Right to unpaid wages of teacher appointed through invalid administrative actDerecho al pago de salarios de docente nombrada mediante acto administrativo inválido

I.Ms. [Name1] claimed unpaid wages for having worked as a teacher at the Limoncito School, from the date of her interim appointment—February 1, 2006—until its effective cancellation, as well as legal interest and costs (folios 6–10). The State’s representative raised the defense of lack of right and justified the absence of the alleged payment on the ground that the plaintiff’s appointment was not perfected, since, as she was duly informed, it was subject to the approval of the General Directorate of Personnel and this was not given because the only position in special education assigned to that educational center had been occupied since the 2005 school year by a qualified educator, Ms. Yanice* Shakira* Cole* Hadgson, with professional group ET, and no other position with an assigned budget code existed. In her view, since an employment relationship with the administration was never constituted and there was never an unjustified dismissal, she cannot invoke Articles 94 and 94 bis of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) as the basis for her claim (folios 26 to 48). In the first-instance judgment (folios 113–121), confirmed by vote No. 137-07-LA, at 11:42 a.m. on November 21, 2007, issued by the Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela (Tribunal del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela) (folios 156–163), it was held that the plaintiff’s termination was due to her pregnancy status and, therefore, the claim was granted, with the consequent award of costs against the State. In this venue, that party alleges an erroneous application of the principle of the primacy of reality (principio de primacía de la realidad), to the detriment of the principle of legality, and the failure to consider documents issued by competent authorities, such as certification UG5-1412-2006, signed by the other head of Unit Five of the General Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública). Furthermore, it denies having litigated in bad faith and asserts that it did not provide proof of its assertions. In its view, there is not a single element that allows one to maintain that the plaintiff was dismissed due to her pregnancy. It therefore requests that the appealed judgment be reversed in all its respects, including the award of costs (folios 171–182).*

II.With the 1949 Political Constitution (Constitución Política), equality in access to public positions, with the consequent guarantee of immovability or stability, was incorporated into the body of fundamental rights (Article 192). In order to make these rights a reality, Article 191 thereof provided that “A civil service statute (estatuto de servicio civil) shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration.” In compliance with those norms, the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) was enacted by Law No. 1581 of May 30, 1953. This legal instrument was supplemented by Law No. 4565 of May 4, 1970, known as the Teaching Career Law (Ley de Carrera Docente), which, as of its effective date, came to constitute the basic regulatory framework for establishing “(...) the requirements for entry into official service, as well as the obligations and rights of the servants.” In this manner, as we indicated in judgments No. 91, at 10:05 a.m. on March 25, 1998, and No. 235, at 10:20 a.m. on August 18, 1999, the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) regulated two different and mutually exclusive types of career: the administrative career (Book I) and the teaching career (Book II). Each one forms a special public employment regime, applicable to two different groups, with specific norms regarding classification, entry, selection, promotions, demotions, advancements, transfers, rights, duties, prohibitions, faults, and sanctions, among others. The first, known as the “Civil Service Regime” (Régimen de Servicio Civil), generally protects those who work in the Executive Branch, with the exceptions set forth in Articles 3, 4, and 5 of said Statute. The second specifically protects employees of the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública) who teach classes; persons who perform technical functions proper to teaching; and those who serve in positions whose performance requires a degree or certificate that accredits them to exercise the teaching function (Article 54). However, it is possible to apply to this latter group some of the rules provided for the former, by virtue of the provisions of Article 180 ibid., whose text is as follows: “Situations not provided for in this Title, relating to the rights and duties of servants, shall be resolved in accordance with what is established, correspondingly, in Title I of this Statute.” Through this avenue, the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and the Civil Code could also be given effect, albeit in a supplementary and exceptional manner (Articles 51 ibid. and 15 of the Labor Code). By Law No. 8555 of October 10, 2006, Title IV—Articles 208 to 232—was added to the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), thus creating another type of career: the artistic career, intended to regulate the relations between the Executive Branch and those who provide it with artistic services or activities on a permanent or habitual basis and in a remunerated form or with the right to economic compensation, by virtue of an appointment by the respective institution or body. Some years before the two legal reforms noted above, the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), No. 2166 of October 9, 1957, was enacted, the fundamental objective of which was to standardize the salary aspect in the Public Sector. In 1978, the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), No. 6227 of May 2 of that year, complemented the regulatory development of the statutory regime by establishing provisions of a general nature regarding the service relationship and by defining, in its Article 111, subsection 1), that “A public servant is the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf and on account of it (sic), as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity.” In the same Article 111 and in Article 112 ibid., the case of officials governed fundamentally by statutory norms was distinguished from those others who would be governed by common labor law, reinforcing for the former the prevailing application of public law norms. This partial review demonstrates the political will expressed by the National Constituent Assembly in the aforementioned Articles 191 and 192 and in the transitory provision to Article 140 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), and by the Legislative Assembly in the implementing regulations, including the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), to differentiate statutory service relationships from private-sector labor relationships; this was enshrined as a general rule in subsection 1) of Article 112 of the last-cited Law, according to which “Administrative law shall be applicable to service relations between the Administration and its public servants.” Consequently, and since we are dealing here with a statutory relationship, the State’s representative is correct in claiming that the principle of legality must prevail in this matter. Neither in this venue nor in the administrative one is it possible to disregard the specific rules derived from it (see Articles 11 and 154 of the Political Constitution, as well as Articles 2 and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Articles 6 and 11 of the cited General Law). This has been reiterated by the Constitutional Chamber and this Chamber’s case law, emphasizing that, in this area, the principles and norms of (private) Labor Law must give way, when appropriate, to the special ones of the public law disciplines—those of Administrative Law, in particular, and Public Law, in general—which may not only be different but even contrary to them (in this regard, it is advisable to consult, among many others, Constitutional Chamber votes No. 1696, at 3:30 p.m. on August 21, 1992; 4788, at 8:48 a.m. on September 30, 1993; 3309, at 3:00 p.m. on July 5, 1994; 6095, at 9:18 a.m. on October 18, 1994; 3125, at 6:24 a.m. on June 14, 1995; 3865, at 10:57 a.m. on July 14, 1995; and 3089, at 3:00 p.m. on May 12, 1998; as well as those of this Chamber, No. 159, at 2:20 p.m. on June 23, 1994; 191, at 10:10 a.m. on September 4; 254, at 9:10 a.m. on August 30, both from 1996; 31, at 3:45 p.m. on February 12, 1997; 91, at 10:05 a.m. on March 25; 236, at 9:50 a.m. on September 18, both from 1998; 235, at 10:20 a.m. on August 18; 258, at 10:00 a.m. on August 31; 299, at 10:40 a.m. on September 29, all three from 1999; 316, at 10:10 a.m. on March 29; 518, at 2:48 p.m. on May 19, both from 2000; 172, at 10:10 a.m. on March 14; 181, at 10:10 a.m. on March 22; 191, at 9:50 a.m. on March 28; 322, at 10:10 a.m. on June 13, all from 2001; 12, at 9:45 a.m. on January 12, 2007; and 258, at 10:30 a.m. on March 28, 2008). In accordance with this principle, set forth in Articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 of the General Law of Public Administration, only those obligations that are authorized by the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale and the system of sources applicable in each specific case, may be considered lawful and effective as obligations chargeable to a public entity or body.*

III.As is evident from the foregoing, the appointment of a person to official service—entry into the teaching career—must be made through a valid and effective administrative act. The legal regime of administrative acts is dealt with by the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), according to which “An administrative act shall be valid if it substantially conforms to the legal system, including as to the motive of the official who issues it.” (Article 128). This substantial conformity occurs when it meets the material requirements—those that adapt the administrative conduct to the need it satisfies and determine what the administration commands, authorizes, or prohibits; that is, the motive, the content, and the purpose—and the formal requirements—those related to the exercise of the power that authorizes it, in order to achieve its realization; that is, the procedure, the form of manifestation, and the competence—[see in this regard [Name2], (2002). Thesis on Administrative Law (Tesis de Derecho Administrativo). Medellín: Biblioteca Jurídica Diké, Volume II, pp. 343 ff.]. For what is relevant here, Article 129 ibid. provides that “The act must be issued by the competent body and by the servant regularly designated at the time of issuing it, after all the substantial procedures provided for that purpose and the indispensable requirements for the exercise of the competence have been fulfilled.” Articles 96 and 97 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) assign the Department of Personnel of the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública) the competence to make interim appointments of teachers throughout the country. The Regulation of the Teaching Career (Reglamento de la Carrera Docente), Executive Decree No. 2235, of February 14, 1972, and its amendments, pronounces itself in a similar sense. In the pertinent part, Article 30 of the Regulation on the Administrative Organization of the Central Offices of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de organización administrativa de las oficinas centrales del Ministerio de Educación Pública), Executive Decree No. 21896-MEP, of January 25, 1993, and its amendments—now repealed by Article 132 of Executive Decree No. 34075 of October 18, 2007—provided: “The Director General of Personnel, in addition to the functions and powers that the laws and regulations grant to the Director of Personnel of the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública), shall be responsible for: a) Developing the personnel administration policy in accordance with the legal provisions and the directives emanating from higher authority. b) Ensuring the proper execution of the actions corresponding to the recruitment, selection, appointment, and promotion of personnel.”*

IV.In Ms. [Name1]’s view, the official letter of January 20, 2006, issued by the head of Administrative Development of the Regional Directorate of Education of Limón, visible at folio 1, constitutes the formal communication of her full-time interim appointment as a special education teacher, specialty in mental retardation, at the [Office1], assigned to the Limoncito School at [Address2], for the period from February 10, 2006, to January 31, 2007. This Chamber, however, does not share that view because, as the State representation correctly argues, the documentary evidence submitted must be taken as proof that the indispensable formal act of investiture as a teacher was never issued. Indeed, after corroborating that, according to the list of positions for the year 2006, only one position in special education, comprising 32 lessons, was authorized in that Educational Center—code CED1—the General Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Education did not definitively approve her interim appointment, since it was appropriate to extend that of Ms. [Name3] (documents at folios 20, 21, 22, and 23), which was done through personnel action No. 2703182 (folio 24). Note, furthermore, that in the communication submitted to support her claims, the plaintiff was clearly informed of the following: "Said movement is subject to the verification of enrollment and change in the educational offering of the 2006 school year; or to the resolution of a permanent transfer, promotion, or demotion of another servant; and to the approval of the General Directorate of Personnel." Therefore, such a document must be conceived, then, as a proposal within the set of preparatory acts that could have concluded with the formal administrative decision of appointment, but never as one that could grant her the right to consider herself a regular public official. Since the provided procedure was not completed and, in particular, since the respective approval was not given by the competent body, concluding that she is entitled to unpaid wages based on that proposal constitutes a flagrant and direct violation of the principle of legality. As stated, the valid and effective act of investiture is missing, and none of the documents submitted can be considered a substitute for it, for the set of all of them obliges precisely the opposite conclusion.*

* * * * * * * * * * V. Without prejudice to what has been indicated, it is not possible to ignore that Ms. [Name1] did work full-time as a special education teacher at the Limoncito School at [Address2] between February 7—the first day of the school year—and April 2, 2006, and that as of the following day she took a maternity leave that expired on July 31 (folios 2 and 3). For this Chamber, those services were rendered in good faith, as was the enjoyment of the leave. Several situations allow this to be inferred. Firstly, the fact that she was received and admitted by the Director as if she had indeed been appointed, to which the fact that no one else showed up to occupy that position undoubtedly contributed. Secondly, the considerable and unjustified delay by the administration in notifying her that her appointment had not been perfected. It is striking that more than four months elapsed between the communication of the proposal and that of the final decision, especially considering that, on March 21, the Director and the Supervisor-Advisor of Circuit 02 arranged for the payment of her salary (folio 2) and did not receive any response. This factual scenario fully justifies the plaintiff having assumed that she had indeed been appointed, beginning to work, continuing to do so, and taking the maternity leave, believing she had every right to enjoy it. For that reason, and because there are regulations that partially protect her, it is not only fair but also legally sound to grant her claims, as explained below.* VI.* According to Article 115 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), “A de facto official (funcionario de hecho) shall be one who does what a regular public servant does, but without investiture or with an invalid or ineffective investiture, even outside of emergency situations or illegitimate changes of government, provided that the following circumstances exist: a) That the absence or irregularity of the investiture has not yet been declared, neither administratively nor judicially; and b) That the conduct is carried out in a public, peaceful, continuous manner and normally conforming to the law” (on this topic, one may consult the votes of the Constitutional Chamber No. 6701, at 3:06 p.m. on December 21, 1993, and No. 9, at 2:54 p.m. on January 4, 1994). For this Chamber, this is the condition that must be attributed to Ms. [Name1], since in her case the following requirements are met simultaneously: a) Pre-existence of "de jure" functions, i.e., normatively established. Undoubtedly, the work performed by her is set forth in the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and is developed in the corresponding Descriptive Manual of Positions. b) Holding or having held the position effectively, publicly, peacefully, and habitually (in official premises, using official records and seals, etc.). It is undeniable that at the [Address3] School, she was considered the holder of the position and that she integrated into that educational center, did so regularly, and it was not questioned whether or not she was the person appointed to the position; on the contrary, she was reputed as such. c) Performing or having performed it under the outward appearance of being the legitimate occupant of the position. It does not seem questionable that she was so in a different manner, at least until the moment she became aware of her “termination” of appointment; that is, on the following June 6. Note that, according to the same plaintiff’s statement contained in her complaint, on that date she received via fax the official letter of May 30, 2006, signed by the head of Administrative Development of the Regional Directorate of Education of Limón, by which she was informed that her interim appointment as a special education teacher at the Limoncito School was being left without effect, because a budget code did not exist, as of the previous February 1st (folio 5). Now, it is true that Article 117 ibid. denies the existence of “(...) a relationship or service between the de facto official (funcionario de hecho) and the Administration (…)” but it is also true that “(...) if the former has acted in good faith, he shall not be obliged to return what he has received from the administration as compensation and, if he has received nothing, he may recover the costs of his conduct to the extent that there has been unjust enrichment on the part of the Administration, according to the rules of common law.”*

VII.For greater abundance, it is worth pointing out, as we did in vote No. 235, at 10:20 a.m. on August 18, 1999, that “XIV. The principle of State responsibility and the right to the integrity of one’s own patrimony have constitutional rank (in order, Articles 9 and 45). The General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) comprehensively and specially regulates the parameters and principles of administrative liability. Its Article 190 establishes, as a general rule, that “1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal, functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. 2. The Administration shall be liable in accordance with this article, even when it cannot be so under the following sections of this Chapter, but liability for a lawful act or normal functioning shall arise only under the terms of the following Third Section.” Based on these statements, an objective system of administrative liability was structured in Costa Rican legislation, the foundation of which is the aforementioned principle of patrimonial integrity of the administered person-victim, who may well be a person in the service of the State, and whose starting point for the analysis of the specific case is always the damage caused. The conduct of the liable Administration lacks significance for the purposes of determining whether or not there is merit to declare the duty to compensate; for this operates by operation of law. However, its assessment is fundamental for establishing the scope of liability. In what is relevant, it is worth noting that, in the case of an activity that is lawful and normal, it is not possible to claim compensation for consequential damages or lost profits (lucro cesante). This is expressly provided by Article 194 ibid.: “1. The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and for its normal functioning when they cause damage to the rights of the administered person in a special manner, due to the small proportion of those affected or the exceptional intensity of the injury. 2. In this case, the compensation shall cover the value of the damages at the time of payment, but not lost profits (lucro cesante). 3. The State shall be liable for damages caused directly by a law, which are special in accordance with this article.” This is not the case when one is in the presence of illegitimate or abnormal conduct, in which case the scope of the compensation is indeed unrestricted. Abnormal functioning exists when the conduct is unlawful in itself, because it was carried out in violation of the positive legal system or of the technical norms of good organization and administration or of the rules of prudence in administrative action (Articles 11, 14, 15, 16, and 17 ibid.). It is likewise abnormal when it produces unexpected results, not consistent with its nature and function; that is, aberrant from a statistical point of view and even contradictory to the public purpose pursued by the legal system, even if the conduct is not, in itself, unlawful. The stated principles are basic for contextualizing the current statutory regulations, the analysis of which cannot be done in isolation, because that could render invisible a possible fraud of law (fraude de ley) which, just because it is committed by a public entity, body, or agency, does not cease to be prohibited by the legal system (Article 20 of the Civil Code and the doctrine of votes No. 177, at 8:10 a.m. on July 31, 1992, and No. 31, at 9:10 a.m. on March 5, 1993). They also constitute the factual and legal assumptions for a claim of economic liability against the State, such as the one now heard, to proceed. And, since it is evident that, in this matter, none of the exclusion hypotheses referred to in the cited Article 190 has occurred, the State cannot be exonerated from its obligation to repair the damage caused. XV. In Costa Rican labor law and also in the law of the public function, the compensation for damages and losses, except in the cases under Article 31 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), does not require the claimant to prove their existence and severity, unlike what occurs in civil law and other legal branches. This is so because, in the face of specific hypotheses, such as dismissal without just cause and occupational hazards, tariffed compensation systems are established (see, for example, Articles 82, 94 bis, 218 and concordant, and 368 ibid., as well as votes No. 31, at 3:00 p.m. on March 20, 1986; 110, at 10:00 a.m. on October 17; 355, at 3:50 p.m. on November 6, both from 1996; 3, at 2:20 p.m. on January 8; 93, at 3:10 p.m. on May 14; 328, at 9:10 a.m. on December 19, the latter from 1997; 90, at 10:00 a.m. on March 25, and 168, at 3:30 p.m. on July 15, both from 1998). Considering the particularities of this proceeding, the non-existence of any specific tariff provision is clear. Hence, the compensation to which Ms. (...) is entitled must be determined by taking, as a fundamental basis, the mentioned Articles 190 to 194 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and Articles 21 and 22 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, it is advisable to keep in mind another principle of law, positivized, in its most generic sense, in both extra-contractual and contractual matters, in Articles 1045 and 701, respectively, of that Civil Code. According to this legal guideline, whoever causes damage to another person must repair it, together with the losses.”*

* * * * * * * * * * VIII. The compensation for the legitimate conduct displayed by Ms. [Name1] can be no other than the salaries she should have received if the act of her appointment had been perfected. That, however, does not cover the entire period for which she could have been appointed as a teacher at the Limoncito School at [Address2], but rather that which runs from the moment she began working; that is, February 7, 2006, until the moment she was to return to her duties after enjoying her maternity leave, since, by then, she already knew that her investiture did not exist; that is, July 31 of that same year, because from that moment on, any provision of services by her would probably constitute a usurpation of functions. Likewise, the corresponding legal interest must be covered. In a case that bears certain similarities to this one, the Constitutional Chamber resolved that: “For this Court, the fundamental rights of the plaintiff were indeed infringed; specifically, the constitutional principle of legal certainty was infringed. In this sense, if it is proven that the appellant worked for the said time, with appointments made by the defendant Ministry, even if the latter had made an error in ordering those appointments, that situation cannot affect the servant, for even though the approval of the Civil Service did not occur, the fact is that the Administration, through acts invested with a certain formality, made those appointments materially effective. This being the case, the defendant cannot now seek to leave the former servant in uncertainty, because it was the Administration that caused the problem, by having done, omitted, or permitted, the plaintiff to work in that state of affairs.” (Vote No. 2003-4588, at 2:38 p.m. on May 27, 2003).*

IX.It is fundamental to point out that the abnormal functioning of the Administration, as evidenced indisputably by that unjustified delay in making a fairly simple decision such as the plaintiff’s appointment—however legitimate not doing so may have been—as well as the effects this generated, is also contrary to administrative legality and cannot harm the administered persons. Undoubtedly, the liability arising from such an anomalous situation “(...) must be directed against the administrative authorities or hierarchical superiors who [caused] it (...); that is, that illegality cannot revert to the detriment of the servant who, without any bad faith being observed, is placed in those conditions.” In this sense, in vote No. 170-98, at 10:00 a.m. on July 16, 1998, this Chamber stated: “...that the execution of irregular practices in the assignment of functions to employees who—personally or academically—do not meet the requirements set forth in the Positions Manual for the profile of the position, could be detrimental to the principle of efficiency that informs the administrative system, the principal purpose of which—elevated to the highest rank by the constituents—is the correct satisfaction of the community’s needs; as is evident from Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution. On this point, the principle of legality that the Administration has correctly alleged (...) obliges it (sic) to recognize for Mr. ..., the salary difference that exists between the salary he receives (...), and what he should receive (...), as long as it keeps him performing duties proper to the second-cited position, while it proceeds to correct that situation. Such recognition is required by the letter of Article 57 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), which enshrines equal pay for equal working conditions and efficiency; a principle developed by Article 167 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). To order the contrary would mean legitimizing an abusive conduct by the employer (...) a course of action that this Chamber cannot, from any point of view, support or endorse.” (Vote No. 1110-2006, at 10:15 a.m. on November 30, 2006).*

X.Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that the special protection for pregnant workers (fuero de protección) is not applicable since, as the State’s representative effectively alleges, no service relationship existed linking the parties. Nor is the discrimination attributed by the lower court authorities visible, since the decision not to appoint the plaintiff on an interim basis to the position of her interest was due to the superior right that Ms. Yanice* Shakira* Cole* Hadgson had to it, for having achieved a higher score for the accreditation of the position and, furthermore, for having held the position in that same capacity since a year earlier (folios 23 and 24).*

**I.** Ms. [Nombre1] claimed unpaid salaries for having served as a teacher at the Limoncito School, from the date of her interim appointment—February 1, 2006—until its effective cancellation; as well as legal interest and costs (folios 6-10). The State's representative raised the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) and justified the absence of the alleged payment on the fact that the plaintiff's appointment was not perfected, since, as she was duly informed, it was subject to the approval of the General Directorate of Personnel (Dirección General de Personal) and this was not given because the only position in special education at that educational center had been occupied since the 2005 school year by a qualified educator, Mrs. Yanice* Shakira* Cole* Hadgson, with professional group ET, and there was no other position with an assigned budget code. In her view, since an employment relationship with the administration was never constituted and there was never an unjustified dismissal, she cannot invoke articles 94 and 94 bis of the *Código de Trabajo* as the basis for her claim (folios 26 to 48). In the first-instance judgment (folios 113-121), confirmed by vote no. 137-07-LA, at 11:42 a.m., on November 21, 2007, issued by the Tribunal del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela (folios 156-163), it was held that the plaintiff's cessation was due to her pregnancy status, and, therefore, the claim was granted, with the consequent order of costs against the State. In this venue, that party alleges an erroneous assessment of the principle of the primacy of reality (principio de primacía de la realidad), to the detriment of the principle of legality (principio de legalidad), and the preterition of documents issued by competent authorities, such as certificate UG5-1412-2006, signed by the former head of Unit Five of the General Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, she denies having litigated in bad faith and that she has not provided proof of her assertions. In her opinion, there is not a single element that allows one to maintain that the plaintiff was dismissed due to her pregnancy. She therefore requests the reversal of the appealed judgment in all its aspects, including the order of costs (folios 171-182).* **II.** With the Constitución Política of 1949, equality in access to public positions was incorporated into the body of fundamental rights, with the consequent guarantee of immovability or stability (article 192). In order to make these a reality, its article 191 provided that "A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration." In compliance with these norms, the Estatuto de Servicio Civil was enacted by Law No. 1581 of May 30, 1953. This legal instrument was supplemented by Law No. 4565 of May 4, 1970, known as the Ley de Carrera Docente, which, from its entry into force, became the basic regulatory framework for establishing "(...) the requirements for entry into official service, as well as the obligations and rights of the servants." Thus, as we indicated in judgments nos. 91, at 10:05 a.m., on March 25, 1998, and 235, at 10:20 a.m., on August 18, 1999, the Estatuto de Servicio Civil regulated two different and mutually exclusive types of career: the administrative (Book I) and the teaching (Book II). Each of them constitutes a special public employment regime, applicable to two different groups, with specific rules regarding classification, entry, selection, promotions, demotions, transfers, rights, duties, prohibitions, faults, and sanctions, among others. The first, known as the "Régimen de Servicio Civil," generally protects those who work in the Executive Branch, with the exceptions of articles 3, 4, and 5 of said Statute. The second specifically protects the employees of the Ministry of Public Education who teach lessons; persons who perform technical functions inherent to teaching; and those who hold positions whose performance requires a degree or certificate that accredits them to exercise the teaching function (article 54). However, it is possible to apply to this latter group some of the rules provided for the former, by virtue of the provisions of article 180 ibidem, the text of which is as follows: "Situations not provided for in this title, relating to the rights and duties of servants, shall be resolved in accordance with what is established, correspondingly, in Title I of this Statute." Through this avenue, the *Código de Trabajo* and the Civil Code could also be given effect, albeit in a supplementary and exceptional manner (articles 51 ibidem and 15 of the *Código de Trabajo*). By Law No. 8555 of October 10, 2006, Title IV—articles 208 to 232—was added to the Estatuto de Servicio Civil, thus creating another type of career: the artistic, intended to regulate relations between the Executive Branch and those who provide artistic services or activities on a permanent or habitual basis and in a remunerated form or with the right to economic compensation, by virtue of an appointment by the respective institution or body. Some years before the two aforementioned legal reforms, the Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, No. 2166 of October 9, 1957, was enacted, whose fundamental objective is to standardize the salary aspect in the Public Sector. In 1978, the Ley General de la Administración Pública, No. 6227 of May 2 of that year, complemented the regulatory development of the statutory regime by establishing provisions of a general nature relating to the service relationship and defining, in its article 111, subsection 1), that "A public servant is the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf of and on account of it (sic), as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with full independence from the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity." In the same article 111 and in article 112 ibidem, the case of officials regulated fundamentally by statutory norms was distinguished from those others who would be governed by common labor law, reinforcing for the former the prevailing application of public law norms. This partial recount demonstrates the political will expressed by the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente in the aforementioned articles 191 and 192 and in the transitional provision to article 140 of the Constitución Política, and by the Legislative Assembly in the implementing regulations, among them the Estatuto de Servicio Civil, to differentiate statutory service relationships from private-sector labor relationships; which was embodied as a general rule in subsection 1) of article 112 of the last-cited Law, according to which "Administrative law shall be applicable to the service relationships between the Administration and its public servants." Consequently, and since we are dealing here with a relationship of a statutory nature, the State's representative is correct when she claims that, in this matter, the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) must prevail. Neither in this venue nor in the administrative one is it possible to disregard the specific rules derived from it (see articles 11 and 154 of the Constitución Política, as well as articles 2 and 5 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial and articles 6 and 11 of the cited Ley General). This has been reiterated by the Constitutional jurisprudence and that of this Chamber, emphasizing that, in this matter, the principles and norms of Labor Law—private—must give way, when appropriate, to the special ones of public-law disciplines—those of Administrative Law in particular, and Public Law in general—which may not only be different but even contrary to them (in this regard, it is advisable to consult, among many others, the votes of the Sala Constitucional nos. 1696, at 3:30 p.m., on August 21, 1992; 4788, at 8:48 a.m., on September 30, 1993; 3309, at 3:00 p.m., on July 5, 1994; 6095, at 9:18 a.m., on October 18, 1994; 3125, at 6:24 a.m., on June 14, 1995; 3865, at 10:57 a.m., on July 14, 1995; and 3089, at 3:00 p.m., on May 12, 1998; as well as those of this Chamber nos. 159, at 2:20 p.m., on June 23, 1994; 191, at 10:10 a.m., on September 4; 254, at 9:10 a.m., on August 30, both of 1996; 31, at 3:45 p.m., on February 12, 1997; 91, at 10:05 a.m., on March 25; 236, at 9:50 a.m., on September 18, both of 1998; 235, at 10:20 a.m., on August 18; 258, at 10:00 a.m., on August 31; 299, at 10:40 a.m., on September 29, all three of 1999; 316, at 10:10 a.m., on March 29; 518, at 2:48 p.m., on May 19, both of 2000; 172, at 10:10 a.m., on March 14; 181, at 10:10 a.m., on March 22; 191, at 9:50 a.m., on March 28; 322, at 10:10 a.m., on June 13, all of 2001; 12, at 9:45 a.m., on January 12, 2007; and 258, at 10:30 a.m., on March 28, 2008). In accordance with that principle, enshrined in articles 11 of the Constitución Política and 11 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, only those obligations that are authorized by the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale and the system of sources applicable in each specific case, may be considered lawful and effective as obligations chargeable to a public entity or body.* **III.** As is evident from the foregoing, the appointment of a person in the official service—entry into the teaching career (carrera docente)—must be made through a valid and effective administrative act (acto administrativo). The legal regime of administrative acts is addressed by the Ley General de la Administración Pública, according to which "An administrative act that substantially conforms to the legal system, including as to the motive of the official who issues it, shall be valid." (Article 128). This substantial conformity occurs when it meets the material requirements—those that adapt the administrative conduct to the need it satisfies and determine what the administration commands, authorizes, or prohibits; that is, the motive (motivo), the content (contenido), and the purpose (fin)—and formal requirements—those referring to the exercise of the power that authorizes it, to achieve its realization; that is, the procedure (procedimiento), the form of manifestation (forma de manifestación), and the competence (competencia)— [see on this matter [Nombre2], (2002). Tesis de Derecho Administrativo. Medellín: Biblioteca Jurídica Diké, tomo II, pp. 343 et seq.]. For what is relevant here, article 129 ibidem provides that "The act must be issued by the competent body and by the servant regularly designated at the time of issuing it, after prior compliance with all the substantial procedures provided for that purpose and the indispensable requirements for the exercise of the competence." Articles 96 and 97 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil attribute to the Personnel Department of the Ministry of Public Education the competence (competencia) to make interim appointments of teachers throughout the country. The Reglamento de la Carrera Docente, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 2235, of February 14, 1972, and its amendments, pronounce in a similar sense. As relevant, article 30 of the Reglamento de organización administrativa de las oficinas centrales del Ministerio de Educación Pública, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 21896-MEP, of January 25, 1993, and its amendments—now repealed by article 132 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34075 of October 18, 2007—provided: "The Director General of Personnel, in addition to the functions and powers that the laws and regulations grant to the Personnel Director of the Ministry of Public Education, shall be responsible for: a) Developing the personnel administration policy in accordance with the legal provisions and the directives emanating from higher authority. b) Ensuring the proper execution of the actions corresponding to the recruitment, selection, appointment, and promotion of personnel."* **IV.-** In the opinion of Mrs. [Nombre1], the official letter of January 20, 2006, issued by the head of Administrative Development of the Regional Directorate of Education of Limón, visible at folio 1, constitutes the formal communication of her full-time interim appointment as a special education teacher, specializing in mental retardation, in the [Dirección1], assigned to the Escuela de [Dirección2] Limoncito, for the period between February 10, 2006, and January 31, 2007. The Chamber, however, does not share this view because, as the State's representative rightly argues, the documentary evidence provided must be considered as proving that the indispensable formal act of investiture (acto formal de investidura) as a teacher was never issued. Indeed, after verifying that, according to the list of positions for the year 2006, in that Educational Center—code CED1—only one position in special education was authorized, which included 32 lessons, the General Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Education did not definitively approve her interim appointment, since the prorogation of the appointment of Mrs. [Nombre3] was appropriate (documents at folios 20, 21, 22, and 23), which was done through personnel action no. 2703182 (folio 24). Note, furthermore, the fact that, in the same communication provided to support her claims, the plaintiff was clearly informed of the following: "Said movement is subject to the verification of enrollment and change in the educational offering of the 2006 school year; or to the resolution of a permanent transfer, promotion, or demotion of another servant; and to the approval of the General Directorate of Personnel." For this reason, such a document must be conceived, then, as a proposal within the set of preparatory acts that could have concluded with the formal administrative decision of appointment, but never as one that could grant her the right to be considered a regular public official. Since the foreseen procedure was not completed and, in particular, since the respective approval was not given by the competent body (órgano competente), concluding that she is entitled to the unpaid salaries, based on that proposal, constitutes a flagrant and frontal violation of the principle of legality (principio de legalidad). As stated, the valid and effective act of investiture is lacking, and none of the documents provided can be considered a substitute for it, since all of them together oblige, precisely, the opposite conclusion.* * * * * * * * * * * **V.** Without prejudice to the foregoing, it is not possible to ignore that Ms. [Nombre1] did work full-time as a special education teacher at the Escuela de [Dirección2] Limoncito between February 7—the first day of the school year—and April 2, 2006, and that from the following day she took a maternity leave that expired on July 31 (folios 2 and 3). For the Chamber, those services were rendered in good faith, as was the enjoyment of the leave. Several situations allow this to be inferred. In the first place, the fact that she was received and admitted by the Director as if she were indeed appointed, to which the fact that no one else showed up to occupy that position undoubtedly contributed. In the second place, the considerable and unjustified delay by the administration in notifying her that her appointment had not been perfected. It is striking that more than four months elapsed between the communication of the proposal and that of the final decision, especially considering that, on March 21, the Director and the Supervisor-Advisor of Circuit 02 processed the payment of her salary (folio 2) and obtained no response. This factual picture fully justifies that the plaintiff assumed she was indeed appointed, began working, continued doing so, and took maternity leave considering that she had every right to enjoy it. For this reason, and because there are norms that partially protect her, it is not only fair but also has a legal basis to partially grant her claims as explained below.* **VI.*** In accordance with article 115 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, "A de facto official (funcionario de hecho) is one who does what the regular public servant does, but without investiture or with an invalid or ineffective investiture, even outside situations of urgency or illegitimate changes of government, provided that the following circumstances are present: a) That the absence or irregularity of the investiture has not yet been declared, neither administratively nor jurisdictionally; and b) That the conduct is carried out in a public, peaceful, continuous manner, and normally accommodated to law" (on the subject, see the votes of the Sala Constitucional nos. 6701, at 3:06 p.m., on December 21, 1993, and 9, at 2:54 p.m., on January 4, 1994). For the Chamber, this is the condition that must be attributed to Ms. [Nombre1], since the following requirements are simultaneously present in her case: a) Pre-existence of "de jure" functions, that is, normatively established. Without a doubt, the work performed by her is stated in the Estatuto de Servicio Civil and is developed in the corresponding Manual descriptivo de puestos. b) Holding or having held the position in an effective, public, peaceful, and habitual manner (in official premises, using official records and seals, etc.). It is undeniable that at the Escuela de [Dirección3] she was considered the holder of the position and that she integrated into that educational center, did so regularly, and it was not questioned whether or not she was the person appointed to the post; on the contrary, she was deemed as such. c) Performing it or having performed it under the external appearance of being the legitimate occupant of the position. It does not seem questionable that she was so in a different manner, at least until the moment she became aware of her "cessation" of appointment; that is, the following June 6. Note that, according to a statement by the plaintiff herself, contained in her complaint, on that date she received via fax the official letter of May 30, 2006, signed by the head of Administrative Development of the Regional Directorate of Education of Limón, by which she was informed that her interim appointment as a special education teacher at the Escuela de Limoncito was being left without effect, due to the non-existence of a code, retroactive to the previous February 1 (folio 5). Now, it is true that article 117 ibidem denies the existence of "(...) a relationship or service between the de facto official and the Administration (...)", but it is also true that "(...) if the former has acted in good faith, they shall not be obliged to return what they have received from the administration as remuneration, and, if they have received nothing, they may recover the costs of their conduct to the extent that there has been unjust enrichment on the part of the Administration, according to the rules of common law."* **VII**. With greater abundance, it is appropriate to point out, as we did in vote no. 235, at 10:20 a.m., on August 18, 1999, that "XIV.- The principle of State responsibility and the right to the integrity of one's own patrimony have constitutional rank (in order, articles 9 and 45). The Ley General de la Administración Pública exhaustively and specially regulates the parameters and principles of administrative liability. Its article 190 establishes, as a general rule, that '1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. 2. The Administration shall be liable in accordance with this article, even when it cannot be so by virtue of the following sections of this Chapter, but liability for lawful act or normal functioning shall only arise according to the terms of the following Third Section.' Based on these statements, an objective system of administrative liability was structured in Costa Rican legislation, whose foundation is the aforementioned principle of patrimonial integrity of the administered person-victim, who may well be one in the service of the State, and whose starting point for the analysis of the specific case is always the damage produced. The conduct of the liable Administration lacks significance for the purposes of determining whether there is merit or not to declare the duty to repair; since this operates by operation of law. However, its assessment is fundamental for establishing its scope. As relevant, it is worth noting that, in the case of an activity that is lawful and normal, it is not possible to claim compensation for lost profits or lucro cesante (lucro cesante). This is expressly provided for by article 194 ibidem: '1. The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and for its normal functioning when they cause damage to the rights of the administered person in a special manner, due to the small proportion of those affected or the exceptional intensity of the injury. 2. In this case, the indemnity shall cover the value of the damages at the time of their payment, but not the lucro cesante. 3. The State shall be liable for damages caused directly by a law, which are special in accordance with this article.' That does not happen when one is in the presence of an illegitimate or abnormal action, in which case the scope of the reparation is unrestricted.

Abnormal functioning exists when the action is unlawful in itself, because it was carried out in violation of the positive legal system or the technical standards of good organization and administration or the rules of prudence in administrative action (articles 11, 14, 15, 16 and 17 ibidem). It is likewise so when it entails unexpected results, not in accordance with its nature and function; that is, aberrant from a statistical point of view and even contradictory to the public purpose pursued by the legal system, although the action is not, in itself, unlawful. The principles set forth are basic for contextualizing the current statutory regulations, whose analysis cannot be done in isolation, because that could make invisible an eventual fraud of law (fraude de ley) which, not because it is carried out by a public entity, body, or agency, ceases to be prohibited by the legal system (article 20 of the Civil Code and the doctrine of votes no. 177, at 8:10 a.m., of July 31, 1992, and 31, at 9:10 a.m., of March 5, 1993). They also constitute the factual and legal assumptions for a claim for economic liability against the State, such as the one now being heard, to proceed. And, since it is evident that, in this matter, none of the exclusion hypotheses referred to in the cited Article 190 has occurred, the State cannot be exonerated from its obligation to have to repair the damage caused. XV - In Costa Rican labor law and also in public function law, the compensation for damages (daños y perjuicios), except in the cases of article 31 of the Labor Code, does not require the claimant to prove their existence and severity, unlike what happens in civil law and other legal branches. This is so because, in the face of specific hypotheses, such as dismissal without just cause and occupational risks, fixed indemnity systems are established (see, for example, articles 82, 94 bis, 218 and concordant articles and 368 ibidem, as well as votes no. 31, at 3:00 p.m., of March 20, 1986; 110, at 10:00 a.m., of October 17; 355, at 3:50 p.m., of November 6; both of 1996; 3, at 2:20 p.m., of January 8; 93, at 3:10 p.m., of May 14; 328, at 9:10 a.m., of December 19; the last ones of 1997; 90, at 10:00 a.m., of March 25 and 168, at 3:30 p.m., of July 15; both of 1998). Considering the particularities of this process, the non-existence of any specific fixed indemnity provision is clear. Hence, the compensation to which Mrs. (...) is entitled must be determined taking, as a fundamental basis, the aforementioned articles 190 to 194 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and 21 and 22 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, it is appropriate to bear in mind another legal principle, made positive law, in its most generic sense, in tort and contract law, in articles 1045 and 701, in that order, of that Civil Code. According to this legal rule, whoever causes harm to another person must repair it, together with the consequential damages (perjuicios).” VIII.- The reparation for the legitimate conduct carried out by Mrs. [Name1] can be none other than the salaries she should have received if the act of her appointment had been perfected. That being said, they do not cover the entire period for which she could have been designated as a teacher at the Escuela de [Address2] Limoncito but rather that which runs from the moment she began work; that is, February 7, 2006, until the moment she was to return to her duties after enjoying her maternity leave, since, by then, she was already aware that her investiture did not exist; that is, July 31 of that same year, because from that moment on, any provision of services by her would probably constitute a usurpation of functions. Likewise, the corresponding legal interest must be covered. In a matter that bears certain similarities to this one, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) resolved that: "For this Court, the fundamental rights of the plaintiff were indeed infringed, specifically, the constitutional principle of legal certainty was infringed. In this sense, if it is proven that the appellant worked the said time, with appointments given to her by the sued Ministry, even if the latter incurred an error in ordering those appointments, that situation cannot affect the employee, because although the approval of the Civil Service was not produced, the truth is that the Administration, through acts bearing certain formality, made those designations materially effective. This being the case, the defendant cannot now attempt to leave the former employee in uncertainty, because it was the Administration that caused the problem, by having done, not done, or permitted that the plaintiff worked under that state of affairs." (Vote no. 2003-4588, at 2:38 p.m., of May 27, 2003).

IX.- It is fundamental to point out that the abnormal functioning of the Administration, an indisputable example of which is that unjustified delay in making a fairly simple decision such as the appointment of the plaintiff, however legitimate it may have been not to do so, as well as the effects this generated, is also contrary to administrative legality and cannot harm the individuals subject to the administration. Without a doubt, the liability derived from such an anomalous situation "(...) must be directed against the administrative authorities or senior officials who [propitiated] it (...); that is, that illegality cannot be reversed to the detriment of the public servant himself/herself who, without any bad faith being noted, is placed under those conditions." In this sense, in vote no. 170-98, at 10:00 a.m. of July 16, 1998, this Chamber stated: "... that the execution of irregular practices in the assignment of functions to employees who - personally or academically - do not meet the requirements contemplated by the Job Manual for the position profile, could be in violation of the principle of efficiency that informs the administrative legal system, whose main purpose - elevated to the highest rank by the constituent assembly - is the correct satisfaction of the community's needs; as is inferred from articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution. At this point, the principle of legality that the Administration has rightly alleged (...) obliges it (sic) to recognize to Mr. ..., the salary difference that exists between the salary he receives (...), and the one he should receive (...), provided that it keeps him performing tasks proper to the second position cited, while proceeding to correct that situation. Such recognition is imposed by the letter of article 57 of the Political Constitution, which enshrines equality of salary under equal working conditions and efficiency; a principle developed by article 167 of the Labor Code. To order otherwise would mean legitimizing abusive conduct by the employer (...) an action that this Chamber cannot, from any point of view, support or foster." (Vote no. 1110-2006, at 10:15 a.m., of November 30, 2006).

X.- Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that the special protection for pregnant workers (fuero de protección) is not applicable since, as the State's representative effectively alleges, there was no employment relationship linking the parties. Nor is the discrimination attributed by the lower court authorities visible, since the decision not to interimly appoint the plaintiff to the position of her interest was due to the better right held over it by Mrs. Yanice* Shakira* Cole* Hagdson for having achieved a better score for the accreditation of the position and, moreover, having held the position under that same status for a year before (folios 23 and 24). The accreditation of these reasons prevents seeing discrimination due to the condition of pregnancy or post-partum against Mrs. [Name1], as was erroneously interpreted in previous instances, without evidence to support it.

XI.- Based on the considerations set forth, the appropriate course is to modify the appealed ruling, insofar as it ordered the State to pay the unearned salaries from February 1, two thousand six, until January 31, two thousand seven, in order to, instead, grant them only between February 7 and July 31, both dates of two thousand six. Regarding what is revoked, the exception of lack of right, invoked by the State representation, must be upheld. In all other respects, the challenged judgment must be confirmed, including the ruling on costs, as the Chamber does not consider that any ground for exoneration exists (articles 494 and 495 of the Labor Code and 221 of the Civil Procedure Code).” * * * * * * * * * * * VIII.- The reparation for the legitimate conduct carried out by Mrs. [Name1] can be none other than the salaries she should have received if the act of her appointment had been perfected. That being said, they do not cover the entire period for which she could have been designated as a teacher at the Escuela de [Address2] Limoncito but rather that which runs from the moment she began work; that is, February 7, 2006, until the moment she was to return to her duties after enjoying her maternity leave, since, by then, she was already aware that her investiture did not exist; that is, July 31 of that same year, because from that moment on, any provision of services by her would probably constitute a usurpation of functions. Likewise, the corresponding legal interest must be covered. In a matter that bears certain similarities to this one, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) resolved that: "For this Court, the fundamental rights of the plaintiff were indeed infringed, specifically, the constitutional principle of legal certainty was infringed. In this sense, if it is proven that the appellant worked the said time, with appointments given to her by the sued Ministry, even if the latter incurred an error in ordering those appointments, that situation cannot affect the employee, because although the approval of the Civil Service was not produced, the truth is that the Administration, through acts bearing certain formality, made those designations materially effective. This being the case, the defendant cannot now attempt to leave the former employee in uncertainty, because it was the Administration that caused the problem, by having done, not done, or permitted that the plaintiff worked under that state of affairs." (Vote no. 2003-4588, at 2:38 p.m., of May 27, 2003).

IX.- It is fundamental to point out that the abnormal functioning of the Administration, an indisputable example of which is that unjustified delay in making a fairly simple decision such as the appointment of the plaintiff, however legitimate it may have been not to do so, as well as the effects this generated, is also contrary to administrative legality and cannot harm the individuals subject to the administration. Without a doubt, the liability derived from such an anomalous situation "(...) must be directed against the administrative authorities or senior officials who [propitiated] it (...); that is, that illegality cannot be reversed to the detriment of the public servant himself/herself who, without any bad faith being noted, is placed under those conditions." In this sense, in vote no. 170-98, at 10:00 a.m. of July 16, 1998, this Chamber stated: "... that the execution of irregular practices in the assignment of functions to employees who - personally or academically - do not meet the requirements contemplated by the Job Manual for the position profile, could be in violation of the principle of efficiency that informs the administrative legal system, whose main purpose - elevated to the highest rank by the constituent assembly - is the correct satisfaction of the community's needs; as is inferred from articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution. At this point, the principle of legality that the Administration has rightly alleged (...) obliges it (sic) to recognize to Mr. ..., the salary difference that exists between the salary he receives (...), and the one he should receive (...), provided that it keeps him performing tasks proper to the second position cited, while proceeding to correct that situation. Such recognition is imposed by the letter of article 57 of the Political Constitution, which enshrines equality of salary under equal working conditions and efficiency; a principle developed by article 167 of the Labor Code. To order otherwise would mean legitimizing abusive conduct by the employer (...) an action that this Chamber cannot, from any point of view, support or foster." (Vote no. 1110-2006, at 10:15 a.m., of November 30, 2006).

X.- Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that the special protection for pregnant workers (fuero de protección) is not applicable since, as the State's representative effectively alleges, there was no employment relationship linking the parties. Nor is the discrimination attributed by the lower court authorities visible, since the decision not to interimly appoint the plaintiff to the position of her interest was due to the better right held over it by Mrs. Yanice* Shakira* Cole* Hagdson for having achieved a better score for the accreditation of the position and, moreover, having held the position under that same status for a year before (folios 23 and 24). The accreditation of these reasons prevents seeing discrimination due to the condition of pregnancy or post-partum against Mrs. [Name1], as was erroneously interpreted in previous instances, without evidence to support it.

XI.- Based on the considerations set forth, the appropriate course is to modify the appealed ruling, insofar as it ordered the State to pay the unearned salaries from February 1, two thousand six, until January 31, two thousand seven, in order to, instead, grant them only between February 7 and July 31, both dates of two thousand six. Regarding what is revoked, the exception of lack of right, invoked by the State representation, must be upheld. In all other respects, the challenged judgment must be confirmed, including the ruling on costs, as the Chamber does not consider that any ground for exoneration exists (articles 494 and 495 of the Labor Code and 221 of the Civil Procedure Code).” In their view, since an employment relationship with the administration was never established and there was never an unjustified dismissal, she cannot invoke articles 94 and 94 bis of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) as the basis for her claim (folios 26 to 48). In the first-instance judgment (folios 113-121), confirmed by vote no. 137-07-LA, at 11:42 a.m., on November 21, 2007, issued by the Third Judicial Circuit Court of Alajuela (Tribunal del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela) (folios 156-163), it was held that the plaintiff's termination was due to her pregnancy status and, therefore, the claim was granted, with the consequent order of costs against the State. In this venue, that party alleges an erroneous application of the principle of the primacy of reality (principio de primacía de la realidad), to the detriment of the principle of legality, and the preterition of documents issued by competent authorities, such as the certification UG5-1412-2006, signed by the other head of Unit Five of the General Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, it rejects having litigated in bad faith and that it has not provided proof of its assertions. In its opinion, there is not a single element to support that the claimant was dismissed due to her pregnancy. It therefore requests the reversal of the appealed judgment in all its aspects, including the order of costs (folios 171-182).* **II.** With the Political Constitution of 1949, equality in access to public positions was incorporated into the body of fundamental rights, along with the consequent guarantee of tenure or stability (article 192). In order to make these a reality, its article 191 provided that "A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration." In compliance with these norms, the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) was enacted by Law No. 1581 of May 30, 1953. This legal instrument was added to by Law No. 4565 of May 4, 1970, known as the Teaching Career Law (Ley de Carrera Docente), which, from its entry into force, came to constitute the basic normative framework for establishing "(...) the requirements for entry into official service, as well as the obligations and rights of the servants." Thus, as indicated in our judgments No. 91, at 10:05 a.m., on March 25, 1998, and No. 235, at 10:20 a.m., on August 18, 1999, the Civil Service Statute regulated two different and mutually exclusive types of careers: the administrative (Book I) and the teaching (Book II). Each of them constitutes a special public employment regime (régimen de empleo público), applicable to two different groups, with specific rules regarding classification, entry, selection, promotions, demotions, advancements, transfers, rights, duties, prohibitions, faults, and sanctions, among others. The first, known as the "Civil Service Regime (Régimen de Servicio Civil)," protects, in general, those who work in the Executive Branch, with the exceptions of articles 3, 4, and 5 of said Statute. The second specifically protects employees of the Ministry of Public Education who teach lessons; persons who perform technical functions inherent to teaching; and those who serve in positions whose performance requires a degree or certificate accrediting them to exercise the teaching function (article 54). However, it is possible to apply to this latter group some of the rules provided for the former, by virtue of the provisions of article 180 ibidem, the text of which is as follows: "Situations not provided for in this title, relating to the rights and duties of the servants, shall be resolved in accordance with what is established, correspondingly, in Title I of this Statute." Through this channel, the Labor Code and the Civil Code could also be given effect, albeit in a supplementary and exceptional manner (articles 51 ibidem and 15 of the Labor Code). By Law No. 8555 of October 10, 2006, Title IV —articles 208 to 232— was added to the Civil Service Statute, thereby creating another type of career: the artistic career, intended to regulate the relations between the Executive Branch and those who provide artistic services or activities on a permanent or habitual basis and in a remunerated form or with a right to economic compensation, by virtue of an appointment by the respective institution or body. Some years before the two legal reforms noted, the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), No. 2166 of October 9, 1957, was enacted, the fundamental objective of which is to standardize the salary aspect in the Public Sector. In 1978, the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), No. 6227 of May 2 of that year, complemented the normative development of the statutory regime by establishing provisions of a general nature relating to the service relationship and defining, in its article 111, subsection 1), that "A public servant is the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf and on account of the same (sic), as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity." In the same article 111 and in article 112 ibidem, the case of officials governed fundamentally by statutory norms was distinguished from those others who would be governed by common labor law, reinforcing for the former the prevailing application of public law norms. That partial account demonstrates the political will expressed by the National Constituent Assembly in the aforementioned articles 191 and 192 and in the transitory provision to article 140 of the Political Constitution, and by the Legislative Assembly in the implementing regulations, including the Civil Service Statute, to differentiate statutory service relationships from the employment relationships of the private sector; which was set forth as a general rule in subsection 1) of article 112 of the last-cited Law, under which "Administrative law shall be applicable to the service relationships between the Administration and its public servants." Consequently, and finding ourselves in this specific case dealing with a statutory relationship, the State representative is correct when she claims that, in this matter, the principle of legality must prevail. Neither in this venue nor in the administrative one is it possible to disregard the specific rules derived from it (see articles 11 and 154 of the Political Constitution, as well as articles 2 and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) and articles 6 and 11 of the cited General Law). This has been reiterated by the Constitutional jurisprudence and that of this Chamber, emphasizing that, in this matter, the principles and norms of Labor Law —private— must give way, when appropriate, to the special ones of the public-law disciplines —those of Administrative Law, in particular, and Public Law, in general— which may not only be different but even contrary to them (in this regard, it is advisable to consult, among many others, the votes of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 1696, at 3:30 p.m., on August 21, 1992; No. 4788, at 8:48 a.m., on September 30, 1993; No. 3309, at 3:00 p.m., on July 5, 1994; No. 6095, at 9:18 a.m., on October 18, 1994; No. 3125, at 6:24 a.m., on June 14, 1995; No. 3865, at 10:57 a.m., on July 14, 1995; and No. 3089, at 3:00 p.m., on May 12, 1998; as well as those of this Chamber (Sala) No. 159, at 2:20 p.m., on June 23, 1994; No. 191, at 10:10 a.m., on September 4; No. 254, at 9:10 a.m., on August 30, both of 1996; No. 31, at 3:45 p.m., on February 12, 1997; No. 91, at 10:05 a.m., on March 25; No. 236, at 9:50 a.m., on September 18, both of 1998; No. 235, at 10:20 a.m., on August 18; No. 258, at 10:00 a.m., on August 31; No. 299, at 10:40 a.m., on September 29, the three of 1999; No. 316, at 10:10 a.m., on March 29; No. 518, at 2:48 p.m., on May 19, both of 2000; No. 172, at 10:10 a.m., on March 14; No. 181, at 10:10 a.m., on March 22; No. 191, at 9:50 a.m., on March 28; No. 322, at 10:10 a.m., on June 13, all of 2001; No. 12, at 9:45 a.m., on January 12, 2007; and No. 258, at 10:30 a.m., on March 28, 2008). In accordance with that principle, contained in articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 of the General Law of Public Administration, only those obligations authorized by the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale and the system of sources applicable in each specific case, may be considered lawful and effective as obligations chargeable to a public entity or body.

**III.** As is evident from the foregoing, the appointment of a person to official service —entry into the teaching career— must be done through a valid and effective administrative act. The legal regime of administrative acts is addressed by the General Law of Public Administration, according to which "An administrative act that substantially conforms to the legal system shall be valid, including with respect to the motive of the official who issues it." (Article 128). That substantial conformity occurs when it meets the material requirements —those that adapt the administrative conduct to the need it satisfies and determine what the administration commands, authorizes, or prohibits; that is, the motive, the content, and the purpose— and formal requirements —those referring to the exercise of the power that authorizes it, to achieve its realization; that is, the procedure, the form of manifestation, and the competence— [see on this subject [Nombre2] , (2002). Thesis of Administrative Law. Medellín: Biblioteca Jurídica Diké, volume II, pp. 343 et seq.]. For what is relevant here, article 129 ibidem provides that "The act must be issued by the competent body and by the servant regularly designated at the time of issuing it, after prior fulfillment of all the substantial procedures provided for that purpose and of the indispensable requirements for the exercise of competence." Articles 96 and 97 of the Civil Service Statute attribute to the Personnel Department of the Ministry of Public Education the competence to make interim appointments of teachers throughout the country. The Regulations of the Teaching Career (Reglamento de la Carrera Docente), Executive Decree No. 2235, of February 14, 1972, and its amendments, pronounce similarly. In the pertinent part, article 30 of the Regulations for the Administrative Organization of the Central Offices of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de organización administrativa de las oficinas centrales del Ministerio de Educación Pública), Executive Decree No. 21896-MEP, of January 25, 1993, and its amendments —now repealed by article 132 of Executive Decree No. 34075 of October 18, 2007— provided: "The General Director of Personnel, in addition to the functions and powers that laws and regulations grant to the Director of Personnel of the Ministry of Public Education, shall be responsible for: a) Developing the personnel administration policy in accordance with legal provisions and directives issued by a higher authority. b) Ensuring the proper execution of actions corresponding to recruitment, selection, appointment, and promotion of personnel."* **IV.-** In the opinion of Ms. [Nombre1] , the official communication of January 20, 2006, issued by the head of Administrative Development of the Regional Directorate of Education of Limón (Dirección Regional de Enseñanza de Limón), visible on folio 1, constitutes the formal communication of her full-time interim appointment as a special education teacher, specializing in mental retardation, at the [Dirección1] , assigned to the [Dirección2] Limoncito School, for the period between February 10, 2006, and January 31, 2007. This Chamber, however, does not share that opinion because, as the State representation rightly argues, the documentary evidence provided must be considered to prove that the indispensable formal act of investiture as a teacher was never issued. Indeed, after verifying that, according to the list of positions for the year 2006, in that Educational Center —code CED1— only one was authorized in special education, which contemplated 32 lessons, the General Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Education did not definitively approve her interim appointment since it was necessary to extend that of Ms. [Nombre3] (documents on folios 20, 21, 22, and 23), which was done through personnel action No. 2703182 (folio 24). Furthermore, note the fact that, in the same communication submitted to support her claims, the plaintiff was clearly told the following: "Said movement is subject to the verification of enrollment and a change in the educational offerings for the 2006 school year; or to the resolution of a permanent transfer, promotion, or demotion of another servant; and to the approval of the General Directorate of Personnel." Therefore, such a document must be conceived, then, as a proposition within the set of preparatory acts that could have concluded with the formal administrative decision of appointment, but never as one that could grant her the right to consider herself a regular public servant. Since the planned procedure was not completed and, in particular, since the respective approval was not given by the competent body, concluding that she is entitled to unpaid salaries, based on that proposal, constitutes a flagrant and direct violation of the principle of legality. As stated, the valid and effective act of investiture is lacking, and none of the documents provided can be considered a substitute for it, since all of them together precisely lead to the opposite conclusion.* *********** **V.** Without prejudice to what has been indicated, it is not possible to ignore that Ms. [Nombre1] did work full-time as a special education teacher at the [Dirección2] Limoncito School between February 7 —the first day of the school year— and April 2, 2006, and that starting the following day she took a maternity leave that expired on July 31 (folios 2 and 3). In the Chamber's view, those services were rendered in good faith, as was the enjoyment of the leave. Several situations allow this inference. First, that she was received and admitted by the Principal as if she were, indeed, appointed, to which the fact that no one else appeared to fill that position undoubtedly contributed. Second, the considerable and unjustified delay by the administration in notifying her that her appointment had not been finalized. It is striking that more than four months elapsed between the communication of the proposal and that of the final decision, especially considering that, on March 21, the Principal and the Supervisor-Advisor of Circuit 02 processed the payment of her salary (folio 2) and received no response. That factual picture fully justifies that the plaintiff assumed she was indeed appointed, began working, continued doing so, and availed herself of maternity leave, considering she had every right to enjoy it. For this reason, and because there are regulations that partially protect her, it is not only fair but also has legal basis to grant her claims as explained below.* **VI.*** According to article 115 of the General Law of Public Administration, "A de facto official (funcionario de hecho) shall be one who does what the regular public servant does, but without investiture or with an invalid or ineffective investiture, even outside situations of urgency or illegitimate changes of government, provided that the following circumstances exist: a) That the absence or irregularity of the investiture has not yet been declared, neither administratively nor jurisdictionally; and b) That the conduct is carried out in a public, peaceful, continuous, and normally lawful manner" (on this subject, see the votes of the Constitutional Chamber No. 6701, at 3:06 p.m., on December 21, 1993, and No. 9, at 2:54 p.m., on January 4, 1994). In the Chamber's view, this is the status that must be attributed to Ms. [Nombre1], insofar as the following requirements are simultaneously present in her case: a) Pre-existence of "de jure" functions, that is, established by regulations. Without a doubt, the work performed by her is set forth in the Civil Service Statute and is developed in the corresponding Descriptive Manual of Positions (Manual descriptivo de puestos). b) Holding or having held the position in an effective, public, peaceful, and habitual manner (on official premises, using official registries and seals, etc.). It is undeniable that at the [Dirección3] School she was considered the holder of the position and that she integrated into that educational center, did so with regularity, and it was not questioned whether or not she was the person appointed to the post; on the contrary, she was considered as such. c) Performing or having performed it under the outward appearance of being the legitimate occupant of the position. It does not seem questionable that it was in a different manner, at least until the moment she became aware of her "cessation" of appointment; that is, the following June 6. Note that, according to the statement of the plaintiff herself, contained in her claim, on that date she received via fax the official communication of May 30, 2006, signed by the head of Administrative Development of the Regional Directorate of Education of Limón, through which she was informed that her interim appointment as a special education teacher at the Limoncito School was being nullified, because no code existed, effective as of the previous February 1 (folio 5). Now then, it is true that article 117 ibidem denies the existence of "(...) a relationship or service between the de facto official and the Administration (…)," but it is also true that "(...) if the former has acted in good faith, they shall not be obliged to return what was received from the administration as compensation and, if they have received nothing, they may recover the costs of their conduct to the extent that there has been unjust enrichment on the part of the Administration, according to the rules of common law."* **VII**. For further support, it is pertinent to point out, as we did in vote No. 235, at 10:20 a.m., on August 18, 1999, that "***XIV**.- The principle of State responsibility and the right to the integrity of one's own patrimony have constitutional rank (in order, articles 9 and 45). The General Law of Public Administration regulates, in an exhaustive and special manner, the parameters and principles of administrative liability. Its article 190 establishes, as a general rule, that '1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. 2. The Administration shall be liable in accordance with this article, even when it cannot be so by virtue of the following sections of this Chapter, but liability for a lawful act or normal functioning shall arise only under the terms of the following Third Section.' Based on these statements, an objective system of administrative liability was structured in Costa Rican legislation, the foundation of which is the aforementioned principle of patrimonial integrity of the administered person-victim, who may well be a person serving the State and whose starting point, for analyzing the specific case, is always the damage produced. The conduct of the liable Administration lacks significance for determining whether there is merit to declare the duty to repair; for this operates by operation of law. However, its assessment is fundamental to establishing its scope. In what is relevant, it is worth noting that, in the case of an activity that is lawful and normal, it is not possible to claim compensation for losses or lost profits (lucro cesante). This is expressly provided by article 194 ibidem: '1. The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and for its normal functioning when they cause damage to the administered party's rights in a special manner, due to the small proportion of affected parties or the exceptional intensity of the injury. 2. In this case, the compensation shall cover the value of the damages at the time of payment, but not lost profits. 3. The State shall be liable for damages caused directly by a law that are special in accordance with this article.' That does not occur when there is illegitimate or abnormal conduct, in which case the scope of the compensation is indeed unrestricted. Abnormal functioning exists when the conduct is unlawful in itself, because it was carried out in violation of the positive legal system or the technical norms of good organization and administration or the rules of prudence in administrative action (articles 11, 14, 15, 16, and 17 ibidem). It likewise exists when it entails unexpected results, not in conformity with its nature and function; that is, aberrant from a statistical point of view and, even, contradictory to the public purpose pursued by the legal system, although the conduct is not, in itself, unlawful. The stated principles are basic for contextualizing the current statutory norms, the analysis of which cannot be done in isolation, because it could render invisible a potential fraud of law (fraude de ley) which, even if carried out by a public entity, body, or agency, does not cease to be prohibited by the legal system (article 20 of the Civil Code and the doctrine of votes No. 177, at 8:10 a.m., on July 31, 1992, and No. 31, at 9:10 a.m., on March 5, 1993). They also constitute the factual and legal assumptions for a claim of economic liability against the State, such as the one now being considered, to proceed. And, since it is evident that in this matter none of the exclusion hypotheses referred to in said article 190 has occurred, the State cannot be exonerated from its obligation to repair the detriment caused. **XV** - In Costa Rican labor law and also in public function law, the compensation for damages and losses, except in the cases of article 31 of the Labor Code, does not require the claimant to prove their existence and severity, unlike what occurs in civil law and other legal branches.* This is so because, in specific scenarios, such as dismissal without just cause and occupational risks, scheduled remedial systems are established (see, for example, numerals 82, 94 bis, 218 and concordant articles and 368 ibidem, as well as votes no. 31, at 3:00 p.m., of March 20, 1986; 110, at 10:00 a.m., of October 17; 355, at 3:50 p.m., of November 6; both of 1996; 3, at 2:20 p.m., of January 8; 93, at 3:10 p.m., of May 14; 328, at 9:10 a.m., of December 19; the last ones of 1997; 90, at 10:00 a.m., of March 25 and 168, at 3:30 p.m., of July 15; both of 1998). Considering the particularities of this proceeding, the absence of any specific scheduled provision is clear. Hence, the compensation to which Mrs. (...) is entitled must be determined taking, as a fundamental basis, the aforementioned articles 190 to 194 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and articles 21 and 22 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, it is pertinent to bear in mind another principle of law, codified, in its most generic sense, in both non-contractual and contractual contexts, in numerals 1045 and 701, respectively, of that Civil Code. According to this legal guideline, whoever causes damage to another person must repair it, together with the losses". * * * * * * * * * * * VIII.- The reparation for the legitimate conduct carried out by Mrs. [Name1] cannot be other than the salaries she should have received if the act of her appointment had been perfected. That said, it does not cover the entire period for which she could have been designated as a teacher at the Escuela de [Address2] Limoncito, but rather that which runs from the moment she began working; that is, February 7, 2006, until the moment she was to return to her duties after enjoying her maternity leave, since, by then, she already knew her investiture did not exist; that is, July 31 of that same year, because from that moment any provision of services by her would probably constitute a usurpation of functions. Likewise, the corresponding legal interest must be covered. In a matter bearing certain similarities to this one, the Constitutional Chamber held that: "For this Court, the fundamental rights of the claimant were indeed infringed, specifically, the constitutional principle of legal certainty was infringed. In this regard, if it is demonstrated that the appellant worked for the said time, with appointments made by the respondent Ministry, even if the latter incurred an error in issuing those appointments, this situation cannot affect the employee, because although approval by the Civil Service did not occur, the reality is that the Administration, through acts endowed with a certain formality, made those designations materially effective. Thus, the respondent cannot now seek to leave the former female employee in uncertainty, because it was the Administration that caused the problem, having done, omitted, or allowed that the petitioner worked under this state of affairs." (Vote no. 2003-4588, at 2:38 p.m., of May 27, 2003). * IX.- It is fundamental to point out that the abnormal functioning of the Administration, of which the unjustified delay in making a fairly simple decision, such as the appointment of the plaintiff, is indisputable evidence—however legitimate it might have been not to make it—as well as the effects it generated, is also contrary to administrative legality and cannot harm the administered individuals. Undoubtedly, the liability arising from such anomalous situation "(...) must be directed against the administrative authorities or heads who [promoted] it (...); that is, this illegality cannot revert to the detriment of the employee themselves who, without any bad faith being observed, is placed in these conditions." In this sense, in vote no. 170-98, at 10:00 a.m. of July 16, 1998, this Chamber said: "..that the execution of irregular practices in assigning functions to employees who—personally or academically—do not meet the requirements set forth by the Job Manual for the position’s profile, could prove detrimental to the principle of efficiency that informs the administrative order, whose main purpose—elevated to the highest rank by the constituents—is the correct satisfaction of the community’s needs; as is inferred from numerals 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution. At this point, the principle of legality that the Administration has rightly alleged (...) obliges the latter (sic) to recognize Mr. ..., the salary difference existing between the wage he receives (...), and the one he should receive (...), as long as it keeps him performing tasks specific to the second cited position, while proceeding to correct this situation. Such recognition is mandated by the letter of article 57 of the Political Constitution, which enshrines the equality of salary under equal conditions of work and efficiency; a principle developed by numeral 167 of the Labor Code. To order the contrary would mean legitimizing an abusive conduct by the employer (...) an action that this Chamber cannot, from any point of view, endorse or foster." (Vote no. 1110-2006, at 10:15 a.m., of November 30, 2006). * X.- Finally, it must be emphasized that the special employment protection (fuero de protección) for the pregnant worker is not applicable since, as the State’s representative effectively argues, there was no service relationship linking the parties. Nor is the discrimination attributed by the lower-court authorities apparent, because the decision not to appoint the plaintiff on an interim basis to the position she was interested in was due to the superior right held over it by Mrs. Yanice* Shakira* Cole* Hagdson for having achieved a better score for accrediting the position and, furthermore, for having held the post in that same capacity since a year prior (folios 23 and 24). The accreditation of these reasons prevents the perception of discrimination due to the condition of pregnancy or postpartum against Mrs. [Name1], as was erroneously interpreted in prior instances, without supporting evidence. *

XI.Based on the considerations set forth, the appropriate course is to modify the appealed judgment, insofar as it ordered the State to pay lost wages from February 1, 2006, to January 31, 2007, to instead grant them only between February 7 and July 31, both dates in 2006. Regarding the revoked portion, the exception of lack of right invoked by the State’s representation must be granted. In all other respects, the challenged sentence must be confirmed, including the ruling on costs, as the Chamber does not consider that any cause for exemption exists (articles 494 and 495 of the Labor Code and 221 of the Civil Procedure Code).” *

*

“I. Doña [Nombre1] reclamó los salarios insolutos por haberse desempeñado como maestra en la Escuela de Limoncito, desde la fecha de su designación interina -1 de febrero de 2006- y hasta su cancelación efectiva; así como los intereses legales y las costas (folios 6-10). La representante del Estado opuso la excepción de falta de derecho y justificó la ausencia del pago acusado en el hecho de que el nombramiento de la actora no se perfeccionó, por cuanto, como bien se le hizo saber, estaba sujeto a la aprobación de la Dirección General de Personal y esta no se dio debido a que el único puesto en educación especial destacado en ese centro educativo lo ocupaba desde el curso lectivo de 2005 una educadora calificada, la señora Yanice* Shakira* Cole* Hadgson, con grupo profesional ET y no existía otro con código presupuestario asignado. A su juicio, como no se llegó a constituir una relación de empleo con la administración y nunca hubo despido injustificado, ella no puede invocar como fundamento de su demanda los artículos 94 y 94 bis del Código de Trabajo (folios 26 a 48). En la sentencia de primera instancia (folios 113-121), confirmada mediante voto n.° 137-07-LA, de las 11:42 horas, del 21 de noviembre de 2007, emitido por el Tribunal del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela (folios 156-163), se estimó que el cese de la actora obedeció a su estado de embarazo y, por eso, se declaró con lugar la demanda, con la consiguiente condenatoria en costas al Estado. En esta sede, esa parte acusa una errada apreciación del principio de primacía de la realidad, en detrimento del de legalidad y la preterición de documentos emitidos por autoridades competentes, como la constancia UG5-1412-2006, suscrita por la otra jefa de la Unidad cinco de la Dirección General de Personal del Ministerio de Educación. Además, rechaza haber litigado de mala fe y que no haya aportado prueba de sus aseveraciones. En su criterio, no existe un solo elemento que permita sostener que la accionante fue despedida por su embarazo. Solicita, por ello, la revocatoria de la sentencia recurrida en todos sus extremos, incluyendo la condena en costas (folios 171-182).*

II.Con la Constitución Política de 1949 se incorporó al acervo de derechos fundamentales la igualdad en el acceso a los cargos públicos con la consiguiente garantía de inamovilidad o estabilidad (artículo 192). Con el fin de hacerlos realidad, su numeral 191 dispuso que “Un estatuto de servicio civil regulará las relaciones entre el Estado y los servidores públicos, con el propósito de garantizar la eficiencia de la administración”. En acatamiento de esas normas, se promulgó el Estatuto de Servido Civil por Ley n°. 1581 de 30 de mayo de 1953. Este instrumento jurídico fue adicionado por Ley n°. 4565 de 4 de mayo de 1970, conocida como Ley de Carrera Docente, la cual, a partir de su vigencia, vino a constituir el marco normativo básico para establecer “(...) los requisitos de ingreso al servido oficial, así como las obligaciones y derechos de los servidores”. De esa manera, conforme lo indicamos en las sentencias n°s 91, de las 10:05 horas, del 25 de marzo de 1998 y 235, de las 10:20 horas, del 18 de agosto de 1999, el Estatuto de Servido Civil reguló dos tipos diferentes y excluyentes de carrera: la administrativa (Libro I) y la docente (Libro II). Cada una de ellas conforma un especial régimen de empleo público, aplicable a dos grupos diversos, con normas específicas en cuanto a clasificación, ingreso, selección, ascensos, descensos, promociones, traslados, derechos, deberes, prohibiciones, faltas y sanciones, entre otros. La primera, conocida como “Régimen de Servicio Civil”, protege, en general, a quienes laboran en el Poder Ejecutivo, con las excepciones de los artículos 3, 4 y 5 de dicho Estatuto. La segunda ampara específicamente a los empleados y a las empleadas del Ministerio de Educación Pública que imparten lecciones; a las personas que realizan funciones técnicas propias de la docencia y a quienes sirven puestos para cuyo desempeño se requiere poseer título o certificado que acredite para ejercer la función docente (ordinal 54). No obstante, es posible aplicarle a este último grupo algunas de las reglas previstas para aquel, en virtud de lo dispuesto por el numeral 180 ibídem, cuyo texto es el siguiente: “Las situaciones no previstas en este título, relativas a derechos y deberes de los servidores, serán resueltas conforme a lo establecido, correspondientemente, en el Título I de este Estatuto”. Por esta vía, podría dársele vigencia también, aunque de manera supletoria y excepcional, al Código de Trabajo y al Civil (artículos 51 ibídem y 15 del Código de Trabajo). Por Ley n°. 8555 de 10 de octubre de 2006 se le adicionó el Título IV —artículos 208 al 232— al Estatuto de Servicio Civil y así se creó otro tipo de carrera: la artística, destinada a normar las relaciones entre el Poder Ejecutivo y quienes le brinden servicios o actividades artísticas de manera permanente o habitual y en forma remunerada o con derecho a retribución económica, en virtud de nombramiento de la institución o del órgano respectivo. Algunos años antes de las dos reformas legales apuntadas, se dictó la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, n°. 2166 de 9 de octubre de 1957, cuyo objetivo fundamental es uniformar el aspecto salarial en el Sector Público. En 1978, la Ley General de la Administración Pública, n°. 6227 de 2 de mayo de ese año, complementó el desarrollo normativo del régimen estatutario al establecer disposiciones, de orden general, relativas a la relación de servicio y definir, en su ordinal 111, inciso 1), que “Es servidor público la persona que presta servidos a la Administración o a nombre y por cuenta de ésta (sic), como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia del carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva”. En el mismo numeral 111 y en el número 112 ibídem, se deslindó el caso de los funcionarios regulados en lo fundamental por las normas estatutarias, respecto de aquellos otros que se regirían por el derecho laboral común, reforzándose para los primeros la aplicación prevalente de las normas del derecho público. Ese recuento parcial evidencia la voluntad política expresada por la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente en los referidos artículos 191 y 192 y en el transitorio al 140 de la Constitución Política y por la Asamblea Legislativa en las regulaciones de desarrollo, entre ellas el Estatuto de Servicio Civil, de diferenciar las relaciones estatutarias de servicio, de los vínculos laborales del sector privado; lo cual fue plasmado como regla general en el inciso 1) del ordinal 112 de la última Ley citada, al tenor del cual “El derecho administrativo será aplicable a las relaciones de servicio entre la Administración y sus servidores públicos”. En consecuencia, y encontrándonos en la especie frente a una relación de carácter estatutario, le asiste razón a la representante estatal cuando reclama que, en este asunto, debe primar el principio de legalidad. Ni en esta sede ni en la administrativa es posible desconocer las reglas específicas de él derivadas (ver los ordinales 11 y 154 de la Constitución Política, al igual que el 2 y el 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y el 6 y el 11 de la Ley General citada). Así lo ha reiterado la jurisprudencia Constitucional y la de esta Sala, enfatizando que, en esta materia, los principios y las normas del Derecho Laboral —privado- deben ceder paso, cuando así proceda, a las especiales de las disciplinas iuspublicistas —las del Derecho Administrativo, en particular y del Público, en general— que no solo pueden ser distintos, sino, inclusive, contrapuestos a ellas (al respecto, conviene consultar, entre muchos otros, los votos de la Sala Constitucional n°s. 1696, de las 15:30 horas, del 21 de agosto de 1992; 4788, de las 8:48 horas, del 30 de setiembre de 1993; 3309, de las 15 horas, del 5 de julio de 1994; 6095, de las 9:18 horas, del 18 de octubre de 1994; 3125, de las 6:24 horas, del 14 de junio de 1995; 3865, de las 10:57 horas, del 14 de julio de 1995 y 3089 de las 15 horas, del 12 de mayo de 1998; así como los de esta Sala n°s 159, de las 14:20 horas, del 23 de junio de 1994; 191, de las 10:10 horas, del 4 de setiembre; 254, de las 9:10 horas, del 30 de agosto, ambos de 1996, 31, de las 15:45 horas, del 12 de febrero de 1997; 91, de las 10:05 horas, del 25 de marzo; 236, de las 9:50 horas, del 18 de setiembre, ambos de 1998; 235, de las 10:20 horas, del 18 de agosto; 258, de las 10 horas, del 31 de agosto; 299, de las 10:40 horas, del 29 de setiembre, los tres de 1999; 316, de las 10:10 horas, del 29 de marzo; 518, de las 14:48 horas, del 19 de mayo, ambos de 2000; 172, de las 10:10 horas, del 14 de marzo; 181, de las 10:10 horas, del 22 de marzo; 191, de las 9:50 horas, del 28 de marzo; 322, de las 10:10 horas, del 13 de junio, todos de 2001; 12, de las 9:45 horas, del 12 de enero de 2007 y 258, de las 10:30 horas, del 28 de marzo de 2008). De conformidad con ese principio, recogido en los artículos 11 de la Constitución Política y 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, solo pueden considerarse lícitas y efectivas, como obligaciones a cargo de un ente u órgano público, aquellas que se encuentren autorizadas por el ordenamiento jurídico, según la escala jerárquica y el sistema de fuentes que resulte aplicable en cada caso concreto.*

III.Como se desprende de lo anterior, el nombramiento de una persona en el servicio oficial —ingreso a la carrera docente— debe hacerse a través de un acto administrativo válido y eficaz. Del régimen jurídico de los actos administrativos se ocupa la Ley General de la Administración Pública, de acuerdo con la cual “Será válido el acto administrativo que se conforme sustancialmente con el ordenamiento jurídico, incluso en cuanto al móvil del funcionario que lo dicta.” (Artículo 128). Esa conformidad sustancial se produce cuando reúne los requisitos materiales —los que adecuan la conducta administrativa a la necesidad que satisface y determinan lo que la administración manda, autoriza o prohíbe; o sea, el motivo, el contenido y el fin— y formales —los referidos al ejercicio de la potestad que lo autoriza, para lograr su realización; es decir, el procedimiento, la forma de manifestación y la competencia— [véase al respecto [Nombre2] , (2002). Tesis de Derecho Administrativo. Medellín: Biblioteca Jurídica Diké, tomo II, pp. 343 ss.]. Para lo que aquí interesa, el numeral 129 ibídem dispone que “El acto deberá dictarse por el órgano competente y por el servidor regularmente designado al momento de dictarlo, previo cumplimiento de todos los trámites sustanciales previstos al efecto y de los requisitos indispensables para el ejercicio de la competencia”. Los artículos 96 y 97 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil le atribuyen al Departamento de Personal del Ministerio de Educación Pública la competencia para realizar los nombramientos interinos de las y los docentes de todo el país. En similar sentido se pronuncia el Reglamento de la Carrera Docente, decreto ejecutivo n° 2235, del 14 de febrero de 1972 y sus reformas. En lo conducente, el artículo 30 del Reglamento de organización administrativa de las oficinas centrales del Ministerio de Educación Pública, decreto ejecutivo n° 21896-MEP, de 25 de enero de 1993 y sus reformas —hoy derogado por el numeral 132 del decreto ejecutivo n° 34075 de 18 de octubre de 2007— disponía: “Al Director General de Personal, además de las funciones y atribuciones que las leyes y los reglamentos otorgan al Director de Personal del Ministerio de Educación Pública, le corresponderá: a)Desarrollar la política de administración de personal de conformidad con las disposiciones legales y las directrices emanadas de autoridad superior. b) Velar por la adecuada ejecución de las acciones correspondientes al reclutamiento, selección, nombramiento y promoción del personal”.*

IV.- A juicio de la señora [Nombre1] , el oficio del 20 de enero de 2006, emitido por el jefe de Desarrollo Administrativo de la Dirección Regional de Enseñanza de Limón, visible a folio 1, constituye la comunicación formal de su nombramiento interino a tiempo completo como profesora de enseñanza especial, especialidad retardo mental, en la [Dirección1] , destacada en la Escuela de [Dirección2] Limoncito, por el periodo comprendido entre el 10 de febrero de 2006 y el 31 de enero de 2007. La Sala, sin embargo, no comparte ese criterio porque, como bien lo defiende la representación estatal, con la prueba documental aportada se debe tener por acreditado que el imprescindible acto formal de investidura como docente nunca se emitió. En efecto, luego de corroborar que, de acuerdo con la relación de puestos para el año 2006, en ese Centro Educativo —código CED1— solo estaba autorizado uno en enseñanza especial, que contemplaba 32 lecciones, la Dirección General de Personal del Ministerio de Educación no aprobó en definitiva su nombramiento interino ya que correspondía prorrogar el de la señora [Nombre3] (documentos de folios 20, 21, 22 y 23), lo cual se hizo mediante acción de personal n° 2703182 (folio 24). Repárese, además, en el hecho de que, en el mismo comunicado aportado para apoyar sus pretensiones, a la actora se le indicó de manera clara lo siguiente: "Dicho movimiento queda sujeto a la verificación de matrícula y cambio en la oferta educativa del curso lectivo 2006; o a que se resuelva un traslado, ascenso o descenso en propiedad de otro servidor; y a la aprobación de la Dirección General de Personal”. Por eso, tal documento ha de ser concebido, entonces, como una proposición dentro del cúmulo de actos preparatorios que podrían haber concluido con la decisión administrativa formal de nombramiento, pero nunca como uno que podría otorgarle el derecho a considerarla funcionaria pública regular. Al no haberse completado el procedimiento previsto y, en particular, al no haberse dado la aprobación respectiva por el órgano competente, concluir que tiene derecho a los salarios insolutos, con base en esa propuesta, constituye una flagrante y frontal violación del principio de legalidad. Como se expuso, se echa de menos el acto válido y eficaz de investidura y ninguno de los documentos aportados puede tenerse como sustitutivo de él, pues el conjunto de todos ellos obliga, justamente, a concluir lo contrario.* * * * * * * * * * * V. Sin demérito de lo indicado, no es posible obviar que doña [Nombre1] sí laboró a tiempo completo como profesora de enseñanza especial en la Escuela de [Dirección2] Limoncito entre el 7 de febrero — primer día del curso lectivo— y el 2 de abril de 2006 y que a partir del día siguiente se acogió a una licencia por maternidad que vencía el 31 de julio (folios 2 y 3). Para la Sala, esos servicios fueron prestados de buena fe, al igual que el disfrute de la licencia. Varias situaciones permiten inferirlo. En primer lugar, el que haya sido recibida y admitida por la Directora como si, efectivamente, estuviese nombrada, a lo cual contribuyó, sin duda, el que nadie más se presentase a ocupar ese puesto. En segundo lugar, el considerable e injustificado retraso de la administración en notificarle que su nombramiento no se había perfeccionado. Llama la atención que entre la comunicación de la propuesta y la de la decisión final hayan transcurrido más de cuatro meses, sobre todo si se tiene en cuenta que, con fecha 21 de marzo, la Directora y el Supervisor-Asesor del Circuito 02 gestionaron el pago de su salario (folio 2) y no obtuvieron respuesta alguna. Ese cuadro fáctico justifica plenamente que la actora haya asumido que sí estaba nombrada, comenzara a trabajar, continuara haciéndolo y se acogiera a la licencia por maternidad estimando que tenía pleno derecho a disfrutarla. Por eso y porque existe normativa que la ampara parcialmente, no solo es justo sino que también tiene asidero jurídico estimar sus pretensiones conforme se explica de seguido.* VI.* De acuerdo con el numeral 115 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, “Será funcionario de hecho el que hace lo que el servidor público regular, pero sin investidura o con una investidura inválida o ineficaz, aun fuera de situaciones de urgencia o de cambios ilegítimos de gobierno, siempre que se den las siguientes circunstancias: a) Que no se haya declarado todavía la ausencia o la irregularidad de la investidura, ni administrativa ni jurisdiccionalmente; y b) Que la conducta sea desarrollada en forma pública, pacífica, continua y normalmente acomodada a derecho” (sobre el tema se pueden consultar los votos de la Sala Constitucional n°s 6701, de las 15:06 horas, del 21 de diciembre de 1993 y 9, de las 14:54 horas, del 4 de enero de 1994). Para la Sala, esa es la condición que cabe atribuirle a doña [Nombre1], por cuanto en su caso concurren, en forma simultánea, los siguientes requisitos: a) Preexistencia de funciones "de jure" es decir, establecidas normativamente. Sin duda, la labor desempeñada por ella se encuentra enunciada en el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y está desarrollada en el correspondiente Manual descriptivo de puestos. b) Detentar o haber detentado el cargo en forma efectiva, pública, pacífica y habitual (en los locales oficiales, utilizando registros y sellos oficiales, etc.). Es innegable que en la Escuela de [Dirección3] se le consideró como titular del cargo y que se integró a ese centro educativo, lo hizo con regularidad y no se cuestionó si era o no la persona nombrada en el puesto; por el contrario, se le reputó como tal. c) Desempeñarlo o haberlo desempeñado bajo la apariencia exterior de ser la persona ocupante legítima del cargo. No parece cuestionable que lo haya sido de diferente manera, al menos hasta el momento en que se dio por enterada de su “cese” de nombramiento; o sea, el 6 de junio siguiente. Nótese que, según manifestación de la misma actora, contenida en su escrito de demanda, en esa fecha ella recibió vía fax el oficio del 30 de mayo de 2006, suscrito por el jefe de Desarrollo Administrativo de la Dirección Regional de Enseñanza de Limón, mediante el cual se le comunicó que se dejaba sin efecto su nombramiento interino como profesora de enseñanza especial en la Escuela de Limoncito, debido a que no existe código, a partir del 1° de febrero anterior (folio 5). Ahora bien, es cierto que el 117 ibídem niega la existencia de “(...) relación o servicio entre el funcionario de hecho y la Administración (…)” pero también lo es que “(...) si el primero ha actuado de buena fe no estará obligado a devolver lo percibido de la administración en concepto de retribución y, si nada ha recibido, podrá recuperar los costos de su conducta en la medida en que haya habido enriquecimiento sin causa, de la Administración, según las reglas del derecho común”.*

VII.A mayor abundamiento, conviene puntualizar, como lo hicimos en el voto n° 235, de las 10:20 horas, del 18 de agosto de 1999, que “XIV.- El principio de responsabilidad del Estado y el derecho a la integridad del propio patrimonio, tienen rango constitucional (por su orden, ordinales 9 y 45). La Ley General de la Administración Pública regula, de maneras exhaustiva y especial, los parámetros y los principios de la responsabilidad administrativa. Su artículo 190 establece, como regla general, que “1. La Administración responderá por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero. 2. La Administración será responsable de conformidad con este artículo, aun cuando no pueda serlo en virtud de las secciones siguientes de este Capítulo, pero la responsabilidad por acto lícito o funcionamiento normal, se dará únicamente según los términos de la Sección Tercera siguiente.” Con base en esos enunciados, en la legislación costarricense se estructuró un sistema objetivo de responsabilidad administrativa, cuyo fundamento es el mencionado principio de integridad patrimonial, de la persona administrada-víctima, que bien puede ser una al servicio del Estado y cuyo punto de partida, para el análisis del caso concreto, es, siempre, daño producido. La conducta de la Administración responsable carece de trascendencia a los efectos de determinar si existe mérito o no para declarar el deber reparatorio; pues este opera de pleno derecho. No obstante, sí resulta fundamental su valoración para establecer sus alcances. En lo que interesa, vale acotar que, tratándose de una actividad que sea lícita y normal, no es posible reclamar la indemnización de los perjuicios o del lucro cesante. Así lo dispone expresamente el ordinal 194 ibídem: “1. La Administración será responsable por su actos lícitos y por su funcionamiento normal cuando los mismos causen daño a los derechos del administrado en forma especial, por la pequeña proporción de afectados o por la intensidad excepcional de la lesión. 2. En este caso la indemnización deberá cubrir el valor de los daños al momento de su pago, pero no el lucro cesante. 3. El Estado será responsable por los daños causados directamente por una ley, que sean especiales de conformidad con el presente artículo.” Eso no sucede cuando se está en presencia de una actuación ilegítima o anormal, caso en el cual los alcances de la reparación sí son irrestrictos. Existe funcionamiento anormal cuando la actuación es antijurídica en sí misma, porque se realizó con violación del ordenamiento positivo o de las normas técnicas de buena organización y administración o de las reglas de prudencia en el actuar administrativo (artículos 11, 14, 15, 16 y 17 ibídem). Igualmente lo es cuando acarrea resultados inesperados, no conformes con su naturaleza y función; esto es, aberrantes desde el punto de vista estadístico e, incluso, contradictorios con el fin público perseguido por el ordenamiento, aunque la actuación no sea, en sí misma, antijurídica. Los principios expuestos son básicos para contextualizar la normativa estatutaria vigente, cuyo análisis no puede hacerse de manera aislada, porque ello podría invisibilizar un eventual fraude de ley que, no por ser realizado por un ente, órgano o dependencia pública, deja de estar prohibido por el ordenamiento jurídico (artículo 20 del Código Civil y doctrina de los votos n°s 177, de las 8:10 horas, del 31 de julio de 1992 y 31, de las 9:10 horas, del 5 de marzo de 1993). Constituyen, también, los supuestos fácticos y jurídicos, para que proceda una demanda de responsabilidad económica contra el Estado, como la que ahora se conoce. Y, al ser evidente que, en este asunto, no se ha dado alguna de las hipótesis de exclusión, a las que hace referencia el citado ordinal 190, el Estado no puede ser exonerado de su obligación de tener que reparar el menoscabo producido. XV - En el derecho laboral y también en el de la función pública costarricenses, el resarcimiento de los daños y los perjuicios, salvo en los supuestos del artículo 31 del Código de Trabajo, no requiere que la persona reclamante demuestre su existencia y gravedad, a diferencia de lo que ocurre en el civil y en otras ramas jurídicas. Ello es así porque, ante hipótesis concretas, como por ejemplo el despido sin causa justa y los riesgos laborales, se establecen sistemas reparatorios tarifados (véanse, por ejemplo, los numerales 82, 94 bis, 218 y concordantes y 368 ibídem, al igual que los votos n°s 31, de las 15 horas, del 20 de marzo de 1986; 110, de las 10 horas, del 17 de octubre; 355, de las 15:50 horas, del 6 de noviembre; ambos de 1996; 3, de las 14:20 horas, del 8 de enero; 93, de las 15:10 horas, del 14 de mayo; 328, de las 9:10 horas, del 19 de diciembre; los últimos de 1997; 90, de las 10 horas, del 25 de marzo y 168, de las 15:30 horas, del 15 de julio; los dos de 1998). Considerando las particularidades de este proceso, es clara la inexistencia de alguna previsión tarifaria específica. De ahí que, la indemnización a que tiene derecho la señora (...), deba determinarse teniendo, como base fundamental, los mencionados artículos 190 a 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y el 21 y el 22 del Código Civil. Además, conviene tener presente otro principio de derecho, positivizado, en su acepción más genérica, en lo extracontractual y en lo contractual, en los numerales 1045 y 701, por su orden, de ese Código Civil. Según esta pauta jurídica, quien cause un daño a otra persona debe repararlo, junto con los perjuicios”.*

* * * * * * * * * * VIII.- La reparación de la legítima conducta desplegada por la señora [Nombre1] no puede ser otra que los salarios que debió haber percibido si se hubiese perfeccionado el acto de su nombramiento. Eso sí, no abarcan todo el período por el que pudo haber sido designada como maestra en la Escuela de [Dirección2] Limoncito sino aquel que va desde el momento en que comenzó labores; es decir, el 7 de febrero de 2006 y hasta el momento en que debía retornar a sus labores luego de disfrutar de su licencia por maternidad, pues, para entonces, ya tenía conocimiento de que su investidura no existía; esto es, el 31 de julio de ese mismo año, pues a partir de ese momento cualquier prestación suya de servicios configuraría, probablemente, una usurpación de funciones. De igual modo, se ha de cubrir los intereses legales correspondientes. En un asunto que guarda ciertas similitudes con este, la Sala Constitucional resolvió que: "Para este Tribunal sí fueron infringidos los derechos fundamentales de la accionante, específicamente, se infringió el principio constitucional de seguridad jurídica. En este sentido, si está demostrado que la recurrente laboró el tiempo dicho, con nombramientos que le hizo la Cartera accionada, aunque ésta hubiere incurrido en error al disponer esos nombramientos, esa situación no puede afectar a la servidora, pues aunque no se produjo la aprobación del Servicio Civil, lo cierto es que la Administración con actos revestidos de cierta formalidad hizo materialmente efectivas esas designaciones. Así las cosas, no puede ahora pretender el accionado, dejar en incertidumbre a la exservidora, porque fue la Administración la causante del problema, al haber hecho, dejado, o permitido, que la promovente trabajara en ese estado de cosas". (Voto n° 2003-4588, de las 14:38 horas, del 27 de mayo de 2003).* IX.- Es fundamental apuntar que el funcionamiento anormal de la Administración, muestra de lo cual es, indiscutiblemente, ese injustificado atraso en tomar una decisión bastante simple como lo era el nombramiento de la actora, por más legítimo que haya sido no hacerlo, así como los efectos que eso generó, también resulta contrario a la legalidad administrativa y no puede perjudicar a las personas administradas. Sin duda, la responsabilidad derivada de tal situación anómala “(...) debe ser dirigida contra las autoridades administrativas o jerarcas que [la] propiciaron (…); es decir, esa ilegalidad no puede revertirse en perjucio del propio servidor/a que, sin advertirse alguna mala fe, es puesto en esas condiciones". En este sentido, en el voto n° 170-98, de las 10:00 horas del 16 de julio de 1998, esta Sala dijo: “..que la ejecución de prácticas irregulares en la asignación de funciones a empleados que -personal o académicamente- no reúnen los presupuestos contemplados por el Manual de Puestos para el perfil del cargo, podrían resultar atentatorias contra el principio de eficiencia que informa el ordenamiento administrativo, cuya principal finalidad -elevada al más alto rango por los constituyentes- es la correcta satisfacción de las necesidades de la colectividad; según se desprende de los numerales 191 y 192 de la Constitución Poítica. En este punto, el principio de legalidad que acertadamente ha alegado la Administración (…) obliga a ésta (sic) a reconocer al señor ..., la diferencia salarial que existe entre el sueldo que él percibe (…), y el que debería de recibir (…), siempre y cuando lo mantenga ejecutando labores propias del segundo puesto citado, mientras procede a corregir esa situación. Tal reconocimiento se impone de la letra del artículo 57 de la Constitución Política, que consagra la igualdad de salario en iguales condiciones de trabajo y eficiencia; principio desarrollado por el numeral 167 del Código de Trabajo. Disponer lo contrarío, significaría legitimar una conducta abusiva del patrono (...) actuación que esta Sala no puede, desde ningún punto de vista, respaldar ni prohijar". (Voto n° 1110-2006, de las 10:15 horas, del 30 de noviembre de 2006).* X.- Finalmente, es preciso destacar que el fuero de protección de la trabajadora embarazada no resulta aplicable ya que, como efectivamente lo alega la representante del Estado, no existió relación de servicio que vinculara a las partes. Tampoco se visualiza la discriminación atribuida por las autoridades de instancia, pues la decisión de no nombrar en forma interina a la actora en la plaza de su interés se debió al mejor derecho que tenía sobre ella la señora Yanice* Shakira* Cole* Hagdson por haber alcanzado mejor puntaje para la acreditación del cargo y, además, haber ocupado el puesto en esa misma condición desde un año antes (folios 23 y 24). La acreditación de esos motivos impide visualizar la discriminación por la condición de gravidez o post parto en contra de doña [Nombre1], como erróneamente se interpretó en instancias anteriores, sin prueba que la amparase.*

XI.Con base en las consideraciones expuestas, lo procedente es modificar el fallo recurrido, en cuanto condenó al Estado al pago de los salarios dejados de percibir desde el primero de febrero de dos mil seis y hasta el treinta y uno de enero de dos mil siete, para, en su lugar, otorgarlos únicamente entre el siete de febrero y el treinta y uno de julio, ambas datas de dos mil seis. Respecto de lo revocado se ha de acoger la excepción de falta de derecho, invocada por la representación estatal. En lo demás, ha de confirmarse la sentencia impugnada, incluido el pronunciamiento sobre costas, pues no estima la Sala que concurra alguna causal de exoneración (artículos 494 y 495 del Código de Trabajo y 221 del Procesal Civil).”*

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