Mandatory market study and price reasonableness in public biddingObligatoriedad del estudio de mercado y razonabilidad del precio en licitación pública

“**II.-** The observation is made that in the cassation appeal heard here, the grievances are not divided by numbering, but they are by headings. For the sake of an orderly study of the legal point under discussion, the claims are reorganized as follows. The first one analyzed, called “Obligatory Nature of the Market Study and Reasonableness of the Price” (“Obligatoriedad del Estudio de Mercado y Razonabilidad del Precio”), denounces that in the public bidding procedure that is the subject of this proceeding, it was obligatory to carry out said study, which was not done. It disagrees with the decision of the Tribunal, the jurisdictional body that determined said study was not necessary, and in support of its thesis, it invokes the Circular of the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), issued at 10 a.m. on November 5, 2004, acknowledging that it was rendered ineffective as of the year 2006. It argues, despite the repeal, that in that same year the Comptroller’s Office issued resolution R-DCA-334-2006, in which it expressed a criterion contrary to that of the lower court. It maintains that the requirement for the study is also grounded in the generality of the legal system, particularly as a mandate stemming from the duty of probity, enshrined in article 3 of Law No. 8422, as well as article 49 of the same law, and the fundamental principles of reasonableness and proportionality derived from articles 34 and 182 of the Political Constitution. It also cites votes 998-98 and 6432-98 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), articles 8, 31, 42 subsection f) of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), the Resolution of the Office of the General Comptroller of the Republic issued at 8 a.m. on February 18, 2004, and article 9 of the Endorsement Regulation for Administrative Procurements (Reglamento de Refrendo para Contrataciones Administrativas). It insists that, at the administrative stage, the General Comptroller’s Office did not carry out a proper technical study on the reasonableness of the price to issue the challenged resolution, and at the judicial stage, the Tribunal improperly assessed the significance of the argument regarding this aspect, which, in its opinion, constitutes a complete defect in the ruling.

**III.-** To resolve this first grievance, one must start from the fact that the challenged procedure corresponds to a public bidding managed by the MEP, for the purchase of “Router and video beams,” equipment necessary for its training activity, initiated in February 2008, which was awarded in favor of the Font-Epson Consortium. The lower court considered that, for this type of administrative contracts, a prior market study and reasonableness of prices is not essential, since the Resolution of the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic issued at 10 a.m. on November 5, 2004, was expressly repealed by article 13 subsection b) of the Regulation on the Endorsement of Public Administration Procurements (Reglamento sobre el Refrendo de las Contrataciones de la Administración Pública), number R-CO-33, issued at 2 p.m. on March 8, 2006. This Chamber deems that the grievance is not admissible. For this determination, it is considered pertinent to briefly state the content of the repealed norm, as well as that of the subsequent regulations related to this topic. The matter of administrative procurement is governed by the principle of legality, among others of constitutional lineage, by virtue of which the authority acts to the extent it is empowered by law, understood in the broad sense, given that procurement procedures are defined a priori in a precise, certain, and concrete manner. The content of articles 8, 31, and 42 of the Administrative Procurement Law determines the parameters under which the requirement for technical studies within a procedure of this nature is regulated, a generic category that encompasses a market analysis and reasonableness of prices, this Chamber determining that, in the case under study, what is required by the legal system is fulfilled. Article 8 of the same law indicates, in what is of interest, that to initiate the administrative procurement procedure, it is necessary to have sufficient budgetary resources to meet the respective expenditure. For its part, article 31 of the same law determines the parameters for the contractual estimate, which will depend on the forms of remuneration, the type of procurement, and the bidding terms. In the case of a public bidding, article 42 of the Administrative Procurement Law determines that the procedure shall be developed by regulation, specifying the margins within which the regulatory power is circumscribed. Subsection a) of the cited norm indicates that, in order to make the administrative decision to promote the bidding, the Administration is obligated to carry out sufficient studies demonstrating that the objectives of the procurement project will be achieved with reasonable efficiency and security. That norm is the only mention made regarding the obligatoriness of technical studies, but in the phase prior to the call for bids, relating to the achievement of the purpose of the procurement procedure, a supposition that does not correspond to the one denounced, where the adequacy of the price offered by the awarded Consortium is questioned, and not the achievement of the project objectives, with efficiency and effectiveness. But it is worth the opportunity to indicate that the appellant himself acknowledges that said study was indeed carried out, as he states on folio 381 verso: “…And regarding a market study, one can only say that there was one carried out by the Ministry of Public Education, to set its budget and the amount of the procurement…”. The Administrative Procurement Law, nor its Regulation, do not require a similar study to be carried out in a later phase, within the regular processing of a public bidding. Only exceptionally is it required to perform an analysis of the offered prices, in the supposition contemplated in article 30 of this regulatory body, which refers to the procedure to follow in the event that the Administration considers the offered price to be ruinous, non-remunerative, or excessive, exceeding budgetary availability, or the product of a collusive practice or unfair trade. In these suppositions, due process must be guaranteed to the questioned offeror, a procedure within which the completion of a technical study that supports the Administration’s criterion is included. With this analysis, and after a hearing for the questioned participant, the Administration may take the determination to exclude the offeror from the procurement procedure. In the present matter, the MEP never considered that the price offered by the Font-Epson Consortium was ruinous, it being solely Office C. R. who maintains so. For this reason, given the mere doubt of one of the participants in the bidding procedure regarding the suitability of the price offered by another of the aspirants, there is no obligation on the part of the Administration, in this case the MEP, to prepare this study. Likewise, as the appellant expressly acknowledges, the resolution of the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic, issued at 10 a.m. on November 5, 2004, was expressly repealed by article 13 subsection b) of the Regulation on the Endorsement of Public Administration Procurements, number R-CO-33, issued at 2 p.m. on March 8, 2006. For the same reasons indicated, Resolutions R-DCA-334-2006, and the one issued at 8 a.m. on February 18, 2004, issued by the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic, which the cassation appellant cites in the appeal, also do not obligate the Administration to carry out a market study and reasonableness of the price, in the factual supposition subject to this proceeding. This Chamber concludes that the analyzed provisions only require a market study and reasonableness of prices in the initial phase of the administrative procedure, with the purpose that the entity proceeds to set its budget and the procurement amount based on objective parameters, which was fulfilled in the case under study. For these reasons, the denounced violation of the legal system did not occur, which obliges the rejection of the charge.

**IV.-** Within the Resolution of the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic issued at 10 a.m. on November 5, 2004, the auditing entity determined: “Under the protection of articles 8 and 31 of the Administrative Procurement Law, public administrations must establish the estimated amount to be reserved from their budgets for a specific procurement. As part of the estimate, it is necessary to carry out a technical or market study to obtain – in reasonable terms – the possible price to be paid.” This regulation was expressly repealed by article 13 subsection b) of the Regulation on the Endorsement of Public Administration Procurements, No. R-CO-33 issued at 2 p.m. on March 8, 2006, which in turn was repealed by a new regulation, with the same name, No. 44 of October 11, 2007. In both regulatory bodies, the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic, in the exercise of its regulatory power, did not include the obligatoriness of this study, therefore, it does not correspond to an indispensable requirement for the legality of the administrative procurement procedure, with the exception of the supposition to be mentioned. It is important to highlight that the Regulation on the Endorsement of Public Administration Procurements, in force, establishes in article 9, second paragraph, the following: “It is the exclusive responsibility of the Administration to verify the reasonableness of the price, an aspect that will not be addressed in the legality analysis of the endorsement, but will be subject to optional subsequent oversight. When the technical studies incorporated in the file indicate the non-reasonableness of the price, the technical and legal reasons that support the decision to proceed with the procurement must be accredited. The propriety of those reasons forms part of the sphere of responsibility of the Administration and is subject to optional subsequent oversight.” The recently stated norm must be assessed together with article 30 of the Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law, which requires the Administration to conduct a study of this nature, in order to give due process and right of defense to the offeror who is excluded from the procurement procedure, given that the offered price falls within the presumptions contemplated in the cited provision. It is then required that the Administration have a doubt regarding the suitability of the offered price, in order to initiate the procedure for the exclusion of the bid. Thus, if the Administration, despite having a technical study indicating that the price is unacceptable, opts to continue with the procedure, it must give an account of the reasons for this decision, as required by article 9 of the Regulation on the Endorsement of Public Administration Procurements. In the present case, the MEP has not questioned the price offered by the Consortium, which is why the aforementioned study is not obligatory, according to the provisions of the recently cited norms. In this way, the cassation appellant’s argument that the first-instance ruling infringes article 9 of the recently cited Regulation lacks factual and legal support.

**V.-** The appellant argues that, according to the duty of probity, enshrined in article 3 of Law No. 8422, article 49 of the same law, the fundamental principles of reasonableness and proportionality “derived from articles 34 and 182 of our Political Constitution (see votes No. 0998-98 and 6432-98 of the Constitutional Chamber),” the obligation to carry out a technical market study and reasonableness of prices, subsequent to the one required in the initial phase of the procedure, is derived. Duty of Probity. Article 3 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito) provides: “The public official shall be obligated to orient his management towards the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall be manifested, fundamentally, by identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by law; ensuring that the decisions adopted in fulfillment of his attributions conform to impartiality and the institution's own objectives in which he serves and, finally, by administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily.” The conduct of the Public Administration, in this case the MEP and the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic, has not injured this fundamental principle of every Democratic State of Law. On the contrary, the public bidding procedure was processed in accordance with the legal system, the aforementioned technical study being carried out at the time the MEP set its budget and procurement amount, just as the regulations require, a situation that was duly appreciated by the lower court, which is why the judgment does not suffer from the defect attributed to it. On the other hand, article 49 of the cited Law regulates the criminal offense of “irregular overpricing” (“sobreprecio irregular”), establishing a prison sentence if the requirements demanded by the legal system for the application of this norm are met. In this regard, it states: “Whoever, through the payment of prices superior or inferior – as the case may be – to the real or current value and according to the quality or specialty of the service or product, obtains an advantage or a benefit of any kind for himself or for a third party in the acquisition, sale, concession, or encumbrance of goods, works, or services in which the State, the other entities and public enterprises, municipalities, and subjects of private law that administer, exploit, or guard public funds or assets by any title or management modality are interested, shall be punished with imprisonment from three to ten years.” The present proceeding corresponds to a preferential process, regulated by the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), since a matter proper to this area is being ventilated. Therefore, for matters relating to the application of a criminal offense, one must resort to the corresponding channel, and in any case, this deciding body is prohibited from hearing matters of this nature. Principles of Reasonableness and Proportionality. The first-instance ruling did not injure these postulates, recognized by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, as guiding maxims of State activity, and particularly, of the area of administrative procurement. First, the clarification is made that article 34 of the Constitution enshrines the principle of non-retroactivity of the law, an aspect that is not part of the dispute (litis) joined in this matter. The appellant cites the reference of judgment 998 of 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, of the Constitutional Chamber, from which it stated the aforementioned principles were enshrined, but it omitted to indicate a specific citation or content of the ruling. However, from a detailed study of the vote in question, this Chamber considers that the Constitutional Court referred, among other aspects, to the importance of the adequate use of public funds within administrative procurement processes, as well as to the constitutional obligation of oversight and supervision of the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic. It is of interest to highlight, for the purpose of resolving the present matter, the following considerations: “…And as a general initial conclusion, emanating from the examination of the principles, doctrine, and jurisprudence set forth in the preceding considerandos, one can only affirm that the administrative procurement system is composed, on one hand, of the constitutional principles emanating from article 182 of the Constitution itself, and on the other hand, as a complement, by the control system exercised directly by the constitutional body charged with the oversight and supervision of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), that is, the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic, which is established as a guarantee of the correct use of public funds for the satisfaction of the public interest. It is in light of these norms and principles that the reasonableness and proportionality of the challenged regulations, referring to administrative procurement contained in the challenged Law and Regulation, are analyzed.” It is concluded that the scope given by the appellant to the constitutional norms and to the cited jurisprudence does not lead to determining that the market study and reasonableness of prices is obligatory, under penalty of absolute nullity of the administrative procedure. On the contrary, the Constitutional Chamber reiterated the function of the Comptroller’s Office, regarding the management of public funds, and the powers it holds, in accordance with the Magna Carta, among which is that of issuing regulations, based on which it regulates its activity, in order to achieve the ends that the Constituent granted it, the action deployed in the present administrative procurement proceeding being in accordance with this statement. Consequently, this grievance must be rejected.

**VI.-** In the second ground, which the party titles: “On the Unacceptable Price (as Ruinous),” it is denounced that the ruling does not appreciate the explanations expressed, regarding that the price offered by the Font-Epson Consortium is unacceptable for being ruinous. It indicates that, in the processing of the administrative procedure, it requested that the Consortium’s bid be excluded, for presenting an amount with the indicated characteristics, in accordance with the provisions of article 30 of the Administrative Procurement Regulation (Reglamento de Contratación Administrativa). It affirms that, on that occasion, a study on the reasonableness of the price was requested, which, it assures, was missed within the procedure followed. It asserts that this analysis was not carried out, nor were the considerations noted by the plaintiff estimated, and an administrative act of award was issued, vitiated by absolute nullity, lacking three essential and basic elements, namely: the “foundation,” the motive, and the necessary content. It refers that, before the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic, an “alleged” study of reasonableness of the price was conducted, which it accuses was not done at the opportune procedural moment, and therefore maintains there is a defect in everything proceeded, as an award act was issued without pondering this aspect, which it classifies as essential and obligatory. It insists that the appealed judgment did not appreciate these aspects.

**VII.-** In accordance with the explanations provided earlier, this Chamber, based on the legal system regulating administrative procurement matters, deemed that the mentioned technical study must be carried out in the prior phase of the administrative procedure, and not at the time the appellant indicates, which is why the argument that there exists an essential defect in the processing leading to the nullity of everything acted upon by the Administration, for not having carried out a similar analysis subsequently, lacks regulatory support. Regarding the denounced grievance, upon reviewing the challenged judgment, it is concluded that the reproach is not admissible. The lower court proceeded, in the substantive considerando highlighted with the letter V, to list the arguments put forth by the cassation appellant, relating to the price offered by the Font-Epson Consortium, to then weigh them one by one, in accordance with the evidence provided to the file and the applicable regulations. The assessment made was contrary to the interests of Office C. R., since the Tribunal dismissed the reasons of this party, but this aspect cannot be subject to review by the Chamber, given that what was denounced is that in the first instance these reasons were not appreciated, and in the ruling they were indeed addressed. Hence, the grievance must be rejected.

**VIII.-** In the third reproach: “Alleged Lack of Proof Regarding the Unacceptable Price as Ruinous,” disagreement is shown with the decision in the prior instance, in particular, with the Tribunal's statement that the plaintiff company did not provide proof that the price of the Font-Epson Consortium is unacceptable for being ruinous, an assertion it qualifies as false. It assures that, for demonstrating that a price is ruinous, there are only two possibilities: revealing the structure of its amount, and a proper and comparative market study. It maintains that the Consortium has unjustifiably refused to detail the composition of its price, a situation that, in its view, has not been duly weighed. Regarding the mentioned study, it adduces the existence of only one, carried out by the MEP to set its budget and procurement amount, an analysis which, it affirms, has been given no importance whatsoever. It explains that, in accordance with article 30 of the Administrative Procurement Regulation, given the Font-Epson Consortium's refusal to reveal the composition of the offered price, a situation of presumption turned into one of certainty regarding the denounced fact. But it refers that, at the administrative stage and by the judges, it was erroneously considered that according to the bid terms (cartel), a breakdown of the price structure was not necessary, pursuant to article 26 of the same law. It asserts that this norm has not been invoked, but rather the provision to be applied is article 30 subsection a) of the same regulatory body, and this article, in its opinion, obligates the offeror whose amount is accused of being ruinous to demonstrate the merits of its price. It assures that, as proof that the price is ruinous, there is the Consortium's refusal to reveal its structure, which, in its view, confirms the reason it claims to have, given the reluctance and contumacy. Another proof is the base budget set by the Administration, to which it alleges they alluded in accordance with what is obligated by articles 8 and 31 of the Administrative Procurement Law, as well as article 3 of the Law Against Corruption, in which the MEP estimated the procurement approximately in the sum of $906.00, and fixing a budgetary amount close to $1,480,000.00 to acquire 1636 video beam packages, in reference to which, the Consortium's offer is 40% lower ($677.00). The appellant affirms that the lower price offered allowed the Ministry to buy 555 additional packages. In the same vein, it insists on the study prepared by the Certified Public Accountant, which in its judgment fully accredits that the price is ruinous, an analysis that it maintains has not been refuted by another study of the same nature and weight, but which it considers has been overlooked, despite its clear content, as indicated by the cassation appellant. It also describes that it conducted a market study, comparing different prices, reaching the conclusion that all amounts are higher in ranges of 30% or more, relative to the questioned price. It alleges that these elements of proof are the only ones that can be presented, and they accredit that, with the price offered by the Consortium, it is not possible to supply the goods subject to the bidding, which makes the amount unacceptable.

**IX.-** In the first-instance judgment, when weighing the reasons given by the parties in the dispute (litis), relating to the price offered by the Font Epson Consortium, the Tribunal determined that the plaintiff company Office C. R. did not demonstrate that the awardee’s amount was unacceptable for being ruinous. It also considered that, in the present case, according to article 26 of the Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law, a breakdown of the price structure is not necessary, unless the bid terms indicate so. The lower court also referred to the fact that the plaintiff did not object to the bid terms on this specific point. The legal aspect to resolve consists of determining which is the applicable norm, whether article 30 or article 26 of the Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law. This deciding body shares the Tribunal's decision in the sense that article 26 of the same law is applicable. Note that this provision is the one determining in which hypotheses participants are required to detail the price structure, an obligation only foreseen in procedures related to: service contracts and public works contracts, and when so determined by the bid terms. The present public bidding process is not within the indicated postulates, which is why the Font-Epson Consortium is not obligated to provide this information. For its part, the appellant insists on applying article 30 of the same law, which is not shared. Reiterating what was stated in considerando III, the cited norm refers to the procedure to follow in the supposition when the Administration considers the offered price to be: “ruinous or non-remunerative for the offeror,” “excessive,” “exceeding budgetary availability,” or “the product of a collusive practice or unfair trade,” which does not occur in the present matter, since the MEP did not question the price offered by the Font-Epson Consortium, it being solely Office C. R. who maintains so. The appellant intends to give the norm a scope it does not have, as neither from its literal content nor its interpretation can it be concluded that, due to the doubt of one of the participants in the bidding procedure alone, the questioned offeror is under the obligation to reveal the structure of its price. Given the awarded Consortium's refusal to detail the composition of the offered amount, due to Office C. R.’s request, it does not go “from a situation of doubt to one of certainty” regarding that the price is ruinous, since in this case, the omission is endorsed by the legal system, as it is not a requirement demanded by article 26 of the Regulation in mention, nor by the bid terms. For the same reason, it cannot be valued as an indication of the ruinousness of the price, as the Consortium acted in accordance with the law. Thus, Office bore the burden of proving its assertion. Market Study. The appellant affirms that in the appealed judgment, no importance whatsoever was given to the study carried out by the MEP to set the base budget for the procurement, the Administration determining the price at $906.00, approximately. According to the claim, the indicated sum corresponded to the base reference price that the MEP set at the time of arranging the procurement. In Office C. R.’s opinion, the amount offered by the Font-Epson Consortium is more than 40% below the reference price, which must be valued as proof of its ruinousness. According to article 7 of the Administrative Procurement Law, the cost estimate for the object of the procurement is a requirement for the initiation of the administrative procedure. The cited study falls within this regulation, because it was what allowed the MEP to determine the base reference price of the goods subject to the public bidding, as the appellant himself affirms. From a study of the questioned ruling, it is evident that the Tribunal, although it is true that it did not expressly indicate the existence of the cited study, did value in the challenged resolution the bid terms, a document that indicates what the Administration's base budget was, this being the ultimate purpose of the cited study. Likewise, it must be indicated that the referred price does not correspond to the definitive amount from which bids could not deviate, but rather it was a reference one, for merely budgetary purposes.

Note that the Regulation to the Law on Administrative Procurement itself foresees the possibility that participants may offer a lower price, by providing in the second paragraph of numeral 86: “…If the winning bid in the tender presents a price lower than the budgeted amount, the Administration may award a greater quantity of goods or services if the need so justifies…”. This situation is what occurred in the present matter, since the appellant itself accepts that, given that the price offered by the Consorcio Font-Epson, which was 40% below the initial estimate, allowed the MEP to be awarded 555 additional packages. For these reasons, the argument by itself is inconsequential for quashing the judgment, since the initial estimate, in the opinion of this Chamber, is insufficient to determine that a price is ruinous. Study of the Certified Public Accountant (Contador Público Autorizado). The Tribunal determined that this technical report provided by Office C. R. did not demonstrate that the price offered by the awarded Consortium was ruinous because it was unacceptable. On this point, the A quo indicated: “…it does not possess sufficient credibility, because that study expressly indicates that the bases of the calculation are supported by costs obtained from the plaintiff company, which leads this tribunal to conclude that the information used by said professional comes from the plaintiff party itself, so its informational base is not suitable to be taken as a true technical and independent proof…” The decision is in accordance with the legal system. The document prepared by the aforementioned professional does not correspond to a suitable piece of evidence that accredits that the price offered by the Consorcio Font-Epson has the attributes contemplated in numeral 30 of the Regulation to the Law on Administrative Procurement. This is because it expressly indicated that “The bases of the calculation performed are based on the costs obtained by the company IMPORTACIONES OFFICE DE COSTA RICA, OFFICE CR. S. A.” (see document at folio 172 of the appeal case file, Comptroller General of the Republic), which implies that the analysis does not start from objective parameters, in order to determine whether the plaintiff’s claim is true, especially considering that it involves a professional privately contracted by the company Office C. R., who performed the study without the participation of the opposing party in this litigation. The appellant also states that it carried out a market study, comparing prices from the two largest independent wholesalers of Epson products for Latin America; the prices given by the same Consortium for Tenders carried out in the MEP contemporaneously with the challenged one, the national market prices (wholesalers), stating that it is clear that all are higher in ranges of 30% or more, than the prices being challenged. In this regard, the judgment properly analyzed this aspect, and considered that mere variations in prices do not constitute a sufficient element to accept the thesis of the appellant party. On the contrary, the A quo determined, as relevant evidence for the issuance of the ruling on the merits, the technical report DCA-2476, of August 18, 2008, prepared by the Interdisciplinary Management and Advisory Team of the Division of Administrative Procurement of the Comptroller General of the Republic, where it was indicated that the appellant does not provide proof that allows for reliably substantiating the questions regarding the price offered by the Consorcio Font-Epson, whereby the document emanating from the Certified Public Accountant (Contador Público Autorizado), and the others cited, were discredited by the study of the oversight body. Despite the clarity of the ruling regarding the evidentiary value it granted to this proof, and the elements of conviction it extracts from its weighing, the appellant did not include in the cassation appeal arguments to undermine what was affirmed by the Tribunal. Based on the foregoing, the objection must be rejected.” It is therefore required that the Administration have a doubt regarding the soundness of the price offered, in order to initiate the procedure for the exclusion of the bid. In this way, if the Administration, despite having a technical study indicating that the price is unacceptable, chooses to continue with the procedure, it must give reasons for this decision, as required by canon 9 of the Reglamento sobre el Refrendo de las Contrataciones de la Administración Pública. In the present case, the MEP has not questioned the price offered by the Consortium, for which reason the aforementioned study is not mandatory, pursuant to the provisions of the recently cited norms. Thus, the appellant's argument that the first-instance judgment violates numeral 9 of the recently cited Reglamento lacks factual and legal basis.

V.- The appellant argues that, in accordance with the duty of probity, enshrined in canon 3 of Ley no. 8422, ordinal 49 ibidem, and the fundamental principles of reasonableness and proportionality “derived from numerals 34 and 182 of our Constitución Política (see votes no. 0998-98 and 6432-98 of the Sala Constitucional)”, the obligation to carry out a technical study of the market and reasonableness of prices is derived, subsequent to the one required in the initial phase of the procedure. Duty of probity. Article 3 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito provides: “The public official shall be obliged to direct his management toward the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall manifest itself, fundamentally, by identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner, and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; ensuring that the decisions adopted in compliance with his attributions conform to impartiality and the objectives proper to the institution in which he serves, and, finally, by administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily.” The conduct of the Public Administration, in this case the MEP and the Contraloría General de la República, has not injured this fundamental principle of any Democratic Rule of Law. On the contrary, the public bidding procedure was processed in accordance with the legal system, the aforementioned technical study having been carried out at the time the MEP set its budget and the amount of the contract, as required by the regulations, a situation that was duly appreciated by the A quo, for which reason the judgment does not suffer from the defect imputed to it. On the other hand, canon 49 of the cited Ley regulates the criminal offense of “sobreprecio irregular”, establishing a prison sentence, provided that the requirements demanded by the legal system for the application of this norm are met. In this regard, it states: “Whoever, by paying prices higher or lower—as the case may be—than the real or current value and according to the quality or specialty of the service or product, obtains an advantage or benefit of any kind for himself or for a third party in the acquisition, disposal, concession, or encumbrance of goods, works, or services in which the State, other public entities and public companies, municipalities, and private law subjects that administer, exploit, or guard public funds or property under any title or modality of management are interested, shall be punished with imprisonment of three to ten years.” The present process corresponds to one of preferential processing, regulated by the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, given that a matter proper to this subject matter is being ventilated. Therefore, with respect to the application of a criminal offense, the corresponding venue must be sought, and in any case, this decision-making body is barred from hearing matters of this nature. Principles of Reasonableness and Proportionality. The first-instance judgment did not injure these postulates, recognized by the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional as guiding maxims of State activity, and in particular, of the matter of administrative contracting. First, the clarification is made that constitutional article 34 enshrines the principle of non-retroactivity of the law, an aspect that does not form part of the litis established in this matter. The appellant cites the data of judgment 998 of 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, of the Sala Constitucional, from which he stated that the aforementioned principles are enshrined, but he omitted to indicate a specific citation or content of the ruling. However, from a detailed study of the vote in question, this Chamber considers that the Constitutional Court referred, among other aspects, to the importance of the adequate use of public funds within administrative contracting processes, as well as to the constitutional obligation of oversight and vigilance of the Contraloría General de la República. It is of interest to highlight, for the purposes of resolving the present matter, the following considerations: “…And as an initial general conclusion, emanating from the examination of the principles, doctrine, and jurisprudence that have been set forth in the preceding considerandos, it can only be affirmed that the administrative contracting system is formed, on one hand, by the constitutional principles emanating from article 182 of the Constitution itself, and on the other hand, as a complement, by the control system exercised directly by the constitutional body responsible for the oversight and vigilance of the Hacienda Pública, that is, the Contraloría General de la República, which is established as a guarantee of the correct use of public funds for the sake of satisfying the public interest. It is in light of these norms and principles that the reasonableness and proportionality of the challenged regulation, referring to the administrative contracting contained in the challenged Ley and Reglamento, are analyzed.” It is concluded that the scope given by the appellant to the constitutional norms and the cited jurisprudence does not lead to the determination that the market and price reasonableness study is mandatory, under penalty of absolute nullity of the administrative procedure. On the contrary, the Sala Constitucional reiterated the function of the Contralor entity regarding the management of public funds, and the powers it has, according to the Carta Magna, among which is that of issuing regulations, based on which it regulates its activity, in order to achieve the ends granted by the Constituent, with the action deployed in the present administrative contracting process being in accordance with this enunciation. Consequently, this grievance must be rejected.

VI.- In the second argument, which the party titles: “Sobre el Precio Inaceptable (por ruinoso)”, it is denounced that the judgment does not appreciate the explanations given, regarding the fact that the price offered by the Font-Epson Consortium is unacceptable for being ruinous. It points out that, in the processing of the administrative procedure, it was requested that the Consortium's bid be excluded for presenting an amount with the indicated characteristics, in accordance with the provisions of precept 30 of the Reglamento de Contratación Administrativa. It affirms that, on that occasion, a study on the reasonableness of the price was requested, which it assures was missed within the procedure followed. It asserts that this analysis was not carried out, nor were the considerations noted by the plaintiff considered, and an adjudication administrative act was issued, vitiated by absolute nullity, as it lacked three essential and basic elements, namely: the “foundation”, the motive, and the necessary content. It states that, before the Contraloría General de la República, a “supposed” price reasonableness study was carried out, which it accuses was not performed at the opportune procedural moment, therefore it maintains that there is a defect in everything proceeded, as an adjudication act was issued without weighing this aspect, which it classifies as essential and mandatory. It insists that the appealed judgment did not appreciate these aspects.

VII.- In accordance with the explanations provided in previous lines, this Chamber, based on the legal system that regulates the matter of administrative contracting, considered that the mentioned technical study must be carried out in the prior phase of the administrative procedure, and not at the opportunity that the appellant indicates, for which reason the argument that there is an essential defect in the processing, which leads to the nullity of everything acted upon by the Administration, for not having carried out a similar analysis subsequently, lacks normative support. Regarding the denounced grievance, upon reviewing the challenged judgment, it is concluded that the reproach is not admissible. The A quo proceeded, in the substantive considerando highlighted with the letter V, to enumerate the arguments put forth by the appellant, relative to the price offered by the Font-Epson Consortium, to then weigh them one by one, in accordance with the evidence contributed to the case file, and the applicable regulations. The assessment carried out was contrary to the interests of Office C. R., since the Court dismissed this party's reasons, but this aspect cannot be the object of the control of this Chamber, given that what is denounced is that in the first instance these reasons were not appreciated, and in the judgment they indeed were. Hence, the grievance must be rejected.

VIII.- In the third reproach: “Supuesta Falta de Prueba en cuanto al Precio Inaceptable por Ruinoso”, disagreement is shown with what was resolved in the prior instance, in particular, with the Court's assertion that the plaintiff company did not provide proof that the Font-Epson Consortium's price is unacceptable for being ruinous, an assertion it qualifies as false. It assures that, for the demonstration that a price is ruinous, there are only two possibilities: the revelation of the structure of its amount, and a proper and comparative market study. It maintains that the Consortium, unjustifiably, has not wanted to detail the composition of its price, a situation that, in its judgment, has not been duly weighed. Regarding the mentioned study, it alleges the existence of only one, carried out by the MEP to set its budget and the amount of the contract, an analysis to which, it affirms, no importance whatever has been given. It explains that, in accordance with numeral 30 of the Reglamento de Contratación Administrativa, given the Font-Epson Consortium's refusal to reveal the composition of the price offered, the situation changed from one of presumption to one of certainty, regarding the denounced fact. But it states that, in the administrative venue and by the judges, it was erroneously considered that, according to the bid terms (cartel), a breakdown of the price structure was not necessary, pursuant to ordinal 26 ibidem. It asserts that this norm has not been invoked, but rather the precept that must be applied is article 30, subsection a) of the same normative body, and this canon, in its judgment, obliges the bidder whose amount is accused of being ruinous to demonstrate the merits of its price. It assures that, as proof that the price is ruinous, there is the Consortium's refusal to reveal its structure, which, in its judgment, confirms the reason it claims to have, in the face of the reluctance and rebellion. Another piece of evidence is the base budget set by the Administration, to which it alleges they made allusion as required by numerals 8 and 31 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, as well as ordinal 3 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción, in which the MEP approximately estimated the contract amount at $906.00, and setting a budgetary amount close to $1,480,000.00 to acquire 1636 video beam packages, in reference to which the Consortium's offer is 40% lower ($677.00). The appellant affirms that the lower price offered allowed the Ministry to purchase 555 additional packages. In the same vein, it insists on the study prepared by the Contador Público Autorizado, which, in its judgment, fully accredits that the price is ruinous, an analysis that it maintains has not been refuted by another study of the same nature and weight, but which it considers has been overlooked, despite its clear content, as indicated by the appellant. Likewise, it describes that it carried out a market study, comparing different prices, reaching the conclusion that all the amounts are higher by ranges of 30% or more, with respect to the price questioned. It alleges that these elements of evidence are the only ones that can be presented, and with them it is accredited that, with the price offered by the Consortium, it is not possible to supply the goods object of the bidding, which makes the amount unacceptable.

IX.- In the first-instance judgment, when weighing the reasons given by the parties in litis, relative to the price offered by the Font Epson Consortium, the Court determined that the plaintiff company Office C. R. did not demonstrate that the awardee's amount was unacceptable for being ruinous. It equally considered that, in the present case, in accordance with numeral 26 of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, a breakdown of the price structure is not necessary, unless the bid terms (cartel) so indicate. The A quo also referred to the fact that the plaintiff did not object to the bid terms (cartel) on this specific point. The legal aspect to be resolved consists of determining which norm is applicable, whether numeral 30 or 26 of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. This decision-making body shares what was resolved by the Court, in the sense that canon 26 ibidem is applicable. It should be noted that this precept is the one that determines in which hypotheses participants are required to detail the structure of the price, an obligation that is only foreseen in procedures related to: service contracts and public works contracts, and when so determined by the bid terms (cartel). The present public bidding process is not within the indicated postulates, for which reason the Font-Epson Consortium is not obliged to provide this information. For its part, the appellant insists on applying ordinal 30 ibidem, which is not shared. Reiterating what was said in Considerando III, the cited norm refers to the procedure to follow, in the event that the Administration considers that the price offered is: “ruinous or non-remunerative for the offeror”, “excessive”, “that exceeds the budgetary availability”, or “the product of a collusive practice or unfair trade”, which does not occur in the present matter, since the MEP did not question the price offered by the Font-Epson Consortium, it being solely Office C. R. that so maintains it. The appellant attempts to give the norm a scope it does not have, since neither from its literal content nor from its interpretation can it be concluded that, by the mere doubt of one of the participants in the bidding procedure, the questioned bidder is under the obligation to reveal the structure of its price. Given the awardee Consortium's refusal to detail the composition of the amount offered, at the request of Office C. R., one does not pass “from a situation of doubt to one of certainty” that the price is ruinous, since in this case, the omission is endorsed by the legal system, not being a requirement demanded in numeral 26 of the Reglamento in mention, nor by the bid terms (cartel). For the same reason, it cannot be valued as an indication of the ruinous nature of the price, since the Consortium acted in accordance with the law. Thus, Office had the burden of proving its affirmation. Market Study. The appellant affirms that, in the appealed judgment, no importance whatever was given to the study carried out by the MEP to set the base budget for the contract, the Administration determining the price at $906.00, approximately. According to the lawsuit, the indicated sum corresponded to the reference base price that the MEP set at the time of ordering the contract. In the judgment of Office C. R., the amount offered by the Font-Epson Consortium is more than 40% below the reference price, which must be valued as proof of its ruinous nature. Pursuant to article 7 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, the estimation of the cost of the object of the contract is a requirement for the initiation of the administrative procedure. The cited study falls within this regulation, because it was what allowed the MEP to determine the reference base price of the goods object of the public bidding, as the appellant himself affirms. From a study of the questioned judgment, it is evident that the Court, although it is true did not expressly indicate the existence of the cited study, did value in the challenged resolution the bid terms (cartel), a document that indicates what the Administration's base budget was, this being the ultimate purpose of the cited study. Likewise, it must be indicated that the referred price does not correspond to the definitive amount, from which the bids could not depart, but rather was a reference one, for purely budgetary purposes.

Note that the Regulation to the Law on Administrative Procurement (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa) itself provides for the possibility that participants may bid a lower price, by stipulating in the second paragraph of article 86: “…If the winning bid in the tender presents a price lower than the budgeted amount, the Administration may award a greater quantity of goods or services if the need so justifies…”. This situation is what occurred in the present matter, since the appellant itself accepts that, given that the price offered by the Font-Epson Consortium, which was 40% below the initial estimate, allowed the MEP to award itself 555 additional packages. For these considerations, the argument by itself is irrelevant for setting aside the ruling, since the initial estimate, in the opinion of this Chamber, is insufficient to determine that a price is ruinous. Study of the Authorized Public Accountant (Estudio del Contador Público Autorizado). The Trial Court determined that this technical report provided by Office C. R. did not demonstrate that the price offered by the awarded Consortium was ruinous to the point of being unacceptable. In this regard, the lower court indicated: “…it lacks sufficient credibility, due to the fact that this study expressly indicates that the bases for calculation are supported by costs obtained from the plaintiff company, which leads this court to conclude that the information used by said professional comes from the plaintiff party itself, and therefore its informational basis is not suitable to be taken as a true technical and independent evidence…” The decision is in accordance with the legal system. The document prepared by the aforementioned professional does not constitute suitable evidence that accredits that the price offered by the Font-Epson Consortium bears the characteristics contemplated in article 30 of the Regulation to the Law on Administrative Procurement (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa). This is because it expressly indicated that “The bases of the calculation performed are based on the costs obtained by the company IMPORTACIONES OFFICE DE COSTA RICA, OFFICE CR. S. A.” (see document at folio 172 of the appeal case file, Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República)), which implies that the analysis does not start from objective parameters to determine whether the statement of the plaintiff is true, especially considering that this is a professional privately contracted by the company Office C. R., who performed the study without participation of the opposing party in this litigation. The appellant further states that it conducted a market study, comparing prices from the two largest independent wholesalers of Epson products for Latin America; the prices given by the Consortium itself for tenders carried out at the MEP contemporaneously with the one being challenged; the prices of the national market (wholesalers), stating that it is clear that all are higher, in ranges of 30% or more, than the prices being questioned. In this regard, the judgment properly analyzed this aspect and considered that mere variations in prices do not constitute a sufficient element to accept the thesis of the cassation appellant. On the contrary, the lower court determined, as relevant evidence for issuing the substantive pronouncement, the technical report DCA-2476 of August 18, 2008, prepared by the Interdisciplinary Management and Advisory Team (Equipo de Gestión y Asesoría Interdisciplinario) of the Division of Administrative Procurement (División de Contratación Administrativa) of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), where it was indicated that the appellant does not provide evidence that would reliably support the challenges regarding the price offered by the Font-Epson Consortium, with which the document emanating from the Authorized Public Accountant (Contador Público Autorizado), and the others cited, were discredited by the study of the comptroller entity. Despite the clarity of the ruling regarding the probative value it granted to this evidence, and the elements of conviction it extracts from its assessment, the appellant did not include in the cassation appeal arguments to undermine what was affirmed by the Court. Based on the foregoing, the objection must be rejected.” But, it is worth taking this opportunity to point out that the appellant himself acknowledges that said study was indeed carried out, as he affirms at folio 381 verso: *"...And as for a market study, it can only be said that one was done by the Ministry of Public Education to set its budget and the amount of the contracting…"*. The Administrative Contracting Law and its Regulations do not require a similar study to be conducted at a later stage within the regular processing of a public tender. Only exceptionally is it required to conduct an analysis of the offered prices, in the case contemplated in numeral 30 of this regulatory body, which refers to the procedure to be followed in the event the Administration considers the offered price to be ruinous, non-remunerative, or excessive, exceeding budget availability, or the product of a collusive practice or unfair trade. In these cases, due process must be guaranteed to the questioned bidder, a procedure within which the completion of a technical study to support the Administration's criteria is included. With this analysis, and after a prior hearing for the questioned participant, the Administration may make the determination to exclude the bidder from the procurement procedure. In the present matter, the MEP never considered the price offered by the Font-Epson Consortium to be ruinous; it is only Office C. R. that maintains this. For this reason, given the mere doubt of one of the participants in the tender procedure regarding the merits of the price offered by another of the applicants, there is no obligation on the part of the Administration, in this case the MEP, to prepare this study. Likewise, as the appellant expressly acknowledges, the resolution of the Comptroller General of the Republic, issued at 10 a.m. on November 5, 2004, was expressly repealed by Article 13, subsection b) of the Regulation on the Refrendo of Public Administration Contracting, number R-CO-33, issued at 2 p.m. on March 8, 2006. For the same reasons noted, Resolutions R-DCA-334-2006, and the one issued at 8 a.m. on February 18, 2004, issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic, which the appellant cites in the appeal, also do not obligate the Administration to carry out a study of market and reasonableness of price in the factual scenario that is the subject of this process. This Chamber concludes that the precepts analyzed only require a study of market and reasonableness of prices to be conducted in the initial phase of the administrative procedure, so that the entity may proceed to set its budget and the amount of the contracting based on objective parameters, which was fulfilled in the case under study. For these reasons, the denounced violation of the legal system did not occur, which compels the rejection of the charge.

**IV.-** Within the Resolution of the Comptroller General of the Republic issued at 10 a.m. on November 5, 2004, the oversight entity determined: "Pursuant to Articles 8 and 31 of the Administrative Contracting Law, public administrations must establish the estimated amount to reserve from their budgets for a specific contracting. As part of the estimation, it is imperative to conduct a technical or market study to obtain—in reasonable terms—the possible price to be paid." This regulation was expressly repealed by Article 13, subsection b) of the Regulation on the Refrendo of Public Administration Contracting, no. R-CO-33 issued at 2 p.m. on March 8, 2006, which was in turn repealed by a new regulation, with the same name, no. 44 of October 11, 2007. In both regulatory bodies, the Comptroller General of the Republic, in the exercise of regulatory authority, did not include the mandatory nature of this study; therefore, it does not correspond to an indispensable requirement for the legality of the administrative contracting procedure, with the exception of the scenario that will be mentioned. It is important to highlight that the current Regulation on the Refrendo of Public Administration Contracting establishes in Article 9, second paragraph, the following: "It is the exclusive responsibility of the Administration to verify the reasonableness of the price, an aspect that will not be addressed in the legality analysis of the endorsement (refrendo), but will be subject to discretionary subsequent oversight. When the technical studies incorporated in the file indicate the unreasonableness of the price, the technical and legal reasons supporting the decision to proceed with the contracting must be accredited. The appropriateness of those reasons forms part of the scope of responsibility of the Administration and is subject to discretionary subsequent oversight." The recently stated rule must be assessed together with precept 30 of the Regulations to the Administrative Contracting Law, which requires the Administration to conduct a study of this nature, in order to provide due process and the right of defense to the bidder who is excluded from the procurement procedure because the offered price falls within the assumptions contemplated in the cited precept. It is therefore required that the Administration have a doubt regarding the soundness of the offered price, in order to initiate the procedure for the exclusion of the offer. Thus, if the Administration, despite having a technical study indicating that the price is unacceptable, chooses to continue with the procedure, it must provide the reasons for this decision, as required by canon 9 of the Regulation on the Refrendo of Public Administration Contracting. In the present case, the MEP has not questioned the price offered by the Consortium; therefore, the aforementioned study is not mandatory, pursuant to the provisions of the recently cited rules. Thus, the appellant's argument that the first-instance judgment violates numeral 9 of the recently cited Regulation lacks factual and legal basis.

**V.-** The appellant argues that, in accordance with the duty of probity, enshrined in canon 3 of Law no. 8422, and ordinal 49 ibidem, as well as the fundamental principles of reasonableness and proportionality “derived from numerals 34 and 182 of our Political Constitution (see rulings no. 0998-98 and 6432-98 of the Constitutional Chamber),” the obligation is derived to carry out a technical study of market and reasonableness of prices, subsequent to the one required in the initial phase of the procedure. **Duty of Probity.** Article 3 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment provides: "The public official shall be obligated to orient his management toward the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall manifest, fundamentally, in identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner, and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, in demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; in ensuring that the decisions he adopts in fulfillment of his duties conform to impartiality and the institution's own objectives in which he serves; and, finally, in administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily." The conduct of the Public Administration, in this case the MEP and the Comptroller General of the Republic, has not injured this fundamental principle of any Democratic State of Law. On the contrary, the public tender procedure was processed in accordance with the legal system, with the aforementioned technical study being carried out at the time the MEP set its budget and the amount of the contracting, just as the regulations require, a situation that was duly appreciated by the lower court; therefore, the judgment does not suffer from the defect attributed to it. On the other hand, canon 49 of the cited Law regulates the criminal type of "irregular overprice" (sobreprecio irregular), establishing a prison sentence if the requirements demanded by the legal system for the application of this rule are met. In this regard, it states: "Whoever, through the payment of prices higher or lower—as the case may be—than the real or current value and according to the quality or specialty of the service or product, obtains an advantage or benefit of any kind for himself or for a third party in the acquisition, disposal, concession, or encumbrance of goods, works, or services in which the State, other entities and public companies, municipalities, and private law subjects that administer, exploit, or guard public funds or property under any title or management modality are interested, shall be punished with imprisonment of three to ten years." The present process corresponds to one of preferential processing, regulated by the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code, given that a matter proper to this area is being heard. Due to the foregoing, for matters relating to the application of a criminal type, recourse must be had through the corresponding channel, and in any case, this decision-making body is prohibited from hearing matters of this nature. **Principles of Reasonableness and Proportionality.** The first-instance ruling did not injure these postulates, recognized by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber as guiding maxims of the activity of the State, and in particular, of the area of administrative contracting. First, it is clarified that constitutional Article 34 enshrines the principle of non-retroactivity of the law, an aspect that does not form part of the dispute joined in this matter. The appellant cites the data of ruling 998 of 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, of the Constitutional Chamber, from which he indicated that the mentioned principles are enshrined, but he omitted to indicate a specific citation or content of the ruling. However, from a detailed study of the ruling in question, this Chamber considers that the Constitutional Court referred, among other aspects, to the importance of the adequate use of public funds within administrative contracting processes, as well as to the constitutional obligation of oversight and vigilance of the Comptroller General of the Republic. It is important to highlight, for the purposes of resolving the present matter, the following considerations: "…And as an initial general conclusion, emanating from the examination of the principles, doctrine, and jurisprudence that have been set forth in the preceding recitals, it can only be affirmed that the administrative contracting system is composed, on the one hand, of the constitutional principles emanating from Article 182 of the Constitution itself, and on the other hand, as a complement, by the control system exercised directly by the constitutional organ charged with the oversight and vigilance of the Public Treasury, that is the Comptroller General of the Republic, which is established as a guarantee of the correct use of public funds for the sake of satisfying the public interest. It is in light of these norms and principles that the reasonableness and proportionality of the challenged regulation, referring to administrative contracting contained in the challenged Law and Regulation, is analyzed." It is concluded that the scope given by the appellant to the constitutional norms and the cited jurisprudence does not lead to determining that the study of market and reasonableness of prices is mandatory, under penalty of absolute nullity of the administrative procedure. On the contrary, the Constitutional Chamber reiterated the function of the Comptroller entity regarding the handling of public funds, and the powers it holds, in accordance with the Magna Carta, among which is that of issuing regulations, based on which it regulates its activity in order to achieve the ends granted by the Constituent Assembly, the action deployed in the present administrative contracting process being in conformity with this statement. Consequently, this grievance must be rejected.

**VI.-** In the **second** ground, which the party titles: "Regarding the Unacceptable Price (for being ruinous)", it is denounced that the judgment does not appreciate the explanations expressed regarding that the price offered by the Font-Epson Consortium is unacceptable for being ruinous. It points out that, in the processing of the administrative procedure, a request was made to exclude the Consortium's bid for presenting an amount with the indicated characteristics, in accordance with the provisions of precept 30 of the Administrative Contracting Regulation. It affirms that, on that occasion, a request was made to conduct a study on the reasonableness of the price, which it assures was missing from the followed procedure. It asserts that this analysis was not carried out, nor were the considerations noted by the plaintiff considered, resulting in an administrative act of award tainted with absolute nullity, as it lacks three essential and basic elements, namely: the "basis," the motive, and necessary content. It relates that before the Comptroller General of the Republic, a "supposed" study of the reasonableness of the price was carried out, which it accuses of not having been done at the proper procedural moment, for which reason it maintains there is a defect in everything conducted, as an act of award was issued without weighing this aspect, which it classifies as essential and mandatory. The appealed judgment, it insists, did not appreciate these aspects.

**VII.-** In accordance with the explanations provided earlier, this Chamber, based on the legal system that regulates the area of administrative contracting, considered that the mentioned technical study must be carried out in the preliminary phase of the administrative procedure, and not at the time the appellant indicates; therefore, the argument that there exists an essential defect in the processing, leading to the nullity of everything conducted by the Administration, for not having conducted a similar analysis subsequently, lacks regulatory support. Regarding the denounced grievance, upon reviewing the impugned judgment, it is concluded that the reproach is not admissible. The lower court proceeded, in the substantive recital denoted with the letter V, to enumerate the arguments waged by the appellant concerning the price offered by the Font-Epson Consortium, and then weighed them one by one, according to the evidence provided in the file and the applicable regulations. The assessment made was contrary to the interests of Office C. R., as the Court dismissed this party's reasons, but this aspect cannot be the object of the Chamber's control, given that what was denounced is that in the first instance these reasons were not appreciated, and in the ruling they were indeed addressed.

Hence, the grievance must be dismissed.

**VIII.-** In the **third** complaint: “Alleged Lack of Proof Regarding the Unacceptable Price Due to Being Ruinous”, disagreement is shown with what was resolved in the previous instance, in particular, with the Court’s statement that the plaintiff company did not provide proof that the price of the Consorcio Font-Epson is unacceptable for being ruinous, an assertion it describes as false. It assures that, to demonstrate that a price is ruinous, there are only two possibilities: the disclosure of the structure of its amount, and a proper and comparative market study. It maintains that the Consorcio unjustifiably did not wish to detail the composition of its price, a situation which, in its view, has not been duly weighed. Regarding the aforementioned study, it adduces the existence of a single one, carried out by the MEP to set its budget and the amount of the procurement, an analysis to which, it affirms, no importance whatsoever has been given. It explains that, in accordance with numeral 30 of the Reglamento de Contratación Administrativa, given the Consorcio Font-Epson's refusal to reveal the composition of the offered price, the situation moved from one of presumption to one of certainty, regarding the denounced fact. But it relates that, at the administrative stage and by the judges, it was erroneously considered that, according to the cartel, a breakdown of the price structure was not necessary, pursuant to ordinal 26 ibidem. It asserts that this provision has not been invoked; rather, the precept that must be applied is article 30, subsection a) of the same regulatory body, and this canon, in its judgment, obligates the offeror whose amount is accused of being ruinous to demonstrate the merits of its price. It affirms, as proof that the price is ruinous, the Consorcio's refusal to reveal its structure, which, in its view, confirms the reason it claims to have, given the reluctance and contumacy. Another piece of proof is the base budget set by the Administration, to which, it alleges, they made allusion in accordance with what is required by numerals 8 and 31 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, as well as ordinal 3 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción, in which the MEP estimated the procurement approximately in the sum of $906.00, and set a budget amount close to $1,480,000.00 to acquire 1636 packages of video beams, in reference to which, the Consorcio's offer is 40% lower ($677.00). The appellant affirms that the lower price offered allowed the Ministry to purchase 555 additional packages. In the same sense, it insists upon the study prepared by the Certified Public Accountant, which in its judgment fully proves that the price is ruinous, an analysis it maintains has not been refuted by another study of the same nature and weight, but which it considers has been overlooked, despite its clear content, as indicated by the appellant. It also describes that it carried out a market study, comparing different prices, reaching the conclusion that all the amounts are higher by ranges of 30% or more, relative to the questioned price. It alleges that these evidentiary elements are the only ones that can be presented, and with them, it is proven that with the price offered by the Consorcio, it is not possible to supply the goods that are the object of the tender, which makes the amount unacceptable.

**IX.-** In the judgment of first instance, when weighing the reasons given by the parties in the lis, relating to the price offered by the Consorcio Font Epson, the Court determined that the plaintiff company Office C. R. did not prove that the awardee's amount was unacceptable for being ruinous. It equally considered that in the present case, according to numeral 26 of the Reglamento to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, a breakdown of the price structure is not necessary, unless the cartel so indicates. The A quo also referred to the fact that the plaintiff did not object to the cartel on this particular point. The legal aspect to be resolved consists of determining which provision is applicable, whether numeral 30 or 26 of the Reglamento to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. This deciding body shares what was resolved by the Court, in the sense that canon 26 ibidem is applicable. Note that this precept is the one that determines, in which hypotheses participants are required to detail the structure of the price, an obligation that is only provided for in procedures related to: contracts for services and public works, and when so determined by the cartel. The present public tender process is not among the indicated postulates, for which reason the Consorcio Font-Epson is not obligated to provide this information. For its part, the appellant insists on applying ordinal 30 ibidem, which is not shared. Reiterating what was stated in Considerando III, the cited provision refers to the procedural steps to be followed, for the supposition when the Administration considers that the offered price is: "*ruinous or non-remunerative for the offeror”, “excessive”, “that exceeds the budget availability",* or *"product of a collusive practice or unfair trade"*, which does not occur in the present matter, since the MEP did not question the price offered by the Consorcio Font-Epson, it being only Office C. R. that so maintains. The appellant seeks to give the provision a scope it does not have, for neither from its literal content nor from its interpretation can it be concluded that, by the mere doubt of one of the participants in the procurement procedure, the questioned offeror is under an obligation to reveal the structure of its price. Given the refusal of the awardee Consorcio to detail the composition of the offered amount, at the request of Office C. R., one does not pass "*from a situation of doubt to one of certainty*" regarding the price being ruinous, since in this case, the omission is endorsed by the legal system, as it is not a requirement demanded in numeral 26 of the Reglamento in mention, nor by the cartel. For the same reason, it cannot be valued as an indication of the ruinousness of the price, since the Consorcio acted in accordance with the law. Thus, it was Office's responsibility to bear the burden of proving its assertion. **Market Study**. The appellant affirms that in the appealed judgment, no importance whatsoever was given to the study carried out by the MEP to set the base budget for the procurement, the Administration determining the price at $906.00, this approximately. According to the complaint, the indicated sum corresponded to the base reference price that the MEP set when ordering the procurement. In Office C. R.'s view, the amount offered by the Consorcio Font-Epson is more than 40% below the reference price, which must be valued as proof of its ruinousness. Pursuant to article 7 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, the estimation of the cost of the object of the procurement is a requirement for the initiation of the administrative procedure. The cited study falls within this regulation, because it was what allowed the MEP to determine the base reference price of the goods that are the object of the public tender, as the appellant itself affirms. From a study of the questioned judgment, it is evident that the Court, while it is true did not expressly indicate the existence of the cited study, did evaluate in the questioned resolution the tender cartel, a document that indicates what the base budget of the Administration was, this being the ultimate purpose of the cited study. Likewise, it must be indicated that the referenced price does not correspond to the definitive amount, from which the offers could not depart, but rather it was a reference price, for merely budgetary purposes. Note that the Reglamento to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa itself provides for the possibility that participants offer a lower price, by stipulating in the second paragraph of numeral 86: "*…If the winning offer of the contest presents a price lower than the budgeted amount, the Administration may award a greater quantity of goods or services if the need so justifies…*". This situation was what occurred in the present matter, for the appellant itself accepts that, given that the price offered by the Consorcio Font-Epson, which was 40% below the initial estimate, allowed the MEP to be awarded 555 additional packages. For these considerations, the argument by itself is inconsequential for overturning the judgment, since the initial estimate, in the judgment of this Chamber, is insufficient to determine that a price is ruinous. **Study of the Certified Public Accountant**. The Court determined that this technical report provided by Office C. R. did not prove that the price offered by the awardee Consorcio was ruinous or unacceptable. On this point, the A quo indicated: "*…it does not possess sufficient credibility, due to the fact that this study expressly indicates that the basis for the calculation is supported by costs obtained from the plaintiff company, which leads this court to conclude that the information utilized by said professional originates from the plaintiff party itself, and therefore its informative base is not suitable to be taken as a true technical and independent proof…*" What was resolved is in accordance with the legal system. The document prepared by the aforementioned professional does not correspond to suitable proof that proves that the price offered by the Consorcio Font-Epson has the characteristics contemplated in numeral 30 of the Reglamento to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. This is because it expressly indicated that "*The basis of the calculation carried out is based on the costs obtained by the company IMPORTACIONES OFFICE DE COSTA RICA, OFFICE CR. S. A.*" (see document at folio 172 of the appeal expediente, Contraloría General de la República), which implies that the analysis does not start from objective parameters, for the purpose of determining whether the statement of the plaintiff is true, especially considering that this is a professional privately contracted by the company Office C. R., who performed the study without the participation of the opposing party in this litigation. The appellant also refers to having carried out a market study, comparing prices from the two largest independent wholesalers of Epson products for Latin America; the prices given by the same Consorcio for Tenders conducted contemporaneously with the one being challenged at the MEP; the national market prices (wholesalers), referring that it is clear that all are higher by ranges of 30% or more, compared to the prices being questioned. In this regard, the judgment properly analyzed this aspect, and considered that mere variations in prices do not constitute a sufficient element to accept the thesis of the appellant party. On the contrary, the A quo determined, as relevant proof for issuing the ruling on the merits, the technical report DCA-2476, of August 18, 2008, prepared by the Equipo de Gestión y Asesoría Interdisciplinario of the División de Contratación Administrativa of the Contraloría General de la República, where it was indicated that the appellant does not provide proof that allows the questioning regarding the price offered by the Consorcio Font-Epson to be reliably substantiated, with which the document issued by the Certified Public Accountant, and the other cited documents, were discredited by the study of the oversight entity. Despite the clarity of the judgment regarding the evidentiary value it granted to this proof, and the evidentiary elements it extracts from its weighing, the appellant did not include in the appeal for cassation arguments to undermine what was stated by the Court. Based on the foregoing, the complaint must be dismissed.

“ II.- Se hace la observación que en el recurso de casación que aquí se conoce, los agravios no son divididos mediante numeración, pero sí con títulos. En aras de un estudio ordenado del punto jurídico objeto de discusión, se procede a reordenar los reclamos, de la siguiente manera. El primero que se analiza, denominado “Obligatoriedad del Estudio de Mercado y Razonabilidad del Precio”, denuncia que en el procedimiento de licitación pública objeto de este proceso, era obligatorio realizar dicho estudio, lo cual no se hizo. Se muestra disconforme con lo resuelto por el Tribunal, órgano jurisdiccional que determinó que no era necesario el citado estudio, y en apoyo de su tesis, invoca la Circular de la Contraloría General de la República, de las 10 horas del 5 de noviembre de 2004, reconociendo que desde el año 2006 fue dejada sin efecto. Argumenta, pese a la derogatoria, en ese mismo año el ente Contralor emitió la resolución R-DCA-334-2006, en la cual externó un criterio contrario al del A-quo. Sostiene, la exigencia del estudio, tiene asidero además, en la generalidad del ordenamiento jurídico, en particular, como un mandato propio del deber de probidad, consagrado en el numeral 3 de la Ley no. 8422, así como el precepto 49 ibídem, y de los principios fundamentales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad derivados de los artículos 34 y 182 de la Constitución Política. Cita asimismo, los votos 998-98 y 6432-98 de la Sala Constitucional, los preceptos 8, 31, 42 inciso f) de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, Resolución del Despacho del Contralor General de la República de las 8 horas del 18 de febrero de 2004, y el numeral 9 del Reglamento de Refrendo para Contrataciones Administrativas. Insiste, en sede administrativa, la Contraloría no realizó un debido estudio técnico sobre la razonabilidad del precio para emitir la resolución cuestionada, y en sede judicial, el Tribunal valoró de forma impropia la trascendencia del argumento en cuanto a este aspecto, lo que a su juicio, determina un vicio pleno de lo fallado.

III.- Para resolver este primer quebranto, debe partirse de que el procedimiento cuestionado, corresponde a una licitación pública, gestionada por el MEP, para la compra de “Router y video beams ”, equipo necesario para su actividad de capacitación, iniciada en el mes de febrero de 2008, que fue adjudicada a favor del Consorcio Font-Epson. El A quo consideró, que para este tipo de contratos administrativos, no resulta indispensable un estudio previo de mercado y razonabilidad de precios, ya que la Resolución de la Contraloría General de la República de las 10 horas del 5 de noviembre de 2004, fue derogada expresamente por el artículo 13 inciso b) del Reglamento sobre el Refrendo de las Contrataciones de la Administración Pública, número R-CO-33, emitido a las 14 horas del 8 de marzo de 2006. Esta Sala estima que el agravio no es de recibo. Para esta determinación, se considera pertinente enunciar de forma breve, el contenido de la norma derogada, así como el de la normativa posterior relacionada con este tema. La materia de contratación administrativa, se rige por el principio de legalidad, entre otros de linaje constitucional, en virtud del cual, la autoridad actúa en la medida que se encuentre facultada por la ley, entendida en sentido amplio, siendo que, los procedimientos de contratación se encuentran definidos a priori en forma precisa, cierta y concreta. El contenido de los ordinales 8, 31 y 42 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, determina los parámetros bajo los cuales, se regula lo relativo al requerimiento de estudios técnicos dentro de un procedimiento de esta índole, categoría genérica que engloba un análisis de mercado y razonabilidad de precios, determinando esta cámara, que en el caso en estudio, se cumple con lo exigido por el ordenamiento jurídico. El numeral 8 ibídem, indica, en lo de interés, que para iniciar el procedimiento de contratación administrativa, resulta necesario contar con recursos presupuestarios suficientes para enfrentar la erogación respectiva. Por su parte el ordinal 31 ibidem, determina los parámetros para la estimación contractual, la cual dependerá de las formas de remuneración, el tipo de contratación, y de las bases del concurso. Tratándose de una licitación pública, el precepto 42 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, determina, que el procedimiento se desarrollará reglamentariamente, precisando los márgenes dentro de los cuales se circunscribe la potestad reglamentaria. En el inciso a) de la norma de cita, se indica que, para tomar la decisión administrativa de promover el concurso, la Administración está obligada a realizar los estudios suficientes donde se demuestre que los objetivos del proyecto de contratación serán alcanzados con eficiencia y seguridad razonables. Esa norma es la única mención que se hace, relativa a la obligatoriedad de estudios técnicos, pero en la fase previa a la convocatoria del concurso, relativos al logro de la finalidad del procedimiento de contratación, supuesto que no corresponde al denunciado, donde se cuestiona la bondad del precio ofrecido por el Consorcio adjudicatario, y no el logro de los objetivos del proyecto, con eficiencia y eficacia. Pero, valga la oportunidad para indicar, que el mismo recurrente reconoce que dicho estudio sí se realizó, tal y como lo afirma a folio 381 vuelto: “…Y en cuanto a un estudio de mercado, solamente se puede decir que hubo uno realizado por el Ministerio de Educación Pública, para fijar su presupuesto y la cuantía de la contratación…”. La Ley de Contratación Administrativa, ni su Reglamento, no exigen la realización de un estudio similar, en una fase posterior, dentro de la tramitación regular de una licitación pública. Sólo de forma excepcional se requiere efectuar un análisis sobre los precios ofertados, en el supuesto contemplado en el numeral 30 de este cuerpo normativo, que refiere el trámite a seguir, en el caso de que la Administración considere que el precio ofertado es ruinoso, no remunerativo o excesivo, que excede la disponibilidad presupuestaria, o producto de una práctica colusoria o de comercio desleal. En estos supuestos, se debe garantizar debido proceso al oferente cuestionado, procedimiento dentro del cual, se incluye la realización de un estudio técnico que venga a sustentar el criterio de la Administración. Con este análisis, y previa audiencia al participante cuestionado, la Administración podrá tomar la determinación de excluir al oferente del procedimiento de contratación. En el presente asunto, el MEP nunca consideró que el precio ofrecido por el Consorcio Font-Epson fuera ruinoso, siendo únicamente Office C. R. quien así lo sostiene. Por esta razón, ante la sola duda de uno de los participantes en el procedimiento de licitación, respecto a las bondades del precio ofertado por otro de los aspirantes, no existe la obligación por parte de la Administración, en este caso el MEP, de elaborar este estudio. Asimismo, tal y como lo reconoce de forma expresa el recurrente, la resolución de la Contraloría General de la República, de las 10 horas del 5 de noviembre de 2004 fue derogada de forma expresa, por el artículo 13 inciso b) del Reglamento Sobre el Refrendo de las Contrataciones de la Administración Pública, número R-CO-33, de las 14 horas del 8 de marzo de 2006. Por las mismas razones apuntadas, las Resoluciones R-DCA-334-2006, y de las 8 horas del 18 de febrero de 2004, dictadas por la Contraloría General de la República, que el casacionista cita en el recurso, tampoco obligan a la Administración a efectuar un estudio de mercado y razonabilidad del precio, en el supuesto fáctico objeto de este proceso. Esta Sala concluye, que los preceptos analizados, sólo exigen realizar un estudio de mercado y razonabilidad de precios en la fase inicial del procedimiento administrativo, esto con el fin, que el ente proceda a fijar su presupuesto y la cuantía de la contratación, con base en parámetros objetivos, lo cual se cumplió en el caso en estudio. Por estas razones, la infracción al ordenamiento jurídico denunciada, no se dio, lo que obliga al rechazo del cargo.

IV.- Dentro de la Resolución de la Contraloría General de la República de las 10 horas del 5 de noviembre de 2004, el ente fiscalizador determinó: “Al amparo de los artículos 8 y 31 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, las administraciones públicas deben establecer el monto estimado por reservar de sus presupuestos para una determinada contratación. Como parte de la estimación se impone realizar un estudio técnico o de mercado para obtener –en términos razonables- el posible precio por pagar.” Esta normativa fue derogada de forma expresa, por el artículo 13 inciso b) del Reglamento sobre el Refrendo de las Contrataciones de la Administración Pública, no. R-CO-33 de las 14 horas del 8 de marzo de 2006, que a su vez fue derogado por un nuevo reglamento, con el mismo nombre, no. 44 de 11 de octubre de 2007. En ambos cuerpos normativos, la Contraloría General de la República, en el ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria, no incluyó la obligatoriedad de este estudio, por lo cual, no corresponde a un requerimiento indispensable para la legalidad del procedimiento de contratación administrativa, con excepción del supuesto que se dirá. Resulta importante destacar, que el Reglamento sobre el Refrendo de las Contrataciones de la Administración Pública, vigente, establece en el cardinal 9, párrafo segundo, lo siguiente: “Es responsabilidad exclusiva de la Administración constatar la razonabilidad del precio, aspecto que no será abordado en el análisis de legalidad del refrendo, pero estará sujeto a la fiscalización posterior facultativa. Cuando los estudios técnicos incorporados en el razones técnicas y jurídicas que sustenten la decisión de proseguir con la contratación. La procedencia de esas razones forma parte del ámbito de responsabilidad de la Administración y está sujeta a la fiscalización posterior facultativa.“ La norma de reciente enunciación, debe valorarse junto al precepto 30 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, que exige a la Administración un estudio de esta índole, con el fin de dar el debido proceso y derecho de defensa, al oferente, que resulte excluido del procedimiento de contratación, dado que el precio ofrecido está dentro los presupuestos contemplados en el precepto de cita. Se exige entonces, que la Administración tenga una duda respecto a la bondad del precio ofrecido, con el fin de dar inicio al procedimiento para la exclusión de la oferta. De esta forma, si la Administración, pese a contar con un estudio técnico donde se indique que el precio es inaceptable, opta por continuar con el procedimiento, debe dar razón de los motivos de esta decisión, por así exigirlo el canon 9 del Reglamento sobre el Refrendo de las Contrataciones de la Administración Pública. En el presente caso, el MEP no ha cuestionado el precio ofrecido por el Consorcio, motivo por el cual, el estudio aludido no resulta obligatorio, al tenor de lo dispuesto en la normas de reciente cita. De esta forma, el argumento del casacionista, relativo a que el fallo de primera instancia lesiona el numeral 9 del Reglamento de reciente cita, carece de sustento fáctico y jurídico.

V.- El recurrente argumenta, que acorde al deber de probidad, consagrado en el canon 3 de la Ley no. 8422, el ordinal 49 ibídem, los principios fundamentales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad “derivados de los numerales 34 y 182 de nuestra Constitución Política (ver votos no. 0998-98 y 6432-98 de la Sala Constitucional)”, se deriva la obligación de efectuar un estudio técnico de mercado y razonabilidad de precios, posterior al requerido en la fase inicial del procedimiento. Deber de probidad. Prevé el artículo 3 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito: “El funcionario público estará obligado a orientar su gestión a la satisfacción del interés público. Este deber se manifestará, fundamentalmente, al identificar y atender las necesidades colectivas prioritarias, de manera planificada, regular, eficiente, continua y en condiciones de igualdad para los habitantes de la República; asimismo, al demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley; asegurarse de que las decisiones que adopte en cumplimiento de sus atribuciones se ajustan a la imparcialidad y a los objetivos propios de la institución en la que se desempeña y, finalmente, al administrar los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad, eficacia, economía y eficiencia, rindiendo cuentas satisfactoriamente.” Con el proceder de la Administración Pública, en este caso el MEP y la Contraloría General de la República, no se ha lesionado este principio fundamental de todo Estado Democrático de Derecho. Por el contrario, el procedimiento de licitación pública fue tramitado conforme al ordenamiento jurídico, efectuándose el estudio técnico aludido en el momento que el MEP fijó su presupuesto y la cuantía de la contratación, tal y como lo exige la normativa, situación que fue apreciada en forma debida por el A quo, motivo por el cual, la sentencia no adolece del vicio que se le recrimina. Por otra parte, el canon 49 de la Ley de cita, regula el tipo penal del “sobreprecio irregular”, estableciendo pena de prisión, en caso que se cumplan con los requisitos exigidos por el ordenamiento jurídico para la aplicación de esta norma. Al respecto, señala: “Será penado con prisión de tres a diez años, quien, por el pago de precios superiores o inferiores - según el caso- al valor real o corriente y según la calidad o especialidad del servicio o producto, obtenga una ventaja o un beneficio de cualquier índole para sí o para un tercero en la adquisición, enajenación, la concesión, o el gravamen de bienes, obras o servicios en los que estén interesados el Estado, los demás entes y las empresas públicas, las municipalidades y los sujetos de derecho privado que administren, exploten o custodien, fondos o bienes públicos por cualquier título o modalidad de gestión.” El presente proceso, corresponde a uno de tramitación preferente, regulado por el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, dado que se ventila un asunto propio de esta materia. Por lo anterior, para lo relativo a la aplicación de un tipo penal, debe acudirse en la vía correspondiente, siendo que, en todo caso, este órgano decisor le está vedado conocer asuntos de esta naturaleza. Principios de Razonabilidad y Proporcionalidad. El fallo de primera instancia, no lesionó estos postulados, reconocidos por la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional, como máximas rectoras de la actividad del Estado, y en particular, de la materia de contratación administrativa. Primero, se hace la aclaración, que el artículo 34 constitucional, consagra el principio de irretroactividad de la ley, aspecto que no forma parte de la litis trabada en este asunto. El recurrente, cita el dato de la sentencia 998 de las 11 horas 30 minutos de 16 de febrero de 1998 de la Sala Constitucional, de la cual refirió que se consagran los principios aludidos, pero omitió indicar una cita o contenido concreto del fallo. No obstante, de un estudio pormenorizado del voto en cuestión, esta Sala considera, que el Tribunal Constitucional se refirió, entre otros aspectos, a la importancia del uso adecuado de los fondos públicos dentro de los procesos de contratación administrativa, así como a la obligación constitucional de fiscalización y vigilancia de la Contraloría General de la República. Interesa destacar, a efectos de resolver el presente asunto, las siguientes consideraciones: “…Y como conclusión general inicial, que emana del examen de los principios, de la doctrina y la jurisprudencia que se han expuesto en los considerandos anteriores, sólo puede afirmarse que el sistema de contratación administrativa está conformado, por un lado, por los principios constitucionales que emanan del artículo 182 de la propia Constitución, y por otro lado, como complemento, por el sistema de control ejercido directamente por el órgano constitucional encargado de la fiscalización y vigilancia de la Hacienda Pública , sea la Contraloría General de la República , que se establece como garantía de la correcta utilización de los fondos públicos en aras de la satisfacción del interés público. Es a la luz de estas normas y principios que se entra a analizar la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de la normativa impugnada, referente a la contratación administrativa contenida en la Ley y el Reglamento impugnados.” Se concluye que el alcance dado por el recurrente, a las normas constitucionales, y a la jurisprudencia citada, no conlleva a determinar que el estudio de mercado y razonabilidad de precios es obligatorio, so pena de nulidad absoluta del procedimiento administrativo. Por el contrario, la Sala Constitucional reiteró la función del ente Contralor, respecto al manejo de los fondos públicos, y las potestades que tiene, acorde a la Carta Magna, dentro de las cuales está, la de emitir reglamentos, con base en los cuales norme su actividad, en aras de lograr los fines que el Constituyente le otorgó, siendo la actuación desplegada en el presente proceso de contratación administrativa, conforme a esta enunciación. En consecuencia, ha de rechazarse este agravio.

VI.- En el segundo motivo, que la parte titula: “Sobre el Precio Inaceptable (por ruinoso)”, se denuncia que el fallo no aprecia, las explicaciones externadas, respecto a que el precio ofrecido por el Consorcio Font-Epson es inaceptable por ruinoso. Señala, en la tramitación del procedimiento administrativo, se solicitó se excluyera de la plica del Consorcio, por presentar un importe con las características señaladas, acorde con lo dispuesto en el precepto 30 del Reglamento de Contratación Administrativa. Afirma, en esa ocasión, se solicitó efectuar un estudio sobre la razonabilidad del precio, el cual asegura, se echaba de menos dentro del procedimiento seguido. Asevera, este análisis no se realizó, ni se estimaron las consideraciones apuntadas por la actora, dictándose un acto administrativo de adjudicación, viciado de nulidad absoluta, al carecer de tres elementos esenciales y básicos, a saber: el “fundamento”, el motivo y contenido necesario. Refiere, ante la Contraloría General de la República, se realizó un “supuesto” estudio de razonabilidad del precio, que acusa, no se efectuó en el momento procesal oportuno, por lo que sostiene, existe un vicio en todo lo procedido, pues se dictó un acto de adjudicación sin ponderar este aspecto, que cataloga de esencial y obligatorio. La sentencia recurrida, insiste, no apreció estos aspectos.

VII.- Conforme a las ordenamiento jurídico que regula la materia de contratación administrativa, estimó que el estudio técnico mencionado, debe efectuarse en la fase previa del procedimiento administrativo, y no en la oportunidad que el recurrente lo señala, motivo por el cual, el argumento relativo a que existe un vicio esencial en la tramitación, que lleva a la nulidad de todo lo actuado por la Administración, por no haberse efectuado un análisis similar con posterioridad, carece de sustento normativo. Respecto al agravio denunciado, revisada la sentencia impugnada, se concluye que el reproche no es de recibo. El A quo procedió, en el considerando de fondo destacado con la letra V, a enumerar los argumentos esgrimidos por el casacionista, relativos al precio ofertado por el Consorcio Font-Epson, para luego ponderarlos uno a uno, de acuerdo con las pruebas aportadas al expediente, y la normativa aplicable. La valoración efectuada, fue contraria a los intereses de Office C. R., ya que el Tribunal desestimó las razones de esta parte, pero este aspecto no puede ser objeto del control de la Sala, dado que lo denunciado, es que en primera instancia no se apreciaron estas razones, y en el fallo sí se hizo. De ahí que el agravio, deberá ser rechazado.

VIII.- En el tercer reproche: “Supuesta Falta de Prueba en cuanto al Precio Inaceptable por Ruinoso”, se muestra disconformidad con lo resuelto en la instancia previa, en particular, con la afirmación del Tribunal, relativa a que la sociedad actora, no aportó prueba de que el precio del Consorcio Font-Epson, sea inaceptable por ruinoso, aseveración que califica de falsa. Asegura, para la demostración de que un precio es ruinoso, sólo hay dos posibilidades: la revelación de la estructura de su importe, y un estudio de mercado debido y comparativo. Sostiene, el Consorcio de forma injustificada, no ha querido detallar la composición de su precio, situación que en su criterio, no ha sido ponderada debidamente. Respecto al estudio mencionado, aduce la existencia de uno solo, efectuado por el MEP, para fijar su presupuesto y la cuantía de la contratación, análisis al que, afirma, no se le ha dado importancia alguna. Explica, acorde con el numeral 30 del Reglamento de Contratación Administrativa, ante la negativa del Consorcio Font-Epson de revelar la composición del precio ofertado, se pasó de una situación de presunción, a una de certeza, en cuanto al hecho denunciado. Pero refiere, en sede administrativa y por los juzgadores, se consideró de forma errada, que acorde al cartel, no era necesario un desglose de la estructura del precio, conforme al ordinal 26 ibídem. Asevera, esta norma no ha sido invocada, sino que el precepto que se ha de aplicar es el artículo 30 inciso a) del mismo cuerpo normativo, y este canon, a su juicio, obliga a la oferente cuyo importe se acusa de ruinoso, a demostrar las bondades de su precio. Asegura, como prueba de que el precio es ruinoso, está la negativa del Consorcio, de revelar su estructura, lo cual, en su criterio, confirma la razón que alega tener, ante la renuencia y rebeldía. Otra prueba, es el presupuesto base fijado por la Administración, al cual alega, hicieron alusión conforme a lo obligado por los numerales 8 y 31 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, así como el ordinal 3 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción, en el cual el MEP estimó la contratación de forma aproximada, en la suma de $906,00, y fijando un monto presupuestario cercano a $1.480.000,00, para adquirir 1636 paquetes de video beams , en referencia al cual, la oferta del Consorcio es un 40 % inferior ($677,00). El recurrente afirma, que el precio menor ofrecido, le permitió al Ministerio comprar 555 paquetes adicionales. En igual sentido, insiste en el estudio elaborado por el Contador Público Autorizado, que a su juicio, acredita plenamente que el precio es ruinoso, análisis que sostiene, no ha sido refutado por otro estudio de la misma índole y peso, pero que considera, se ha dejado de ver, pese a su claro contenido, según lo indica el casacionista. Asimismo describe, que efectuó un estudio de mercado, comparando diferentes precios, llegando a la conclusión que todos los importes son superiores en rangos del 30 % o más, respecto al precio cuestionado. Alega, estos elementos de prueba son los únicos que se pueden presentar, y con ellos se acredita, que con el precio ofertado por el Consorcio, no es posible suministrar los bienes objeto de la licitación, lo que hace inaceptable el importe.

IX.- En la sentencia de primera instancia, al ponderarse las razones dadas por las partes en litis, relativas al precio ofertado por el Consorcio Font Epson, el Tribunal determinó que la sociedad actora Office C. R., no demostró que el importe del adjudicatario fuera inaceptable por ruinoso. Igualmente consideró, que en el presente caso, acorde al numeral 26 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, no es necesario un desglose de la estructura del precio, a menos que el cartel lo indique. El A quo refirió además, el hecho que la demandante no objetó el cartel en este punto en concreto. El aspecto jurídico a resolver, consiste en determinar cuál es la norma aplicable, si el numeral 30 o el 26 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Este órgano decisor comparte lo resuelto por el Tribunal, en el sentido de que resulta aplicable el canon 26 ibidem. Nótese que este precepto, es el que determina, en cuáles hipótesis se exige a los participantes, detallar la estructura del precio, obligación que sólo se prevé, en los procedimientos relacionados con: contratos de servicios y de obra pública, y cuando así lo determine el cartel. El presente proceso de licitación pública, no está dentro de los postulados indicados, motivo por el cual, el Consorcio Font-Epson no está obligado a brindar esta información. Por su parte, el recurrente insiste en aplicar el ordinal 30 ibídem, lo cual no es compartido. Reiterando lo dicho en el considerando III, la norma de cita refiere el trámite a seguir, para el supuesto cuando la Administración considere que el precio ofertado es: “ruinoso o no remunerativo para el oferente”, “excesivo”, “que excede la disponibilidad presupuestaria”, o “producto de una práctica colusoria o de comercio desleal”, lo que no ocurre en el presente asunto, ya que el MEP no cuestionó el precio ofrecido por el Consorcio Font-Epson, siendo únicamente Office C. R. quien así lo sostiene. El recurrente pretende darle a la norma un alcance que no tiene, pues ni de su contenido literal ni de su interpretación, puede concluirse, que por la sola duda de uno de los participantes en el procedimiento de licitación, el oferente cuestionado esté es la obligación de revelar la estructura de su precio. Ante la negativa del Consorcio adjudicatario de detallar la composición del importe ofrecido, por la petición de Office C. R., , no se pasa “de una situación de duda a una de certeza” respecto a que el precio es ruinoso, ya que en este caso, la omisión es avalada por el ordenamiento jurídico, al no ser un requisito exigido en el numeral 26 del Reglamento en mención, ni por el cartel. Por la misma razón, no puede ser valorado como un indicio de la ruinosidad del precio, ya que el Consorcio actuó conforme a derecho. Así, a Office le correspondía la carga de demostrar su afirmación. Estudio de Mercado. El recurrente afirma, que en la sentencia recurrida, no se le dio importancia alguna al estudio efectuado por el MEP, para fijar el presupuesto base de la contratación, determinando la Administración el precio en $906,00, esto de forma aproximada. De acuerdo con la demanda, la suma indicada, correspondió al precio base de referencia, que el MEP fijó al momento de disponer la contratación. A criterio de Office C. R., el importe ofertado por el Consorcio Font-Epson, está más de un 40 % por debajo del precio de referencia, lo que debe valorarse como una prueba de la ruinosidad de este. Al tenor del artículo 7 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, la estimación del costo del objeto de la contratación, es un requisito para el inicio del procedimiento administrativo. El estudio citado se enmarca dentro de esta normativa, porque fue el que le permitió al MEP determinar el precio base de referencia de los bienes objeto de la licitación pública, según lo afirma el propio recurrente. De un estudio del fallo cuestionado, se evidencia que el Tribunal, si bien es cierto no indicó de forma cuestionada el cartel de licitación, documento que indica cuál era el presupuesto base de la Administración, siendo esta la finalidad última del estudio de cita. Asimismo, debe indicarse que el precio referido, no corresponde al importe definitivo, del cual no podían salirse las ofertas, sino que se trataba de uno de referencia, con fines meramente presupuestarios. Nótese que el propio Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa prevé la posibilidad de que los participantes oferten un precio menor, al disponer en el párrafo segundo del numeral 86: “…Si la oferta ganadora del concurso presenta un precio menor al monto presupuestado, la Administración podrá adjudicar una mayor cantidad de bienes o servicios si la necesidad así lo justifica…”. Esta situación fue lo que ocurrió en el presente asunto, pues el propio recurrente acepta que, dado que el precio ofertado por el Consorcio Font-Epson, que estuvo un 40 % por debajo de la estimación inicial, le permitió al MEP adjudicarse 555 paquetes adicionales. Por estas consideraciones, el argumento por sí solo resulta intrascendente para casar el fallo, ya que la estimación inicial, a criterio de esta Sala, resulta insuficiente para determinar que un precio es ruinoso. Estudio del Contador Público Autorizado. El Tribunal determinó, que este informe técnico aportado por Office C. R., no demostró que el precio ofertado por el Consorcio adjudicatario fuera ruinoso por inaceptable. Sobre el particular, el A quo indicó: “…no cuenta con una suficiente credibilidad, debido a que expresamente indica ese estudio, que las bases del cálculo se sustentan en costos obtenidos de la empresa actora, lo que hace concluir a este tribunal, que la información utilizada por dicho profesional proviene de la misma parte actora, por lo que su base informativa no es apta para tomarla como una verdadera prueba técnica e independiente…” Lo resuelto es conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico. El documento elaborado por el profesional aludido, no corresponde a una prueba idónea, la cual acredite que el precio ofertado por el Consorcio Font-Epson tenga por características los atributos contemplados en el numeral 30 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Esto porque expresamente indicó, que “Las bases del cálculo realizado se basa en los costos obtenidos por la empresa IMPORTACIONES OFFICE DE COSTA RICA, OFFICE CR. S. A.” (véase documento a folio 172 del expediente de apelación, Contraloría General de la República), lo que implica, que el análisis no parte de parámetros objetivos, a efecto de determinar si el dicho de la actora resulta cierto, máxime considerando que se trata de un profesional contratado de forma privada por la sociedad Office C. R., quien realizó el estudio sin participación de la parte contraria de este litigio. El recurrente refiere además, que efectuó un estudio de mercado, comparando precios de los dos más grandes mayoristas independientes de productos Epson para América Latina; los precios dados por el mismo Consorcio para Licitaciones llevadas a cabo en el MEP contemporáneamente con la objetada, los precios del mercado nacional (mayoristas), refiriendo que es claro que todos son superiores en rangos del 30 % o más, con los precios que se cuestionan. Al respecto, la sentencia analizó con propiedad este aspecto, y consideró que las solas variaciones en los precios, no constituyen un elemento suficiente para aceptar la tesis de la parte casacionista. Por el contrario, el A quo determinó, como una prueba relevante para el dictado del pronunciamiento de fondo, el informe técnico DCA-2476, del 18 de agosto de 2008, elaborado por el Equipo de Gestión y Asesoría Interdisciplinario de la División de Contratación Administrativa de la Contraloría General de la República, donde se indicó que la recurrente no aporta prueba que permita fundamentar fehacientemente los cuestionamientos respecto al precio ofrecido por el Consorcio Font-Epson, con lo cual el documento emanado del Contador Público Autorizado, y los demás citados, fueron desacreditados por el estudio del ente contralor. Pese a la claridad del fallo respecto al valor probatorio que le otorgó a esta prueba, y a los elementos de convicción que extrae de su ponderación, el recurrente no incluyó en el recurso de casación, argumentos para socavar lo afirmado por el Tribunal. Con base en lo expuesto, el reproche ha de ser rechazado.”