orders the accused to pay both types of costs. To determine whether such a procedure is erroneous or not, it is necessary to first elucidate what costs are and how they are regulated in criminal procedural matters in Costa Rica. The first thing that must be indicated is that, as a counterpart to the right of action or access to justice, there exists an obligation to finance the expenses generated by the process. That obligation falls, as a general rule, on the losing party, since by not having extrajudicially acknowledged the claim of the winning party, they forced the latter to make use of the jurisdictional apparatus. This rule, that the losing party bears the expenses originating in the process, is practically universal. Traditional procedural doctrine sets it forth as follows:

¬"The fundamental characteristic of the modern principle of cost orders consists precisely in being\" conditioned upon pure and simple defeat, and not upon the intention or conduct of the defeated party (bad faith or fault). Such was the point that (...) Roman law reached (...) and such is also the point that, following a similar historical process, modern procedural law has reached.\" [Nombre2]. La condena en costas (Cost Orders). Translation by [Nombre3]. Madrid, 1928, p. 220.

¬"General principle. The party that succumbs in the lawsuit is ordered to pay the expenses thereof (...) The basis of this cost order is the objective fact of defeat (soccombenza); and the justification for this institution is found in the fact that the operation of the law must not represent a patrimonial diminution for the party in whose favor it is performed (...) This is the result to which the development of procedural law leads; which, in its origins, only has cost orders for litigants acting in bad faith; subsequently, one passes through an intermediate period in which, not seeing the exact nature of the institution, principles of civil law (fault) are applied to cost orders; afterward, one arrives at the absolute cost order\" [Nombre2]. Derecho procesal civil: principios (Civil Procedural Law: Principles). Volume II. Cárdenas editor y distribuidor, Mexico, 1990 edition.

¬"...the cost of the process. This cost refers both to the work of the court and to that of the parties; but it falls entirely upon the parties through a system of judicial fees and advances, which the State demands from whoever brings an action. Each party, therefore, must spend money to bring an action; however, if it can be said that the one who was not in the right acted at their own risk, it is not equally licit to say so of the one who was in the right; if the latter had to bear their own expenses, there would be an injustice to their detriment (...) the cost of the process must be borne by the one whose claim has been rejected, that is, by the defeated party. The principle of acting at one's own risk is thus applied, as expressed in the ancient formula: ubi commoda ibi incommoda\" [Nombre4]. Derecho procesal civil y penal (Civil and Criminal Procedural Law). Translation by [Nombre5]. Colección de clásicos del derecho, Mexico, 1994, p. 80.

Now, the costs of the process, or judicial costs, as can be inferred from the foregoing, cannot be confused with procedural costs. The former is the generic category that has two components: personal costs, which comprise attorney's fees, and procedural costs, which are all remaining expenses originating from the process and which can range from per diem payments to witnesses so that they appear to testify, payments of fees to experts, technical consultants, executors, process servers, notaries, translators, transportation expenses, paper, stamps, certifications, etc. However, the content of each of these subcomponents may vary in each country or in the specifics of each area of law (for example, in Costa Rica in civil procedural matters, personal costs include, in addition to attorney's fees, compensation for the time spent by the party attending procedural hearings, considering their personal circumstances and provided their presence was necessary; but in criminal procedural matters, all payments to persons are treated as procedural costs: Article 269, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure). So, procedural costs are a subcategory of the general notion of costs of the process. In Costa Rican law, the various procedural codes in force in different areas of law incorporate the obligation that a ruling on the issue of costs must be made, imperatively and even ex officio, in the resolution that concludes the process, and that this ruling falls upon the losing party. This general rule, which excludes the possibility that the issue of costs might cause the pronouncement to lack congruity due to ultra or extrapetitio (see decisions of this Tribunal, with different compositions, numbers 787-F-96 of November 29, 1996 -U. [Nombre6], [Nombre7] and [Nombre8]-; 476-F-97 of June 13, 1997 -U. [Nombre6], [Nombre8] and [Nombre9]- and 1009-2004 of September 29, 2004 -[Nombre10], [Nombre11] and [Nombre12]- and, in civil claim matters: Sanabria Rojas, Rafael Ángel. Reparación civil en el proceso penal (Civil Reparation in Criminal Procedure), 2008, Editorama, San José, p. 306; with a contrary opinion: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado (Criminal Procedure Commented). Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 417 and Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José -C. [Nombre13], and [Nombre14]- decision number 1342-2005), is, however, excepted in some rules that provide the possibility that, optionally, different guidelines be applied:

¬"Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure: Condemnation. In the resolutions provided for in subsections 3) and 4) of Article 153, the defeated party shall be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs (...) The ruling on costs must be made ex officio. Every judgment must necessarily indicate what class of costs it orders the defeated party to pay...\" "Article 222. Exemption. Notwithstanding what is stated in the preceding article, the judge may exempt the defeated party from paying personal costs, and even procedural costs, when they have litigated with evident good faith, when the claim or counterclaim includes exaggerated demands, when the judgment only partially accepts the fundamental petitions of the claim or counterclaim, when the judgment admits important defenses invoked by the defeated party, or when there is mutual defeat. The judge may also exempt them from paying those procedural costs that were incurred due to petitions or hearings of the opposing party that, in the judge's opinion, must be classified as idle or unnecessary. If there is no specific cost order, each party must pay those costs they have incurred, and both parties those that are common." ¬"Article 494 of the Labor Code: ...the judgment shall contain a statement that procedural costs, or both costs, are being ordered, or that it is being rendered without a specific cost order." ¬"Article 55 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria (Agrarian Jurisdiction Law). Judgments, as well as resolutions that put an end to the process, shall contain a cost order. The defeated party may be exempted from paying personal costs, and even procedural costs, when it is evident that they have litigated in good faith, because, in the tribunal's opinion, there was sufficient reason to litigate, or because the claims of the winning party ultimately proved disproportionate" ¬"Article 193 of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure: Costs to the defeated party, exceptions: unknown evidence, litigiousness. In judgments and orders having the character of judgments, the defeated party shall be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs, a pronouncement that must be made ex officio. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the defeated party may be exempted from paying costs when: a) The judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party could plausibly not have known and, because of this, their opposition was justified; b) By the nature of the debated issues, there was, in the Tribunal's opinion, sufficient reason to litigate" Article 194. Plus petitio, provisional imposition of costs. 1) There shall be no cost order when the winning party has incurred in plus petitio. 2) There is plus petitio when the difference between what was claimed and what was definitively obtained is fifteen percent or more..." Now, the issue thus focused—questioned in modern general process theory based on principles such as free access to justice, but without such criticism having had major practical repercussions in world legislation—was put in check, long ago, in criminal procedural law, given the nature (public or collective) of the conflict decided therein and the existence of international instruments on human rights that obligate the states that have signed them to mandatorily provide free defense for the accused who, against their will, is brought into the process but is protected by a constitutional state of innocence, as well as by the state duty to provide its population with suitable mechanisms to resolve its most important conflicts (cf.: Article 8.2.a and 8.2.e of the American Convention on Human Rights and 14.2.d and 14.2.f of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which establish the right of the accused to be assisted free of charge by a translator or interpreter and for the State to provide them with a lawyer). That differentiated treatment of the issue, while maintaining the same principles, incorporates additional ones and is manifested in the evolution with which such topics have been addressed in the various criminal procedural legislations that have been enacted in Costa Rica, of which the last two are cited:

¬Code of Criminal Procedures (1973):

"Necessary resolution. Article 543.- Every resolution that puts an end to the cause shall order payment of procedural and personal costs. One that puts an end to an incident shall order payment of procedural costs only." "Imposition. Article 544.- Costs shall be borne by the defeated party, but the tribunal may exempt them, totally or partially, when there was a plausible reason to litigate." "Advance payment. Article 542.- In every process, the State shall cover expenses in relation to the accused and the other parties who enjoy the benefit of litigating as paupers" "Exempt persons. Article 545.- The representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the lawyers, and mandataries who intervene in the process may not be ordered to pay costs, except in cases where the contrary is specifically provided and without prejudice to the criminal or disciplinary liability they incur" ¬Code of Criminal Procedure (1996):

"Article 265. Costs of the accused. In every process, the State shall cover expenses in relation to the accused and the other parties who enjoy the benefit of litigating without being charged for them. When the accused is economically solvent, they must pay the Judicial Branch for the services of the public defender or any other service they may have received. For this purpose, the procedure established in the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (Organic Law of the Judicial Branch) shall be followed, with respect to the public defender. The payment of the official translator or interpreter is excepted from this duty" "Article 266. Necessary resolution. The criminal tribunal must rule in a reasoned manner on the payment of procedural and personal costs when issuing the resolution that puts an end to the cause." "Article 267. Fixing of costs. Costs shall be borne by the defeated party, but the tribunal may exempt them, totally or partially, when there is a plausible reason to litigate. When there are several persons ordered to pay costs, the tribunal shall fix the proportional part corresponding to each one, without prejudice to the joint and several liability established by law" "Article 268. Exempt persons. The representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, lawyers, and mandataries who intervene in the process may not be ordered to pay costs, except in cases where the contrary is specifically provided {e.g., what is provided in section 105, third paragraph, of the Code of Criminal Procedure} and without prejudice to the civil, criminal, or disciplinary liability they incur" "Article 269- Content: Costs shall consist of: a)- the expenses originated by the processing of the procedure; b)- the payment of fees to lawyers, other professionals, and other persons who have intervened in the procedure" "Article 270. Civil action. If the civil claim is admitted in the judgment, the accused and the civilly sued third party shall solidarily bear the costs; if the claim is rejected, the civil plaintiff shall bear them. If the action cannot proceed, each of the parties involved shall bear their own costs, unless the parties have agreed to another measure or the tribunal, due to the circumstances of the case, distributes them in another manner" (boldface is supplied).

It is thus that, in Costa Rican criminal procedural matters, some exceptions arise to the treatment that this topic receives in other branches of law, be they public or private. So, although the rule is that costs are borne by the defeated party, if this party is the criminal accused, a differentiation must be made between procedural costs or expenses. The latter, that is, the expenses incorporating the payment of the translator or interpreter, shall always be borne by the State, as provided by section 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cited, and, with respect to attorney's fees, the accused may be exempted from payment, if and only if two situations converge: a)- that their defender is a public defender; and b)- that they lack the resources to reimburse the State for their fees (in a similar sense, cf.: decision of this Chamber number 851-2005 of September 1, 2005 -U. [Nombre6], [Nombre14] and [Nombre15]- ). Although this latter position has been academically questioned regarding its constitutionality when the accused is acquitted (cf.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado (Criminal Procedure Commented). Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 416, who notes that these rules: "...imply a violation of the principle of equality before public burdens. Indeed, the accused, even if economically solvent, must have the right at a minimum to avail themselves of the appointment of a public defender, and for the State, in the event that a conviction is not reached, to cover the expenses relating to said defender. Otherwise, the acquitted or discharged solvent person would necessarily have been made to incur expenses for the benefit of the community, even though the basis of the punitive claim against them could not be demonstrated"), the truth is that it has not yet been so found through the proper procedural channels, which means it remains in force and, therefore, is applicable as of this date and is complemented by what, in this regard, the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (Organic Law of the Judicial Branch) provides, which states:

¬Article 152: "The Public Defense shall provide a public defender to any accused or pre-indicted person who requests its services. The authority processing the cause shall warn them that, if it is demonstrated that they are economically solvent, they must appoint a private attorney or pay the Judicial Branch for the services of the public defender, according to the determination made by the judge. Likewise, the employees of the Judicial Investigation Agency and other judicial servants shall have the right to have a public defender appointed for them, when they are brought before the courts (...) for matters directly related to the exercise of their functions..." ¬Article 153: "The Head of the Public Defense or whoever they designate shall manage, before the corresponding authority, the determination and collection of the fees for the services rendered. The certification issued regarding the amount of fees chargeable to the accused shall constitute an enforceable title..." ¬Article 154. "The determination of fees shall be made in the judgment or at the moment when the accused decides to dispense with the services of the public defender..." But if the legal professional representing the accused is private or if, being paid by the State, the accused possesses the resources to pay them (an aspect that, as has been indicated, can be elucidated in the enforcement stage according to what the judgment may have decided in that regard), the order for personal costs will imply that it is the accused or sentenced person who pays their lawyer's fees, and not that the latter can demand such payment from the State, as would happen if the cited rule were erroneously interpreted or applied and, through lack of knowledge, the accused were always exempted from paying both costs or the State were always ordered to pay them (cf.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado (Criminal Procedure Commented). Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 416). The same occurs if the defeated party is the Public Prosecutor's Office, regarding which there is also a legal exemption from the charging of both costs, per the provisions of section 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There are already jurisprudential criteria from other bodies that this Tribunal shares:

"In the present process, there was no private prosecutor or civil plaintiff, but only the Public Prosecutor's Office in the exercise of criminal prosecution, so the costs must be covered by the State, under the argument that this Chamber noted in its resolution number 1154, of October 8, 2007: “…Article 361, subsection d), of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires tribunals to deliberate and vote on costs. Furthermore, Article 266 of the same legal text provides: “Necessary resolution.- The criminal tribunal must rule in a reasoned manner on the payment of procedural and personal costs when issuing the resolution that puts an end to the cause”. In the present case, it is observed that the lower court did not justify its decision to order the sentenced person to pay costs. However, despite the defect noted, in the present cause only a criminal accusation formulated by the Public Prosecutor's Office was heard, so only this body and the defense were considered procedural parties. The victim… did not become a procedural party through the exercise of criminal prosecution —via a private criminal complaint— or civil action —via a civil action for damages—. Consequently, insofar as the Public Prosecutor's Office is a public and official party, the expenses that, on the occasion of the process, it may have incurred, cannot be passed on to the convicted person, since the Administration of Justice constitutes a public service, financed with funds that are, likewise, public. It is the State that, in this case, must bear the expenses of the judicial system, without it being possible to demand from the accused… any payment for the monetary investment that the exercise of criminal prosecution by the Fiscalía entailed. The legal system does not provide that, for the simple fact of having their criminal liability proven, the convicted person must pay the costs of the process incurred by the party whose claims were upheld. Article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not an obstacle to the foregoing reasoning. Said norm determines: «Costs shall be borne by the defeated party, but the tribunal may exempt them, totally or partially, when there is a plausible reason to litigate…». In reality, this provision regulates those cases where a private criminal complaint or a civil action has been filed, on the understanding that the winning party (private prosecutor or civil plaintiff whose claims are upheld, accused who is a defendant in a private prosecution and is acquitted or discharged, civil defendant exonerated from liability) must be compensated, at the expense of the defeated party (private prosecutor or civil plaintiff whose claims are rejected, accused who is a defendant in a private prosecution and is convicted, civil defendant found liable) for the expenses they may have incurred —according to the content of costs defined in Article 269 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—, for the reduction of their assets due to the claimant's claim before the Administration of Justice, except when, regarding the defeated party, there was no recklessness or abuse of the right to litigate, in which case the Tribunal, discretely, may totally or partially exempt the defeated party. Therefore, this ground is upheld and the judgment is partially annulled, only with respect to the cost order imposed on… consisting of paying the expenses incurred by the Public Prosecutor's Office on the occasion of the process and, in its place, for reasons of procedural economy, this Chamber rules that costs are borne by the State…”. Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, decision number 2008-01095 of 4:05 p.m. on October 2, 2008. In a similar sense: Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José, decision number 197-2002 composed of [Nombre16], and [Nombre17]).

This Tribunal slightly disagrees with that criterion only regarding the reasoning, because although Article 266 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires it, this norm must be interpreted systematically with the rest of the articles to consider that if the tribunal applies the mandatory cost order (for the defeated party in the event that it is not the accused or the Public Prosecutor's Office) or the mandatory exemption (for the accused regarding procedural costs or for the Public Prosecutor's Office), when a legal rule is being applied, it is sufficient to justify the pronouncement by stating that it is done so by provision of law or by alluding to the norm that establishes it (see the imperative wording in Articles 265 and 267 of that same legislation), which must be applied. Only when the exception is applied, is it necessary for there to be greater reasoning so that the discretion granted to the judge by the legislature in this respect does not become arbitrariness, since reasoning is what marks the dividing line between the two terms (in that same sense: Sala Tercera, decision 1157-2007 of October 12, 2007 and Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José, decision number 53-F-99 of February 12, 1999. For a contrary sense, cf.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado (Criminal Procedure Commented). Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 418. The topic has been handled in different ways by this same Tribunal, with different compositions, with the tendency appearing to be to always require reasoning and even to accept exemption as an exception for all cases. For a better study of the question, cf.: decisions numbers 239-F-98 of April 2, 1998 -López, [Nombre18] and [Nombre8]-, 539-F-98 of July 31, 1998 -[Nombre18], [Nombre8] and [Nombre9]-, 579-F-98 of August 21, 1998 -[Nombre8], [Nombre17] and [Nombre18]-, 366-2002 of May 10, 2002 -[Nombre17], [Nombre8] and [Nombre11]-, 747-2002 of September 19, 2002 -[Nombre14], [Nombre19] and [Nombre20]-, 891-2002 of October 31, 2002 -[Nombre19], [Nombre17] and [Nombre14]-, 1028-2003 of October 16, 2003 -[Nombre11], [Nombre8] and [Nombre20]-, 1031-2003 of October 16, 2003 -[Nombre17], [Nombre21] . and [Nombre20]-, 746-2004 of July 29, 2004 -[Nombre15], [Nombre12] and [Nombre20]-, 780-2004 of August 5, 2004 -[Nombre20], [Nombre11] and [Nombre21] . -, 1348-2004 of December 23, 2004 -[Nombre11], [Nombre21] . and [Nombre17]-, 132-2005 of February 24, 2005 -[Nombre14], [Nombre19] and [Nombre21] . -, 271-2005 of April 14, 2005 -Vargas, [Nombre10] and [Nombre11]-, 408-2005 of May 12, 2005 -[Nombre11], [Nombre21] . and [Nombre10]-, 497-2005 of June 2, 2005 -[Nombre20], [Nombre11] and [Nombre14]- and 1019-2005 of October 10, 2005 -[Nombre11], [Nombre22] , -). However, these rules are for the ordinary process in criminal matters, as it must be taken into account that in other types of special criminal processes (private prosecution, for example) and in civil claim matters, there are special rules that displace those general provisions. There, the general rule is that the losing party always faces both costs and the possibility of granting an exemption does not apply, since the special rule does not allow for it. Thus state Articles 78 (express abandonment of a public prosecution private criminal complaint, where costs are imperatively ordered against the one who abandons, unless the parties agree otherwise), 118, second paragraph (abandonment of a civil action), 384 (abandonment of a private prosecution private criminal complaint, where costs are imperatively ordered against the one who abandons, unless the parties agree otherwise) and 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (cost order against the defeated civil party) (see in this sense the decision of this Tribunal, with a composition partially different from the current one, number 851-2005 of September 1, 2005 -U. [Nombre6], [Nombre14] and [Nombre15]- and the note in decision number [Telf1] of January 17, 2010 -Camacho, [Nombre23] and [Nombre21] . -. For a contrary sense, that is, accepting the plausible reason to litigate as an exception in all cases, the decisions of this Chamber, with a different composition, numbers [Telf2] of September 29, 2006 -[Nombre23], [Nombre24] and [Nombre12]- and 2000-119 of February 11, 2000 -López, [Nombre11] and [Nombre25]-, where the topic is addressed, though with criteria different from those set forth here). Furthermore, supplementary application of the Code of Civil Procedure is also not appropriate, since there is an express rule to the contrary. When the repealed Code of Criminal Procedures of 1973 was in force, which contained provisions similar to the current ones, the Sala Tercera so indicated, a criterion that this Chamber shares:

"The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures are not applicable in the subjúdice as long as criminal norms exist that establish guidelines for the purpose, and recourse to the former would only be possible -as an exceptional case- when the criminal procedural forms do not contemplate a specific case, which the civil ones do address or contain" Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, decision number 255-F of 9:35 a.m. on November 10, 1989.

III.- In the present case, the judgment, without further reasoning, orders the accused to pay both costs. In this matter, the accused litigated under the sponsorship of the public defense, although it is unknown whether they have the resources to make that payment. Besides the accused and their public defender, only the Public Prosecutor's Office participated, which is exempt from paying costs and which, moreover, was the "winning" party (understanding "party" in a formal sense, since it cannot be so in a material sense, being subject to a duty of objectivity imposed by law). Therefore, there is no error in that the tribunal, without delving into why it was not exempting from costs, ordered the accused to pay personal costs, since it was applying the legal rule and not the exception and, for this reason, that aspect must remain untouched; however, there is an incorrect application of procedural law when it orders them to pay procedural costs, since there is an express rule that indicates that, regarding the accused, expenses are borne by the State.

“**Sole Ground.** Mr. [Name1], public defender of the accused, filed the appeal in cassation on procedural grounds, alleging as the **sole ground** the lack of reasoning in the judgment because the judgment imposes costs on his client without providing any reasoning in that regard. He indicates that the imposition of costs on the accused, when there is no private prosecutor (querellante) or civil party (actor civil), constitutes an illegitimate burden against the accused's assets and an unjustified increase in favor of the Public Administration. He points out that the Third Chamber has on occasion annulled the imposition of costs thus ordered or has indicated that the costs correspond to the State, and in support thereof he cites votes numbers 1154-2007, 26-2008, and 845-2009 of that jurisdictional body. He adds that said judicial instance has also referred to the fact that Article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies only when there is a civil action or a private criminal complaint (querella), and he again cites the last two pronouncements indicated above. He indicates that if, in this case, the only parties were the accused and the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), the imposition of costs on the former is not appropriate. **The argument is partially admissible.** This Court, with a partially similar composition to the current one, has ruled on the issue of the imposition of costs based on the current rules established by criminal procedure legislation. In this regard, in vote number 2010-305, it was stated:

"In the present case, the judgment, without further reasoning, imposes both types of costs on the accused. To determine whether there is an error in such a procedure or not, it is first necessary to elucidate what costs are and what their regulation is in criminal procedural matters in Costa Rica. The first thing that must be indicated is that, as a counterpart to the right of action or access to justice, there is the obligation to finance the expenses generated by the process. This obligation falls, as a general rule, on the losing party, since, by not having recognized the winning party's claim extrajudicially, it forced the latter to make use of the court system. This rule, that the losing party bears the expenses arising from the process, is practically universal. This is how traditional procedural doctrine sets it out:

¬"The fundamental characteristic of the modern principle of the imposition of costs consists precisely in being conditioned upon pure and simple defeat (vencimiento), and not upon the intention or conduct of the defeated party (bad faith or fault). Such was the end to which Roman law arrived (...) and such is also the end to which, following a similar historical process, modern procedural law has arrived." [Name2]. *La condena en costas*. Translation by [Name3]. Madrid, 1928, p. 220.

¬"General principle. The party who loses the trial is ordered to pay the costs thereof (...) The basis for this order is the objective fact of defeat (soccombenza); and the justification for this institution is found in that the application of the law must not represent a financial loss for the party in whose favor it is carried out (...) This is the result to which the development of procedural law leads; which, in its origins, does not impose costs except for litigants of bad faith; subsequently, it passes through an intermediate period in which, the exact nature of the institution not being seen, principles proper to civil law (fault) are applied to the imposition of costs; finally, absolute imposition is arrived at." [Name2]. *Derecho procesal civil: principios*. Tomo II. Cárdenas editor and distributor, Mexico, 1990 edition.

¬"...the cost of the process. This cost refers both to the work of the court and to that of the parties; but it falls entirely on the parties through a system of court fees and advances, which the State requires from whoever brings an action. Each party, therefore, must spend to bring an action; however, if it can be said of the one who was not right that they acted at their own risk, it is not equally licit to say so of the one who was right; if the latter had to bear their own expenses, there would be an injustice to their detriment (...) the cost of the process must be borne by the one whose claim has been rejected, that is, by the defeated party. Thus, the principle of acting at one's own risk is applied, expressed in the old formula: ubi commoda ibi incommoda" [Name4]. *Derecho procesal civil y penal*. Translation by [Name5]. Colección de clásicos del derecho, Mexico, 1994, p. 80.

Now then, the **costs of the process** (costas del proceso) or court costs, as can be inferred from the foregoing, cannot be confused with **procedural costs** (costas procesales). The former is the generic category that has two components: **personal costs** (costas personales), which include attorney's fees, and **procedural costs** (costas procesales), which are all the remaining expenses arising from the process and which can range from the payment of allowances to witnesses so they appear to testify, payments of fees to experts, technical consultants, executors, notifiers, notaries, translators, transportation expenses, paper, stamps, certifications, etc. However, the content of each of these subcomponents can vary in each country or in the specifics of each area (for example, in Costa Rica in civil procedural matters, personal costs are considered to be, in addition to attorney's fees, the compensation for the time invested by the party in attending proceedings of the process, taking into account their personal circumstances and provided their presence was necessary; but in criminal procedural matters, all payments to persons are treated as procedural costs: Article 269, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Thus, procedural costs is a subcategory of the general notion of costs of the process. In Costa Rican law, the various procedural codes in force in different areas include the obligation that the ruling on the matter of costs be made, imperatively and even on the court's own motion (de oficio), in the decision that ends the process and that it falls on the losing party. That general rule, which excludes the possibility that the issue of costs might cause the ruling to incur in a lack of congruence due to being *ultra* or *extrapetitio* (thus the votes of this Court, with various compositions, numbers 787-F-96 of November 29, 1996 – Judges [Name6], [Name7], and [Name8]; 476-F-97 of June 13, 1997 – Judges [Name6], [Name8], and [Name9]; and 1009-2004 of September 29, 2004 – [Name10], [Name11], and [Name12] and in the matter of civil claims: Sanabria Rojas, Rafael Ángel. *Reparación civil en el proceso penal*, 2008, Editorama, San José, p. 306; with a contrary opinion: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. *Proceso penal comentado*. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 417 and the Criminal Cassation Court of San José – Judges [Name13] and [Name14] – vote number 1342-2005), is, however, subject to exceptions in some rules that provide for the possibility that, optionally, other guidelines be applied:

¬"Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code: Imposition of Costs. In the decisions provided for in subsections 3) and 4) of Article 153, the defeated party shall be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs (...) The ruling on costs must be made on the court's own motion. Every judgment must necessarily indicate in what kind of costs the defeated party is being ordered to pay..." "Article 222. Exemption. Notwithstanding what is stated in the preceding article, the judge may exempt the defeated party from the payment of personal costs, and even procedural costs, when it has litigated with evident good faith, when the claim or counterclaim includes exaggerated claims, when the judgment accepts only part of the fundamental claims of the claim or counterclaim (reconvención), when the judgment admits important defenses invoked by the defeated party, or when there is mutual defeat (vencimiento recíproco). The judge may also exempt said party from the payment of those procedural costs that were caused by requests or proceedings of the opposing party which, in the judge's opinion, must be classified as idle or unnecessary. If there is no specific order regarding costs, each party must pay those it has caused, and both parties those that were common." ¬"Article 494 of the Labor Code: ...the judgment shall contain an expression ordering the payment of procedural costs, or of both types of costs, or stating that it is issued without a specific order for costs." ¬"Article 55 of the Law of the Agrarian Jurisdiction. The judgments, as well as the decisions that put an end to the process, shall contain a ruling on costs. The defeated party may be exempted from the payment of personal costs, and even of procedural costs, when it is evident that it has litigated in good faith, because there exists, in the tribunal's opinion, sufficient reason to litigate, or because the claims of the winning party ultimately proved disproportionate." ¬"Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code: Costs to the Defeated Party, Exceptions: Unknown Evidence, Litigiousness. In judgments and interlocutory decisions (autos) having the character of a judgment, the defeated party shall be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs, a ruling that must be made on the court's own motion. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the defeated party may be exempted from the payment of costs, when: a) The judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party presumably could not have known about and, for this reason, the party's opposition was appropriate; b) By the nature of the issues debated, in the Court's opinion, there has been sufficient reason to litigate. Article 194. Plus petitio, Provisional Imposition of Costs. 1) There shall be no order for costs when the winning party has incurred in plus petitio. 2) There shall be plus petitio when the difference between the amount claimed and the amount finally obtained is fifteen percent or more..." Now then, the topic thus focused – questioned in modern general theory of process based on principles such as gratuitous access to justice, but without such criticism having had major practical repercussions in world legislation – was put in check, a long time ago, in criminal procedural law, given the (public or collective) nature of the conflict decided therein and the existence of international instruments on human rights that oblige the states that have signed them to provide, mandatorily, a free defense for the accused who, against their will, is brought into the process but is protected by a constitutional state of innocence, as well as by the state duty to supply its population with suitable mechanisms to resolve their most important conflicts (cfr.: Article 8.2.a and 8.2.e of the American Convention on Human Rights and 14.2.d and 14.2.f of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which establish the right of the accused to be assisted free of charge by a translator or interpreter and for the State to provide them with a lawyer). This differentiated treatment of the issue, while maintaining the same principles, incorporates additional ones and becomes apparent in the evolution with which such topics have been addressed in the different criminal procedure legislations that have succeeded each other in Costa Rica, of which the last two are cited:

¬Code of Criminal Procedures (1973):

"Necessary Resolution. Article 543.- Every resolution that puts an end to the case shall order the payment of procedural and personal costs. That which ends an incident shall order the payment of procedural costs only." "Imposition. Article 544.- The costs shall be borne by the defeated party, but the tribunal may exempt it, totally or partially, when there was plausible reason to litigate." "Advancement. Article 542.- In every process, the State shall cover the expenses in relation to the accused and the other parties who enjoy the benefit of litigating as poor." "Exempt Persons. Article 545.- The representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the lawyers, and agents who intervene in the process may not be ordered to pay costs, except in cases where the contrary is specifically provided and without prejudice to the criminal or disciplinary responsibility they incur." ¬Code of Criminal Procedure (1996):

"Article 265. Costs of the accused. In every process, the State **shall cover** the expenses in relation to the accused and the other parties who enjoy the benefit of litigating without being charged for them. When the accused has economic solvency, **must pay the Judicial Branch for the services of the public defender or any other services received**. **For this purpose, the procedure established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch shall be followed,** with respect to the public defender. **Excepted from this duty is the payment of the official translator or interpreter.**" "Article 266. Necessary Resolution. The criminal tribunal must issue a reasoned ruling on the payment of procedural and personal costs when issuing the resolution that puts an end to the case." "Article 267. Determination of Costs. **The costs shall be borne by the defeated party,** but the tribunal may exempt it, totally or partially, when there is plausible reason to litigate. When there are multiple persons ordered to pay the costs, the tribunal shall determine the proportional part that corresponds to each one, without prejudice to the joint and several liability established by law." "Article 268. Exempt Persons. The representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, **lawyers,** and agents who intervene in the process may not be ordered to pay **costs,** except in cases where the contrary is specifically provided {e.g., what is provided in numeral 105, third paragraph, of the Code of Criminal Procedure} and without prejudice to the civil, criminal, or disciplinary responsibility they incur." "Article 269- Content: Costs shall consist of: a)- the expenses originated by the processing of the proceeding; b)- the payment of fees of lawyers, other professionals, and other persons who have intervened in the proceeding." "Article 270. Civil action. If the civil claim is admitted in the judgment, the accused and the third-party civilly liable **shall bear** jointly and severally the costs; if the claim is rejected, the civil party (actor civil) **shall bear** them. If the action cannot proceed, each of the interveners shall bear their own costs, unless the parties have agreed on another measure or the tribunal, due to the circumstances of the case, distributes them otherwise" (the bold lettering is supplied).

This is how, in Costa Rican criminal procedural matters, some exceptions arise to the treatment that this topic receives in other branches of law, whether public or private. Therefore, although the rule is that costs are borne by the defeated party, if the latter is the criminal accused, it is appropriate to differentiate between procedural costs or expenses. The latter, that is, the expenses that include the payment of the translator or interpreter, shall always be borne by the State, as provided for in Article 265 of the cited Code of Criminal Procedure, and, regarding attorney's fees, the accused may be exempted from payment, if and only if two situations converge: **a)-** that their defender is a public one; and **b)-** that they lack the resources to repay the State for their fees (in a similar sense, cfr.: vote of this Chamber number 851-2005 of September 1, 2005 – Judges [Name6], [Name14], and [Name15]). Although this latter position has been academically questioned regarding its constitutionality when the accused is acquitted (cfr.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. *Proceso penal comentado*. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 416, who points out that these rules: "...suppose a violation of the principle of equality before public burdens. Indeed, the accused, even the economically solvent one, must have the right at least to be able to avail themselves of the appointment of a public defender, and that the State, in the event that a conviction is not reached, cover the expenses referring to said defender. Otherwise, the acquitted or dismissed (sobreseído) economically solvent person would necessarily have been made to incur expenses for the benefit of the community, even though the basis for the punitive claim against them could not be demonstrated"), the truth is that it has not yet been declared unconstitutional through the rigorous procedural channels, which means that it remains in force and, therefore, to this date it is applicable and is complemented by what, in this regard, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch provides, which states:

¬Article 152: "The Public Defense shall provide a public defender to every accused or person charged (prevenido) who requests its services. The authority processing the case shall warn them that, if it is demonstrated that they have economic solvency, they must appoint a private lawyer or pay the Judicial Branch for the services of the public defender, according to the determination that the judge shall make. Likewise, the employees of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) and other judicial servants shall have the right to be appointed a public defender, when they are brought before the tribunals (...) for matters directly related to the exercise of their functions..." ¬Article 153: "The Head of the Public Defense or whoever they designate shall manage, before the corresponding authority, the determination and collection of the fees for the services rendered. The certification issued regarding the amount of fees chargeable to the accused shall constitute an enforceable title..." ¬Article 154. "The determination of fees shall be made in the judgment or at the moment when the accused decides to dispense with the services of the public defender..." But if the legal professional of the accused person is private or if, being paid by the State, the accused possesses resources to pay for them (an aspect that, as has been indicated, can be elucidated in the enforcement stage according to what the judgment may have decided in that regard), the order for personal costs shall imply that it is the accused or convicted person who pays the fees of their lawyer and not that the latter can demand said remuneration from the State, as would happen if the cited rule were erroneously interpreted or applied and, due to ignorance, the accused were always exempted from the payment of both types of costs or the State were always ordered to pay them (cfr.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. *Proceso penal comentado*. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 416).

The same occurs if the losing party is the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), with respect to which there is also a legal exemption from the collection of both types of costs, as provided for in numeral 268 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal). There are already jurisprudential criteria from other bodies that this Court shares:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"In the present proceeding, there was no private prosecutor (querellante) or civil plaintiff (actor civil), but only the Public Prosecutor's Office in the exercise of criminal prosecution, so the costs must be covered by the State, under the argument that this Chamber pointed out in its resolution number 1154, of October 8, 2007: '…Article 361, subsection d), of the Criminal Procedure Code requires courts to deliberate and vote on costs. Furthermore, Article 266 of the same legal text provides: "Necessary Resolution.- The criminal court must issue a reasoned pronouncement on the payment of court costs (costas procesales) and personal costs (costas personales) when issuing the resolution that terminates the case." In the present case, it is noted that the trial court (a quo) did not substantiate its decision to sentence the convicted person to pay costs. However, despite the noted defect, in this case only a criminal accusation filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office was heard, so only this body and the defense were considered procedural parties. The victim… did not become a procedural party through the exercise of criminal prosecution—via a private prosecution (querella)—or civil action—through a civil claim for damages (demanda civil resarcitoria). Consequently, insofar as the Public Prosecutor's Office is a public and official party, the expenses it has incurred on the occasion of the proceeding are not chargeable to the convicted person, since the Administration of Justice constitutes a public service, financed with public funds. It is the State that, in this case, must defray the expenses of the judicial system, without it being possible to demand from the accused (encartado)… any payment for the monetary investment that the exercise of criminal prosecution by the Prosecutor's Office entailed. The legal system does not provide that, by the simple fact of proving their criminal liability, the convicted person must pay the costs of the proceeding incurred by the party whose claims were upheld. Article 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not an obstacle to the foregoing reasoning. Said rule determines: "Costs shall be borne by the losing party, but the court may exempt it, totally or partially, when there is a plausible reason to litigate…". In reality, this provision regulates those cases in which a private prosecution or a civil action has been filed, on the understanding that the winning party (private prosecutor or civil plaintiff whose claims are upheld, accused who is dismissed or acquitted, civil defendant exonerated from liability) must be compensated, at the expense of the losing party (private prosecutor or civil plaintiff whose claims are rejected, convicted accused, liable civil defendant) for the expenses incurred by them—pursuant to the content of costs defined in Article 269 of the Criminal Procedure Code—for the reduction of their assets due to the plaintiff's claim before the Administration of Justice, except when, with respect to the losing party, there has been no recklessness (temeridad) or abuse of the right to litigate, in which case the Court, at its discretion, may exempt the losing party totally or partially. Therefore, this ground is granted, and the judgment is partially annulled, only with respect to the sentence imposed on… consisting of paying the expenses incurred by the Public Prosecutor's Office on the occasion of the proceeding and, in its place, for procedural economy, this Chamber orders that the costs shall be borne by the State…". </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote number 2008-01095 of 4:05 p.m. on October 2, 2008. In a similar vein: Criminal Cassation Court of San José, vote number 197-2002 composed of [Nombre16] ,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">and [Nombre17]).</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">This Court slightly disagrees with that criterion only with respect to the reasoning, because although Article 266 of the Criminal Procedure Code requires it, said rule must be interpreted systematically with the rest of the articles to consider that if the court applies the mandatory sentence (for the losing party in the event that it is not the accused or the Public Prosecutor's Office) or the mandatory exemption (for the accused regarding court costs or for the Public Prosecutor's Office), when applying a legal rule, it is sufficient to substantiate the pronouncement by indicating that it is done so by provision of law or by alluding to the rule that establishes it (see the mandatory wording in Articles 265 and 267 of that same legislation), which must be applied. Only when the exception is applied is it necessary to have greater justification so that the discretion conferred on the judge by the legislator for this purpose does not become arbitrary, since between both terms, it is the reasoning that marks the dividing line (in that same sense: Third Chamber, vote 1157-2007 of October 12, 2007 and Criminal Cassation Court of San José, vote number 53-F-99 of February 12, 1999. To the contrary, cf.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Proceso penal comentado</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 418. The issue has been treated in various ways by this same Court, with different compositions, the tendency appearing to be to always require justification and even to accept the exemption as an exception for all cases. For a better study of the question, cf.: votes numbers 239-F-98 of April 2, 1998 -López, [Nombre18] and [Nombre8]-, 539-F-98 of July 31, 1998 -[Nombre18], [Nombre8] and [Nombre9]-, 579-F-98 of August 21, 1998 -[Nombre8], [Nombre17] and [Nombre18]-, 366-2002 of May 10, 2002 -[Nombre17], [Nombre8] and [Nombre11]-, 747-2002 of September 19, 2002 -[Nombre14], [Nombre19] and [Nombre20]-, 891-2002 of October 31, 2002 -[Nombre19], [Nombre17] and [Nombre14]-, 1028-2003 of October 16, 2003 -[Nombre11], [Nombre8] and [Nombre20]-, 1031-2003 of October 16, 2003 -[Nombre17], [Nombre21] .</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">and [Nombre20]-, 746-2004 of July 29, 2004 -[Nombre15], [Nombre12] and [Nombre20]-, 780-2004 of August 5, 2004 -[Nombre20], [Nombre11] and [Nombre21] . -, 1348-2004 of December 23, 2004 -[Nombre11], [Nombre21] .</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">and [Nombre17]-, 132-2005 of February 24, 2005 -[Nombre14], [Nombre19] and [Nombre21] . -, 271-2005 of April 14, 2005 -Vargas, [Nombre10] and [Nombre11]-, 408-2005 of May 12, 2005 -[Nombre11], [Nombre21] .</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">and [Nombre10]-, 497-2005 of June 2, 2005 -[Nombre20], [Nombre11] and [Nombre14]- and 1019-2005 of October 10, 2005 -[Nombre11], [Nombre22] , -). However, those rules are for ordinary proceedings and in criminal matters, because it must be taken into account that in other types of special criminal proceedings (private prosecution (acción privada) for example) and in matters of civil claims, there are special rules that displace those general provisions. There, the general rule is that the loser </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">always</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> bears both types of costs and that the possibility of granting an exemption does not apply since the special rule does not allow it. This is stated in Articles 78 (express withdrawal of a public prosecution complaint (querella de acción pública) in which a cost sentence is imperatively ordered against the withdrawing party unless otherwise agreed by the parties), 118 second paragraph (withdrawal of civil action), 384 (withdrawal of a private prosecution complaint (querella de acción privada) in which a cost sentence is imperatively ordered against the withdrawing party unless otherwise agreed by the parties) and 270 of the Criminal Procedure Code (sentence against the losing civil party) (see in this regard the vote of this Court, with a composition partially different from the current one, number 851-2005 of September 1, 2005 -U. [Nombre6], [Nombre14] and [Nombre15]- and the note in vote number [Telf1] of January 17, 2010 -Camacho, [Nombre23] and [Nombre21] . -. To the contrary, that is, accepting the plausible reason to litigate as an exception in all cases, the votes of this Chamber, with a different composition, numbers [Telf2] of September 29, 2006 -[Nombre23], [Nombre24] and [Nombre12]-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> and 2000-119 of February 11, 2000 -López, [Nombre11] and [Nombre25]-, where the issue is addressed although with criteria different from those set forth herein). On the other hand, supplementary application of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) is also not appropriate, since there is an express rule to the contrary. When the repealed Criminal Procedure Code (Cödigo de Procedimientos Penales) of 1973 was in force, which contained provisions similar to the current ones, the Third Chamber indicated so, a criterion this Chamber shares:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures (Código de Procedimientos Civiles) are not applicable in the sub judice case as long as there are criminal rules that indicate guidelines to that effect, and it would only be possible to resort to the former -as an exceptional case- when the criminal forms do not contemplate a specific case, which the civil ones do address or contain" </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote number 255-F of 09:35 a.m. on November 10, 1989.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">III.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">In the present case, the judgment, without further justification, sentences the defendant (imputado) to pay both costs. In this matter, the accused litigated under the sponsorship of the public defender's office (defensa pública), although it is unknown whether he has the resources to make that payment. In addition to the defendant and his public defender, only the Public Prosecutor's Office intervened, which is exempt from paying costs and which, moreover, was the winning "party" (understanding "party" in a formal sense since it cannot be so in a material sense as it is subject to a legally imposed duty of objectivity). Therefore, there is no error in the court, without delving into why it did not exempt from costs, sentencing the accused to pay personal costs, since it was applying the legal rule and not the exception and, for that reason, that aspect must remain intact, but there is an incorrect application of procedural law when it sentences him to pay court costs because there is an express rule that states that, with respect to the accused, the expenses are borne by the State. Therefore, the appeal filed must be partially granted, and the appealed judgment must be revoked solely insofar as it sentences the defendant to pay both costs of the proceeding, in order to instead decree that he is responsible only for the payment of professional fees (in the event that he has the resources to do so and the constitutionality of said provision is not formally challenged) and that the expenses of the proceeding or court costs are borne by the State, a pronouncement that can be made at this stage without affecting the accused's right to appeal since it is more beneficial than what was imposed and, moreover, it is something that must be done ex officio according to the referenced legal provisions." (the emphasis is from the original).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">From the foregoing, it follows that this Court partially shares the precedents invoked by the appellant, since regarding the exemption of the accused from the payment of personal costs, there is an express rule contrary to what the precedents of the Third Chamber indicate, and although said regulatory provisions could potentially touch upon Constitutional Law (as indicated in the vote of this Chamber just transcribed), this is not the venue to raise the argument, so the appellant must seek the defense of his rights and, if he deems it appropriate, go to the constitutional jurisdiction in charge of concentrated review of constitutionality in our country. In this case, effectively, the trial judge, without any justification, sentenced the accused to pay both costs, without it being recorded that there was a private prosecutor or civil plaintiff. However, since a public defender has appeared and it is unknown whether the accused has the economic resources to cover his professional fees, an aspect that the Public Defender's Office must process in the enforcement phase as referred to by the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) (which, as indicated in that vote, is in force and has not been declared unconstitutional regarding those regulations). Therefore, the proper course is to partially revoke the appealed judgment (since a referral back would lead nowhere, as it is a matter of directly applying the omitted legal provision, which does not deal with a strictly criminal aspect) to determine that the expenses of the proceeding are borne by the State and, regarding the fees related to the professional who assisted the accused, the latter is responsible for their payment, in the event that it is proven—in the corresponding stage—that he has the resources for it. For the rest, the challenge must be rejected."</span></p></div></body></html> **"Sole. –** Mr. [Name1], public defender of the accused, filed an appeal in cassation on procedural grounds, alleging as the **sole ground** the lack of reasoning of the judgment because the judgment imposes costs (costas) on his client without any reasoning in that regard. He indicates that the imposition of costs on the accused, when there is no private prosecutor (querellante) or civil party (actor civil), constitutes an illegitimate encumbrance against the accused's assets and an unwarranted windfall in favor of the Public Administration. He points out that the Third Chamber has at times annulled the imposition of costs thus ordered or has indicated that the costs correspond to the State, and cites in support thereof votes number 1154-2007, 26-2008, and 845-2009 of that jurisdictional body. He adds that this judicial instance has also referred that Article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies only when there is a civil action or private prosecution, and again cites the last two pronouncements indicated above. He indicates that if in this case the only parties were the accused and the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), the imposition of costs against the former is not appropriate. **The argument is partially admissible.** This Tribunal, with a composition partially similar to the current one, has ruled on the issue of the imposition of costs based on the current rules established by criminal procedural legislation. In this regard, vote number 2010-305 stated:

"In the present case, the judgment, without further reasoning, imposes both sets of costs on the accused. To determine whether there is an error in such a procedure or not, it is first necessary to elucidate what costs are and what their regulation is in criminal procedural matters in Costa Rica. The first thing to be indicated is that, as a counterpart to the right of action or access to justice, there is an obligation to finance the expenses generated by the process. This obligation falls, as a general rule, on the party that has been defeated, since, by not having recognized the claim of the prevailing party extrajudicially, it forced the latter to make use of the jurisdictional apparatus. This rule, that the defeated party bears the expenses arising from the process, is practically universal. This is how traditional procedural doctrine expresses it:

¬"The fundamental characteristic of the modern principle of the imposition of costs lies precisely in being conditioned by pure and simple defeat, and not by the intention or behavior of the defeated party (bad faith or fault). Such was the point reached by Roman law (...) and such is also the point reached by modern procedural law." [Name2]. *La condena en costas*. Translation by [Name3]. Madrid, 1928, p. 220.

¬"General principle. The party that loses the lawsuit is ordered to pay the costs of the same (...) The basis of this imposition is the objective fact of defeat (soccombenza); and the justification for this institution is found in the fact that the application of the law should not represent a patrimonial decrease for the party in whose favor it is carried out (...) This is the result to which the development of procedural law leads; which, in its origins, imposed costs only on bad-faith litigants; subsequently, it passed through an intermediate period in which, without seeing the exact nature of the institution, principles of civil law (fault) were applied to the imposition of costs; later, absolute imposition was reached." [Name2]. *Derecho procesal civil: principios. Tomo II*. Cárdenas editor y distribuidor, México, 1990 edition.

¬"...the cost of the process. This cost refers to both the work of the court and that of the parties; but it falls entirely on the parties through a system of judicial fees and advances that the State demands from the person who brings an action. Each party, therefore, must spend to act; now then, if of the one without right it can be said that they acted at their own risk, it is not equally permissible to say so of the one with right; if the latter had to bear their own expenses, there would be an injustice to their detriment (...) the cost of the process must be borne by the one whose claim was rejected, that is, the defeated party. Thus, the principle of acting at one's own risk is applied, expressed in the old formula: *ubi commoda ibi incommoda*." [Name4]. *Derecho procesal civil y penal*. Translation by [Name5]. Colección de clásicos del derecho, México, 1994, p. 80.

Now, the **costs of the process** (costas del proceso) or judicial costs, as inferred from the foregoing, should not be confused with **procedural costs** (costas procesales). The former is the generic category that has two components: **personal costs** (costas personales), which include attorney's fees, and **procedural costs** (costas procesales), which are all the remaining expenses arising from the process, which can range from the payment of per diems to witnesses so they appear to testify, payments of fees to experts, technical consultants, enforcement officers, process servers, notaries, translators, transportation expenses, paper, stamps, certifications, etc. However, the content of each of these subcomponents can vary in each country or in the specifics of each area of law (for example, in Costa Rica in civil procedural matters, personal costs are considered to include, in addition to attorney's fees, compensation for the time invested by the party in attending procedural proceedings, according to their personal circumstances and provided their presence was necessary, but in criminal procedural matters, all payments to persons are treated as procedural costs: Article 269 subsection 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Thus, procedural costs is a subcategory of the general notion of costs of the process. In Costa Rican law, the various procedural codes in force in the different areas of law establish the obligation that the ruling on the matter of costs be made, imperatively and even *ex officio*, in the resolution that ends the process, and that this burden falls on the defeated party. This general rule, which excludes the issue of costs from causing the ruling to incur a lack of congruence due to being *ultra* or *extrapetita* (thus the votes of this Tribunal, with different compositions, numbers 787-F-96 of November 29, 1996 -U. [Name6], [Name7] and [Name8]-; 476-F-97 of June 13, 1997 -U. [Name6], [Name8] and [Name9]- and 1009-2004 of September 29, 2004 -[Name10], [Name11] and [Name12]- and in the matter of civil claim: Sanabria Rojas, Rafael Ángel. *Reparación civil en el proceso penal*, 2008, Editorama, San José, p. 306; with contrary opinion: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. *Proceso penal comentado*. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th. edition, 2009, p. 417 and the Criminal Cassation Tribunal of San José -C. [Name13], and [Name14]- vote number 1342-2005), is excepted, however, in some rules that provide the possibility that, facultatively, other criteria be applied:

¬"Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure: Imposition. In the resolutions provided for in subsections 3) and 4) of Article 153, the defeated party shall be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs (...) The ruling on costs must be made *ex officio*. Every judgment must necessarily indicate in what class of costs it condemns the defeated party..." "Article 222. Exemption. Notwithstanding what is stated in the preceding article, the judge may exempt the defeated party from the payment of personal costs, and even procedural costs, when they have litigated with evident good faith, when the complaint or counterclaim includes exaggerated claims, when the judgment accepts only part of the fundamental claims of the complaint or counterclaim, when the judgment admits important defenses invoked by the defeated party, or when there is reciprocal defeat. They may also exempt them from the payment of those procedural costs that were incurred with requests or in proceedings of the opposing party that, in the judgment of the judge, must be classified as superfluous or unnecessary. If there is no special ruling on costs, each party must pay those they have incurred, and both parties those that are common." ¬"Article 494 of the Labor Code: ...the judgment shall contain an expression that it imposes procedural costs, or both sets of costs, or that it is issued without a special ruling on costs." ¬"Article 55 of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction. Judgments, as well as resolutions that put an end to the process, shall contain a ruling on costs. The defeated party may be exempted from the payment of personal costs, and even procedural costs, when it is evident that they have litigated in good faith, because there is, in the judgment of the court, sufficient reason to litigate, or because the claims of the winning party, ultimately, proved disproportionate." ¬"Article 193 of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure: Costs to the defeated party, exceptions: unknown evidence, litigiousness. In judgments and final orders having the character of a judgment, the defeated party shall be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs, a ruling that must be made *ex officio*. Notwithstanding the above, the defeated party may be exempted from the payment of costs when: a) The judgment is handed down by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party could not plausibly have known of and, because of this, the party's opposition had been adjusted; b) Due to the nature of the issues debated, there has been, in the judgment of the Tribunal, sufficient reason to litigate. Article 194. *Plus petitio*, provisional imposition of costs. 1) There shall be no grounds for the imposition of costs when the winning party has incurred in *plus petitio*. 2) There shall be *plus petitio* when the difference between what was claimed and what was finally obtained is fifteen percent or more..." Now, the issue thus focused —questioned in the modern general theory of process based on principles such as the gratuity of access to justice, but without such criticism having had major practical repercussions in world legislation— was challenged, for a long time, in criminal procedural law, given the nature (public or collective) of the conflict decided there and the existence of international instruments on human rights that obligate the states that have signed them to mandatorily provide free defense for the accused who, against their will, is brought into the process but is protected by a constitutional state of innocence, as well as by the state's duty to provide its population with suitable mechanisms to resolve their most important conflicts (cf.: Article 8.2.a and 8.2.e of the American Convention on Human Rights and 14.2.d and 14.2.f of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which establish the right of the accused to be assisted free of charge by a translator or interpreter and for the State to provide them with a lawyer). This differentiated treatment of the issue, while maintaining the same principles, incorporates additional ones and is manifested in the evolution with which such topics have been addressed in the different criminal procedural legislations that have succeeded one another in Costa Rica, of which the last two are cited:

¬Code of Criminal Procedure (Código de Procedimientos Penales) (1973):

*"Necessary resolution. Article 543.- Every resolution that puts an end to the cause shall impose the payment of procedural and personal costs. That which puts an end to an incident shall impose only the payment of procedural costs." "Imposition. Article 544.- Costs shall be borne by the defeated party, but the court may exempt them, totally or partially, when there has been a plausible reason to litigate." "Advancement. Article 542.- In every process, the State shall cover the expenses in relation to the accused and the other parties who enjoy the benefit of litigating as poor." "Exempt persons. Article 545.- The representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the lawyers and agents intervening in the process may not be ordered to pay costs, except in cases where the contrary is specifically provided and without prejudice to the criminal or disciplinary liability they may incur."* ¬Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) (1996):

*"Article 265. Costs of the accused. In every process, the State shall cover the expenses in relation to the accused and the other parties who enjoy the benefit of litigating without the charging of them. When the accused is financially solvent, they must pay the Judiciary for the services of the public defender or any other they have received. For this, the procedure established in the Organic Law of the Judiciary shall be followed, regarding the public defender. Excepted from this duty is the payment of the official translator or interpreter." "Article 266. Necessary resolution. The criminal court must issue a reasoned ruling on the payment of procedural and personal costs when issuing the resolution that puts an end to the cause." "Article 267. Determination of costs. The costs shall be borne by the defeated party, but the court may exempt them, totally or partially, when there has been a plausible reason to litigate. When there are several persons ordered to pay the costs, the court shall determine the proportional part corresponding to each one, without prejudice to the joint and several liability established by law." "Article 268. Exempt persons.* Representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, lawyers and agents who intervene in the proceeding may not be ordered to pay costs, except in cases where the contrary is specifically provided {cf. the provisions of Article 105, third paragraph, of the Code of Criminal Procedure} and without prejudice to any civil, criminal, or disciplinary liability they may incur." "Article 269 – Content: The costs shall consist of: a) the expenses arising from the processing of the proceeding; b) the payment of the fees of the lawyers, other professionals, and other persons who have intervened in the proceeding." "Article 270. Civil action. If the civil claim is admitted in the judgment, the accused and the third-party civil defendant shall jointly bear the costs; if the claim is rejected, the civil plaintiff shall bear them. If the action cannot proceed, each of the interveners shall bear their own costs, unless the parties have agreed to another measure or the court, due to the circumstances of the case, distributes them otherwise" (emphasis supplied).

Thus, in Costa Rican criminal procedural law, some exceptions arise to the treatment of this topic in other branches of law, whether public or private. Therefore, although the rule is that costs are borne by the losing party, if that party is the criminal accused, a distinction must be made between procedural costs and expenses. The latter, that is, expenses that incorporate payment of the translator or interpreter, shall always be borne by the State, as provided by Article 265 of the cited Code of Criminal Procedure, and, with regard to attorney's fees, the accused may be exempt from payment if and only if two situations converge: a) that their defender is a public defender; and b) that they lack the resources to reimburse the State for the payment of their fees (in a similar sense cf.: ruling of this Chamber number 851-2005 of September 1, 2005 – U. [Name6], [Name14], and [Name15] –). Although this latter position has been academically questioned as to its constitutionality when the accused is acquitted (cf.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. *Proceso penal comentado*. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 416, who points out that these rules: "...involve a breach of the principle of equality before public burdens. Indeed, the accused, even the economically solvent one, must have the right at a minimum to avail themselves of the appointment of a public defender, and to have the State, in the event that a conviction is not reached, cover the expenses related to said defender. Otherwise, the acquitted or discharged person who is economically solvent would necessarily have been caused to incur expenses for the benefit of the community, even though the basis of the punitive claim against them could not be demonstrated"), the truth is that it has not yet been so through the appropriate procedural channels, which means it remains in force and, therefore, as of this date is applicable and is complemented by what, in this regard, the Organic Law of the Judiciary provides, which states:

¬Article 152: "The Public Defense shall provide a public defender to any accused or person under investigation who requests its services. The authority processing the case shall warn them that, if it is proven that they have economic solvency, they must appoint a private attorney or pay the Judiciary for the services of the public defender, according to the determination to be made by the judge. Likewise, employees of the Judicial Investigation Agency and other judicial servants shall have the right to have a public defender appointed for them when they are brought before the courts (...) for matters directly related to the exercise of their functions..." ¬Article 153: "The Head of the Public Defense or whoever they designate shall manage, before the corresponding authority, the determination and collection of the fees for the services rendered. The certification issued regarding the amount of fees to be charged to the accused shall constitute an enforceable title..." ¬Article 154. The determination of fees shall be made in the judgment or at the moment the accused decides to dispense with the services of the public defender..." But if the legal professional of the accused person is private or if, being paid by the State, the accused possesses resources to pay for them (an aspect which, as has been indicated, may be elucidated in the enforcement stage according to what the judgment may have decided in that regard), the order to pay personal costs shall imply that it is the accused or convicted person who pays the fees of their attorney, and not that the latter may demand said remuneration from the State, as would happen if the cited rule were erroneously interpreted or applied and, through ignorance, the accused were always exempted from payment of both costs or the State were always ordered to pay them (cf.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. *Proceso penal comentado*. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 416). The same applies if the losing party is the Public Prosecutor's Office, for which, also, there is a legal exemption from the collection of both costs, by virtue of the provisions of Article 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There are already jurisprudential criteria from other bodies, which this Court shares:

"In the present proceeding, there was no private prosecutor or civil plaintiff, but only the Public Prosecutor's Office in the exercise of the criminal action, so the costs must be covered by the State, under the reasoning that this Chamber set forth in its resolution number 1154 of October 8, 2007: "...Article 361, subsection d), of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires courts to deliberate and vote on costs. Furthermore, Article 266 of the same legal text provides: 'Necessary resolution. – The criminal court must rule in a reasoned manner on the payment of procedural and personal costs when issuing the resolution that concludes the case.' In the present case, it appears that the trial court did not base its decision to order the convicted person to pay costs. However, despite the defect noted, in the present case only a criminal accusation brought by the Public Prosecutor's Office was heard, so that only this body and the defense were considered procedural parties. The victim... did not become a procedural party by exercising the criminal action – through a private prosecution – or the civil action – by means of a civil action for damages. Therefore, since the Public Prosecutor's Office is a public and official party, the expenses that, on the occasion of the proceeding, it may have incurred, are not susceptible to being passed on to the convicted person, since the Administration of Justice constitutes a public service, financed with equally public funds. It is the State that, in this case, must bear the expenses of the judicial system, without there being any room to demand from the accused... any payment for the monetary investment that the exercise of the criminal action by the Prosecutor's Office entailed. The legal system does not provide that, simply by virtue of his criminal liability being proven, the convicted person must pay the costs of the proceeding incurred by the party whose claims were upheld. Article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not an obstacle to the foregoing reasoning. Said provision determines: 'Costs shall be borne by the losing party, but the court may exempt that party, totally or partially, when there was plausible reason to litigate...'. In reality, this provision regulates those cases in which a private prosecution or a civil action has been brought, with the understanding that the winning party (private prosecutor or civil plaintiff whose claims are upheld, discharged or acquitted person proceeded against by private prosecution, civil defendant exonerated from liability) must be compensated, at the expense of the losing party (private prosecutor or civil plaintiff whose claims are rejected, convicted person proceeded against by private prosecution, civil defendant found liable) for the expenses they have incurred – in accordance with the content of costs defined in Article 269 of the Code of Criminal Procedure – due to the reduction of their assets on account of the claim of the plaintiff before the Administration of Justice, except when, with respect to the losing party, there has been no recklessness or abuse of the right to litigate, in which case the Court, at its discretion, may exempt the losing party totally or partially. Therefore, this ground is declared with merit and the judgment is partially annulled, only with respect to the order imposed on... to pay the expenses incurred by the Public Prosecutor's Office on account of the proceeding and, instead, for procedural economy, this Chamber orders that the costs are to be borne by the State...". Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, ruling number 2008-01095 of 4:05 p.m. on October 2, 2008. In a similar sense: Criminal Cassation Court of San José, ruling number 197-2002 composed of [Name16], and [Name17]).

This Court slightly disagrees with that criterion only regarding the reasoning, because although Article 266 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires it, said provision must be interpreted systematically with the rest of the articles to consider that if the court applies the mandatory order (for the losing party in the event that it is not the accused or the Public Prosecutor's Office) or the mandatory exemption (for the accused regarding procedural costs or for the Public Prosecutor's Office), since it is applying a legal rule, it is sufficient to substantiate the pronouncement by stating that it is done by provision of law or by alluding to the provision that establishes it (see the mandatory wording in Articles 265 and 267 of that same legislation), which must be applied. Only when the exception is applied is it necessary for there to be greater reasoning so that the discretion conferred by the legislator on the judge in that regard does not become arbitrariness, since between the two terms it is the reasoning that draws the dividing line (in that same sense: Third Chamber, ruling 1157-2007 of October 12, 2007, and Criminal Cassation Court of San José, ruling number 53-F-99 of February 12, 1999. To the contrary cf.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. *Proceso penal comentado*. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 418. The issue has been treated in various ways by this same Court, with different compositions, the tendency seeming to be to always require reasoning and even to accept exemption as an exception for all cases. For a better study of the question, cf.: rulings numbers 239-F-98 of April 2, 1998 -López, [Name18] and [Name8]-, 539-F-98 of July 31, 1998 -[Name18], [Name8] and [Name9]-, 579-F-98 of August 21, 1998 -[Name8], [Name17] and [Name18]-, 366-2002 of May 10, 2002 -[Name17], [Name8] and [Name11]-, 747-2002 of September 19, 2002 -[Name14], [Name19] and [Name20]-, 891-2002 of October 31, 2002 -[Name19], [Name17] and [Name14]-, 1028-2003 of October 16, 2003 -[Name11], [Name8] and [Name20]-, 1031-2003 of October 16, 2003 -[Name17], [Name21]. and [Name20]-, 746-2004 of July 29, 2004 -[Name15], [Name12] and [Name20]-, 780-2004 of August 5, 2004 -[Name20], [Name11] and [Name21]. -, 1348-2004 of December 23, 2004 -[Name11], [Name21]. and [Name17]-, 132-2005 of February 24, 2005 -[Name14], [Name19] and [Name21]. -, 271-2005 of April 14, 2005 -Vargas, [Name10] and [Name11]-, 408-2005 of May 12, 2005 -[Name11], [Name21]. and [Name10]-, 497-2005 of June 2, 2005 -[Name20], [Name11] and [Name14]- and 1019-2005 of October 10, 2005 -[Name11], [Name22] , -). However, those rules are for the ordinary proceeding and in criminal matters, since it must be taken into account that in other types of special criminal proceedings (private prosecution actions, for example) and in civil claim matters, there are special rules that displace those general provisions. There, the general rule is that the losing party always faces both costs and that the possibility of making an exemption is not applicable since the special provision does not allow it. This is how Articles 78 (express withdrawal of the public action private prosecution where the order against the withdrawing party is mandatory unless the parties agree otherwise), 118 second paragraph (withdrawal of the civil action), 384 (withdrawal of the private prosecution action where the order against the withdrawing party is mandatory unless the parties agree otherwise) and 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (order against the losing civil party) pronounce themselves (see in this sense the ruling of this Court, with a composition partially different from the current one, number 851-2005 of September 1, 2005 – U. [Name6], [Name14] and [Name15] – and the note in ruling number [Telf1] of January 17, 2010 – Camacho, [Name23] and [Name21]. –. To the contrary, that is, accepting plausible reason to litigate as an exception in all cases, the rulings of this Chamber, with different composition, numbers [Telf2] of September 29, 2006 – [Name23], [Name24] and [Name12] – and 2000-119 of February 11, 2000 – López, [Name11] and [Name25] –, where the subject is addressed although with criteria different from that set forth here). On the other hand, supplementary application of the Code of Civil Procedure is also not appropriate, since there is an express provision to the contrary. With the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 being in force, which contained provisions similar to the current ones, the Third Chamber indicated this, a criterion that this Chamber shares:

"The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable in the sub judice as long as there are criminal provisions that establish guidelines to that effect, and it would only be possible to resort to those – or as a case of exception – when the criminal procedural forms do not contemplate a specific case, that the civil ones do address or contain." Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, ruling number 255-F of 9:35 a.m. on November 10, 1989.

III.- In the present case, the judgment, without greater reasoning, orders the accused to pay both costs. In this matter, the accused litigated under the sponsorship of the public defense, although it is unknown whether they have the resources to make that payment. Besides the accused and their public defender, only the Public Prosecutor's Office intervened, which is exempt from payment of costs and which, furthermore, was the "winning" party (understanding "party" in a formal sense since it cannot be so in a material sense as it is subject to a duty of objectivity legally imposed). Therefore, there is no error in the fact that the court, without delving into why it was not exempting from costs, ordered the accused to pay the personal costs, since it was applying the legal rule and not the exception and, for that reason, that aspect must remain unscathed, but there is an incorrect application of procedural law when it orders them to pay procedural costs, as there is an express provision indicating that, regarding the accused, the expenses are borne by the State. Consequently, the appeal filed must be partially granted and the appealed judgment must be revoked only insofar as it orders the accused to pay both costs of the proceeding, in order to, instead, decree that they are responsible for payment only of the professional fees (in the event that they have the resources to do so and the constitutionality of said provision is not formally challenged) and that the expenses of the proceeding or procedural costs are borne by the State, a pronouncement that can be made in this venue without affecting the accused's right to appeal since it is more beneficial than what has been imposed and, furthermore, it is something that must be done ex officio according to the legal provisions referred to." (the emphasis is from the original).

From the foregoing, it follows that this Court partially shares the precedents invoked by the appellant, since regarding the exoneration of the accused from payment of personal costs, there is an express provision against what the precedents of the Third Chamber indicate, and although said normative provisions could potentially border on Constitutional Law (as indicated in the ruling of this Chamber just transcribed), this is not the venue to raise the argument, so the appellant must turn, in defense of their rights and if they deem it appropriate, to the constitutional jurisdiction responsible for concentrated constitutional review in our country. In this case, effectively, the trial judge, without any reasoning, ordered the accused to pay both costs, without it being evident that there was a private prosecutor and a civil plaintiff. However, since a public defender has participated and it is unknown whether the accused has economic resources to cover their professional fees, an aspect that the Public Defense will be responsible for processing in the enforcement phase according to what is established by the Organic Law of the Judiciary (which, as indicated in that ruling, is in force and has not been declared unconstitutional regarding those regulations). Therefore, the proper course is to partially revoke the appealed judgment (since a remand would lead nowhere when it is a matter of directly applying the omitted legal provision, which does not pertain strictly to a criminal aspect) to determine that the expenses of the proceeding are borne by the State and, concerning the fees related to the professional who assisted the accused, their payment corresponds to the accused, in the event that it is proven – in the corresponding stage – that they have the resources for it. For the rest, the challenge must be rejected."

“Único.- El licenciado [Nombre1] , defensor público del encartado, interpuso el recurso de casación por la forma alegando, como único motivo, la falta de fundamentación de la sentencia porque la sentencia condena en costas a su representado sin hacer ninguna fundamentación al respecto. Indica que la condena en costas a cargo del imputado, cuando no existe querellante ni actor civil, constituye un gravamen ilegítimo contra el patrimonio del encartado y un aumento sin causa a favor de la Administración Pública. Señala que la Sala Tercera en ocasiones ha anulado la condena así dispuesta o ha indicado que las costas corresponden al Estado y cita en amparo de ello los votos número 1154-2007, 26-2008 y 845-2009 de dicha órgano jurisdiccional. Agrega que esa instancia judicial también ha referido que el artículo 267 del Código Procesal Penal aplica sólo cuando hay acción civil o querella y cita nuevamente los dos últimos pronunciamientos supra indicados. Indica que si en esta causa las únicas partes eran el imputado y el Ministerio Público, no cabe la condena en costas a cargo del primero. El alegato es parcialmente de recibo. Este Tribunal, con una integración parcialmente similar a la actual, se ha pronunciado sobre el tema de la condena en costas con base en las reglas vigentes estatuídas por la legislación procesal penal. Al respecto en el voto número 2010-305 se indicó:

"En el presente caso la sentencia, sin mayor fundamentación, condena en ambas costas al imputado. Para determinar si en tal proceder existe error o no, es necesario dilucidar, de previo, qué son las costas y cuál es su regulación en materia procesal penal en Costa Rica. Lo primero que ha de indicarse es que, como una contrapartida del derecho de acción o de acceso a la justicia, existe la obligación de financiar los gastos que el proceso genere. Esa obligación recae, por regla general, en la parte que ha sido vencida desde que, al no haber reconocido extrajudicialmente la pretensión de la parte vencedora, obligó a ésta a hacer uso del aparato jurisdiccional. Esta regla, de que la parte vencida soporta los gastos que se originen en el proceso, es prácticamente universal. Así la expone la doctrina procesal tradicional:

¬"La característica fundamental del principio moderno de la condena en costas consiste precisamente en hallarse" condicionada al vencimiento puro y simple, y no a la intención ni al comportamiento del vencido(mala fe o culpa). Tal fue el término a que (...) llegó el derecho romano (...) y tal es también el término a que, siguiendo un proceso histórico semejante, ha llegado el Derecho procesal moderno." [Nombre2] . La condena en costas. Traducción de [Nombre3] . Maderid, 1928, p. 220.

¬"Principio general. La parte que sucumbe en el juicio es condenada en los gastos del mismo (...) El fundamento de esta condena es el hecho objetivo de la derrota (soccombenza); y la justificación de esta institución encuéntrase en que la actuación de la ley no debe representar una disminución patrimonial para la parte en favor de la que se realiza (...) Este es el resultado a que lleva el desarrollo del derecho procesal; el cual, en sus orígenes, no tiene condena en las costas sino para los litigantes de mala fe; posteriormente se pasa por un período intermedio en el cual no viéndose la naturaleza exacta de la institución, se aplican principios propios del derecho civil (culpa) a la condena en las costas; después se llega a la condena absoluta" [Nombre2] . Derecho procesal civil: principios. Tomo II. Cárdenas editor y distribuidor, México, edición 1990.

¬"...el costo del proceso. Este costo se refiere tanto a la obra del oficio como a la de las partes; pero recae totalmente sobre las partes a través de un sistema de tasas judiciales y de anticipos, que el Estado exige de quien acciona. Cada parte, por tanto, debe gastar para accionar; ahora bien, si de quien no tenía razón se puede decir que ha obrado a propio riesgo, no es igualmente lícito decirlo de quien tenía razón; si este debiese soportar los propios gastos, se tendría una injusticia en daño suyo (...) el costo del proceso debe estar a cargo de aquel cuya demanda ha sido rechazada, es decir del vencido. Se aplica así el principio del obrar a propio riesgo expresado en la antigua fórmula: ubi commoda ibi incommoda" [Nombre4] . Derecho procesal civil y penal. Traducción de [Nombre5] . Colección de clásicos del derecho, México, 1994, p. 80.

Ahora bien, las costas del proceso o judiciales, como se infiere de lo anterior, no pueden confundirse con las costas procesales. La primera es la categoría genérica que tiene dos componentes: las costas personales que comprenden los honorarios de abogado y las costas procesales que son todos los restantes gastos que se originen con el proceso y que pueden ir desde el pago de dietas a testigos para que comparezcan a declarar, pagos de honorarios de peritos, consultores técnicos, ejecutores, notificadores, notarios, traductores, gastos de transporte, papel, timbres, certificaciones, etc. No obstante, el contenido de cada uno de esos subcomponentes puede variar en cada país o en lo específico de cada materia (por ejemplo, en Costa Rica en materia procesal civil se estima como costa personal, además de los honorarios de abogado, la indemnización del tiempo invertido por la parte en asistir a diligencias del proceso, atendiendo a sus circunstancias personales y siempre que fuere necesaria su presencia pero en materia procesal penal, todo pago a personas se trata como costa procesal: artículo 269 inciso 2 del Código Procesal Penal). Entonces, costas procesales es una subcategoría de la noción general de costas del proceso. En el derecho costarricense, los diversos cuerpos procesales vigentes en las distintas materias recogen la obligación de que el pronunciamiento sobre el extremo de costas se haga, imperativamente y aún de oficio, en la resolución que pone fin al proceso y que éste pese sobre la parte vencida. Esa norma general, que excluye que el tema de costas haga incurrir al pronunciamiento en falta de congruencia por ultra o extrapetitio (así los votos de este Tribunal, con diversas integraciones, números 787-F-96 del 29 de noviembre de 1996 -U. [Nombre6], [Nombre7] y [Nombre8]-; 476-F-97 del 13 de junio de 1997 -U. [Nombre6], [Nombre8] y [Nombre9]- y 1009-2004 del 29 de setiembre de 2004 -[Nombre10], [Nombre11] y [Nombre12]- y en materia de demanda civil: Sanabria Rojas, Rafael Ángel. Reparación civil en el proceso penal, 2008, Editorama, San José, p. 306; con criterio contrario: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4a. edición, 2009, p. 417 y Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José -C. [Nombre13] , y [Nombre14]- voto número 1342-2005), es excepcionado, sin embargo, en algunas normas que prevén la posibilidad de que, facultativamente, sean otras las pautas a aplicar:

¬"Artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil: Condena. En las resoluciones previstas en los incisos 3) y 4) del artículo 153 se condenará al vencido al pago de las costas personales y procesales (...) El pronunciamiento sobre costas deberá hacerse de oficio. Todo fallo debe indicar necesariamente en qué clase de costas condena al vencido..." "Artículo 222. Exención. No obstante lo dicho en el artículo que antecede, el juez podrá eximir al vencido del pago de las costas personales, y aún de las procesales, cuando haya litigado con evidente buena fe, cuando la demanda o la contrademanda comprendan pretensiones exageradas, cuando el fallo acoja solamente parte de las peticiones fundamentales de la demanda o reconvención, cuando el fallo admita defensas de importancia invocadas por el vencido, o cuando haya vencimiento recíproco. Podrá eximirlo también del pago de aquellas costas procesales que se hubieren causado con peticiones o en diligencias de la contraria que, a juicio del juez, deban ser calificadas de ociosas o innecesarias. Si no hubiere especial condenatoria en costas, cada parte deberá pagar las que hubiere causado, y ambas partes aquellas que fueren comunes." ¬"Artículo 494 del Código de Trabajo: ...la sentencia contendrá expresión de que se condena en costas procesales, o en ambas costas, o que se pronuncia sin especial condena en ellas." ¬"Artículo 55 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria. Las sentencias, así como las resoluciones que pongan fin al proceso, contendrán pronunciamiento sobre costas. La parte vencida podrá ser exonerada del pago de las costas personales, y aun de las procesales, cuando sea evidente que ha litigado de buena fe, por existir, a juicio del tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar, o porque las pretensiones de la parte vencedora, en definitiva, resultaron desproporcionadas" ¬"Artículo 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo: Costas al vencido, excepciones: pruebas desconocidas, litigiosidad. En las sentencias y los autos con carácter de sentencia, se condenará al vencido al pago de las costas personales y procesales, pronunciamiento que deberá hacerse de oficio. No obstante lo anterior, la parte vencida podrá ser exonerada del pago de las costas, cuando: a) La sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia verosímilmente no haya conocido la contraria y, por causa de ello, se haya ajustado la oposición de la parte; b) Por la naturaleza de las cuestiones debatidas haya existido, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo bastante para litigar" Artículo 194. Plus petitio, imposición provisional de costas. 1) No habrá lugar a la condenatoria en costas, cuando la parte vencedora haya incurrido en plus petitio. 2) Habrá plus petitio cuando la diferencia entre lo reclamado y lo obtenido en definitiva sea de un quince por ciento o más..." Ahora bien, el tema así enfocado -cuestionado en la moderna teoría general del proceso a partir de principios como la gratuidad en el acceso a la justicia, pero sin que tal crítica haya tenido mayores repercusiones prácticas en las legislaciones mundiales- fue puesto en jaque, desde mucho tiempo atrás, en el derecho procesal penal, habida cuenta de la naturaleza (pública o colectiva) del conflicto que allí se decide y de la existencia de instrumentos internacionales sobre derechos humanos que obligan a los estados que los han suscrito a proporcionar, obligatoriamente, una defensa gratuita para el encartado que, contra su voluntad, es traído al proceso pero se encuentra amparado por un estado constitucional de inocencia, así como por el deber estatal de suministrar a su población mecanismos idóneos para resolver sus conflictos más importantes (cfr.: artículo 8.2.a y 8.2.e de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y 14.2.d y 14.2.f del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y políticos que establecen el derecho del imputado de ser asistido gratuitamente por un traductor o intérprete y de que el Estado le suministre abogado). Ese trato diferenciado del tema, si bien mantiene los mismos principios, incorpora otros adicionales y se pone de manifiesto en la evolución con que tales tópicos se han abordado en las diferentes legislaciones procesales penales que se han sucedido en Costa Rica, de las que se citan las dos últimas:

¬Código de Procedimientos Penales (1973):

"Resolución necesaria. Artículo 543.- Toda resolución que ponga término a la causa, condenará al pago de las costas procesales y personales. La que ponga fin a un incidente, condenará al pago de las procesales únicamente." "Imposición. Artículo 544.- Las costas serán a cargo de la parte vencida, pero el tribunal podrá eximirla, total o parcialmente, cuando hubiera razón plausible para litigar." "Anticipación. Artículo 542.- En todo proceso, el Estado cubrirá los gastos con relación al imputado y a las demás partes que gozaren del beneficio de litigar como pobres" "Personas exentas. Artículo 545.- Los representantes del Ministerio Público, los abogados y mandatarios que intervengan en el proceso, no podrán ser condenados en costas, salvo los casos en que especialmente se disponga lo contrario y sin perjuicio de la responsabilidad penal o disciplinaria en que incurran" ¬Código Procesal Penal (1996):

"Artículo 265. Costas del imputado. En todo proceso, el Estado cubrirá los gastos en relación con el imputado y las demás partes que gocen del beneficio de litigar sin el cobro de ellos. Cuando el imputado tenga solvencia económica, deberá pagar al Poder Judicial los servicios del defensor público o cualquier otro que haya recibido. Para ello, se seguirá el procedimiento establecido en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, respecto del defensor público. Se exceptúa de ese deber el pago del traductor o del intérprete oficiales" "Artículo 266. Resolución necesaria. El tribunal penal deberá pronunciarse en forma motivada sobre el pago de las costas procesales y personales al dictar la resolución que ponga término a la causa." "Artículo 267. Fijación de las costas. Las costas estarán a cargo de la parte vencida, pero el tribunal podrá eximirla, total o parcialmente, cuando haya razón plausible para litigar. Cuando sean varios los condenados al pago de las costas, el tribunal fijará la parte proporcional que corresponda a cada uno, sin perjuicio de la solidaridad que establezca la ley" "Artículo 268. Personas exentas. Los representantes del Ministerio Público, abogados y mandatarios que intervengan en el proceso, no podrán ser condenados en costas, salvo los casos en que especialmente se disponga lo contrario {vgr. lo dispuesto en el numeral 105 párrafo tercero del Código Procesal Penal} y sin perjuicio de la responsabilidad civil, penal o disciplinaria en que incurran" "Artículo 269- Contenido: Las costas consistirán en: a)- los gastos originados por la tramitación del procedimiento; b)- el pago de los honorarios de los abogados, de otros profesionales y demás personas que hayan intervenido en el procedimiento" "Artículo 270. Acción civil. Si es admitida la pretensión civil en la sentencia, el imputado y el tercero civilmente demandado soportarán solidariamente las costas; si se rechaza la pretensión, las soportará el actor civil. Si la acción no puede proseguir, cada uno de los intervinientes soportará sus propias costas, salvo que las partes hayan convenido otra medida o el tribunal, por las circunstancias del caso, las distribuya de otra manera" (las negritas son suplidas).

Es así como, en materia procesal penal costarricense, surgen algunas excepciones al tratamiento que de este tópico se hace en otras ramas del derecho, sea público o privado. Entonces, aunque la regla es que las costas corren por cuenta de la parte vencida, si ésta es el acusado penal, cabe hacer la diferenciación entre las costas procesales o gastos. Estos últimos, es decir los gastos que incorporan el pago del traductor o intérprete- siempre quedarán a cargo del Estado, por así disponerlo el numeral 265 del Código Procesal Penal citado y, en lo referente a los honorarios de abogado, el encartado puede estar eximido del pago, si y solo si converjan dos situaciones: a)- que su defensor sea público; y b)- que carezca de recursos para devolver el pago de sus honorarios al Estado (en sentido similar cfr.: voto de esta Cámara número 851-2005 del 01 de setiembre de 2005 -U. [Nombre6], [Nombre14] y [Nombre15]- ). Aunque esta última posición ha sido académicamente cuestionada en su constitucionalidad cuando el encartado es absuelto (cfr.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4a. edición, 2009, p. 416 quien señala que esas reglas: "...suponen un quebranto al principio de igualdad ante las cargas públicas. En efecto, el imputado, aun el solvente económicamente, debe tener derecho como mínimo a acogerse al nombramiento de un defensor público, y a que el Estado en caso de que no se llegue a una sentencia condenatoria cubra los gastos referentes a dicho defensor. De lo contrario se habría hecho incurrir necesariamente al absuelto o sobreseído solvente económicamente en gastos en beneficio de la colectividad, no obstante que no pudo demostrarse el sustento de la pretensión punitiva contra él"), lo cierto es que no lo ha sido aún por los canales procesales de rigor, lo que hace que permanezca vigente y, por tanto, a esta fecha resulta aplicable y se complementa con lo que, al respecto, dispone la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial que refiere:

¬Artículo 152: "La Defensa Pública proveerá defensor público a todo imputado o prevenido que solicite sus servicios. La autoridad que tramite la causa le advertirá que, si se demuestra que tiene solvencia económica, deberá designar un abogado particular o pagar al Poder Judicial los servicios del defensor público, según la fijación que hará el juzgador. Asimismo, los empleados del Organismo de Investigación Judicial y los demás servidores judiciales tendrán derecho a que se les nombre defensor público, cuando sean llevados ante los tribunales (...) por asuntos directamente relacionados con el ejercicio de sus funciones..." ¬Artículo 153: "El Jefe de la Defensa Pública o quien éste designe, gestionará ante la autoridad correspondiente, la fijación y el cobro de los honorarios por los servicios prestados. Constituirá título ejecutivo, la certificación que se expida sobre el monto de honorarios a cargo del imputado..." ¬Artículo 154. La fijación de honorarios se hará en sentencia o en el momento en que el imputado decida prescindir de los servicios del defensor público..." Pero si el o la profesional en derecho de la persona acusada es particular o si, siendo pagado/a por el Estado, el encartado/a posee recursos para pagarlo (aspecto que, como ha quedado indicado, puede dilucidarse en la etapa de ejecución según lo que al respecto haya decidido la sentencia) la condena en costas personales implicará que sea el encartado o sentenciado quien pague los honorarios de su abogado y no que éste pueda exigirle al Estado dicha retribución, como sucedería si se interpretara o aplicara erróneamente la regla citada y, por desconocimiento, se eximiera siempre al encartado del pago de ambas costas o se condenara en ellas, siempre, al Estado (cfr.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4a. edición, 2009, p. 416). Igual ocurre, si la parte vencida es el Ministerio Público, respecto de quien, también, hay exención legal para el cobro de ambas costas, esto por lo dispuesto en el numeral 268 del Código Procesal Penal. Ya existen criterios jurisprudenciales de otros órganos, que este Tribunal comparte:

"En el presente proceso no figuró querellante ni actor civil, sino sólo el Ministerio Público en el ejercicio de la acción penal, por lo que las costas deben ser cubiertas por el Estado, bajo el argumento que esta Sala apuntó en su resolución número 1154, de 8 de octubre de 2007: “…El artículo 361, inciso d), del Código Procesal Penal exige a los tribunales deliberar y votar sobre las costas. Además, el artículo 266 del mismo texto legal dispone: “Resolución necesaria.- El tribunal penal deberá pronunciarse en forma motivada sobre el pago de costas procesales y personales al dictar la resolución que ponga término a la causa”. En el presente caso, se aprecia que el a quo no fundamentó su decisión de condenar al sentenciado al pago de las costas. Sin embargo, a pesar del vicio apuntado, en la presente causa sólo se conoció una acusación penal formulada por el Ministerio Público, de modo que únicamente éste órgano y la defensa se tuvieron como partes procesales. La víctima… no se constituyó en parte procesal mediante el ejercicio de la acción penal -a través de una querella- o de la civil -por medio de una demanda civil resarcitoria-. Por consiguiente, en tanto el Ministerio Público es parte pública y oficial, los gastos en los que, con ocasión del proceso, éste haya incurrido, no son susceptibles de hacerlos recaer sobre la persona condenada, toda vez que la Administración de Justicia constituye un servicio público, financiado con fondos, igualmente, públicos. Es el Estado el que, en este caso, debe sufragar los gastos del sistema judicial, sin que quepa exigir al encartado…pago alguno por la inversión dineraria que supuso el ejercicio de la acción penal por la Fiscalía. El ordenamiento jurídico no prevé que, por el simple hecho de acreditarse su responsabilidad penal, la persona condenada deba pagar las costas del proceso en que incurrió la parte cuyas pretensiones fueron acogidas. El artículo 267 del Código Procesal Penal no es obstáculo para el anterior razonamiento. Dicha norma determina: «Las costas estarán a cargo de la parte vencida, pero el tribunal podrá eximirla, total o parcialmente, cuando haya razón plausible para litigar…». En realidad, esta disposición regula aquellos supuestos en los que se ha formulado una querella o una acción civil, en el entendido de que la parte vencedora (querellante o actora civil cuyas pretensiones son acogidas, querellado sobreseído o absuelto, demandado civil exonerado de responsabilidad) debe ser reparada, con cargo a la parte vencida (querellante o actora civil cuyas pretensiones son rechazadas, querellado condenado, demandado civil responsable) en los gastos en que haya incurrido -conforme al contenido de las costas definido en el artículo 269 del Código Procesal Penal-, por la disminución de su patrimonio con motivo de la pretensión del accionante ante la Administración de Justicia, salvo cuando, respecto de la parte vencida, no haya existido temeridad o abuso del derecho al litigar, en cuyo caso el Tribunal, facultativamente, puede eximir de forma total o parcial a la parte vencida. Por consiguiente, se declara este motivo con lugar y se anula parcialmente la sentencia, sólo en lo que respecta a la condena impuesta a… consistente en pagar los gastos en que haya incurrido el Ministerio Público con motivo del proceso y, en su lugar, por economía procesal, esta Sala dispone que las costas corren a cargo del Estado…”. Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto número 2008-01095 de las 16:05 hrs. del 02 de octubre de 2008. En similar sentido: Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José, voto número 197-2002 integrado por [Nombre16] , y [Nombre17]).

Este Tribunal discrepa ligeramente de ese criterio sólo en lo relativo a la motivación pues si bien el artículo 266 del Código procesal Penal la exige, dicha norma debe interpretarse sistemáticamente con el resto del articulado para estimar que si el tribunal aplica la condena imperativa (para la parte vencida en caso de que no sea el encartado o el Ministerio Público) o la exención imperativa (para el encartado en costas procesales o para el Ministerio Público), al estarse aplicando una regla legal, basta para fundamentar el pronunciamiento que se indique que se hace así por disposición de ley o aludiendo a la norma que lo establece (véase la redacción imperativa en los artículos 265 y 267 de esa misma legislación), que debe ser aplicada. Solo cuando se aplique la excepción, es que se precisa que exista una mayor fundamentación para que la discrecionalidad que al efecto le confiere el legislador al juez no se torne en arbitrariedad, pues entre ambos términos es la motivación la que marca la línea divisoria (en ese mismo sentido: Sala Tercera, voto 1157-2007 del 12 de octubre de 2007 y Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José, voto número 53-F-99 del 12 de febrero de 1999. En sentido contrario cfr.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4a. edición, 2009, p. 418. El tema ha sido tratado de diversa manera por este mismo Tribunal, con diversas integraciones, pareciendo que la tendencia es a exigir siempre la fundamentación y hasta a aceptar la exención como excepción para todos los casos. Para un mejor estudio de la cuestión cfr.: los votos números votos 239-F-98 del 02 de abril de 1998 -López, [Nombre18] y [Nombre8]-, 539-F-98 del 31 de julio de 1998 -[Nombre18], [Nombre8] y [Nombre9]-, 579-F-98 del 21 de agosto de 1998 -[Nombre8], [Nombre17] y [Nombre18]-, 366-2002 del 10 de mayo de 2002 -[Nombre17], [Nombre8] y [Nombre11]-, 747-2002 del 19 de setiembre de 2002 -[Nombre14], [Nombre19] y [Nombre20]-, 891-2002 del 31 de octubre de 2002 -[Nombre19], [Nombre17] y [Nombre14]-, 1028-2003 del 16 de octubre de 2003 -[Nombre11], [Nombre8] y [Nombre20]-, 1031-2003 del 16 de octubre de 2003 -[Nombre17], [Nombre21] . y [Nombre20]-, 746-2004 del 29 de julio de 2004 -[Nombre15], [Nombre12] y [Nombre20]-, 780-2004 del 05 de agosto de 2004 -[Nombre20], [Nombre11] y [Nombre21] . -, 1348-2004 del 23 de diciembre de 2004 -[Nombre11], [Nombre21] . y [Nombre17]-, 132-2005 del 24 de febrero de 2005 -[Nombre14], [Nombre19] y [Nombre21] . -, 271-2005 del 14 de abril de 2005 -Vargas, [Nombre10] y [Nombre11]-, 408-2005 del 12 de mayo de 2005 -[Nombre11], [Nombre21] . y [Nombre10]-, 497-2005 del 02 de junio de 2005 -[Nombre20], [Nombre11] y [Nombre14]- y 1019-2005 del 10 de octubre de 2005 -[Nombre11], [Nombre22] , -). No obstante, esas reglas son para el proceso ordinario y en materia penal, pues hay que tener en cuenta que en otros tipos de procesos penales especiales (de acción privada por ejemplo) y en materia de demandas civiles existen normas especiales que desplazan a esas disposiciones generales. Allí la regla general es que el perdidoso siempre afronta ambas costas y que la posibilidad de hacer exención no cabe desde que la norma especial no lo posibilita. Así se pronuncian los artículos 78 (desistimiento expreso de la querella de acción pública en que imperativamente se dispone la condena al que desiste salvo acuerdo de partes en contrario), 118 párrafo segundo (desistimiento de la acción civil), 384 (desistimiento de la querella de acción privada en que imperativamente se dispone la condena al que desiste salvo acuerdo de partes en contrario) y 270 del Código Procesal Penal (condena a la parte civil vencida) (ver en tal sentido el voto de este Tribunal, con una integración parcialmente diferente a la actual, número 851-2005 del 01 de setiembre de 2005 -U. [Nombre6], [Nombre14] y [Nombre15]- y la nota en el voto número [Telf1] del 17 de enero de 2010 -Camacho, [Nombre23] y [Nombre21] . -. En sentido contrario, esto es, aceptando la razón plausible para litigar como excepción en todos los casos, los votos de esta Cámara, con diferente integración, números [Telf2] del 29 de setiembre de 2006 -[Nombre23], [Nombre24] y [Nombre12]- y 2000-119 del 11 de febrero de 2000 -López, [Nombre11] y [Nombre25]-, en donde se aborda el tema aunque con diversos criterios al aquí expuesto). Por otra parte, tampoco cabe hacer aplicación supletoria del Código Procesal Civil, desde que hay norma expresa en contrario. Estando en vigencia el Cödigo de Procedimientos Penales de 1973 derogado, que contenía disposiciones similares a las actuales, así lo indicó la Sala Tercera, criterio que esta Cámara comparte:

"No resultan aplicables en el subjúdice disposiciones del Código de Procedimientos Civiles en tanto existan normas penales que señalen pautas al efecto, y sólo sería posible recurrir a aquéllas o -como caso de excepción- cuando las formas penales no contemplaren un caso específico, que sí trataren o contuvieren las civiles" Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto número 255-F de las 09:35hrs. del 10 de noviembre de 1989.

III.- En el presente caso la sentencia, sin mayor fundamentación, condena en ambas costas al imputado. En este asunto el encartado litigó bajo el patrocinio de la defensa pública aunque se ignora si cuenta con recursos para hacer ese pago. Además del imputado y su defensora pública, solo intervino el Ministerio Público que está exento del pago de las costas y que, además, resultó "parte" ganadora (entendiendo "parte" en sentido formal desde que no puede serlo en sentido material al estar sujeto a un deber de objetividad impuesto legalmente). Por ende, no existe ningún error en que el tribunal, sin profundizar en el por qué no eximía en costas, condenara al encartado al pago de las costas personales, ya que estaba aplicando la norma legal y no la excepción y, por eso, ese aspecto ha de quedar incólume, pero sí hay una incorrecta aplicación de la ley procesal cuando lo condena al pago de las costas procesales pues hay norma expresa que señala que, respecto del encartado, los gastos corren a cargo del Estado. Por ello, debe acogerse parcialmente el recurso interpuesto y se debe revocar la sentencia recurrida únicamente en cuanto condena al imputado al pago de ambas costas del proceso para, en su lugar, decretar que a él le corresponde al pago sólo de los honorarios profesionales (en caso de que tenga recursos para hacerlo y no se cuestione formalmente la constitucionalidad de dicha disposición) y que los gastos del proceso o costas procesales quedan a cargo del Estado, pronunciamiento este que puede hacerse en esta sede sin afectar el derecho al recurso del encartado desde que es más beneficioso que lo que viene impuesto y, además, es algo que debe hacerse oficiosamente según las disposiciones legales referidas." (el destacado es del original).

De lo anterior se desprende que este Tribunal comparte parcialmente los precedentes invocados por el impugnante, pues en punto a la exoneración del encartado del pago de las costas personales, hay norma expresa en contra de lo que señalan los precedentes de la Sala Tercera y si bien dichas disposiciones normativas eventualmente podrían rozar con el Derecho de la Constitución (como se indicó en el voto de esta Cámara recién transcrito), no es esta la sede para plantear el alegato, por lo que el impugnante deberá acudir en defensa de sus derechos y si a bien lo tiene a la jurisdicción constitucional encargada del contralor concentrado de constitucionalidad en nuestro país. En esta causa, efectivamente, la jueza de instancia, sin fundamentación alguna, condenó al encartado al pago de ambas costas, sin que conste que haya existido querellante y actor civil. Empero, como ha figurado un defensor público y se desconoce si el encartado cuenta con recursos económicos para hacer frente a los honorarios profesionales de él, aspecto que corresponderá tramitarlo a la Defensa Pública en la fase de ejecución según lo referido por la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (la cual, como se indicó en aquel voto, se encuentra vigente y no ha sido declarada inconstitucional en punto a esas regulaciones). Por ende, lo procedente es revocar parcialmente la sentencia impugnada (pues a nada conduciría un reenvío al tratarse de aplicar directamente la disposición legal omitida, que no versa sobre un aspecto penal propiamente) para determinar que los gastos del proceso quedan a cargo del Estado y, en cuanto a los honorarios relativos al profesional que asistió encartado, le corresponde a éste su pago, en caso de que se acredite -en la etapa correspondiente- que cuente con recursos para ello. En lo demás, la impugnación debe rechazarse.”