Abusive ius variandi and job relocation due to moral harmIus variandi abusivo y reubicación laboral por menoscabo moral

**III.- ON THE EXISTENCE OF ABUSIVE USE OF IUS VARIANDI:** The term “ius variandi” has been used to denote the employer’s discretionary right to unilaterally modify working conditions, within certain limits, regarding the form and modalities of the service provision. In other words, that managerial power of “change” is limited, since the variations made must not substantially alter the employment contract nor be arbitrary to the detriment of the worker. Hence, if the employer modifies the working conditions of its employees, it must be based on a genuine need that justifies the measure with a view to improving the service provided (in this regard, see the resolutions of this Chamber numbers 227, at 10:00 a.m. on April 13, and 294, at 9:35 a.m. on May 11, both from 2007.) It is important, therefore, to determine, in each specific situation, whether the changes conform to the principles of reasonableness, necessity, and indemnity of the worker (as they must not cause pecuniary or moral impairment), and whether they respond to organizational needs or some exceptional situation, provided, of course, that they do not violate the essential clauses of the contract. This Chamber considers that in the case before us, abusive ius variandi did indeed occur. As is evident from the case file, the plaintiff has provided her services to the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Paquera since May 1, 1999, holding various positions. As stated in the complaint, an aspect that was not debated, since July 2004 she held the position of “Auxiliar de Contabilidad”. This continued until April 11, 2007, when she was transferred to the position of ticket seller and snack-bar attendant on the launch “[Placa1]”. The explanation given by the association to the plaintiff to support the decision to transfer her is simply that the worker who held that position had resigned (communication visible on folio 2). Now, said movement entails a significant modification in the duties to be performed. The defendant’s representative alleged that the position the plaintiff had been holding received the title of “auxiliar de contabilidad” and that it was a processing clerk position where the only duties were to enter data and prepare checks. The plaintiff, when giving confessional testimony, denied that those were the only tasks assigned to her. In that regard, she stated: “I did what I am being asked about, but not only that; at one time I prepared payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable, public service in the offices, I conducted petty cash counts, some human resources responsibilities, reception, answering the phone, filing documentation such as checks, accounts receivable and payable and, at the end of the month, conducting inventory at the different points of sale, among other things” (folio 56). From the foregoing, it can be inferred that these were typical office duties and directly related to the accounting subject matter of an institution or company. The fact that the plaintiff does not have an academic degree in accounting or the defendant’s argument that the job title the entity gave to the position does not match the duties performed by the incumbent are not facts that can be attributed to the plaintiff, given that, despite what the defendant’s representative said, the plaintiff remained in that position for a period of almost three years. Also, although it is true that the plaintiff’s curriculum vitae does not show an academic degree accrediting her in the field of accounting, it is observed that she has taken courses in computer packages, writing, and some related to secretarial functions, from which her aptitude to assist in typical office tasks could be inferred. On the other hand, although it is said that as part of her new duties she will perform inventories and tasks similar to those she had been performing as an assistant, she will basically be required to sell tickets and perform duties as a snack-bar attendant on the aforementioned boat. To this Chamber, it is clear that this transfer constitutes a significant change in duties. While it is true that she did not suffer pecuniary harm, as the plaintiff herself indicated that her income actually increased due to the overtime she works, it is possible to infer that a moral impairment took place derived from the substantial alteration in the duties to be performed.

**IV.- ON THE CLAIM FOR RELOCATION TO THE PREVIOUSLY HELD POSITION:** Our legal system, when faced with the application of abusive ius variandi, offers as a remedy the possibility for the worker to terminate the employment contract with employer liability. However, the plaintiff’s claim was her relocation to the position of Auxiliar de Contabilidad, arguing that the fact that the worker, when faced with the employer’s abuse of power, only has the option to resign from her job violates the protective principle and the principle of non-waivability of labor rights. In the case before us, the employment relationship is of a private nature. Indeed, in accordance with the certification visible on folio 15, the defendant entity is registered in the Registro Público de Asociaciones de Desarrollo de la Comunidad. According to the regulations governing such associations, they “are first-level community bodies, with a determined territorial circumscription. They are public-interest entities, although governed by private law norms, and as such, are authorized to promote or carry out a set of plans necessary to socially, economically, and culturally develop the inhabitants of the area in which they coexist, collaborating for this purpose with the Government, municipalities, and any public and private bodies. In this same manner, they are incorporated into regional development strategies and plans and into decentralization” (article 11 of the Reglamento a la Ley sobre Desarrollo de la Comunidad, Decreto Ejecutivo 26935). Despite the foregoing and the implications deriving therefrom, which is that the plaintiff does not enjoy the job stability characteristic of public employment relationships, the existence of the Constitución Política as a cardinal source of Labor Law cannot be ignored. Indeed, “a study of the internal law norms or direct sources, which Labor Law shares with the other sectors of the legal system, must necessarily begin at its apex with the Constitution” (Alonso Olea, Manuel and [Nombre1], María Emilia (2004). Derecho del Trabajo, twenty-second edition, Civitas Ediciones, Madrid, Spain, pp 781). It is at that level of the normative hierarchy where the governing principles, in force in employment relationships (articles 56 to 74 of the Constitución Política), and the fundamental rights that have gained increasing relevance within this branch and have contributed to what doctrine calls the “constitutionalization” of labor law are contemplated. On the subject, the Sala Constitucional has stated:

“As indicated, among the characteristic components of the Social State of Law is the protection of workers. In this regard, Article 56 of the Constitución Política establishes that the right to work is a right of the individual and an obligation to society, while obligating the State to prevent that, due to an occupation, conditions that impair the freedom or dignity of man are established or degrade his work to the condition of mere merchandise. Such duty is definitively based on principles of social solidarity, real equality, and defense of human dignity, basic elements of the constitutional order”. (Resolution No. 13205 at 3:13 p.m. on September 27, 2005).

Hence, the conclusion of an employment contract could not imply that the worker is dispossessed of a series of rights and principles guaranteed by the Magna Carta, which are human dignity and the right to work. This recognition of fundamental rights derives from the horizontal effect that characterizes them, in the sense that they are applicable not only against public authorities but also applicable to relationships between private individuals. In labor matters, although it is true that the employer enjoys a directive power that allows certain alterations in the service provision regime in order to direct, coordinate, and supervise the company, this must be exercised within the parameters set by the objective legal order and without denaturing the purposes sought when recognizing it. The foregoing has been widely recognized by legal doctrine: “But, furthermore, and above all, the aforementioned corporate powers, however much they may have a constitutional basis, will be subject to the natural limits derived from the fundamental rights of the workers. As Valdés has pointed out, the regime of freedoms, rights, and constitutional principles “inevitably carries with it a system of limits on corporate powers, among which fundamental rights hold indisputable primacy”. ([Nombre2], (1992). Despido y derechos fundamentales, first edition, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, Spain, pp.42). Consequently, that directive power must be used for the achievement of legitimate interests, because that is where its reason for being and its functionality lie. Precisely, to guarantee aspects such as these, the preliminary title of the Código Civil –which is common law for the entire Costa Rican legal system– contains fundamental rules of interpretative work that constitute a connection point between the current legislation and the prevailing social morality, and whose purpose is none other than the overcoming of legalism. Thus, by virtue of its Article 21, “Rights shall be exercised in accordance with the requirements of good faith.” Article 20 indicates that “Acts carried out under the cover of the text of a norm, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system; or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of the law and shall not prevent the proper application of the norm that was intended to be evaded.” Finally, the first part of Article 22 establishes that: “The law does not protect the abuse of rights or the antisocial exercise thereof (sic).” From these precepts, it follows that subjective rights and private powers, apart from their express constitutional and legal limits, are circumscribed by moral and social barriers. (see votes numbers 177, at 8:10 a.m., on August 20, 1993; 141, at 4:00 p.m., on July 4, 1997; 52, at 11:50 a.m., on February 13, 1998; 197, at 3:50 p.m., on July 15, 1999; 2003-78, at 8:50 a.m., on February 20, 2003, and 2008-93, at 10:20 a.m., on February 8, 2008). In the case before us, there was a substantial modification of the plaintiff’s position because the duties she had been performing were typical of an accounting office, and those assigned to her are activities in the area of public service, specifically acting as a ticket seller and attending the snack bar, which amounts to a demotion –even if her salary was maintained–, thereby injuring her dignity, because even though she did not have a degree accrediting her as an accounting assistant, that situation was not an obstacle to her being kept in that position for several years. Furthermore, it is evident that said modification was abusive because the plaintiff was transferred from an office to a boat where the working conditions are completely different. The defendant association was obliged to act in good faith and in a reasonable manner when modifying that situation and, above all, was prohibited from unilaterally and suddenly ordering the modification of the plaintiff’s working conditions, without identifying the superior interest or necessity that justified it, explaining it to her counterpart, giving her the opportunity to renegotiate the employment relationship, and, where appropriate, assuming the unavoidable economic consequences of its decision. (See in this regard vote No. 228 at 9:20 a.m. on March 20, 2009, of this Chamber). For all the reasons stated, and by virtue of the moral impairment suffered by the plaintiff, this Chamber considers that the fact that a vacancy arose in a position did not obligate the worker to accept, for the sake of the good faith and loyalty that must prevail in employment relationships, a demotion. For that reason, as the defendant incurred in abusive ius variandi, the plaintiff’s claim aimed at her relocation to the position she held, namely, as an accounting assistant, is appropriate, under the protection of Article 41 of the Constitución Política, which states: “Resorting to the laws, everyone must find redress for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. They must be provided prompt, complete justice, without denial and in strict accordance with the laws.” The appellant is correct in stating that offering the plaintiff, as the sole remedy, the possibility of terminating the contract with employer liability violates the guiding principles of labor law, given that such an option would rather amount to a penalty. Indeed, it is evident from the record that the plaintiff has been working for the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Paquera since 1999, meaning she enjoys a certain degree of job stability. Forcing her to resign violates her right to work because, even though in that case she would be entitled to the respective labor benefits, she would have no guarantee of finding another source of work, which would be placing a risk on her that is not hers to bear.” In the case before us, there was a substantial modification of the plaintiff's position, since the functions she had been performing were typical of an accounting office and those assigned to her are activities in the area of public service, specifically working as a ticket seller and attending the soda fountain (soda), which amounts to a demotion—even though her salary was maintained—, thereby injuring her dignity, for although she did not have a degree accrediting her as an accounting assistant, that situation was no obstacle to her being kept in that position for several years. Furthermore, it is evident that said modification was abusive because the plaintiff was transferred from an office to a boat where the working conditions are completely different. The defendant association was obligated to act in good faith and in a reasonable manner when it came to modifying that situation and, above all, it was prohibited from ordering the modification of the plaintiff's working conditions unilaterally and suddenly, without identifying the superior interest or the need that justified it, explaining it to its counterpart, giving her the opportunity to renegotiate the employment relationship, and, where appropriate, assuming the unavoidable economic consequences of its decision. (See in this regard vote no. 228 of 9:20 a.m. on March 20, 2009 of this Chamber). For all the foregoing reasons, and by virtue of the moral harm (menoscabo moral) suffered by the plaintiff, this Chamber considers that the fact that a vacancy arose in a position did not oblige the worker to accept a demotion, for the sake of the good faith and loyalty that must prevail in employment relationships. For this reason, since the defendant engaged in an abusive ius variandi, the plaintiff's claim for her reassignment to the position she held, namely, accounting assistant (auxiliar de contabilidad), is admissible, under the protection of Article 41 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), which reads: “*Occurring to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws*.” The appellant is correct in indicating that giving the plaintiff, as the sole remedy, the possibility of terminating the contract with employer liability (responsabilidad patronal) violates the guiding principles of labor law, since said option would amount rather to a sanction. Indeed, it is clear from the record that the plaintiff has worked for the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Paquera since 1999, that is, she enjoys a certain degree of employment stability. Forcing her to resign violates her right to work, since even though in that case she would be entitled to the respective employment benefits, she would have no guarantee of finding another source of work, which would be imposing a risk on her that is not hers to bear.” As Valdés has pointed out, the regime of constitutional liberties, rights, and principles “carries ineluctably associated with it a system of limits on corporate powers, among which fundamental rights indisputably hold primacy.” ([Nombre2], (1992). *Despido y derechos fundamentales*, first edition, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, Spain, pp. 42). Consequently, that managerial authority must be used for the achievement of legitimate interests, because therein lies its reason for being and its functionality. Precisely to guarantee aspects such as these, the preliminary title of the *Civil Code*—which is the common law of the entire Costa Rican legal system—contains fundamental rules of interpretive work that constitute a point of connection between current legislation and prevailing social morality, and whose purpose is none other than overcoming legalism. Thus, by virtue of its Article 21, *“Rights must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of good faith.”* Article 20 states that *“Acts carried out under the cover of a norm’s text, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system or contrary to it, shall be deemed executed in fraud of the law (fraude de la ley) and shall not prevent the due application of the norm that was sought to be evaded.”* Finally, the first part of Article 22 establishes that: *“The law does not protect abuse of right or its antisocial exercise (sic).”* From these precepts it follows that subjective rights and private powers, apart from their express constitutional and legal limits, are circumscribed by moral and social barriers. (See votes No. 177, at 8:10 a.m., of August 20, 1993; No. 141, at 4:00 p.m., of July 4, 1997; No. 52, at 11:50 a.m., of February 13, 1998; No. 197, at 3:50 p.m., of July 15, 1999; 2003-78, at 8:50 a.m., of February 20, 2003; and 2008-93, at 10:20 a.m., of February 8, 2008). In the case before us, there was a substantial modification of the plaintiff’s position, since the functions she had been performing were those of an accounting office and those assigned to her are activities in the area of customer service, specifically working as a ticket seller and attending the soda, which amounts to a demotion—even though her salary was maintained—thereby harming her dignity, for although she did not hold a degree accrediting her as an accounting assistant, that situation was no obstacle to her being kept for several years performing that position. Moreover, it is evident that said modification was abusive because the plaintiff was transferred from an office to a boat where the working conditions are completely different. The defendant association was obligated to act in good faith and in a reasonable manner when it came to modifying that situation and, above all, was prohibited from ordering the modification of the plaintiff’s working conditions in a unilateral and sudden manner, without identifying the superior interest or the need that justified it, explaining it to her counterpart, giving her the opportunity to renegotiate the employment relationship, and, where applicable, assuming the unavoidable economic consequences of its decision. (See in this regard vote No. 228 at 9:20 a.m. of March 20, 2009, of this Chamber). For all the foregoing and by virtue of the moral harm suffered by the plaintiff, this Chamber considers that the fact that a vacancy arose in a position did not obligate the worker to accept, in the interest of the good faith and loyalty that must prevail in employment relationships, a demotion. For that reason, the defendant having incurred an abusive ius variandi, the plaintiff’s claim seeking her relocation to the position she held, namely, as accounting assistant, is appropriate, the foregoing under the protection of Article 41 of the Political Constitution, which provides: *“Resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. They must be afforded prompt, complete justice, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws.”* The appellant is correct in indicating that offering the plaintiff, as the sole remedy, the possibility of terminating the contract with employer liability runs counter to the guiding principles of labor law, since that option would rather amount to a sanction. Indeed, from the record it is clear that the plaintiff has worked for the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Paquera since 1999, that is, she enjoys a certain degree of employment stability. Forcing her to resign violates her right to work, since although in that case she would be entitled to the respective employment benefits, she would have no guarantee of finding another source of work, which would be to saddle her with a risk that is not hers to bear.”

“III.- SOBRE LA EXISTENCIA DEL USO ABUSIVO DEL IUS VARIANDI: Se ha denominado “ius variandi” al derecho potestativo del empleador de modificar de manera unilateral las condiciones de trabajo, dentro de ciertos límites, en cuanto a la forma y modalidades de la prestación. En otras palabras, ese poder patronal de “cambio” es limitado, ya que las variaciones que realice no deben alterar sustancialmente el contrato de trabajo ni deben ser arbitrarias en perjuicio del trabajador. De ahí que, si el patrono modifica las condiciones del contrato de trabajo de sus empleados, debe basarse en una verdadera necesidad que justifique la medida con miras al mejoramiento del servicio que presta (en este sentido, consúltense las resoluciones de esta Sala números 227, de las 10:00 horas del 13 de abril y 294, de las 9:35 horas del 11 de mayo, ambas de 2007.) Es importante, entonces, determinar, en cada situación concreta, si los cambios se ajustan a los principios de razonabilidad, necesidad e indemnidad del trabajador (pues no puede dar lugar a menoscabo patrimonial ni moral), y si obedecen a necesidades de la organización o a alguna situación excepcional, desde luego, sin que atenten contra las cláusulas esenciales del contrato. Esta Sala considera que en el caso que nos ocupa sí tuvo lugar un ius variandi abusivo. Tal y como se desprende del expediente, la accionante ha brindado sus servicios para la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Paquera desde el 1 de mayo de 1999 desempeñando diversos puestos. Tal y como se indicó en el escrito de demanda, aspecto que no fue debatido, desde julio de 2004 ocupó el cargo de “Auxiliar de Contabilidad”. Lo anterior hasta el día 11 de abril de 2007 cuando se le traslada al puesto de tiquetera y dependienta de soda en la lancha “[Placa1] ”. La explicación que le da la asociación a la actora para fundamentar la decisión de trasladarla de puesto es simplemente que la trabajadora que ocupaba ese puesto había presentado la renuncia (comunicación visible a folio 2). Ahora bien, dicho movimiento conlleva una modificación importante en las funciones a desempeñar. El representante de la demandada alegó que el cargo que venía ocupando la actora recibía la nomenclatura de “auxiliar de contabilidad” y que se trataba de un puesto de tramitadora donde las únicas funciones a realizar eran la de digitar información y confeccionar cheques. La actora, a la hora de rendir prueba confesional, negó que fueran las únicas tareas que tenía asignadas. En ese sentido manifestó: “Sí realizaba lo que se me pregunta pero no únicamente, en un tiempo realicé planillas, cuentas por cobrar, cuentas por pagar, atención al público eso en las oficinas, llevaba arqueos de caja chica, algunas responsabilidades de recursos humanos, recepción, contestar teléfono, archivo de documentación como cheques, cuentas por cobrar y pagar y a fin de mes, realizar inventario en los diferentes puntos de venta, entre otras cosas” (folio 56). De lo anterior se puede inferir que se trataban de funciones típicas de una oficina y directamente relacionadas con la temática de contabilidad de una institución o empresa. El hecho de que la actora no tenga un grado académico en contabilidad o el argumento de la demandada en cuanto a que la nomenclatura que el ente le dio al puesto no es acorde con las funciones que recaen sobre quien lo ocupe, no son hechos que se le puedan imputar a la actora, toda vez que pese a lo dicho por el representante de la accionada, se mantuvo a la actora desempeñando dicho cargo por espacio de casi tres años. Asimismo, si bien es cierto no se extrae del currículum vitae que la actora tenga un grado académico que la acredite en el campo de la contabilidad, sí se observa que ha realizado cursos de paquetes de cómputo, de redacción y algunos relacionados con la función secretarial de lo cual podría inferirse su aptitud para asistir en tareas propias de una oficina. Por otro lado, si bien se dice que como parte de sus nuevas funciones va a realizar inventarios y tareas similares a las que venía realizando como auxiliar, básicamente le corresponde vender los tiquetes y ejercer funciones de dependiente de soda dentro del barco supra citado. Para esta Sala es claro que ese traslado significa un cambio significativo de funciones. Si bien es cierto no sufrió un perjuicio patrimonial pues la misma actora indicó que más bien aumentaron sus ingresos en razón de las horas extra que labora, sí es posible inferir que tuvo lugar un menoscabo de orden moral derivado de la alteración sustancial en las funciones a realizar.

IV.- SOBRE LA PRETENSIÓN DE REUBICACIÓN EN EL PUESTO DESEMPEÑADO ANTERIORMENTE: Nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, ante la aplicación de un ius variandi abusivo, presenta como remedio la posibilidad del trabajador de dar por roto el contrato de trabajo con responsabilidad patronal. Sin embargo, la pretensión de la actora fue su reubicación en el puesto de Auxiliar de Contabilidad aduciendo que el hecho de que el trabajador, ante el abuso de poder del empleador, solo tenga la opción de renunciar a su trabajo atenta contra el principio protector y el de irrenunciabilidad de los derechos laborales. En el caso que nos ocupa la relación laboral es de naturaleza privada. En efecto, de conformidad con la certificación visible a folio 15 se tiene que la entidad demandada se encuentra inscrita en el Registro Público de Asociaciones de Desarrollo de la Comunidad. De acuerdo con la normativa que regula dicho tipo de asociaciones, las mismas “son organismos comunitarios de primer grado, con una circunscripción territorial determinada. Son entidades de interés público, aunque regidas por las normas del derecho privado, y como tales, están autorizadas para promover o realizar un conjunto de planes necesarios para desarrollar social, económica y culturalmente a los habitantes del área en que conviven, colaborando para ello con el Gobierno, las municipalidades y cualesquiera organismos públicos y privados. De esta misma forma se incorporan a las estrategias y planes de desarrollo regional y a la descentralización” (artículo 11 del Reglamento a la Ley sobre Desarrollo de la Comunidad, Decreto Ejecutivo 26935). Pese a lo antes expuesto y a las implicaciones que de ello derivan cual es que la actora no goza de la estabilidad laboral característica de las relaciones de empleo público, no puede desconocerse la existencia de la Constitución Política como fuente cardinal del Derecho Laboral. En efecto, “un estudio de las normas o fuentes directas de Derecho interno, que el del Trabajo comparte con los demás sectores del ordenamiento jurídico, debe forzosamente comenzar en su ápice por la Constitución” (Alonso Olea, Manuel y [Nombre1] , María Emilia (2004). Derecho del Trabajo, vigésimo segunda edición, Civitas Ediciones, Madrid, España, pp 781). Es a ese nivel de la jerarquía normativa, donde están contemplados los principios reguladores, vigentes en las relaciones de trabajo (artículos 56 al 74 de la Constitución Política) y los derechos fundamentales que han cobrado cada vez mayor relevancia dentro de esta rama y han contribuido a lo que la doctrina denomina la “constitucionalización” del derecho laboral. Sobre el tema, la Sala Constitucional ha manifestado:

“Como se indicó, dentro de los componentes característicos del Estado Social de Derecho se encuentra la protección a los trabajadores. Al respecto, el artículo 56 de la Constitución Política estatuye que el derecho al trabajo es un derecho del individuo y una obligación con la sociedad, a la vez que obliga al Estado a impedir que por causa de una ocupación se establezcan condiciones que menoscaben la libertad o la dignidad del hombre o degraden su trabajo a la condición de simple mercancía. Tal deber se apoya definitivamente en principios de solidaridad social, igualdad real y defensa de la dignidad humana, elementos básicos del orden constitucional”. (Resolución n° 13205 de las 15:13 horas del 27 de setiembre de 2005).

De ahí que la celebración de un contrato laboral no podría implicar que el trabajador se vea desposeído de una serie de derechos y principios que le son tutelados por la Carta Magna cuales son la dignidad humana y el derecho al trabajo. Ese reconocimiento de los derechos fundamentales deriva de la eficacia horizontal que les caracteriza, en el sentido de que estos son de aplicación no solo frente a los poderes públicos sino también son aplicables a las relaciones entre particulares. En materia laboral, si bien es cierto, el empleador goza de un poder directivo que le permite ciertas alteraciones en el régimen de la prestación de los servicios a fin de dirigir, coordinar y fiscalizar la empresa, el mismo ha de ser ejercido dentro de los parámetros fijados por el ordenamiento objetivo y sin desnaturalizar los fines perseguidos al reconocerla. Lo anterior ha sido ampliamente reconocido por la doctrina: “Pero, además, y sobre todo, los señalados poderes empresariales, por más que tengan un fundamento constitucional, estarán sometidos a los naturales límites que se derivan de los derechos fundamentales de los trabajadores. Como ha señalado Valdés, el régimen de libertades, derechos y principios constitucionales “lleva ineluctablemente asociado un sistema de límites a los poderes empresariales, de entre los cuales la primacía indiscutible la ocupan los derechos fundamentales”. ([Nombre2] , (1992). Despido y derechos fundamentales, primera edición, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, España, pp.42 ). En consecuencia, ese poder directivo ha de ser utilizado para la consecución de intereses legítimos, porque es ahí en donde radica su razón de ser y su funcionalidad. Precisamente, para garantizar aspectos como esos, el título preliminar del Código Civil –que es derecho común de todo el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense– contiene reglas fundamentales de la labor interpretativa que constituyen un punto de conexión de la legislación vigente con la moral social imperante y cuyo propósito no es otro que la superación del legalismo. Así, en virtud de su artículo 21 "Los derechos deberán ejercitarse conforme con las exigencias de la buena fe". El ordinal 20 indica que “Los actos realizados al amparo del texto de una norma, que persigan un resultado prohibido por el ordenamiento jurídico; o contrario a él, se considerarán ejecutados en fraude de la ley y no impedirán la debida aplicación de la norma que se hubiere tratado de eludir”. Por último, la primera parte del 22 instituye que: "La ley no ampara el abuso del derecho o el ejercicio antisocial de éste (sic)". De esos preceptos deriva que los derechos subjetivos y las potestades privadas, aparte de sus expresos límites constitucionales y legales, estén circunscritos por barreras morales y sociales. (ver los votos números 177, de las 8:10 horas, del 20 de agosto de 1993; 141, de las 16 horas, del 4 de julio de 1997; 52, de las 11:50 horas, del 13 de febrero de 1998; 197, de las 15:50 horas, del 15 de julio de 1999; 2003-78, de las 8:50 horas, del 20 de febrero de 2003 y 2008-93, de las 10:20 horas, del 8 de febrero de 2008). En el caso que nos ocupa existió una modificación sustancial del puesto de la actora pues las funciones que venía realizando eran propias de una oficina de contabilidad y las que se le asignaron son actividades del área de servicio al público específicamente ejerciendo de tiquetera y atendiendo la soda lo cual equivale a un descenso de categoría –aunque se le haya mantenido el salario-, lesionándose de ese modo su dignidad, pues aunque no contaba con un título que la acreditara como auxiliar de contabilidad, esa situación no fue óbice para que se le mantuviera por varios años desempeñando dicho cargo. Además es evidente que dicha modificación fue abusiva debido a que se trasladó a la actora de una oficina a un barco donde las condiciones para trabajar son completamente distintas. La asociación demandada estaba obligada a actuar de buena fe y de manera razonable cuando de modificar esa situación se tratase y, sobre todo, tenía vedado disponer la modificación de las condiciones laborales de la actora de manera unilateral y sorpresiva, sin individualizar el interés superior o la necesidad que la justificaba, explicitársela a su contraparte, darle la oportunidad de renegociar la relación laboral y, en su caso, asumir las ineludibles consecuencias económicas de su decisión. (Ver en este sentido el voto n° 228 de las 9:20 horas del 20 de marzo de 2009 de esta Cámara). Por todo lo expuesto y en virtud del menoscabo moral sufrido por la actora, esta Sala considera que el hecho de que surgiera una vacante en un puesto no obligaba a la trabajadora a aceptar, en aras de la buena fe y la lealtad que deben reinar en las relaciones laborales, un descenso de categoría. Por ese motivo al haber incurrido la accionada en un ius variandi abusivo resulta procedente la pretensión de la actora tendiente a su reubicación en el puesto que desempeñaba, a saber, como auxiliar de contabilidad, lo anterior al amparo del artículo 41 de la Constitución Política que reza “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes”. Lleva razón el recurrente cuando indica que brindarle a la actora, como único remedio, la posibilidad de dar por roto el contrato con responsabilidad patronal atenta contra los principios rectores del derecho laboral, toda vez que dicha opción equivaldría más bien a una sanción. En efecto de los autos se desprende que la actora labora para la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Paquera desde 1999, es decir goza de cierta estabilidad laboral. Obligarla a renunciar vulnera su derecho al trabajo pues aunque en ese caso sería acreedora de las prestaciones laborales respectivas no tendría garantía de encontrar otra fuente de trabajo lo cual sería endilgarle un riesgo que no le corresponde.”