Independent interruption of civil claim despite expired criminal statute of limitationsAutonomía de la interrupción de la acción civil resarcitoria frente a la prescripción penal

I.A violation of Articles 632 and 871 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) is alleged, given that civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime (cuasidelito) prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they originate. It indicates that if the criminal action was deemed prescribed, the civil action should also have been deemed prescribed. In the second ground of the appeal, erroneous application of Art. 96 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) is claimed, which was used in the judgment to impose civil liability, despite the criminal action having been deemed prescribed, since said article does not include the prescription of the criminal action. Both grounds are resolved jointly, being declared without merit. The Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación), in vote 492-98 of July 13, 1998, decided to uphold the civil judgment, despite considering that the matter had prescribed criminally. It was stated in that decision: "III.- This resolution does not contravene what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) through Vote 5029-93 at 2:36 p.m. on October thirteenth, nineteen ninety-three, which stated: 'But whatever the prescription period established by law may be, in the case of criminal conduct, it is logical that the civil actions derived therefrom, being merely private and, therefore, secondary in relation to the primary public interest embedded in the criminal action, should suffer the same fate as the latter regarding prescription. The contrary would imply that the criminal act could be invoked and judicially proven in a civil venue, with a view to compensation for damages, even though the penalty cannot be imposed because the criminal action is prescribed, which is illogical.' The resolution of the Constitutional Chamber analyzes the consultation made by the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal), which questioned the constitutionality of article 871 of the Civil Code, which establishes that civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they originate, for establishing (sic) for cases of crimes a shorter prescription period than that indicated by the general norm of the Civil Code, of ten years. The Constitutional Chamber referred in its decision to that sole aspect, and considered that article 871 of the Civil Code is not unconstitutional. Judgment 5029-93 does not examine the matter of whether such prescription of the civil aspect would be declared or not ex officio (de oficio), since that was not the object of the consultation. Furthermore, article 96, second paragraph of the Penal Code clearly establishes: 'the extinction of the criminal action and of the penalty shall have no effect with respect to the obligation to repair the damage caused, nor shall it prevent the confiscation (decomiso) of the instruments of the crime.' For its part, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código de Procedimientos Penales), article 11 indicates, referring to the civil action for damages (acción resarcitoria): 'nor shall the subsequent extinction of the criminal claim prevent the Cassation Chamber from deciding on the civil action.' Having analyzed all the foregoing regulations, and the resolution of the Constitutional Chamber, harmoniously, it is concluded that what prescribes together with the crime is the possibility of bringing a civil action within the criminal process, but once both actions are underway, each shall be governed by its own particular norms, regarding the declaration of prescription. IV.- It is added to the foregoing that, independently of the fact that prescription was not invoked in relation to the civil action in the appeal filed, but only concerning the criminal one, it must be noted that, consistent with what was indicated in the preceding recital (considerando), the civil action is interrupted independently of the criminal action. It must be taken into account, as this Court has previously stated (for example: vote 481-F-98), that civil liability is not a consequence of the punishable act, but rather of the damage, attributable by a basis of imputation (título de imputación) to the person civilly liable. It is established in the civil legislation that negative prescription is interrupted not only by any judicial action (gestión judicial), but also by extrajudicial actions (gestiones extrajudiciales) (article 879 of the Civil Code). Thus, if a civil prescription can even be interrupted by an extrajudicial action, it cannot depend on the causes for interruption of the prescription of the criminal action, such that it is only interrupted when one of those occurs. It should be noted that the criminal procedural legislation of 1973 even establishes the possibility for the civil party (parte civil) to go to the civil courts to present their claim and not to the criminal ones (see: [Name1]. Annotated Code of Criminal Procedure (Código de Procedimientos Penales Anotado). San José, Juricentro, 1991, pp. 54-55), for which it is clear that in such a case, the prescription of the civil action could not be made to depend on the grounds for interruption of the criminal action. If that is so in such a case, there is no reason to consider that even though the civil claimant (actor civil) has resorted to the criminal venue by presenting the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria), a different solution should be reached and consider that the grounds for interruption of the civil action provided for in the civil legislation do not operate. It follows that the presentation of the petition to be constituted as a civil party (instancia de constitución en acción civil) must be considered a judicial action aimed at collection and, consequently, an interruptor of the prescription. The foregoing in accordance with Art. 879 of the Civil Code and 296 subsection a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código de Procedimientos Civiles), which refers to the summons (emplazamiento), that is, the notification to the debtor of the claim, as an interruptor of the prescription. It should be highlighted that by resolution of November 22, 1995, the civil action was granted leave to proceed, giving a period of three days to the civil defendant (parte demandada civil) to respond in relation to it, having been notified on January 26, 1996, that is, when two years had not yet elapsed since the occurrence of the accident (see folio 21 vto.), therefore, civil prescription has not occurred. All of the foregoing, as stated in the preceding recital, is consistent with what is indicated by Articles 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 and 96 of the Penal Code, which are even subsequent to the same article 871 of the Civil Code, such that the latter must be interpreted in harmony with the cited subsequent norms, as indicated above (see in that regard: Ulises Zúñiga Morales. Penal Code (Código Penal). San José, Investigaciones Jurídicas, 1998, who even goes so far as to maintain that Article 96 of the Penal Code implicitly repealed, as a later special law, article 871 of the Civil Code)." See also vote 54-F-99 of February 12, 1999, ordered by the Court of Cassation, which upheld the civil judgment, despite having decreed the prescription of the criminal action, on the argument that civil prescription is not declarable ex officio (de oficio), to which vote 492-F-98 also referred. The First Chamber of the Supreme Court (Sala Primera de la Corte), by vote 18-F-96 of February 21, 1996, referred to the interruption of civil prescription, making it independent of the civil action. Indeed, it involved a claim against a third-party civil defendant (tercero demandado civil), that is, a subject who would have civil liability due to their relationship with the accused (imputado), but who was not sued civilly in the criminal process. It was considered that, therefore, the interruption of the civil action with respect to that third party had not occurred. It was stated in that decision: "II.- It must be borne in mind that the rule is that the prescription period to demand extracontractual civil liability arising from a crime or quasi-crime is that of the crime or quasi-crime that generates said liability (article 871 of the Civil Code). However, article 873 of the Civil Code provides that: 'The actions referred to in articles 869, 870 and 871, if after the obligation becomes enforceable a document is granted or a judicial judgment falls, shall not prescribe in the terms previously expressed, but in the common term which shall begin to run from the maturity of the document or from the day of the enforceable judgment (sentencia ejecutoria).' To harmonize this provision with that of the cited article 871, it must be interpreted that when a judgment is rendered in the proceedings followed for the crime or quasi-crime that generates civil liability, the prescription established by said norm is interrupted, replacing it with the ten-year prescription (prescripción decenal), counted from the day of the final judgment (sentencia firme). But, for this to operate, it is clear that it is essential that in the respective criminal process the corresponding civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) has been brought against all potential civilly liable parties, since for the judgment to have an effect, one must have been a party and have been able to exercise the right of defense, as, otherwise, there can be no material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). On the other hand, it is evident that the mere act of filing a criminal complaint (denuncia penal) does not reveal the unequivocal will of the claimant (actor) to demand payment of the damages relating to the corresponding crime, so it cannot be said that this is sufficient to interrupt the prescription of the civil debt. On the other hand,. as in the present case, in the criminal proceeding no action whatsoever was brought against Almacén La Granja S.A., with respect to it there can be no material res judicata, since according to article 163 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil): 'For a final judgment to produce material res judicata in relation to another proceeding, it will be necessary that in both cases the parties, the object, and the cause be the same.' It must be borne in mind that, if the subject whose liability is intended to be enforced has not been brought to trial, it could hardly be inferred that the prescription of the corresponding obligation has been interrupted with respect to them, since they would thereby be affected by a proceeding in which they have not been a party and in which they have not exercised their right of defense." Said decision implies that even applying Art. 871 of the Civil Code regarding the prescription periods, the civil action can be interrupted differently from the criminal action. In a similar sense to the First Chamber of the Supreme Court, the Second Civil Court of San José, Second Section (Tribunal Segundo Civil de San José, Sección Segunda), ruled in judgment No. 48 at nine hours ten minutes on February 6, 2001.

II.It is ultimately held that although the prescription periods of the criminal action and the civil action are the same, according to what was ordered by the Constitutional Chamber, the grounds for interruption of the civil action differ from the grounds for interruption of the criminal action. Therefore, the arguments given in vote 492-98 of the Court of Cassation are valid. It must be recognized that said vote was issued based on the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, but it is clear that the reasoning provided therein is also applicable to the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) of 1996. Indeed, Art. 40 thereof establishes the possibility that the civil action be declared with merit, notwithstanding that an acquittal judgment (sentencia absolutoria) is ordered. On the other hand, Art. 41 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for the possibility that the civil claimant (actor civil) decides not to resort to the criminal venue to present their claim, being able to file it in the civil venue, it being absolutely absurd that what might be resolved in the criminal process in such a case could harm them civilly, which makes it clear that Art. 871 of the Civil Code cannot lead to an automatic relationship between criminal prescription and civil prescription, both being capable of being interrupted independently. It must be borne in mind, as stated in vote 492-98, that even extrajudicial claims (reclamos extrajudiciales) have the consequence of interrupting the civil prescription (Art. 879 of the Civil Code), so that to interrupt said prescription, the civil claimant does not even have to provoke the initiation of a criminal process and present the civil action within it, or else present a claim before the civil jurisdiction. It could even be, therefore, that the criminal process was never initiated, but that the extrajudicial claim (or else the filing of the civil claim) would have interrupted the prescription, such that it could not later be argued that, based on Art. 871 of the Civil Code, because the criminal process was not initiated within the prescription period of the criminal action, the civil action would also have prescribed.

III.The act for which the accused was civilly condemned consists of the following, according to the statement of proven facts (relación de hechos probados): "In April 1997, a date on which the accused was still acting as administrator of Empresas Brody Ltda., being in charge of the handling, administration, and care of the property owned by Empresas Brody Limitada, the accused, as owner of the company Constructora La Mar S. A., charged under invoice number 341 to Empresas Brody Limitada the sum of one hundred seven thousand one hundred colones for the concept of purchase and hauling of seventy meters of tobacal ballast (lastre tobacal), a purchase made from Constructora La Mar S. A., ballast that never entered the hotel, in addition to the fact that it was no longer needed because the hotel had been completed in mid-1996, thus it constitutes a supposed expense, which the accused caused Empresas Brody to incur, for the benefit of one of his companies" (folios 523-524). The prescription period for the crime of fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) is three years; the prescription began to run from the commission of the crime, running in principle, unless there was a cause for interruption, until April 2000. This case was initiated on October 28, 1998, whereby the criminal action was interrupted with that, beginning to run anew, but for half of the original period, that is, for one year and six months, which, unless a new ground for interruption of the criminal action occurred, would prescribe on April 28, 2000. We do not proceed here to analyze whether any other ground for interruption of the criminal prescription occurred, as it is not the object of the appeal and is irrelevant in relation to this appeal.

IV.It is not important to analyze whether the reduction of the criminal prescription period to half also produced a reduction in the prescription period of the civil action. Nor whether, when an interruption of the prescription of the criminal action occurs, an interruption of the prescription of the civil action is also produced. The foregoing because, regardless of the criterion followed here, the civil action would not have prescribed, given that grounds for its interruption according to civil legislation occurred. Indeed, the act having been committed in April 1997 and the criminal process having been initiated on October 28, 1998, the petition to be constituted as a civil party (instancia de constitución), which interrupts the prescription (Art. 296 subsection a) of the Civil Procedure Code), was notified on September 8, 1999 (folio 101). If one were to start from a three-year period from April 1997, it had not elapsed yet; equally, if one were to start from a period of one year and six months from the initiation of the proceeding, it would not have elapsed yet. Any other claim presented within the case file by the civil claimant (parte actora civil) interrupts the prescription (Art. 879 of the Civil Code), for example, the appearance at the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar) by the civil claimant on March 27, 2000 (folio 146), the same as on March 31 of that year (folio 148-154). Similarly, the intervention of the civil claimant in the oral trial (juicio oral) from August 7, 2000, through September 1 of that year interrupted the prescription (folios 295-324). For all the foregoing reasons, Arts. 632, 871 of the Civil Code and 96 of the Penal Code cannot be deemed violated, and the first two grounds of the appeal must be declared without merit."

"I. An alleged violation of Articles 632 and 871 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) is claimed, since the civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime (cuasidelito) prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise. It indicates that if the criminal action was deemed prescribed, the civil action should also have been deemed prescribed. In the second ground of the appeal, an erroneous application of Art. 96 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) is claimed, used in the judgment to impose civil liability, notwithstanding that the criminal action was deemed prescribed, since said article does not include the prescription of the criminal action. <span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">Both grounds are resolved jointly, declaring them without merit</span>. The Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación), in vote 492-98 of July 13, 1998, resolved to uphold the civil judgment, despite considering that the matter had prescribed criminally. It was stated in that ruling \"III.- This resolution does not contravene what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) through Vote 5029-93 at 14:36 hours on October thirteenth, nineteen ninety-three, which stated: 'But whatever the term of prescription established by law, in the case of criminal conduct, it is logical that the civil actions derived therefrom, being merely private and, therefore, secondary in relation to the principal public interest immersed in the criminal action, should suffer the same fate as the latter regarding prescription. The contrary would imply that the criminal fact could be invoked and judicially proven in a civil venue, with a view to compensation for damages, even when the penalty cannot be imposed because the criminal action is prescribed, which is illogical.' The resolution of the Constitutional Chamber analyzes the consultation made by the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal), which questioned the constitutionality of article 871 of the Civil Code, which establishes that civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise, by establishing (sic) for cases of crimes a shorter prescription period than that indicated by the general rule of the Civil Code, of ten years. The Constitutional Chamber referred in its ruling to that single aspect, and considered that article 871 of the Civil Code is not unconstitutional. Judgment 5029-93 does not examine the matter of whether such prescription of the civil aspect should be declared ex officio or not, since it was not the subject of the consultation. Furthermore, article 96, second paragraph, of the Penal Code clearly establishes: 'the extinction of the criminal action and of the penalty shall not produce any effect with respect to the obligation to repair the damage caused, nor shall it prevent the confiscation (decomiso) of the instruments of the crime.' For its part, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código de Procedimientos Penales), article 11, states, referring to the civil action for damages (acción resarcitoria): 'nor shall the subsequent extinction of the criminal claim prevent the Cassation Chamber from deciding on the civil action.' Having analyzed all the preceding regulations, and the resolution of the Constitutional Chamber, harmoniously, it is concluded that what prescribes together with the crime is the possibility of suing civilly within the criminal process, but once both actions are underway, each shall be governed by its particular rules, with respect to the declaration of prescription.<span>&#xa0;</span><span> IV.- Added to the above, is that regardless of the fact that prescription was not invoked in relation to the civil action in the filed appeal, but only concerning the criminal one, it must be noted that, consistent with what was indicated in the preceding recital (considerando), the civil action is interrupted independently of the criminal action. It should be taken into account, as this Court has previously stated (for example: vote 481-F-98), that civil liability is not a consequence of the punishable act, but rather of the damage, attributable by a title of imputation to the civilly responsible party. It is established in civil legislation that negative prescription is interrupted not only by any judicial action, but also by extrajudicial actions (article 879 of the Civil Code). Thus, if even by an extrajudicial action civil prescription can be interrupted, it cannot depend on the causes of interruption of the prescription of the criminal action, such that it is only interrupted when one of these occurs. Note that the criminal procedural legislation of 1973 even establishes the possibility for the civil party to go to the civil venue to present its claim and not to the criminal one (see: [Nombre1]. Código de Procedimientos Penales Anotado. San José, Juricentro, 1991, pp. 54-55), so it is clear that in such a case, the prescription of the civil action could not be made to depend on the causes of interruption of the criminal action. If this is so in such a case, there is no reason to consider that even though the civil plaintiff (actor civil) has resorted to the criminal venue filing the civil action for damages, a different solution must be reached and consider that the causes of interruption of the civil action provided for in civil legislation do not apply. Thus, the filing of the petition for joinder (instancia de constitución) in the civil action must be considered as a judicial action aimed at collection and consequently as interrupting prescription. The foregoing in accordance with Art. 879 of the Civil Code and 296 subsection a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código de Procedimientos Civiles), which refers to the summons (emplazamiento), i.e., the notification to the debtor of the lawsuit, as an interrupter of prescription. It must be highlighted that by resolution of November 22, 1995, the civil action was processed, giving the civil defendant a period of three days to respond in relation thereto, having been notified on January 26, 1996, i.e., when two years had not elapsed since the occurrence of the accident (see folio 21 vto.,), so civil prescription has not operated. All the foregoing, as stated in the preceding recital, is consistent with what is indicated by Articles 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 and 96 of the Penal Code, which are even subsequent to article 871 of the Civil Code itself, so the latter must be interpreted in harmony with the cited subsequent norms, as indicated above (see in this regard: Ulises Zúñiga Morales. Código Penal. San José, Investigaciones Jurídicas, 1998, who even goes so far as to maintain that Article 96 of the Penal Code implicitly repealed, as a later special law, article 871 of the Civil Code).\" See also vote 54-F-99 of February 12, 1999, ordered by the Court of Cassation, which upheld the civil judgment, notwithstanding that it decreed the prescription of the criminal action, based on the argument that civil prescription is not declarable ex officio, to which vote 492-F-98 also referred. The First Chamber of the Supreme Court (Sala Primera de la Corte), by vote 18-F-96 of February 21, 1996, referred to the interruption of civil prescription, making it independent from the civil action. Indeed, it involved a claim against a third-party civil defendant, i.e., a subject who would have civil liability due to their relationship with the accused, but who was not civilly sued in the criminal process. It was considered that, therefore, the interruption of the civil action had not operated with respect to that third party. It was stated in said ruling \"II.- It must be borne in mind that the rule is that the prescription period for demanding extra-contractual civil liability arising from a crime or quasi-crime is that of the crime or quasi-crime that generates said liability (article 871 of the Civil Code). Nevertheless, article 873 of the Civil Code provides that: 'The actions referred to in articles 869, 870 and 871, if after the obligation becomes enforceable a document is granted or a judicial judgment is issued, shall not prescribe in the terms previously expressed, but rather in the common term which shall begin to run from the maturity of the document or from the day of the final judgment.' To harmonize this provision with that of the cited article 871, it must be interpreted that when a judgment is issued in the process followed for the crime or quasi-crime that generates civil liability, the prescription established by said norm is interrupted, replacing it with the ten-year prescription, counted from the day of the final judgment. But, for this to operate, it is clear that it is indispensable that in the respective criminal process, the corresponding civil action for damages was exercised against all the potentially civilly obligated parties, since for the judgment to have an effect, one must have been a party and have been able to exercise the right of defense, because, otherwise, there can be no material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). On the other hand, it is evident that the mere act of filing the criminal complaint does not reveal the unequivocal intention of the plaintiff to demand payment of the damages and losses relating to the corresponding crime, so it cannot be said that this is enough to interrupt the prescription of the civil debt. On the other hand, as in the present case, no action was exercised in the criminal case against Almacén La Granja S.A., with respect to it, there can be no material res judicata, since according to article 163 of the Code of Civil Procedure: 'For a final judgment to produce material res judicata in relation to another process, it will be necessary that in both cases the parties, the object, and the cause are the same.' Bear in mind that, if the subject whose liability is intended to be enforced has not been brought to trial, one could hardly infer that with respect to them the prescription of the corresponding obligation has been interrupted, since thereby they would be affected by a process of which they have not formed part and in which they have not exercised their right of defense.\" Said ruling implies that even applying Art. 871 of the Civil Code regarding the prescription periods, the civil action can be interrupted differently from the criminal action. Similar to the First Chamber of the Supreme Court, the Second Civil Court of San José (Tribunal Segundo Civil de San José), Second Section (Sección Segunda), ruled in judgment No. 48 of nine hours ten minutes of February 6, 2001.<span>&#xa0;</span><span> II. It is held definitively that although the prescription periods for the criminal action and the civil action are the same, according to the provisions of the Constitutional Chamber, the causes of interruption of the civil action are different from the causes of interruption of the criminal action. The arguments given in vote 492-98 of the Court of Cassation are therefore valid. It must be recognized that that vote was issued based on the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, but it is clear that the arguments given therein are also applicable to the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) of 1996. Indeed, Art. 40 thereof establishes the possibility that the civil action be declared with merit, notwithstanding that an acquittal judgment is issued. On the other hand, Art. 41 of the Criminal Procedure Code foresees the possibility that the civil plaintiff decides not to resort to the criminal venue to file their claim, being able to file it in the civil venue, it being absolutely absurd that what can be resolved in the criminal process in such a case could harm them civilly, which makes it clear that Art. 871 of the Civil Code cannot lead to an automatic relationship between criminal prescription and civil prescription, both being able to be interrupted independently. Bear in mind, as stated in vote 492-98, that even extrajudicial claims have the consequence of interrupting civil prescription (Art. 879 of the Civil Code), so to interrupt said prescription the civil plaintiff does not even have to provoke the initiation of a criminal process and file the civil action within it, or else file a lawsuit before the civil jurisdiction. It could even be, therefore, that the criminal process was never initiated, but that the extrajudicial claim (or the filing of the civil lawsuit) would have interrupted the prescription, so that it could not later be argued that based on Art. 871 of the Civil Code, because the criminal process was not initiated within the prescription period of the criminal action, the civil action would also prescribe.</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> III. The fact for which the accused was civilly condemned consists of the following, according to the statement of proven facts: \"In April 1997, a date on which the accused still served as administrator of Empresas Brody Ltda., having in his charge the handling, administration, and care of the property owned by empresas Brody Limitada, the accused, as owner of the company Constructora La Mar S. A., charges under invoice number 341 to empresas Brody Limitada the sum of one hundred seven thousand one hundred colones for the purchase and hauling of seventy meters of tobacal ballast (lastre tobacal), a purchase he made from Constructora La Mar S. A., ballast that never entered the hotel, besides that it was no longer needed because the hotel had been finished in mid-1996, thus it concerns a supposed expense, which the accused caused empresas Brody to incur, in favor of one of his companies\" (folios 523-524). The prescription period for the crime of fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) is three years; the prescription began to run from the commission of the crime, running in principle, barring a cause of interruption, until April 2000. The present case was initiated on October 28, 1998, so the criminal action was interrupted thereby, beginning to run again, but for half the original period, that is, for one year and six months, which, unless a new cause for interruption of the criminal action operated, would prescribe on April 28, 2000. It is not necessary to analyze here whether any other cause for interruption of criminal prescription operated, as it is not the subject of the appeal and is irrelevant in relation to this appeal.</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> IV. It is not important to analyze whether the reduction of the period to half for criminal prescription also produced a reduction of the prescription period for the civil action. Nor whether when an interruption of the prescription of the criminal action occurs, an interruption of the prescription of the civil action also occurs. The foregoing because, regardless of the criterion followed here, the civil action would not have prescribed, as causes for its interruption occurred in accordance with civil legislation. Indeed, the act having been committed in April 1997 and the criminal process having been initiated on October 28, 1998, the petition for joinder, which interrupts prescription (Art. 296 subsection a) of the Code of Civil Procedure), was notified on September 8, 1999 (folio 101). If one started from a period of three years from April 1997, it had not elapsed; likewise, if one started from a period of one year and six months from the start of the proceeding, it would not have elapsed. Any other claim filed within the case file by the civil plaintiff interrupts the prescription (Art. 879 of the Civil Code), for example, the appearance at the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar) by the civil plaintiff, on March 27, 2000 (folio 146), as well as on March 31 of that year (folio 148-154). Likewise, the intervention of the civil plaintiff in the oral trial (juicio oral) from August 7, 2000, to September 1 of that year interrupted the prescription (folios 295-324). For all the foregoing, it cannot be considered that Arts. 632, 871 of the Civil Code and 96 of the Penal Code were violated, and the first two grounds of the appeal must be declared without merit.\""

"I. Se alega violación de los Artículos 632 y 871 del Código Civil, ya que las acciones civiles del delito o cuasidelito prescriben junto con el delito o cuasidelito de que proceden. Indica que si se tuvo por prescrita la acción penal debió tenerse también por prescrita la acción civil. En el segundo motivo del recurso se reclama errónea aplicación del Art. 96 del Código Penal, utilizado en la sentencia para condenar civilmente, no obstante que se tuvo por prescrita la acción penal, ya que dicho artículo no incluye la prescripción de la acción penal. Se resuelven ambos motivos en forma conjunta, declarándolos sin lugar. El Tribunal de Casación en voto 492-98 del 13 de julio de 1998 resolvió mantener la condenatoria civil, ello a pesar de considerar que el asunto prescribió penalmente. Se dijo en ese fallo "III.- La presente resolución no contraviene lo resuelto por la Sala Constitucional mediante Voto 5029-93 de 14.36 horas del trece de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y tres que señaló: "Pero cualquiera que sea el término de la prescripción que establezca la ley, en el caso de las conductas delictivas lo lógico es que las acciones civiles de ellas derivadas, por ser meramente privadas y, por ende, secundarias en relación con el interés público principal inmerso en la acción penal, corran la misma suerte que ésta en lo que a la prescripción se refiere. Lo contrario implicaría que el hecho penal pueda ser invocado y probado judicialmente en sede civil, con miras al resarcimiento de los daños y perjuicios, aun cuando la pena no pueda ser impuesta por encontrarse prescrita la acción penal, lo que resulta ilógico". La resolución de la Sala Constitucional analiza la consulta realizada por la Sala de Casación Penal, en la que se cuestiona la constitucionalidad del artículo 871 del Código Civil, que establecen que las acciones civiles procedentes de delito o cuasidelito se prescriben junto con el delito o cuasidelito de que proceden, por establer (sic) para casos de delitos un plazo menor de prescripción que el que señala la norma general del Código Civil, de diez años. La Sala Constitucional se refirió en su fallo a ese único aspecto, y consideró que el artículo 871 del Código Civil, no resulta inconstitucional. No examina la sentencia 5029-93 lo referente a si tal prescripción del aspecto civil se dictara o no de oficio, puesto que no fue objeto de la consulta. Además, el artículo 96 párrafo segundo del Código Penal establece con claridad: "la extinción de la acción penal y de la pena no producirá efecto con respecto a la obligación de reparar el daño causado, ni impedirá el decomiso de los instrumentos del delito". Por su parte, el Código de Procedimientos Penales, el artículo 11 señala, refiriéndose a la acción resarcitoria: "ni la ulterior extinción de la pretensión penal impedirá que la Sala de Casación decida sobre la acción civil". Analizada toda la normativa anterior, y la resolución de la Sala Constitucional, en forma armónica, se concluye que lo que prescribe junto con el delito es la posibilidad de accionar civilmente dentro del proceso penal, pero una vez en curso ambas acciones, cada una se regirá por sus normas particulares, en lo que se refiere, a la declaratoria de prescripción. IV.- Se agrega a lo anterior, que independientemente de que la prescripción no fue invocada en relación con la acción civil en el recurso interpuesto, sino solamente en lo concerniente a la penal, debe anotarse que, en coherencia con lo que se indicó en el considerando anterior, la acción civil se interrumpe de manera independiente a la acción penal. Téngase en cuenta, tal y como este Tribunal lo ha dicho con anterioridad (por ejemplo: voto 481-F-98), que la responsabilidad civil no es una consecuencia del hecho punible, sino más bien del daño, atribuible por un título de imputación al responsable civil. Se establece en la legislación civil que la prescripción negativa se interrumpe no solamente por cualquier gestión judicial, sino por las gestiones extrajudiciales (artículo 879 del Código Civil). Resulta así, si incluso que por una gestión extrajudicial puede interrumpirse la prescripción civil, la misma no puede depender de las causas de interrupción de la prescripción de la acción penal, de modo que solamente se interrumpa cuando ocurra una de éstas. Nótese que la legislación procesal penal de 1973 incluso establece la posibilidad de que la parte civil acuda a la vía civil a presentar su reclamo y no a la penal (véase: [Nombre1]. Código de Procedimientos Penales Anotado. San José, Juricentro, 1991, pp. 54-55), por lo que es claro que en tal supuesto no podría hacerse depender la prescripción de la acción civil de las causales de interrupción de la acción penal. Si ello es así en tal supuesto, no hay ninguna razón para estimar que aunque se haya acudido por el actor civil a la vía penal presentando la acción civil resarcitoria se deba llegar a una solución diversa y estimar que no operan las causales de interrupción de la acción civil previstas en la legislación civil. Resulta así que la presentación de la instancia de constitución en acción civil debe ser considerada como una gestión judicial tendiente al cobro y por consiguiente interruptora de la prescripción. Lo anterior de conformidad con el Art. 879 del Código Civil y el 296 inciso a) del Código de Procedimientos Civiles, que se refiere al emplazamiento, sea la notificación al deudor de la demanda, como interruptora de la prescripción. Debe resaltarse que por resolución del 22 de noviembre de 1995, se le dio curso a la acción civil dándosele un plazo de tres días a la parte demandada civil para que se manifestara en relación con la misma, habiéndosele notificado el 26 de enero de 1996, sea cuando no habían transcurrido dos años desde el acaecimiento del accidente (véase folio 21 vto.,), por lo que no ha operado la prescripción civil. Todo lo anterior, como se dijo en el considerando anterior, es coherente con lo indicado por los Artículos 11 del Código de Procedimientos Penales de 1973 y 96 del Código Penal, los que incluso son posteriores al mismo artículo 871 del Código Civil, de modo que éste debe ser interpretado en armonía con las citadas normas posteriores, tal y como se indicó arriba (véase al respecto: Ulises Zúñiga Morales. Código Penal. San José, Investigaciones Jurídicas, 1998, quien llega incluso a sostener que el Artículo 96 del Código Penal derogó implícitamente, como ley especial posterior, al artículo 871 del Código Civil)". Véase también el voto 54-F-99 del 12 de febrero de 1999, ordenado por el Tribunal de Casación, que mantuvo la condenatoria civil, no obstante que decretó la prescripción de la acción penal, ello con el argumento de que la prescripción civil no es declarable de oficio, al que hizo referencia también el voto 492-F-98. La Sala Primera de la Corte por voto 18-F-96 del 21 de febrero de 1996 hizo referencia a la interrupción de la prescripción civil, independizándola de la acción civil. En efecto se trataba de un reclamo en contra de un tercero demandado civil, o sea de un sujeto que tendría responsabilidad civil por su relación con el imputado, pero que no fue demandado civilmente en el proceso penal. Se estimó que por ello no había operado la interrupción de la acción civil con respecto a ese tercero. Se dijo en dicho fallo "II.- Debe tenerse presente que la regla es que el plazo de prescripción para exigir la responsabilidad civil extracontractual procedente de un delito o cuasidelito, es el del delito o cuasidelito que genera dicha responsabilidad (artículo 871 del Código Civil). Con todo, el artículo 873 del Código Civil dispone que: "Las acciones a que se refieren los artículos 869, 870 y 871, si después de ser exigible la obligación se otorgare documento o recayere sentencia judicial, no se prescribirán en los términos antes expresados, sino en el término común que se comenzará a contar desde el vencimiento del documento o desde el día de la sentencia ejecutoria.". Para armonizar esta disposición con la del artículo 871 citado, debe interpretarse que cuando recae sentencia en el proceso seguido por el delito o cuasidelito que genera la responsabilidad civil, se interrumpe la prescripción establecida por dicha norma, sustituyéndola por la prescripción decenal, contada a partir del día de la sentencia firme. Pero, para que ello opere, es claro que resulta indispensable que en el proceso penal respectivo se haya ejercido la acción civil resarcitoria correspondiente, contra todos los eventuales obligados civiles, pues para que la sentencia pueda afectar se ha debido ser parte y haberse podido ejercitar el derecho de defensa, ya que, en caso contrario, no puede haber cosa juzgada material. Por otra parte, resulta evidente que el mero hecho de establecer la denuncia penal no revela la voluntad inequívoca del actor de exigir el pago de los daños y perjuicios relativos al delito correspondiente, por lo que no puede decirse que ello baste para interrumpir la prescripción de la deuda civil. Por otra parte,. como en el presente caso, en la causa penal no se ejercitó acción alguna contra Almacén La Granja S.A, a su respecto no puede haber cosa juzgada material, ya que según el artículo 163 del Código Procesal Civil: "Para que la sentencia firme produzca cosa juzgada material en relación con otro proceso, será necesario que en ambos casos sean iguales las partes, el objeto y la causa". Téngase presente que, si no se ha traído a juicio al sujeto cuya responsabilidad se pretende hacer efectiva, mal podría colegirse que a su respecto se ha interrumpido la prescripción de la obligación correspondiente, pues con ello se le estaría afectando con un proceso del que no ha formado parte y en el que no ha ejercido su derecho de defensa". Dicho fallo implica que aun aplicándose el Art. 871 del Código Civil en cuanto a los plazos de la prescripción, la acción civil puede interrumpirse de manera diferente a la acción penal. En sentido similar a la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema se pronunció el Tribunal Segundo Civil de San José, Sección Segunda, en sentencia No. 48 de las nueve horas diez minutos del 6 de febrero del 2001. II. Se tiene en definitiva que aunque los plazos de prescripción de la acción penal y la acción civil son los mismos, ello de acuerdo con lo dispuesto por la Sala Constitucional, las causales de interrupción de la acción civil son diversas a las causales de interrupción de la acción penal. Son valederos por ello los argumentos dados en el voto 492-98 del Tribunal de Casación. Debe reconocerse que ese voto fue dictado con base en el Código de Procedimientos Penales de 1973, pero es claro que las argumentaciones que se dan en el mismo son aplicables también al Código Procesal Penal de 1996. En efecto en el Art. 40 del mismo se establece la posibilidad de que la acción civil sea declarada con lugar, no obstante que se disponga una sentencia absolutoria. Por otro lado, el Art. 41 del Código Procesal Penal prevé la posibilidad de que el actor civil decida no acudir a la vía penal a presentar su reclamo, pudiendo interponerlo en la vía civil, siendo absolutamente absurdo que lo que se pueda resolver en el proceso penal en tal caso lo pueda perjudicar a él civilmente, lo que deja claro que el Art. 871 del Código Civil no puede llevar a una relación automática entre la prescripción penal y la prescripción civil, pudiendo ambas interrumpirse en forma independiente. Téngase en cuenta, como se dijo en el voto 492-98, que incluso los reclamos extrajudiciales tienen como consecuencia la interrupción de la prescripción civil (Art. 879 del Código Civil), por lo que para interrumpir dicha prescripción el actor civil no tiene siquiera que provocar el inicio de un proceso penal y presentar dentro del mismo la acción civil, o bien presentar una demanda ante la jurisdicción civil. Podría ser incluso por ello que el proceso penal nunca se iniciara, pero que el reclamo extrajudicial (o bien la presentación de la demanda civil) habría interrumpido la prescripción, de modo que no podría luego argumentarse que con base en el Art. 871 del Código Civil al no iniciarse el proceso penal en el plazo de prescripción de la acción penal prescribiría también la acción civil. III. El hecho por el que se condenó civilmente al imputado consiste en el siguiente, ello de acuerdo con la relación de hechos probados: "En abril de 1997, fecha para la cual aún el imputado fungía como administrador de Empresas Brody Ltda., teniendo a su cargo el manejo, la administración y el cuido de los bienes propiedad de empresas Brody Limitada, el imputado como dueño de la empresa Constructora La Mar S. A., cobra bajo factura número 341 a empresas Brody Limitada la suma de ciento siete mil cien colones por concepto de compra y acarreo de setenta metros de lastre tobacal, compra que realizó a Constructora La Mar S. A., lastre que nunca ingresó al hotel, además de que el mismo ya no se necesitaba porque el hotel había sido terminado a mediados del año 1996, por lo que se trata de un gasto supuesto, en que el imputado hizo incurrir a empresas Brody, a favor de una de sus empresas" (folios 523-524). El plazo de prescripción del delito de administración fraudulenta es de tres años, la prescripción empezó a correr a partir de la comisión del delito, corriendo en principio salvo causa de interrupción hasta abril del 2000. La presente causa se inició el 28 de octubre de 1998, por lo que la acción penal se interrumpió con ello, empezando a correr de nuevo, pero ello por la mitad del plazo original, es decir por un año y seis meses, que salvo que operase una nueva causal de interrupción de la acción penal prescribiría el 28 de abril del 2000. No se entra aquí a analizar si operó alguna otra causal de interrupción de la prescripción penal por no ser objeto del recurso y ser irrelevante en relación con este recurso. IV. No tiene importancia analizar si la reducción del plazo a la mitad de la prescripción penal produjo también una reducción del plazo de la prescripción de la acción civil. Tampoco si cuando opera una interrupción de la prescripción de la acción penal se produce también una interrupción de la prescripción de la acción civil. Lo anterior ya que independientemente del criterio que se siguiera aquí la acción civil no habría prescrito, ello al haber ocurrido causales de interrupción de la misma de acuerdo con la legislación civil. En efecto habiendo sido el hecho cometido en abril de 1997 y habiéndose iniciado el proceso penal el 28 de octubre de 1998, la instancia de constitución, interruptora de la prescripción (Art. 296 inciso a) del Código Procesal Civil), fue notificada el 8 de setiembre de 1999 (folio 101). Si se partiera de una plazo de tres años a partir de abril de 1997 no había transcurrido el mismo, igualmente si se partiera de un plazo de un año y seis meses a partir del inicio del procedimiento no habría transcurrido el mismo. Cualquier otro reclamo presentado dentro del expediente por la parte actora civil interrumpe la prescripción (Art. 879 del Código Civil), por ejemplo la comparecencia a la audiencia preliminar por la parte actora civil, ello el 27 de marzo del 2000 (folio 146), lo mismo que el 31 de marzo de ese año (folio 148-154). Igualmente la intervención de la parte actora civil en el juicio oral a partir del día 7 de agosto del 2000 hasta el 1 de setiembre de ese año interrumpió la prescripción (folios 295-324). Por todo lo anterior no puede estimarse como violentados los Arts. 632, 871 del Código Civil y 96 del Código Penal, debiendo ser declarados sin lugar los dos primeros motivos del recurso."