Unjustified dismissal of worker with fibromyalgia for absencesDespido injustificado por ausencias de trabajadora con fibromialgia

IV.- Unlike the scenario provided for in the case of dismissal at will, in which Article 28 of the Labor Code requires the employer to exercise in writing this power to terminate the indefinite-term employment contract, in the case of disciplinary dismissal, there is no express legal norm with similar content. However, it is to be expected that, in consideration of the principle of good faith (Articles 19 thereof and 21 of the Civil Code), such a momentous act be documented in the same manner and communicated personally to the counterparty. Within this context, the Constitutional Chamber has repeatedly stated that, in order to prevent the potential abuse of the freedom to dismiss and to guarantee the fundamental rights of the employed person to work, to equality, and to due process should they have to resort to the courts to claim their rights, it is the employer's obligation to deliver the certification referred to in Article 35 of the Labor Code, both when they dismiss the employee and when the employee leaves their service for another reason, regardless of whether the employee requests it or not (Voto 2170-93, of 10:12 hours, of May 21, 1993, reiterated, among others, in Nos. 6585, of 15:24 hours, of July 26, 2000; 14363, of 10:02 hours, of December 17, 2004; 2724, of 18:55 hours, of February 28, and 12606, of 17:18 hours, of August 30, both of 2006). In Voto No. 2003-4101, of 10:30 hours, of May 16, 2003, that Chamber stated the following: "The importance of the employer's certification obligation is related to the principles of equality and due process because the material inequality of employers and workers must and does find legal compensations in constitutional law—and even in ordinary legislation: the obligation to certify the cause of withdrawal or termination of the contract—even when the worker does not expressly demand it—is one of them, as are the socially and doctrinally settled rules concerning the absolute nullity of waivers of the code's provisions, the 'in dubio pro operario' principle, the presumption of the existence of the individual employment contract, the very special privilege enjoyed by claims for notice of termination and severance pay (preaviso y cesantía) in the event of bankruptcy and other scenarios, the absolute prohibition of obligating workers by any means to 'withdraw from the unions or legal groups to which they belong'... (Labor Code, respectively, Articles 11, 17, 18, 33, 70 subsection c). Legal freedom and equality, consubstantial to persons, require procedural and substantive rules such as those referred to in order to be actually realized, to reduce material inequality, as inferred from Article 50 of the Constitution. This, the axis of the Social State of Law inaugurated in the forties, introduces the title of social guarantees with an aspiration to real freedom and equality. Article 74 closes the same title by invoking the 'Christian principle of social justice' and the balance between the factors of production, which makes social justice a constitutional value of the first order." However, neither from the cited norms nor from the pronouncements of the Constitutional Chamber—binding erga omnes, in accordance with Article 13 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)—can it be inferred that the failure to issue the certificate or its proper notification renders the employer's act of termination null. Hence, precisely to protect the rights of working people, this Chamber has admitted tacit dismissal in cases where the employer removed them from the payroll and ceased enabling the collection of the subsidy for their disability from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) or paying their salary (see Votos Nos. 2000-505, of 14:20 hours, of May 19, 2000, and 2007-256, of 9:35 hours, of April 25, 2007).

V.- It is true that the defendant company documented its decision to dismiss the plaintiff without employer liability, attributing to her the failure to justify her absences on October 21, 22, and 23, 2003. Apparently, it did so on the following November 3, the date of the dismissal letter provided, visible at folio 39. But it is also true that it never delivered that communication to her or, at least, did not take care to prove that it did so, as it was its responsibility to do. The fact of having inserted in it the signatures of two acting witnesses and a receipt stamp from the Personnel Procedures Department (Departamento de Trámites de Personal) does not refute this assertion, because it was not recorded that these actions were due to Mrs. [Name1]'s refusal to receive it. And even though, as already mentioned, formal notification by the employer was to be expected, not having acted in this way does not exclude the possibility that the plaintiff became aware of her dismissal, nor does it render it non-existent, because, as we indicated in Voto No. 174, of 10 hours, of July 29, 1992, and it is appropriate to reiterate now, "(…) the absence of written communication of the dismissal (…), does not make it impossible for the employer to apply the disciplinary measure. The Labor Code only refers, in its Article 35, to a request by the worker for the issuance of a certificate indicating general data such as the start and end dates of the employment relationship, the type of work, as well as the reason for withdrawal (…). The employer’s failure to deliver said certificate, in no way can condition the validity (…) of the dismissal (…). Although it is true that both doctrine and jurisprudence are uniform in recognizing its importance, in some cases, according to the particularities presented, it is not always possible to have the document, and the appropriateness thereof must be resolved in the corresponding channel." Consequently, for the purposes of calculating the statute of limitations for disciplinary authority, the relevant moment is when Mrs. García Muñoz had certain knowledge of the dismissal. In her initial pleading, she stated the following: “(…) I worked for the defendant from February 4, 2003 until November 22, 2003. (…) On November 22, 2003, since I was incapacitated, I sent my son to the company (…) so that they would authorize the collection of my disability benefits CED1° NIE1 CED2 , in order to present them for collection at the CCSS. Notwithstanding the above, in the Human Resources Department of said Company, they refused to receive said documents from my son, and moreover, they gave him a settlement of my labor rights, indicating to him that I had been dismissed as of November 3, 2003 for job abandonment.” (Facts one and five, at folios 1 and 2-3). Folio 20 of the case file is occupied by the copy of the referenced settlement of labor rights, provided by her and dated November 22, 2003. That being the case, although the employer's act of termination was not communicated to her personally, it is unquestionable that on that date she became aware of its existence, and for all purposes, that knowledge of hers substitutes for the notification she misses (see, in a similar vein, Voto No. 2002-393, of 10:50 hours, of August 7, 2002). And since, by that time, the month provided for in Article 603 of the Labor Code, counted from the date of commission of the alleged fault —October 23, 2003— had not elapsed, the disciplinary authority must be considered exercised in a timely manner, as the appellate court correctly resolved.

VI.- Without detracting from the foregoing, it is necessary to point out now that the notification date is indeed determinative for establishing when the dismissal can take effect. For this Chamber, it is not legally admissible that an act of this nature could have operated before it was brought to the knowledge of the affected person (see, to the same effect, Voto No. 2006-1098, of 9:15 hours, of November 30, 2006). Therefore, as Mrs. [Name1] had certain knowledge of her dismissal until November 22, 2003, that date is the one that must be considered that of its effective execution, without any importance that the employer representative set it on the 3rd of the same month and year in the dismissal letter.

VII.- The plaintiff was dismissed without employer liability for not having justified in writing, within the first two days, her absences from work on October 21, 22, and 23, 2003. This was recorded by her immediate superior, Ms. Pamela Campos, in the referenced letter dated November 3, 2003, and the defendant's representation has taken care to demonstrate it in its main pleadings. For example, in the response to the lawsuit, it stated: “I clarify that the plaintiff's dismissal was due to the fact that she was absent from her work on October 21, 22, and 23, 2003, and it was not until the (…) 24th of the same month that her son appeared at the company to authorize the collection of an alleged disability that expired that same day. That is, the plaintiff did not present the medical disability certificate that justified her absences within the first two days thereof, according to the criterion established by jurisprudence regarding this cause (…).” (Folio 31. The boldface is added). In the brief with which it addressed the hearing on the documentary evidence provided for better provision, it stated: “I insist, once more, that the issue we are discussing is not whether the plaintiff was incapacitated or not; nor whether the CCSS paid her or not; nor how or why it paid her, nor how much. That is NOT the subject of this litigation. What is discussed is that, if she was incapacitated, she did not present the documents that justified it within the established time, as required by jurisprudence on the matter. Therefore, her absences were unjustified and the dismissal without liability was indeed appropriate.” (Folios 101 and 103. The boldface is also added). As observed, the telephone communication of the reasons why she did not show up for work on those days, which the plaintiff maintains she made to her immediate supervisor, has not been subject to any questioning by the employer. The only thing disputed has been the timeliness of the presentation of the medical disability certificate. Therefore, it is necessary to recall that, as a consequence of the principle of contribution (principio de aportación), which forms an organic whole with the party presentation principle (principio dispositivo) and the principle of congruence (principio de congruencia) and also governs the labor process, it is the parties who are exclusively responsible for introducing and defining the facts upon which the debate must focus and for producing the evidence they deem pertinent to credit them — doctrine of Articles 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), 394, 461, 464, and 490 of the Labor Code, and 99, 153, 155, 305, 316, and 317 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), applicable as provided by Article 452 of the Labor Code. For each party to achieve its purpose, the plaintiff must allege and prove the factual aspects constitutive of the claimed right, and the defendant must do the same regarding those of an extinctive, obstructive, or exclusionary nature. The fulfillment of these burdens occurs precisely in the complaint and its response; acts by which the "thema decidendum" is fixed or delimited; that is, the object—factual and legal—of the litigation, which constitutes an insurmountable limit for the competent jurisdictional authority, whose pronouncement, as a general rule, cannot encompass facts and allegations different from those raised by the parties (principle of immutability of the litigation). So much so that the parties are forbidden from altering the bases on which they have raised the process, and the authority cannot rule on aspects not timely alleged by them, no matter how many reasons exist to do so. The degree of linkage to the parties' activity in this matter is such that the supplementary procedural rules provide a special procedure for the expansion of facts —Article 313, second paragraph, of the Civil Procedure Code— (see, to the same effect, Votos Nos. 215-99, of 10 hours, of July 30, 1999, and 1999-363, of 10:10 hours, of November 19, 1999). Neither the public and instrumental nature of any jurisdictional process, nor the interest of the State and the social collectivity in equitably solving legal conflicts arising within it, currently recognized by doctrine, legislation —Articles 16, 17, 394, 399, and 452 of the Labor Code and 1, 3, 97, 98, and 132 of the Civil Procedure Code— and jurisprudence in civil and labor proceedings, break with those minimum requirements derived both from the party presentation principle (see Voto No. 98-90, of 10 hours, of March 25, 1998) and from the rights to due process and defense (see, among the most recent, Votos Nos. 2004-524, of 10:05 hours, of June 24, 2004; 2005-351, of 9:30 hours, of May 13, 2005; 2006-16, of 9:55 hours, of January 25, 2006; 2006-149, of 9:40 hours, of March 10, 2006; 2006-790, of 15:25 hours, of August 16, 2006; 2007-387, of 10:35 hours, of June 20; 2007-576, of 14:55 hours, of August 22; 2007-887, of 9:35 hours, of November 21, the latter from 2007, and 2008-219, of 9:40 hours, of March 12, 2008). Consequently, the lower court authorities erred in requiring Mrs. García Muñoz to prove the telephone communication. But they also erred in placing the burden on her to do so through suitable evidence, without paying attention to the fact that, given the particular circumstances in which it occurred, they placed her before a practically impossible task. The party that could undoubtedly easily discredit that it occurred was the defendant, since, had it been interested in doing so, it would have been sufficient to provide the testimony of Ms. Pamela Campos. By virtue of the principles applicable in this matter, the omission to question that it happened and, having done so, the omission to offer the mentioned deposition, now forces us to presume —human presumption— that, on that occasion, what was customary in "(…) the company's procedure (…)" happened; that is, "(…) that as a collaborator one must notify one's immediate supervisor on the day they were incapacitated or if the incapacity continued." (testimony of [Name2], human resources employee, visible at folio 67). The court, then, erred in justifying its decision on a factual element that has been outside the debate, and it is now appropriate to decide whether, in this specific matter, the documentary justification of the absences —presentation of the disability certificate— was or was not untimely.- VIII.- In labor matters, disciplinary authority derives from the employer's directive power and is a reflection of the insertion of the working person into its organizational sphere. It seeks to guarantee the effective fulfillment of the activity obligation —personal provision of service— assumed by the employed individual by virtue of the employment contract, through the imposition of sanctions for the breach of one or more of their specific legal duties. As such, it has a corrective character because, rather than punishing past conduct, it seeks to influence future conduct. Furthermore, it is regulated and limited by objective law. The purpose of disciplinary responsibility is, then, to ensure the observance of legal subordination and, in general, the exact fulfillment of the commitment of the working party. In accordance with these criteria, in its Voto No. 5594-94, of 15:45 hours, of September 27, 1994, the Constitutional Chamber noted that the disciplinary fault or infraction “(…) is a violation of the functioning of any duty inherent to their condition, even when it has not been specially defined although it is foreseen. The determining facts of disciplinary faults are innumerable because they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of 'subordinate' subjects, behaviors or conducts that are truly unlimited in number given their variety; therefore, the existence of three elements of the disciplinary fault is deduced: 1.- a material element: which is an act or an omission; 2.- a moral element: which is the imputation of the act to a free will; and 3.- a formal element: which is the disturbance to the functioning of the service or the immediate or possible affectation of its effectiveness." (See, to the same effect, Votos Nos. 563-97, of 14:39 hours, of January 29, 1997; 2000-4545, of 15:39 hours, of May 31, and 2000-6590, of 15:29 hours, of July 26, the latter from 2000). As [Name3] and [Name4] correctly point out, "The sanctionable fault, however much it may sometimes tend to be objectified, must always be attributable to the intent or negligence of the worker; as for the latter, moreover, in a lasting relationship with long periods of compliance activity within its duration, good faith does not consent to demanding impeccable conduct at every moment, without the slightest carelessness, a zealous and unfaltering diligence (Barreiro); the legal system allows for the human failings of the good family man; it also allows, paraphrasing, for those of the 'good worker,' from whom only normal diligence is due, as was seen; what this tolerates is neither sanctionable conduct nor can it be sanctioned. As for intent, this is the contractual intent which, abstracted from the motive, indicates the knowledge and will of the guilty party." (Derecho del Trabajo, Madrid: Civitas Ediciones, S. L., twentieth edition, revised, 2002, p. 392).

IX.- Repeatedly, this Chamber has indicated that the disciplinary authority (dismissal-sanction) must be exercised by the employer within the parameters set by the objective legal system and without distorting the purposes pursued when recognizing it. Consequently, it must be used for the reaffirmation of a subjective right or for the achievement of legitimate interests, because it is there where the material cause of its legislative reception and its functionality lies. Precisely to guarantee aspects such as these, the preliminary title of the Civil Code —which is the common law of the entire Costa Rican legal system— contains fundamental rules of interpretative work that constitute a communication channel between current legislation and the prevailing social morals, and whose purpose is none other than overcoming legalism. Thus, by virtue of its Article 21 "Rights must be exercised in accordance with the demands of good faith." Article 20 declares that "Acts performed under the cover of a norm's text, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of the law and shall not prevent the proper application of the norm that was intended to be circumvented." Finally, the first part of Article 22 establishes that: "The law does not protect the abuse of right or its antisocial exercise." From these precepts derives that subjective rights and private powers, apart from their express legal limits, are circumscribed by moral, teleological, and social barriers and that their irregular exercise is prohibited, with the jurisdictional authorities being responsible for determining the specific hypotheses in which such reprehensible human behavior occurs (see, for all, Votos Nos. 177, of 8:10 hours, of August 20, 1993; 141, of 16 hours, of July 4, 1997; 52, of 11:50 hours, of February 13, 1998; 197, of 15:50 hours, of July 15, 1999; 2003-78, of 8:50 hours, of February 20, 2003, and 2008-93, of 10:20 hours, of February 8, 2008).

X.- Legal fraud (fraude de derecho) operates, generally, outside of any reciprocity relationship and is a species within the broader category formed by illicit acts, whose conceptualization is not exhausted in the merely formal; that is, contrary to written legislation, but encompasses a material notion of illegality, encompassing the breach of obligations derived from much broader general principles, such as good faith and equity (Articles 28 of the Political Constitution and 21 of the Civil Code). Among many other hypotheses, it exists both when the covering norm —which must always exist— does not confer complete and perfect protection for the person relying on it, and when the actually applicable norm is circumvented, adopting the guise of a legal figure regulated by another that responds to a different purpose. If, when dealing with legal relationships such as labor relations, the act thus issued reveals, in turn, behavior contrary to the loyalty and honesty that could be expected towards the counterparty, in addition to committing legal fraud, an open breach of the principle of good faith also occurs. In short, the theory of legal fraud constitutes, on the one hand, the legal cause for denying the holder of a power or a subjective right exercised in a manner deviating from its purpose the protection of the legal system and, on the other, the unquestionable source of civil liability. In the specific field of labor law, fraud of law (fraude de ley) exists if, once the lack of coincidence is determined between the specific purpose, always of public or general interest, to which the applicable precept of the legal system is directed and that pursued by one of the parties of the employment relationship when exercising the conferred power, the former is not achieved. This is a deviation perfectly typified in current legislation, whose consequence is the nullity of the act issued, even though, in formal terms, it is not contrary to legality.

XI.- Certainly, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has repeatedly established that, by imperative of the principle of good faith and the duty of minimal consideration, inherent to any labor contract, it is the obligation of the working person who is absent for two or more consecutive days to inform their counterparty, in a timely manner, of the reasons for their non-attendance (so that they can take the pertinent measures to protect their interests) and to accredit them with suitable documents, because the mere act of communicating them does not automatically imply the endorsement of the corresponding justification. Any careless attitude that undermines the employment relationship and the reciprocal obligations deriving from it is unacceptable. Thus, in Voto No. 158, of 15 hours, of October 4, 1989, we indicated the following: "Jurisprudence has been clear in the sense that, in the case of absences from work, it is indispensable that the employee, for reasons of good faith and the duty of minimal consideration that underlies as an element of any labor contract, is obligated to report it and justify it in a timely manner, and the practice of doing so later has not been accepted as correct (...). It is specified that the report and verification must be done in a timely manner, that is, during the first two days, so that the employer can take the necessary measures to attend to its interests; and a careless and discourteous attitude is not conceivable as if there were no relationship with reciprocal obligations involved. The term of two days is mentioned at least, given that, according to Article 81, subsection g), of the Code on the matter, non-attendance at the workplace without the employer's permission and without justification is cause for dismissal, so the absence on those terms immediately gives rise to the legitimate interest for the employer to proceed accordingly. If, according to the norm, the absence as indicated is sufficient for the cause for dismissal to arise, therein is implicit the duty to accredit the factual issues that exclude the fault before said fault can be considered configured and the effects that legitimize the employer to act in defense of its rights are produced." In the one invoked by the defendant, No. 136, of 9 hours, of April 19, 1995, we noted that "The worker is obligated to provide their services to the employer in exchange for remuneration (Articles 4, 18, 19, and 71, subsection b), all of the Labor Code). Absences from their work, which imply non-compliance with that obligation, must be based on certain facts that unmistakably prevent them from fulfilling their task. Proof thereof must be presented to the employer in time, so that the latter has the opportunity to take the necessary precautions. Otherwise, the cause for dismissal provided in Article 81, subsection g) of the aforementioned regulatory body is incurred, which establishes: 'The following are just causes that empower the employer to terminate the employment contract: ... g) When the worker fails to attend work without the employer's permission, without justified cause for two consecutive days or for more than two alternate days within the same calendar month.' / In the matter before us, (...) It could not be validly sustained that the plaintiff was treated by his employer unjustly and surprisingly upon being dismissed (...), because, on the contrary, (...) the company gave him the opportunity to show up for work, which he should have taken advantage of to avoid a measure that would harm him, and if, in reality, he was sick, he had the duty to obtain from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund a medical opinion certifying his incapacity for work, and promptly present that document to the employer, at least within the first two days of the incapacity, which he did not do. / (...) even if those absences actually corresponded to an illness, to prevent them from giving grounds for a justified dismissal, the existence of such illness had to be accredited and proof that it incapacitated him from performing his work had to be delivered to the employer in a timely manner." In the same vein are pronouncements Nos. 81, of 9:10 hours, of May 9; 104, of 9:20 hours, of May 23; 162, of 15:30 hours, of August 9; all three of 1984; 108, of 9:50 hours, of July 3; 211, of 15:20 hours, of October 23; both of 1985; 144, of 9:30 hours, of September 6, 1989; 266, of 9:10 hours, of December 11, 1991; 219, of 9:40 hours, of October 6, 1993; 52, of 11:50 hours, of February 13, 1998; and 159-99, of 10 hours, of June 11, 1999; 2000-568, of 9:40 hours, of June 2, 2000; 2001-10, of 9:50 hours, of January 5; 2001-182, of 10:20 hours, of March 23, both of 2001; 2003-82, of 9:30 hours, of February 26, 2003; and 2008-789, of 10:10 hours, of September 12, 2008. However, taking into account what has been set forth in the preceding sections, it is not possible to derive from that jurisprudential reading of the applicable legal norms —Article 81, subsection g), in relation to Article 19 of the Labor Code—, insofar as it informs both (Article 9 of the Civil Code), that, in exceptional cases, any untimely presentation of the disability certificates inevitably results in the impossibility of validly justifying the non-attendance at work. Already in Voto No. 13, of 14:20 hours, of January 22, 1986, we stated that "The text of the aforementioned article [81, subsection g), of the Labor Code], cannot be applied in a closed manner, because the background and circumstances that mediated in relation to the worker's absence must be examined in each case (…)." In No. 158, of 1989, already cited, that possibility was reaffirmed when we held: "Of course, the above is posed as a general question and without prejudice to the existence of conventional norms that regulate the situation in another way or that there are sufficient reasons, to be analyzed in each case, that warrant a greater delay in verification, such as, for example, serious illness or distance from the workplace, without adequate means of communication." In a more recent one, No. 2008-822, of 10:30 hours, of September 24, 2008, we stated the following: "(…) this Chamber has resolved that there are afflictions that make it impossible to comply with the deadlines indicated in the different norms —regulatory, conventional, etc.— for presenting the justification of absences, and that have been rigidly interpreted by the employer (think, for example, of a person who, as a result of a blow to the head, remains unconscious for several days). In those exceptional cases, it has been interpreted that the deadline to justify the absence must be counted from when the worker is in the effective possibility of personally fulfilling that duty, or, at least, of asking a family member or acquaintance to do so (see Voto No. 158 of fifteen hours of October four, nineteen eighty-nine)." It is therefore necessary to analyze, in each specific case, the real possibilities of the worker to go to their workplace to deliver the supporting document, in order to determine whether or not negligent or malicious conduct on their part prevails regarding the fulfillment of that duty.

XII.- It was duly proven that the plaintiff suffers from fibromyalgia, rheumatoid arthritis, and gastritis, and that as a consequence of the treatment provided, she was unable to perform various physical activities, including walking. This was recounted by Doctor José Martín Rojas Castro, medical director of the Clínica de Barva, who stated: “(…) the case of Mrs. [Name1], being an uncommon case, she had an arthritis problem and musculoskeletal problems, the treatments given to her did not have much response, so (sic) the treating physician consulted me on the case to see how (sic) we would manage it, and she was even referred to the Rheumatology Service of the Hospital México. Fibromyalgia and arthritis were diagnosed. It is an uncommon condition; it has crisis periods that require impactful (sic) treatments, meaning they are very strong, and as part of the treatment, rest periods are required because during these crisis periods, patients cannot move 'normally'; they have difficulty walking and performing other physical activities. In that second half of 2003, which is what I remember, Mrs. [Name1] presented several crises that I had to treat personally because the rest periods exceeded what is stipulated (sic) by the Caja's regulations for general practitioners, and therefore they must be endorsed or approved by the Medical Directorate or the Rheumatology Specialist of the corresponding Hospital. During those periods, there were several dates when Mrs. [Name1] came for consultation, was given the corresponding treatment, within which various sick leaves were included.” (Folios 69-70). To this it must be added that, as already indicated, the timely telephone communication of her health situation to her immediate supervisor, and that she would therefore be absent from work, must be considered proven; that her rest by medical indication during the days of October 21, 22, and 23 was a continuation of others that, uninterruptedly, had followed since October 10 prior; that on October 24, when her son presented the respective form at the Human Resources Department, the defendant's representatives completed it with the information required by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in order to pay it; and that the dismissal was documented and ordered some time after that event – at the beginning of the following month – and was communicated to the Department of Personnel Procedures only until November 6. If the nature of her condition and the consequences produced by the administered medication make it understandable that the form for the period between October 20 and 24, 2003, was not presented within the two days following its issuance date, those other facts demonstrate that the challenged employer action, even though it may formally be covered by paragraph g) of Article 81 of the Código de Trabajo and the case law informing it, evades the one that should have been applied in the first place, namely: the one contained in the first paragraph of numeral 19 ibidem, according to which “The employment contract binds both to what is expressed in it, and to the consequences that derive from it (sic) according to good faith, equity, usage, custom, or the law.” For this Chamber, under those circumstances, Mrs. [Name1]'s absence from work during the days of October 21, 22, and 23, 2003, cannot be classified as unjustified, and the decision to terminate her without employer liability constitutes behavior contrary to loyalty and honesty and, therefore, an open breach of the principle of good faith. The company was aware of her delicate situation and, even so, refused to consider them as justified when she was able, within her possibilities, to provide the documentation that reliably proven it. It is inadmissible that, in this case, more importance was given to a requirement of punctuality in the presentation of the sick leave form than to the plaintiff's health problems, as if the former were an end in itself and not a guarantee of the duty of minimum consideration that, by definition, is reciprocal. The defendant overlooked the corrective purpose of its disciplinary power. It is an act of bad faith that, in the face of special circumstances such as those in this matter, the employing party refused to justify the absences in question, under the pretext that the sick leave was presented late. It is unreasonable to expect that, in her delicate situation, she would take care of delivering it personally, since she was unable to travel to her workplace, especially considering that she is a resident of Santa Lucía de Barva and her counterparty is domiciled in San José. It is also not possible to assume that her family members had full availability to do it for her within such a short period. Within her circumstances, she did the maximum that could be required of her: communicating it by telephone. Consequently, the punctuality demanded by the company is out of place. The situation would be different if she had been absent without giving any type of information or reason to her superiors, as that would demonstrate an irresponsible attitude toward the essential obligations generated by her employment contract. But, as has been indicated, the plaintiff fulfilled her duty to communicate her ailments to her immediate supervisor and to reliably proven them, in a valid manner, within her particular circumstances (in a similar sense, see the rulings Votos n.os 54, of 3:40 p.m., of March 19, 1997, and 52, of 11:50 a.m., of February 13, 1998). If, furthermore, one considers the fact that, in this case, it is not possible to identify the moral element of the disciplinary offense; that is, its attribution to a free will or, at least, to an inexcusable carelessness, it must be concluded that it is legally impossible to consider the dismissal justified under the cause provided in the cited paragraph g) of Article 81 of the Código de Trabajo, and that the disciplinary power was exercised in a manner deviated from its purpose. As we indicated in Voto n.º 2008-753, of 9:45 a.m., of September 5, 2008, “(…) in this matter, so sensitive to the particularities of how relations between employer and worker develop (…) numeral 492 of the Código de Trabajo grants the labor judge the possibility of assessing the evidence with a broad criterion, in accordance with principles derived from logic and experience, allowing them to evaluate the entire body of evidentiary material to derive a reasonably just conclusion from it. (…) The set of this evidence, analyzed in the light of logic and experience, allows reaching the conclusion that the employer did indeed know the reasons why the plaintiff did not show up for work on the cited days. One cannot think of a negligent or disinterested attitude on [their] part (…) in explaining to the employer the reasons for their absence, reasons that really existed and that their superiors knew (…) in such a way that the decision to dismiss the plaintiff turned out to be precipitous, since the employer did not grant the worker a sufficiently prudent time to justify the absences, which clearly violated the principles of good faith and loyalty, present in all employment contracts by provision of Article 19 of the Código de Trabajo. Therefore, this accumulation of situations allows inferring that the employer's decision was motivated by the absences the worker presented, without considering that they stemmed from their health impairment (…). Consequently, the ordered dismissal was unjustified, and the defendant must therefore bear the obligations derived from a dismissal of that nature.” XIII.- The defendant company has insisted that the payment of the sick leave forms corresponding to the periods between October 20 and 24; October 25 and November 5; and November 6 and 15, all those dates in 2003, occurred because “(…) the plaintiff was still covered by the insurance paid in the company's last payroll, before being excluded from it (sic), not because the payment of said sick leave was authorized by the company.” (Brief responding to the complaint, at folio 32). For this Chamber, that argument is inadmissible because it is a requirement to collect the subsidy that the employing party declares the incapacitated person as its worker. This was explained by Doctor José Martín Rojas Castro, medical director of the Clínica de Barva, in his statement: “The procedure that a sick leave issued in a clinic like the one where I work must follow is that the patient is given two vouchers, one is for the patient themselves and the other is for the employer to sign and carry out the payment procedure at the corresponding branch.” (Folios 69-70). Moreover, the Reglamento del seguro de salud, approved by the Board of Directors of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in session n.° 7082, held on December 3, 1996 (Article 19), and published in La Gaceta n.° 25, of February 5, 1997, provides for a procedure in the event of the employer's refusal to complete the sick leave forms. Its Article 54 establishes the following: “If the employer refuses to fill out and deliver to the worker the certificate for the collection of the subsidy, the form shall be completed by the inspectors of laws and regulations of the Caja, based on the procedures deemed necessary.” On the other hand, [Name2], a human resources employee, stated that “Her case is particular and hard to forget; her son came to leave the (sic) sick leave notes at the office, which is normal; it is checked in the payroll system and she was reported with a job abandonment, for which reason the sick leave notes are not received from the young man, and he is told that the Sales Department made the notification of her departure.” (Folio 67). Without a doubt, that part of the account refers to the visit of November 22, not the previous ones, and it follows from it that the authorizations in question were given because when the three forms were presented, the act of dismissal was not yet recorded in the system. Consequently, not only must the granting of the corresponding authorizations be considered true, but also the surprising and bad-faith nature of the termination, since the sick leave forms had indeed been received and processed. Moreover, this fact makes that decision suspicious, as explained below.

XIV.- The termination of the employment contract by the will of the employing party may be justified, when it is the result of the legitimate exercise of disciplinary power given the breach, attributable to the worker, of their contractual obligations (dismissal-sanction) – see, in this regard, numerals 19, 71, 72, and 81 of the Código de Trabajo – or, it may be unjustified, when it is the direct or covert consequence of the freedom to dismiss, which, in principle, every employing party holds (dismissal-liberality) – Articles 28, 31, and 80 of the Código de Trabajo. These two modalities differ, on the substantive level, by the necessarily compensatory effect of the second, which, as a general rule, the first does not have. It often happens, however, that the dismissal-liberality is prohibited because there is a special legal protection in favor of the employee due to a particular condition of theirs, as is the case, among others, of pregnant persons, those sexually harassed, and union representatives (see, in the same sense, Voto n.° 235-98, of 9:45 a.m., of September 18, 1998). In the case of someone who is obliged to rest for health reasons, numerals 79 and 80 of the Código de Trabajo prohibit their unjustified termination, at least during the first three months (see Voto n.° 198, of 3:10 p.m., of December 13, 1989, reiterated in n.os 49, of 11:20 a.m., of February 13, 1998; 2002-150, of 2:40 p.m., of April 9, 2002; 2002-150, of 2:40 p.m., of April 9, 2002; and 2005-326, of 9:10 a.m., of May 11, 2005). This is so because sick leave due to illness is a cause for suspension of the employment relationship. In accordance with the provisions of the first of those articles, in that scenario, it is the obligation of the employing party to grant leave to the worker so that they can be protected by social security regulations while fully recovering (Votos n.os 2000-945, of 10:20 a.m., of November 13, 2000, and 2003-516, of 9:30 a.m., of October 1, 2003). It is true that the last mentioned ordinal, 80, is challenged before the Sala Constitucional (file n.° 08-008837-0007-CO) and that this action was admitted since last June 25, 2008. However, it must be clear that the challenge does not encompass the prohibition established therein, but the period during which it is in force.

XV.- Now then, if one considers the letter and the spirit of those provisions, it becomes evident that the special protection given to workers who circumstantially suffer an impairment to their health status that prevents them from working is rendered empty of content if they could be dismissed by the employer's decision, without an objective legal cause to justify it. From that perspective and in view of the public interest involved, the payment of the so-called social benefits is insufficient to guarantee compliance with the referred prohibition, since an unscrupulous employer could illegitimately attribute the commission of a breach of their obligations to them and, in that way, circumvent the prohibition. Hence, the use of any means tending to undermine the relative stability of someone incapacitated for work, and especially dismissal, must be considered contrary to law. As the Sala Constitucional has pointed out, “The Chamber recognizes the right of employers to reorganize their company and reduce expenses, aimed at stabilizing their economy, since not accepting it would violate the constitutional right to freedom of commerce, but in a Social State of Law such as the one in force in Costa Rica, the fundamental freedoms and rights of citizens cannot be violated with impunity.” (Voto n.° 5000-93, of 10:09 a.m., of October 8, 1993). In Voto n.° 2007-17971, of 2:51 p.m., of December 12, 2007, issued regarding an unconstitutionality action filed against Articles 9 and 10 of the Reglamento para otorgamiento de incapacidades y licencias a beneficiarios del Seguro de salud, that same jurisdictional body established: “The need of a worker to (sic) take sick leave, responsibly certified as such by a physician, is a matter that cannot be assessed solely in economic terms, because said condition precisely reflects the existence of a vulnerable state in the person's health, and in the face of this, the State has the duty to protect them, guarantee them the required care, and, in accordance with labor rights, also guarantee their reestablishment under dignified and just conditions. The foregoing assessed in light of the fundamental right to work and to health, without considering a time limit, but rather the established medical conditions, with the responsibilities of what is recommended by said professional. This is because, as indicated, there are scenarios in which one does not qualify for a disability pension, leaving as options for the employer the termination of the employment contract with employer liability, or, for the worker, returning to work under precarious health conditions. A situation which, as noted, is not only unconstitutional but also contrary to human rights.” And, in a more recent one, n.° 2008-1573, of 2:55 p.m., of January 30, 2008, it expressed: “It is also important to remember that constitutional case law has prohibited, even in the field of labor relations between subjects of private law, that illness become a factor of discrimination against the employee, causing them to derive harmful consequences to their situation (Judgments #2005-13205 of 3:13 p.m. of September 27, 2005, and #2007-3168 of 10:30 a.m. of March 9, 2007). In summary, dismissal – even with the payment of full benefits – is not a solution that derives from or aligns with the principles of social justice or solidarity.” XVI.- For this Chamber, more than an accidental breach of the referred prohibition due to an error in applying the current regulations, the employer's decision to dismiss Mrs. [Name5] is a clear act consciously aimed at disregarding it and rendering void the special protection of which she was the holder due to her health situation. The circumstances under which it occurred allow, without a doubt, inferring that illegitimate motive. From this perspective, this is a typical act of discrimination based on health reasons, and as the Sala Constitucional has resolved, “(…) the Principle of the Social State of Law, the right not to suffer discriminatory treatment for any cause, and respect for human dignity are essential elements of our constitutional order that coexist peacefully, whose safeguarding corresponds not only to the State but also to all members of the community. In this sense, all kinds of discrimination, regardless of whether it comes from the Administration or a private individual, are in violation of the constitutional order. In the specific case of labor discrimination due to illness, on the one hand, paragraph b) of the first article of Convention 111 admits the possibility of specifying, through a certain means, any type of discrimination that nullifies or alters the equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation, and, on the other hand, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights expressly proscribe any type of discriminatory treatment, a stance that, in the same way, our constitutional regime professes under the protection of what is regulated in numeral 33 of the Fundamental Law. Moreover, the discriminatory dismissal of which (…) was a victim, collaterally affects the constitutional rights to work and to health. Regarding the former, it is evident that any dismissal due to discrimination irremediably implies an injury to it (sic) and, in general, to the duty of solidarity inherent in the Social State of Law and the Christian principle of social justice (Article 74 of the Constitución Política). Furthermore, given the age of the protected person and the real reason for their dismissal, their illness, they (sic) are left prostrate in a situation particularly harmful both for their health and for their dignity as a human being, as they have fewer possibilities of finding another employment option and, consequently, of obtaining the necessary resources to attend to their health problem and family obligations, aside from the fact that in practice, unfortunately, a person of a certain age, abruptly dismissed and affected by such a severe illness (…), finds it enormously difficult to obtain dignified employment, considering the operational and cost problems that having to find a substitute for eventual sick leaves for hospitalization or some type of medical treatment could entail for a new employer.” (Voto n.° 2005-13205, of 3:13 p.m., of September 27, 2005; reiterated in n.° 2007-3168, of 10:30 a.m., of March 9, 2007). In any case, as we have pointed out before, “(…) in addition to the necessary compliance, in accordance with the canons of good faith, it is clear that the exercise of a right is not free and unrestricted. One of those limits is, precisely, respect for the rights of others. Therefore, when with the exercise of a right considered one's own, that of a third party is transgressed, one incurs in abusive or antisocial use of it (sic). Expressly, numeral 22 of the Código Civil, applicable in this matter as supplementary regulation, expressly denies protection to whoever abuses the right, engages in an antisocial exercise of it (sic), or, that in a contractual relationship, exceeds the normal limits in its exercise. In all those cases, the obligation to indemnify is recognized for whoever has abused their right, in open deterioration of the right of others (see, in this sense, the judgments of this Chamber No. 141-97, of 4:00 p.m., of July 4, 1997; and, No. 229-99, of 9:10 a.m., of August 13, 1999). The important thing is, then, to determine the rules in force in each case, in order to be able to fix the limit of the compensation.” (Voto n.° 2001-200, of 9:50 a.m., of April 4, 2001).” And even though, as already mentioned, formal notification by the employer was to be expected, the failure to act in this way does not preclude the plaintiff from having become aware of her dismissal nor does it render it non-existent, since, as we indicated in ruling no. 174, of 10:00 a.m., of July 29, 1992, and it is appropriate to reiterate now, "(…) the absence of written communication of the dismissal (…), does not make it impossible for the employer to apply the disciplinary measure. The Código de Trabajo, only refers in its Article 35 to a request by the worker, for a certificate to be issued indicating general data such as the start and end date of the employment relationship, the type of work, as well as the reason for separation (…). The failure to deliver the same (sic), by the employer, in no way can condition the validity (…) of the dismissal (…). Although it is true that both doctrine and case law are uniform in recognizing the importance of the same (sic), in some cases, according to the peculiarities that arise, it is not always possible to have the document, and the propriety of the same (sic) must be elucidated in the corresponding venue." Consequently, for the purpose of counting the statute of limitations (prescripción) period of the disciplinary power, the moment from which Mrs. García Muñoz had certain knowledge of the cessation. In her initial pleading, she stated the following: "(…) I worked for the defendant from February 4 (sic), 2003 until November 22 (sic), 2003. (…) On November 22 (sic), 2003, as the undersigned was on medical leave, I sent my son to the company (…) so that they would authorize the collection of my incapacity benefits CED1 NIE1 CED2 , in order to submit them for collection at the CCSS. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the Human Resources Department of said Company they did not want to receive said documents from my son, and instead they gave him a settlement of my labor rights indicating that the undersigned had been dismissed as of November 3 (sic), 2003 for job abandonment." (Facts one and five, at folios 1 and 2-3). Folio 20 of the expediente is occupied by the copy of the referred settlement of labor rights, provided by her and dated November 22, 2003. Thus, although the act of employer separation (desvinculación patronal) was not communicated to her personally, it is unquestionable that on that date she became aware of its existence, and for all purposes, that knowledge of hers substitutes for the notification she misses (see, in a similar sense, ruling no. 2002-393, of 10:50 a.m., of August 7, 2002). And since at that moment the month provided for in numeral 603 of the Código de Trabajo had not elapsed, counted from the date of commission of the alleged fault -October 23, 2003- the disciplinary power must be deemed exercised in a timely manner, as the appellate court correctly resolved.

VI.- Without detriment to the foregoing, it is necessary to make evident from now on that the date of notification is indeed decisive for establishing from when the dismissal can take effect. For this Chamber (Sala), it is not legally admissible that an act of that nature could have operated before it was brought to the knowledge of the affected person (see, in the same sense, ruling no. 2006-1098, of 9:15 a.m., of November 30, 2006). Consequently, as Mrs. [Nombre1] had certain knowledge of her cessation only until November 22, 2003, that date is the one that must be deemed as that of its effective execution, without it having any importance that in the dismissal letter the employer representative set it on the 3rd of that same month and year.

VII.- The plaintiff was dismissed without employer liability (sin responsabilidad patronal) for not having justified in writing, within the first two days, her absences from work on October 21, 22, and 23, 2003. Thus recorded her immediate superior, Mrs. Pamela Campos, in the referred letter dated November 3, 2003, and the representation of the defendant has been responsible for making it evident in its main pleadings. For example, in the answer to the complaint, it specified: "I clarify that the plaintiff's dismissal was due to the fact that she was absent from her work on October 21, 22, and 23 (sic), 2003, and it was not until the day (…) the 24th of the same month, that her son appeared at the company to have the collection of a supposed incapacity that expired that same day authorized (sic). That is, the plaintiff did not present the medical incapacity certificate that justified her absences within the first two days of the same (sic), in accordance with the criterion established by case law regarding this cause (…)”. (Folio 31. The bold is added). In the brief with which it responded to the hearing on the documentary evidence provided for better provision (para mejor proveer), it affirmed: "I insist, once again, that the issue we are discussing is not whether the plaintiff was on medical leave or not; nor whether the CCSS paid her or not; nor how or why it paid her, nor how much. That is NOT the object of this litis. What is being discussed is that, if she was on medical leave, she did not present the documents that justified it within the established time, as required by the case law in this regard. Therefore, her absences were unjustified and the dismissal without liability was indeed appropriate." (Folios 101 and 103. The bold is also added). As observed, the telephone communication of the reasons why she did not show up for work those days, which the plaintiff maintains she made to her immediate supervisor, has not been subject to any questioning by the employer. The only thing that has been discussed is the timeliness of the presentation of the medical incapacity certificate. Therefore, it is necessary to remember that, as a consequence of the principle of party presentation (principio de aportación), which forms an organic whole with the dispositive principle (principio dispositivo) and the principle of congruence and also governs the labor process, it is incumbent upon the parties, exclusively, to introduce and define the facts on which the debate must revolve and to produce the evidence they deem pertinent to accredit them - doctrine of numerals 5 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, 394, 461, 464, and 490 of the Código de Trabajo and 99, 153, 155, 305, 316, and 317 of the Código Procesal Civil, applicable as provided by 452 of the de Trabajo-. For each one to achieve its purpose, the claimant must allege and demonstrate the factual aspects constituting the claimed right, and the defendant must do the same regarding those of an extinctive, obstructive, or excluding nature of it. The fulfillment of these burdens is done, precisely, in the complaint and in its answer; acts through which the "thema decidendum" is fixed or delimited; that is, the object – factual and legal – of the litigation, which constitutes an insurmountable limit for the competent jurisdictional authority, whose pronouncement, as a general rule, cannot encompass facts and allegations different from those raised by the parties (principle of immutability of litigation). So much so that the latter are prohibited from altering the bases upon which they have brought the process, and the former cannot rule on aspects not alleged in a timely manner by them, regardless of how many reasons exist to do so. The degree of linkage to the activity of the parties in this matter is such that the supplementary procedural regulations provide a special procedure for the expansion of facts -Article 313, second paragraph, of the Código Procesal Civil- (see, in the same sense, rulings nos. 215-99, of 10:00 a.m., of July 30, and 1999-363, of 10:10 a.m., of November 19, both of 1999). Neither the public and instrumental nature of every jurisdictional process, nor the interest of the State and the social community in equitably resolving the legal conflicts arising within it, recognized today by doctrine, legislation -Articles 16, 17, 394, 399, and 452 of the Código de Trabajo and 1, 3, 97, 98, and 132 of the Código Procesal Civil- and case law for civil and labor proceedings, break with these minimum requirements derived both from the dispositive principle (see ruling no. 98-90, of 10:00 a.m., of March 25, 1998), and from the rights to due process and defense (see, among the most recent, rulings nos. 2004-524, of 10:05 a.m., of June 24, 2004; 2005- 351, of 9:30 a.m., of May 13, 2005; 2006-16, of 9:55 a.m., of January 25, 2006; 2006-149, of 9:40 a.m., of March 10, 2006; 2006-790, of 3:25 p.m., of August 16, 2006; 2007-387, of 10:35 a.m., of June 20; 2007-576, of 2:55 p.m., of August 22; 2007-887, of 9:35 a.m., of November 21, the last ones of 2007, and 2008-219, of 9:40 a.m., of March 12, 2008). Consequently, the lower court authorities erred in demanding that Mrs. García Muñoz demonstrate the telephone communication. But they also erred in placing upon her the burden of doing so through suitable proof, without paying attention to the fact that, given the particular circumstances in which it occurred, they placed her before a practically impossible task. The one who, without a doubt, found it easy to discredit that it happened was the defendant, since, had she been interested in doing so, it would have sufficed for her to offer the testimony of Mrs. Pamela Campos. By virtue of the applicable principles in this matter, the omission to question that it had occurred and, having done so, that of offering the mentioned deposition, now obliges us to suppose -human presumption- that, on that occasion, what was usual in "(…) the company's procedure (…)" occurred; that is, "(…) that as a collaborator one must notify one's immediate supervisor the day they placed one on medical leave (sic) or if the leave continued." (testimony of [Nombre2], human resources employee, visible at folio 67). The court was mistaken, then, in justifying its decision on a factual element that has been outside the debate, and it is now appropriate to decide whether, in this specific matter, the documentary justification of the absences –presentation of the incapacity certificate– was or was not untimely.- VIII.- In labor matters, the disciplinary power derives from the employer's power of direction and is a reflection of the worker's insertion into its organizational sphere. It seeks to guarantee the effective fulfillment of the activity debt -personal rendering of service- assumed by the employee by virtue of the employment contract, through the imposition of sanctions upon the breach of one or several of their specific legal duties. As such, it has a corrective character since, more than punishing past conduct, it seeks to influence future conduct. Furthermore, it is regulated and limited by objective law. The purpose of disciplinary liability is, then, to ensure observance of legal subordination and, in general, the exact fulfillment of the worker's commitment. In accordance with those criteria, in its ruling no. 5594-94, of 3:45 p.m., of September 27, 1994, the Sala Constitucional pointed out that the disciplinary fault or infraction "(…) is a violation of the functioning of any duty inherent to their condition, even when it has not been especially defined although it was foreseen. The determining facts of disciplinary faults are innumerable, as they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conduct of the 'subordinate' subjects, behaviors or conduct that are truly unlimited in number given their variety; therefore, the existence of three elements of the disciplinary fault is deduced: 1.- a material element: which is an act or an omission; 2.- a moral element: which is the imputation of the act to a free will; and 3.- a formal element: which is the disturbance to the functioning of the service or immediate or possible affection of its effectiveness." (See, in the same sense, rulings nos. 563-97, of 2:39 p.m., of January 29, 1997; 2000-4545, of 3:39 p.m., of May 31, and 2000-6590, of 3:29 p.m., of July 26, the last ones of 2000). As [Nombre3] and [Nombre4] rightly point out, "The sanctionable fault, however much it tends at times to become objectified, must always be attributable to the worker's willful misconduct (dolo) or negligence (negligencia); as for the latter, furthermore, in a long-lasting relationship with long periods of compliance activity within its duration, good faith does not consent to an impeccable conduct being demanded at all times, without the slightest carelessness, a zealous and unwavering diligence (Barreiro); the legal system accounts for the human failings of the good family father; it also accounts, paraphrasing, for those of the 'good worker,' the latter owing only a normal diligence, as was seen; what the latter tolerates is neither sanctionable conduct nor can it be sanctioned. As for willful misconduct, it is the contractual one which, abstracted from the motive, shows the knowledge and will of the guilty party." (Derecho del Trabajo, Madrid: Civitas Ediciones, S. L., twentieth edition, revised, 2002, p. 392).

IX.- Repeatedly, this Chamber has indicated that the disciplinary power (disciplinary dismissal, despido-sanción) must be exercised by the employer within the parameters set by the objective legal system and without distorting the purposes pursued in recognizing it. Consequently, it must be used for the reaffirmation of a subjective right or for the achievement of legitimate interests, because that is where the material cause of its legislative reception and its functionality lies. Precisely to guarantee aspects such as these, the preliminary title of the Código Civil - which is the common law of the entire Costa Rican legal system - contains fundamental rules of interpretive work that constitute a communication channel between the legislation in force and the prevailing social morality, and whose purpose is none other than the overcoming of legalism. Thus, by virtue of its Article 21 "Rights shall be exercised in accordance with the requirements of good faith." Article 20 declares that "Acts carried out under the protection of the text of a norm, that pursue a result prohibited by the legal system; or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of the law and shall not prevent the due application of the norm that one sought to evade." Finally, the first part of Article 22 establishes that: "The law does not protect the abuse of right or the antisocial exercise of the latter (sic)".

From those precepts it follows that subjective rights and private powers, apart from their express legal limits, are circumscribed by moral, teleological, and social barriers and that their irregular exercise is prohibited, with the jurisdictional authorities being responsible for determining the specific hypotheses in which such reprehensible human conduct occurs (see, for all, votes nos. 177, of 8:10 a.m., of August 20, 1993; 141, of 4:00 p.m., of July 4, 1997; 52, of 11:50 a.m., of February 13, 1998; 197, of 3:50 p.m., of July 15, 1999; 2003-78, of 8:50 a.m., of February 20, 2003 and 2008-93, of 10:20 a.m., of February 8, 2008).

X.- Fraud of law (fraude de derecho) operates, generally, outside of any relationship of reciprocity and is a species within the broader category formed by unlawful acts (hechos ilícitos), whose conceptualization is not exhausted in the merely formal; that is, what is contrary to written legislation, but rather encompasses a material notion of unlawfulness, inclusive of the breach of obligations derived from much broader general principles, such as good faith (buena fe) and equity (equidad) (articles 28 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 21 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)). Among many other hypotheses, it exists both when the covering norm—which must always exist—does not confer complete and perfect protection for the person relying on it, and when the actually applicable norm is evaded by adopting the guise of a legal figure regulated by another norm that serves a different purpose. If, in the presence of legal relationships such as employment relationships, the act so issued also reveals a behavior contrary to the loyalty and honesty that could be required toward the counterpart, in addition to committing fraud of law, an open breach of the principle of good faith is also incurred. Ultimately, the theory of fraud of law constitutes, on one hand, the legal cause to deny the holder of a power or a subjective right exercised in a manner deviated from its purpose the protection of the legal system and, on the other, the unquestionable source of civil liability (responsabilidad civil). In the specific realm of labor law, there is fraud of law (fraude de ley) if, once the lack of coincidence is determined between the specific purpose, always of public or general interest, toward which the precept of the applicable legal system is directed and the purpose pursued by one of the parties to the employment relationship when exercising the conferred power, the former is not achieved. It is a deviation perfectly typified in current legislation, the consequence of which is the nullity of the act issued, even though, in formal terms, it is not contrary to legality.

XI.- Certainly, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has repeatedly established that, by imperatives of the principle of good faith and the duty of minimal consideration (deber de consideración mínima), inherent to every employment contract, it is the obligation of the worker who is absent for two or more consecutive days to inform their counterpart, in a timely manner, of the reasons for their non-attendance (so that the latter can arrange the pertinent measures to safeguard their interests) and to accredit them with suitable documents, since the simple act of communicating them does not automatically entail the endorsement of the corresponding justification. Any attitude of carelessness that undermines the employment relationship and the reciprocal obligations derived from it is unacceptable. Thus, in vote No. 158, of 3:00 p.m., of October 4, 1989, we stated the following: “The jurisprudence has been clear in the sense that in the case of absences from work it is essential that the employee, for reasons of good faith and the duty of minimal consideration that underlies as an element of every employment contract, is obliged to give notice and to justify them in a timely manner, and the practice of doing so subsequently has not been accepted as correct (...). It is specified that the notice and verification must be done in a timely manner, that is, within the first two days, so that the employer can take the measures required for the attention of their interests; and an attitude of carelessness and discourtesy as if there were no relationship with reciprocal obligations involved is not conceivable. The term of at least two days is mentioned, given that according to article 81, subsection g), of the Code of this matter, non-attendance at the workplace without the employer’s permission and without justification is cause for dismissal, so that absence in those terms immediately gives rise to the legitimate interest for the employer to proceed accordingly. If according to the norm the absence as indicated is sufficient for the cause for dismissal to arise, implicit therein is the duty to accredit the factual issues that exclude the fault before it can be considered as constituted and the effects that legitimize the employer to act in defense of their rights are produced.” In the one invoked by the defendant party, No. 136, of 9:00 a.m., of April 19, 1995, we pointed out that “The worker is obliged to provide their services to the employer in exchange for remuneration (articles 4, 18, 19 and 71, subsection b), all of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)). Absences from their duties, which imply a breach of that obligation, must be based on certain facts that undoubtedly prevent them from fulfilling their task. The proof of these must be presented to the employer in time, so that the latter has the opportunity to take the necessary precautions. Otherwise, the cause for dismissal provided for in numeral 81, subsection g) of the aforementioned normative body is incurred, which establishes: 'The following are just causes that empower the employer to terminate the employment contract: ... g) When the worker fails to attend work without the employer's permission, without justified cause for two consecutive days or for more than two alternate days within the same calendar month.' / In the matter before us, (...) It could not be validly maintained that the plaintiff was treated by their employer in an unjust and surprising manner, upon being dismissed (...), since, on the contrary, (...) the company gave them the opportunity to report to work, which they should have taken advantage of in order to avoid a measure that would harm them and, if in reality, they were ill, they had the duty to obtain from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) a medical opinion certifying their incapacity for work, and promptly present that document to the employer, at least within the first two days of the incapacity, which they did not do. / (...) even when those absences actually corresponded to an illness, to prevent them from providing grounds for a justified dismissal, the existence of such illness should have been accredited and the proof that it incapacitated them to perform their duties delivered to the employer in a timely manner.” Sentences nos. 81, of 9:10 a.m., of May 9; 104, of 9:20 a.m., of May 23; 162, of 3:30 p.m., of August 9; all three of 1984; 108, of 9:50 a.m., of July 3; 211, of 3:20 p.m., of October 23; both of 1985; 144, of 9:30 a.m., of September 6, 1989; 266, of 9:10 a.m., of December 11, 1991; 219, of 9:40 a.m., of October 6, 1993; 52, of 11:50 a.m., of February 13, 1998 and 159-99, of 10:00 a.m., of June 11, 1999; 2000-568, of 9:40 a.m., of June 2, 2000; 2001-10, of 9:50 a.m., of January 5; 2001-182, of 10:20 a.m., of March 23, both of 2001; 2003-82, of 9:30 a.m., of February 26, 2003 and 2008-789, of 10:10 a.m., of September 12, 2008, pronounce in the same sense. However, if what has been set forth in the preceding sections is taken into account, it is not possible to deduce from that jurisprudential reading of the applicable legal norms—articles 81, subsection g, in relation to article 19 of the Labor Code—, as informing both of them (numeral 9 of the Civil Code), that, in exceptional cases, every untimely presentation of incapacity slips (boletas de incapacidad) has as an inescapable consequence the impossibility of validly justifying the non-attendance at work. Already in vote No. 13, of 2:20 p.m., of January 22, 1986, we specified that “The text of the mentioned article [81, subsection g), of the Labor Code], cannot be applied in a closed manner, since the antecedents and circumstances that mediated in relation to the worker’s absence must be examined in each case (…)”. In No. 158, of 1989, already cited, that possibility was reaffirmed when we held: “Of course, the foregoing is posed as a general question and without prejudice to the existence of conventional norms that regulate the situation in another manner or that sufficient reasons mediate, to be analyzed in each case, that merit a greater delay in the verification, such as, for example, serious illness or distance from the workplace, without adequate means of communication.” In a more recent one, No. 2008-822, of 10:30 a.m., of September 24, 2008, we affirmed the following: “(…) this Chamber has resolved that there are afflictions that make it impossible to comply with the deadlines indicated in the different norms—regulatory, conventional, etc.—for presenting the justification of absences, and that have been rigidly interpreted by the employer (think, for example, of a person who, as a result of a blow to the head, remains unconscious for several days). In those exceptional cases, it has been interpreted that the deadline to justify the absence must be computed from the moment the worker is in the effective possibility of personally fulfilling that duty, or, at least, of requesting a family member or acquaintance to do so (see vote No. 158 of three o'clock in the afternoon of October four, nineteen eighty-nine).” It is appropriate to analyze, then, in each specific case, the real possibilities of the male or female worker to go to their workplace to deliver the justifying document, to determine whether negligent or malicious conduct on their part prevails or not, regarding the fulfillment of such duty.

XII.- It was duly accredited that the plaintiff suffers from fibromyalgia, rheumatoid arthritis (artritis reumatoide), and gastritis and that as a consequence of the treatment supplied she was unable to perform various physical activities, including walking. This was related by Doctor José Martín Rojas Castro, medical director of the Barva Clinic, who stated: “(…) the case of Mrs. [Name1] being an infrequent case, she had an arthritis problem and musculoskeletal problems, the treatments given did not have much response, so the treating physician consulted me on the case to see how we managed it and she was even referred to the Rheumatology service of Hospital México. Fibromyalgia and arthritis were diagnosed. It is an infrequent condition, it has crisis periods that merit impactful treatments, that is to say, they are very strong and as part of the treatment it requires periods of rest because in these crisis periods patients cannot mobilize ‘normally’, it is difficult for them to walk and perform other physical activities. In that second semester of two thousand three, which is what I remember, Mrs. [Name1] presented several crises that fell to me to treat personally because the rest periods exceeded what the regulations of the Fund (Caja) stipulate for general practitioners and therefore they must be endorsed or approved by the Medical Directorate or the Rheumatology Specialist of the corresponding Hospital. In those periods there were several dates on which Mrs. [Name1] came to consultation, the corresponding treatment was given, within which different incapacities were included.” (Folios 69-70). To this it must be added that, as already noted, the timely telephone communication of her state of health and that, because of this, she would miss work to her immediate boss must be considered accredited; that her rest by medical indication during the days of October 21, 22, and 23 were a continuation of others that, uninterruptedly, had followed one another since October 10; that on October 24, when her son presented the respective slip (boleta) to the Human Resources Department, the representatives of the defendant completed it with the information required by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund to be able to pay it; and that the dismissal was documented and ordered sometime after that event—at the beginning of the following month—and was communicated to the Personnel Procedures Department until November 6. If the nature of her condition and the consequences produced by the administered medication make it understandable that the slip for the period between October 20 and 24, 2003 was not presented within the two days following its date of issuance, those other facts show that the questioned employer action, even though it may formally be protected under subsection g) of article 81 of the Labor Code and the jurisprudence that informs it, evades the one that should have been applied in the first instance, namely: that contained in the first paragraph of numeral 19 ibidem, according to which “The employment contract obliges both what is expressed in it, and the consequences that derive from it according to good faith, equity, usage, custom, or the law.” For this Chamber, in those circumstances, the non-attendance of Mrs. [Name1] to her work during the days of October 21, 22, and 23, 2003 cannot be qualified as unjustified and the decision to terminate her without employer liability constitutes behavior contrary to loyalty and honesty and, therefore, an open breach of the principle of good faith. The company knew of her delicate situation and, even so, refused to consider them as justified when she could, within her possibilities, deliver the documentation that accredited them in a reliable manner. It is inadmissible that, in this case, more importance was given to a requirement of punctuality in the presentation of the incapacity slip than to the plaintiff’s health problems, as if the former were an end in itself and not a guarantee of the duty of minimal consideration which, by definition, is reciprocal. The defendant bypassed the corrective purpose of its disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria). It is in bad faith that, given special circumstances such as those of this matter, the employer refused to justify the absences in question, under the pretext that the incapacity was presented belatedly. It is not reasonable to expect that, in her delicate situation, she would take care to deliver it personally because she was unable to travel to her workplace, especially considering that she is a resident of Santa Lucía de Barva and her counterpart is domiciled in San José. Nor is it possible to assume that her family members had full availability to do it for her within such a short period. Within her circumstances, she did the most that could be demanded of her: communicate it by phone. Consequently, the punctuality demanded by the company is out of place. The situation would be different if she had been absent without giving any type of information or reason to her superiors, as that would show an irresponsible attitude toward the essential obligations generated by her employment contract. But, as has been indicated, the plaintiff fulfilled her duty to communicate her ailments to her immediate boss and to accredit them, in a valid manner, within her particular circumstances (in a similar sense, votes nos. 54, of 3:40 p.m., of March 19, 1997 and 52, of 11:50 a.m., of February 13, 1998, may be consulted). If, moreover, one considers the fact that, in this case, it is not possible to identify the moral element of the disciplinary fault; that is, its imputation to a free will or, at least, to an inexcusable carelessness, it must be concluded that it is legally impossible to consider the dismissal justified on the cause provided for in the cited subsection g) of article 81 of the Labor Code and that the disciplinary power was exercised in a manner deviated from its purpose. As we pointed out in vote No. 2008-753, of 9:45 a.m., of September 5, 2008, “(…) in this matter, so sensitive to the particularities of how relations between employer and worker develop (…) numeral 492 of the Labor Code grants the labor judge the possibility of appreciating the evidence with a broad criterion, in accordance with principles derived from logic and experience, which allow them to assess the entire evidentiary material to derive a reasonably fair conclusion from it. (…) The set of this evidence, analyzed in light of logic and experience, allows reaching the conclusion that the employer did know the reasons why the plaintiff did not report for work on the cited days. One cannot think of a negligent or disinterested attitude on [their] part (…) in explaining to the employer the reasons for their non-attendance, which really existed and which their superiors knew of (…) in such a way that the decision to dismiss the plaintiff turned out to be hasty, since the employer did not grant the worker sufficient prudential time to justify the absences, which clearly violated the principles of good faith and loyalty, present in all employment contracts by provision of article 19 of the Labor Code. Thus then, this accumulation of situations allows inferring that the employer's decision was motivated by the absences the worker presented, without considering that they stemmed from the impairment of their health (…). Consequently, the ordered dismissal was unjustified, and the defendant must therefore bear the obligations derived from a dismissal of that nature.” XIII.- The defendant company has insisted that the payment of the incapacity slips corresponding to the periods between October 20 and 24; October 25 and November 5; and November 6 and 15, all these dates in 2003, occurred because “(…) the plaintiff was still covered by the insurance paid in the company's last payroll, before being excluded from it, not because the payment of said incapacity was authorized by the company.” (Brief contesting the claim, at folio 32). For this Chamber, that allegation is inadmissible as it is a requirement to collect the subsidy that the employer declares the incapacitated person as their worker. This was explained by Doctor José Martín Rojas Castro, medical director of the Barva Clinic, in his statement: “The procedure that an incapacity slip issued in a clinic such as the one where I work must follow is that the patient is given two vouchers, one is for the patient themselves and another is for the employer to sign and carry out the payment procedure at the corresponding branch.” (Folios 69-70). Furthermore, the Health Insurance Regulation (Reglamento del seguro de salud), approved by the Board of Directors of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund in session No. 7082, held on December 3, 1996 (article 19) and published in La Gaceta No. 25, of February 5, 1997, provides for a procedure in case of the employer's refusal to complete the incapacity slips.

Article 54 of that regulation establishes the following: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“If the employer refuses to fill out and deliver to the worker the certificate for claiming the subsidy, the form shall be completed by the Caja's inspectors of laws and regulations, based on the procedures deemed necessary.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> On the other hand, [Nombre2]</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">, a human resources employee, stated that </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“Her case is unique and it is difficult to forget; her son came to leave the (sic) medical leave certificates (incapacidades) at the office, which is normal, they are checked in the payroll system and she was reported with a job abandonment, for which reason the boy's medical leave certificates are not received and he is told that the Sales Department made the notification of her departure.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> (Folio 67). Without a doubt, that part of the account refers to the visit of November 22, not to the previous ones, and it can be inferred from it that the authorizations in question were given because when the three medical leave forms were presented, the act of dismissal was not yet recorded in the system. Consequently, not only must the granting of the corresponding authorizations be taken as true, but also the surprising nature and bad faith of the termination, since the medical leave forms had indeed been received and processed. Moreover, that fact renders that decision suspicious, as explained below.</span><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:200%; font-size:15pt\"><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">XIV.-</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\"> The termination of the employment contract by the will of the employer may be justified when it is the result of the legitimate exercise of disciplinary power given the breach, attributable to the worker, of their contractual obligations</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\"> (disciplinary dismissal) -see, in this regard, articles 19, 71, 72 and 81 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)-, or it may be unjustified when it is the direct or concealed consequence of the freedom to dismiss, which, in principle, every employer holds (dismissal at will) -articles 28, 31 and 80 of the Labor Code-. These two modalities differ, on a substantive level, by the necessarily compensatory effect of the second which, as a general rule, the first does not have. It often happens, however, that dismissal at will is prohibited because there is a special legal protection in favor of the employee in view of a particular condition of his or hers, as is the case, among others, of pregnant persons, those sexually harassed, and union representatives (see, in the same sense, Voto n.° 235-98, of 9:45 hours, of September 18, 1998). In the case of a person who is required to rest for health reasons, articles 79 and 80 of the </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Labor Code</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\"> prohibit their unjustified dismissal, at least during the first three months (see Voto n.° 198, of 15:10 hours, of December 13, 1989, reiterated in nos.</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:10pt; vertical-align:super\">os</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\"> 49, of 11:20 hours, of February 13, 1998; 2002-150, of 14:40 hours, of April 9, 2002; 2002-150, of 14:40 hours, of April 9, 2002 and 2005-326, of 9:10 hours, of May 11, 2005). This is so because the medical leave (incapacidad) for illness is a cause for suspension of the employment relationship. Pursuant to the provisions of the first of those articles, in such a case, it is the employer's obligation to grant the worker a leave of absence so that they can be protected by social security rules while they achieve a full recovery (Votos n.</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:10pt; vertical-align:super\">os</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\"> 2000- 945, of 10:20 hours, of November 13, 2000 and 2003-516, of 9:30 hours, of October 1, 2003). It is true that the last-mentioned article, 80, is challenged before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) (expediente n.° 08-008837-0007-CO) and that this action was admitted since last June 25, 2008. However, it must be clear that the challenge does not cover the prohibition established therein, but the period during which it is in force.</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-size:12pt\"> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">XV.-</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> Now then, if one considers the letter and the spirit of those provisions, it is evident that the special protection granted to workers who temporarily suffer a deterioration in their health that prevents them from working is rendered meaningless if they could be dismissed by an employer's decision without an objective legal cause to justify it. From that perspective and in view of the social interest involved, the payment of so-called social benefits is insufficient to guarantee compliance with the referred prohibition, since an unscrupulous employer could illegitimately attribute the commission of a breach of his or her obligations to the worker and, in this way, circumvent the prohibition. Hence, the use of any means tending to undermine the relative stability of a person who is on medical leave (incapacitado) to work, and especially dismissal, must be considered contrary to law. As the Constitutional Chamber has stated, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“This Chamber recognizes the right of employers to reorganize their company and reduce expenses, aimed at stabilizing their economy, since not accepting it would violate the constitutional right to freedom of commerce, but in a Social State of law like the one in force in Costa Rica, the fundamental freedoms and rights of citizens cannot be violated with impunity.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> (Voto n.° 5000-93, of 10:09 hours, of October 8, 1993). In Voto n.° 2007-17971, of 14:51 hours, of December 12, 2007, issued regarding an action of unconstitutionality filed against articles 9 and 10 of the </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Reglamento para otorgamiento de incapacidades y licencias a beneficiarios del Seguro de salud</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">, that same jurisdictional body established: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“The need of a worker to take a medical leave (incapacitarse), responsibly certified by a physician, is a matter that cannot be evaluated solely in economic terms, since that condition precisely reflects the existence of a vulnerable state in the person’s health and, in the face of this, the State has the duty to protect them, guarantee the required care, and in accordance with labor rights, guarantee their recovery in dignified and fair conditions. The foregoing, evaluated in light of the fundamental right to work and to health, without regard to a period but to the established medical conditions, with the responsibilities of what was recommended by said professional. This is because, as indicated, there are situations in which one does not qualify for a disability pension, leaving as options for the employer the termination of the employment contract with labor liability or, for the worker, returning to work in precarious health conditions. A situation which, as is noted, is not only unconstitutional, but also contrary to human rights.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> And, in a more recent one, n.° 2008-1573, of 14:55 hours, of January 30, 2008, it stated: </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“It is also important to recall that constitutional jurisprudence has prohibited, even in the field of labor relations between subjects of private law, that illness becomes a factor of discrimination against the employee, which leads to consequences detrimental to his or her situation</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> (decisions # 2005-13205 of 15:13 hours of September 27, 2005 and #2007-3168 of 10:30 hours of March 9, 2007). In summary, dismissal –even with the payment of full benefits– is not a solution that derives from or aligns with the principles of social justice or solidarity.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">.</span><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">XVI.-</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> For this Chamber, more than an accidental breach of the referred prohibition due to an error in the application of current regulations, the employer's decision to dismiss Ms. [Nombre5]</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">is a clear act consciously directed to disregard it and nullify the special protection to which she was entitled due to her health situation. The circumstances in which it occurred allow that illegitimate motive to be inferred without a doubt. From this perspective, this is a typical act of discrimination based on health reasons, and, as the Constitutional Chamber has resolved, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“(…) the Principle of the Social State of Law, the right not to suffer discriminatory treatment for any cause, and respect for human dignity are essential elements of our constitutional order that coexist peacefully, the safeguarding of which falls not only to the State, but also to all members of the community. In this sense, all types of discrimination, regardless of whether it comes from the Administration or from a private individual, is a violation of the constitutional order. In the specific case of labor discrimination based on illness, on the one hand, subsection b) of the first article of Convention 111 admits the possibility of specifying, through a certain procedure, any type of discrimination that nullifies or alters the equality of opportunities or treatment in employment or occupation and, on the other hand, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights expressly proscribe any type of discriminatory treatment, a position that, likewise, our constitutional regime professes under the protection of article 33 of the Fundamental Law. Furthermore, the discriminatory dismissal of which (…) was a victim collaterally affects the constitutional rights to work and to health. Regarding the first, it is evident that any dismissal based on discrimination irremediably implies an injury to the same and, in general, to the duty of solidarity inherent to the Social State of Law and to the Christian principle of social justice (article 74 of the Political Constitution). In addition, given the age of the protected party and the real reason for their dismissal, their illness, they are left prostrate in a situation that is particularly harmful to both their health and their dignity as a human being, since they have fewer possibilities of finding another employment option and, consequently, of obtaining the necessary resources to attend to their health problem and family obligations, apart from the fact that in practice, regrettably, a person of a certain age, abruptly dismissed and affected by such a severe illness (…), finds it enormously difficult to obtain dignified employment, given the operational and cost problems that a new employer could face in having to find a substitute for eventual medical leaves (incapacidades) due to hospital confinement or some type of medical treatment.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> (Voto n.° 2005-13205, of 15:13 hours, of September 27, 2005; reiterated in n.° 2007-3168, of 10:30 hours, of March 9, 2007). In any case, as we have stated before, </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“(…) in addition to the necessary compliance, in accordance with the canons of good faith, it is clear that the exercise of a right is not free and unrestricted. One of those limits is, precisely, respect for the rights of others. Therefore, when through the exercise of a right considered one's own, the right of a third party is violated, one incurs in the abusive or antisocial use of the same. Expressly, article 22 of the Civil Code, applicable in this matter as supplementary legislation, expressly denies protection to those who abuse a right, exercise an antisocial use of the same, or, in a contractual relationship, exceed the normal limits of its exercise. In all those cases, the obligation to compensate is recognized for whoever has abused their right, to the clear detriment of another's right (see, in this sense, the judgments of this Chamber No. 141- 97, of 16:00 hours, of July 4, 1997; and, No. 229-99, of 9:10 hours, of August 13, 1999). The important thing is, then, to determine the rules in force in each case, in order to determine the limit of the compensation.”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> (Voto n.° 2001-200, of 9:50 hours, of April 4, 2001).</span><span>”</span></p> “IV.- Unlike what is provided for in the case of dismissal at will, in which Article 28 of the Código de Trabajo requires the employer to exercise in writing that power to terminate the indefinite-term employment contract, in the case of disciplinary dismissal there is no express legal rule with similar content. However, it is to be expected that, in light of the principle of good faith (Articles 19 ibidem and 21 of the Código Civil), such a momentous act be documented in the same manner and communicated personally to the counterparty. Within this context, the Sala Constitucional has repeatedly pointed out that, in order to prevent the potential abuse of the freedom to dismiss and to guarantee the fundamental rights of the salaried person to work, to equality, and to due process should they need to resort to the courts to claim their rights, it is the obligation of the employer to provide the certification referred to in Article 35 of the Código de Trabajo, both when dismissing them and when there is another reason for their ceasing to be in their service, regardless of whether it is requested or not (vote No. 2170-93, of 10:12 a.m., of May 21, 1993, reiterated, among others, in Nos. 6585, of 3:24 p.m., of July 26, 2000; 14363, of 10:02 a.m., of December 17, 2004; 2724, of 6:55 p.m., of February 28 and 12606, of 5:18 p.m., of August 30, both of 2006). In vote No. 2003-4101, of 10:30 a.m., of May 16, 2003, that Chamber specified the following: “The importance of the employer's obligation to certify is related to the principles of equality and due process because the material inequality of employers and workers must find, and does find, in constitutional law—and even in ordinary legislation—legal compensations: the obligation to certify the cause of withdrawal or termination of the contract—even when the worker does not expressly request it—is one of them, as are the socially and doctrinally settled rules regarding the absolute nullity of waivers of the code's provisions, the ‘in dubio pro operario’ principle, the presumption of the existence of the individual employment contract, the very special privilege enjoyed in cases of bankruptcy and other scenarios by credits for notice and severance pay, the absolute prohibition against forcing workers by any means to ‘withdraw from the unions or legal groups to which they belong’... (Código de Trabajo, respectively, Articles 11, 17, 18, 33, 70 subsection c). Legal freedom and equality, inherent to persons, require for their real translation procedural and substantive rules such as those mentioned to reduce material inequality, as is inferred from Article 50 of the Constitution. This, the axis of the Social State of Law inaugurated in the forties, introduces the title of social guarantees with an aspiration to real freedom and equality. Article 74 closes the same title invoking the ‘Christian principle of social justice’ and the balance between the factors of production, which makes social justice a constitutional value of the first order.” However, neither from the cited rules nor from the pronouncements of the Sala Constitucional—binding erga omnes, in accordance with Article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional—can it be inferred that the failure to issue the certificate or its proper notification renders the employer's termination act null and void. Hence, precisely to safeguard the rights of workers, this Chamber has admitted tacit dismissal in cases where the employer removed them from payrolls and stopped allowing them to collect the subsidy for their sick leave from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social or to pay their salary (see votes Nos. 2000-505, of 2:20 p.m., of May 19, 2000 and 2007-256, of 9:35 a.m., of April 25, 2007).

V.- It is true that the defendant company documented its decision to dismiss the plaintiff without employer liability, attributing to her the failure to justify her absences of October 21, 22, and 23, 2003. Apparently, it did so on the following November 3, the date of the dismissal letter provided, visible on folio 39. But it is also true that it never delivered that communication to her or, at least, it did not take care to prove that it did, as was its responsibility. The fact of having inserted in it the signatures of two witnesses and a receipt stamp from the Personnel Processing Department does not refute this assertion, since it was not recorded that those actions were due to Mrs. [Name1]’s refusal to receive it. And even though, as already mentioned, a formal notification by the employer was to be expected, not having acted in this way does not exclude that the plaintiff realized she had been dismissed, nor does it make the dismissal non-existent, since, as we indicated in vote No. 174, of 10:00 a.m., of July 29, 1992, and it is appropriate to reiterate now, “(…) the absence of written communication of dismissal (…), does not make it impossible for the employer to apply the disciplinary measure. The Código de Trabajo only refers in its Article 35 to a worker's request to be issued a certificate indicating general data such as the start and end dates of the employment relationship, the type of work, as well as the reason for withdrawal (…). The employer's failure to deliver it, in no way can condition the validity (…) of the dismissal (…). While it is true that both doctrine and jurisprudence are uniform in recognizing its importance, in some cases, according to the peculiarities that arise, it is not always possible to have the document, and its appropriateness must be resolved in the corresponding venue.” Consequently, for the purposes of counting the statute of limitations for the disciplinary power, the moment from which Mrs. García Muñoz had certain knowledge of the dismissal must be determined. In her initial filing, she stated the following: “(…) I worked for the defendant from February 04, 2003 until November 22, 2003. (…) On November 22, 2003, as the undersigned was on sick leave, I sent my son to the company (…) so that they would authorize the cashing of my sick leave certificates CED1° NIE1 CED2 , in order to present them for payment at the CCSS. However, in the Human Resources Department of said Company, they refused to receive said documents from my son, and rather gave him a settlement of my labor rights, indicating to him that the undersigned had been dismissed since November 03, 2003 for job abandonment.” (Facts one and five, on folios 1 and 2-3). Folio 20 of the file is occupied by the copy of the referred settlement of labor rights, provided by her and dated November 22, 2003. This being the case, although the employer's termination act was not communicated to her personally, it is unquestionable that on that date she became aware of its existence, and, for all purposes, that knowledge of hers substitutes for the notification she misses (see, in a similar sense, vote No. 2002-393, of 10:50 a.m., of August 7, 2002).

And since at that time the month provided for in numeral 603 of the <span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Código de Trabajo</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">, counted from the date the imputed fault was committed—23 October 2003—had not elapsed, the disciplinary power must be deemed to have been exercised in a timely manner, as the appellate court correctly resolved.</span><span> </span> <span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">VI.-</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> Without prejudice to the foregoing, it is necessary to point out from now on that the date of notification is indeed determinative for establishing from when the dismissal may take effect. For this Chamber, it is not legally admissible that an act of that nature could have operated before it was made known to the affected person (see, in the same sense, voto n.º 2006-1098, of 9:15 a.m., of 30 November 2006). Consequently, since Ms. [Nombre1]</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">had certain knowledge of her termination only until 22 November 2003, that date is the one that must be deemed as that of its effective execution, it being of no importance that in the dismissal letter the employer's representative set it on the 3rd of that same month and year.</span><span> </span> <span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">VII.- </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">The plaintiff was dismissed without employer liability for not having justified in writing, within the first two days, her absences from work on 21, 22, and 23 October 2003.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> This was recorded by her immediate superior, Ms. Pamela Campos, in the aforementioned letter dated 3 November 2003, and the defendant's representation has taken it upon itself to evidence it in its principal writings. For example, in the answer to the complaint, it specified: </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“I clarify that the plaintiff's dismissal was due to the fact that she was absent from her work on 21, 22, and 23 October of (sic) 2003, and it was not until the day (…) 24 of the same month, that her son appeared at the company to request authorization for the collection of a supposed sick leave (incapacidad) that expired that same day. That is, </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the plaintiff did not present the medical proof of sick leave (incapacidad médica) justifying her absences within the first two days thereof (sic), in accordance with the criterion established by case law regarding this ground</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"> (…)”.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> (Folio 31. The bold is added). In the brief with which it responded to the hearing on the documentary evidence provided for better resolution, it affirmed: </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“I insist, once again, that the issue we are discussing is not whether the plaintiff was on sick leave or not; nor whether the CCSS paid her or not; nor how or why it paid her, nor how much. That is NOT the object of this litigation. </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">What is being discussed is that, if she was on sick leave, she did not present the documents that so justified it </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">within the established time</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">, as required by the case law on the matter.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"> Therefore, her absences were unjustified and the dismissal without employer liability was indeed appropriate.”</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> (Folios 101 and 103. The bold is also added). As can be seen, the telephone communication of the reasons why she did not report to work those days, which the plaintiff maintains she made to her immediate boss, has not been the subject of any questioning by the employer. The only thing that has been disputed is the timeliness of the presentation of the medical proof of sick leave (incapacidad médica). For that reason, it is necessary to recall that, as a consequence of the principle of contribution, which forms an organic whole with the dispositive principle and the principle of congruence and also governs labor proceedings, it is incumbent exclusively upon the parties to introduce and define the facts upon which the debate must turn, and to</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> produce</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> the</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> evidence</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> that</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> they deem</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> pertinent</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> to</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> prove them—doctrine of numerals 5 of the </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">, 394, 461, 464, and 490 of the </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Código de Trabajo</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">, and 99, 153, 155, 305, 316, and 317 of the </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Procesal Civil</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">, applicable as provided by 452 of the </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">de Trabajo-</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> For each to achieve its purpose, the plaintiff must allege and demonstrate the factual aspects constituting the right claimed, and the defendant must do the same with respect to those of an extinctive, obstructive, or excluding nature. The fulfillment of these burdens occurs, precisely, in the complaint and its answer; acts by which the </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">"thema decidendum"</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> is set or delimited; that is, the object—factual and legal—of the litigation, which constitutes an impassable limit for the competent jurisdictional authority, whose pronouncement, as a general rule, cannot encompass facts and allegations different from those raised by the parties (principle of immutability of the litigation). So much so that the parties are prohibited from altering the bases upon which they have brought the proceeding, and the authority cannot rule on aspects not timely alleged by them, however many reasons there may be to do so. Such is the degree of binding force of the parties' activity in this matter that the supplementary procedural rules provide for a special procedure for the expansion of the facts—Article 313, second paragraph, of the </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Código Procesal Civil-</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> (see, in the same sense, votes n.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:10pt; vertical-align:super">os</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> 215-99, of 10:00 a.m., of 30 July, and 1999-363, of 10:10 a.m., of 19 November, both of 1999). Neither the public and instrumental nature of every jurisdictional proceeding, nor the interest of the State and the social community in equitably resolving legal conflicts arising within it, currently recognized by doctrine, legislation—Articles 16, 17, 394, 399, and 452 of the </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Código de Trabajo</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">, and 1, 3, 97, 98, and 132 of the </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Código Procesal Civil-</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">, and case law applicable to civil and labor proceedings, break with these minimum requirements derived from both the dispositive principle (see voto n.° 98-90, of 10:00 a.m., of 25 March 1998), and the rights to due process and to defense (see, among the most recent, votes n.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:10pt; vertical-align:super">os</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> 2004-524, of 10:05 a.m., of 24 June 2004; 2005-351, of 9:30 a.m., of 13 May 2005; 2006-16, of 9:55 a.m., of 25 January 2006; 2006-149, of 9:40 a.m., of 10 March 2006; 2006-790, of 3:25 p.m., of 16 August 2006; 2007-387, of 10:35 a.m., of 20 June; 2007-576, of 2:55 p.m., of 22 August; 2007-887, of 9:35 a.m., of 21 November, the latter of 2007, and 2008-219, of 9:40 a.m., of 12 March 2008). Consequently, the lower court authorities erred in requiring Ms. García Muñoz to prove the telephone communication. But they also erred in saddling her with the burden of doing so through suitable evidence, without paying attention to the fact that, given the particular circumstances in which it occurred, they placed her before a practically impossible task. The party for which it undoubtedly was easy to discredit that it happened was the defendant, as, had it been interested in doing so, it would have sufficed to present the testimony of Ms. Pamela Campos. By virtue of the applicable principles in this matter, the omission to question that it had occurred, and, having done so, the omission to offer the aforementioned deposition, now obliges us to presume—human presumption—that, on that occasion, what happened was what was usual in </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“(…) the company's way of proceeding (…)”</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">; that is, </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“(…) that as a collaborator one must notify their immediate boss on the day they were (sic) given sick leave or if the sick leave continued”.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> (testimony of [Nombre2]</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">, human resources employee, visible at folio 67). The lower court was therefore mistaken in justifying its decision on a factual element that has been outside the debate, and we must now decide whether, in this specific matter, the documentary justification of the absences—presentation of the sick leave proof (incapacidad)—was or was not untimely.-</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-size:12pt"> </span> <span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">VIII.- </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">In labor matters, the disciplinary power derives from the employer's power of direction and is a reflection of the insertion of the worker into its organizational sphere. With it, the aim is to guarantee the effective fulfillment of the debt of activity—personal provision of the service—assumed by the employee by virtue of the employment contract, through the imposition of sanctions for the breach of one or more of their specific legal duties. As such, it has a corrective character because, rather than punishing past conduct, it seeks to influence future conduct. Furthermore, it is regulated and limited by objective law. The purpose of disciplinary liability is, then, to ensure the observance of legal subordination and, in general, the exact fulfillment of the worker's commitment. In accordance with those criteria, in its voto n.° 5594-94, of 3:45 p.m., of 27 September 1994, the Sala Constitucional noted that the disciplinary fault or infraction </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“(…) is a violation of the functioning of any duty inherent to their condition, even (sic) when it has not been specifically defined although it is (sic) provided for. The determining facts of disciplinary faults are innumerable, for they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of the ‘subordinate’ subjects, behaviors or conducts that are truly unlimited in number given their variety; therefore, the existence of three elements of the disciplinary fault is deduced: 1.- a material element: which is an act or an omission; 2.- a moral element: which is the imputation of the act to a free will; and 3.- a formal element: which is the disturbance to the functioning of the service or the immediate or possible affectation of its efficiency." </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">(See, in the same sense, votes n.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:10pt; vertical-align:super">os</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> 563-97, of 2:39 p.m., of 29 January 1997; 2000-4545, of 3:39 p.m., of 31 May, and 2000-6590, of 3:29 p.m., of 26 July, the latter of 2000). As [Nombre3]</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">and [Nombre4]</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">rightly point out, </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“The sanctionable fault, however much it tends at times to be objectified, must always be capable of being imputed to the willful misconduct or negligence of the worker; as for the latter, furthermore, in a lasting relationship with long periods of compliance activity within its duration, good faith does not allow that impeccable conduct be required at all times, without the slightest carelessness, a zealous and unfaltering diligence (Barreiro); the legal system reckons with the human failings of the good family man; it also reckons, to paraphrase, with those of the ‘good worker,’ the latter being owing (sic) only (sic) normal diligence, as was seen; what this (sic) tolerates is neither sanctionable conduct nor can it be sanctioned. As for willful misconduct, it is (sic) the contractual one which, abstracted from the motive, reveals the knowledge and will of the guilty party.”</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> (</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Derecho del Trabajo</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">, Madrid: Civitas Ediciones, S. L., twentieth edition, revised, 2002, p. 392).</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-size:12pt"> </span> <span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">IX.- </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">Repeatedly, this Chamber has indicated that the disciplinary power (dismissal</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">‑</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">sanction) must be exercised by the employer within the parameters set by the objective legal system and without distorting the purposes pursued in recognizing it. Consequently, it must be used for the reaffirmation of a subjective right or for the attainment of legitimate interests, because that is where the material cause of its legislative recognition and its functionality lies. Precisely to guarantee aspects such as these, the preliminary title of the </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Código Civil</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">—which is the common law of the entire Costa Rican legal system—contains fundamental rules of interpretive work that constitute a communication pathway between current legislation and prevailing social morality, and whose purpose is none other than the overcoming of legalism. Thus, by virtue of its Article 21, </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">"Rights shall be exercised in accordance with the requirements of good faith." </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">Article 20 declares that </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“Acts carried out under the cover of the text of a norm, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of the law and shall not prevent the due application of the norm that was sought to be evaded.”</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> Finally, the first part of Article 22 establishes that: </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">"The law does not protect the abuse of right or the antisocial exercise thereof (sic)." </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">From those precepts it follows that subjective rights and private powers, apart from their express legal limits, are circumscribed by moral, teleological, and social barriers, and that their irregular exercise is prohibited, it being the responsibility of the jurisdictional authorities to determine the specific hypotheses in which such reprehensible human behavior occurs (see, for all, votes n.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:10pt; vertical-align:super">os</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> 177, of 8:10 a.m., of 20 August 1993; 141, of 4:00 p.m., of 4 July 1997; 52, of 11:50 a.m., of 13 February 1998; 197, of 3:50 p.m., of 15 July 1999; 2003-78, of 8:50 a.m., of 20 February 2003; and 2008-93, of 10:20 a.m., of 8 February 2008).</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-size:12pt"> </span> <span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">X.-</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> Fraud of law (fraude de derecho) operates, generally, outside any relationship of reciprocity and is a species within the broader category formed by unlawful acts, whose conceptualization is not exhausted in the merely formal; that is, what is contrary to written legislation, but rather encompasses a material notion of unlawfulness, inclusive of the breach of obligations derived from much broader general principles, such as good faith and equity (Articles 28 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Constitución Política</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> and 21 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Código Civil</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">). Among many other hypotheses, it exists both when the covering norm—which there must always be—does not confer complete and perfect protection for the person who relies on it, and when the actually applicable norm is evaded by adopting the guise of a legal figure regulated by another that responds to a different purpose. If, being in the presence of legal relationships such as employment, the act so issued reveals, in turn, a behavior contrary to the loyalty and honesty that could be required toward the counterpart, in addition to committing fraud of law, an open breach of the principle of good faith is also incurred. In short, the theory of fraud of law constitutes, on one hand, the legal cause for denying the holder of a power or a subjective right exercised in a manner deviating from its purpose the protection of the legal system, and, on the other, the unquestionable source of civil liability. In the specific sphere of labor law, fraud of law exists if, once the lack of coincidence between the specific purpose, always of public or general interest, to which the applicable precept of the legal system is directed and that pursued by one of the parties to the employment relationship in exercising the conferred power is determined, the former is not achieved.</span> It is a deviation perfectly defined in current legislation, the consequence of which is the nullity of the issued act, even though, in formal terms, it is not contrary to legality.

XI.- Certainly, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has repeatedly established that, by imperatives of the principle of good faith (principio de buena fe) and the duty of minimum consideration, inherent to every employment contract, it is the obligation of the worker who is absent for two or more consecutive days to inform their counterpart, in a timely manner, of the reasons for their absence (so that the latter can take the pertinent measures to safeguard their interests) and to prove them with the appropriate documents, since the simple act of communicating them does not automatically entail the endorsement of the corresponding justification. Any careless attitude that undermines the employment relationship and the reciprocal obligations derived from it is unacceptable. Thus, in Voto n.° 158, at 3:00 p.m., of October 4, 1989, we indicated the following: “Jurisprudence has been clear in the sense that in the case of absences from work, it is essential that the employee, for reasons of good faith and the duty of minimum consideration that underlies as an element of every employment contract, is obliged to report and justify it in a timely manner, and the practice of doing so subsequently has not been accepted as correct (...). It is specified that the notice and verification must be done in a timely manner, that is, during the first two days, so that the employer can take the necessary measures to attend to their interests; and a careless and discourteous attitude as if there were no relationship with reciprocal obligations is not conceivable. The term of at least two days is mentioned, given that according to Article 81, subsection g), of the Code on the matter, absence from the workplace without the employer's permission and without justification is grounds for dismissal, so that absence in those terms immediately gives rise to the legitimate interest of the employer to proceed accordingly. If according to the rule, the absence as indicated is sufficient for the reason for dismissal to exist, there is implicit the duty to prove the factual matters that exclude the fault before it can be considered as constituted and the effects that legitimize the employer to act in defense of their rights are produced.” In the one invoked by the defendant, n.° 136, at 9:00 a.m., of April 19, 1995, we stated that “The worker is obliged to provide their services to the employer in exchange for remuneration (Articles 4, 18, 19, and 71, subsection b), all of the Código de Trabajo). Absences from their work, which imply a breach of that obligation, must be based on certain facts that unquestionably prevent them from fulfilling their duty. Proof of these must be presented to the employer in time, so that the latter has the opportunity to take the necessary precautions. Otherwise, the grounds for dismissal provided for in numeral 81, subsection g) of the aforementioned normative body are incurred, which establishes: 'The following are just causes that empower the employer to terminate the employment contract: ... g) When the worker fails to attend work without the employer's permission, without justified cause, for two consecutive days or for more than two alternate days within the same calendar month.' / In the matter before us, (...) It could not be validly maintained that the plaintiff was treated unfairly and surprisingly by their employer when they were dismissed (...), since, on the contrary, (…) the company gave them the opportunity to report to work, which they should have taken advantage of in order to avoid a measure that would harm them, and if they were indeed ill, they had the duty to obtain from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social a medical opinion certifying their inability to work, and promptly present that document to the employer, at least within the first two days of the incapacity, which they did not do. / (...) even if those absences actually corresponded to an illness, in order to prevent them from constituting grounds for justified dismissal, the existence of such illness should have been proven and proof that it incapacitated them from performing their work should have been delivered to the employer in a timely manner.” Rulings n. 81, at 9:10 a.m., of May 9; 104, at 9:20 a.m., of May 23; 162, at 3:30 p.m., of August 9; all three from 1984; 108, at 9:50 a.m., of July 3; 211, at 3:20 p.m., of October 23; both from 1985; 144, at 9:30 a.m., of September 6, 1989; 266, at 9:10 a.m., of December 11, 1991; 219, at 9:40 a.m., of October 6, 1993; 52, at 11:50 a.m., of February 13, 1998, and 159-99, at 10:00 a.m., of June 11, 1999; 2000-568, at 9:40 a.m., of June 2, 2000; 2001-10, at 9:50 a.m., of January 5; 2001-182, at 10:20 a.m., of March 23, both from 2001; 2003-82, at 9:30 a.m., of February 26, 2003, and 2008-789, at 10:10 a.m., of September 12, 2008, are pronounced in the same vein. However, if what has been set forth in the preceding sections is taken into account, it is not possible to deduce from that jurisprudential reading of the applicable legal norms—Articles 81, subsection g), in relation to Article 19 of the Código de Trabajo, as informing both (numeral 9 of the Código Civil)—that, in exceptional cases, any extemporaneous presentation of the incapacity slips inevitably results in the impossibility of validly justifying the absence from work.

Already in Voto n.° 13, at 2:20 p.m., of January 22, 1986, we specified that “The text of the aforementioned article [81, subsection g), of the Código de Trabajo], cannot be applied in a closed manner, as the background and circumstances that mediated in relation to the worker's absence must be examined in each case (…)” . In n.° 158, of 1989, already cited, that possibility was reaffirmed when we held: “Of course, the foregoing is posed as a general matter and without prejudice to the existence of conventional norms that regulate the situation otherwise or that there are sufficient reasons, to be analyzed in each case, that warrant a greater delay in verification, such as for example serious illness or distance from the workplace, without adequate means of communication.” In a more recent one, n.º 2008-822, at 10:30 a.m., of September 24, 2008, we affirmed the following: “(…) this Chamber has resolved that there are afflictions that make it impossible to comply with the deadlines set forth in the different norms—regulatory, conventional, etc.—for presenting the justification for absences, and that have been rigidly interpreted by the employer (consider, for example, a person who, as a result of a blow to the head, remains unconscious for several days). In those exceptional cases, it has been interpreted that the deadline to justify the absence must be computed starting from when the worker is effectively able to fulfill that duty personally, or, at least, to request a family member or acquaintance to do so (see Voto Nº 158 at three o'clock in the afternoon on October fourth, nineteen hundred eighty-nine).” It is appropriate to analyze, then, in each specific case, the real possibilities of the worker to go to their workplace to deliver the supporting document, in order to determine whether or not a negligent or malicious conduct prevails on their part regarding the fulfillment of such duty.

XII.- It was duly proven that the plaintiff suffers from fibromyalgia, rheumatoid arthritis, and gastritis, and that as a consequence of the treatment administered, she was unable to perform various physical activities, including walking. This was recounted by Dr. José Martín Rojas Castro, medical director of the Clínica de Barva, who stated: “(…) the case of Mrs. [Name1], being an infrequent case, she had a problem with arthritis and musculoskeletal problems, the treatments given did not have much response, so the attending physician consulted me on the case to see how we would manage it, and she was even referred to the Rheumatology service of Hospital México. Fibromyalgia and arthritis were diagnosed. It is an infrequent condition, it has crisis periods that require aggressive treatments, meaning they are very strong, and as part of the treatment it requires periods of rest because in these crisis periods patients cannot mobilize 'normally,' they find it difficult to walk and perform other physical activities. In that second half of two thousand three, which is what I remember, Mrs. [Name1] presented several crises that I had to treat personally because the rest periods exceeded what the Caja’s regulations stipulate for general practitioners, and therefore must be endorsed or approved by the Medical Directorate or the Rheumatology Specialist of the corresponding Hospital. In those periods there were several dates on which Mrs. [Name1] showed up for consultation, she was given the corresponding treatment, within which different incapacities were included.” (Folios 69-70). To this must be added that, as already noted, the timely telephone communication of her health situation to her immediate superior must be taken as proven, and that, for this reason, she would miss work; that her rest by medical indication during the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd of October was a continuation of others that, uninterruptedly, followed one another since the previous October 10th; that on October 24th, when her son presented the respective slip to the Human Resources Department, the representatives of the defendant completed it with the information required by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in order to pay it; and that the dismissal was documented and ordered some time after that event—at the beginning of the following month—and was communicated to the Personnel Procedures Department only on November 6th. If the nature of her condition and the consequences produced by the administered medication makes it understandable that the slip for the period between October 20th and 24th, 2003, was not presented within the two days following its date of issuance, those other facts show that the questioned employer action, even though it may formally be protected by subsection g) of Article 81 of the Código de Trabajo and the jurisprudence that informs it, evades the one that should have been applied in the first instance, namely: that contained in the first paragraph of numeral 19 ibidem, according to which “The employment contract obliges both what is expressed in it, and the consequences that derive from it according to good faith, equity, usage, custom, or the law.” For this Chamber, in those circumstances, Mrs. [Name1]'s absence from work during the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd of October, 2003, cannot be classified as unjustified, and the decision to terminate her without employer liability constitutes a behavior contrary to loyalty and honesty and, therefore, an open breach of the principle of good faith. The company knew her delicate situation and, even so, refused to consider them as justified when she was able, within her means, to send them the documentation that firmly proved it. It is inadmissible that, in this case, more importance was given to a requirement of punctuality in the presentation of the incapacity slip than to the plaintiff's health problem, as if the former were an end in itself and not a guarantee of the duty of minimum consideration, which, by definition, is reciprocal. The defendant ignored the corrective purpose of its disciplinary power. It is in bad faith that, under special circumstances like those in this matter, the employer party refused to justify the absences in question, under the pretext that the incapacity was presented late. It is not reasonable to expect that, in her delicate situation, she should take care of delivering it personally since she was unable to travel to her workplace, especially considering that she is a resident of Santa Lucía de Barva and her counterpart is domiciled in San José. Nor is it possible to assume that her family members had full availability to do so for her within such a short period. Within her circumstances, she did the maximum that could be demanded of her: communicate it by phone. Consequently, the punctuality claimed by the company is out of place. The situation would be different if she had been absent without giving any type of information or reason to her superiors, as that would show an irresponsible attitude towards the essential obligations generated by her employment contract. But, as has been indicated, the plaintiff fulfilled her duty to communicate her ailments to her immediate superior and to prove them, in a valid manner, within her particular circumstances (in a similar sense, see Votos n. 54, at 3:40 p.m., of March 19, 1997, and 52, at 11:50 a.m., of February 13, 1998). If, in addition, one considers the fact that, in this case, it is not possible to identify the moral element of the disciplinary fault; that is, its attribution to a free will or, at the very least, to an inexcusable carelessness, it must be concluded that it is legally impossible to consider the dismissal justified under the grounds provided for in the cited subsection g) of Article 81 of the Código de Trabajo, and that the disciplinary power was exercised in a manner deviating from its purpose. As we stated in Voto n.º 2008-753, at 9:45 a.m., of September 5, 2008, “(…) in this matter so sensitive to the particularities of how relations between the employer and the worker develop (…) numeral 492 of the Código de Trabajo grants the labor judge the possibility of appreciating the evidence with a broad criterion, in accordance with principles derived from logic and experience, which allow them to assess the entire body of evidentiary material to derive a reasonably fair conclusion from it. (…) The set of this evidence, analyzed in light of logic and experience, allows reaching the conclusion that the employer did know the reasons why the plaintiff did not show up to work on the cited days. A negligent or disinterested attitude on [their] part cannot be thought of (…) in explaining to the employer the reasons for their absence, which truly existed and which their superiors knew (…) in such a way that the decision to dismiss the plaintiff turned out to be hasty, since the employer did not grant the worker sufficient reasonable time to justify the absences, which clearly violated the principles of good faith and loyalty, present in all employment contracts by provision of Article 19 of the Código de Trabajo. Thus then, this accumulation of situations allows inferring that the employer's decision was motivated by the absences the worker presented, without considering that they stemmed from their health impairment (…). Consequently, the ordered dismissal was unjustified, and the defendant must therefore bear the obligations derived from a dismissal of that nature.” XIII.- The defendant company has insisted that the payment of the incapacity slips corresponding to the periods between October 20th and 24th; October 25th and November 5th; and November 6th and 15th, all those dates in 2003, occurred because “(…) the plaintiff was still covered by the insurance paid in the last payroll of the company, before being excluded from it, not because the payment of said incapacity was authorized by the company.” (Brief contesting the lawsuit, at folio 32). For this Chamber, that argument is inadmissible because it is a requirement to collect the subsidy (subsidio) that the employer party declares the incapacitated person as their worker. This was explained by Dr. José Martín Rojas Castro, medical director of the Clínica de Barva, in his statement: “The procedure that an incapacity extended in a clinic like the one I work at must follow is that the patient is given two vouchers, one is for the patient themselves and the other is for the employer to sign and carry out the payment procedure at the corresponding branch.” (Folios 69-70). Furthermore, the Reglamento del seguro de salud, approved by the Board of Directors of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in session n.° 7082, held on December 3, 1996 (Article 19), and published in La Gaceta n.° 25, of February 5, 1997, provides a procedure in case of the employer's refusal to complete the incapacity slips. Its Article 54 establishes the following: “If the employer refuses to fill out and deliver to the worker the certificate for the collection of the subsidy, the form will be filled out by the Caja’s inspectors of laws and regulations, based on the procedures deemed necessary.” On the other hand, [Name2], a human resources employee, expressed that “Her case is particular and difficult to forget, her son came to leave the incapacities at the office, what is normal, it is checked in the payroll system and she was reported with a job abandonment, for which reason the incapacities are not received from the young man and he is told that the Sales Department made the notification of her exit.” (Folio 67). Without a doubt, that part of the account refers to the visit of November 22nd, not the previous ones, and it follows from it that the authorizations in question were given because when the three slips were presented, the act of dismissal was not yet recorded in the system. Consequently, not only must the granting of the corresponding authorizations be taken as true, but also the surprising and bad faith nature of the rupture, since the incapacity slips had indeed been received and processed. Moreover, that fact makes that decision suspicious, as explained below.

XIV.- The termination of the employment contract by the will of the employer party can be justified, when it is the result of the legitimate exercise of the disciplinary power given the breach, attributable to the worker, of their contractual obligations (dismissal-sanction) - see, in this regard, numerals 19, 71, 72, and 81 of the Código de Trabajo -, or it can be unjustified, when it is the direct or covert consequence of the freedom to dismiss, of which, in principle, every employer party is a holder (dismissal-liberality) - Articles 28, 31, and 80 of the Código de Trabajo -. These two modalities are differentiated, on the substantial level, by the necessarily compensatory effect of the second, which, as a general rule, the first does not have. It often happens, however, that the dismissal-liberality is prohibited because it is in the presence of a special legal protection in favor of the salaried man or woman in view of a particular condition of theirs, as is the case, among others, of pregnant women, of those sexually harassed, and of union representatives (see, in the same sense, Voto n.° 235-98, at 9:45 a.m., of September 18, 1998).

In the case of someone who is obliged to rest for health reasons, articles 79 and 80 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) prohibit their unjustified dismissal, at least during the first three months (see opinion (voto) no. 198, at 3:10 p.m., of December 13, 1989, reiterated in nos. 49, at 11:20 a.m., of February 13, 1998; 2002-150, at 2:40 p.m., of April 9, 2002; 2002-150, at 2:40 p.m., of April 9, 2002 and 2005-326, at 9:10 a.m., of May 11, 2005). This is so because incapacity due to illness is a ground for suspension of the employment relationship. Under the terms provided in the first of those articles, in that situation the employer is obliged to grant the worker leave so that they can be protected by social security regulations while they fully recover (opinions (votos) nos. 2000-945, at 10:20 a.m., of November 13, 2000 and 2003-516, at 9:30 a.m., of October 1, 2003). It is true that the last-cited article, article 80, is challenged before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) (case file (expediente) no. 08-008837-0007-CO) and that this action was admitted as of last June 25, 2008. However, it must be made clear that the challenge does not encompass the prohibition established therein, but rather the period during which it applies.

XV.- That said, if one considers the letter and the spirit of those provisions, it is evident that the special protection afforded to workers who temporarily suffer a deterioration in their health that prevents them from working would be rendered meaningless if they could be dismissed by the employer's decision, without an objective legal cause to justify it. From that perspective and in view of the social interest involved, the payment of so-called social benefits is insufficient to guarantee compliance with the aforementioned prohibition, since an unscrupulous employer could illegitimately accuse the worker of committing a breach of their obligations and, in that way, circumvent the prohibition. Hence, the use of any means aimed at undermining the relative stability of someone who is incapacitated from working and, especially, dismissal, must be considered contrary to law. As the Constitutional Chamber has indicated, “The Chamber recognizes the right of employers to reorganize their businesses and reduce expenses, aimed at stabilizing their finances, since not accepting this would violate the constitutional right to freedom of commerce, but in a Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho) such as that in force in Costa Rica, the fundamental freedoms and rights of citizens cannot be violated with impunity.” (Opinion (Voto) no. 5000-93, at 10:09 a.m., of October 8, 1993). In opinion (voto) no. 2007-17971, at 2:51 p.m., of December 12, 2007, issued in connection with an unconstitutionality action filed against articles 9 and 10 of the Regulations for granting incapacity and leave to beneficiaries of Health Insurance (Reglamento para otorgamiento de incapacidades y licencias a beneficiarios del Seguro de salud), that same jurisdictional body established: “A worker’s need to be incapacitated, responsibly certified as such by a physician, is a matter that cannot be assessed solely in economic terms, because said condition precisely reflects the existence of a vulnerable state in the person’s health and, in the face of this, the State has the duty to protect them, guarantee them the required care, and, in accordance with labor rights, also guarantee their recovery in dignified and fair conditions. The foregoing is assessed in light of the fundamental right to work and to health, without regard to a specific timeframe, but rather according to the established medical conditions, with the responsibilities arising from what is recommended by said professional. This is because, as indicated, there are scenarios in which one does not qualify for a disability pension, leaving the employer with the option of terminating the employment contract with labor liability, or the worker with the option of returning to work in precarious health conditions. A situation, as can be seen, that is not only unconstitutional but also contrary to human rights.” And, in a more recent one, no. 2008-1573, at 2:55 p.m., of January 30, 2008, it stated: “It is also important to recall that constitutional case law has prohibited, even in the field of labor relations between private legal subjects, that illness become a factor of discrimination against the employee, causing harmful consequences for their situation (rulings # 2005-13205 at 3:13 p.m. of September 27, 2005 and #2007-3168 at 10:30 a.m. of March 9, 2007). In short, dismissal—even with the payment of full severance benefits—is not a solution that derives from or is consistent with the principles of social justice or solidarity.” XVI.- For this Court, more than an accidental breach of the aforementioned prohibition due to an error in applying the current legal framework, the employer’s decision to dismiss Ms. [Nombre5] is a clear act consciously aimed at disregarding it and nullifying the special protection to which she was entitled due to her health situation. The circumstances under which it occurred allow one to infer, without a doubt, that illegitimate motive. From this perspective, this is a typical act of discrimination on health grounds and, as the Constitutional Chamber has ruled, “(...) the Principle of the Social State of Law, the right not to suffer discriminatory treatment for any reason, and respect for human dignity are essential elements of our constitutional order that coexist peacefully, the safeguarding of which is the responsibility not only of the State but also of all members of the community. In that sense, all kinds of discrimination, regardless of whether it comes from the Administration or from a private individual, are a violation of the constitutional order. In the specific case of labor discrimination due to illness, on the one hand, subsection b) of the first article of Convention 111 admits the possibility of specifying, through a certain channel, any type of discrimination that nullifies or impairs equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation and, on the other hand, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights expressly proscribe any type of discriminatory treatment, a stance that our constitutional regime likewise upholds under the provisions of article 33 of the Constitution. Moreover, the discriminatory dismissal of which (…) was a victim collaterally affects the constitutional rights to work and to health. Regarding the former, it is evident that any discriminatory dismissal inevitably implies an injury to the same and, in general, to the duty of solidarity inherent in the Social State of Law and to the Christian principle of social justice (article 74 of the Political Constitution). Furthermore, given the protected person’s age and the real reason for their dismissal, their illness, they are left prostrate in a situation that is particularly harmful both to their health and to their dignity as a human being, since they have fewer possibilities of finding another work option and, consequently, of obtaining the necessary resources to attend to their health problem and family obligations, apart from the fact that in practice, unfortunately, a person of a certain age, abruptly dismissed and affected by such a serious illness (…), finds it enormously difficult to obtain decent employment, considering the operational and cost problems that a new employer might face in having to find a substitute for eventual incapacities due to hospitalization or some type of medical treatment.” (Opinion (Voto) no. 2005-13205, at 3:13 p.m., of September 27, 2005; reiterated in no. 2007-3168, at 10:30 a.m., of March 9, 2007). In any event, as we have noted before, “(...) in addition to the necessary fulfillment, in accordance with the canons of good faith, it is clear that the exercise of a right is neither free nor unrestricted. One of those limits is precisely respect for the rights of others. Therefore, when the exercise of a right considered one’s own violates the right of a third party, one incurs in an abusive or antisocial use of the same. Expressly, article 22 of the Civil Code, applicable in this matter as supplementary legislation, expressly denies protection to someone who abuses a right, exercises it in an antisocial manner, or, in a contractual relationship, exceeds the normal limits in its exercise. In all those cases, the obligation to indemnify is recognized for whoever has abused their right, to the clear detriment of another's right (see, in this regard, the rulings of this Court No. 141-97, at 4:00 p.m., of July 4, 1997; and No. 229-99, at 9:10 a.m., of August 13, 1999). What is important, then, is to determine the rules in force in each case, in order to set the limit of the indemnification.” (Opinion (Voto) no. 2001-200, at 9:50 a.m., of April 4, 2001).”

“IV.- A diferencia de lo previsto en el supuesto del despido liberalidad, en el cual el artículo 28 del Código de Trabajo le exige a la parte empleadora ejercer por escrito esa potestad resolutoria del contrato de trabajo por tiempo indefinido, tratándose del cese disciplinario no existe una norma jurídica expresa con un contenido similar. No obstante, es de esperar que, en atención al principio de buena fe (ordinales 19 ibídem y 21 del Código Civil), ese trascendental acto sea documentado del mismo modo y se comunique personalmente a la contraparte. Dentro de esta tesitura, la Sala Constitucional ha puntualizado en forma reiterada que, con el fin de evitar el eventual abuso de la libertad de despedir y garantizar los derechos fundamentales de la persona asalariada al trabajo, a la igualdad y al debido proceso si tuviese que recurrir a los tribunales a reclamar sus derechos, es obligación del patrono o patrona entregarle la certificación a la que alude el numeral 35 del Código de Trabajo, tanto cuando la despide como cuando es otro el motivo por el cual deja de estar a su servicio, con absoluta independencia de si la solicita o no (voto n.° 2170-93, de las 10:12 horas, del 21 de mayo de 1993, reiterado, entre otros, en los n.os 6585, de las 15:24 horas, del 26 de julio de 2000; 14363, de las 10:02 horas, del 17 de diciembre de 2004; 2724, de las 18:55 horas, del 28 de febrero y 12606, de las 17:18 horas, del 30 de agosto, ambos de 2006). En el voto n.º 2003- 4101, de las 10:30 horas, del 16 de mayo de 2003, esa Sala puntualizó lo siguiente: “La importancia de la obligación patronal de certificación tiene relación con los principios de igualdad y del debido proceso pues la desigualdad material de patronos y trabajadores ha de encontrar y encuentra en el derecho de la Constitución -y aún en la legislación ordinaria- compensaciones jurídicas: la obligación de certificar la causal del retiro o de la cesación del contrato -incluso cuando expresamente no lo reclame el trabajador- es una de ellas, como lo son las social y doctrinariamente pacíficas normas atinentes a la nulidad absoluta de las renuncias a las disposiciones del código, el "in dubio pro operario", la presunción de existencia del contrato individual de trabajo, el privilegio especialísimo de que gozan en caso de quiebras y otros supuestos los créditos a título de preaviso y cesantía, la absoluta prohibición de obligar a los trabajadores por cualquier medio a "retirarse de los sindicatos o grupos legales a que pertenezca"... (Código de Trabajo, respectivamente, artículos 11, 17, 18, 33, 70 inciso c). La libertad e igualdad jurídicas, consustanciales a las personas, requieren para su traducción real de normas procesales y sustanciales como las referidas para reducir la desigualdad material, como se infiere del artículo 50 constitucional. Este, eje del Estado Social de Derecho inaugurado en los años cuarenta, introduce al título de las garantías sociales con una aspiración a la libertad e igualdad reales. El artículo 74 cierra el mismo título invocando el "principio cristiano de justicia social" y el equilibrio entre los factores de la producción, lo cual hace de la justicia social un valor constitucional de primer orden”. Sin embargo, ni de las normas citadas ni de los pronunciamientos de la Sala Constitucional -vinculantes erga omnes, de conformidad con el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional- puede desprenderse que la falta de expedición del certificado o su debida notificación conviertan en nulo el acto de desvinculación patronal. De ahí que, precisamente para resguardar los derechos de las personas trabajadoras, esta Sala haya admitido el despido tácito en casos en que la parte empleadora las excluyó de planillas y dejó de posibilitarle el cobro del subsidio por su incapacidad a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social o de pagarle el salario (ver los votos n.os 2000-505, de las 14:20 horas, del 19 de mayo de 2000 y 2007-256, de las 9:35 horas, del 25 de abril de 2007).

V.- Es cierto que la empresa accionada documentó su decisión de cesar a la actora sin responsabilidad patronal atribuyéndole no haber justificado sus ausencias del 21, 22 y 23 de octubre de 2003. En apariencia, lo hizo el 3 de noviembre siguiente, fecha de la carta de despido aportada, visible a folio 39. Pero también es verdad que nunca le entregó esa comunicación o, cuando menos, no se ocupó de acreditar que lo hizo, conforme le correspondía. El hecho de haber insertado en ella las firmas de dos testigos de actuación y un sello de recibido del Departamento de Trámites de Personal no desvirtúa ese aserto, pues no se hizo constar que esas actuaciones obedecieran a la negativa de doña [Nombre1] a recibirla. Y aun cuando, como ya se mencionó, cabía esperar una notificación formal por parte de la empleadora, el no haber actuado así no excluye que la demandante se haya dado por enterada de su despido ni lo torna inexistente, pues, como lo indicamos en el voto n.° 174, de las 10 horas, del 29 de julio de 1992 y conviene reiterar ahora, “(…) la ausencia de la comunicación del despido por escrito (…), no imposibilita a la parte patronal para aplicar la medida disciplinaria. El Código de Trabajo, únicamente hace referencia en su artículo 35 a una solicitud del trabajador, para que se le extienda un certificado que indica datos generales como la fecha de inicio y de término de la relación laboral, la clase de trabajo, así como el motivo de retiro (…). La falta de entrega del mismo (sic), por parte del patrono, en modo alguno puede condicionar la validez (…) del despido (…). Si bien es cierto, tanto la doctrina como la jurisprudencia, son uniformes en reconocer la importancia de la misma (sic), en algunos casos, de acuerdo con las peculiaridades que se presenten, no siempre es posible contar con el documento, debiendo dilucidarse la procedencia del mismo (sic), en la vía que corresponda”. En consecuencia, para efectos de contabilizar el plazo de prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria, el momento a partir del cual la señora García Muñoz tuvo noticia cierta del cese. En su escrito inicial, ella afirmó lo siguiente: “(…) laboré para la demandada desde el 04 de febrero del (sic) 2003 hasta el 22 de noviembre del (sic) 2003. (…) El día 22 de noviembre del (sic) 2003, como la suscrita se encontraba incapacitada, envié a mi hijo a la empresa (…) para que le autorizaran el cobro de mis incapacidades CED1° NIE1 CED2 , con la finalidad de presentarlas al cobro en la CCSS. No obstante lo anterior, en el Departamento de Recursos Humanos de dicha Empresa no le quisieron recibir dichos documentos a mi hijo, y más bien le dieron a él, una liquidación de mis derechos laborales indicándole que la suscrita se encontraba despedida desde el 03 de noviembre del (sic) 2003 por abandono de trabajo”. (Hechos primero y quinto, a folios 1 y 2-3). El folio 20 del expediente lo ocupa la copia de la referida liquidación de derechos laborales, aportada por ella misma y fechada 22 de noviembre de 2003. Así las cosas, aunque el acto de desvinculación patronal no le haya sido comunicado personalmente, es incuestionable que en esa data se dio por enterada de su existencia y, para todos los efectos, ese conocimiento suyo sustituye a la notificación que echa de menos (ver, en similar sentido, el voto n.º 2002-393, de las 10:50 horas, del 7 de agosto de 2002). Y como para ese momento no había transcurrido el mes previsto en el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo, contado desde la fecha de comisión de la falta imputada -23 de octubre de 2003- la potestad disciplinaria se debe tener por ejercida de manera oportuna, como bien lo resolvió el tribunal de alzada.

VI.- Sin demérito de lo indicado, es preciso evidenciar desde ahora que la fecha de notificación sí es determinante para establecer a partir de cuándo el despido puede surtir efectos. Para la Sala, no es legalmente admisible que un acto de esa naturaleza pueda haber operado antes de su puesta en conocimiento a la persona afectada (ver, en igual sentido, el voto n.º 2006-1098, de las 9:15 horas, del 30 de noviembre de 2006). Por consiguiente, como doña [Nombre1] tuvo noticia cierta de su cese hasta el 22 de noviembre de 2003, esa data es la que debe reputarse como la de su efectiva ejecución, sin que tenga importancia alguna que en la carta de despido la representante patronal la haya fijado el día 3 de esos mismos mes y año.

VII.- La actora fue despedida sin responsabilidad patronal por no haber justificado por escrito, dentro de los primeros dos días, sus ausencias al trabajo del 21, 22 y 23 de octubre de 2003. Así lo consignó su superior inmediata, la señora Pamela Campos, en la referida carta fechada 3 de noviembre de 2003 y se ha encargado de evidenciarlo la representación de la accionada en sus principales escritos. Por ejemplo, en la contestación de la demanda puntualizó: “Aclaro que el despido de la actora obedeció a que se ausentó de su trabajo los días 21, 22 y 23 de octubre del (sic) 2003, y no es sino hasta el día (…) 24 del mismo mes, en que su hijo se presentó a la empresa para que se le autorizada (sic) el cobro de una supuesta incapacidad que vencía ese mismo día. O sea, que la actora no presentó la incapacidad médica que justificaba sus ausencias dentro de los dos primeros días de la misma (sic), conforme al criterio sentado por la jurisprudencia respecto de esta causal (…)”. (Folio 31. La negrita es agregada). En el memorial con el que evacuó la audiencia sobre la documental aportada para mejor proveer afirmó: “Insisto, una vez más, en que el tema que discutimos no es que la actora haya estado incapacitada o no; ni si la CCSS le pagó o no; ni cómo o por qué fue que le pagó, ni cuánto. Ese NO es el objeto de esta litis. Lo que se discute es que, si estuvo incapacitada, no presentó los documentos que así lo justificaran dentro del tiempo establecido, conforme lo exige la jurisprudencia al respecto. Por tanto, sus ausencias fueron injustificadas y el despido sin responsabilidad sí era procedente”. (Folios 101 y 103. La negrita también es agregada). Como se observa, la comunicación telefónica de las razones por las cuales no se presentó a trabajar esos días, que la actora sostiene haberle hecho a su jefe inmediata, no ha sido objeto de cuestionamiento alguno por parte de la empleadora. Lo único que ha discutido es la oportunidad de la presentación de la incapacidad médica. Por eso, es preciso recordar que, como consecuencia del principio de aportación, que conforma un todo orgánico con el dispositivo y el de congruencia y rige también en el proceso de trabajo, es a las partes a quienes les incumbe, de modo exclusivo, introducir y definir los hechos sobre los cuales ha de versar el debate y la de producir las pruebas que estimen pertinentes para acreditarlos -doctrina de los numerales 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, 394, 461, 464 y 490 del Código de Trabajo y 99, 153, 155, 305, 316 y 317 del Procesal Civil, aplicables por disponerlo así el 452 del de Trabajo-. Para que cada una alcance su propósito, quien acciona debe alegar y demostrar los aspectos fácticos constitutivos del derecho reclamado y el demandado o la demandada ha de hacer lo propio respecto de aquellos que tengan carácter extintivo, obstativo o excluyente de él. El cumplimiento de esas cargas se hace, justamente, en la demanda y en su contestación; actos con los cuales se fija o delimita el "thema decidendum"; es decir, el objeto –fáctico y jurídico– del litigio, el cual constituye un límite infranqueable para la autoridad jurisdiccional competente, cuyo pronunciamiento, por regla general, no puede abarcar hechos y alegaciones diferentes a las planteadas por las partes (principio de inmutabilidad del litigio). Tanto es así que a estas les está vedado alterar las bases sobre las cuales han planteado el proceso y aquella no puede resolver sobre aspectos no alegados oportunamente por ellas, por más razones que existan para hacerlo. Es tal el grado de vinculación a la actividad de las partes en esta materia que la normativa procesal supletoria prevé un trámite especial de ampliación de los hechos -artículo 313, párrafo segundo, del Código Procesal Civil- (ver, en igual sentido, los votos n.os 215-99, de las 10 horas, del 30 de julio y 1999-363, de las 10:10 horas, del 19 de noviembre, ambos de 1999). Ni la índole pública e instrumental de todo proceso jurisdiccional, ni el interés del Estado y de la colectividad social de solucionar equitativamente los conflictos jurídicos surgidos en su seno, reconocidos en la actualidad por la doctrina, la legislación -artículos 16, 17, 394, 399 y 452 del Código de Trabajo y 1, 3, 97, 98 y 132 del Código Procesal Civil- y la jurisprudencia al proceso civil y al laboral, rompen con esas exigencias mínimas derivadas tanto del principio dispositivo (ver el voto n.° 98-90, de las 10 horas, del 25 de marzo de 1998), como de los derechos al debido proceso y de defensa (ver, entre los más recientes, los votos n.os 2004-524, de las 10:05 horas, del 24 de junio del 2004; 2005- 351, de las 9:30 horas, del 13 de mayo de 2005; 2006-16, de las 9:55 horas, del 25 de enero de 2006; 2006-149, de las 9:40 horas, del 10 de marzo de 2006; 2006-790, de las 15:25 horas, del 16 de agosto de 2006; 2007-387, de las 10:35 horas, del 20 de junio; 2007-576, de las 14:55 horas, del 22 de agosto; 2007-887, de las 9:35 horas, del 21 de noviembre, los últimos de 2007 y 2008-219, de las 9:40 horas, del 12 de marzo de 2008). Por consiguiente, erraron las autoridades de instancia al exigirle a la señora García Muñoz demostrar la comunicación telefónica. Pero también lo hicieron al endilgarle la carga de hacerlo mediante prueba idónea, sin prestar atención al hecho de que, dadas las particulares circunstancias en que se produjo, la colocaban ante una tarea prácticamente imposible. A quien, sin duda, le resultaba fácil desacreditar que la hubo era a la accionada, pues, de haber estado interesada en hacerlo, le bastaba aportar el testimonio de la señora Pamela Campos. En virtud de los principios aplicables en esta materia, la omisión de cuestionar que hubiese ocurrido y, de haberlo hecho, la de ofrecer la deposición mencionada, obliga ahora a suponer -presunción humana- que, en esa oportunidad, sucedió lo que era habitual en “(…) el proceder de la compañía (…)”; es decir, “(…) que como colaborador uno debe notificar a su jefe inmediato el día que los (sic) incapacitaron o si continuaba la incapacidad”. (testimonio de [Nombre2] , empleada de recursos humanos, visible a folio 67). Se equivocó, entonces, el tribunal al justificar su decisión en un elemento de hecho que ha estado fuera del debate y procede ahora decidir si, en este asunto concreto, la justificación documental de las ausencias –presentación de la incapacidad– fue o no extemporánea.- VIII.- En materia laboral, la potestad disciplinaria deriva del poder de dirección de la parte empleadora y es un reflejo de la inserción de la persona trabajadora en su ámbito de organización. Con ella se procura garantizar el cumplimiento efectivo de la deuda de actividad -prestación personal del servicio- asumida por la asalariada o el asalariado en virtud del contrato de trabajo, mediante la imposición de sanciones ante el quebranto de uno o varios de sus deberes jurídicos concretos. En cuanto tal, tiene un carácter correctivo pues más que castigar las conductas pasadas busca influir sobre las futuras. Además, es reglada y limitada por el derecho objetivo. El fin de la responsabilidad disciplinaria es, entonces, asegurar la observancia de la subordinación jurídica y, en general, el exacto cumplimiento del compromiso de la parte trabajadora. En concordancia con esos criterios, en su voto n.° 5594-94, de las 15:45 horas, del 27 de setiembre de 1994, la Sala Constitucional apuntó que la falta o infracción disciplinaria “(…) es una violación al funcionamiento de cualquier deber propio de su condición, aún (sic) cuando no haya sido especialmente definida aunque si (sic) prevista. Los hechos determinantes de las faltas disciplinarias son innumerables, pues dependen de la índole de los comportamientos o conductas de los sujetos "subordinados", comportamientos o conductas en verdad ilimitados en número dada su variedad; por ello se deduce la existencia de tres elementos de la falta disciplinaria: 1.- un elemento material: que es un acto o una omisión; 2.- un elemento moral: que es la imputación del acto a una voluntad libre; y 3.- un elemento formal: que es la perturbación al funcionamiento del servicio o afección inmediata o posible de su eficacia". (Véanse, en igual sentido, los votos n.os 563-97, de las 14:39 horas, del 29 de enero de 1997; 2000-4545, de las 15:39 horas, del 31 de mayo y 2000-6590, de las 15:29 horas, del 26 de julio, los últimos de 2000). Como bien apuntan [Nombre3] y [Nombre4] , “La falta sancionable, por mucho que en ocasiones tienda a objetivarse, siempre ha de poder ser imputada al dolo o negligencia del trabajador; en cuanto a esta última, además, en una relación duradera y con tiempos largos de actividad de cumplimiento dentro de la duración, la buena fe no consiente que se exija en todo momento una conducta impecable, sin el menor descuido, una diligencia celosa y sin desfallecimiento (Barreiro); el ordenamiento cuenta con los fallos humanos del buen padre de familia; cuenta también, parafraseando, con los del “buen trabajador” debiendo éste (sic) sólo (sic) una diligencia normal, como se vio; lo que ésta (sic) tolera ni es conducta sancionable ni puede ser sancionado. En cuanto al dolo, es éste (sic) el contractual que, abstraído del motivo, acusa el conocimiento y la voluntad del culpable”. (Derecho del Trabajo, Madrid: Civitas Ediciones, S. L., vigésima edición, revisada, 2002, p. 392).

IX.- De manera reiterada, esta Sala ha señalado que la potestad disciplinaria (despido‑sanción) debe ser ejercida, por la parte patronal, dentro de los parámetros fijados por el ordenamiento objetivo y sin desnaturalizar los fines perseguidos al reconocerla. En consecuencia, ha de ser utilizada para la reafirmación de un derecho subjetivo o para la consecución de intereses legítimos, porque es ahí en donde radica la causa material de su recepción legislativa y su funcionalidad. Precisamente para garantizar aspectos como esos, el título preliminar del Código Civil -que es derecho común de todo el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense- contiene reglas fundamentales de la labor interpretativa que constituyen una vía de comunicación de la legislación vigente con la moral social imperante y cuyo propósito no es otro que la superación del legalismo. Así, en virtud de su artículo 21 "Los derechos deberán ejercitarse conforme con las exigencias de la buena fe." El 20 declara que “Los actos realizados al amparo del texto de una norma, que persigan un resultado prohibido por el ordenamiento jurídico; o contrario a él, se considerarán ejecutados en fraude de la ley y no impedirán la debida aplicación de la norma que se hubiere tratado de eludir”. Por último, la primera parte del 22 instituye que: "La ley no ampara el abuso del derecho o el ejercicio antisocial de éste (sic)". De esos preceptos deriva que los derechos subjetivos y las potestades privadas, aparte de sus expresos límites legales, estén circunscritos por barreras morales, teleológicas y sociales y que esté prohibido su ejercicio irregular, correspondiéndole a las autoridades jurisdiccionales la determinación de las hipótesis concretas en las cuales se presenta tan reprochable comportamiento humano (ver, por todos, los votos n.os 177, de las 8:10 horas, del 20 de agosto de 1993; 141, de las 16 horas, del 4 de julio de 1997; 52, de las 11:50 horas, del 13 de febrero de 1998; 197, de las 15:50 horas, del 15 de julio de 1999; 2003-78, de las 8:50 horas, del 20 de febrero de 2003 y 2008-93, de las 10:20 horas, del 8 de febrero de 2008).

X.- El fraude de derecho opera, por lo general, al margen de toda relación de reciprocidad y es una especie dentro de la más vasta categoría conformada por los hechos ilícitos, cuya conceptualización no se agota en lo meramente formal; es decir, lo contrario a la legislación escrita, sino que abarca una noción material de ilicitud, comprensiva del incumplimiento de obligaciones derivadas de principios generales mucho más amplios, tales como el de buena fe y el de equidad (artículos 28 de la Constitución Política y 21 del Código Civil). Entre muchas otras hipótesis, existe tanto cuando la norma de cobertura -que siempre ha de haberla- no confiere una protección completa y perfecta para quien se ampara en ella, como cuando se elude la realmente aplicable, adoptando la vestidura de una figura jurídica regulada por otra que responde a finalidad distinta. Si, estando en presencia de relaciones jurídicas como la laboral, el acto así emitido trasluce, a su vez, un comportamiento contrario a la lealtad y a la honestidad que cabría exigir para con la contraparte, además de cometer fraude de derecho se incurre también en un abierto quebranto del principio de buena fe. En definitiva, la teoría del fraude de derecho constituye, por un lado, la causa jurídica para negarle al titular de una potestad o de un derecho subjetivo ejercitados en forma desviada de su destino, la tutela del ordenamiento jurídico y, por otro, la fuente incuestionable de responsabilidad civil. En el concreto ámbito del derecho laboral, existe fraude de ley si, una vez determinada la falta de coincidencia entre el fin específico, siempre de interés público o general, a que se encamina el precepto del ordenamiento jurídico aplicable y el perseguido por una de las partes de la relación de trabajo al ejercitar la potestad conferida, el primero no se alcanza. Se trata de una desviación perfectamente tipificada en la legislación vigente, cuya consecuencia es la nulidad del acto emitido, a pesar de que, en términos formales, no sea contrario a la legalidad.

XI.- Ciertamente, la jurisprudencia de esta Sala ha establecido en forma reiterada que, por imperativos del principio de buena fe y del deber de consideración mínima, inherentes a todo contrato laboral, es obligación de la persona trabajadora que se ausente durante dos o más días consecutivos, informarle a su contraparte, en forma oportuna, las razones de su inasistencia (para que esta pueda disponer las medidas pertinentes en resguardo de sus intereses) y acreditarlas con los documentos idóneos, pues el simple acto de comunicarlas no conlleva, de modo automático, el aval de la justificación correspondiente. Cualquier actitud de descuido que menoscabe la relación laboral y las obligaciones recíprocas que de ella derivan es inaceptable. Así, en el voto n.° 158, de las 15 horas, del 4 de octubre de 1989, indicamos lo siguiente: “La jurisprudencia ha sido clara en el sentido de que en el caso de ausencias al trabajo es indispensable que el empleado, por razones de la buena fe y del deber de consideración mínima que subyace como elemento de todo contrato laboral, está obligado a avisarlo y a justificarlo en forma oportuna y no se ha aceptado como correcta la práctica de hacerlo posteriormente (...). Se concreta que el aviso y comprobación deben hacerse en forma oportuna, o sea durante los dos primeros días, con el fin de que el patrono pueda tomar las medidas del caso para la atención de sus intereses; y no es concebible una actitud de descuido y descortesía como si no existiera de por medio una relación con obligaciones recíprocas. Se habla del término de dos días por lo menos, en vista de que de acuerdo con el artículo 81, inciso g), del Código de la materia, la inasistencia al centro de trabajo sin permiso del patrono y en forma injustificada es causa de despido, de suerte que la ausencia en aquellos términos hace nacer de inmediato para el empleador el interés legítimo para proceder de conformidad. Si de acuerdo con la norma basta la ausencia conforme se ha señalado para que se de (sic) el motivo de despido, ahí está implícito el deber de acreditar las cuestiones de hecho que excluyen la falta antes de que ésta (sic) se pueda tener por configurada y se produzcan los efectos que legitiman al patrono para actuar en defensa de sus derechos”. En el invocado por la parte demandada, el n.° 136, de las 9 horas, del 19 de abril de 1995, señalamos que “El trabajador está obligado a prestar sus servicios al patrono a cambio de una remuneración (artículos 4, 18, 19 y 71, inciso b), todos del Código de Trabajo). Las ausencias a sus labores, que implican un incumplimiento de esa obligación, deben fundarse en hechos ciertos que le impidan, sin lugar a dudas, cumplir con su cometido. La prueba de ellos, ha de presentarla al empleador en tiempo, a fin de que éste (sic) tenga la oportunidad de tomar las previsiones del caso. De lo contrario, se incurre en la causal de despido prevista en el numeral 81, inciso g) del cuerpo normativo aludido, el que establece: "Son causas justas que facultan al patrono para dar por terminado el contrato de trabajo: ... g) Cuando el trabajador deje de asistir al trabajo sin permiso del patrono, sin causa justificada durante dos días consecutivos o durante más de dos días alternos dentro del mismo mes calendario." / En el asunto que nos ocupa, (...) No se podría sostener validamente que el demandante fue tratado por su empleadora en forma injusta y sorpresiva, al ser despedido (...), pues, por el contrario, (…) la empresa le dio la oportunidad de presentarse al trabajo, la que debió haber aprovechado a fin de evitar una medida que lo perjudicara y, si en realidad, estaba enfermo, tenía el deber de proveerse en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social de un dictamen médico que certificara su incapacidad para el trabajo, y en forma pronta, presentar ese documento al patrono, por lo menos, dentro de los dos primeros días de la incapacidad, lo que no hizo. / (...) aún (sic) cuando aquellas ausencias respondieran en la realidad a una enfermedad, para evitar que dieran base a un despido justificado, debió acreditarse la existencia de tal enfermedad y entregarse al patrono en tiempo oportuno la prueba de que ella lo incapacitaba para realizar sus labores". En igual sentido se pronuncian las sentencias n.os 81, de las 9:10 horas, del 9 de mayo; 104, de las 9:20 horas, del 23 de mayo; 162, de las 15:30 horas, del 9 de agosto; las tres de 1984; 108, de las 9:50 horas, del 3 de julio; 211, de las 15:20 horas, del 23 de octubre; ambas de 1985; 144, de las 9:30 horas, del 6 de setiembre de 1989; 266, de las 9:10 horas, del 11 de diciembre de 1991; 219, de las 9:40 horas, del 6 de octubre de 1993; 52, de las 11:50 horas, del 13 de febrero de 1998 y 159-99, de las 10 horas, del 11 de junio de 1999; 2000-568, de las 9:40 horas, del 2 de junio de 2000; 2001-10, de las 9:50 horas, del 5 de enero; 2001-182, de las 10:20 horas, del 23 de marzo, los dos de 2001; 2003-82, de las 9:30 horas, del 26 de febrero de 2003 y 2008-789, de las 10:10 horas, del 12 de setiembre de 2008. Sin embargo, si se tiene en cuenta lo expuesto en los apartados anteriores, no es posible desprender de esa lectura jurisprudencial de las normas legales aplicables -artículos 81, inciso g, en relación con el 19 del Código de Trabajo-, en tanto informadora de ambas (numeral 9 del Código Civil), que, en casos excepcionales, toda presentación extemporánea de las boletas de incapacidad tenga como consecuencia ineludible la imposibilidad de justificar válidamente la inasistencia al trabajo. Ya en el voto n.° 13, de las 14:20 horas, del 22 de enero de 1986, puntualizamos que “El texto del mencionado artículo [81, inciso g), del Código de Trabajo], no puede aplicarse en forma cerrada, pues se deben examinar en cada caso los antecedentes y circunstancias que mediaron en relación a (sic) la ausencia del trabajador (…)”. En el n.° 158, de 1989, ya citado, se reafirmó esa posibilidad cuando sostuvimos: “Desde luego que lo anterior se plantea como cuestión general y sin perjuicio de la existencia de normas convencionales que regulen la situación en otra forma o que medien razones suficientes, a analizar en cada caso, que ameriten un mayo (sic) retardo en la comprobación, como por ejemplo la enfermedad grave o lejanía del centro de trabajo, sin medios de comunicación adecuados”. En otro más reciente, el n.º 2008-822, de las 10:30 horas, del 24 de setiembre de 2008, afirmamos cuanto sigue: “(…) esta Sala ha resuelto que existen aflicciones que imposibilitan el cumplimiento de los plazos señalados en las diferentes normas -reglamentarias, convencionales, etc.- para presentar la justificación de ausencias, y que han sido interpretadas rígidamente por el empleador (piénsese, por ejemplo, en una persona que, a raíz de un golpe en la cabeza, queda inconsciente durante varios días). En esos supuestos excepcionales, se ha interpretado que el plazo para justificar la ausencia se debe computar a partir de que el trabajador esté en la posibilidad efectiva de cumplir personalmente ese deber, o, al menos, de solicitarle a algún familiar o conocido que lo haga (vid voto Nº -sic- 158 de las quince horas del cuatro de octubre de mil novecientos ochenta y nueve)”. Corresponde analizar, entonces, en cada caso concreto, las posibilidades reales del trabajador o de la trabajadora, de acudir a su lugar de trabajo a entregar el documento justificativo, para determinar si prevalece o no una conducta negligente o maliciosa de su parte, respecto del cumplimiento de tal deber.

XII.- Fue debidamente acreditado que la actora padece de fibromialgia, artritis reumatoide y gastritis y que como consecuencia del tratamiento suministrado se veía imposibilitada de realizar diversas actividades físicas, entre ellas caminar. Así lo relató el doctor José Martín Rojas Castro, director médico de la Clínica de Barva, quien sostuvo: “(…) el caso de doña [Nombre1] por ser un caso poco frecuente ella tenía un problema de artritis y problemas osteomusculares, los tratamientos que se le daban no tenían mucha respuesta, entoces (sic) el médico tratante me consultó el caso para ver como (sic) lo manejábamos e inclusive fue referida al servicio de Reumatología del Hospital México. Se diagnosticó una fibromialgia y una artritis. Es un padecimiento poco frecuente tiene periodos de crisis que ameritan tratamientos impacivos (sic), sea que son muy fuertes y como parte del tratamiento requiere de periodos de reposo porque en estos periodos de crisis los pacientes no pueden movilizarse “normalmente”, se les dificulta deambular y otras actividades físicas. En ese segundo semestre del dos mil tres que es lo que yo recuerdo doña [Nombre1] presentó varias crisis que me correspondió a mi tratar personalmente porque los periodos de reposo sobrepasaban lo que estipula (sic) los reglamentos de la Caja para los médicos generales y por lo tanto deben ser avalados o con visto bueno de la Dirección Médica o del Especialista de Reumatología del Hospital correspondiente. En esos periodos hubo varias fechas en que doña [Nombre1] se presentaba a consulta, se le daba el tratamiento correspondiente, dentro del cual se incluían diferentes incapacidades". (Folios 69-70). A ello ha de agregarse que, como ya se señaló, debe tenerse por acreditada la oportuna comunicación telefónica de su situación de salud a su jefa inmediata y que, por eso, faltaría a su trabajo; que su reposo por indicación médica durante los días 21, 22 y 23 de octubre eran continuación de otros que, de manera ininterrumpida, se sucedieron desde el 10 de octubre anterior; que el 24 de octubre, cuando su hijo presentó en el Departamento de Recursos Humanos la respectiva boleta, los personeros de la accionada la completaron con la información requerida por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social para poder pagarla y que el despido fue documentado y ordenado tiempo después de ese hecho -a principios del mes siguiente- y se comunicó al Departamento de Trámites de Personal hasta el 6 de noviembre. Si la índole de su padecimiento y las consecuencias producidas por la medicación administrada hace comprensible que la boleta del periodo comprendido entre el 20 y el 24 de octubre de 2003 no haya sido presentada dentro de los dos días siguientes a su fecha de emisión, esos otros hechos evidencian que la actuación patronal cuestionada, aun cuando formalmente puede estar amparada en el inciso g) del artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo y en la jurisprudencia que lo informa, elude la que debió ser aplicada en primer término, a saber: la contenida en el párrafo primero del numeral 19 ibídem, a cuyo tenor “El contrato de trabajo obliga tanto a lo que se expresa en él, como a las consecuencias que del mismo (sic) se deriven según la buena fe, la equidad, el uso, la costumbre o la ley”. Para la Sala, en esas circunstancias, la inasistencia de doña [Nombre1] a su trabajo durante los días 21, 22 y 23 de octubre de 2003 no puede calificarse como injustificada y la decisión de cesarla sin responsabilidad patronal constituye un comportamiento contrario a la lealtad y honestidad y, por tanto, un abierto quebranto del principio de buena fe. La empresa conocía su delicada situación y, aún así, se negó a tenerlas como justificadas cuando ella pudo, dentro de sus posibilidades, hacerle llegar la documentación que lo acreditaba en forma fehaciente. Es inadmisible que, en este caso, se le haya dado más importancia a un requerimiento de puntualidad en la presentación de la boleta de incapacidad que a la problemática de salud de la actora, como si lo primero fuese un fin en sí mismo y no una garantía del deber de consideración mínima que, por definición, es recíproco. La demandada obvió la finalidad correctiva de su potestad disciplinaria. Es de mala fe que, ante circunstancias especiales como las de este asunto, la parte empleadora se haya negado a justificar las ausencias en cuestión, so pretexto de que la incapacidad fue presentada en forma tardía. No es razonable pretender que, en su delicada situación, se ocupase de entregarla en forma personal pues estaba imposibilitada para desplazarse hasta su centro de trabajo, sobre todo considerando que es vecina de Santa Lucía de Barva y su contraparte está domiciliada en San José. Tampoco es posible asumir que sus familiares tenían disponibilidad plena para hacerlo por ella en un plazo tan corto. Dentro de sus circunstancias, hizo lo máximo que podía exigírsele: comunicarlo por teléfono. En consecuencia, la puntualidad reclamada por la empresa está fuera de lugar. Diferente sería la situación si se hubiese ausentado sin dar ningún tipo de información o de razón a sus superiores, pues ello mostraría una actitud irresponsable hacia las obligaciones esenciales generadas por su contrato de trabajo. Pero, como se ha indicado, la demandante cumplió con su deber de comunicar sus padecimientos a su jefa inmediata y con el de acreditarlos, de manera válida, dentro de sus particulares circunstancias (en sentido similar pueden consultarse los votos n.os 54, de las 15:40 horas, del 19 de marzo de 1997 y 52, de las 11:50 horas, del 13 de febrero de 1998). Si, además, se repara en el hecho de que, en este caso, no es posible identificar el elemento moral de la falta disciplinaria; es decir, su imputación a una voluntad libre o, cuando menos, a un descuido inexcusable, se debe concluir que es jurídicamente imposible tener por justificado el despido en la causal prevista en el citado inciso g) del artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo y que la potestad disciplinaria fue ejercida en forma desviada de su destino. Como señalamos en el voto n.º 2008-753, de las 9:45 horas, del 5 de setiembre de 2008, “(…) en esta materia tan sensible a las particularidades como se desarrollan las relaciones entre el patrono y el trabajador (…) el numeral 492 del Código de Trabajo, otorga al juez/a de lo laboral, la posibilidad de apreciar las probanzas con un criterio amplio, acorde con principios derivados de la lógica y de la experiencia, que le permiten valorar el conjunto del material probatorio para derivar de ahí una conclusión razonablemente justa. (…) El conjunto de estas pruebas, analizadas a la luz de la lógica y de la experiencia, permiten llegar a la conclusión de que el patrono sí conocía los motivos por los cuales el actor no se presentó a laborar los días citados. No puede pensarse en una actitud negligente ni desinteresada de [su] parte (…) en explicar a la empleadora las razones de su inasistencia, las que realmente existieron y que sus superiores conocían (…) de manera tal que, la decisión de despedir al actor resultó ser precipitada, pues el patrono no le otorgó al trabajador un tiempo prudencial suficiente para justificar las ausencias, lo cual a todas luces violentó los principios de buena fe y lealtad, presentes en todos los contratos de trabajo por disposición del artículo 19 del Código de Trabajo. Así entonces, este cúmulo de situaciones permiten inferir que la decisión patronal fue motivada por las ausencias que el trabajador presentaba, sin considerar que ellas provenían del quebranto en su salud (…). En consecuencia, el despido ordenado fue injustificado, debiendo en consecuencia la demandada, cargar con las obligaciones derivadas de un despido de esa naturaleza”.

XIII.- La empresa accionada ha insistido en que el pago de las boletas de incapacidad correspondientes a los periodos comprendidos entre el 20 y 24 de octubre; 25 de octubre y 5 de noviembre y 6 y 15 de noviembre, todas esas fechas de 2003, se produjo porque “(…) la actora aún estaba cubierta por el seguro pagado en la última planilla de la empresa, antes de ser excluida de la misma (sic), no porque el pago de dicha incapacidad haya sido autorizado por la empresa”. (Escrito de contestación de la demanda, a folio 32). Para la Sala, ese alegato es inadmisible pues es requisito para cobrar el subsidio que la parte patronal declare a la persona incapacitada como su trabajadora. Así lo explicó el doctor José Martín Rojas Castro, director médico de la Clínica de Barva, en su declaración: “El trámite que debe seguir una incapacidad extendida en una clínica como la que yo trabajo es que al paciente se le dan dos comprobantes, uno es para el mismo paciente y otro es para que lo firme el patrono y realice el trámite de pago en la sucursal correspondiente”. (Folios 69-70). Es más, el Reglamento del seguro de salud, aprobado por la Junta Directiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social en la sesión n.° 7082, celebrada el 3 de diciembre de 1996 (artículo 19) y publicado en La Gaceta n.° 25, del 5 de febrero de 1997, prevé un trámite ante la negativa patronal a completar las boletas de incapacidad. Su artículo 54 establece lo siguiente: “Si el patrono se niega a llenar y entregar al trabajador la constancia para el cobro de subsidio, la fórmula será llenada por los inspectores de leyes y reglamentos de la Caja, con fundamento en los procedimientos que se estimen necesarios”. Por otro lado, [Nombre2] , empleada de recursos humanos, expresó que “El caso de ella es particular y es difícil de olvidar, el hijo de ella llegó a dejar la (sic) incapacidades a la oficina, lo es que es normal, se revisa en el sistema de planillas y estaba reportada con un abandono de trabajo, por lo cual no se le recibe las incapacidades al muchacho y se le dice que el Departamento de Ventas hizo la notificación de la salida de ella”. (Folio 67). Sin duda, esa parte del relato está referida a la visita del 22 de noviembre, no a las anteriores y de ella se desprende que las autorizaciones en cuestión se dieron porque para cuando las tres boletas fueron presentadas aún no constaba en el sistema el acto de despido. En consecuencia, no solo debe tenerse como cierto el otorgamiento de las autorizaciones correspondientes, sino también el carácter sorpresivo y de mala fe de la ruptura pues las boletas de incapacidad sí habían sido recibidas y tramitadas. Es más, ese hecho torna sospechosa esa decisión, conforme se explica de seguido.

XIV.- La resolución del contrato de trabajo por voluntad de la parte patronal puede ser justificada, cuando es el resultado del ejercicio legítimo de la potestad disciplinaria dado el incumplimiento, imputable a la persona trabajadora, de sus obligaciones contractuales (despido-sanción) -ver, al respecto, los numerales 19, 71, 72 y 81 del Código de Trabajo-, o bien, puede ser injustificado, cuando es la consecuencia, directa o encubierta, de la libertad de despedir, de la que, en principio, es titular toda parte empleadora (despido-liberalidad) -artículos 28, 31 y 80 del Código de Trabajo-. Esas dos modalidades se diferencian, en el plano sustancial, por el efecto necesariamente indemnizatorio del segundo que, por regla general, no lo tiene el primero. Suele suceder, sin embargo, que el despido-liberalidad esté vedado porque se esté en presencia de una protección jurídica especial en favor del asalariado o de la asalariada en atención de una particular condición suya, como es el caso, entre otras, de las personas embarazadas, de las hostigadas sexualmente y de las representantes sindicales (ver, en igual sentido, el voto n.° 235-98, de las 9:45 horas, del 18 de setiembre de 1998). Tratándose de quien se encuentra obligada a guardar reposo por razones de salud, los numerales 79 y 80 del Código de Trabajo prohíben su cese injustificado, cuando menos durante los primeros tres meses (ver el voto n.° 198, de las 15:10 horas, del 13 de diciembre de 1989, reiterado en los n.os 49, de las 11:20 horas, del 13 de febrero de 1998; 2002-150, de las 14:40 horas, del 9 de abril de 2002; 2002-150, de las 14:40 horas, del 9 de abril de 2002 y 2005-326, de las 9:10 horas, del 11 de mayo de 2005). Ello es así porque la incapacidad por enfermedad es una causal de suspensión de la relación laboral. Al tenor de lo previsto en el primero de esos artículos, en ese supuesto es obligación de la parte patronal concederle licencia a la persona trabajadora para que pueda estar protegida por las normas de seguridad social mientras se logra restablecer totalmente (votos n.os 2000- 945, de las 10:20 horas, del 13 de noviembre de 2000 y 2003-516, de las 9:30 horas, del 1º de octubre de 2003). Es cierto que el último ordinal referido, el 80, está impugnado ante la Sala Constitucional (expediente n.° 08-008837-0007-CO) y que esa acción fue admitida desde el pasado 25 de junio de 2008. Sin embargo, ha de quedar claro que el cuestionamiento no abarca la prohibición ahí establecida, sino el plazo durante el cual rige.

XV.- Ahora bien, si se atiende a la letra y al espíritu de esas disposiciones resulta evidente que la protección especial dada a las personas trabajadoras que coyunturalmente sufren un quebranto en su estado de salud que les impide trabajar queda vacía de contenido si pudieran ser despedidas por decisión patronal, sin que mediara causa legal objetiva que lo justificase. Desde esa perspectiva y en vista del interés social comprometido, el pago de las denominadas prestaciones sociales es insuficiente para garantizar el cumplimiento de la prohibición referida, pues un patrono o una patrona inescrupulosa podría endilgarle ilegítimamente la comisión de una falta a sus obligaciones y, de ese modo, burlar la prohibición. De ahí que la utilización de cualquier medio tendiente a menoscabar la estabilidad relativa de quien se encuentra incapacitado para laborar y, en especial, el despido, debe considerarse contraria a derecho. Como ha señalado la Sala Constitucional, “La Sala reconoce el derecho de los patronos de reorganizar su empresa y de reducir gastos, tendientes a estabilizar su economía, pues no aceptarlo sería violentar el derecho constitucional a la libertad de comercio, pero en un Estado Social de derecho como el vigente en Costa Rica, no pueden vulnerarse impunemente las libertades y derechos fundamentales de los ciudadanos”. (Voto n.° 5000-93, de las 10:09 horas, del 8 de octubre de 1993). En el voto n.° 2007-17971, de las 14:51 horas, del 12 de diciembre de 2007, emitido a propósito de una acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada contra los artículos 9 y 10 del Reglamento para otorgamiento de incapacidades y licencias a beneficiarios del Seguro de salud, ese mismo órgano jurisdiccional estableció: “La necesidad de un trabajador a (sic) incapacitarse, certificado así responsablemente por un médico, es un asunto que no puede ser valorado únicamente en términos económicos, pues dicha condición refleja precisamente la existencia de un estado vulnerable en la salud de la persona y frente a esto, el Estado tiene el deber de tutelarle, garantizarle la atención requerida y de conformidad con los derechos laborales además, garantizar su reestablecimiento en condiciones dignas y justas. Lo anterior valorado a la luz del derecho fundamental al trabajo y al de salud, sin atender a un plazo, sino a las condiciones médicas establecidas, con las responsabilidades de lo recomendado por dicho profesional. Esto por cuanto, como se indicó, existen supuestos en los cuales no se califica para optar por una pensión por invalidez, quedando como opciones para el patrono el término del contrato laboral con responsabilidad laboral o, para el trabajador, regresar al trabajo en condiciones precarias de salud. Situación, que como se advierte, resulta no solo inconstitucional, sino también contraria a los derechos humanos”. Y, en uno más reciente, el n.° 2008-1573, de las 14:55 horas, del 30 de enero de 2008, expresó: “Importa también recordar que la jurisprudencia constitucional ha vedado, aún en el campo de las relaciones laborales entre sujetos de derecho privado, que la enfermedad se convierta en un factor de discriminación en contra del empleado, que le haga derivar consecuencias perjudiciales a su situación (sentencias # 2005-13205 de las 15:13 horas del 27 de septiembre del 2005 y #2007-3168 de las 10:30 horas del 9 de marzo de 2007). En síntesis, el despido –aún mediando el pago de prestaciones completas– no es una solución que derive ni comulgue con los principios de justicia social ni de solidaridad”.

XVI.- Para la Sala, más que un quebranto accidental de la prohibición referida por un error de aplicación de la normativa vigente, la decisión patronal de despedir a la señora [Nombre5] es un acto claro y concientemente dirigido a desconocerla y dejar sin efecto la especial protección de la que ella era titular por su situación de salud. Las circunstancias en que se dio permiten inferir, sin duda, ese ilegítimo móvil. Desde esta perspectiva, se está ante un típico acto de discriminación por razones de salud y, como ha resuelto la Sala Constitucional, “(…) el Principio del Estado Social de Derecho, el derecho a no sufrir trato discriminatorio por cualesquiera causas y el respeto a la dignidad humana son elementos esenciales de nuestro orden constitucional que coexisten pacíficamente, cuya salvaguardia le corresponde no solo al Estado, sino también a todos los integrantes de la comunidad. En tal sentido, toda clase de discriminación, sin importar que provenga de la Administración o de un particular, resulta violatoria del orden constitucional. En el caso concreto de la discriminación laboral por enfermedad, por una parte, el inciso b) del primer artículo del Convenio 111 admite la posibilidad de especificar, a través de cierta vía, cualquier tipo de discriminación que anule o altere la igualdad de oportunidades o de trato en el empleo u ocupación y, por otra parte, tanto la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos como la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos proscriben de manera expresa cualquier tipo de trato discriminatorio, tesitura que, de igual forma, profesa nuestro régimen constitucional al amparo de lo regulado en el numeral 33 de la Ley Fundamental. Por lo demás, el despido discriminatorio de que fue víctima (…), afecta colateralmente los derechos constitucionales al trabajo y a la salud. En cuanto al primero, es evidente que todo despido por discriminación irremediablemente implica una lesión al mismo (sic) y, en general, al deber de solidaridad inherente al Estado Social de Derecho y al principio cristiano de justicia social (artículo 74 de la Constitución Política). Además, dada la edad del amparado y el motivo real de su despido, su enfermedad, éste (sic) queda postrado en una situación particularmente perjudicial tanto para su salud como para su dignidad como ser humano, pues cuenta con menos posibilidades de encontrar otra opción laboral y, consiguientemente, de obtener los recursos necesarios para atender su problema de salud y obligaciones familiares, aparte de que en la práctica, lamentablemente, a una persona de cierta edad, despedida abruptamente y afectada por una enfermedad tan severa (…), se le dificulta enormemente la obtención de un empleo digno, habida cuenta de los problemas operativos y de costo que podría depararle a un nuevo empleador el tener que encontrar sustituto para eventuales incapacidades por internamiento hospitalario o algún tipo de tratamiento médico”. (Voto n.° 2005-13205, de las 15:13 horas, del 27 de septiembre del 2005; reiterado en el n.° 2007-3168, de las 10:30 horas, del 9 de marzo de 2007). En todo caso, como hemos señalado antes, “(…) además del necesario cumplimiento, acorde con los cánones de la buena fe, es claro que el ejercicio de un derecho, no es libre e irrestricto. Uno de esos límites lo constituye, precisamente, el respeto al derecho ajeno. Por eso, cuando con el ejercicio de un derecho estimado como propio, se transgrede el de un tercero, se incurre en uso abusivo o antisocial del mismo (sic). De forma expresa, el numeral 22 del Código Civil, aplicable en esta materia como normativa supletoria, en forma expresa deniega el amparo a quien abusa del derecho, realiza un ejercicio antisocial del mismo (sic), o bien, que en una relación contractual, sobrepasa los límites normales en su ejercicio. En todos esos casos, se reconoce la obligación que tiene de indemnizar, quien ha abusado de su derecho, en franco deterioro del derecho ajeno (ver, en este sentido, las sentencias de esta Sala No. 141- 97, de las 16:00 horas, del 4 de julio de 1997; y, la No. 229-99, de las 9:10 horas, de 13 de agosto de 1999). Lo importante es, entonces, determinar las reglas vigentes en cada caso, para poder fijar el límite de la indemnización”. (Voto n.° 2001-200, de las 9:50 horas, del 4 de abril de 2001).”