Judicial recognition of de facto union after partial annulment of Article 246 of the Family CodeReconocimiento judicial de unión de hecho tras anulación parcial del artículo 246 del Código de Familia

**III.- REGARDING THE DE FACTO UNION:** Through Law No. 7532, of August 8, 1995, published in *La Gaceta* No. 162, of August 28 following, effective as of its publication, a Title VII consisting of a single chapter aimed at regulating de facto unions was added to the *Código de Familia*. That chapter comprised articles 229 through 233, whose numbering was subsequently transferred as a result of another reform and currently corresponds to numerals 242 through 246. Thus, Article 242 provides that "a public, notorious, unique, and stable de facto union, for more than three years, between a man and a woman who possess the legal capacity to marry, shall produce all the patrimonial effects inherent to a legally formalized marriage, upon its termination for any cause." Furthermore, by provision of ordinal 244 *ídem*, that judicial recognition shall retroact the patrimonial effects to the date on which the union began. For its part, Article 243 of the *Código de Familia* stipulates: "For the purposes indicated in the preceding article, either of the cohabitants or their heirs may petition the Court for the recognition of the de facto union. The action shall be processed through the abbreviated proceeding (proceso abreviado), regulated in the *Código Procesal Civil*, and shall lapse in two years from the rupture of the cohabitation or from the death of the decedent." (The emphasis was supplied by the drafter). As it pertains to the present proceeding, Article 246 of that new chapter provided: "A public, notorious, stable, and unique de facto union, lasting more than four years, in which one of the cohabitants is impeded from marrying due to the existence of a prior bond, shall have the limited patrimonial effects stipulated in this article, as the cohabitants shall have no right to demand support (alimentos) from each other. Should that union dissolve, the property acquired during the cohabitation shall be distributed in equal parts between the cohabitants. The rights shall be recognized within the abbreviated proceeding (proceso abreviado) established in Article 230 of this Code. In such case, those who may be affected by the resolution and the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia if there are minor children must be considered as parties. If one of the cohabitants dies, the survivor shall retain his or her patrimonial right over fifty percent (50%) of the property acquired during that union. For that right to be recognized, the survivor must file the abbreviated proceeding (proceso abreviado) for recognition of the de facto union within the corresponding probate proceeding (juicio sucesorio). Once compliance with the requirements established in this article is verified, the judge shall award the surviving cohabitant fifty percent (50%) of the property acquired during the cohabitation and order its exclusion from the hereditary estate (masa hereditaria)." By judgment number 3858, at 4:48 p.m. on May 25, 1999, the Sala Constitucional annulled the norm contemplated in the cited Article 246, with declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the indicated norm, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. As grounds for said declaration of unconstitutionality, the following was considered: "… granting patrimonial effects to an irregular union, as the second paragraph of Article 246 of the *Código de Familia* does, obviously infringes Article 52 of the Constitution and must be so declared in light of the consolidated jurisprudence of the Chamber, despite being produced by a divided vote, since under current conditions there are no reasons to modify the criterion." As can be observed, according to the dimensionalization carried out by the Sala Constitucional, the declaration of unconstitutionality was extended to the effective date of the norm in order to protect rights acquired as of that date. The foregoing means that if a couple met the requirements set forth by the norm at the time it entered into force, their situation was covered by the annulled regulation. This Chamber, in judgment number 34, at 2:40 p.m. on January 12, 2001, resolved in this regard: "In this way, when the norm was annulled due to defects of unconstitutionality, its subsequent application becomes impossible; however, attention must also be paid to what was expressly resolved by the Sala Constitucional. Consequently, if the declaration of unconstitutionality was made without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, the norm cannot cease to be applied without first having conducted an analysis, in each specific case, regarding the existence of the eventual acquired rights, in favor of the party claiming the application of the regulation. […] Thus, despite Article 246 of the *Código de Familia* having been annulled for being unconstitutional, before ceasing to apply it, it must be established, in each specific case, whether there are acquired rights or consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas) that must be respected, by virtue of the provisions of Article 34 of the Constitution." With respect to the concept of acquired right, this Chamber has indicated:

"In a general manner, it should be understood that this exists when a specific asset or right, previously alien or non-existent, enters or affects a person's patrimony, in a positive manner; that is, obtaining a verifiable increase, benefit, or advantage. As can be inferred from the foregoing, this concept is closely related to the patrimonial topic, unlike the concept of consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada), which expresses more a definition of the legal effects or consequences of a certain fact or set of facts, in a certain and indisputable manner, which may arise through a legal norm or by a final judgment of a jurisdictional body. The legal system provides special protection, in order to guarantee that whoever benefits from the acquired right or the consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada) cannot have their legal and patrimonial status modified, this in guarantee of legal certainty and the principle of good faith. Likewise, it must be made clear, as doctrine and jurisprudence have done, that although this special protection exists, which manifests itself, among other forms, in the principle of non-retroactivity of the law—Article 34 of the Constitution—it is also true that one cannot therefore speak of the existence of a right that the legal regulations not change, known as the 'right to the immutability of the law,' but rather what is maintained is the right to the effects, to the consequence, in the event that the factual situation required by the norm for those results to occur was fulfilled during the validity of that norm …" (Voto 91, at 9:15 a.m. on February 24, 2006). (In the same vein, one may also consult this Chamber’s judgment number 04, at 9:45 a.m. on January 10, 2007).

For its part, the Sala Constitucional has also referred to this particular topic. Thus, in Voto number 2765, at 3:03 p.m. on May 20, 1997, it was affirmed:

"The concepts of 'acquired right' and 'consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada)' appear closely related in constitutional doctrine. It is feasible to affirm that, in general terms, the former denotes that consummated circumstance in which a thing—material or immaterial, be it a previously alien asset or a previously non-existent right—has entered into (or impacted upon) the patrimonial sphere of the person, such that the latter experiences a verifiable advantage or benefit. For its part, the 'consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada)' represents not so much a patrimonial surplus, but rather a state of affairs fully defined in terms of its legal characteristics and its effects, even if these have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant regarding the consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada), precisely, is not whether those effects still endure or not, but rather that—by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared—a clear and defined rule has already emerged in legal life, connecting a factual presupposition (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect). […] In both cases (acquired right or consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada)), the legal system protects—rendering it intangible—the situation of the person who obtained the right or enjoys the situation, for reasons of equity and legal certainty. In this case, the constitutional guarantee of the non-retroactivity of the law translates into the certainty that a change in the legal system cannot have the consequence of subtracting the already acquired asset or right from the person's patrimony, or of causing that, if the factual presupposition had occurred prior to the legal reform, the (advantageous, it is understood) consequence that the interested party expected from the consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada) no longer arises. Now, specifically regarding the latter, it has also been understood that no one has a 'right to the immutability of the legal system,' that is, that the rules never change. Therefore, the constitutional precept does not consist of the fact that, once born into legal life, the rule connecting the fact with the effect cannot be modified or even suppressed by a subsequent norm; what it means is that—as explained—if the conditioning presupposition has occurred, a legal reform that changes or eliminates the rule cannot have the virtue of preventing the conditioned effect that was expected under the rule of the prior norm from arising. This is so because, as stated, what is relevant is that the state of affairs the person enjoyed was already defined in terms of its elements and its effects, even if these are still being produced or, even, have not begun to be produced." **IV.- ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE DE FACTO UNION IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE:** In the matter under analysis, the appellant alleges that no consideration was given to the fact that she and her partner fulfilled the presuppositions stipulated in Article 246 of the *Código de Familia*, before that norm was declared unconstitutional, and therefore an acquired right existed that must be respected, just as the constitutional ruling generically ordered. She argues that, then, it was only upon the death of Mr. [Nombre1] that the two-year lapse period for requesting the judicial recognition of the respective de facto union began to run. Based on the foregoing and on the claims outlined by the plaintiff in her complaint, it is observed that she requested the recognition of the de facto union without limiting her petition to a relationship of the so-called regular kind (Article 242 of the *Código de Familia*), and therefore this Chamber can also analyze whether a type of cohabitation like the one regulated in the now-annulled Article 246 *ídem* was accredited and whether it was protected by the dimensionalization carried out by the Sala Constitucional. Now, as was accredited in the case file, at the time of the death of Mr. [Nombre1], which occurred on June 4, 2002 (folio 2), the parties had already been cohabiting for at least twenty years according to the presuppositions of the norm, that is, in a public, notorious, stable, and unique manner. This was declared by the witnesses H—folios 236 and 237—; Z—folio 238— and O—folio 239—. The foregoing implies that by August 28, 1995, the date of the entry into force of the norm declared unconstitutional, the couple had already been cohabiting for more than four years as the norm required. That is, when the decedent's death occurred, the norm had been in force for 6 years, 9 months, and 7 days, which implies that, on the date it came into effect, the couple had already been cohabitating in a de facto union for more than thirteen years. In accordance with this, that period of cohabitation falls within the dimensionalization carried out by the Sala Constitucional, and the consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada) for that date must therefore be recognized for having fulfilled the normative presuppositions, as previously explained. In Voto number 34, at 2:40 p.m. on January 12, 2001 (previously cited), a matter with similar characteristics to the present one, this Chamber resolved the following: "In the case under study, it is clear that the effects of the annulled norm have not yet benefitted the plaintiff; nevertheless, it must be analyzed whether, prior to the annulment, her situation fell within each of the factual presuppositions provided for in the norm; because, in such a case, her situation was legally consolidated (se consolidó jurídicamente) and, consequently, the legal effects provided for the contemplated factual situation must be applied to her, in light of the provisions of Article 34 of the Constitution. […] If the plaintiff’s situation coincided with said presupposition, prior to the norm being declared unconstitutional, she retains the right to have the provided legal effects applied to her; because, as indicated, her legal situation was fully consolidated (se consolidó plenamente) when the regulation was still in force." (Emphasis supplied). With respect to the lapse of the action to request judicial recognition, this Chamber does not share the court’s reasoning that the action had lapsed, because, according to the foregoing, the date on which the two-year lapse period provided for in numeral 243 of the *Código de Familia* should have begun to run was from the death of Mr. [Nombre1], that is, June 4, 2002. Note that the norm refers to the death of one of the cohabitants and, furthermore, the Sala Constitucional did not indicate any circumstance that varied that initial term for starting to compute the two years. Hence, if the date of filing the complaint was May 6, 2003 (folio 3), the indicated period did not elapse, since only eleven months and two days had passed since the death of Mr. [Nombre1]. The foregoing is so, because what is being discussed before this Chamber is the recognition of an irregular de facto union and not the one contemplated in numeral 242 of the *Código de Familia*, regarding which any discussion is precluded. Lastly, for the purposes of the operative part and enforcement of this judgment, it must be held as proven that the beginning of the relationship was August 10, 1979 (twenty years before the signing of the divorce agreement), as can be inferred from the documentary evidence on folio 1 in relation to the aforementioned testimonial evidence.

**V.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:** In accordance with the foregoing, it is appropriate to sustain the appeal filed by the plaintiff. Consequently, the appealed judgment must be annulled and the first-instance judgment revoked. In its place, it is appropriate to grant the complaint. The de facto union between the parties must be recognized from August 10, 1979, until June 4, 2002. The plaintiff has the right to be recognized as participating in fifty percent of the net value of the marital property (bienes gananciales) acquired during that period, which shall be determined during the enforcement stage. The mentioned percentage of the referenced marital property (bienes gananciales) must be awarded to Ms. S, and it shall be excluded from the hereditary estate (masa hereditaria) within the respective probate proceeding (proceso sucesorio) currently being processed (final paragraph of Article 246 of the *Código de Familia*). The payment of both costs must be imposed upon the defendant succession (Article 221 of the *Código Procesal Civil*).” In this way, what a person is entitled to is the consequence, not the rule."</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">IV.- REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE (UNIÓN DE HECHO) IN THIS SPECIFIC CASE: </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">In the matter under analysis, the appellant alleges that no consideration was given to the fact that she and her partner fulfilled the requirements stipulated in Article 246 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Family Code (Código de Familia)</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">, before that provision was declared unconstitutional, and therefore a vested right (derecho adquirido) existed that must be respected, as the constitutional ruling generically ordered. She argues that, therefore, it was not until the death of Mr. [Name1] that the two-year statute of limitations for requesting the judicial recognition of the respective common-law marriage began to run.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">Based on the foregoing and on the claims outlined by the plaintiff in the complaint, it is observed that she requested the recognition of the common-law marriage without limiting her petition to a relationship of the so-called regular type (Article 242 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Family Code</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">), hence this Chamber may also analyze whether a type of cohabitation such as that regulated in the now-annulled Article 246 </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">idem</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> was accredited and whether it remained protected by the scope of application defined by the Constitutional Chamber. Now, as proven in the record, at the time of the death of Mr. [Name1], which occurred on June 4, 2002 (folio 2), the parties had been cohabiting for at least twenty years according to the requirements of the provision, that is, in a public, notorious, stable, and exclusive manner. This was declared by the witnesses H–folios 236 and 237-; Z –folio 238- and O –folio 239-. The foregoing implies that as of August 28, 1995, the date the provision declared unconstitutional entered into force, the couple had already been cohabiting for more than four years as required by the provision. That is, when the death of the decedent occurred, the provision had been in force for 6 years, 9 months, and 7 days, which implies that, as of the date it entered into force, the couple had already been cohabiting in a common-law marriage for more than thirteen years. Accordingly, that period of cohabitation falls within the scope of application established by the Constitutional Chamber, and the legally consolidated situation (situación jurídica consolidada) as of that date must therefore be recognized for having met the regulatory requirements, as explained above. In vote number 34, at 14:40 hours on January 12, 2001 (previously cited), a matter with similar characteristics to the present one, this Chamber resolved the following: </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">"In the case under study, it is clear that the effects of the annulled provision have not yet benefited the plaintiff; however, it must be analyzed whether, prior to the annulment, her situation fell within each of the factual presuppositions provided for in the provision; for, in such a case, her situation was legally consolidated and, consequently, the legal effects provided for the contemplated factual situation must be applied to her, in accordance with the provisions of Article 34 of the Constitution. […] </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">If the plaintiff's situation coincided with said presupposition, prior to the provision being declared unconstitutional, she retains the right to have the provided legal effects applied to her</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">; for, as indicated, her legal situation was fully consolidated when the regulation was still in force". </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">(Emphasis added). Regarding the statute of limitations for the action to request judicial recognition, this Chamber does not share the lower court's reasoning that the action had expired, since, according to the foregoing, the date on which the two-year statute of limitations period provided in numeral 243 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Family Code</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> should have begun to run was from the death of Mr. [Name1], that is, on June 4, 2002. Note that the provision refers to the death of one of the cohabitants and, furthermore, the Constitutional Chamber did not indicate any circumstance that would vary that initial term for beginning to count the two years. Hence, if the date of filing the complaint was May 6, 2003 (folio 3), the indicated period did not elapse, since only eleven months and two days had passed since the death of Mr. [Name1]. The foregoing is so, because what is being discussed before this Chamber is the recognition of an irregular common-law marriage and not the one contemplated in numeral 242 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Family Code, </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">regarding which any discussion is foreclosed. Finally, for the purposes of the operative part and enforcement of this judgment, it must be deemed proven that the relationship began on August 10, 1979 (twenty years before the signing of the divorce agreement), as is evident from the documentary evidence on folio 1 in relation to the aforementioned testimonial evidence. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">V.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">In accordance with the foregoing, the appeal filed by the plaintiff is to be granted. Consequently, the appealed ruling must be annulled and the first-instance ruling revoked. In its place, the complaint should be granted. The common-law marriage between the parties must be recognized from August 10, 1979, until June 4, 2002. The plaintiff has the right to be recognized a share of fifty percent of the net value of the community property acquired during that period, which shall be determined in the enforcement stage. The aforementioned percentage of the referred community property shall be awarded to Mrs. S and shall be excluded from the estate within the respective probate proceeding currently being processed (final paragraph of Article 246 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Family Code</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">). The payment of both court costs shall be imposed on the defendant estate (Article 221 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil)</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">).”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span></p></div></body></html> Thus, that to which a person is entitled is the consequence, not the rule."</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">IV.- REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE IN THE SPECIFIC CASE: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">In the matter under analysis, the appellant claims that no consideration was given to the fact that she and her partner fulfilled the prerequisites stipulated in article 246 of the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Family Code</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">, before that norm was declared unconstitutional, and therefore a vested right existed that must be respected, as the constitutional ruling generally provided. She argues, then, that it was not until the death of Mr. [Nombre1] that the two-year limitation period (plazo de caducidad) for requesting the judicial recognition of the respective common-law marriage began to run.</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">Based on the foregoing and on the claims set forth by the plaintiff in the complaint, it is observed that she requested the recognition of the common-law marriage without limiting her petition to a relationship of the so-called regular type (article 242 of the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Family Code</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">), hence this Chamber may also analyze whether a type of cohabitation like that regulated in the now-annulled article 246 </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">idem</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> was proven and whether it remained protected by the delimitation made by the Constitutional Chamber. Now, as was proven in the record, at the time of the death of Mr. [Nombre1], which occurred on June 4, 2002 (folio 2), the parties had already been cohabiting for at least twenty years according to the prerequisites of the norm, that is, in a public, notorious, stable, and exclusive manner. This was declared by the witnesses H–folios 236 and 237-; Z –folio 238- and O –folio 239-. The foregoing implies that as of August 28, 1995, the effective date of the norm declared unconstitutional, the couple had already been cohabiting for more than four years as required by the norm. That is, when the decedent's death occurred, the norm had been in effect for 6 years, 9 months and 7 days, which implies that, on the date it came into force, the couple had already been cohabiting in a common-law marriage for more than thirteen years. In accordance with this, that period of cohabitation falls within the delimitation made by the Constitutional Chamber, and the legal situation consolidated as of that date must therefore be recognized for having fulfilled the regulatory prerequisites, as explained previously. In vote number 34, at 2:40 p.m. on January 12, 2001 (previously cited), a matter with similar characteristics to the present one, this Chamber resolved the following: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">\"In the case under study, it is clear that the effects of the annulled norm have not yet benefited the plaintiff; nevertheless, it must be analyzed whether, prior to the annulment, her situation fell within each of the factual prerequisites provided for in the norm; because, in such case, her situation was legally consolidated and, consequently, the legal effects provided for the contemplated factual situation must be applied to her, pursuant to what is regulated in constitutional article 34. […] </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">If the plaintiff's situation coincided with said prerequisite, prior to the norm being declared unconstitutional, she retains the right to have the provided legal effects applied to her</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">; because, as indicated, her legal situation was fully consolidated when the regulation was still in force\". </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">(Emphasis supplied). Regarding the expiration of the action to request judicial recognition, this Chamber does not share the lower court's reasoning that the action had expired, because, according to what was stated above, the date on which the two-year limitation period (caducidad), provided in numeral 243 of the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Family Code</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">, should have begun to run was from the death of Mr. [Nombre1], that is, June 4, 2002. Note that the norm refers to the death of one of the cohabitants and, moreover, the Constitutional Chamber did not indicate any circumstance that would vary that initial term for beginning to count the two years. Hence, if the date of filing the complaint was May 6, 2003 (folio 3), the indicated period did not elapse, because only eleven months and two days passed since the death of Mr. [Nombre1]. The foregoing is so, because what is being discussed before this Chamber is the recognition of an irregular common-law marriage and not the one contemplated in numeral 242 of the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Family Code, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">regarding which any discussion is precluded. Lastly, for the purposes of the operative part and execution of this judgment, it must be taken as proven that the beginning of the relationship was August 10, 1979 (twenty years before the signing of the divorce agreement), as is deduced from the documentary evidence on folio 1 in relation to the aforementioned witness testimony. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">V.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">In accordance with what has been set forth above, the appeal filed by the plaintiff is to be granted. Consequently, the appealed judgment must be annulled and the first-instance judgment reversed. In their stead, the complaint is to be granted. The common-law marriage between the parties is to be recognized from August 10, 1979 until June 4, 2002. The plaintiff has the right to be recognized as participating in fifty percent of the net value of the marital property (bienes gananciales) acquired during that period, which shall be determined in the execution phase. The aforementioned percentage of the referred marital property shall be awarded to Mrs. S and it shall be excluded from the hereditary estate within the respective probate proceeding currently being processed (final paragraph article 246 of the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Family Code</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">). The payment of both costs is to be imposed on the defendant estate (article 221 of the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Civil Procedure Code</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">).”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>"

“III.- SOBRE LA UNIÓN DE HECHO: Mediante Ley n° 7532, del 8 de agosto de 1995, publicada en La Gaceta n° 162, de 28 de agosto siguiente, con vigencia a partir de su publicación, se adicionó al Código de Familia un título VII constante de un único capítulo tendiente a regular las uniones de hecho. Ese capítulo comprendía los artículos del 229 al 233, cuya numeración, posteriormente, a raíz de otra reforma, fue trasladada y en la actualidad, corresponde a los numerales 242 a 246. Así, el artículo 242 dispone que "la unión de hecho pública, notoria, única y estable, por más de tres años, entre un hombre y una mujer que posean aptitud legal para contraer matrimonio, surtirá todos los efectos patrimoniales propios del matrimonio formalizado legalmente, al finalizar por cualquier causa". Además, por disposición del ordinal 244 ídem, ese reconocimiento judicial retrotraerá los efectos patrimoniales a la fecha en que se inició la unión. Por su parte, el artículo 243 del Código de Familia estipula: “Para los efectos indicados en el artículo anterior, cualquiera de los convivientes o sus herederos podrá solicitar al Tribunal el reconocimiento de la unión de hecho. La acción se tramitará por la vía del proceso abreviado, regulada en el Código Procesal Civil, y caducará en dos años a partir de la ruptura de la convivencia o de la muerte del causante”. (El destacado fue suplido por la redactora). En lo que atañe al presente proceso, el artículo 246 de ese nuevo capítulo disponía: "La unión de hecho pública, notoria, estable y única, cuya duración sea mayor de cuatro años, en la cual uno de los convivientes esté impedido para contraer matrimonio por existir un vínculo anterior, tendrá los efectos patrimoniales limitados que se estipulan en este artículo, pues los convivientes no tendrán derecho a exigirse alimentos. De romperse esa unión, los bienes adquiridos durante la convivencia deberán repartirse en partes iguales entre los convivientes. Los derechos se reconocerán dentro del proceso abreviado establecido en el artículo 230 de este Código. En tal caso, deberá tenerse como partes a quienes puedan resultar afectados por la resolución y al Patronato Nacional de la Infancia si existen hijos menores. Si uno de los convivientes muere, el supérstite conservará su derecho patrimonial sobre el cincuenta por ciento (50%) de los bienes adquiridos durante esa unión. Para que se le reconozca ese derecho, deberá plantear el proceso abreviado de reconocimiento de la unión de hecho dentro del juicio sucesorio correspondiente. Comprobado el cumplimiento de los requisitos establecidos en este artículo, el juez adjudicará al conviviente supérstite el cincuenta por ciento (50%) de los bienes adquiridos durante la convivencia y ordenará excluirlo de la masa hereditaria". Mediante sentencia número 3858, de las 16:48 horas del 25 de mayo de 1999, la Sala Constitucional anuló la norma contemplada en el citado artículo 246, con efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de la indicada norma, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe. Como fundamento de dicha declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad, se consideró lo siguiente: "… el otorgar efectos patrimoniales a la unión irregular, como lo hace el párrafo segundo del artículo 246 del Código de Familia, obviamente infringe el artículo 52 Constitucional y así debe declararse a la luz de la jurisprudencia consolidada de la Sala, no obstante producirse con voto dividido, ya que en las condiciones actuales no existen motivos para modificar criterio". Como se puede observar, según el dimensionamiento hecho por la Sala Constitucional, la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad se hizo extensiva a la fecha de vigencia de la norma a efecto de proteger los derechos adquiridos a esa data. Lo anterior quiere decir que si una pareja cumplía los requisitos dispuestos por la norma al momento en que esta entró en vigencia, su situación quedaba amparada por la normativa anulada. Esta Sala en la sentencia número 34, de las 14:40 horas del 12 de enero de 2001, resolvió al respecto: "De esa manera, al ser anulada la norma, por vicios de inconstitucionalidad, su aplicación posterior resulta imposible; no obstante, se debe atender a lo también expresamente resuelto por la Sala Constitucional. Por consiguiente, si la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad se hizo, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe, la norma no puede dejarse de aplicar sin antes haberse realizado un análisis, en cada caso concreto, respecto de la existencia de los eventuales derechos adquiridos, a favor de la parte que reclama la aplicación de la normativa. […] De esa manera, a pesar de que el artículo 246 del Código de Familia fue anulado por inconstitucional, de previo a desaplicarse, debe establecerse, en cada caso concreto, si median derechos adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas que deban respetarse, en virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 34 constitucional".

Con respecto al concepto de derecho adquirido, esta Sala ha indicado:

"De forma general, se debe entender que este existe, cuando un determinado bien o derecho, anteriormente ajeno o inexistente, ingresa o afecta el patrimonio de una persona, de manera positiva; es decir, obteniendo un aumento, beneficio o ventaja, que puede ser verificable. Como se desprende de lo dicho, ese concepto está muy relacionado con el tema patrimonial, a diferencia del concepto de situación jurídica consolidada, que más expresa una definición de los efectos o consecuencias jurídicas de un cierto hecho o conjunto de estos, de forma cierta e indiscutible, que puede surgir mediante norma jurídica o por una sentencia firme de un órgano jurisdiccional. El ordenamiento jurídico brinda una protección especial, a efecto de garantizar a quien se beneficie del derecho adquirido o la situación jurídica consolidada, de manera que no se le pueda modificar su estatus jurídico y patrimonial, ello en garantía de la seguridad jurídica y del principio de buena fe. Asimismo, debe dejarse claro como lo ha hecho la doctrina y la jurisprudencia, que si bien existe esa protección especial, que se manifiesta entre otras formas en el principio de irretroactividad de la ley -artículo 34 constitucional-, es también lo cierto que no se puede hablar por ello de la existencia de un derecho a que la normativa jurídica no cambie, conocido como 'derecho a la inmutabilidad de la ley', sino que lo que se mantiene es el derecho a los efectos, a la consecuencia, en el caso de que la situación fáctica exigida por la norma para que se den esos resultados, se hayan cumplido durante la vigencia de esa norma …" (voto n° 91, de las 9:15 horas del 24 de febrero de 2006). (En igual sentido, puede consultarse también la sentencia de esta Sala número 04, de las 9:45 horas del 10 de enero de 2007).

Por su parte, la Sala Constitucional también se referido a este particular tema. Así, en el voto número 2765, de las 15:03 horas del 20 de mayo de 1997, se afirmó:

"Los conceptos de 'derecho adquirido' y 'situación jurídica consolidada' aparecen estrechamente relacionados en la doctrina constitucionalista. Es dable afirmar que, en términos generales, el primero denota a aquella circunstancia consumada en la que una cosa -material o inmaterial, trátese de un bien previamente ajeno o de un derecho antes inexistente- ha ingresado en (o incidido sobre) la esfera patrimonial de la persona, de manera que ésta experimenta una ventaja o beneficio constatable. Por su parte, la 'situación jurídica consolidada' representa no tanto un plus patrimonial, sino un estado de cosas definido plenamente en cuanto a sus características jurídicas y a sus efectos, aun cuando éstos no se hayan extinguido aún. Lo relevante en cuanto a la situación jurídica consolidada, precisamente, no es que esos efectos todavía perduren o no, sino que -por virtud de mandato legal o de una sentencia que así lo haya declarado- haya surgido ya a la vida jurídica una regla, clara y definida, que conecta a un presupuesto fáctico (hecho condicionante) con una consecuencia dada (efecto condicionado). […] En ambos casos (derecho adquirido o situación jurídica consolidada), el ordenamiento protege -tornándola intangible- la situación de quien obtuvo el derecho o disfruta de la situación, por razones de equidad y de certeza jurídica. En este caso, la garantía constitucional de la irretroactividad de la ley se traduce en la certidumbre de que un cambio en el ordenamiento no puede tener la consecuencia de sustraer el bien o el derecho ya adquirido del patrimonio de la persona, o de provocar que si se había dado el presupuesto fáctico con anterioridad a la reforma legal, ya no surja la consecuencia (provechosa, se entiende) que el interesado esperaba de la situación jurídica consolidada. Ahora bien, específicamente en punto a ésta última, se ha entendido también que nadie tiene un 'derecho a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento', es decir, a que las reglas nunca cambien. Por eso, el precepto constitucional no consiste en que, una vez nacida a la vida jurídica, la regla que conecta el hecho con el efecto no pueda ser modificada o incluso suprimida por una norma posterior; lo que significa es que –como se explicó– si se ha producido el supuesto condicionante, una reforma legal que cambie o elimine la regla no podrá tener la virtud de impedir que surja el efecto condicionado que se esperaba bajo el imperio de la norma anterior. Esto es así porque, se dijo, lo relevante es que el estado de cosas de que gozaba la persona ya estaba definido en cuanto a sus elementos y a sus efectos, aunque éstos todavía se estén produciendo o, incluso, no hayan comenzado a producirse. De este modo, a lo que la persona tiene derecho es a la consecuencia, no a la regla".

IV.- ACERCA DE LA POSIBILIDAD DE RECONOCIMIENTO JUDICIAL DE LA UNIÓN DE HECHO EN EL CASO PARTICULAR: En el asunto bajo análisis, la recurrente alega que no se tomó en consideración que ella y su compañero cumplieron los presupuestos estipulados en el artículo 246 del Código de Familia, antes de que esa norma fuera declarada inconstitucional, de ahí que existiera un derecho adquirido que debe ser respetado, tal y como lo dispuso el fallo constitucional en forma genérica. Aduce que, entonces, no fue sino al fallecer el señor [Nombre1], cuando empezó a correr el plazo de caducidad de dos años para solicitar el reconocimiento judicial de la respectiva unión de hecho. Con base en lo anterior y en las pretensiones esbozadas por la actora en la demanda, se observa que ella solicitó el reconocimiento de la unión de hecho sin que limitara su petición a una relación de las denominadas regulares (artículo 242 del Código de Familia), de ahí que la Sala también pueda analizar si se acreditó un tipo de convivencia como la regulada en el hoy anulado artículo 246 ídem y si esta quedó protegida por el dimensionamiento hecho por la Sala Constitucional. Ahora bien, según se acreditó en autos, al momento de la muerte del señor [Nombre1], ocurrida el 4 de junio de 2002 (folio 2), ya las partes tenían como mínimo veinte años de convivir según los presupuestos de la norma, es decir, en forma pública, notoria, estable y única. Así lo declararon los testigos H–folios 236 y 237-; Z –folio 238- y O –folio 239-. Lo anterior implica que para el 28 de agosto de 1995, fecha de la entrada en vigencia de la norma declarada inconstitucional, ya la pareja tenía más de cuatro años de convivir como lo exigía la norma. Es decir, cuando aconteció el fallecimiento del causante, la norma tenía 6 años, 9 meses y 7 días de haber entrado en vigencia, lo cual implica que, para la data en que entró a regir, ya la pareja llevaba conviviendo en unión de hecho más de trece años. De conformidad con ello, ese periodo de cohabitación entra en el dimensionamiento efectuado por la Sala Constitucional y se debe entonces reconocer la situación jurídica consolidada para esa fecha por cumplir con los presupuestos normativos, según se explicó anteriormente. En el voto número 34, de las 14:40 horas del 12 de enero de 2001 (antes indicado), asunto de similares características al presente, esta Sala resolvió lo siguiente: "En el caso bajo estudio, está claro que los efectos de la norma anulada no han beneficiado aún a la accionante; no obstante ello, debe analizarse si de previo a la anulación, su situación se enmarcaba dentro de cada uno de los presupuestos de hecho previstos en la norma; pues, en tal caso, su situación se consolidó jurídicamente y, por consiguiente, los efectos jurídicos previstos para la situación fáctica contemplada, deben aplicársele, en atención a lo normado en el artículo 34 constitucional. […] Si la situación de la accionante coincidió con dicho presupuesto, de previo a que la norma fuera declarada inconstitucional, conserva el derecho a que se le apliquen los efectos jurídicos previstos; pues, como se indicó, su situación jurídica se consolidó plenamente cuando la normativa estaba aún vigente". (Énfasis suplido). Con respecto a la caducidad de la acción para solicitar el reconocimiento judicial, esta Sala no comparte el razonamiento del tribunal en el sentido de que la acción se hallaba caduca, pues, según lo antes referido, la fecha en que debió empezar a correr el término de la caducidad de dos años, dispuesto en el numeral 243 del Código de Familia, fue a partir de la muerte del señor [Nombre1], es decir, el día 4 de junio de 2002. Nótese que la norma se refiere a la muerte de uno de los convivientes y, además, la Sala Constitucional no indicó ninguna circunstancia que variara ese término inicial para empezar a computar los dos años. De ahí que, si la fecha de interposición de la demanda lo fue el 6 de mayo de 2003 (folio 3), no aconteció el plazo indicado, pues solamente transcurrieron once meses y dos días desde la defunción de don [Nombre1]. Lo anterior es así, por cuanto lo que se discute ante la Sala es el reconocimiento de una unión de hecho irregular y no la contemplada en el numeral 242 del Código de Familia, sobre la cual, cualquier discusión se encuentra precluida. Por último, para los efectos de la parte dispositiva y ejecución de esta sentencia, debe tenerse por demostrado que el inicio de la relación fue el 10 de agosto de 1979 (veinte años antes de la firma del convenio de divorcio), según se desprende de la prueba documental de folio 1 en relación con la testimonial antes mencionada.

V.- CONSIDERACIONES FINALES: De conformidad con lo expuesto anteriormente, procede acoger el recurso planteado por la actora. En consecuencia, se debe anular el fallo recurrido y revocar el de primera instancia. En su lugar, cabe declarar con lugar la demanda. Se debe reconocer la unión de hecho entre las partes desde el 10 de agosto de 1979 hasta el 4 de junio de 2002. La actora tiene derecho a que se le reconozca participar en el cincuenta por ciento del valor neto de los bienes gananciales adquiridos durante ese periodo, lo cual se determinará en la etapa de ejecución. El mencionado porcentaje en los bienes gananciales referidos se deberá adjudicar a la señora S y se procederá a excluir de la masa hereditaria dentro del respectivo proceso sucesorio que se tramita actualmente (párrafo final artículo 246 del Código de Familia). El pago de ambas costas corresponde imponerlo a la sucesión demandada (artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil).”